G.R. No.

91298 June 22, 1990 In its decision, the public respondent held that the motion for execution was
time-barred, having been filed beyond the five-year period prescribed by both
CORAZON PERIQUET, petitioner, the Rules of Court and the Labor Code. It also rejected the petitioner's claim
vs. that she had not been reinstated on time and ruled as valid the two quitclaims
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and THE PHIL. NATIONAL she had signed waiving her right to reinstatement and acknowledging
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION (Formerly Construction Development settlement in full of her back wages and other benefits. The petitioner contends
Corp. of the Phils.), respondents. that this decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and asks for its
reversal. We shall affirm instead.
Tabaquero, Albano & Associates for petitioner.
Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:
The Government Corporate Counsel for private respondent.
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A judgment may be
executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the
date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.
CRUZ, J.:
A similar provision is found in Art. 224 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA
It is said that a woman has the privilege of changing her mind but this is usually 6715, viz.
allowed only in affairs of the heart where the rules are permissibly inconstant.
In the case before us, Corazon Periquet, the herein petitioner, exercised this ART. 224. Execution of decision, orders, awards. — (a) The Secretary of Labor
privilege in connection with her work, where the rules are not as fickle. and Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor
Arbiter or Med-Arbiter, or the Voluntary Arbitrator may, motu propio, or on
The petitioner was dismissed as toll collector by the Construction Development motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment within
Corporation of the Philippines, private respondent herein, for willful breach of five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory, requiring a sheriff or
trust and unauthorized possession of accountable toll tickets allegedly found in a duly deputized officer to execute or enforce a final decision, order or award. ...
her purse during a surprise inspection. Claiming she had been "framed," she
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and was sustained by the labor arbiter, The petitioner argues that the above rules are not absolute and cites the
who ordered her reinstatement within ten days "without loss of seniority rights exception snowed in Lancita v. Magbanua, 6 where the Court held:
and other privileges and with fun back wages to be computed from the date of
her actual dismissal up to date of her actual reinstatement." 1 On appeal, this
order was affirmed in toto by public respondent NLRC on August 29, 1980. 2 Where judgments are for money only and wholly unpaid, and execution has
been previously withheld in the interest of the judgment debtor, which is in
financial difficulties, the court has no discretion to deny motions for leave to
On March 11, 1989, almost nine years later, the petitioner filed a motion for the issue execution more than five years after the judgments are entered.
issuance of a writ of execution of the decision. The motion was granted by the (Application of Molnar, Belinsky, et al. v. Long Is. Amusement Corp., I N.Y.S, 2d
executive labor arbiter in an order dated June 26, 1989, which required 866)
payment to the petitioner of the sum of P205,207.42 "by way of implementing
the balance of the judgment amount" due from the private respondent.3
Pursuant thereto, the said amount was garnished by the NLRC sheriff on July In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution, although there is
12, 1989. 4 On September 11, 1989, however, the NLRC sustained the appeal of authority to the contrary, the general rule is that there should not be included
the CDCP and set aside the order dated June 20, 1989, the corresponding writ of the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a
execution of June 26, 1989, and the notice of garnishment. 5 definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to

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operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise. Any On June 27, 1988; she wrote the new management of the CDCP and asked that
interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within the rights granted her by the decision dated August 29, 1980, be recognized
which the writ may be issued without scire facias. because the waiver she had signed was invalid. 10

xxx xxx xxx On September 19, 1988, the Corporate Legal Counsel of the private respondent
(now Philippine National Construction Corporation) recommended the
There has been no indication that respondents herein had ever slept on their payment to the petitioner of the sum of P9,544.00, representing the balance of
rights to have the judgment executed by mere motions, within the reglementary her back pay for three years at P654. 00 per month (minus the P14,000.00
period. The statute of limitation has not been devised against those who wish to earlier paid). 11
act but cannot do so, for causes beyond their central.
On November 10, 1988, the petitioner accepted this additional amount and
Periquet insists it was the private respondent that delayed and prevented the signed another Quitclaim and Release reading as follows:
execution of the judgment in her favor, but that is not the way we see it. The
record shows it was she who dilly-dallied. KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

The original decision called for her reinstatement within ten days from receipt THAT, I CORAZON PERIQUET, of legal age, married and resident of No. 87
thereof following its affirmance by the NLRC on August 29, 1980, but there is no Annapolis St., Quezon City, hereby acknowledged receipt of the sum of PESOS:
evidence that she demanded her reinstatement or that she complained when NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY FOUR PESOS ONLY (P9,544.00)
her demand was rejected. What appears is that she entered into a compromise Philippine currency, representing the unpaid balance of the back wages due me
agreement with CDCP where she waived her right to reinstatement and under the judgment award in NLRC Case No. AB-2-864-79 entitled "Corazon
received from the CDCP the sum of P14,000.00 representing her back wages Periquet vs. PNCC- TOLLWAYS" and I further manifest that this payment is in
from the date of her dismissal to the date of the agreement. 7 full satisfaction of all my claims/demands in the aforesaid case. Likewise, I
hereby manifest that I had voluntarily waived reinstatement to my former
Dismissing the compromise agreement, the petitioner now claims she was position as TOLL TELLER and in lieu thereof, I sought and am satisfied with my
actually reinstated only on March 16, 1987, and so should be granted back pay present position as XEROX MACHINE OPERATOR in the Central Office.
for the period beginning November 28, 1978, date of her dismissal, until the
date of her reinstatement. She conveniently omits to mention several significant Finally, I hereby certify that delay in my reinstatement, after finality of the
developments that transpired during and after this period that seriously cast Decision dated 10 May 1979 was due to my own fault and that PNCC is not liable
doubt on her candor and bona fides. thereto.

After accepting the sum of P14,000.00 from the private respondent and waiving I hereby RELEASE AND DISCHARGE the said corporation and its officers from
her right to reinstatement in the compromise agreement, the petitioner secured money and all claims by way of unpaid wages, separation pay, differential pay,
employment as kitchen dispatcher at the Tito Rey Restaurant, where she company, statutory and other benefits or otherwise as may be due me in
worked from October 1982 to March 1987. According to the certification issued connection with the above-entitled case. I hereby state further that I have no
by that business, 8 she received a monthly compensation of P1,904.00, which more claims or right of action of whatever nature, whether past, present, future
was higher than her salary in the CDCP. or contingent against said corporation and its officers, relative to NLRC Case No.
AB-2-864-79.
For reasons not disclosed by the record, she applied for re-employment with
the CDCP and was on March 16,1987, given the position of xerox machine IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 10th day of November
operator with a basic salary of P1,030.00 plus P461.33 in allowances, for a total 1988 at Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. (Emphasis supplied.) 12
of P1,491.33 monthly. 9

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The petitioner was apparently satisfied with the settlement, for in the was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of
memorandum she sent the PNCC Corporate Legal Counsel on November 24, settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the
1988, 13 she said in part: questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the
waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the
Sir, this is indeed my chance to express my gratitude to you and all others who consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must
have helped me and my family enjoy the fruits of my years of stay with PNCC by be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. As in this case.
way of granting an additional amount of P9,544.00 among others ...
The question may be asked: Why did the petitioner sign the compromise
As per your recommendation contained therein in said memo, I am now agreement of September 16, 1980, and waive all her rights under the judgment
occupying the position of xerox machine operator and is (sic) presently in consideration of the cash settlement she received? It must be remembered
receiving a monthly salary of P2,014.00. that on that date the decision could still have been elevated on certiorari before
this Court and there was still the possibility of its reversal. The petitioner
obviously decided that a bird in hand was worth two on the wing and so opted
Reacting to her inquiry about her entitlement to longevity pay, yearly company for the compromise agreement. The amount she was then waiving, it is worth
increases and other statutory benefits, the private respondent adjusted her noting, had not yet come up to the exorbitant sum of P205,207.42 that she was
monthly salary from P2,014.00 to P3,588.00 monthly. later to demand after the lapse of eight years.

Then the lull. Then the bombshell. The back pay due the petitioner need not detain us. We have held in countless
cases that this should be limited to three years from the date of the illegal
On March 11, 1989, she filed the motion for execution that is now the subject of dismissal, during which period (but not beyond) the dismissed employee is
this petition. deemed unemployed without the necessity of proof. 14 Hence, the petitioner's
contention that she should be paid from 1978 to 1987 must be rejected, and
It is difficult to understand the attitude of the petitioner, who has blown hot and even without regard to the fact (that would otherwise have been counted
cold, as if she does not know her own mind. First she signed a waiver and then against her) that she was actually employed during most of that period.
she rejected it; then she signed another waiver which she also rejected, again on
the ground that she had been deceived. In her first waiver, she acknowledged Finally, the petitioner's invocation of Article 223 of the Labor Code to question
full settlement of the judgment in her favor, and then in the second waiver, after the failure of the private respondent to file a supersedeas bond is not well-
accepting additional payment, she again acknowledged fun settlement of the taken. As the Solicitor General correctly points out, the bond is required only
same judgment. But now she is singing a different tune. when there is an appeal from the decision with a monetary award, not an order
enforcing the decision, as in the case at bar.
In her petition she is now disowning both acknowledgments and claiming that
the earlier payments both of which she had accepted as sufficient, are As officers of the court, counsel are under obligation to advise their clients
insufficient. They were valid before but they are not valid now. She also claimed against making untenable and inconsistent claims like the ones raised in this
she was harassed and cheated by the past management of the CDCP and sought petition that have only needlessly taken up the valuable time of this Court, the
the help of the new management of the PNCC under its "dynamic leadership." Solicitor General, the Government Corporate Counsel, and the respondents.
But now she is denouncing the new management-for also tricking her into Lawyers are not merely hired employees who must unquestioningly do the
signing the second quitclaim. bidding of the client, however unreasonable this may be when tested by their
own expert appreciation of the pertinent facts and the applicable law and
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the jurisprudence. Counsel must counsel.
agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable
settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver ordered.

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