THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 148072. July 10, 2007.]

FRANCISCO MAGESTRADO , petitioner, vs . PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES and ELENA M. LIBROJO , respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO , J : p

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the (1) Resolution 1 dated 5
March 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 entitled, "Francisco
Magestrado v. Hon. Estrella T. Estrada, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of Regional
Trial Court, Branch 83 of Quezon City, People of the Philippines and Elena M. Librojo ,"
which dismissed petitioner Francisco Magestrado's Petition for Certiorari for being the
wrong remedy; and (2) Resolution 2 dated 3 May 2001 of the same Court denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Private respondent Elena M. Librojo led a criminal complaint 3 for perjury against
petitioner with the O ce of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which was docketed as I.S.
No. 98-3900.
After the ling of petitioner's counter-a davit and the appended pleadings, the
O ce of the City Prosecutor recommended the ling of an information for perjury against
petitioner. Thus, Assistant City Prosecutor Josephine Z. Fernandez led an information for
perjury against petitioner with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City.
Pertinent portions of the information are hereby quoted as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1997, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and knowingly make an untruthful statement under oath upon a
material matter before a competent o cer authorized to receive and administer
oath and which the law so require, to wit: the said accused subscribe and swore
to an A davit of Loss before Notary Public Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezon City, per
Doc. No. 168, Page No. 35, Book No. CLXXIV of her notarial registry, falsely
alleging that he lost Owner's Duplicate Certi cate of TCT No. N-173163, which
document was used in support of a Petition For Issuance of New Owner's
Duplicate Copy of Certi cate of Title and led with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, docketed as LRC# Q-10052 (98) on January 28, 1998 and assigned
to Branch 99 of the said court, to which said Francisco M. Mag[e]strado signed
and swore on its veri cation, per Doc. 413 Page 84 Book No. CLXXV Series of
1998 of Notary Public Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezon City; the said accused knowing
fully well that the allegations in the said a davit and petition are false, the truth
of the matter being that the property subject of Transfer Certi cate of Title No. N-
173163 was mortgaged to complainant Elena M. Librojo as collateral for a loan in
the amount of P758,134.42 and as a consequence of which said title to the
property was surrendered by him to the said complainant by virtue of said loan,
thus, making untruthful and deliberate assertions of falsehoods, to the damage
and prejudice of the said Elena M. Librojo. 4CAaSHI

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com

 The case was ra ed to the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 43, where it was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 90721 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Francisco Magestrado."
On 30 June 1999, petitioner led a motion 5 for suspension of proceedings based
on a prejudicial question. Petitioner alleged that Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, a case for
recovery of a sum of money pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 84, and Civil Case No. Q-98-34308, a case for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of
Title and Damages, pending before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 77, must be resolved
rst before Criminal Case No. 90721 may proceed since the issues in the said civil cases
are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action.
On 14 July 1999, MeTC-Branch 43 issued an Order 6 denying petitioner's motion for
suspension of proceedings, thus:
Acting on the "Motion for Suspension of Proceedings" led by the [herein
petitioner Magestrado], thru counsel, and the "Comment and Opposition thereto,
the Court after an evaluation of the same, nds the aforesaid motion without
merit, hence, is hereby DENIED, it appearing that the resolution of the issues
raised in the civil actions is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.

Hence, the trial of this case shall proceed as previously scheduled on July
19 and August 2, 1993 at 8:30 in the morning.

On 17 August 1999, a motion 7 for reconsideration was led by petitioner but was
denied by the MeTC in an Order 8 dated 19 October 1999.
Aggrieved, petitioner led a Petition for Certiorari 9 under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court, with a prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC
of Quezon City, Branch 83, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-39358, on the ground that
MeTC Judge Billy J. Apalit committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in denying his motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 90721.
On 14 March 2000, RTC-Branch 83 dismissed the petition and denied the prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, reasoning thus:
Scrutinizing the complaints and answers in the civil cases
abovementioned, in relation to the criminal action for PERJURY, this Court opines
and so holds that there is no prejudicial question involved as to warrant the
suspension of the criminal action to await the outcome of the civil cases. The
civil cases are principally for determination whether or not a loan was obtained by
petitioner and whether or not he executed the deed of real estate mortgage
involving the property covered by TCT No. N-173163, whereas the criminal case is
for perjury which imputes upon petitioner the wrongful execution of an a davit
of loss to support his petition for issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of
TCT No. 173163. Whether or not he committed perjury is the issue in the criminal
case which may be resolved independently of the civil cases. Note that the
a davit of loss was executed in support of the petition for issuance of a new
owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163 which petition was ra ed to Branch
99 of the RTC. . . . . 10
IaEACT

Again, petitioner led a motion for reconsideration 1 1 but this was denied by RTC-
Branch 83 in an Order 1 2 dated 21 December 2000.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com

 Dissatis ed, petitioner led with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari 1 3
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63293.
Petitioner alleged that RTC Judge Estrella T. Estrada committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the Petition for Certiorari in Civil
Case No. Q-99-39358, and in effect sustaining the denial by MeTC-Branch 43 of
petitioner's motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721, as well as his
subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof.
On 5 March 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed 1 4 the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
63293 on the ground that petitioner's remedy should have been an appeal from the
dismissal by RTC-Branch 83 of his Petition for Certiorari in Q-99-39358. The Court of
Appeals ruled that:
Is this instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 the correct and
appropriate remedy?

We rule negatively.

The resolution or dismissal in special civil actions, as in the instant

petition, may be appealed . . . under Section 10, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and not by petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same rules. Thus,
the said rule provides:

Section 10. Time for ling memoranda on special cases. In certiorari,

prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus cases, the parties shall
le in lieu of briefs, their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of
thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice issued by the clerk that all the evidence,
oral and documentary, is already attached to the record . . . . acHDTE

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the instant

Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is hereby
DISMISSED. 1 5

The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 1 6 in a

Resolution 1 7 dated 3 May 2001.
Hence, petitioner comes before us via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Orders of Judge Estrella T. Estrada dated March 14,
2000 denying petitioner's Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, and her subsequent Order dated December 21, 2000, denying the
Motion for Reconsideration thereafter led can only be reviewed by the
Court of Appeals thru appeal under Section 10, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.
2. Whether or not Judge Estrella T. Estrada of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
83, Quezon City, had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of her jurisdiction in denying the Petition for Certiorari and
petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration on the ground of a
prejudicial question pursuant to the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the
prevailing jurisprudence.

After consideration of the procedural and substantive issues raised by petitioner, we

find the instant petition to be without merit.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com

 The procedural issue herein basically hinges on the proper remedy which petitioner
should have availed himself of before the Court of Appeals: an ordinary appeal or a petition
fo r certiorari. Petitioner claims that he correctly questioned RTC-Branch 83's Order of
dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 through a Petition for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Private respondent and public respondent People
of the Philippines insist that an ordinary appeal was the proper remedy.
We agree with respondents. We hold that the appellate court did not err in
dismissing petitioner's Petition for Certiorari, pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised
Rules of Court (and not under Rule 44, Section 10, invoked by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution dated 5 March 2001).
The correct procedural recourse for petitioner was appeal, not only because RTC-
Branch 83 did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's Petition
for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 but also because RTC-Branch 83's Order of
dismissal was a nal order from which petitioners should have appealed in accordance
with Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court. IDaEHC

An order or a judgment is deemed nal when it nally disposes of a pending action,

so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court. In other words, the order or
judgment ends the litigation in the lower court. Au contraire, an interlocutory order does
not dispose of the case completely, but leaves something to be done as regards the
merits of the latter. 1 8 RTC-Branch 83's Order dated 14 March 2001 dismissing petitioner's
Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 nally disposes of the said case and
RTC-Branch 83 can do nothing more with the case.
Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or nal
order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared
by the Revised Rules of Court to be appealable. The manner of appealing an RTC judgment
or final order is also provided in Rule 41 as follows:
Section 2. Modes of appeal. —
(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall
be taken by ling a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment
or nal order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other
cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In
such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

Certiorari generally lies only when there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy or
adequate remedy available to petitioners. Here, appeal was available. It was adequate to
deal with any question whether of fact or of law, whether of error of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion or error of judgment which the trial court might have committed. But
petitioners instead filed a special civil action for certiorari. TcSCEa

We have time and again reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court lies only when "there is no
appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." 1 9 Certiorari
cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability
of that remedy, 2 0 certiorari not being a substitute for lost appeal. 2 1
As certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal, we have repeatedly emphasized that
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 the perfection of appeals in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional, and that the failure to perfect an appeal renders the decision
of the trial court nal and executory. This rule is founded upon the principle that the right to
appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. Neither can petitioner
invoke the doctrine that rules of technicality must yield to the broader interest of
substantial justice. While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause, free from constraints of technicalities, the
failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It
raises a jurisdictional problem as it deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the
appeal. 22
The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive. 2 3 A party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court for the remedy of appeal. The existence and availability of the right of
appeal are antithetical to the availability of the special civil action for certiorari. 2 4 As this
Court held in Fajardo v. Bautista: 2 5
Generally, an order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a nal order,
and hence a proper subject of appeal, not certiorari. The remedies of appeal and
certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. Accordingly,
although the special civil action of certiorari is not proper when an ordinary
appeal is available, it may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would be
inadequate, slow, insu cient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the
injurious effects of the order complained of, or where appeal is inadequate and
ineffectual. Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost or lapsed
remedy of appeal, where such loss is occasioned by the petitioner's own neglect
or error in the choice of remedies.

On 21 December 2000, petitioner received a copy of the Order of the RTC-Branch 83

denying his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari in Civil
Case No. Q-99-39358; hence, he had until 18 January 2001 within which to le an appeal
with the Court of Appeals. The Petition for Certiorari led by petitioner on 19 February
2001 with the Court of Appeals cannot be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. As
petitioner failed to le a timely appeal, RTC-Branch 83's dismissal of his Petition for
Certiorari had long become final and executory. IcESaA

For this procedural lapse, the Court of Appeals correctly denied outright the Petition
for Certiorari filed by petitioner before it.
Moreover, there are even more cogent reasons for denying the instant Petition on
the merits.
In the Petition at bar, petitioner raises several substantive issues. Petitioner harps
on the need for the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721 for perjury
pending before MeTC-Branch 43 based on a prejudicial question still to be resolved in Civil
Case No. Q-98-34308 (for cancellation of mortgage) and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 (for
collection of a sum of money) which are pending before other trial courts.
For clarity, we shall rst discuss the allegations of petitioner in his complaint in Civil
Case No. Q-98-34308 (for cancellation of mortgage) and that of private respondent in her
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 (for collection of a sum of money).
Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 is a complaint for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 Title and Damages led on 8 May 1988 by petitioner against private respondent with RTC-
Branch 77. Petitioner alleges that he purchased a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certi cate of Title No. N-173163 thru private respondent, a real estate broker. In the
process of negotiation, petitioner was pressured to sign a Deed of Sale prepared by
private respondent. Upon signing the Deed of Sale, he noticed that the Deed was already
signed by a certain Cristina Gonzales as attorney-in-fact of vendor Spouses Guillermo and
Amparo Galvez. Petitioner demanded from private respondent a special power of attorney
and authority to sell, but the latter failed to present one. Petitioner averred that private
respondent refused to deliver the certi cate of title of the land despite execution and
signing of the Deed of Sale and payment of the consideration. Petitioner was thus
compelled to engage the services of one Modesto Gazmin, Jr. who agreed, for
P100,000.00 to facilitate the ling of cases against private respondent; to deliver to
petitioner the certi cate of title of the land; and/or to cancel the certi cate of title in
possession of private respondent. However, Mr. Gazmin, Jr., did nothing upon receipt of
the amount of P100,000.00 from petitioner. In fact, petitioner was even charged with
perjury before the O ce of the City Prosecutor, all because of Mr. Gazmin, Jr.'s
wrongdoing. Petitioner further alleged that he discovered the existence of a spurious Real
Estate Mortgage which he allegedly signed in favor of private respondent. Petitioner
categorically denied signing the mortgage document and it was private respondent who
falsi ed the same in order to justify her unlawful withholding of TCT No. N-173163 from
petitioner. Thus, petitioner prayed for: AHaDSI

1. The cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage dated August 2, 1997 as

null and void;
2. As well as to order [herein private respondent] to DELIVER the
Owner's Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certi cate of Title No. N-173163 to [herein
petitioner];

3. Condemning [private respondent] to pay [petitioner] the sums of

a) P100,000.00 as MORAL DAMAGES;
b) P50,000.00 as EXEMPLARY DAMAGES;
c) P50,000.00 as Attorney's fees and
d) Cost of suit.

4. A general relief is likewise prayed for (sic) just and equitable under
the premises.

Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, 2 6 on the other hand, is a complaint for a sum of money
with a motion for issuance of a writ of attachment led by private respondent against
petitioner on 14 May 1988 before RTC-Branch 84. Private respondent alleges that
petitioner obtained a loan from her in the amount of P758,134.42 with a promise to pay on
or before 30 August 1997. As security for payment of the loan, petitioner executed a Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage covering a parcel of land registered under TCT No. N-173163.
Petitioner pleaded for additional time to pay the said obligation, to which respondent
agreed. But private respondent discovered sometime in February 1998 that petitioner
executed an a davit of loss alleging that he lost the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. N-
173163, and succeeded in annotating said a davit on the original copy of TCT No. N-
173163 on le with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Private respondent further
alleges that she also discovered that petitioner led a petition for issuance of a new
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163 with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98,
docketed as LRC Case No. Q-10052. Private respondent demanded that petitioner pay his
obligation, but the latter refused to do so. Resultantly, private respondent prayed for the
following:
A. That upon ling of this Complaint as well as the A davit of attachment
and a preliminary hearing thereon, as well as bond led, a writ of
preliminary attachment is (sic) by the Honorable Court ordering the Sheriff
to levy [herein petitioner] property su cient to answer [herein private
respondent's] claim in this action;
B. That after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered in [private
respondent's] favor as against [petitioner], ordering the latter to pay the
former the sum of P758,134.42 plus interest thereon at 5% per month from
September 1997 up to the date of actual payment; actual damages in the
sums of P70,000.00 each under paragraphs 11 and 12 of the complaint;
P200,000.00 as moral damages; P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
twenty (20%) of the principal claim as attorney's fees plus P2,500.00 per
appearance honorarium; and P60,000.00 as litigation expense before this
Honorable Court. ESHAIC

[Petitioner] prays for such further relief in law, justice and equity.

As to whether it is proper to suspend Criminal Case No. 90721 for perjury pending
nal outcome of Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 and Civil Case No. Q-98-34308, we take into
consideration Sections 6 and 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A petition for
suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
question in a civil action may be led in the o ce of the prosecutor or the court
conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been led
in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be led in the same criminal action
at any time before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. — The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action;
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.

The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a

prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 2 7
A prejudicial question is de ned as that which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case
before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in
another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused. 2 8
For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend criminal action, it must appear
not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in
the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. AEIDTc

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com

 Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the
suspension of the criminal proceedings until the nal resolution of the civil case, the
following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in
another tribunal. 2 9
If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal
responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no
necessity "that the civil case be determined rst before taking up the criminal case,"
therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. 3 0 Neither is there a
prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. 3 1
However, the court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of sound
discretion, and upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in
abeyance to abide by the outcome of another case pending in another court, especially
where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to
control the disposition of cases on its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself,
for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second action cannot be
properly determined until the questions raised in the rst action are settled, the second
action should be stayed. 32
The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to
control the disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering its time and effort, those
of counsel and the litigants. But if proceedings must be stayed, it must be done in order to
avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, con icting judgments,
confusion between litigants and courts. It bears stressing that whether or not the trial
court would suspend the proceedings in the criminal case before it is submitted to its
sound discretion. 3 3
Indeed, a judicial order issued pursuant to the court's discretionary authority is not
subject to reversal on review unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. As the United
States Supreme Court aptly declared in Landis v. North American Co ., "the burden of
making out the justice and wisdom from the departure from the beaten truck lay heavily on
the petitioner, less an unwilling litigant is compelled to wait upon the outcome of a
controversy to which he is a stranger. It is, thus, stated that only in rare circumstances will
a litigant in one case is compelled to stand aside, while a litigant in another, settling the
rule of law that will de ne the rights of both is, after all, the parties before the court are
entitled to a just, speedy and plain determination of their case undetermined by the
pendency of the proceedings in another case. After all, procedure was created not to
hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice." 3 4
As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on the
basis of a prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and issues raised in the
pleadings in the civil cases are so related with the issues raised in the criminal case such
that the resolution of the issues in the civil cases would also determine the judgment in the
criminal case. TAECSD

A perusal of the allegations in the complaints show that Civil Case No. Q-98-34308
pending before RTC-Branch 77, and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, pending before RTC-
Branch 84, are principally for the determination of whether a loan was obtained by
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 petitioner from private respondent and whether petitioner executed a real estate mortgage
involving the property covered by TCT No. N-173163. On the other hand, Criminal Case No.
90721 before MeTC-Branch 43, involves the determination of whether petitioner
committed perjury in executing an a davit of loss to support his request for issuance of a
new owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163.
It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of
each other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish the
innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case for perjury. The purchase by
petitioner of the land or his execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing
whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed a false a davit of
loss of TCT No. N-173163.
MeTC-Branch 43, therefore, did not err in ruling that the pendency of Civil Case No.
Q-98-34308 for cancellation of mortgage before the RTC-Branch 77; and Civil Case No. Q-
98-34349 for collection of a sum of money before RTC-Branch 84, do not pose a
prejudicial question in the determination of whether petitioner is guilty of perjury in
Criminal Case No. 90721. RTC-Branch 83, likewise, did not err in ruling that MeTC-Branch
43 did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion for suspension
of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions dated 5 March 2001
and 3 May 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 are hereby AFFIRMED
and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 43, is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing and trial on
the merits of Criminal Case No. 90721, and to expedite proceedings therein, without
prejudice to the right of the accused to due process. Costs against petitioner. ECDHIc

SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Nachura, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes with Associate Justices Marina L.
Buzon and Elvi John S. Asuncion concurring; rollo, pp. 27-29.
2. Id. at 30.
3. The date of filing of the criminal complaint does not appear from the Records.
4. CA rollo, p. 21.
5. Id. at 58-61.
6. Penned by Judge Billy M. Apalit. Id. at 66.
7. Id. at 67-70.
8. Id. at 71.
9. Id. at 72-81.
10. Penned by Judge Estrella T. Estrada. Id. at 18.
11. Id. at 67-70.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 12. Id. at 20.
13. Id. at 2-16.
14. Id. at 91-93.
15. Id. at 92.
16. Id. at 94-96.
17. Id. at 104-105.
18. Diesel Construction Company, Inc. v. Jollibee Corp., 380 Phil. 813, 824 (2000).
19. De la Paz v. Panis, 315 Phil. 238, 248 (1995).
20. Felizardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112050, 15 June 1994, 233 SCRA 220, 223-224.
21. David v. Cordova, G.R. No. 152992, 28 July 2005, 464 SCRA 385, 395.
22. Delgado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137881, 21 December 2004, 447 SCRA 402, 413.
23. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 755, 785 (2003).
24. Bell Carpets Int'l Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75315, 7 May 1990,
185 SCRA 35, 41.
25. G.R. Nos. 102193-97, 10 May 1994, 232 SCRA 291, 298.
26. This case was subsequently dismissed on 15 August 2000 on ground of litis pendentia
(pendency of Civil Case No. 34308). The motion for reconsideration was denied on 27
December 2000. The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals.
27. Te v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126746, 29 November 2000, 346 SCRA 327, 335.
28. Donato v. Luna, G.R. No. L-53642, 15 April 1988, 160 SCRA 441, 445; Quiambao v.
Osorio, G.R. No. L-48157, 16 March 1988, 158 SCRA 674, 677-678; Ras v. Rasul, G.R.
Nos. L-50441-42, 18 September 1980, 100 SCRA 125, 127.
29. Prado v. People, 218 Phil. 573, 577 (1984).
30. Sabandal v. Tongco, 419 Phil. 13, 18 (2001).
31. Rojas v. People, 156 Phil. 224, 229 (1974).
32. Quiambao v. Osorio, supra note 28 at 679.
33. Security Bank Corporation v. Victorio, G.R. No. 156994, 31 August 2005, 468 SCRA 609,
628.
34. Id. at 628.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com