Spec Pro Assigned Cases

Case Digests

Rule 90
8) QuashaAnchetavs LCN Construction

QUASHA ANCHETA PEÑA v. LCN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION

G.R No. 174873, August 26, 2008

PETITIONER:QuashaAncheta Peña and Nolasco Law Office for its own behalf and representing
the heirs of Raymond Triviere
RESPONDENT: LCN Construction Corporation

SUMMARY: Atty. Syquia and Quasha were appointed administrators of the estate of the
deceased Raymond Triviere. They dutifuly discharged their obligations but have not been paid
for services they rendered for over a decade. They filed a Motion for Payment in the trial court
which the latter granted. LCN, as the only remaning claimant of the estate, opposed the same
and on appeal to the appellate court, the former’s petition was given partial merit in that the
awards given to the heirs and administrators were deleted. The SC held that the award in favor
of the heirs is already a distribution of the estate. However, it awarded attorney’s fees to
petitioner to be sourced from the shares of the Triviere children upon final distribution of the
estate.

DOCTRINE:Section 2, Rule 82 provides in clear and unequivocal terms the modes for replacing
an administrator of an estate upon the death of an administrator: Court may remove or accept
resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal.x xx.
When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to
act with him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted
to any suitable person.

FACTS:
1. Raymond Triviere passed away on 14 December 1987. On January 1988, proceedings
for the settlement of his intestate estate were instituted by his widow, Amy Triviere,
before the Makati RTC. Atty. Enrique Syquia and Atty. William Quasha of the Quasha
Law Office, representing the widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere,
respectively were appointed administrators of the estate of the deceased. As
administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real
estate taxes, security services, and the preservation and administration of the estate, as
well as litigation expenses.
2. In February 1995, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for
Payment of their litigation expenses. Citing their failure to submit an accounting of the
assets and liabilities of the estate under administration, the RTC denied the Motion for
Payment of Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha. In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away.
Atty. Redentor Zapata (Zapata), also of the Quasha Law Office, took over as the counsel
of the Triviere children, and continued to help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of the
estate. On 6 September 2002, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion for
Payment,for their own behalf and for their respective clients presenting certain
 allegations1 the most important of which is that there has been no payment of money
from the estate for more than 10 years already. As a consequence, they moved that the
amount of P1M be taken from the estate funds to be divided among the parties (P450k
as share of the children, P200k as attorney’s fees, P150k as share of the widow, and
P200k for the administrator).
3. LCN opposed the motion stating that the RTC had already resolved the issue of
payment of litigation expenses when it denied the first Motion for Payment filed by Atty.
Syquia and Atty. Quasha for
4. The appellate court modified the Order of the RTC by deleting the awards of P450k and
P150k in favor of the children and widow of the deceased respectively. The appellate
court adopted the position of LCN that the claim of LCN was an obligation of the estate
which was yet unpaid and, under Section 1, Rule 90, barred the distribution of the
residue of the estate. Petitioners, though, insist that the awards in favor of the petitioner
children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere is not a distribution of the residue of the
estate, thus, rendering Section 1, Rule 90 inapplicable.

ISSUES:
1. WoN the CA erred in ruling that the award in favor of the heirs is already a distribution of
the residue of the estate — NO
2. WoN the CA erred in nullifying the award of attorney’s fees in favor of the co-
administrators – YES

RULING:Petition PARTLY GRANTED.

RATIO:
1. Although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit the advance
distribution of the estate, its exercise of such discretion should be qualified by the
following: [1] only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending controversy or
appeal may be the subject of advance distribution (Section 2, Rule 109); and [2] the
distributees must post a bond, fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of
outstanding obligations of the estate (second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 90). There is
no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner children and widow their shares in
the estate prior to the settlement of all its obligations, complied with these two
requirements or, at the very least, took the same into consideration. Its Order of 12 June
2003 is completely silent on these matters. It justified its grant of the award in a single
sentence which stated that petitioner children and widow had not yet received their
respective shares from the estate after all these years. Taking into account that the claim
of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere allegedly amounted to
P6,016,570.65, already in excess of the P4,738,558.63 reported total value of the estate,
the RTC should have been more prudent in approving the advance distribution of the
same.
2. Petitioners earlier invoked Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Courtwhere the Court
sustained an Order granting partial distribution of an estate. However, Daelis not even
on all fours with the case at bar. No similar determination on sufficiency of assets or
absence of any outstanding obligations of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere was
made by the RTC in this case. In fact, there is a pending claim by LCN against the
 estate, and the amount thereof exceeds the value of the entire estate. Furthermore, in
Dael, the Court actually cautioned that partial distribution of the decedent's estate
pending final termination of the testate or intestate proceeding should as much as
possible be discouraged by the courts, and, except in extreme cases, such form of
advances of inheritance should not be countenanced. The reason for this rule is that
courts should guard with utmost zeal and jealousy the estate of the decedent to the end
that the creditors thereof be adequately protected and all the rightful heirs be assured of
their shares in the inheritance.
3. Petitioner Quasha Law Office asserts that it is not within the purview of Section 7, Rule
85 since it is not an appointed administrator of the estate.When Atty. Quasha passed
away in 1996, Atty. Syquia was left as the sole administrator of the estate of the late
Raymond Triviere. The person of Atty. Quasha was distinct from that of petitioner
Quasha Law Office; and the appointment of Atty. Quasha as administrator of the estate
did not extend to his law office. Neither could petitioner Quasha Law Office be deemed
to have substituted Atty. Quasha as administrator upon the latter's death for the same
would be in violation of the rules on the appointment and substitution of estate
administrators, particularly, Section 2, Rule 82. Hence, when Atty. Quasha died,
petitioner Quasha Law Office merely helped in the settlement of the estate as counsel
for the petitioner children of the late Raymond Triviere.
4. The Court notes with disfavor the sudden change in the theory by petitioner Quasha Law
Office. Consistent with discussions in the preceding paragraphs, Quasha Law Office
initially asserted itself as co-administrator of the estate before the courts. The records do
not belie this fact. Petitioner Quasha Law Office later on denied it was substituted in the
place of Atty. Quasha as administrator of the estate only upon filing a Motion for
Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, and then again before this Court. As a
general rule, a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on
appeal. This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions.In the interest of justice and
within the sound discretion of the appellate court, a party may change his legal theory on
appeal, only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further
evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in
the new theory.
5. On the foregoing considerations, this Court finds it necessary to exercise leniency on the
rule against changing of theory on appeal, consistent with the rules of fair play and in the
interest of justice. Petitioner Quasha Law Office presented conflicting arguments with
respect to whether or not it was co-administrator of the estate. Nothing in the records,
however, reveals that any one of the lawyers of Quasha Law Office was indeed a
substitute administrator for Atty. Quasha upon his death.
6. The court has jurisdiction to appoint an administrator of an estate by granting letters of
administration to a person not otherwise disqualified or incompetent to serve as such,
following the procedure laid down in Section 6, Rule 78. Corollary thereto, Section 2,
Rule 82 provides in clear and unequivocal terms the modes for replacing an
administrator of an estate upon the death of an administrator. The records of the case
are wanting in evidence that Quasha Law Office or any of its lawyers substituted Atty.
Quasha as co-administrator of the estate. None of the documents attached pertain to the
issuance of letters of administration to petitioner Quasha Law Office or any of its lawyers
at any time after the demise of Atty. Quasha in 1996. This Court is thus inclined to give
credence to petitioner's contention that while it rendered legal services for the settlement
of the estate of Raymond Triviere since the time of Atty. Quasha's death in 1996, it did
not serve as co-administrator thereof, granting that it was never even issued letters of
administration. However, while petitioner Quasha Law Office, serving as counsel of the
Triviere children from the time of death of Atty. Quasha in 1996, is entitled to attorney's
 fees and litigation expenses of P100,000.00 as prayed for in the Motion for Payment
dated 3 September 2002, and as awarded by the RTC in its 12 June 2003 Order, the
same may be collected from the shares of the Triviere children, upon final distribution of
the estate, in consideration of the fact that the Quasha Law Office, indeed, served as
counsel (not anymore as co-administrator), representing and performing legal services
for the Triviere children in the settlement of the estate of their deceased father.

9) Silverio Jr vs CA

RICARDO C. SILVERIO v. RICARDO S. SILVERIO, GR Nos. 208828-29, 2014-08-13

Facts:
The late Beatriz S. Silverio died without leaving a will on October 7, 1987. She was survived by
her legal heirs, namely: Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (husband), Edmundo S. Silverio (son), Edgardo
S. Silverio (son), Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. (son), Nelia S.
Silverio-Dee (daughter), and Ligaya S. Silverio (daughter). Subsequently, an intestate
proceeding (SP PROC. NO.M-2629) for the settlement of her estate was filed by SILVERIO,
SR.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties filed different petitions and appeal challenging
several orders of the intestate court that went all the way up to the Supreme Court.
CA-G.R. SP No. 121172
The first petition of the three consolidated petitions is CA-G.R. SP No. 121172 wherein
petitioner, RICARDO S. SILVERIO JR. ("SILVERIO JR.") assails the Order of the intestate court
dated 16 June 2011 reinstating RICARDO SILVERIO SR. ("SILVERIO SR.") as administrator to
the... estate of the late Beatriz Silverio.
The administrator first appointed by the Court was EDGARDO SILVERIO ("EDGARDO"), but by
virtue of a Joint Manifestation dated 3 November 1999 filed by the heirs of BEATRIZ D.
SILVERIO, the motion to withdraw as administrator filed by EDGARDO was approved by the
intestate court... and in his stead, SILVERIO SR. was appointed as the new administrator.
Thereafter, an active exchange of pleadings to remove and appoint a new administrator ensued
between SILVERIO SR. and SILVERIO JR.
CA-G.R. SP No. 121173
On 15 March 2011, heirs SILVERIO JR., EDMUNDO and LIGAYA represented by her legal
guardian moved for the disqualification and/or inhibition of JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. based on the
following grounds: (1) Absence of the written consent of all parties in interest allowing JUDGE
GUANLAO,... JR. to continue hearing the case considering that he appeared once as counsel in
the intestate proceedings; (2) JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. has shown bias and partiality in favor of
SILVERIO SR. by allowing the latter to pursue several motions and even issued a TRO in
violation of the... rules against forum shopping; (3) Heir LIGAYA's Petition for Support and
Release of Funds for Medical Support has not been resolved; and (4) It is in the best interest of
all the heirs that the proceedings be presided and decided by the cold neutrality of an impartial...
judge.
On 23 March 2011, JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. issued an order denying the Motion for
Disqualification and/or Inhibition.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 122024
The intestate court in its Omnibus Order dated 31 October 2006, ordered among others, the
sale of certain properties belonging to the estate.
By virtue of the aforesaid Order, SILVERIO, JR. on 16 October 2007 executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of CITRINE HOLDINGS, Inc. ("CITRINE") over the property located at
No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. CITRINE became the registered owner thereof on
06
September 2010 as evidenced by TCT No. 006-201000063.
A Deed of Absolute Sale was likewise executed in favor of Monica P. Ocampo (notarized on
September 16, 2010) for the lot located at No. 82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati City.
On 23 December 2010, TCT No. 006-2011000050 was issued to Monica P. Ocampo. The...
latter subsequently sold said property to ZEE2 Resources, Inc. (ZEE2) and TCT No. 006-
2011000190 was issued on 11 February 2011 under its name.
On 04 February 2011 SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent Application for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order/Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction (With Motion For the Issuance of Subpoena
Ad Testificandum and Subpoena DucesTecum) praying among others, that a
TRO be issued restraining and/or preventing SILVERIO, JR., MONICA OCAMPO, CITRINE
HOLDINGS, INC. and their successors-in-interest from committing any act that would affect the
titles to the three properties.
On 14 February 2011, SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion (a) To Declare as Null
and Void the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 September 2010; (b) To cancel the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000050; and (c) To reinstate the Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 2236121 in the name of Ricardo C. Silverio Sr. and the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz
S. Silverio.
On 28 February 2011 the Intestate Court issued an Order granting a Temporary Restraining
Order
The consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by respondent Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. ("Silverio,
Jr.") before the CA questioned the following issuances of the intestate court: CA-G.R. SP No.
121172 Order dated June 16, 2011 reinstating Silverio, Sr. as
Administrator; CA-G.R. SP No. 121173 (1) Order dated March 23, 2011 granting Silverio, Sr.'s
application for preliminary injunction enjoining Silverio, Jr. or anyone acting on their behalf from
committing any act that would affect the titles to the subject... properties and enjoining the
Register of Deeds of Makati City from accepting, admitting, approving, registering, annotating or
in any way giving due course to whatever deeds, instruments or any other documents involving
the Cambridge and Intsia properties, (2) Order dated March
23, 2011 which denied Silverio, Jr.'s motion or disqualification and/or inhibition of Judge
Guanlao, Jr., and (3) Order dated June 14, 2011 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
March 23, 2011 Order (granting application for preliminary injunction); and in
CA-G.R. SP No. 122024 Order dated August 18, 2011 declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale,
TCT and all derivative titles over the Cambridge and Intsia properties as null and void.
On March 8, 2013, the CA rendered its Decision, the fallo of which reads:
1. The petition in CA G.R. SP No. 121172 is DENIED for lack of merit.
2. The petition in CA GR. S.P. No. 121173 is partly DENIED for lack of merit insofar as it
questions the 23 March 2011 Order denying RICARDO SILVERIO, JR's Motion for
Disqualification and/or Inhibition of Judge Honorio E. Guanlao, Jr.
3. The petition in CA G.R.-S.P. No. 122024 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the 18 August 2011
Order declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificate of Title and all derivative titles
over the Cambridge and Intsia Property null and void is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Issues:
the CA committed a reversible error in upholding the validity of the Intsia and Cambridge
properties upon the ground that the intestate court cannot annul the sales as it has a limited
jurisdiction only and which does not include resolving... issues of ownership. It is asserted that
the CA should not have stopped there and looked into the nature of the properties sold, which
formed part of the conjugal partnership of Ricardo Silverio, Sr. and Beatriz S. Silverio.
Ruling:
the probate court having jurisdiction over properties under administration has the authority not
only to approve any disposition or conveyance, but also to annul an unauthorized sale by the
prospective heirs or administrator.
In this case, the sale of the subject properties was executed by respondent Silverio, Jr. with
prior approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006.
Subsequently, however, the sale was annulled by the said court on motion by... petitioner.
In reversing the intestate court's order annulling the sale of the subject properties, the CA noted
that said ruling is anchored on the fact that the deeds of sale were executed at the time when
the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 was still... in effect.
It then concluded that the eventual decision in the latter case making the writ of preliminary
injunction permanent only with respect to the appointment of petitioner as administrator and not
to the grant of authority to sell mooted the issue of whether the sale was... executed at the time
when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction were in effect.
The CA's ruling on this issue is hereunder quoted:
The more crucial question that needs to be addressed is: Whether the authority to sell the
properties in question granted under the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order, was nullified by the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196. A look at the... dispositive portion of
the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 would lead us to reasonably conclude that the grant of
authority to sell is still good and valid.
The October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order of the testate [sic] court in so far as it authorizes the sale
of the three properties in question was not declared by the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division
as null and void.
the injunction order which was made permanent by the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) was
declared to be limited only to the portion of the Omnibus Order that upheld the grant of letters of
administration by SILVERIO, JR. and the... removal of SILVERIO, SR. as administrator and
nothing else.
when the... preliminary injunction was issued on 23 March 2011 new titles over the disputed
properties were already issued to CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and ZEE2 RESOURCES INC.
While it is true that petitioner was eventually reinstated as Administrator pursuant to the August
28, 2008 decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 (petition for certiorari filed by NeliaSilverio-Dee), we
agree with the CA that the permanent injunction issued under the said decision,... as explicitly
stated in its fallo, pertained only to the portions of the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order
upholding the grant of letters of administration to and taking of an oath of administration by
respondent Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the CA would have expressly set... aside as well the
directive in the same Omnibus Order allowing the sale of the subject properties. Moreover, the
CA Decision attained finality only on February 11, 2011 when this Court denied with finality
respondent Silverio, Jr.'s motion for reconsideration of the
February 11, 2009 Resolution denying his petition for review (G.R. No. 185619).
The CA therefore did not err in reversing the August 18, 2011 Order of the intestate court
annulling the sale of the subject properties grounded solely on the injunction issued in CA-G.R.
SP No. 97196. Respondents Ocampo, Citrine and ZEE2 should not be prejudiced by the... flip-
flopping appointment of Administrator by the intestate court, having relied in good faith that the
sale was authorized and with prior approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order
dated October 31, 2006 which remained valid and subsisting insofar as it... allowed the
aforesaid sale.

10) Vda de Lopez vs Lopez

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT OF ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ RICHARD B. LOPEZ vs. DIANA JEANNE LOPEZ,
MARYBETH DE LEON and VICTORIA L. TUAZON

G.R. No. 189984 November 12, 2012

Doctrine:

The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one
or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.

Facts:

Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez (Lopez), and their four
legitimate children, namely, petitioner Richard, Diana, Marybeth and Victoria as compulsory
heirs. Before Enrique’s death, he executed a Last Will and Testament and constituted Richard
as his executor and administrator.
Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will and Testament before the RTC
with prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. Marybeth opposed the petition
contending that the purported last will and testament was not executed and attested as required
by law, and that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of
Richard. Victoria also adopted the said opposition.

After submitting proofs of compliance with jurisdictional requirements, Richard presented the
attesting witnesses, namely: Reynaldo Maneja; Romulo Monteiro; Ana Maria Lourdes Manalo
(Manalo); and the notary public who notarized the will, Atty. Perfecto Nolasco (Atty. Nolasco).
The instrumental witnesses testified that after the late Enrique read and signed the will on each
and every page, they also read and signed the same in the latter's presence and of one
another. Photographs of the incident were taken and presented during trial. Manalo further
testified that she was the one who prepared the drafts and revisions from Enrique before the
final copy of the will was made.

Likewise, Atty. Nolasco claimed that Enrique had been his client for more than 20 years. The
latter consulted him in the preparation of the subject will and furnished him the list of his
properties for distribution among his children. He prepared the will in accordance with Enrique's
instruction and that before the latter and the attesting witnesses signed it in the presence of one
another, he translated the will, which was written in English to Filipino and added that Enrique
was in good health and of sound mind at that time.

RTC: disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code
which requires a statement in the attestation clause of the number of pages used upon which
the will is written. It held that while Article 809 of the same Code requires mere substantial
compliance of the form laid down in Article 805 thereof, the rule only applies if the number of
pages is reflected somewhere else in the will with no evidence aliunde or extrinsic evidence
required. While the acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of 7 pages including the
page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written, the RTC observed that it has 8
pages including the acknowledgment portion. As such, it disallowed the will for not having been
executed and attested in accordance with law.

CA: found no valid reason to deviate from the findings of the RTC that the failure to state the
number of pages of the will in the attestation clause was fatal. It noted that while Article 809 of
the Civil Code sanctions mere substantial compliance with the formal requirements set forth in
Article 805 thereof, there was a total omission of such fact in the attestation clause. Moreover,
while the acknowledgment of the will made mention of "7 pages including the page on which the
ratification and acknowledgment are written," the will had actually 8 pages including the
acknowledgment portion thus, necessitating the presentation of evidence aliunde to explain the
discrepancy.

Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision to disallow the probate of will.

Held:

The provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills, particularly, Articles 805 and 809 of the Civil
Code provide:

ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by
his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of
the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left
margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact
that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write
his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that
the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another.

ART. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and
influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein
shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.
While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause,
Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the
subject last will and testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the
ratification and acknowledgment are written" cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will
actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be
explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence
aliunde.

The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of
the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear
in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized.
All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them
in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether
all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the
attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings.

Hence, the CA properly sustained the disallowance of the will.

11) Divinagracia vs Rovira

SALUD DIVINAGRACIA, EMILIA DIVINAGRACIA, DOLORES DIVINAGRACIA, ROSARIO

DIVINAGRACIA and JUANITA DIVINAGRACIA
vs.
HON. JUDGE VALERIO V. ROVIRA
G.R. No. L-42615 August 10, 1976

FACTS: Feliciano Divinagracia died in Iloilo City on February 1, 1964. He was survived by his
wife, Salud and their four daughters named Emilia, Dolores, Rosario, and Juanita. The notice of
his death was published in two local periodicals and in the Manila times. Two days after his
death, a petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the settlement of his estate
The order setting the petition for hearing was published. Emilia Divinagracia qualified as
administratrix on May 22, 1964. She administered the estate for seven years. She paid the
estate and inheritance taxes. In April, 1971 she submitted to the court a final accounting and
project of partition with a prayer for the closure of the proceeding. Judge Castrense C. Veloso in
his order of April 17, 1971 approved the final accounting and project of partition and declared
the proceeding "closed and terminated, subject to the condition that the heirs shall assume all
the outstanding obligations of the estate". The partition was duly registered.
On June 8, 1971 or after the order closing the intestate proceeding had become
final,CamiloDivinagracia filed a motion to reopen it and to set aside the order of closure. He
alleged that he was an illegitimate child of the decedent; that he was born on November 9,
1930, and that he came to know of the intestate proceeding only when he was transferred as a
government employee from Masbate to Iloilo a few days before June 8. He prayed for the
determination of his share in the decedent's estate.

The administratrix in her opposition to the motion contended that the proceeding could no longer
be reopened; that its expediente had already been archived; that there is no allegation in the
motion that Camilo's filiation was acknowledged by the decedent. The motion remained
unresolved for more than four years. Judge Veloso did not act on it before he retired in the early
part of 1975. The case was re-raffled to respondent Judge Valerie V. Rovira who issued the
questioned order dated October 18, 1975 reopening the intestate proceeding.

The probate court set aside its prior order of closure because it assumed that there was no
liquidation of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Feliciano Divinagracia and SaludBretaña
that there was no declaration of heirs, and that an interested party, who was left out in the
partition, should be allowed to secure relief in the intestate proceeding by filing the proper
motion within the reglementary period.

ISSUE: W/N an intestate proceeding, which had already been closed, can still be reopened so
as to allow a spurious child to present evidence on his filiation and to claim his share in the
decedent's estate.

RULING: The probate court erred in reopening the intestate proceeding, a proceeding in rem of
which CamiloDivinagracia is deemed to have had constructive notice. The order closing it was
already final and executory. The motion to reopen it was not filed within the thirty-day
reglementary period counted from the date the order of closure was served on the
administratrix. The closure order could not be disturbed anymore. Moreover, the order for the
reopening of the intestate proceeding was predicated on the false assumption that there had
been no liquidation of the conjugal partnership and no declaration of heirs. The truth is that the
project of partition and distribution, with final accounting, which was submitted by the
administratrix and approved by the probate court, contained a liquidation of the conjugal
partnership and a statement as to who were the decedent's heirs and what were their respective
hereditary shares.

The probate court further erred in entertaining CamiloDivinagracia's motion to reopen the
intestate proceeding. It erred because that motion involved the determination of his status as
the decedent's spurious child. That question falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Iloilo. The rule prohibiting the splitting of a cause of
action (Sec. 4, Rule 2, Rules of Court) is not violated by the holding that the action to establish
plaintiff's filiation as an illegitimate child should be filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court and cannot be joined to the action of the illegitimate child for partition and recovery of his
hereditary share in his putative father's estate, which is cognizable by the Court of First
Instance.

The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural children, commonly
known as bastards include adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married woman
cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married woman cohabiting with a woman
other than his wife. They are entitled to support and successional rights (Art. 287, Civil Code).
But their filiation must be duly proven (Ibid, Art. 887).

In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child, then his filiation
may be established by means of the circumstances or grounds for compulsory recognition. In
the instant case, CamiloDivinagracia did not disclose whether he has any evidence of voluntary
recognition of his filiation. There is no allegation in his motion that would sustain his claim for
compulsory acknowledgment of his filiation.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the probate court's order of October 18, 1975,
reopening the intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Feliciano Divinagracia, is
set aside.

12) Guilas vs Judge of CFI Pampanga 43 SCRA 111

JUANITA LOPEZ GUILAS vs. JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA
AND ALEJANDRO LOPEZ

Facts : Jacinta Limson de Lopez was married to Alejandro Lopez y Siongco. They had no
children.llOn April 28, 1936, Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro as her
sole heir and executor. On October 26, 1953, herein petitioner Juanita Lopez, then single and
now married to Federico Guilas, was declared legally adopted daughter and legal heir of the
spouses Jacinta and Alejandro. After adopting legally herein petitioner Juanita Lopez, the
testatrix Doña Jacinta did not execute another will or codicil so as to include Juanita Lopez as
one of her heirs. In an order dated March 5, 1959 in Testate Proceedings No. 1426, the will was
admitted to probate and the surviving husband, Alejandro Lopez y Siongco, was appointed
executor without bond by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. Neverthless, both Alejandro
and Juanita executed a project partition, approved by the lower court on April 23, 1960 and
directed that the records of the case be sent to the archives, upon payment of the estate and
inheritance taxes

On April 10, 1964, herein petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas filed a separate ordinary action to set
aside and annul the project of partition, on the ground of lesion, perpetration and fraud, and pray
further that Alejandro Lopez be ordered to submit a statement of accounts of all the crops and to
deliver immediately to Juanita the lots allocated to her. Meanwhile, in the Testate Proceedings,
Juanita filed a petition dated July 20, 1964 praying that Alejandro Lopez be directed to deliver to
her the actual possession of said lots and its produce. Alejandro opposed the separate
petition alleging the testate proceedings had already been closed and terminated; and
that he ceased as a consequence to be the executor of the estate of the deceased; and
that Juanita Lopez is guilty of laches and negligence in filing the petition of the delivery of her
share 4 years after such closure of the estate. The parties have agreed to suspend action or
resolution upon the said petition for the delivery of shares until; after the civil action
aforementioned has been finally settled and decided. TC denied Juanita's petition on the ground
that the parties themselves agreed to suspend resolution of her petition for the delivery of her
shares until after the civil action for annulment of the project of partition has been finally settled
and decided. Hence this petition for certiorari and mandamus.

Issue : WON the project partition approved by the TC “ ordering it closed and terminated”
terminated the Probate proceeding.

Ruling : No. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the
payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same. The finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the
probate proceeding. As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied
with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated Siguiong vs. Tecson, );
because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from
bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period has not elapsed. The
better practice, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a
proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the
probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an
independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a
decision or order of the probate on intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle
properties long ago distributed and disposed of. Sec. 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court
of 1964 as, which secures for the heirs or legatees the right to "demand and recover their
respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in
his possession", re-states the doctrines. In the case at bar, the motion filed by petitioner for the
delivery of her share was filed on July 20, 1964, which is just more than 3 years from August 28,
1961 when the amended project of partition was approve and within 5 years from April 23, 1960
when the original project of partition was approved. Clearly, her right to claim the two lots
allocated to her under the project of partition had not yet expired. The position of Juanita should
be sustained and the writs prayed for granted.