FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 122166. March 11, 1998]

CRESENTE Y. LLORENTE, JR., petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and

LETICIA G. FUERTES, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

In a prosecution for violation of Section 3[e] of the Anti-Graft Law, that is, causing
undue injury to any party, the government prosecutors must prove actual injury to the
offended party; speculative or incidental injury is not sufficient.

The Case

Before us is a petition for review of the Decision promulgated on June 23, 1995 and
the Resolution promulgated on October 12, 1995 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 18343, finding Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr. guilty as charged.
Llorente, then municipal mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, was charged
with violation of Sec. 3[e] of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, under an Information dated October 22, 1992, textually
reproduced as follows:i
That in or about and during the period of July, 1990 to October, 1991, or for sometime
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Sindangan, Province of Zamboanga del Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr., a public officer, being then the Mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga
del Norte, in the exercise of his official and administrative functions, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally with evident bad faith refuse to sign and approve the
payrolls and vouchers representing the payments of the salaries and other emoluments
of Leticia G. Fuertes, without just valid cause and without due process of law, thereby
causing undue injury to the said Leticia G. Fuertes.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Duly arraigned on March 29, 1993, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, entered
a plea of NOT GUILTY.ii After trial in due course, the Sandiganbayaniii rendered the
assailed Decision, disposing as follows:iv
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Mayor Cresente Y.
Llorente, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Violation of
 Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH, as minimum to SEVEN (7)
YEARS, as maximum; to further suffer perpetual disqualification from public office; and
to pay the costs.
Respondent Court denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration in the assailed
Resolution, thus:v
WHEREFORE, accuseds Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. His Motion for Marking of Additional Exhibits Cum Offer of
Documentary Exhibits in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial is now
rendered moot and academic.
Hence, this petition.vi

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

As found by Respondent Court, the prosecutions version of the facts of this case is
as follows:vii
After appreciating all the evidence on both sides, the following uncontroverted facts
may be gleaned:
1. Accused Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr., at the time the alleged act was
committed, was the Municipal Mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte.
2. Private [C]omplainant, Leticia C. Fuertes, is the duly appointed Assistant
Municipal Treasurer in the same municipality since October 18, 1985.
3. Starting 1986, private complainant was detailed to different offices, as follows:
(a) Municipality of Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte from April, 1986
to August, 1987 as OIC Municipal Treasurer.
(b) Municipality of Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte from September,
1987 to March, 1988 as OIC Municipal Treasurer.
(c) Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Zamboanga del Norte from
April, 1988 to May, 1988.
(d) Municipality of Pian, Zamboanga del Norte from June, 1988 to
June, 1990 as OIC Municipal Treasurer.
4. In July, 1990, she was returned to her post as Assistant Municipal Treasurer
in the town of Sindangan.
She was not provided with office table and chair nor given any assignment; neither
her daily time record and application for leave acted upon by the municipal treasurer per
instruction of accused Mayor (Exh. G-2; G-3).
5. On July 23, 1990, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sindangan, Zamboanga del
Norte, presided by accused Mayor, passed Resolution No. SB 214 (Exh. 3), vehemently
objecting to the assignment of complainant as Assistant Municipal Treasurer of
Sindangan.
6. On March 12, 1991, accused Municipal Mayor received a letter (SB Resolution
No. 36) from the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Pian, demanding from the
private complainant return of the amount overpaid to her as salaries (par. 9, p. 2 of Exh.
4 counter-affidavit of accused Mayor).
7. On May 22, 1991, private complainant filed a Petition for Mandamus with
Damages (Exh. E) against the accused Mayor and the Municipality of Sindangan before
Branch II, Regional Trial Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 45, for the alleged unjustified refusal of Mayor Llorente to sign and/or
approve her payrolls and/or vouchers representing her salaries and other emoluments as
follows: (a) salary for the month of June, 1990 in the amount of P5,452.00 under
disbursement voucher dated September 5, 1990 (Exh. H). Although complainant
rendered services at the municipality of Pian during this period, she could not collect her
salary there considering that as of that month, Pian had already appointed an Assistant
Municipal Treasurer. When she referred the matter to the Provincial Auditor, she was
advised to claim her salary for that month with her mother agency, the Municipality of
Sindangan, [(]p. 12, TSN of August 9, 1994; 10th paragraph of complainants
Supplemental Affidavit marked Exh. G); (b) salary differential for the period from July 1,
1989 to April 30, 1990 in the total amount of P19,480.00 under disbursement voucher
dated August, 1990 (Exh. I); (c) 13th month pay, cash gift and clothing allowance under
Supplemental Budget No. 5, CY 1990 in the total amount of P7,275 per disbursement
voucher dated December 4, 1990 (Exh. J); (d) vacation leave commutation for the period
from October to December 31, 1990 in the total amount of P16,356.00 per disbursement
voucher dated December 3, 1990 (Exh. K); (e) RATA for the months of July, August and
September, 1990, January and February, 1991 in the total amount of P5,900.00 (par. 12
& 16 of Exh. E); and (f) salaries for January and February, 1991 in the total amount of
P10,904.00 (par. 17 of Exh. E).
8. Accused Mayor did not file an answer; instead, he negotiated for an amicable
settlement of the case (p. 24, TSN of August 10, 1994). Indeed, a Compromise
Agreement (Exh. A) dated August 27, 1991, between the accused and private
complainant was submitted to and approved by the court, hereto quoted as follows:
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
That the parties have agreed, as they hereby agree, to settle this case amicably on
the basis of the following terms and conditions, to wit:
(a) That the respondent Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr. binds himself
to sign and/or approve all vouchers and/or payrolls for unpaid salaries, RATA,
Cash-gifts, 13th month pay, clothing allowance, salary differentials and other
emoluments which the petitioner is entitled is Assistant Municipal Treasurer of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte;
(b) That the parties herein hereby waive, renounce and relinquish
their other claims and counter-claims against each other;
(c) That the respondent Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente Jr. binds himself
to sign and/or approve all subsequent vouchers and payrolls of the herein
petitioner.
9. On August 27, 1991, a Decision (Exh. B) was rendered by Judge Wilfredo
Ochotorena on the basis of the aforesaid compromise agreement.
 10. For his failure to comply with the terms of the compromise agreement, private
complainant, thru counsel, filed a Motion for Execution on September 12, 1991. A Writ of
Execution (Exh. C) was issued by the Court on September 17, 1991, and served [on] the
accused on September 23, 1991.
11. As shown in the Sheriffs Return dated November 19, 1991 (Exh. D), private
complainant was paid her salaries for the period from January, 1991 to August, 1991,
while the rest of her salaries including the RATA and other emoluments were not paid
considering the alleged need of a supplemental budget to be enacted by the Sangguniang
Bayan of Sindangan per verbal allegation of the municipal treasurer.
12. Complainant was not also paid her salaries from July to December 1990;
September and October, 1991; RATA for the period from July 1990 to June 1994
(admission of accused, pp. 8-9, TSN of June 27, 1994, a.m.; Exh. E; p. 17, TSN of June
27, 1994).
13. Sometime in 1993, accused municipal mayor received from the Municipality of
Pian, Bill No. 93-08 (Exh. 1), demanding from the Municipality of Sindangan settlement
of overpayment to complainant Fuertes in the amount of P50,643.93 per SB Resolution
No. 6 sent on July 23, 1990. The bill was settled by the Municipality of Sindangan in
December, 1993 per Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9312487 dated December 2, 1993
(Exh. 2).
14. Private complainant was able to receive complete payment of her claims only
on January 4, 1993 in the form of checks all dated December 29, 1992 (as appearing on
Exhs. H, I, J, K of the prosecution, Exhs. 6, 7, 8, of the defense) except her RATA which
was given to her only on July 25, 1994, covering the period from July 1990 to December,
1993 amounting to P55,104.00, as evidenced by Disbursement Voucher dated July 25,
1994 (Exh. 5).

Version of the Defense

While admitting some delays in the payment of the complainants claims, petitioner
sought to prove the defense of good faith -- that the withholding of payment was due
to her failure to submit the required money and property clearance, and to the
Sangguniang Bayans delayed enactment of a supplemental budget to cover the
claims. He adds that such delays did not result in undue injury to complainant. In his
memorandum, petitioner restates the facts as follows:viii
1. Complainant xxx was appointed assistant municipal treasurer of Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte on October 18, 1985. However, starting 1986 until July 1990, or
for a period of about four (4) and one half (1/2) years, she was detailed in other
municipalities and in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Zamboanga del Norte. She
returned as assistant treasurer of Sindangan in July 1990. (Decision, pp. 5-6).
2. As complainant had been working in municipallities and offices other than in
Sindangan for more than four (4) years, her name was removed from the regular payroll
of Sindangan, and payment of past salaries and other emoluments had to be done by
vouchers. When complainant xxx presented her vouchers to petitioner, the latter required
her to submit clearances from the different offices to which she was detailed, as well as
a certificate of last payment as required by COA regulations (Tsn, p. 11, Aug. 10, 1994).
 Instead of submitting the required documents, Mrs. Fuertes said that what I did, I
endorsed my voucher to the mayor through the municipal treasurer (Tsn, p. 13, June 27,
1994). The municipal treasurer could not, however, process the vouchers and certify as
to the availability of funds until after the Sangguniang Bayan had passed a supplemental
budget for the purpose (Exhs. D and 6-c Motion), which came only in December 1992.
3. Petitioner, in the meanwhile, received on March 12, 1991 SB Resolution No.
36 from the Municipality of Pinan, demanding from Mrs. xxx Fuertes the reimbursement
of P105,915.00, and because of this demand, he needed time to verify the matter before
acting on Mrs. Fuertes claims (Exh. 4). Mrs. Fuertes admitted that she had at the time
problems of accountability with the Municipality of Pinan. She testified:
Q. Counsel now is asking you, when you went back to Sindangan there was [sic] still
problems of the claims either against you or against the Municipality of Sindangan by the
municipalities had, [sic] in their minds, overpaid you?
A. Yes, your Honor, that was evidence[d] by the bill of the Municipality of Pinan to the
Municipality of Sindangan. (Tsn, p. 18, Aug. 3, 194).
4. Petitioner also stated that he could not act on complainants claims because
she had not submitted the required money and property accountability clearance from
Pinan (Tsn, 11, Aug. 10, 1994) and that at the time the Sangguniang Bayan had not
appropriated funds for the purpose. (Tsn, pp. 18, 30, 42-43, Aug. 10, 1994). Nonetheless,
petitioner included Mrs. Fuertes name in the regular annual budget beginning 1991 (Exhs.
4-b, 4-d, 4-f), as a result of which she had been since then receiving her regular monthly
salary.
5. On May 21, 1991, Mrs. Fuertes filed a complaint xxx. Petitioner filed his answer
to the complaint, alleging as a defense, that plaintiff did not exhaust administrative
remedies. (Annex B, p. 3, Petition; Exh. 1-Motion). On August 27, 1991, the parties
entered into a compromise agreement, which the trial court approved (Exh. B). x x x.
6. Upon motion of counsel for Mrs. Fuertes, the trial court issued a writ of execution
of the compromise judgment. However, the writ of execution was addressed only to
petitioner; it was not served on the municipal Sangguniang Bayan. x x x.
Thus, Mrs. Fuertes had been receiving her regular salary from January, 1991
because petitioner had included her name in the regular budget beginning 1991, which
fact complainant did not dispute. With respect to her other claims for past services in
other offices, Municipal Treasurer, Mrs. Narcisa Caber, informed that a supplemental
budget for such purpose to be passed by the Sangguniang Bayan was necessary before
she could be paid thereof. Being the municipal treasurer, Mrs. Caber knew that without
such supplemental budget, payment of Mrs. Fuertes other claims could not be made
because the law requires that disbursements shall be made in accordance with the
ordinance authorizing the annual or supplemental appropriations (Sec. 346, RA 7160)
and that no money shall be disbursed unless xxx the local treasurer certifies to the
availability of funds for the purpose. (Sec. 344, RA 7160).
7. Petitioner had instructed the municipal budget officer to prepare the
supplemental budget for payment of complainants unpaid claims for submission to the
Sangguniang [Bayan] for enactment. (Tsn, pp. 32-33, Aug. 10, 1994). The budget officer,
Mr. Narciso Siasico stated as follows:
1. I am the budget officer for the Municipality of Sindangan, Zamboanga del
Norte, a position I have held since 1981.
 xxx xxx xxx
3. Immediately after said mandamus case was settled through a compromise
agreement, Mayor Llorente instructed me to prepare the necessary budget
proposals for the deliberation and approval of the Sangguniang Bayan;
xxx xxx xxx.
8. Instead of waiting for the Sangguniang Bayan to enact the budget or of
securing an alias writ of execution to compel the Sangguniang Bayan to pass the same,
Mrs. Fuertes filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman under date of
October 28, 1991, admitting receipt of her salaries from January 1991 and saying she
had not been paid her other claims in violation of the compromise judgment. (Exh. F).
She had thus made the Office of the Ombudsman a collecting agency to compel payment
of the judgment obligation.
9. While the budget proposal had been prepared and submitted to the
Sangguniang Bayan for action, it took time for the Sangguniang Bayan to pass the
supplemental budget and for the Provincial Board to approve the same. It was only on
December 27, 1992 that the municipal treasurer and the municipal accountant issued a
certification of availability of funds for the purpose. Petitioner approved the vouchers
immediately, and in a period of one week, Mrs. Fuertes was paid all claims, as evidenced
by the prosecutions Exhs. H, I, J and K, which were the four vouchers of Mrs. Fuertes,
xxxx.
xxx xxx xxx
11. Petitioner testified that he could not immediately sign or approve the vouchers
of Mrs. Fuertes for the following reasons:
a)The Sangguniang Bayan had not appropriated the amounts to pay Mrs.
Fuertes. (Tsn, pp. 18, 30, 42-43, Aug. 10, 1994).
b)Municipal Treasurer Caber, to whom Mrs. Fuertes endorsed her vouchers
for processing, and the Municipal Accountant issued the certificate of availability
of funds only on December 27, 1992 (Tsn, p. 42, Aug. 10, 1994; Exhs. H, I, J and
K); and the delay in the issuance of the certificate of availability of funds was due
to the delay by the Provincial Board to approve the supplemental budget. (Tsn,
p. 43, Aug. 10, 1994).
[c]) He received on March 12, 1991 a demand from the Municipality of Pinan,
Zamboanga del Norte, where Mrs. Fuertes last worked, for the reimbursement of
P105,915.00, and the matter had to be clarified first. (Exh. 4). Mrs. Fuertes
admitted that she had some problem of accountability with the Municipality of
Pinan. (Tsn, p. 18, 1994). It took time before this matter could be clarified by the
Municipality of Pinan reducing its claim to P50,647.093 and the Municipality of
Sindangan paying said claim. (Exh. 2; Decision, p. 9).
[d]) Mrs. Fuertes had not submitted the required clearance from the
Municipality of Pinan. (Tsn, p. 11, Aug. 10, 1994). He did not insist on this
requirement after the trial court issued the writ of execution to implement the
compromise judgment. (Tsn, p. 23, Aug. 10, 1994). Nonetheless, in the post audit
of Mrs. Fuertes accountability, the Commission on Audit issued a notice of
suspension of the amount of P5,452.00 from Mrs. Fuertes for her failure to
submit: 1. Clearance for money & property accountability from former office. 2.
 Certification as [sic] last day of service in former office. 3. Certification of last
salary received & issued by the disbursing officer in former office, certified by
chief accountant and verified by resident auditor. (Exh. 2-Motion).
12. The Information dated October 12, 1992 filed against petitioner alleged that
petitioner as mayor did not sign and approve the vouchers of Mrs. Fuertes for payment
of her salaries and other emoluments from July 1, 1990 to October 1991, which caused
her undue injury. However, the prosecutions Exh. D, the sheriffs return dated November
19, 1991, stated that Mrs. Fuertes had received her salary from January 1, 1991 up to
the present, which meant that even before the information was filed, she had been paid
her regular salaries from January 1, 1991 to October 1991. The supplemental budget to
cover payment of her other claims for past services was passed only in December 1992
and the municipal treasurer and accountant issued the certificate of availability of funds
only on December 27, 1992, and Mrs. Fuertes got paid of [sic] all her other claims,
including those not claimed in the Information, within one week therefrom. (Exhs. H, I, J,
and K).
xxx xxx xxx.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

Respondent Court held that the delay or withholding of complainants salaries and
emoluments was unreasonable and caused complainant undue injury. Being then the
sole breadwinner in their family, the withholding of her salaries caused her difficulties in
meeting her familys financial obligations like paying for the tuition fees of her four children.
Petitioners defense that complainant failed to attach the required money and property
clearance to her vouchers was held to be an afterthought that was brought about, in the
first place, by his own failure to issue any memorandum requiring its submission. That the
voucher form listed the clearance as one of the requirements for its approval had neither
been brought to complainants attention, nor raised by petitioner as defense in his answer.
In any event, the payment of complainants salary from January to November 1991,
confirmed by the sheriffs return, showed that the clearance was not an indispensable
requirement, because petitioner could have acted upon or approved the disbursement
even without it. The alleged lack of a supplemental budget was also rejected, because it
was petitioners duty as municipal mayor to prepare and submit the executive and
supplemental budgets under Sections 318, 320, and 444 (3)(ii) of the Local Government
Code,ix and the complainants claims as assistant municipal treasurer, a permanent
position included in the plantilla for calendar year 1990 and 1991, were classified as
current operating expenditures for the same calendar years, which were chargeable
against the general funds of the town of Sindangan. Except for the representation and
transportation allowance, Fuertes claims for thirteenth month pay, cash gift and clothing
allowance were already covered by Supplemental Budget No. 5 for calendar year 1990.
Petitioners contention that funds covering complainants claims were made available only
in December 1992 was unbelievable, considering that an ordinance enacting a
supplemental budget takes effect upon its approval or on the date fixed therein under
Sec. 320 of the Local Government Code.
 The Sandiganbayan also ruled that the petitioners evident bad faith was the direct
and proximate cause of Fuertes undue injury. Complainants salaries and allowances
were withheld for no valid or justifiable reasons. Such delay was intended to harass
complainant, because petitioner wanted to replace her with his political protege whom he
eventually designated as municipal treasurer, bypassing Fuertes who was next in
seniority. Bad faith was further evidenced by petitioners instructions to the outgoing
municipal treasurer not to give the complaining witness any work assignment, not to
provide her with office table and chair, not to act on her daily time record and application
for leave of absence, instructions which were confirmed in the municipal treasurers
certification. (Exh. G-2).

The Issues

In his memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues:x

1. Could accused be held liable under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 in the discharge of
his official administrative duties, a positive act, when what was imputed to him was failing
and refusing to sign and/or approve the vouchers of Mr[s]. Fuertes on time or by inaction
on his obligation under the compromise agreement (ibid., p. 19), a passive act? Did not
the act come under Sec. 3(f) of R.A. 3019, of [sic] which accused was not charged with?
2. Assuming, arguendo, that his failure and refusal to immediately sign and
approve the vouchers of Mrs. Fuertes comes [sic] under Sec. 3(e), the questions are:
(a) Did not the duty to sign and approve the same arise only after the
Sangguniang Bayan had passed an appropriations ordinance, and not before? In other
words, was the non-passage of the appropriation ordinance a justifiable reason for not
signing the vouchers?
(b) Did Mrs. Fuertes suffer undue injury, as the term is understood in Sec. 3(e),
she having been paid all her claims?
(c) Did petitioner not act in good faith in refusing to immediately sign the vouchers
and implement the compromise agreement until the Sangguniang Bayan had enacted
the appropriation ordinance and until Mrs. Fuertes submitted the clearance from the
Municipality of Pinan, Zamboanga del Norte?
Restated, petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to establish the elements of
undue injury and bad faith. Additionally, petitioner submits that a violation of Section 3[e]
of RA 3019 cannot be committed through nonfeasance.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious. After careful review of the evidence on record and
thorough deliberation on the applicable provision of the Anti-Graft Law, the Court agrees
with the solicitor generals assessment that the prosecution failed to establish the
elements of the crime charged.
 First Issue: Undue Injury

Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 3[e] of R.A. 3019, which states:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
To hold a person liable under this section, the concurrence of the following elements
must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution:
(1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy
with the former;
(2) that said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of
his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions;
(3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or
a private party; and
(4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence.xi
The solicitor general, in his manifestation,xii points out that undue injury requires proof
of actual injury or damage, citing our ruling in Alejandro vs. Peoplexiii and Jacinto vs.
Sandiganbayan.xiv Inasmuch as complainant was actually paid all her claims, there was
thus no undue injury established.
This point is well-taken. Unlike in actions for torts, undue injury in Sec. 3[e] cannot be
presumed even after a wrong or a violation of a right has been established. Its existence
must be proven as one of the elements of the crime. In fact, the causing of undue injury,
or the giving of any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act
punished under this section. Thus, it is required that the undue injury be specified,
quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.
In jurisprudence, undue injury is consistently interpreted as actual damage. Undue
has been defined as more than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal; and injury as any wrong
or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or property[;] [that is,
the] invasion of any legally protected interest of another. Actual damage, in the context of
these definitions, is akin to that in civil law.xv
In turn, actual or compensatory damages is defined by Article 2199 of the Civil Code
as follows:
 Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
Fundamental in the law on damages is that one injured by a breach of a contract, or
by a wrongful or negligent act or omission shall have a fair and just compensation
commensurate to the loss sustained as a consequence of the defendants act. Actual
pecuniary compensation is awarded as a general rule, except where the circumstances
warrant the allowance of other kinds of damages.xvi Actual damages are primarily
intended to simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong. xvii
Furthermore, damages must not only be capable of proof, but must be actually
proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. They cannot be based on flimsy and
non-substantial evidence or upon speculation, conjecture or guesswork. xviii They cannot
include speculative damages which are too remote to be included in an accurate estimate
of the loss or injury.
In this case, the complainant testified that her salary and allowance for the period
beginning July 1990 were withheld, and that her family underwent financial difficulty which
resulted from the delay in the satisfaction of her claims.xix As regards her money claim,
payment of her salaries from January 1991 until November 19, 1991 was evidenced by
the Sheriffs Return dated November 19, 1991 (Exh. D). She also admitted having been
issued a check on January 4, 1994 to cover her salary from June 1 to June 30, 1990; her
salary differential from July 1, 1989 to April 30, 1990; her thirteenth-month pay; her cash
gift; and her clothing allowances. Respondent Court found that all her monetary claims
were satisfied. After she fully received her monetary claims, there is no longer any basis
for compensatory damages or undue injury, there being nothing more to compensate.
Complainants testimony regarding her familys financial stress was inadequate and
largely speculative. Without giving specific details, she made only vague references
to the fact that her four children were all going to school and that she was the breadwinner
in the family. She, however, did not say that she was unable to pay their tuition fees and
the specific damage brought by such nonpayment. The fact that the injury to her family
was unspecified or unquantified does not satisfy the element of undue injury, as akin to
actual damages. As in civil cases, actual damages, if not supported by evidence on
record, cannot be considered.xx
Other than the amount of the withheld salaries and allowances which were eventually
received, the prosecution failed to specify and to prove any other loss or damage
sustained by the complainant. Respondent Court insists that complainant suffered by
reason of the long period of time that her emoluments were withheld.
This inconvenience, however, is not constitutive of undue injury. In Jacinto, this Court
held that the injury suffered by the complaining witness, whose salary was eventually
released and whose position was restored in the plantilla, was negligible; undue injury
entails damages that are more than necessary or are excessive, improper or illegal. xxi In
Alejandro, the Court held that the hospital employees were not caused undue injury, as
they were in fact paid their salaries.xxii
 Second Issue: No Evident Bad Faith

In the challenged Decision, Respondent Court found evident bad faith on the part of
the petitioner, holding that, without any valid or justifiable reason, accused withheld the
payment of complainants salaries and other benefits for almost two (2) years,
demonstrating a clear manifestation of bad faith.xxiii It then brushed aside the petitioners
defenses that complainant failed to submit money and property clearances for her
vouchers, and that an appropriation by the Sangguniang Bayan was required before
complainants vouchers could be approved. It said:xxiv
Secondly, his reliance on the failure of complainant to submit the clearances which
were allegedly necessary for the approval of vouchers is futile in the light of the foregoing
circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
b. The evidence on record shows that complainants salaries for the period from
January to November 1991 (included as subject matter in the mandamus case) were
duly paid, as confirmed in the Sheriffs Return dated November 19, 1991 (Exh. D). This
means that accused, even without the necessary clearance, could have acted upon or
approved complainants disbursement vouchers if he wanted to.
c. It may be true that a clearance is an indispensable requirement before
complainant will be paid of her claims, but accused could not just hide behind the cloak
of the clearance requirement in order to exculpate himself from liability. As the approving
officer, it was his duty to direct complainant to submit the same. Moreover, accused could
not just set aside the obligation he voluntarily imposed upon himself when he entered
into a compromise agreement binding himself to sign complainants vouchers without any
qualification as to the clearance requirement. Perforce, he could have seen to it that
complainant secured the same in order that he could comply with the said obligation.
xxx xxx xxx
Fourthly, accuseds contention that the delay in the release of complainants claim
could not be attributed to him because the vouchers were only submitted to him for his
signature on December 24-27, 1992; that the approval of the budget
appropriations/resolutions depends on the Sangguniang Bayan, Budget Officer and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, is unavailing.
As revealed in the alleged newly discovered evidence themselves, particularly x x x
SB Res. No. 202 and Appropriation Ordinance No. 035, both dated May 21, 1990 (Exh.
5-a- Motion), the Sangguniang Bayan appropriated a budget of P5M in the General Fund
for calendar year 1991 [the Budget Officer does not approve the budget but assists the
Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan in the preparation of the budget (Sec. 475,
Local Government Code of 1991)]. Complainants claims consisted of her salaries and
other benefits for 1990 and 1991 which were classified as Current Operating
Expenditures chargeable against the General Fund. It is undisputed that she was holding
her position as Assistant Municipal Treasurer in a permanent capacity (her position was
also designated Assistant Department Head), which was included in the plantilla for
calender years 1990 and 1991 (Exhs. 4-a & '4-b', Motion). In Program Appropriation and
Obligation by Object (Exhs. 4-c & 4-c, Motion), appropriations were made for current
operating expenditures to which complainants claims properly appertained. xxx. Verily,
 complainants claims were covered by appropriations duly approved by the officials
concerned, signifying that adequate funds were available for the purpose. In fact, even
complainants claims for her 13th month pay, cash gift and clothing allowance, subject
matter of Disbursement Voucher marked Exhibit J which would need a supplemental
budget was covered by Supplemental Budget No. 5 for CY 1990 duly approved by the
authorities concerned as shown in the voucher itself. This means that the said claim was
already obligated (funds were already reserved for it) as of calendar year 1990. xxxx. It
is clear, then, that as regards availability of funds, there was no obstacle for the release
of all the complainants claims.
The Court disagrees. Respondent Court cannot shift the blame on the petitioner,
when it was the complainant who failed to submit the required clearance. This
requirement, which the complainant disregarded, was even printed at the back of the very
vouchers sought to be approved. As assistant municipal treasurer, she ought to know that
this is a condition for the payment of her claims. This clearance is required by Article
443 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code of
1991:
Art. 443. Property Clearances When an employee transfers to another government
office, retires, resigns, is dismissed, or is separated from the service, he shall be required
to secure supplies or property clearance from the supply officer concerned, the provincial
or city general services officer concerned, the municipal mayor and the municipal
treasurer, or the punong barangay and the barangay treasurer, as the case may be. The
local chief executive shall prescribe the property clearance form for this purpose.
For her own failure to submit the required clearance, complainant is not entirely
blameless for the delay in the approval of her claims.
Also, given the lack of corresponding appropriation ordinance and certification of
availability of funds for such purpose, petitioner had the duty not to sign the vouchers.
As chief executive of the municipality Llorente could not have approved the voucher for
the payment of complainants salaries under Sec. 344, Local Government Code of 1991. xxv
Also, Appropriation Ordinance No. 020xxvi adding a supplemental budget for calendar year
1990 was approved on April 10, 1989, or almost a year before complainant was
transferred back to Sindangan. Hence, she could not have been included therein. SB
Resolution No. 202 and Appropriation Ordinance No. 035,xxvii which fixed the municipal
budget for calendar year 1991, was passed only on May 21, 1990, or almost another year
after the transfer took effect. The petitioners failure to approve the complainants vouchers
was therefore due to some legal obstacles,xxviii and not entirely without reason. Thus,
evident bad faith cannot be completely imputed to him.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a
breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature
of fraud. (Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 8 NE 2nd Series, 895, 1007). It contemplates
a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self interest
or ill will for ulterior purposes (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155, 166-167). Evident
bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or
cause damage. xxix
In Jacinto, evident bad faith was not appreciated because the actions taken by the
accused were not entirely without rhyme or reason; he refused to release the
complainants salary because the latter failed to submit her daily time record; he refused
to approve her sick-leave application because he found out that she did not suffer any
illness; and he removed her name from the plantilla because she was moonlighting during
office hours. Such actions were measures taken by a superior against an erring employee
who studiously ignored, if not defied, his authority.xxx
In Alejandro, evident bad faith was ruled out, because the accused gave his approval
to the questioned disbursement after relying on the certification of the bookkeeper on the
availability of funds for such disbursement.xxxi

Third Issue: Interpretation of Causing

The Court does not completely agree with petitioners assertion that the imputed act
does not fall under Sec. 3[e] which, according to him, requires a positive act -- a
malfeasance or misfeasance. Causing means to be the cause or occasion of, to effect as
an agent, to bring into existence, to make or to induce, to compel.xxxii Causing is, therefore,
not limited to positive acts only. Even passive acts or inaction may cause undue injury.
What is essential is that undue injury, which is quantifiable and demonstrable, results from
the questioned official act or inaction.
In this case, the prosecution accused petitioner of failing or refusing to pay
complainants salaries on time, while Respondent Court convicted him of unduly delaying
the payment of complainants claims. As already explained, both acts did not, however,
legally result in undue injury or in giving any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, [or] administrative x x x functions. Thus, these
acts are not punishable under Sec. 3[e].
It would appear that petitioners failure or refusal to act on the complainants vouchers,
or the delay in his acting on them more properly falls under Sec. 3[f]:
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient
justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the
purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some
pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for purpose of favoring his own interest or
giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.
Here, the neglect or refusal to act within a reasonable time is the criminal act, not the
causing of undue injury. Thus, its elements are:
1) The offender is a public officer;
2) Said officer has neglected or has refused to act without sufficient justification
after due demand or request has been made on him;
3) Reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request without the public
officer having acted on the matter pending before him; and
4) Such failure to so act is for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly,
from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or
 advantage in favor of an interested party, or discriminating against another. xxxiii
However, petitioner is not charged with a violation of Sec. 3[f]. Hence, further disquisition
is not proper. Neither may this Court convict petitioner under Sec. 3[f] without violating
his constitutional right to due process.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner is ACQUITTED of
violating Section 3[e] of R.A. 3019, as amended. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

i
Records, p. 1; the information was signed by Special Prosecution Officer II Luz L. Quiones-Marcos of the
Office of the Special Prosecutor.
ii
Records, p. 60.
iii
First Division is composed of J. Minita Chico-Nazario, ponente; PJ. Francis E. Garchitorena and J. Jose
S. Balajadia, concurring.
iv
Rollo, pp. 56-57.
v
Rollo, p. 72.
vi
The case was deemed submitted for resolution upon filing of the memorandum for Respondent Court on December
11, 1997 by the Office of the Ombudsman.
vii
Rollo, pp. 39-44.
viii
Rollo, pp. 259-266; the memorandum for the petitioner was signed by Atty. Ruben E. Agpalo.
ix
SEC. 318. Preparation of the Budget by the Local Chief Executive. Upon receipt of the statements of
income and expenditures from the treasurer, the budget proposals of the heads of departments and offices,
and estimates of income and budgetary ceilings from the local finance committee, the local chief executive
shall prepare the executive budget for the ensuing fiscal year in accordance with the provisions of this Title.
The local chief executive shall submit the said executive budget to the sanggunian concerned not
later than the sixteenth (16th) of October of the current fiscal year. Failure to submit such budget on the
date prescribed herein shall subject the local chief executive to such criminal and administrative penalties
as provided for under this Code and other applicable laws.
SEC. 320. Effectivity of Budgets. The ordinance enacting the annual budget shall take effect at
the beginning of the ensuing calendar year. An ordinance enacting a supplemental budget, however, shall
take effect upon its approval or on the date fixed therein.
The responsibility for the execution of the annual and supplemental budgets and the
accountability therefor shall be vested primarily in the local chief executive concerned.
SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation xxxx The
municipal mayor shall:
(3) xxx xxx xxx
(ii) Prepare and submit to the sanggunian for approval the executive and supplemental budgets of
the municipality for the [ensuing] calendar years in the manner provided for under Title Five, Book II of
this Code.
x
Rollo, p. 266.
xi
Ponce de Leon vs. Sandiganbayan, 186 SCRA 745, 754, June 25, 1990; Pecho vs. Sandiganbayan,
238 SCRA 116, 128, November 14, 1994; Jacinto vs. Sandiganbayan, 178 SCRA 254, 259, October 2,
1989; and Medija, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 218 SCRA 219, 223, January 29, 1993.
xii
Rollo, p. 140; the 30-page Manifestation in Lieu of Comment of the OSG, dated March 6, 1996, was
signed by then Solicitor General Raul I. Goco, Asst. Solicitor General Romeo C. dela Cruz and Solicitor
Karl B. Miranda.
xiii
170 SCRA 400, 405, February 20, 1989.
xiv
Supra.
xv
Pecho vs. Sandiganbayan, supra at p. 133.
xvi
Art. 2199, Civil Code; Nolledo, Civil Code of the Philippines, 10th ed., Vol. V, p. 927; and Gonzales-
Decano, Notes on Torts and Damages, 1992 ed., pp. 141 & 144.
xvii
Tolentino, The Civil Code, Vol. V, 1992 ed., pp. 633-634.
xviii
Ibid.
xix
TSN, August 9, 1994, p. 3.
xx
Fuentes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 430, 438, February 9, 1996; People vs. Fabrigas, 261
SCRA 436, 448, September 5, 1996.
xxi
Jacinto vs. Sandiganbayan, supra at p. 259.
xxii
Alejandro vs. People, supra at p. 405.
xxiii
Rollo, p. 56.
xxiv
Ibid., pp. 65-68.
xxv
SEC. 344. Certification on, and Approval of, Vouchers.No money shall be disbursed unless the local
budget officer certifies to the existence of appropriation that has been legally made for the purpose, the
local accountant has obligated said appropriation, and the local treasurer certifies to the availability of funds
for the purpose. Vouchers and payrolls shall be certified to and approved by the head of the department or
office who has administrative control of the fund concerned, as to validity, propriety, and legality of the claim
involved. Except in cases of disbursements involving regularly recurring administrative expenses such as
payrolls for regular or permanent employees, xxx, approval of the disbursement voucher by the local chief
executive himself shall be required whenever local funds are disbursed.
xxx xxx xxx.
xxvi
Records, p. 219.
xxvii
Records, pp. 322-323.
xxviii
Baldivia vs. Lota, 107 Phil 1099, 1103 [1960]; and Discanso vs. Gatmaytan, 109 Phil 816, 920-921
[1960].
xxix
Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan, 185 SCRA 346, 349, May 14, 1990.
xxx
Jacinto vs. Sandiganbayan, supra at p. 260.
xxxi
Alejandro vs. Sandiganbayan, supra at p. 405.
xxxii
Pecho vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, p. 135.
xxxiii
Coronado vs. Sandiganbayan, 225 SCRA 406, 409-410, August 18, 1993; and Nessia vs. Fermin,
220 SCRA 615, 621-622, March 30, 1993.