Strategy & Leadership

Winning through innovation

Michael L. Tushman,
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 EDITOR'S NOTE: THIS ARTICLE IS BASED ON PROFESSOR TUSHMAN'S
WELL-RECEIVED PRESENTATION AT THE 1997 INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON, D.C., IN APRIL.
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Winning
Through
Innovation by Michael L. Tushman
Michael Tushman is Phillip Hettleman Professor of Business at the Graduate
School of Business, Columbia University. He is the co-author with Charles A.
O'Reilly III of Winning Through Innovation: A Practical Guide to Leading
Organizational Change and Renewal (Harvard Business School Press, 1997).

S t r a t e g y & Leadership J u l y / A u g u s t 1997

14
 s e e m e d , had to die before
" I m a g i n e a valley in the westernmost part of they could be reborn.
the United States, a valley surrounded by T h e expected role of
universities. Lots of entrepreneurs rush
"Once a firm gains con-
managers and corporate
into this valley—most fail, a few succeed; officers is not to oversee
more technical change occurs, more entre­ trol if a productclassin the destruction of firms
preneurs come—most fail, a few succeed." so they can be reborn,
With these words, one of my doctoral stu­ an industry, if often it's to make sure that
dents began his dissertation. H e had conducted his death doesn't happen.
research on the 100-year history of the cement industry. Hayek, a Lebanese
T h e valley he is talking about is the Lehigh Valley in
begins to lose in the
immigrant, did what
Pennsylvania in the 1880s. T h e industry in that valley no Swiss manager was
showed exactly the same evolutionary structure as marketplace and excess prepared to do—he
Silicon Valley 100 years later and Switzerland between revolutionized the
1820 and 1980. It seems to make no difference whether profits are Swiss watch industry.
we're talking about cement in the Lehigh In industry after
Valley, mini-computers in California, or industry, leading
watches in Switzerland: the underlying
shifted elswhere." firms almost always
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structure of evolutionary success and become losers. In

failure tends to be the same over my view, their fail­
very long periods of time. ure is not driven
W h e n Winners B e c o m e L o s e r s by the wrong strat­
W. Edwards Deming, a past col­ egy, and it usually has little to do with technolo­
league of mine at Columbia, would gy. We have found that an effective way to get to
start his seminars with a list of indus­ the future is through long periods of incremental
tries and ask his students to cite the change and continuous improvement, broken by rad­
commonalties among them. (See box.) ical, revolutionary change that leads to further incre­
While they may have a number of features in mental change, which will be interrupted by a subse­
common, Deming's primary point was that these are quent revolutionary event. T h e s e revolutions are trig­
industries in which the leaders very quickly became gered by discontinuous environmental shifts, only one of
losers. H e would then impress the audience with the which might be technology.
importance of continuous improvement. But there is T h e time between the revolutionary events
another instructive point in looking at these industries: depends on the industry itself. In high-tech industries
once a firm gains control of a product class in an indus­ like computers, the time is very short; in low-tech indus­
try, it often begins to lose in the marketplace and excess tries like cement, it's long. But the underlying pattern
profits are shifted elsewhere. of incremental change followed by revolution applies
T h i s point is illustrated very clearly in the classic across industries.
story of the Swiss watch industry. In 1970, there were Long-term success has to do with managing streams
1600 firms gainfully employing 90,000 people in watch­ of innovation rather than singular innovation events.
making. At the time, the Swiss controlled about 90 per­ Driving innovation streams is like juggling a set of balls,
cent of the world's watch market. Within a ten-year peri­ and it requires multiple organizational architectures
od, half of those firms had gone out of business, and inside a single business unit.
roughly 50,000 people lost their jobs. T h i s was a busi­
ness catastrophe and a national catastrophe. WHAT DO THESE INDUSTRIES HAVE IN COMMON?
What happened? Did they have the wrong strategy? Watches Financial Services
T h e wrong technology? T h e wrong management? Or Automobiles Food Processors
was it just bad luck? In this case, watchmaking technol­ Industrial Robots
Cameras
ogy changed, but the Swiss didn't accept the change. Srereo Equipment
Color Television Sets
T h e y had invented the quartz movement, but they
Hand Tools Athletic Equipment
didn't take advantage of it. Ten years later, Nicholas
Radial Tires Consulting Services
Hayek, with help from the Swiss banks, created a new
Microwave Ovens Optical Equipment
Swiss firm, S \ I H , that used the new technology to
Machine Tools Medical Instruments
become the number-one watch producer worldwide—
Electric Motors Computer Chips
the maker of Swatch watches. T h e Swiss companies, it
Airlines Photocopiers

S t r a t e g y & Leadership J u l y / A u g u s t 1997

15
 The Evolution of Organizational Architectures them. In industry after industry, the response of first-
Leaders help their organizations clarify strategy—to make class players almost always has been pathological.
choices about the breadth of product and service offer­ Structural inertia caused by factors located deep in the
ings, target customers, technology strategy, competitive technical infrastructure and executive team can make a
timing, and the strategic intent, vision, or aspirations for a firm great today but can kill it tomorrow. At a company
business unit. In our book, Charles O'Reilly and I call called American Bell, Alexander Graham Bell worked
these the "axioms" of an organization. But strategy with the people at
and vision statements, by themselves, are just "Internal forces forstabilitythatWestern Union to invent
words; almost all firms these days have well-articu­ the telephone. Company
lated visions and strategies—relatively few execute. executives, believing
Execution depends upon how managers use the and present success run headlong that "any business com­
organization's processes, structures, rewards, sys­ munication without a
tems, roles, competencies, and culture. Success hard copy is a joke,"
comes in the short-term, because organizations are demand c h a n g e . " gave away the patents to
managed for internal congruence and consistency. a company soon to be
Then, these organizations start to grow so they called AT&T.
can handle higher volume. But, the only way To be successful over
they can handle high volume throughput time, a company must be
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is by installing structure, bureaucracy, able to reorganize and rede­

controls, systems, rewards, and pro­ fine itself to stay in sync
cedures for resource allocation. with external forces and
Whether a business is making events. For example, General
dinners, training students, or Radio was formed in 1915 with a
assembling computer chips or particular strategy: it was a high-
automobiles, the only way its price, high-quality, test-equipment
managers can develop internal company. It was dominated by engi­
congruence for handling high neering, and it had a loose functional
volume is by building these structure and a tradition of internal pro­
technical systems in the service motion. Its strategy, structure, people,
of a strategy. That's good news for and processes were internally congruent.
today, but bad news for tomorrow, By the end of World War II, it was the
because with structure, bureaucracy, largest, most profitable test-equipment com­
and systems also comes "structural pany in the world.
inertia." After the war, however, new firms like
Firms also get older. The older an Hewlett-Packard and Tektronics moved into
organization becomes, the more it this product class. General Radio began to
develops myths, stories, and histories. decline, and by the early '70s, this once-great firm
People begin saying things like "experience teaches had lost 80 percent of its market share. By 1972, it
us. . . ." When the world is shifting, experience does not had actually lost money. In 1973, a new general
teach us well. The older an organization becomes, the manager took over. He changed the strategy to focus on
more its people tend to develop a paradigm of the way three product lines instead of 20. The balance of power
work should be done and a certain pomposity and arro­ shifted away from engineering toward marketing and
gance about what they are doing. operations, and the loose, functional organization took on
Inertia and arrogance are benign as long as the envi­ a complex, matrix structure. New executives were
ronment is stable or moving incrementally. But when the brought in from the outside, and the name of the firm
environment moves rapidly, inertia becomes profoundly changed to GenRad.
pathological. When an environment shifts in a discontin­ In one year, strategy, structure, people, and process
uous way, the response of high-inertia systems is almost changed. It became a totally different organization. In the
always increased conformity, increased commitment to long history of General Radio, we see a 55-year period of
the status quo, and decreased vigilant problem-solving. continuous improvement, broken by a revolution, leading
When refrigeration was introduced, the ice industry to a period of incremental change. That revolutionary
responded with a 300 percent improvement in ways of break was driven by the imminent collapse of the firm.
cutting, storing, and shipping ice. Xerox's initial Demography of the Senior Team
response to low-end Japanese competition was to make Structural inertia comes not only from organizational archi­
more Xerox machines the way they had been making tecture but also from the executive team itself. Executive

Strategy & Leadership J u l y / A u g u s t 1997

16
 succession is a powerful force in organizational revolution. Managing Streams of Innovation
Some interesting research has shown that the performance Great companies compete successfully over time by man­
of a given firm is associated with the group age of its exec­ aging innovation streams: processes for incremental, archi­
utive team—not the age of specific members of the team, tectural, and radical innovations. These streams of innova­
but how long the team has been in place. Very young tion allow them to enter new markets with existing prod­
teams don't do well. Performance gradually improves until ucts and to proactively introduce substitute products that
the teams peak at an average group age of 3.5 years. As can create new markets and rewrite industry rules.
senior teams get older, performance generally declines. Managing streams of innovation requires an ambidex­
One of the cement companies in our research, the trous organization that can do two fundamentally differ­
Colorado Portland Cement Company, was founded in ent things simultaneously and well. It calls for managers
1900. The company was led by a four-man senior team who can maintain consistency and encourage continuous
that was in place for 32 years. Imagine the group process improvement in current offerings, while at the same
within that team: old stories, not much conflict, not much time allowing the flexibility and experimentation that
dissent. As long as the environment was stable, the con­ help the firm create or respond to radical shifts in the
gruence between the company's strategy, structure, peo­ environment. The organization must host multiple, con­
ple, and process was great. But when the economic crash tradictory structures and cultures held in alignment by a
hit in 1929 and a new way of making cement came along single vision and management team. Ambidextrous orga­
in the early 1930s, this team didn't have a clue, and the nizations are usually decentralized but have strong finan­
company quickly went out of business. The inertia in the
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cial and social controls.

senior team had to be part of the reason for the failure. Understanding the basic evolutionary cycles of a tech­
Successful companies must work to keep the group age of nology can help an organization predict the timing of
their executive teams relatively young. radical change. The cycle begins with a technological
Another factor for success is diversity in the senior discontinuity—the discovery or invention of a new possi­
team. For example, Prime Computer was a successful bility. (See Exhibit 1.) As the product class opens, there
company in the mini-computer product class through the is a high rate of innovation. When a dominant design is
late '80s. The company was born in 1971 and had a mix­ selected or an industry standard is established, variation
ture of skills at the top. There was a manufacturing per­ ceases. Now the product enters the retention stage—a
son, an R&D person, a marketing person—a heteroge­
neous team. This team decided to be a high-price, high-
quality, semi-conductor-memory, mini-computer firm sell­
ing through original equipment manufacturers (OEM). At
this point, Prime was dominated by engineering and had a
simple, functional organization. By 1975 the company had
$11 million in sales.
But in 1975 the first team left, and a new executive
team came in with new strategy, structure, people, and
process. Prime changed its product line; its target cus­
tomers changed from the OEMs alone to OEMs and end-
users; the balance of power shifted from engineering to
sales; and the structure and incentives of the organization
changed. Under its new leadership, the firm exploded in
its product class. It grew so rapidly that by 1981, its sales
reached $267 million.
In 1981, it happened again. New senior management
came in, and strategy, structure, people, and process
changed once more. Instead of a 15-year-old firm, the com­
pany evolved as three, completely different, five-year-old
firms: Prime I, Prime II, and Prime III. Each transition at
Prime was associated with revolutionary organizational
change and new senior teams.
Managing discontinuous change is fundamentally period of incremental change and architectural innova­
different from managing incremental change. The most tion. At the same time, process innovation begins with
successful teams can manage both. However, executive improvements in how the product is produced and deliv­
team succession is often associated with periods of ered. Eventually, another technological discontinuity
radical change. occurs and the cycles begin again.

Strategy & Leadership July/August 1997

17
 product, service, and process innovation and is, in turn,
punctured by a subsequent substitution event. In this
"Every once in a while, the senior team must stage, for example, if someone begins making the same
make a bet. As leaders, they must break out thing you make but at one-tenth the cost, you're fin­
of the forces for stability that come from ished. For example, when Pilkington developed the
today's success and be willing to make a bet
float-glass process for making flat glass, the price went
on these punctuated changes."
from a dollar per sheet to a penny per sheet. In that
process revolution, the product itself was transformed.
Glass was no longer expensive—it became so cheap that
whole buildings could be made from it. Once the
Japanese figured out how to make a watch with an incre­
mental cost of almost zero, it was no longer a timepiece,
The automobile industry offers a wonderful example it became fashion. When one of these watches breaks,
of this evolutionary process. At the turn of century, there the customer throws it away and buys five or six new
were no automobiles. Then, there was tremendous varia­ ones. Process discontinuities transform the product itself
tion with Stanley Steamers, internal combustion engines, and kick off the next evolutionary wave of variation,
and battery-powered automobiles. At Ford there was the selection, and retention. Across all industries, the timing
Model A, the Model B, change and more change, until of these evolutionary cycles is getting tighter and tighter.
Ford decided to make a bet on the Model T. The Model This innovation game also occurs at the subsystem
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T wasn't the standard upfront, it became the standard, and level of complicated products and services. For example,
variation stopped. The internal combustion engine had every watch has several subsystems: something that pro­
won the variation game. The cost of the car went from vides energy, something that oscillates, something that
$1500 to $500, and it became a car for the masses. This links the oscillation to the face, and a case to hold it all
standard was, in turn, substituted by General Motors' together. In 1970, the actions of variation, selection, and
fully enclosed auto. retention occurred in a battle to control a core subsys­
The first juncture in the evolution of a product class is tem—the oscillation. A core subsystem is central to the
the closing on a standard—the shift from an era of fer­ product—if it is removed it has cascading implications
ment to an era of incremental change. That juncture is for the rest of the product or service. A business unit
crucial. When Windows became the dominant design in must never lose control of the core subsystems in its
the operating system of PCs, Apple and IBM dropped in products or services.
that product class, and Bill Gates became the single rich­ In real time, no one in the watch industry knew which
est person in the United States. oscillation technology would become dominant—after the
In the stage of variation, it's not a technology game fact, of course, everyone knew it was quartz. Technical
alone. It's partly technology, partly lobbying in and social inertia in organizations often impede perceiving
Washington, and partly coalitions with suppliers, vendors, the need for action as well as the action itself. Internal
and customers. The consequences of losing control of a forces for stability that come from a company's past and
core subsystem are catastrophic. Look at the world of present success run headlong into outside forces that
hand-held phones. There's a European standard, an demand change. As a result, firms often find it difficult to
American standard, and a Japanese standard. One will take a product to new markets, to add new subsystems to
become the global standard. If you're Ericsson you want it an existing product, or to adjust to new technologies that
to be Ericsson; if you're Nokia you want it to be Nokia; if affect their products or services.
you're Lucent you want it to be Lucent. This is a pro­ In juggling streams of innovation, today's managers
foundly political game that is crucial in the evolution of a must deal with political issues, global competition, and
product class. the time path of technological change in their particular
These ideas come from evolutionary biology, except product classes. Revolutionary change, as described in
that this is not natural selection, it is competitively driven the General Radio example, is often reactive, driven by
selection in which actions taken by firms actually shape a crisis in performance. In other cases such as Prime, rev­
the time path of technological change. These actions are olutionary change is driven proactively by the vision of a
not taken inside the firm but on the environment out­ strategic leader and his or her team, who follow external
side—it's senior managers shaping the outside world. events and are determined to move before change is
After the standard is selected, there is a period of forced on them. At Prime, it was the board of directors
incremental change. It's the period of bells, buzzers, that provided that vision and energy. In multi-divisional
whistles, sizes, shapes, and packaging. This is the mature firms, it's often the corporate officers who see the need
stage of a product class that is driven by incremental for radical change.

S t r a t e g y & Leadership J u l y / A u g u s t 1997

18
 Building Luck into the Organization tion is a world of "please fail"—by making many small
Some firms win over time because they're systematically mistakes, the organization learns. In this world, the
more lucky than the competition. You actually can maxi­ very language of quality may get in the way. Unless the
mize the probability that your business unit will be more environment is stable, TQM maximizes short-term,
lucky than its competition. Senior managers are paid incremental improvement, yet truncates innovation
more than others in their companies because they must streams because it seeks to remove variance. Once you
make profound strategic bets on behalf of their firms. If make a bet on one of the variations, you begin to build
they make the wrong bet, even if it's at the right time your luck. You enter the world of retention—the world
and executed well, their business units pay a severe of "never make mistakes." T h e cost of mistakes in this
price. By building an ambidextrous organization, moni­ world is catastrophic. These worlds must be allowed to
toring technology cycles, and managing streams of inno­ operate in parallel within a given organization.
vation, an executive team can systematically make these For the senior team who holds it all together, manag­
bets more effective than the competition. ing streams of innovation is like juggling three, four, or
Yet, these bets take place in a context of uncertainly. A five balls simultaneously. It takes great skill to be able to
company called General Automation was three times larg­ articulate a single, clear vision for the enitre unit while,
er than Prime in 1974, and it faced the same competitive at the same time, fostering multiple organizational struc­
turbulence. General Automation, too, had a visionary tures within the unit.
manager, Larry Goshorn. Goshorn bet his company on the Almost always, today kills tomorrow, big kills little,
silicon-on-sapphire technology. It turned out to be a poor and centralized kills decentralized. Today's mainframe
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bet, and he was asked to leave. A new executive came in world tries to kill tomorrow's PCs. Given the learnings
to bring the company back to where it was in 1974 and to from ambidextrous organizations, every once in a while
make up for five years of lost competitive time. the senior team must make a bet. As leaders, they must
In retrospect, it is easy to say that Larry Goshorn was break out of the forces for stability that come from
a poor manager and Bill Fisher at Prime was a transfor­ today's success and be willing to make a bet on these
mational leader, a visionary executive. We know from punctuated changes. Managers must build organizational
some research in this area that in real time it is impossi­ capabilities such that their firms are systematically more
ble to distinguish the fool from the hero; these "facts" consistent and lucky than the competition.
are only known after the fact. Indeed, the behavioral Innovation streams and puncutated change seem to be
characteristics of transformational leaders arc exactly the a worldwide phenomenon. As companies move through
same as the behavioral characteristics of failed managers! innovation streams, they find it is better to make these
Winning Through Innovation revolutionary changes before being forced to make them.
In today's watch industry, Nicholas Hayek's firm is the When Percy Barnevik brought together ABB, he treated it
dominant watch producer worldwide. SMH controls the as a revolution, not as incremental change. IBM should
low end of the market with Swatch, the middle with have begun its revolution ten years prior to Gerstner. The
Omega, and the high end with Blanepain. Hayek does it Swiss should have done it ten years before Nick Hayek.
by managing streams of innovation to shape the But organizational inertia was too powerful.
product class. Today's senior teams must manage inherent inconsis­
To manage these streams of innovation as Hayek tencies consistently if they are to manage innovation and
does, one must build two fundamentally different orga­ change. They must be architects, building fit, consistent,
nizational architectures in the same business unit to and congruent structures and cultures to execute tasks in
operate, not sequentially, but at the same time. The the service of vision and strategy. They must be network
kind of strategy, structure, people, and process that are builders, shaping coalitions to manage revolutionary
required in a mature era of incremental change of a change and to close on standards in a product class. And
product class is fundamentally different than the kind of they must be skilled artists as they juggle contradictory
strategy, structure, people, and process required in an era strategies, structures, competencies, and cultures in the
of ferment. It is not portfolio management, it is an service of both incremental and discontinuous innova­
ambidextrous organization—an organization that has dif­ tion. While difficult, great firms like Microsoft seem to
ferent cultures, structures, competencies, and processes be able to build ambidextrous organizations and manage
operating in the same business unit at the same time. discontinuous and incremental change in the service of
winning through innovation. ■
The only way to break out of the internal forces for
inertia is by juggling sets of competencies inside the
business unit, or by establishing alliances, joint ven­
tures, partnerships, or internal venturing—creating an
organization that has multiple strategies, multiple com­
petencies, and multiple structures. T h e world of varia­

Strategy & Leadership J u l y / A u g u s t 1997

19
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