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Vault 7: CIA Hacking Tools

Revealed

Releases ▼ (https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/index.html) Documents ▼

(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/index.html)

Contents

• Press Release
• Analysis
• Examples
• Frequently Asked Questions

Press Release
Today, Tuesday 7 March 2017, WikiLeaks begins its new series of leaks on the
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Code-named "Vault 7" by WikiLeaks, it is the
largest ever publication of confidential documents on the agency.

The first full part of the series, "Year Zero", comprises 8,761 documents and
files from an isolated, high-security network situated inside the CIA's Center for
Cyber Intelligence (https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/files/org-chart.png) in Langley,
Virgina. It follows an introductory disclosure last month of CIA targeting French
political parties and candidates in the lead up to the 2012 presidential election
(https://wikileaks.org/cia-france-elections-2012).

Recently, the CIA lost control of the majority of its hacking arsenal including
malware, viruses, trojans, weaponized "zero day" exploits, malware remote
control systems and associated documentation. This extraordinary collection,
which amounts to more than several hundred million lines of code, gives its
possessor the entire hacking capacity of the CIA. The archive appears to have
been circulated among former U.S. government hackers and contractors in an
unauthorized manner, one of whom has provided WikiLeaks with portions of
the archive.

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"Year Zero" introduces the scope and direction of the CIA's global covert
hacking program, its malware arsenal and dozens of "zero day" weaponized
exploits against a wide range of U.S. and European company products,
include Apple's iPhone, Google's Android and Microsoft's Windows and even
Samsung TVs, which are turned into covert microphones.

Since 2001 the CIA has gained political and budgetary preeminence over the
U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). The CIA found itself building not just its
now infamous drone fleet, but a very different type of covert, globe-spanning
force — its own substantial fleet of hackers. The agency's hacking division
freed it from having to disclose its often controversial operations to the NSA
(its primary bureaucratic rival) in order to draw on the NSA's hacking
capacities.

By the end of 2016, the CIA's hacking division, which formally falls under the
agency's Center for Cyber Intelligence (https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/files/org-
chart.png) (CCI), had over 5000 registered users and had produced more than
a thousand hacking systems, trojans, viruses, and other "weaponized"
malware. Such is the scale of the CIA's undertaking that by 2016, its hackers
had utilized more code than that used to run Facebook. The CIA had created,
in effect, its "own NSA" with even less accountability and without publicly
answering the question as to whether such a massive budgetary spend on
duplicating the capacities of a rival agency could be justified.

In a statement to WikiLeaks the source details policy questions that they say
urgently need to be debated in public, including whether the CIA's hacking
capabilities exceed its mandated powers and the problem of public oversight of
the agency. The source wishes to initiate a public debate about the security,
creation, use, proliferation and democratic control of cyberweapons.

Once a single cyber 'weapon' is 'loose' it can spread around the world in
seconds, to be used by rival states, cyber mafia and teenage hackers alike.

Julian Assange, WikiLeaks editor stated that "There is an extreme proliferation

risk in the development of cyber 'weapons'. Comparisons can be drawn
between the uncontrolled proliferation of such 'weapons', which results from
the inability to contain them combined with their high market value, and the
global arms trade. But the significance of "Year Zero" goes well beyond the
choice between cyberwar and cyberpeace. The disclosure is also exceptional
from a political, legal and forensic perspective."

Wikileaks has carefully reviewed the "Year Zero" disclosure and published
substantive CIA documentation while avoiding the distribution of 'armed'
cyberweapons until a consensus emerges on the technical and political nature

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of the CIA's program and how such 'weapons' should analyzed, disarmed and
published.

Wikileaks has also decided to redact and anonymise some identifying

information in "Year Zero" for in depth analysis. These redactions include ten
of thousands of CIA targets and attack machines throughout Latin America,
Europe and the United States. While we are aware of the imperfect results of
any approach chosen, we remain committed to our publishing model and note
that the quantity of published pages in "Vault 7" part one (“Year Zero”) already
eclipses the total number of pages published over the first three years of the
Edward Snowden NSA leaks.

Analysis
CIA malware targets iPhone, Android, smart
TVs
CIA malware and hacking tools are built by EDG (Engineering Development
Group), a software development group within CCI (Center for Cyber
Intelligence), a department belonging to the CIA's DDI (Directorate for Digital
Innovation). The DDI is one of the five major directorates of the CIA (see this
organizational chart (https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/files/org-chart.png) of the
CIA for more details).

The EDG is responsible for the development, testing and operational support
of all backdoors, exploits, malicious payloads, trojans, viruses and any other
kind of malware used by the CIA in its covert operations world-wide.

The increasing sophistication of surveillance techniques has drawn

comparisons with George Orwell's 1984, but "Weeping Angel", developed by
the CIA's Embedded Devices Branch (EDB)
(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/space_753667.html), which infests smart
TVs, transforming them into covert microphones, is surely its most emblematic
realization.

The attack against Samsung smart TVs

(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_12353643.html) was developed in
cooperation with the United Kingdom's MI5/BTSS. After infestation, Weeping
Angel places the target TV in a 'Fake-Off' mode, so that the owner falsely
believes the TV is off when it is on. In 'Fake-Off' mode the TV operates as a
bug, recording conversations in the room and sending them over the Internet
to a covert CIA server.

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As of October 2014 the CIA was also looking at infecting the vehicle control
systems used by modern cars and trucks
(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_13763790.html). The purpose of such
control is not specified, but it would permit the CIA to engage in nearly
undetectable assassinations.

The CIA's Mobile Devices Branch (MDB) developed numerous attacks to

remotely hack and control popular smart phones
(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/space_3276804.html). Infected phones can
be instructed to send the CIA the user's geolocation, audio and text
communications as well as covertly activate the phone's camera and
microphone.

Despite iPhone's minority share (14.5%) of the global smart phone market in
2016, a specialized unit in the CIA's Mobile Development Branch produces
malware to infest, control and exfiltrate data from iPhones and other Apple
products running iOS, such as iPads
(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/space_2359301.html). CIA's arsenal
includes numerous local and remote "zero days"
(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_13205587.html) developed by CIA or
obtained from GCHQ, NSA, FBI or purchased from cyber arms contractors
such as Baitshop. The disproportionate focus on iOS may be explained by the
popularity of the iPhone among social, political, diplomatic and business elites.

A similar unit targets Google's Android which is used to run the majority of the
world's smart phones (~85%) including Samsung, HTC and Sony
(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/space_11763721.html). 1.15 billion Android
powered phones were sold last year. "Year Zero" shows that as of 2016 the
CIA had 24 "weaponized" Android "zero days"
(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_11629096.html) which it has
developed itself and obtained from GCHQ, NSA and cyber arms contractors.

These techniques permit the CIA to bypass the encryption of WhatsApp,

Signal, Telegram, Wiebo, Confide and Cloackman by hacking the "smart"
phones that they run on and collecting audio and message traffic before
encryption is applied.

CIA malware targets Windows, OSx, Linux,

routers
The CIA also runs a very substantial effort to infect and control Microsoft
Windows users (https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_11628612.html) with
its malware. This includes multiple local and remote weaponized "zero days",
air gap jumping viruses such as "Hammer Drill"

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(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_17072172.html) which infects

software distributed on CD/DVDs, infectors for removable media such as
USBs (https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_13762636.html), systems to
hide data in images (https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_13763247.html)
or in covert disk areas ( "Brutal Kangaroo"
(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_13763236.html)) and to keep its
malware infestations going
(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_13763650.html).

Many of these infection efforts are pulled together by the CIA's Automated
Implant Branch (AIB) (https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/space_3276805.html),
which has developed several attack systems for automated infestation and
control of CIA malware, such as "Assassin" and "Medusa".

Attacks against Internet infrastructure and webservers are developed by the

CIA's Network Devices Branch (NDB)
(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/space_15204355.html).

The CIA has developed automated multi-platform malware attack and control
systems covering Windows, Mac OS X, Solaris, Linux and more, such as
EDB's "HIVE" and the related "Cutthroat" and "Swindle" tools, which are
described in the examples section below.

CIA 'hoarded' vulnerabilities ("zero days")

In the wake of Edward Snowden's leaks about the NSA, the U.S. technology
industry secured a commitment from the Obama administration that the
executive would disclose on an ongoing basis — rather than hoard — serious
vulnerabilities, exploits, bugs or "zero days" to Apple, Google, Microsoft, and
other US-based manufacturers.

Serious vulnerabilities not disclosed to the manufacturers places huge swathes

of the population and critical infrastructure at risk to foreign intelligence or
cyber criminals who independently discover or hear rumors of the vulnerability.
If the CIA can discover such vulnerabilities so can others.

The U.S. government's commitment to the Vulnerabilities Equities Process

(https://is.gd/vepvep) came after significant lobbying by US technology
companies, who risk losing their share of the global market over real and
perceived hidden vulnerabilities. The government stated that it would disclose
all pervasive vulnerabilities discovered after 2010 on an ongoing basis.

"Year Zero" documents show that the CIA breached the Obama
administration's commitments. Many of the vulnerabilities used in the CIA's
cyber arsenal are pervasive and some may already have been found by rival

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intelligence agencies or cyber criminals.

As an example, specific CIA malware revealed in "Year Zero" is able to

penetrate, infest and control both the Android phone and iPhone software that
runs or has run presidential Twitter accounts. The CIA attacks this software by
using undisclosed security vulnerabilities ("zero days") possessed by the CIA
but if the CIA can hack these phones then so can everyone else who has
obtained or discovered the vulnerability. As long as the CIA keeps these
vulnerabilities concealed from Apple and Google (who make the phones) they
will not be fixed, and the phones will remain hackable.

The same vulnerabilities exist for the population at large, including the U.S.
Cabinet, Congress, top CEOs, system administrators, security officers and
engineers. By hiding these security flaws from manufacturers like Apple and
Google the CIA ensures that it can hack everyone &mdsh; at the expense of
leaving everyone hackable.

'Cyberwar' programs are a serious

proliferation risk
Cyber 'weapons' are not possible to keep under effective control.

While nuclear proliferation has been restrained by the enormous costs and
visible infrastructure involved in assembling enough fissile material to produce
a critical nuclear mass, cyber 'weapons', once developed, are very hard to
retain.

Cyber 'weapons' are in fact just computer programs which can be pirated like
any other. Since they are entirely comprised of information they can be copied
quickly with no marginal cost.

Securing such 'weapons' is particularly difficult since the same people who
develop and use them have the skills to exfiltrate copies without leaving traces
— sometimes by using the very same 'weapons' against the organizations that
contain them. There are substantial price incentives for government hackers
and consultants to obtain copies since there is a global "vulnerability market"
that will pay hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars for copies of such
'weapons'. Similarly, contractors and companies who obtain such 'weapons'
sometimes use them for their own purposes, obtaining advantage over their
competitors in selling 'hacking' services.

Over the last three years the United States intelligence sector, which consists
of government agencies such as the CIA and NSA and their contractors, such
as Booz Allan Hamilton, has been subject to unprecedented series of data
exfiltrations by its own workers.

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A number of intelligence community members not yet publicly named have

been arrested or subject to federal criminal investigations in separate
incidents.

Most visibly, on February 8, 2017 a U.S. federal grand jury indicted Harold T.
Martin III with 20 counts of mishandling classified information. The Department
of Justice alleged that it seized some 50,000 gigabytes of information from
Harold T. Martin III that he had obtained from classified programs at NSA and
CIA, including the source code for numerous hacking tools.

Once a single cyber 'weapon' is 'loose' it can spread around the world in
seconds, to be used by peer states, cyber mafia and teenage hackers alike.

U.S. Consulate in Frankfurt is a covert CIA

hacker base
In addition to its operations in Langley, Virginia the CIA also uses the U.S.
consulate in Frankfurt as a covert base for its hackers covering Europe, the
Middle East and Africa.

CIA hackers operating out of the Frankfurt consulate ( "Center for Cyber
Intelligence Europe" (https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_20251151.html)
or CCIE) are given diplomatic ("black") passports and State Department cover.
The instructions for incoming CIA hackers
(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_26607630.html) make Germany's
counter-intelligence efforts appear inconsequential: "Breeze through German
Customs because you have your cover-for-action story down pat, and all they
did was stamp your passport"

Your Cover Story (for this trip)

Q: Why are you here?
A: Supporting technical consultations at the Consulate.

Two earlier WikiLeaks publications give further detail on CIA approaches to

customs (https://wikileaks.org/cia-travel/) and secondary screening procedures
(https://wikileaks.org/cia-travel/).

Once in Frankfurt CIA hackers can travel without further border checks to the
25 European countries that are part of the Shengen open border area —
including France, Italy and Switzerland.

A number of the CIA's electronic attack methods are designed for physical
proximity. These attack methods are able to penetrate high security networks
that are disconnected from the internet, such as police record database. In
these cases, a CIA officer, agent or allied intelligence officer acting under
instructions, physically infiltrates the targeted workplace. The attacker is

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provided with a USB containing malware developed for the CIA for this
purpose, which is inserted into the targeted computer. The attacker then
infects and exfiltrates data to removable media. For example, the CIA attack
system Fine Dining (https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_20251107.html),
provides 24 decoy applications for CIA spies to use. To witnesses, the spy
appears to be running a program showing videos (e.g VLC), presenting slides
(Prezi), playing a computer game (Breakout2, 2048) or even running a fake
virus scanner (Kaspersky, McAfee, Sophos). But while the decoy application is
on the screen, the underlaying system is automatically infected and ransacked.

How the CIA dramatically increased

proliferation risks
In what is surely one of the most astounding intelligence own goals in living
memory, the CIA structured its classification regime such that for the most
market valuable part of "Vault 7" — the CIA's weaponized malware (implants +
zero days), Listening Posts (LP), and Command and Control (C2) systems —
the agency has little legal recourse.

The CIA made these systems unclassified.

Why the CIA chose to make its cyberarsenal unclassified reveals how
concepts developed for military use do not easily crossover to the 'battlefield'
of cyber 'war'.

To attack its targets, the CIA usually requires that its implants communicate
with their control programs over the internet. If CIA implants, Command &
Control and Listening Post software were classified, then CIA officers could be
prosecuted or dismissed for violating rules that prohibit placing classified
information onto the Internet. Consequently the CIA has secretly made most of
its cyber spying/war code unclassified. The U.S. government is not able to
assert copyright either, due to restrictions in the U.S. Constitution. This means
that cyber 'arms' manufactures and computer hackers can freely "pirate" these
'weapons' if they are obtained. The CIA has primarily had to rely on
obfuscation to protect its malware secrets.

Conventional weapons such as missiles may be fired at the enemy (i.e into an
unsecured area). Proximity to or impact with the target detonates the ordnance
including its classified parts. Hence military personnel do not violate
classification rules by firing ordnance with classified parts. Ordnance will likely
explode. If it does not, that is not the operator's intent.

Over the last decade U.S. hacking operations have been increasingly dressed
up in military jargon to tap into Department of Defense funding streams. For
instance, attempted "malware injections" (commercial jargon) or "implant

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drops" (NSA jargon) are being called "fires" as if a weapon was being fired.
However the analogy is questionable.

Unlike bullets, bombs or missiles, most CIA malware is designed to live for
days or even years after it has reached its 'target'. CIA malware does not
"explode on impact" but rather permanently infests its target. In order to infect
target's device, copies of the malware must be placed on the target's devices,
giving physical possession of the malware to the target. To exfiltrate data back
to the CIA or to await further instructions the malware must communicate with
CIA Command & Control (C2) systems placed on internet connected servers.
But such servers are typically not approved to hold classified information, so
CIA command and control systems are also made unclassified.

A successful 'attack' on a target's computer system is more like a series of

complex stock maneuvers in a hostile take-over bid or the careful planting of
rumors in order to gain control over an organization's leadership rather than
the firing of a weapons system. If there is a military analogy to be made, the
infestation of a target is perhaps akin to the execution of a whole series of
military maneuvers against the target's territory including observation,
infiltration, occupation and exploitation.

Evading forensics and anti-virus

A series of standards lay out CIA malware infestation patterns which are likely
to assist forensic crime scene investigators as well as Apple, Microsoft,
Google, Samsung, Nokia, Blackberry, Siemens and anti-virus companies
attribute and defend against attacks.

"Tradecraft DO's and DON'Ts"

(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_14587109.html) contains CIA rules on
how its malware should be written to avoid fingerprints implicating the "CIA, US
government, or its witting partner companies" in "forensic review". Similar
secret standards cover the use of encryption to hide CIA hacker and malware
communication
(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/files/NOD%20Cryptographic%20Requirements%20v1.1%20TOP%20SECRET.pdf)
(pdf), describing targets & exfiltrated data
(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/files/Codex-Spec-v1-SECRET.pdf) (pdf) as
well as executing payloads (https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/files/ICE-Spec-
v3-final-SECRET.pdf) (pdf) and persisting
(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/files/Persisted-DLL-Spec-v2-SECRET.pdf)
(pdf) in the target's machines over time.

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CIA hackers developed successful attacks against most well known anti-virus
programs. These are documented in AV defeats
(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_2064514.html), Personal Security
Products (https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_13762910.html), Detecting
and defeating PSPs (https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_7995642.html)
and PSP/Debugger/RE Avoidance
(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_2621845.html). For example, Comodo
was defeated by CIA malware placing itself in the Window's "Recycle Bin"
(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_5341269.html). While Comodo 6.x
has a "Gaping Hole of DOOM"
(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_5341272.html).

CIA hackers discussed what the NSA's "Equation Group" hackers did wrong
and how the CIA's malware makers could avoid similar exposure
(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_14588809.html).

Examples
The CIA's Engineering Development Group (EDG) management system
contains around 500 different projects (only some of which are documented by
"Year Zero") each with their own sub-projects, malware and hacker tools.

The majority of these projects relate to tools that are used for penetration,
infestation ("implanting"), control, and exfiltration.

Another branch of development focuses on the development and operation of

Listening Posts (LP) and Command and Control (C2) systems used to
communicate with and control CIA implants; special projects are used to target
specific hardware from routers to smart TVs.

Some example projects are described below, but see the table of contents
(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/index.html) for the full list of projects
described by WikiLeaks' "Year Zero".

UMBRAGE
The CIA's hand crafted hacking techniques pose a problem for the agency.
Each technique it has created forms a "fingerprint" that can be used by
forensic investigators to attribute multiple different attacks to the same entity.

This is analogous to finding the same distinctive knife wound on multiple

separate murder victims. The unique wounding style creates suspicion that a
single murderer is responsible. As soon one murder in the set is solved then

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the other murders also find likely attribution.

The CIA's Remote Devices Branch

(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/space_753668.html)'s UMBRAGE group
(https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_2621751.html) collects and maintains
a substantial library (https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_2621753.html) of
attack techniques 'stolen' from malware produced in other states including the
Russian Federation.

With UMBRAGE and related projects the CIA cannot only increase its total
number of attack types but also misdirect attribution by leaving behind the
"fingerprints" of the groups that the attack techniques were stolen from.

UMBRAGE components cover keyloggers, password collection, webcam

capture, data destruction, persistence, privilege escalation, stealth, anti-virus
(PSP) avoidance and survey techniques.

Fine Dining
Fine Dining comes with a standardized questionnaire i.e menu that CIA case
officers fill out. The questionnaire is used by the agency's OSB (Operational
Support Branch (https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/space_1736706.html)) to
transform the requests of case officers into technical requirements for hacking
attacks (typically "exfiltrating" information from computer systems) for specific
operations. The questionnaire allows the OSB to identify how to adapt existing
tools for the operation, and communicate this to CIA malware configuration
staff. The OSB functions as the interface between CIA operational staff and the
relevant technical support staff.

Among the list of possible targets of the collection are 'Asset', 'Liason Asset',
'System Administrator', 'Foreign Information Operations', 'Foreign Intelligence
Agencies' and 'Foreign Government Entities'. Notably absent is any reference
to extremists or transnational criminals. The 'Case Officer' is also asked to
specify the environment of the target like the type of computer, operating
system used, Internet connectivity and installed anti-virus utilities (PSPs) as
well as a list of file types to be exfiltrated like Office documents, audio, video,
images or custom file types. The 'menu' also asks for information if recurring
access to the target is possible and how long unobserved access to the
computer can be maintained. This information is used by the CIA's
'JQJIMPROVISE' software (see below) to configure a set of CIA malware
suited to the specific needs of an operation.

Improvise (JQJIMPROVISE)

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'Improvise' is a toolset for configuration, post-processing, payload setup and

execution vector selection for survey/exfiltration tools supporting all major
operating systems like Windows (Bartender), MacOS (JukeBox) and Linux
(DanceFloor). Its configuration utilities like Margarita allows the NOC (Network
Operation Center) to customize tools based on requirements from 'Fine Dining'
questionairies.

HIVE
HIVE is a multi-platform CIA malware suite and its associated control software.
The project provides customizable implants for Windows, Solaris, MikroTik
(used in internet routers) and Linux platforms and a Listening Post
(LP)/Command and Control (C2) infrastructure to communicate with these
implants.

The implants are configured to communicate via HTTPS with the webserver of
a cover domain; each operation utilizing these implants has a separate cover
domain and the infrastructure can handle any number of cover domains.

Each cover domain resolves to an IP address that is located at a commercial

VPS (Virtual Private Server) provider. The public-facing server forwards all
incoming traffic via a VPN to a 'Blot' server that handles actual connection
requests from clients. It is setup for optional SSL client authentication: if a
client sends a valid client certificate (only implants can do that), the connection
is forwarded to the 'Honeycomb' toolserver that communicates with the
implant; if a valid certificate is missing (which is the case if someone tries to
open the cover domain website by accident), the traffic is forwarded to a cover
server that delivers an unsuspicious looking website.

The Honeycomb toolserver receives exfiltrated information from the implant;

an operator can also task the implant to execute jobs on the target computer,
so the toolserver acts as a C2 (command and control) server for the implant.

Similar functionality (though limited to Windows) is provided by the RickBobby

project.

See the classified user (https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/files/UsersGuide.pdf)

and developer (https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/files/DevelopersGuide.pdf)
guides for HIVE.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why now?
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WikiLeaks published as soon as its verification and analysis were ready.

In Febuary the Trump administration has issued an Executive Order calling for
a "Cyberwar" review to be prepared within 30 days.

While the review increases the timeliness and relevance of the publication it
did not play a role in setting the publication date.

Redactions
Names, email addresses and external IP addresses have been redacted in the
released pages (70,875 redactions in total) until further analysis is complete.

1. Over-redaction: Some items may have been redacted that are not
employees, contractors, targets or otherwise related to the agency, but
are, for example, authors of documentation for otherwise public projects
that are used by the agency.
2. Identity vs. person: the redacted names are replaced by user IDs
(numbers) to allow readers to assign multiple pages to a single author.
Given the redaction process used a single person may be represented
by more than one assigned identifier but no identifier refers to more than
one real person.
3. Archive attachments (zip, tar.gz, ...) are replaced with a PDF listing all
the file names in the archive. As the archive content is assessed it may
be made available; until then the archive is redacted.
4. Attachments with other binary content are replaced by a hex dump of
the content to prevent accidental invocation of binaries that may have
been infected with weaponized CIA malware. As the content is assessed
it may be made available; until then the content is redacted.
5. The tens of thousands of routable IP addresses references (including
more than 22 thousand within the United States) that correspond to
possible targets, CIA covert listening post servers, intermediary and test
systems, are redacted for further exclusive investigation.
6. Binary files of non-public origin are only available as dumps to prevent
accidental invocation of CIA malware infected binaries.

Organizational Chart
The organizational chart (https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/files/org-chart.png)
corresponds to the material published by WikiLeaks so far.

Since the organizational structure of the CIA below the level of Directorates is
not public, the placement of the EDG and its branches within the org chart of
the agency is reconstructed from information contained in the documents

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released so far. It is intended to be used as a rough outline of the internal

organization; please be aware that the reconstructed org chart is incomplete
and that internal reorganizations occur frequently.

Wiki pages
"Year Zero" contains 7818 web pages with 943 attachments from the internal
development groupware. The software used for this purpose is called
Confluence, a proprietary software from Atlassian. Webpages in this system
(like in Wikipedia) have a version history that can provide interesting insights
on how a document evolved over time; the 7818 documents include these
page histories for 1136 latest versions.

The order of named pages within each level is determined by date (oldest
first). Page content is not present if it was originally dynamically created by the
Confluence software (as indicated on the re-constructed page).

What time period is covered?

The years 2013 to 2016. The sort order of the pages within each level is
determined by date (oldest first).

WikiLeaks has obtained the CIA's creation/last modification date for each page
but these do not yet appear for technical reasons. Usually the date can be
discerned or approximated from the content and the page order. If it is critical
to know the exact time/date contact WikiLeaks.

What is "Vault 7"

"Vault 7" is a substantial collection of material about CIA activities obtained by
WikiLeaks.

When was each part of "Vault 7" obtained?

Part one was obtained recently and covers through 2016. Details on the other
parts will be available at the time of publication.

Is each part of "Vault 7" from a different

source?
Details on the other parts will be available at the time of publication.

What is the total size of "Vault 7"?

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The series is the largest intelligence publication in history.

How did WikiLeaks obtain each part of "Vault

7"?
Sources trust WikiLeaks to not reveal information that might help identify them.

Isn't WikiLeaks worried that the CIA will act

against its staff to stop the series?
No. That would be certainly counter-productive.

Has WikiLeaks already 'mined' all the best

stories?
No. WikiLeaks has intentionally not written up hundreds of impactful stories to
encourage others to find them and so create expertise in the area for
subsequent parts in the series. They're there. Look. Those who demonstrate
journalistic excellence may be considered for early access to future parts.

Won't other journalists find all the best

stories before me?
Unlikely. There are very considerably more stories than there are journalists or
academics who are in a position to write them.

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