ALPHA

RHO
LAMBDA
LAW
SOCIETY
BAR OPERATIONS 2018
CASES DECIDED/PENNED BY JUSTICE
MARIANO DEL CASTILLO

CIVIL LAW
 RODOLFO S. AGUILAR v. EDNA G. SIASAT
G.R. No. 200169; January 28, 2015
Paternity and Filiation

DOCTRINE: The filiation of illegitimate children can be established by an admission of

legitimate filiation in a public document and signed by the parent concerned.

FACTS:
Rodolfo Aguilar claimed that he is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar
spouses who died intestate. Rodolfo, to prove filiation, presented several documents and
one of which is his father’s, Alfredo Aguilar’s, SSS Form E-1. This is a public document
subscribed and made under oath by Alfredo during his employment with BMMC, which
bears his signature and thumb marks and indicates that Rodolfo, born on 5 March 1945, is
his son and dependent.
Rodolfo argued that he cannot present his Certificate of Live Birth because all the records
of the Local Civil Registry covering the period of 1945-1946 were destroyed.

ISSUE: Whether or not SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement in the establishment of
legitimate filiation

HELD:
Yes. The filiation of illegitimate children is, like legitimate children, under Art. 172 of the
Family Code, established by
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
SSS Form E-1, a public document, acknowledged and notarized before a notary public
executed by Alfredo Aguilar, recognizing Rodolfo as his son, satisfies the requirement of
proof of filiation.
Such due recognition in any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition but it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action
for judicial approval.

KALAW v. FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 166357; September 19, 2011
Marriage

DOCTRINE:
It is the plaintiff that has the burden of proving the existence of facts that would establish
psychological incapacity.
Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, the same does not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity.

FACTS:
Petitioner is married to respondent. Years later, he filed a petition to declare their marriage
void under article 36 of the Family Code.
In support of his allegations, Kalaw presented a psychologist and a Catholic canon law
expert who testified that such acts complained of reflected a narcissistic personality
disorder (NPD).
Petitioner also alleges the sexual infidelity of respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not Kalaw has sufficiently proved that Fernandez suffers from
psychological incapacity

HELD: No, the burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff who must
prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious
or psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state.
 The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and
must be incurable.
The testimonies of the supposed expert witnesses that he relied upon were mere
conclusions premised on the alleged acts or behavior of Fernandez, which had not been
sufficiently proven.
As to the allegation that Fernandez committed adultery, the SC ruled that although sexual
infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, the same does not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity.

JULIANO-LLAVE v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 169766; March 30, 2011
Marriage

DOCTRINE: The law in effect at the time of marriage shall be applied in determining the
validity of marriage.

FACTS:
Senator Tamano married petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave (“Estrellita”) twice: o The first
marriage was performed under the Islamic laws and tradition in 1993; and The second
marriage was performed under a civil ceremony also in 1993. In their marriage contracts,
Tamano indicated his civil status as “divorced”.
Zorayda Tamano (“Zorayda”) filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage of
Tamano and Estrellita for being bigamous with the following allegations:
At the time of Tamano’s marriage with Estrellita in 1993, his marriage with Zorayda in
1958 remained subsisting. Tamano did not and could not have divorced Zorayda by
invoking the Code of Muslim Personal Laws on the ground that his marriage with Zorayda
was never deemed legally and factually contracted under Muslim law.
Estrellita, on the other hand, alleged that: The Muslim law automatically applies to
Tamano’s marriage with Zorayda without need of registering their consent since they are
both Muslims; and that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing because under the law,
only the husband or wife can file a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Tamano and Estrellita’s marriage was bigamous
Whether or not Zorayda and Adib have legal standing to file the complaint

HELD:
Yes, since the marriage of Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, the applicable law
that shall govern marriages of a Muslim and non-Muslim is the Civil Code of 1950 and not
the Muslim Law of 1977.
Under the Civil Code, only one marriage can exist at any given time and divorce is not
recognized except during the effectivity of R.A. 394 (An Act Authorizing for a Period of
Twenty Years Divorce Among Moslems Residing in Non-Christian Provinces), however, this
was not availed of by the parties.

Yes. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a
complaint for nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a
void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, and
which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the contracting parties.
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10 SC does not apply, Adib as one of the children of the deceased who
has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the
suit he and his mother has filed since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SARENOGON
G.R. No. 199194; February 10, 2016
Absence

DOCTRINE: Under Art. 41 of the Family Code, “well-founded” belief must be established by
honest-to-goodness efforts to ascertain whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already
dead.

FACTS:
Jose filed a Petition for declaration of presumptive death of his wife. No one opposed the
petition so trial ensued. Jose testified that Netchie was employed as a domestic helper in
Hong Kong. They did not communicate for 3 months, and he could not contact her relatives.
He filed the petition before the RTC so he could contract another marriage under Art. 41 of
the Family Code, which was granted.
The Republic claims that Jose’s alleged efforts in locating Netchie did not engender or
generate a well-founded belief that the latter is probably dead. It maintains that even as
Jose exerted efforts to locate Netchie, Jose inexplicably failed to enlist the assistance of the
relevant government agencies such as the PNP, NBI, and POEA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the “well-founded belief” requisite under Article 41 of the Civil Code
was complied with by the alleged efforts of respondent in locating his missing wife.

HELD:
No. Article 41 of the Family Code pertinently provides that: Art. 41. A marriage contracted
by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under
the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage
under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
In Republic v. Cantor,57 we further held that: Before a judicial declaration of presumptive
death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse
was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four essential requisites
for the declaration of presumptive death:1. That the absent spouse has been missing for
four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there
is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code. 2.
That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded
belief that the absentee is dead; and,4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
In a petition for a declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code, the
claim must be based on a “well-founded belief” that the spouse is dead.
Jose’s effort is clearly insufficient as he did not even sought the help of appropriate
government authorities in finding the whereabouts of his missing wife.

FRANCISCO LIM v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK

G.R. No. 183918; January 15, 2014
Property Relations of the Spouses

DOCTRINE: The presumption in Article 160 that “all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership” applies to property acquired during the lifetime of
the husband and wife. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and
there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an
indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.
FACTS:
Francisco Lim executed an Irrevocable SPA in favor of his brother, Franco Lim, authorizing
latter to mortgage his share in the property, which they co-owned.
Franco, and their mother from the Bank a loan and to secure the loan, Francisco and Franco
executed in favor of the Bank a REM over the property. But, when the loan was not paid, the
Bank foreclosed the mortgaged property.
Francisco filed before the RTC a complaint against the Bank, Franco, and Victoria.
Francisco alleged that he did not authorize Franco to mortgage the subject property and
same should be avoided because the mortgage contract was executed without the consent
of his wife.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lack of signature of Francisco’s wife is a ground to invalidate the
contract.

HELD: No, the presumption that a property registered to one spouse is part of the conjugal
property applies only to properties acquired during marriage the marriage.
In this case, the property was acquired before the marriage so the presumption does not
apply and the signature of the wife is not required.

TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. DAVID

G.R. No. 169548; March 15, 2010
Property Relations of the Spouses

DOCTRINE: Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any disposition or encumbrance
of conjugal property must have the written consent of the other spouse, otherwise, such
disposition is void.

FACTS:
Spouses Manuel and Martha David, acquired a lot, which was registered in the name of
Martha. The spouses separated de facto, and no longer communicated with each other.
Manuel discovered that Martha had previously sold the property to Titan Corp.
Manuel filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Reconveyance against Titan.
Manuel alleged that the sale executed by Martha in favor of Titan was without his
knowledge and consent, and therefore void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Sale is void by reason of the absence of Manuel’s
consent.

HELD:
Yes, the property is part of the spouses’ conjugal partnership, even if it is registered only to
Martha’s name.
Absence any proof that it is not part of the conjugal property, it must be deemed to be part
of it. Since the property is part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to Titan required the
consent of both spouses and in the absence of the other spouse’s consent; the Deed of Sale
is void.

SIY v. TOMLIN
G.R. No. 205998; April 24, 2017
Possession

DOCTRINE: In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is
either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered.
DOCTRINE: A sale made by the agent binds the principal to such sale.

FACTS:
Siy filed a complaint for recovery of possession with prayer for replevin against Ong. Siy
alleged that he owns a Range Rover which he purchased from Lopez. Siy admitted that he
did not register the sale in his favor, and that the vehicle remained in the name of Lopez.
Siy entrusted the vehicle to Ong under an arrangement that the latter would sell the vehicle
for him. Siy stated that Ong failed to neither remit the proceeds of the purported sale nor
return the vehicle. Among the evidence presented by Siy were: a manager’s check and cash
voucher as proof of payment, and the affidavit of Lopez attesting to the sale.
Tomlin, on the other hand, claimed to be the lawful and registered owner of the vehicle.
Tomlin presented the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration. Tomlin argued that he
is the true owner of the subject vehicle. He said that Ong sold to vehicle to Chua, and that
the same vehicle was later on sold to him by the latter.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Siy is entitled to possession of the car
2. Whether or not the sale between Ong and Chua is valid

HELD:
1. No, in a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the
owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered. From Siy’s
own account, he appointed Ong as his agent to sell the vehicle. Since Ong was able to sell
the vehicle, Siy ceased to be the owner thereof. Considering that he was no longer the
owner or rightful possessor of the subject vehicle at the time he filed the case, he is not
entitled to possession over the property.
2. Yes, from Siy’s own account, he appointed Ong as his agent to sell the vehicle. Since Ong
was able to sell the vehicle, Siy ceased to be the owner thereof. Siy cannot be allowed to go
against Tomlin to recover the property in lieu of the proceeds which Ong failed to remit.

COMMUNITIES CAGAYAN v. NANOL

G.R. No. 176791; November 14, 2012
Ownership

DOCTRINE: In case of a builder in good faith, the seller (the owner of the land) has two
options under Article 448:
(1) He may appropriate the improvements for himself after reimbursing the buyer (the
builder in good faith) the necessary and useful; or
(2) He may sell the land to the buyer, unless its value is considerably more than that of the
improvements, in which case, the buyer shall pay reasonable rent.

FACTS:
Respondent spouses Arsenio and Angeles Nanol entered into a Contract to Sell with
petitioner Communities Cagayan, Inc., whereby the latter agreed to sell to respondent
spouses a house and Lots. Respondent spouses availed of petitioner’s in house financing16
thus, undertaking to pay the loan over four years. Respondent Arsenio demolished the
original house and constructed a three story house allegedly valued at P3.5 million, more or
less. Respondents defaulted which prompted petitioner to file a case for unlawful detainer.
Respondent spouses’ demands for the reimbursement of the improvements made which
petitioner denies alleging that the respondents were builders in bad faith.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents is entitled to reimbursement of the improvements

made
HELD: Yes, the presumption remains that the respondents are builders in good faith.
Article 448 of the Civil Code applies when the builder believes that he is the owner of the
land or that by some title he has the right to build thereon, or that, at least, he has a claim of
title thereto. The seller (the owner of the land) has two options under Article 448: (1) He
may appropriate the improvements for himself after reimbursing the buyer (the builder in
good faith) the necessary and useful expenses; or (2) He may sell the land to the buyer,
unless its value is considerably more than that of the improvements, in which case, the
buyer shall pay reasonable rent.
 GUYAMIN v. FLORES
G.R. No. 202189; April 25, 2017
Ownership

DOCTRINE: Occupants by mere tolerance must vacate upon the demand of the registered
owner.

FACTS: Flores is the registered owner of a parcel of land occupied by Guyamin.

Guyamin occupied the property by mere tolerance and liberality of Flores. Despite demand,
Guyamin refused to vacate the property. This prompted Flores to file a complaint for
recovery of possession for said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not Guyamin should vacate the property

HELD: Yes, as occupants by mere tolerance of the owner, Guyamin has no right to the
property whatsoever, and his presence is merely tolerated and under the good graces of
the owners. Gayumin is bound by an implied promise to vacate the premises upon demand.

MANANQUIL v. MOICO
G.R. No. 180076; November 21, 2012
Quieting of Title to or Interest in and Removal or Prevention of Cloud over Title or
Interest in Real Property

DOCTRINE: In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, it is essential that the
plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the property which is the
subject-matter of the action.

FACTS:
Lots 18 & 19 formed part of the land previously expropriated by the NHA. Lot 18 was
awarded to Spouses Mananquil under a Conditional Contract to Sell while Lot 19 was sold
to Prescilla. When the spouses died, the Mananquil heirs (brothers and sisters of the
husband Mananquil) executed an extrajudicial settlement and adjudicated ownership over
Lots 18 & 19 in favor of Dianita. They took possession and leased them out to third parties.
Eulegio and two others (claiming to be the surviving heirs of the spouses) executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Moico.
Moico evicted the Mananquil tenants and demolished the structure they built on Lots 18 &
19. The Mananquils instituted a civil case for quieting of title

ISSUE: Whether or not the Mananquils had legal or equitable title over the lots for their
action to prosper

HELD: No, petitioners failed to show their qualifications or right to succeed the husband in
his rights under the NHA program/project.
They failed to present any title, award, grant, document or certification from the NHA or
proper government agency which would show that the spouses Mananquil have become
the registered owners/beneficiaries/awardees of Lots 18 and 19, or that petitioners are
qualified successors or beneficiaries taking over Iluminardo's rights after his death.
An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. The
competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other
claimants, not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights
to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that
he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he
could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even
to abuse the property as he deems best. But for an action to quiet title to prosper, two
indispensable requisites must concur, namely:
(1) The plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action;
(2) The deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.

DELA CRUZ v. CAPCO

G.R. No. 176055; March 17, 2014
Possession

DOCTRINE: The only issue in an ejectment case is the physical possession of real property
— possession de facto and not possession de jure.

FACTS:
Sps. Dela Cruz filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Sps. Capco, alleging that
Teodora, mother of petitioner Amelia Dela Cruz, acquired a parcel of land by virtue of a
land registration case. The said property was eventually registered in her name.
Teodora, out of neighborliness and blood relationship, tolerated the Sps. Capco’s
occupation thereof. Eventually, the title to the property was conveyed to Sps. Dela Cruz.
Intending to construct a house and utilize the space for balut and salted egg business, they
asked Sps. Capco to vacate the property.
As Sps. Capco refused, the matter was brought to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation but
to no avail. Hence this complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sps. Dela Cruz has a better right to possess such property

HELD: Yes, the only issue in an ejectment case is the physical possession of real property —
possession de facto and not possession de jure but where the parties to an ejectment case
raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who
between the parties has the better right to possess the property.”
Here, both parties anchor their right to possess based on ownership, i.e., the spouses Dela
Cruz by their own ownership while the spouses Capco by the ownership of Rufino as one of
the heirs of the alleged true owner of the property. Thus, the MTC and the RTC correctly
passed upon the issue of ownership in this case to determine the issue of possession.
However, it must be emphasized that “[t]he adjudication of the issue of ownership is only
provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the
property.”

REPUBLIC v. CORTEZ
G.R. No. 201405; August 24, 2015
Possession

DOCTRINE: Possession, no matter how long, cannot produce any legal effect if the property
cannot be lawfully possessed in the first place.

FACTS:
Rev. Claudio R. Cortez, Sr., a missionary, established an orphanage and school in Punta
Verde, Palaui Island, Cagayan. He claimed that since 1962, he has been in peaceful
possession of about 50 hectares of land located in the western portion of Palaui Island
where with the help of Aetas and other people under his care, cleared and developed for
agricultural purposes in order to support his charitable, humanitarian and missionary
works.
May 22, 1967: Pres. Marcos issued Proc. No. 201 which reserved 2,000 hectares of the
southern half portion of the Palaui Island for the use of the Philippine Navy, subject, to
private rights if there be any.
Aug. 16, 1994: Pres. Ramos issued Proc. No. 447 declaring Palaui Island and the
surrounding waters as marine reserve, subject to any private rights. The entire Palaui
Island consisting of an aggregate area of 7,415.48 hectares was accordingly reserved as a
marine protected area.
Jun. 13, 2000: Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for Injunction against Rogelio C. Biñas in his
capacity as Commanding Officer of the Philippine Naval Command in Port San Vicente, Sta.
Ana, Cagayan. According to Rev. Cortez, some members of the Philippine Navy, upon orders
of Biñas, disturbed his peaceful and lawful possession of the said 50hectare portion of
Palaui Island when they commanded him and his men, through the use of force and
intimidation, to vacate the area.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rev. Cortez is entitled to possess the land

HELD:
No, only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of
possession and thus, property of the public dominion, common things and things
specifically prohibited by law cannot be appropriated and hence, cannot be possessed.
The Court notes that while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right of possession, he
failed to show that the subject area over which he has a claim, is not part of the public
domain and therefore can be the proper object of possession.
To prove that a land is alienable, the existence of a positive act of the government, such as
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute declaring the land
as alienable and disposable must be established. In this case, there is no such proof
showing that the subject portion

DE GUZMAN v. FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 191710; January 14, 2015
Easements

DOCTRINE: The need of the dominant estate is the one which governs the determination of
the width of the easement of right of way. The grant of the easement should not be
excessive that would be prejudicial to the dominant estate.

FACTS:
The Petitioners Demetria de Guzman, Lolita de Guzman, Esther Milan, Banaag de Guzman,
Amor Apolo, Herminio de Guzman, Leonor Vivencio, Norma de Guzman, and Josefina
Hernandez (petitioners) were co-owners of a parcel of land (15,063 sqm) in Cainta, Rizal.
Said land was then subdivided among them and individual titles were issued to them.
The property was enclosed and surrounded by other properties belonging to various
owners. One of the owners is the respondent Filinvest, which has a potential direct access
to Marcos highway.
The petitioners then filed a complaint for easement of right of way against the respondent.
The respondent answered that the petitioners have an access to Sumulong Highway
through another adjoining property. And they also alleged that Sumulong Highway is
nearer than Marcos Highway from the petitioners’ property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 10-meters of right of way grant is proper for the petitioners

HELD: No, what governs the width of the easement is the needs of the dominant estate.
Under Art. 651 of the Civil Code, the width of the easement of right of way shall be that
which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate and may accordingly be changed
from time to time.
According to Senator Tolentino, it is the needs of the dominant tenement which determines
the width of the passage
In this case, the grant of the RTC of 10 meters width of the easement was surely not proper
since if that was the case, the indemnity that the petitioners would be giving is around
P38M. That amount would be iniquitous since the need of the petitioner was just an
adequate vehicular access to the highway.
The right of way of 3 meters would already suffice to meet the needs of the petitioners.
Therefore the indemnification must be computed using the 3-meter right of way and not
the excessive 10-meter one.
 NAGA CENTRUM, INC. v. ORZALES
G.R. No. 203576; September 14, 2016
Easements

DOCTRINE: The owner of a landlocked property has a right to demand a right-of-way

through neighboring estates provided that it is least prejudicial to the servient estate and
shortest to the highway
FACTS:
Sps. Orzales owns a house and lot situated in Valentin Street, Sabang Naga City. Their
property was surrounded by different property owners and eventually lost passageway to
public highway. To access the public road, they can only pass through Rizal Street, which is
in Naga Centrum’s property, on a limited time from 9:00am to 2:00pm dail
Burdened by it, Sps. Orzales demands for a right-of-way from Naga Centrum but the later
declined Naga Centum intentionally blocked the passageway and landlocked Sps. Orzales’

ISSUE: Whether or not Sps. Orzales has the right to demand right-of-way

HELD: Yes, to be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following requisites should be
met:
(1) The estate is surrounded by other immovable and is without adequate outlet to public
highway
(2) Payment of proper indemnity
(3) Isolation of the immovable is not due to its owner’s acts
(4) Right-of-way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate

All the four requisites were present in this case which justifies Sps. Orzales demand for
right of way. Also with the interest of justice as enshrined under Art. 19 and 26 of the Civil
Code, Naga Centrum should have exercised its right with justice and respect to its
neighbors

ANDRES. v. STA. LUCIA DEV’T CO.

G.R. No. 201405; August 24, 2015
Easements

DOCTRINE:
• An easement of rightofway may be demanded by the owner of an immovable or by any
person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use the same.
• If the mode of acquisition is prescription, it must first be shown that the land has already
been converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period.

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Easement of Right of Way against Sta. Lucia Dev’t Co.
Before RTC, alleging that they are co-owners and possessors for more than 50 years of 3
parcels of unregistered agricultural land in Rizal with a total area of more or less 10,500
sqm.
A few years back, however, Sta. Lucia Dev’t Co. acquired the lands surrounding the subject
property and developed the same into a residential subdivision known as the Binangonan
Metropolis East, and built a concrete perimeter fence around it such that petitioners were
denied access from subject property to the nearest public road and vice versa.
They thus prayed for a right of way within Binangonan Metropolis East in order for them to
have access to Col. Guido Street, a public road. This is considering that their possession
became adverse when their predecessor-in-interest with regard to the land allegedly
formally registered his claim of ownership with the DENR.

ISSUE:
• Whether or not petitioners are entitled to demand an easement of right of way from
respondent
• Whether or not petitioners acquired the property through acquisitive prescription
HELD:
• No, the petition has no merit. Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, an easement of right of
way may be demanded by the owner of an immovable or by any person who by virtue of a
real right may cultivate or use the same. Contrary to petitioners' allegations, there is no
showing that there was a claim of ownership over the subject property by their
predecessor-in-interest. His letter to the DENR is actually just a request for the issuance of
certain documents and nothing more.
• No, the petition has no merit. Even if timely raised, such argument of petitioners, as well
as with respect to extraordinary acquisitive prescription, fails.
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.
However, only lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer
intended for public use or for the development of national wealth, or removed from the
sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of
private ownership, may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring
ownership under the Civil Code. And if the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether
ordinary or extraordinary, it must first be shown that the land has already been converted
to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period.

HIPOLITO, JR. v. CINCO

G.R. No. 174143; November 28, 2011
Nuisance
DOCTRINE: The mere fact that the building is considered as a nuisance under the Civil
Code does not deprive the Building Official the authority to order its condemnation and
demolition.

FACTS:
Edeltrudis Hipolity y Marciano (Edeltrudis) entered into a lease agreement with Francisco
Villena (Villena) over a parcel of land located at San Andres Bukind, Manila for 20 years.
Edeltrudis was obliged to build an apartment-style building adjacent to the existing house
in the property.
After 13 years, the heir of Edeltrudis, Spouses Ricardo Hipolito, Jr. and Liza Hipolito (Sps.
Hipolito), and the heirs of Villena were informed that the property was acquired by Atty.
Carlos D. Cinco (Cinco) via a deed of sale. Cinco then filed with the OBO a verified request
for structural inspection of the structures in the lot. The Office of the Building Official
eventually declared the buildings dangerous and ruinous, and recommended their
demolition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Building Official could order the condemnation and demolition
of the buildings even though the building falls under the concept of a nuisance under the
Civil Code

HELD: Yes, the Building Official has authority. The fact that the buildings in question could
also constitute nuisances under the Civil Code does not preclude the Building Official form
issuing the assailed Demolition Order.
As provided by P.D. No. 1096, the authority of the Building Official to order the repair,
vacation or demolition, as the case may be, is without prejudice to further action that may
be undertaken under the relevant provisions of the Civil Code.

ROSETE v. BRIONES
G.R. No. 176121; September 22, 2014
Extinguishment of Obligations

DOCTRINE: Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid,
except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can
recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the debtor.
FACTS:
The NHA awarded a lot to petitioner Teodorico Rosete. Respondents Jose and Remedios
Rosete, Neorimse and Felicitas Corpuz, and Felix and Marietta Briones objected, claiming
that the award of the entire lot of Teodorico was erroneous.
The property was eventually awarded to Teodorico, who subsequently made full payment
of the value of the subject lot and likewise paid the real property taxes thereon.
However, the NHA later withdrew its decision and subsequently cancelled the award made
in favor of Teodorico. The subject property was then subdivided among both petitioner and
respondents.
The NHA informed Teodorico that his payments shall be adjusted accordingly, but that his
excess payments will not be refunded; instead, they will be applied to his co-awardees’
amortizations and his co-awardees shall in turn pay him.
Teodorico now demands that his co-awardees be required to reimburse his property tax
payments as failure to do so would result to unjust enrichment.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rosete is entitled to reimbursement

HELD: No, the SC cannot order respondents to refund Rosete’s overpayments since the
specific amount of overpayment is not fixed or determinable from the record. Also, the
Court is not a trier of facts, hence, it cannot receive evidence on the matter.
Had Rosete proven the actual overpaid amounts, the Court could have ordered the
reimbursement pursuant to Article 1236 of the Civil Code which states, “Whoever pays for
another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without the
knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has
been beneficial to the debtor.”
Rosete may however recover from NHA – the actual recipient of the overpayment –
applying the principle of solution indebiti.

CACAYORIN v. AFPMBAI
G.R. No. 171298; April 15, 2013
Extinguishment of Obligations

DOCTRINE: Article 1256 of the Civil Code authorizes consignation alone, without need of
prior tender of payment, when the creditor is unknown or when two or more persons claim
the same right to collect.

FACTS:
Petitioner Cacayorin filed an application with respondent AFPMBAI to purchase a piece of
property which the latter owned, through a loan facility. Cacayorin and the Rural Bank
executed a Loan and Mortgage Agreement. The Rural Bank issued a letter of guaranty
informing AFPMBAI that the proceeds of the approved loan will be released to them after
AFPMBAI transfers the title of the property to Cacayorin. AFPMBAI complied. The Rural
Bank was closed and was placed under receivership by the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC). AFPMBAI, on the other hand, made oral and written demands for
petitioners to pay the loan/consideration for the property. Petitioners filed a complaint
before the RTC for consignation of loan payment against AFPMBAI and PDIC alleging that
as a result of Rural Bank’s closure and PDIC’s claim that their loan papers could not be
located, they were left in a quandary as to where they should tender full payment of the
loan.
AFPMBAI filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that: o The complaint falls within the
jurisdiction of the HLURB and not the RTC since Cacayorin filed the case in his capacity as a
buyer of a subdivision lot;
Since no prior valid tender of payment was made by Cacayorin, the consignation case was
fatally defective and susceptible to dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lack of prior tender of payment is fatal to the consignation case
HELD: No, Article 1256 of the Civil Code authorizes consignation alone, without need of
prior tender of payment, when the creditor is unknown or when two or more persons claim
the same right to collect.
As can be seen from the records, two entities may possibly be the creditors of the loan: (1)
the Rural Bank (through PDIC), which is the apparent creditor under the earlier Loan and
Mortgage Agreement; and (2) AFPMBAI, which is currently in possession of the loan
documents and the certificate of title, and the one making demands upon petitioners to pay.
Whatever transpired between PDIC and AFPMBAI in respect of Cacayorin’s loan account, if
any, such that AFPMBAI came into possession of the loan documents and the TCT, it
appears that Cacayorin was not informed nor made privy thereto. As such, the consignation
case must proceed.

LAO v. SPECIAL PLANS, INC.

G.R. No. 164791; June 29, 2010
Extinguishment of Obligations

DOCTRINE: Compensation takes place only if both obligations are liquidated and
demandable.

FACTS:
Petitioners Lao, Manansala and Jim, entered into a Contract of Lease with Special Plans, Inc.
(SPI) over the latter’s building.
SPI sent a Demand Letter to the petitioners asking for full payment of rentals in arrears.
Receiving no payment, SPI filed a complaint for sum of money.
Petitioners, in their Answer with Counterclaim, admitted their nonpayment of rentals but
alleged that SPI did not deliver the leased premises in a condition fit for petitioners’
intended use and thus, they incurred expenses for repairs done on the property.
Petitioners claim that the amount spent for repairs should be judicially compensated
against the said unpaid rentals.

ISSUE: Whether or not compensation is proper

HELD: No, compensation can take place only when both debts are liquidated and
demandable.
The Civil Code provides that compensation shall take place when the following requisites
are present:
(1) Each one of the obligors be bound principally and that he be at the same time a
principal creditor of the other;
(2) Both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the
same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated;
(3) The two debts are due:
(4) The debts are liquidated and demandable;
(5) Over neither of them be any retention or controversy, commenced by third parties and
communicated in due time to the debtor.
A claim is considered liquidated when the amount and time of payment is fixed.
In this case, petitioners failed to properly discharge their burden to show that the debts
are liquidated and demandable. They did not present any convincing evidence or proof
which could support their allegation that there were actual expenses made for the alleged
repairs. Consequently, legal compensation is inapplicable.

MOVERTRADE CORP. v. COA and DPWH

G.R. No. 204835; September 22, 2015
Essential Requisites of a Contract

DOCTRINE: It is a basic principle in law that contracts have the force of law between the
parties and should be complied with in good faith.
FACTS:
Petitioner Movertrade and the Commission on Audit (COA) with the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) entered into a contract for dredging in Pampanga Bay.
Project Supervisor, Director Soriquez, issued two letters reminding Movertrade that side
dumping is not allowed and that dredge spoils should be pumped in the provided spoil
sites. Engineer Bustos of DPWH issued another letter reiterating the prohibition of side
dumping and the availability of the spoil sites.
Despite these letters, Movertrade continued to side dump. In the final phase of completion,
the president of Movertrade issued a letter asking for payment for the work rendered, and
provided and explanation as to why it side dumped.
Director Soriquez denied the request for payment for the reason that the side dumping
done was not authorized. DPWH still paid Movertrade, however, the amount of
P7,354,897.10 representing the cubic meters of the dredging work rendered remained
unpaid.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to payment

HELD: No, contracts have the force of law between the parties and should be complied with
in good faith. A breach occurs where the contractor inexcusably fails to perform
substantially in accordance with the terms of the contract.
In this case, the contract specifically provides the manner of disposing dredge spoils. As
such, Movertrade cannot unilaterally change the manner of disposal without first amending
the contract or obtaining the express consent or approval of DPWH. To do otherwise would
result to a breach of the contract.
Without a doubt, Movertrade's failure to dump the dredge spoils at the designated spoil
sites constitutes a breach. Thus, petitioner is not entitled to its money claim for the
165,576.27 cubic meters dredging work as it was done in contravention of paragraph 11 of
the Contract Agreement.

TOLEDO v. HYDEN
G.R. No. 172139; December 8, 2010
Essential Requisites of a Contract

DOCTRINE: A threat to enforce one’s claim through competent authority, if the claim is just
or legal, does not vitiate consent.

FACTS:
Petitioner Toledo obtained several loans from respondent Hyden. Toledo had an unpaid
balance, thus Jocelyn with two of her subordinates as witnesses signed a document entitled
Acknowledgment of Debt. Toledo issued five (5) checks to Hyden representing renewal
payment of her five (5) previous loans.
Later, Toledo asked Hyden for the recall of one of the checks in the amount of P30,000.00
and replaced the same with six (6) checks. After honoring three of these checks, Jocelyn
ordered the stop payment on the remaining checks and filed a complaint against Hyden for
Declaration of Nullity and Payment, Annulment, Sum of Money, Injunction and Damages. o
Toledo averred that Hyden forced, threatened and intimidated her into signing the
Acknowledgment of Debt and at the same time forced her to issue the seven (7) postdated
checks.

ISSUE: Whether or not document Acknowledgment of Debt is valid

HELD:
Yes, Toledo failed to prove her claim that she was made to sign the Acknowledgment of
Debt and draw the seven (7) postdated checks through force, threat and intimidation.
Even if Toledo was able to prove the existence of such threats, the same is not considered
as threat that would vitiate consent. Article 1335 of the Civil Code provides that “a threat to
enforce one’s claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not
vitiate consent.”
As can be seen from the records of the case, Toledo in fact signed the document in her office
and in the presence of two witnesses. Furthermore, after the execution of the said
document, Toledo honored the first three checks before filing the present complaint. If
indeed she was forced as she claims to be, she would never have made good on the first
three checks.

SONLEY v. ANCHOR SAVINGS BANK

G.R. No. 205623; August 10, 2016
Rescissible Contracts

DOCTRINE: The party aggrieved by the breach of a compromise agreement may, if he

chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand as if there had
never been any compromise agreement, and without bringing an action for rescission
thereof.

FACTS:
Petitioner Sonley agreed to purchase a real property from respondent Anchor Savings
Bank. Pursuant to the Agreement, the parties entered into a Contract to Sell whereby
petitioner agreed to pay a downpayment and the remaining balance will be payable on
monthly installments. Sonley defaulted in her obligation, hence, Anchor Savings Bank
rescinded the contract.
Sonley filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Rescission of Contract. The parties
agreed to an amicable settlement and entered into a Compromise Agreement whereby
Sonley would be given the right to repurchase the subject property, and which the latter
exercised in 2010.
Anchor filed a Manifestation and Motion for Execution claiming that Sonley had not been
paying the agreed monthly installments. It prayed that a writ of execution be issued in its
favor ordering that the Contract to Sell be rescinded.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Compromise Agreement can be rescinded?

HELD: Yes, the language of Article 2041 of the Civil Code denotes that the party aggrieved
by the breach of a compromise agreement may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated
or involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any compromise agreement,
without bringing an action for rescission thereof. He need not seek a judicial declaration of
rescission, for he may regard the compromise agreement already rescinded.
Under Article 2041 of the Civil Code, “if one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the
compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and
insist upon his original demand.”
The parties’ Compromise Agreement provides that “the defendant shall have a right to
rescind this Compromise Agreement as provided under the Contract to Sell”. The Contract to
Sell likewise provides that “the SELLER shall be entitled, as a matter of right, to rescind this
Contract upon the failure of the BUYER to pay on due date any monthly installment.”
Sonley’s failure to abide by the agreement should result in execution, cancellation and
rescission of the Compromise Agreement and Contract to Sell, and her eviction from the
property.

LOCSIN v. MEKENI FOOD CORP.

G.R. No. 192105; December 9, 2013
Nature and Form of Contracts

DOCTRINE: Express stipulation is needed to consider payment installments as rentals.

FACTS:
Mekeni offered Locsin a car plan. The vehicle was a used Honda Civic valued at P280,000.
½ of the cost of the vehicle will be paid by the company and the other half to be deducted
from the salary of Locsin. The deduction would be P5,000 each from his salary. 2 years
after, Locsin resigned. A total of P112,500 has been deducted and applied as his share in
the car plain. Locsin filed a complaint for recovery of monthly salary deductions which
were earmarked for his cost-sharing in the car plan. Mekeni asserts further that the service
vehicle was merely a loan which had to be paid through the monthly salary deductions.
CA considered such payments as rentals for the use of his service and installments paid.

ISSUE: Whether or not the payments by Locsin may be considered rentals

HELD: No. installments made on the car plan may be treated as rentals only when
there is an express stipulation in the car plan agreement to such effect.
Under a typical car plan, there are also stipulations in car plan agreements to the effect that
should the employment of the employee concerned be terminated before all installments
are fully paid, the vehicle will be taken by the employer and all installments paid shall be
considered rentals per agreement.

DIEGO v. DIEGO
G.R. No. 179965; February 20, 2013
Nature and Form of Contract

DOCTRINE: An agreement which stipulates that the seller shall execute a deed of sale only
upon or after full payment of the purchase price is a contract to sell, not a contract of sale.

FACTS:
Petitioner Nicolas Diego and respondent Rodolfo entered into an oral contract to sell
covering Nicolas’s share of the family’s building at P 500,000.00.
Rodolfo made a down payment of P 250,000.00 and was agreed that the deed of sale shall
be executed upon payment of the remaining balance of P 250,000.00. However, Rodolfo
failed to pay the balance. The building was leased out to third parties but the building’s
designated administrator did not remit Nicolas’s share in the rents to him. Instead, the
share was remitted to Rodolfo. Nicolas filed a complaint against the respondents to order
them to deliver to him his share in the rents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contract between the parties was that of a Contract to Sell
HELD: Yes, the stipulation to execute a deed of absolute sale upon full payment of the
purchase price, is a unique and distinguishing characteristic of a contract to sell.
The agreement to execute a deed of sale upon full payment of the purchase price shows
that the vendors reserved title to the subject property until full payment of the purchase
price. The remedy of rescission is not available in contracts to sell. Since the agreement is a
mere contract to sell, the full payment of the purchase price partakes of a suspensive
condition. The non- fulfillment of the condition prevents the obligation to sell from arising
and ownership is retained by the seller without further remedies by the buyer.

FIRST OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION v. SECURITRON SECURITY

SERVICES, INC.
G.R. No. 199648; January 28, 2015
Nature and Form of Contract

DOCTRINE: The payment of earnest money before the property owner agrees to sell his
property cannot bind the owner to the obligations of a seller.

FACTS:
First Optima is the registered owner of a parcel of land that Securitron wanted to buy.
Sometime thereafter, Securitron sent a Letter to First Optima accompanied by a check for
P100,000.00, which was coursed through an ordinary receiving clerk/receptionist. The
Letter states that it is depositing the said amount as earnest money for the property.
The check was eventually deposited and credited to First Optima’s bank account.
Subsequently, Securitron demanded that First Optima proceed with the sale of the
property, which the latter refused. First Optima contended that no contract for the earnest
money or contract to sell existed.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a perfected contract of sale upon payment of earnest money
prior to the acceptance of the offer by the seller.

HELD: No, Securitron’s offer to purchase the property was never accepted by First Optima.
Since there is no perfected sale between the parties, Securitron had no obligation to make
payment through check, nor did it possess the right to deliver earnest money to First
Optima to bind the latter to a sale. As contemplated under Art. 1482 of the Civil Code,
“there must first be a perfected contract of sale before we can speak of earnest money.”
The prior payment of earnest money even before the property owner can agree to sell his
property is irregular, and cannot be used to bind the owner to the obligations of a seller
under a perfected contract of sale, because it prevents the owner from freely giving his
consent to the transaction. This constitutes a palpable transgression of the property
owner’s rights of ownership over his property.

GOLDLOOP v. GSIS
G.R. No. 171076; August 1, 2012
Kinds of Obligations

DOCTRINE: Parties may validly stipulate the unilateral rescission of a contract.

FACTS:
GSIS and Goldloop executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby Goldloop, at its
own expense and account, would renovate the facade of the Philcomcen Building as well as
construct a condominium building on a portion of the said land.
The MOA provided for a unilateral rescission in case of failure to perform the contract.
The projects, however, were not completed because the Mayor did not act on Goldloop’s
application for building permits. By reason thereof, GSIS rescinded the contract. Goldloop
asserted that the rescission was without basis and clearly made in bad faith.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rescission was valid

HELD: Yes, parties may validly stipulate the unilateral rescission of a contract. Such is the
case here since the parties conferred upon GSIS the right to unilaterally rescind the MOA.
In this case, both Goldloop and GSIS failed to comply with their reciprocal obligations.
Goldloop’s obligation failed to construct and develop the condominium building. GSIS failed
to deliver to Goldloop the property free from all liens and encumbrances.

In view of the rescissory action taken by GSIS pursuant to Article 1191 of the Civil Code,
mutual restitution is required. Goldloop should return to GSIS the possession and control of
the property subject of their agreements while GSIS should reimburse Goldloop whatever
amount it had received from the latter by reason of the MOA.

MANLAR RICE MILL, INC. v. DEYTO

G.R. No. 191189; January 29, 2014
Kinds of Obligations

DOCTRINE: There is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, when
the law so provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires.

FACTS:
Respondent Ang entered into a rice supply contract with Petitioner Manlar Rice Mill Inc.
(Manlar) where the former purchased rice from the latter. This transaction was covered by
nine (9) postdated checks issued by Ang from her personal bank/checking account. Upon
presentment, all nine (9) checks were dishonored.
Manlar made oral and written demands upon respondents Deyto and Ang, which went
unheeded. Manlar filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against Deyto and Ang before the
RTC seeking to hold respondents solidarily liable on the rice supply contract.
Deyto filed her Answer claiming that she did not contract with Malar or any of its
representatives regarding the purchase and delivery of rice. She further argued that
Manlar’s claim has no factual and legal basis, and that Manlar’s impleading her is simply a
desperate strategy or attempt to recover its losses from her, considering that Janet Ang can
no longer be located.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Deyto can be held solidarily liable with Ang for what the latter owes to
Manlar.

HELD:
No, well-entrenched is the rule that solidary obligations cannot be lightly inferred. There is
a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, when the law so provides
or when the nature of the obligation so requires.
A contract affects only the parties to it, and cannot be enforced by or against a person who
is not a party thereto. In the present case, the preponderance of evidence indicates that it
was Janet Ang alone who entered into the rice supply agreement with Manlar. Whenever
Manlar made rice deliveries, Deyto was not around. Also, it was Ang alone who issued the
subject checks and delivered them to Manlar.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. JUMAMOY

G.R. No. 169901; August 3, 2011
Mortgage

DOCTRINE: The general rule that a mortgagee need not look beyond the title, does not
apply to banks and other financial institutions as greater care and due diligence is required
of them.

FACTS:
In an earlier case for reconveyance, the RTC rendered a decision ordering the exclusion of
2.5 hectares of property from the coverage of an OCT registered in the name of Pace. It was
established that the said lot was owned by the predecessor of Jumamoy, hence, should be
reconveyed in favor respondent Jumamoy.
However, the RTC decision could not be annotated on the OCT of Pace. o It was found that
the OCT had already been cancelled by reason of an unpaid mortgage executed by Pace
with the PNB, and that TCT had already been issued in favor of PNB.
Jumamoy filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Mortgage, Foreclosure Sale,
Reconveyance and Damages against PNB and Pace. o Jumamoy argued that Pace could not
validly mortgage the entire Lot to PNB as a portion thereof consisting of 2.5 hectares
belongs to him. Plus, Jumamoy claimed that PNB is not an innocent mortgagee/purchaser
for value since it had been notified that the said lot was subject to litigation.
The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Jumamoy.
In PNB’s petition for review with the SC, it contends that: It is an innocent mortgagee for
value, making the mortgage valid. Jumamoy’s action for reconveyance had already
prescribed.

ISSUE: Whether or not PNB is an innocent mortgagee for value

HELD: No, a banking institution is expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a
mortgage contract. The general rule that a mortgagee need not look beyond the title does
not apply to banks and other financial institutions as greater care and due diligence is
required of them.
In this case, it has been established that the said lot was adjudicated in favor of Jumamoy.
Hence, PNB has the burden of proof in proving that it is a mortgagee in good faith.
However, there was no showing at all that it conducted an investigation; that it observed
due diligence and prudence by checking for flaws in the title; that it verified the identity of
the true owner and possessor of the land; and, that it visited subject premises to determine
its actual condition before accepting the same as collateral.

ESTORES v. SUPANGAN
G.R. No. 175139; April 18, 2018
Loan

DOCTRINE: Absent any stipulation, the applicable rate of interest shall be 12% per annum
when the obligation arises out of a loan or a forbearance of money, goods or credits.

FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent entered into a Conditional Deed of Sale whereby petitioner
offered to sell a parcel of land.
Respondent paid 3.5M as downpayment but petitioner was not able to comply with her
obligations provided in the contract.
Respondent demanded the return of the amount of P3.5 million. When petitioner still failed
to return the amount despite demand, respondentspouses were constrained to file a
Complaint for sum of money.
Petitioner does not deny the obligation to pay the 3.5M but denies liability to pay for the
interest. They argued that since the Conditional Deed of Sale provided only for the return of
the down payment in case of breach, they cannot be held liable to pay legal interest as well
since it is neither a loan or forbearance.

ISSUE:
• Whether or not the petitioner is liable for interest
• Whether or not the stipulation may be considered as forbearance

HELD:
• Yes, stipulation is not required in order to be liable for interest. The general rule is that
the applicable rate of interest shall be computed in accordance with the stipulation of the
parties. Absent any stipulation, the applicable rate of interest shall be 12% per annum
when the obligation arises out of a loan or a forbearance of money, goods or credits. In
other cases, it shall be six percent (6%).
• Yes, the stipulation as to the return of the down payment in case of non-fulfillment of
obligation is in the nature of forbearance. Forbearance of money, goods or credits refers to
arrangements other than loan agreements, where a person acquiesces to the temporary
use of his money, goods or credits pending happening of certain events or fulfillment of
certain conditions. In this case, the respondent spouses parted with their money even
before the conditions were fulfilled. They have therefore allowed or granted forbearance to
the seller (petitioner) to use their money pending fulfillment of the conditions.
Even if the transaction involved a Conditional Deed of Sale, the stipulation governing the
return of the money may be considered as a forbearance of money which required payment
of interest at the rate of 12%.

IBM PHILIPPINES, INC. v. PRIME SYSTEMS PLUS, INC.

G.R. No. 203192; August 15, 2016
Loan

DOCTRINE: Interest rates must be agreed upon by the creditor and debtor through an
express stipulation in writing in order to be due and demandable.
FACTS:
Prime Systems bought 45 ATM from IBM for a total price of 24 Million o Prime Systems
failed to pay for the balance
IBM filed a collection suit against Prime systems praying for payment of the balance; o
Amount prayed for by IBM is pegged at 46 Million with 3% per month interest;
IBM argues that the 3% per month interest is provided for in a letter they sent to Prime
Systems dated December 29, 1997 which was duly received by respondent’s employee and
therefore assented to by respondent.
IBM also argues that respondent failed to object to the 3% per month interest rate and
even asked for a possible reduction, this then, according to petitioner, resulted to
concurrence by respondent to the 3% per month interest rate.
RTC agrees with IBM; CA Reversed stating that a 6% per annum is the proper interest rate
since the 3% interest rate being imposed by IBM was not stipulated in writing and agreed
upon by petitioner and respondent.
IBM now questions the decision of CA in rejecting their claim for 3% per month interest

ISSUE: Whether or not the 3% per month interest rate was properly agreed upon by the
parties

HELD: No, the 3% per month interest rate was not agreed by the parties. Article 1956
states that interest rates should be expressly stipulated in writing in order to be due. Stated
differently, interest rates should be (1) expressly stipulated and (2) in writing in order for
said rate to be due and demandable.
In the present case, the Supreme Court found that the petitioner failed to comply with the
above-mentioned requisites. Petitioner’s contention that respondent’s employee’s
acceptance and failure to object to the letter equates to consent to the 3% interest rate is
untenable; The Supreme Court stated that the letter was not even accepted and assented to
by an authorized representative of the respondent therefore no consent was actually
acquired from respondent. Additionally, petitioner’s contention that the respondent’s act of
continuing with the transaction a year after receiving the letter amounted to consent is also
untenable in light of the fact that interest rates should be in writing and expressly
stipulated there being no actual and clear agreement as to the applicable interest rate.
Considering that there is no proper interest rate agreed upon by the parties, the Supreme
Court found the imposition of the CA of the 6% per annum legal interest rate in lieu of the
supposed 3% per month interest rate as proper.

DELA PAZ v. L&J DEVELOPMENT COMPANY

G.R. No. 183360; September 8, 2014
Loan

DOCTRINE: No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.

FACTS:
De La Paz lent L&J Development Php350,000 with no security. The loan, with no maturity
date, carried 6% interest. As L&J failed to pay despite repeated demands, De La Paz filed a
Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages. In their Answer, L&J and Atty.
Salonga (President and General Manager of L&J) denied De La Paz’s allegations. While they
acknowledged the loan as a corporate debt, they claimed that the failure to pay the same
was due to a fortuitous event, that is, the financial difficulties brought about by the
economic crisis. They further argued that De La Paz cannot enforce the 6% monthly
interest for being unconscionable and shocking to the morals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the interest is valid

HELD: No, the lack of a written stipulation to pay interest on the loaned amount disallows a
creditor from charging monetary interest. Under Article 1956 of the Civil Code, no interest
shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. Jurisprudence on the matter
also holds that for interest to be due and payable, two conditions must concur: a) express
stipulation for the payment of interest; and b) the agreement to pay interest is reduced in
writing.
Here, it is undisputed that the parties did not put down in writing their agreement. Thus,
no interest is due. The collection of interest without any stipulation in writing is prohibited
by law. Even if the payment of interest has been reduced in writing, a 6% monthly interest
rate on a loan is unconscionable, regardless of who between the parties proposed the rate.
Indeed at present, usury has been legally non-existent in view of the suspension of the
Usury Law by Central Bank Circular No. 905 s. 1982. Even so, not all interest rates levied
upon loans are permitted by the courts as they have the power to equitably reduce
unreasonable interest rates.

LIM v. DBP
G.R. No. 177050; July 1, 2013
Loan
DOCTRINE: Art. 1956 of the NCC provides that penalties and interest rates should be
expressly stipulated in writing.
FACTS:
Petitioner Lim (Lim & Diamond L Ranch accounts) obtained a loan from Development Bank
of the Philippines (DBP) to finance their cattle raising business. Petitioner Lim executed a
promissory note to pay annual amortization with an interest of 9% pa and penalty charge
of 11%pa. Petitioner Lim’s business collapsed and they failed to pay the amortizations due
to violent confrontations between the government and the Muslim Rebels in Mindanao.
DBP, in the course of negotiations with the petitioner for their restructuring agreement,
imposed additional interests and penalties not stipulated in the promissory note.

ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition of additional interests and penalties is valid

HELD: No, the petitioners never agreed to pay additional interest and penalties, hence, the
court declared the same to be illegal and thus void. Thus, the payment of interest and
penalties in loans is allowed only if the parties agreed to it and reduced their agreement in
writing.

ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION v. MANGALINAO

G.R. Nos. 174089 & 174266; January 25, 2012
The Concepts and Doctrines of Res Ipsa Loquitur, Last Clear Chance, Proximate
Cause, Damnum Absque Injuria, Presumption of Negligence, Vicarious Liability

DOCTRINE:
The Emergency Rule is not applicable when the driver is also negligent.
The registered owner of a vehicle could be held liable for damages even though he is no
longer the actual owner of the vehicle.

FACTS:
3 vehicles were traveling northbound along NLEX. The first is a Fuso 10-wheeler truck
(Fuso) driven by Loreto Lucilo (Loreto). Behind it is a Pathfinder driven by Anacleto
Edurese, Jr. (Edurese). Behind the Pathfinder is another 10-wheeler truck (Isuzu) driven by
Antonio.
The Pathfinder sought to overtake the Fuso and therefore took the fast lane. However, the
Fuso suddenly swerved to the left which resulted to a collision. Even though Antonio
applied the brakes, the Isuzu crashed into the rear of the Pathfinder leaving it a total wreck.
As a result of the collision Edurese and the passengers of the Pathfinder (Sps. Mangalinao,
Jebueza, and Marriane) died.
Orix, the owner of the Fuso, argued that when the incident occurred he no longer was the
owner of the Fuso because it was sold to MMO Trucking.
Antonio, on the other hand, argued that the crash was the result of Loreto and that
according to the Emergency Rule, he could not be held liable.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Emergency Rule is applicable to this case
Whether or not Orix could be exculpated from liability because he is no longer the owner of
the vehicle

HELD:
No, the emergency Rule is not applicable to the case because Antonio, himself, was also
negligent. The emergency rule provides that one who suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted
to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.
In this case, Antonio was driving too closely to the Pathfinder. As such, Antonio was also
negligent in driving thus making the emergency rule inapplicable.

No, the registered owner of a vehicle may also be held liable for damages. Orix cannot point
fingers at the alleged real owner to exculpate itself from vicarious liability under Article
2180 of the Civil Code. Regardless of whoever Orix claims to be the actual owner of the
Fuso by reason of a contract of sale, it is nevertheless primarily liable for the damages or
injury the truck registered under it have caused.

GREENSTAR EXPRESS, INC. v. UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP.

G.R. No. 205090; October 17, 2016
Tortfeasor

DOCTRINE: When by evidence of the ownership of vehicle and employment were proved,
the presumption on negligence will be attached, as the registered owner of the vehicle and
employer

FACTS:
A bus and van owned by Greenstar and URC collided in Laguna, which resulted to the death
of NURC Operations Manager Bicomong who drove the van.
Bicomong used the URC van, which was original assigned to another officer, for his
personal use
Greenstar driver Sayson fled right after the incident happened and reported to his
employer

ISSUE: Whether or not URC should be held liable for the negligence of its employee

HELD: No, URC succeeded in overcoming the presumption of negligence, having shown
that when the collision took place, Bicomong was not in the performance of his work.
Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, employers shall be held primarily and solidarily
liable for damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks. To hold the employer liable under this provision, it must be shown that an employer-
employee relationship exists, and that the employee was acting within the scope of his
assigned task when the act complained of was committed.
The burden of proof shifted to respondents to show that no liability under Article 2180
arose, which they were able to prove. This may be done by proof of any of the following: (1)
That they had no employment relationship with Bicomong; (2) That Bicomong acted
outside the scope of his assigned tasks; or (3) That they exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of Bicomong.
 GUNTALILIB v. DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 200042; July 7, 2016
Dealings with Unregistered Lands

DOCTRINE: The reliefs sought in an action for quieting of title and annulment of title are
the same.

FACTS:
Respondents filed a Complaint for Quieting of Titles; Annulment and Cancellation of
Unnumbered OCT/ Damages against petitioner. o They claim the subject property by
inheriting the same from their father (who inherited the property from his
father/respondents’ grandfather) Respondents likewise alleged that petitioner filed a
petition for reconstitution or issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu of an allegedly lost
unnumbered OCT. o This was issued in the name of petitioner’s predecessor, Bernardo
Tumaliuan, covering the very same property which the respondents owned. Said
unnumbered OCT constituted a cloud upon their titles that must necessarily be removed.
Petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss arguing that the Complaint stated no cause of action;
that the case constituted a collateral attack on their unnumbered OCT.

ISSUE: Whether or not the quieting of title case filed by respondents constitutes as a
prohibited (collateral) attack on the unnumbered OCT

HELD: No, it is settled that a certificate of title is not subject to collateral attack. However,
while respondents’ action is denominated as one for quieting of title, it is in reality an
action to annul and cancel Bernardo Tumaliuan’s unnumbered OCT. .
The allegations and prayer in their Amended Complaint make out a case for annulment and
cancellation of title, and not merely quieting of title: they claim that their predecessor’s
OCT 213, which was issued on August 7, 1916, should prevail over Bernardo Tumaliuan’s
unnumbered OCT which was issued only on August 29, 1916; that petitioner and his
codefendants have knowledge of OCT 213 and their existing titles; that through fraud, false
misrepresentations, and irregularities in the proceedings for reconstitution, petitioner was
able to secure a copy of his predecessor’s supposed unnumbered OCT; and for these
reasons, Bernardo Tumaliuan’s unnumbered OCT should be cancelled.
Besides, the case was denominated as one for “Quieting of Titles x x x; Cancellation of
Unnumbered OCT/Damages.” It has been held that the underlying objectives or reliefs
sought in both the quieting-of-title and the annulment-of-title cases are essentially the
same: adjudication of the ownership of the disputed lot and nullification of one of the two
certificates of title. Nonetheless, petitioner should not have been so simplistic as to think
that the respondents’ complaint is merely a quieting of title case. It is more appropriate to
suppose that one of the effects of cancelling Bernardo Tumaliuan’s unnumbered OCT would
be to quiet title over the subject property; in this sense, quieting of title is subsumed in the
annulment of title case.

PEOPLE v. BERNARDINO PERALTA and MICHAEL AMBAS

G.R. No. 208524; June 1, 2016
Temperate or Moderate Damages

DOCTRINE: Temperate damages are recovered when the court finds some pecuniary loss
has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty.

FACTS:
Bernardino Peralta and Michael Ambas were charged of the crime of robbery with
homicide for shooting Supt. Joven Bocalbos in the head during an armed robbery commited
inside Bocalbos’ own passenger van for hire. According to the witnesses of the prosecution,
Bocalbos was driving his van and transporting passengers as additional income. Along
Commonwealth Avenue, one of the passengers announced a “holdup”. Bocalbos stopped
the van near Fairview Market and was ordered by one of the armed passengers to vacate
the driver’s seat.
Peralta took over the van. Afterwards, he shot Bocalbos in the head. Peralta’s cohorts took
the valuables of the passengers including Olitan’s belongings including: o Cellphone, silver
ring, sunglasses and cash money
Olitan was then made to drive the van to Mandaluyong City where the assailants alighted.
Olitan brought Bocalbos to M-tech Medical Center but it was already too late
RTC: found both Peralta and Ambas guilty beyond reasonable doubt o Heirs of the deceased
Bocalbos were awarded civil indemnity, burial expenses, moral damages, award for
unearned income. Olitan was awarded P3,000 temperate damages in lieu of the actual
damages caused by the robbery

ISSUE: Whether or not the award for temperate damages awarded to Olitan was proper

HELD: Yes, SC found it proper to award P3,000 to Olitan, as no receipts were presented
during trial to prove the actual costs of the items taken from him. Under Article 2224 of the
Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary
loss had been suffered but its amount, cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty.

GIL MACALINO, JR., et. al. v. ARTEMIO PIS-AN

G.R. No. 204056; June 1, 2016
Quieting of Title to or Interest in and Removal or Prevention of Cloud over Title or
Interest in Real Property

DOCTRINE: In cases of quieting of title, it is essential that the plaintiff has a legal or
equitable title or interest in the subject property.

FACTS:
Emeterio Jumento was the owner of the half portion of Lot 3154 consisting of 469 square
meters and his children, the other half in equal shares. Emeterio inherited his children’s
portion when they died, thus becoming the owner of the whole lot. Subsequently, Emeterio
passed away. Meanwhile, the City of Dumaguete built a barangay road which cut across the
said lot, dividing it into three portions. Artemio, a grandson-in-law of Emeterio and one of
the latter’s heirs, had the lot surveyed, divided into three (Lot 3154 A, B, and C) Artemio
and his co-heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Absolute Sale
adjudicating among themselves Lot 3154. The document did not identify which portion of
the three was being sold to the Silleros, who simply bought 207-sqm of Lot 3154. They then
put up a house and sold it to Gil Macalino. Macalino had the lot surveyed and discovered
that the portion occupied by him was only 140sqm, not 207sqm. He, along with his
children, filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages to RTC
Artemio argues that the lot fenced by the Silleros was exactly the portion that they sold to
Gil, the latter not having execerised the diligence required of a buyer. o The deed of sale
from the Silleros, particularly state that they were selling a 207-sqm portion “known as
Sub-lot 3154-A” and that due to this phrase, the sale was for a lump sum, presuming that
Gil only intended to buy Lot 3154-A (and not the other lots)

ISSUE: Whether or not Gil is entitled to Lot 3154-C for the remainder of the 207sqm
portion he bought?

HELD: No, in order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, it is essential that the
plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the property that is the subject
matter of the action.
Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership.
Since what the Silleros bought from Artemio was Lot 3154-A, which was only 140-sqm, it
logically follows that what they sold to Macalino was the same and exact property. As such,
no confusion exists as to the extent of what the Spouses Silleros owned. Thus, what
Macalino bought from the Silleros was Lot 3154-A only, and in the absence of a legal or
equitable title, or interest, in favor of Macalino there is no cloud to be prevented or
removed.

TRINIDAD v. PALAD
G.R. No. 203397; December 9, 2015
Torrens System (General Principles)

DOCTRINE: Title to property, evidenced by a certificate of title, is indefeasible and

incontrovertible. Those who hold such title of ownership is entitled to possession.

FACTS:
Ramos, Navarro and Loyola owned a 12 hectare Property (1). Genaro Kausapin (father of
respondent Feliciana) was the tenant of the property. Genaro Kausapin availed of Joaquin
Trinidad’s legal services, they then entered into a Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi where they
partitioned property 1 into lot A, B, and C, and Genaro then gave lot A to Joaquin. Who in
turn gave it to his son, petitioner Agusto Trinidad. However, Agusto, instead of using lot A,
occupied and converted 2 hectares of lot C into a fishpond. Genaro and Ramos didn’t
question this entry. 5 years later, Ramos sold 8 hectares of property 1 to Spouses which
covers the 2 hectare property being encroached on by Agusto which was later registered as
Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) T-47318. They later surveyed the land and only then
found out about the encroachment. Ramos claims he did not know about this
encroachment. The spouses demanded for Agusto to vacate but he denied. The spouses
filed a Complaint for recovery of possession with damages against Agusto. Claiming that as
the registered owners, they are entitled to possession. RTC: ruled for Agusto. It is clear that
they did not know the metes and bounds of the lots especially since the seller, Ramos,
wasn’t aware of the encroachment until the surveyance of the property.

ISSUE: Whether or not Spouses has right to possession of the property

HELD: Yes, the 2 hectare property is within C which is registered in the name of spouses as
TCT T-47318. As against possession claimed by the petitioners, respondents' certificate of
title prevails. Mere possession cannot defeat the title of a holder of a registered Torrens
title. TCT T-47318 constitutes evidence of respondents' ownership over the subject
property, which lies within the area covered by said title; that TCT T-47318 serves as
evidence of indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of respondents,
whose names appear therein; and that as registered owners, they are entitled to possession
of the subject property. Agusto are mere intruders with respect to the subject property;
they have no right to own or possess the same. On the other hand, as registered owners of
the subject property, respondents have the right to exercise all attributes of ownership
including possession which they cannot do while petitioners remain there.

NICOLAS v. MARIANO
G.R. No. 201070; August 1, 2016
Torrens System (General Principles)

DOCTRINE: Torrens System only confirms ownership; It does not create ownership.

FACTS:
Mariano (Respondent) filed with the NHA an application for a land grant. NHA approved
the application. The grant, however, is subject to a mortgage. NHA withheld the conveyance
of the original TCT to Mariano. Mariano was only given a photocopy of the TCT; Issuance of
the original TCT in her name is conditioned upon her full payment of the mortgage loan.
Mariano defaulted in payment of her obligation with NHA. Mariano obtained a loan from
Nicolas (Petitioner); To secure the loan, she mortgaged the subject property. A second
mortgage deed was executed in favor of Nicolas. Since Mariano defaulted on the second
obligation, Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Propety was executed in favor of Nicolas. Mariano
filed a case for Specific Performance with Damages against Nicolas.
RTC ruled in favor of Mariano. CA affirmed.
Hence, this petition. Nicolas argued that Mariano had the right to mortgage and sell the
property as she is the owner of the subject property, even though NHA withheld the
original and TCT and merely gave a photocopy to Mariano.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in favor of respondent
Mariano is an evidence of her ownership over the subject property thus capacitating her to
alienate the said property in favor of petitioner.

HELD:
No. While title to TCT No. C-44249 is in the name of Mariano, she has not completed her
installment payments to NHA; this fact is not disputed, and as a matter of fact, Mariano
admits it. Indeed, Mariano even goes so far as to concede, in her Comments and Opposition
to the Petition, that she is not the owner of the subject property.21 Thus, if she never
became the owner of the subject property, then she could not validly mortgage and sell the
same to Nicolas. The principle nemo dat quod non habet certainly applies.By title, the law
refers to ownership which is represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses
certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does
not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a
certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides,
the certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. Indeed,
the Torrens system of land registration "merely confirms ownership and does not create it.
It cannot be used to divest lawful owners of their title for the purpose of transferring it to
another one who has not acquired it by any of the modes allowed or recognized by law."

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPS. BENIGNO

G.R. No. 205492; March 11, 2015
Original Registration

DOCTRINE: Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable and
disposable, it remains part of the inalienable public domain that cannot be subject for an
application for registration of title.

FACTS:
Sps. Benigno filed an application for registration of title under PD 1529 of a lot in Laguna,
which the RTC granted. The Republic argues that: o The RTC’s Decision granting Sps.
Benigno’s application for registration is void for lack of the required certification from the
DENR Secretary declaring the land applied for as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
Mere testimony of a special investigator of CENRO cannot form the basis that the land
applied for is alienable and disposable.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s application for registration is null and void for lack of
proof that the land applied for is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

HELD: No. Applicants for registration of title under PD 1529 must prove:
(1) That the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain; and
(2) That they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
In order to prove number (1), the general rule is that: all applications for original
registration must include both (a) a CENRO or PENRO certification and (b) a certified true
copy of the original classification made by the DENR Secretary. In this case, Sps. Benigno
did not present any documentary evidence in the earlier LRC case to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable. Hence, Sps. Benigno’s application for registration of title should
not be allowed.
“The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion
presumably belong to the State. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and
disposable rests with the applicant.” “[P]ublic lands remain part of the inalienable land of
the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to
private persons.” “Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a
private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed,
occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title.”

ENDAYA v. VILLAOS
G.R. No. 202426; January 27, 2016
General Provisions of Succession

DOCTRINE: The rights of succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent.

FACTS:
Gina Endaya, and other heirs of Atilano Villaos (petitioners) filed before the RTC, a
complaint for declaration of nullity of deeds of sale, recovery of titles, and accounting of
income of the Palawan Village Hotel (PVH) against Ernesto Villaos (respondent).
Petitioners claim that the purported sale by Atilano to respondent was spurious.
Subsequently, respondent filed an ejectment case against petitioners in the MTCC.
Respondent claims that he bought the properties where PVH was located and asked those
residing in said properties (petitioners) to vacate. Petitioners refused to vacate assailing
that the deeds of sale were forged and not properly notarized in the correct venue.
The MTCC ruled in favor of respondent. The petitioners appealed before the RTC, which
affirmed the ruling of the MTCC. The RTC said that the questioned deeds of sale, being
notarized, are public documents afforded the presumption of regularity. No litis pendentia
because the asserted rights and prayed reliefs in the first RTC case filed were contrasting.
Petitioner files an MR, but it was denied. The petitioners filed a petition for review before
the CA, which was also denied. The only issue for resolution in an ejectment case is who is
entitled to possession independent of any claim of ownership. No litis pendentia because
first RTC case was an action for declaration of nullity of the deeds of sale and the case in the
MTCC was about possession.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to possession

HELD: Yes, under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent. Thus, petitioner and her coheirs should
have been favored on the question of possession, being heirs who succeeded the registered
owner of the properties in dispute. Clearly, the MTCC, RTC, and CA erred in ruling in favor
of respondent.
In resolving the issue of possession in an ejectment case, the registered owner of the
property is preferred over the transferee under an unregistered deed of sale. While
respondent has in his favor deeds of sale over the eight parcels of land, these deeds were
not registered; thus, title remained in the name of the owner and seller Atilano. When he
died, title passed to petitioner, who is his illegitimate child. This relationship does not
appear to be contested by respondent in these proceedings, at least
 INING v. VEGA
G.R. No. 174727; August 12, 2013
General Principles of Succession

DOCTRINE: One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the
latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s property.

FACTS:
Leon Roldan, married to Rafaela Menez, is the owner of a parcel of land in Kalibo, Aklan.
Leon and Rafaela died, the former was survived by two siblings; Romana, and Gregoria.
Romana’s grandson Leonardo filed a case for partition of property against Gregoria’s heirs.
Antipolo, one of the heirs, claims that they have become the sole owners of the subject
property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired it in good faith from Juan Enriquez, who got it
from Leon. o Lucimo Sr. was the husband of Teodora, the daughter of Antipolo, thus related
only by affinity to the family of Leon.
Lucimo Sr. claims that he repudiated the co-ownership upon execution of the Affidavit of
Ownership of Land, and that Leonardo can no longer have the property partitioned, based
on prescription through adverse possession.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lucimo Sr. can effect a repudiation of the co-ownership

HELD: No, one who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the
latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s property. He is merely Antipolo’s
son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora.
Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for succession, exclude
relations by affinity. Thus, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the
existing co-ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the property at any time.

REPUBLIC v. SPS. SALVADOR

G.R. No. 205428; June 7, 2017
Actual and Compensatory Damages

DOCTRINE: Consequential damages are only awarded if as a result of the expropriation,

the remaining property of the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in value.

FACTS:
The Republic filed a verified complaint for the expropriation of a parcel of land belonging to
Sps. Salvador.
Sps. Salvador received two checks from the DPWH representing 100% of the zonal value of
the subject property. They signified in open court that they are interposing no objection,
and that they have received the total sum of Php 683,349.22, and are no longer intending to
claim any just compensation.
The RTC directed the Republic to pay consequential damages equivalent to the value of the
capital gains tax and other taxes necessary for the transfer.

ISSUE: Whether or not consequential damages should be granted

HELD: No, consequential damages are only awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the
remaining property of the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in value. In this
case, no evidence was submitted to prove such impairment.