An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour

—a letter to a friend
Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury

Copyright © Jonathan Bennett 2017. All rights reserved

[Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small ·dots· enclose material that has been added, but can be read as
though it were part of the original text. Occasional •bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations,
are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. every four-point ellipsis . . . . indicates
the omission of a brief passage that seems to present more difficulty than it is worth. Longer omissions are
reported between brackets in normal-sized type.—This work is the second of the five Treatises in Shaftesbury’s
Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. Its title fits less than half its content; there are all sorts of
other good things on offer here.
First launched: March 2011.
Freedom of wit and humour Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury

Contents
Part I 1
Section 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Section 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Section 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Section 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Section 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Section 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Part II 8
Section 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Section 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Section 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Part III 15
Section 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Section 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Section 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Section 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Part IV 22
Section 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Section 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Section 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Freedom of wit and humour Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury

glossary
affection: In the early modern period, ‘affection’ could mean present work (including its title), Shaftesbury uses the word
‘fondness’, as it does today; but it was also often used to mainly in our present sense.
cover desires, approvals, likings, disapprovals, dislikings,
imposture: Willful and fraudulent deception.
etc. In this work it is mainly used to refer to pro-feelings,
but the negative ones may be hovering in the background. luxury: This meant something like: extreme or inordinate
indulgence in sensual pleasures.
animal spirits: This stuff was supposed to be matter that is
even more finely divided than air, able to move extremely fast magistrate: In this work, as in general in early modern
and seep into tiny crevices. and (this being Shaftesbury’s times, ‘a magistrate’ is anyone with an official role in gov-
point on page 4) continuously active. his other mentions of ernment; ‘the magistrate’ usually means ‘the government’ or
‘spirits’ in this work are to mental items. ‘the ruler’. The ‘magistracy’ is also just the government, or
the collective of all the senior officials in the government.
education: In early modern times this word had a somewhat
broader meaning than it does today. It wouldn’t have been mixed company: On page 6 Shaftesbury uses this to mean
misleading to replace it by ‘upbringing’ on almost every ‘company comprising people of different backgrounds or
occasion characters’, not in its more usual sense of ‘company contain-
ing both men and women’.
formality: On page 6 this refers to intellectual conduct that
is stiff, rule-governed, prim. moral: In early modern times, ‘moral’ could mean roughly
what it does today, but also had a use in which it meant
generous: It had today’s sense of ‘free in giving’ but also ‘having to do with intentional human action’. On page 25 its
the sense of ‘noble-minded, magnanimous, rich in positive use is even broader than that: Shaftesbury is saying that the
emotions’ etc. beauty and significance of fine works of art comes from their
bearing on the human condition—how they affect people’s
genius: Sometimes used to mean nothing much more than
feelings and thoughts.
‘intellect’; more often meaning ‘(the possessor of) very high-
level intellect’. In early modern times ‘genius’ wasn’t given passive obedience: The doctrine that anything short of or
the very strong meaning it has today. other than absolute obedience to the monarch is sinful.
humour: In ancient Greek medicine it was held that the peculiar: Individual, pertaining exclusively to one individual.
human body contains four basic kinds of fluid (‘humours’), On page 27 the requirement that a work of visual or literary
the proportions of which in a given body settled that person’s art not contain anything ‘peculiar or distinct’ means that it
physical and mental qualities. By the early modern period is not to have any features that mark off what is represented
this theory was dead; but the use of ‘humours’ to refer to in a highly individual way that would, Shaftesbury thinks,
bodily states, character-traits, moods, lingered on. In the be distracting.
Freedom of wit and humour Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury

performer: In early modern times, a ‘performance’ could selfish: In the paragraph ‘It is the height of wisdom. . . ’
be the writing of a book, the composing of an opera, or the on page 20 Shaftesbury is using the word to mean merely
like. The ‘performers’ referred to on page 25 are poets and ‘self-ish’, i.e. ‘self-related’ or ‘concerned with one’s own
composers rather than actors and singers and violinists. interests’. Most of his uses of the word make it mean also
‘. . . to the exclusion of proper care for the interests of others’.
popular: It means ‘of the people’; in early modern times it
seldom means ‘liked by the people’. speculation: This has nothing to do with guess-work. It
means ‘an intellectual pursuit that doesn’t involve morality’.
prince: As was common in his day, Shaftesbury uses ‘prince’ ethics is a ‘practical’ discipline, chemistry is a ‘speculative’
to mean ‘ruler’ or ‘chief of government’. It doesn’t stand for one.
a rank that would distinguish ‘prince’ from ‘king’ or indeed
from ‘commoner’. vice, vicious: Morally wrong conduct, not necessarily of
the special kind that we reserve ‘vice’ for these days, or the
principle: In a few places Shaftesbury uses this word in different special kind that we label as ‘vicious’.
a once-common but now-obsolete sense in which it means
‘source’, ‘cause’, ‘driver’, ‘energizer’, or the like. vulgar: Applied to people who have no social rank, are
not much educated, and (the suggestion often is) not very
raillery: Good-humoured witty ridicule or teasing, done with intelligent.
a light touch. Engaging in raillery is rallying.
wit: This often meant about the same as ‘intelligence’; but in
science: In early modern times this word applied to any Shaftesbury and some other writers it usually carries some
body of knowledge or theory that is (perhaps) axiomatised suggestion of today’s meaning—e.g. in the work’s title and
and (certainly) conceptually highly organised. in the link on page 1 between ‘wit’ and ‘raillery’.
Freedom of wit and humour Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury I/2

Part I

Section 1 viewed in order to evaluate them thoroughly is ridicule itself,

i.e. the form of test through which we discover whatever is
When in conversation the other day I spoke in defence of vulnerable to fair raillery in any subject.. . . .
raillery [see Glossary], you were surprised; and I have been So I want you to know fully what my views are regarding
thinking about why. Is it possible that you have supposed this, so that you can judge whether I •was sincere the other
me to be such a grave [= ‘solemn’] person that I would dislike day in defending raillery, and •can still plead for those able
all conversation of this kind? Or were you afraid that if you friends of ours who are often criticised for their humour of
put me to the test by the use of raillery I would fail? this kind, and for the freedom they take in this airy way of
I must confess that you had reason enough for your conversing and writing.
caution if you thought me to be basically such a true zealot
that I couldn’t bear the least raillery on my own opinions. I
Section 2
know there are many people like that. Anything that they
think is grave or solemn must, they hold, be treated only in Seriously, thinking about how this species of wit is some-
a grave and solemn way; though they don’t mind treating times employed, and how excessively some of our contempo-
differently anything that others think—they are eager to try raries have been using it lately, one may be a little confused
the edge of ridicule against any opinions except their own. and unsure •what to think of the practice or •where this
Is it fair for them to take this attitude? Isn’t it just and rallying frame of mind will eventually take us. It has passed
reasonable to handle our own opinions as freely as we do from the men of pleasure to the men of business. Politicians
other people’s? To be sparing with our own opinions may be have been infected with it, so that grave affairs of state have
regarded as a piece of selfishness. We might be accused of been treated with an air of irony and banter. The ablest
willful ignorance and blind idolatry, for having taken opinions negotiators have been known as the most notable clowns;
on trust and consecrated in ourselves certain idol-notions the most celebrated authors have shown themselves as the
that we won’t allow to be unveiled or seen in day light. [For greatest masters of burlesque.
‘idol notions’ see Bacon’s New Organon, aphorism 1:39.] The items There is indeed a kind of defensive raillery (if I may so
that we carefully tuck away in some dark corner of our call it) which I am willing enough to allow—in affairs of any
minds may be monsters rather than divinities or sacred kind—when the spirit of inquiry would force a discovery of
truths; the spectres can impose on us if we refuse to turn more truth than can conveniently be told, ·and the raillery is
them every way and view their shapes and complexions in a device for heading off inquiry·. In some contexts the worst
every light. Something that can be shown only in a certain harm we can do to truth is to discover too much of it. It’s the
light is questionable. Truth, they say, can stand any light; same with •understandings as with •eyes: for a given size
and one of the principal lights. . . .by which things are to be and structure just so much light is necessary, and no more;

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anything beyond that brings darkness and confusion. company; there are only a few signs of it in the country; and
It is real humanity and kindness to hide strong truths it seems at last to have been restricted to the schools, as
from tender eyes. And it is easier and more civil to do this by the chief entertainment of teachers and their pupils. Other
pleasant humour than by a harsh denial or by remarkable kinds of wit will also improve in our hands, and humour
reserve [= ‘by conspicuously buttoning your lip’]. But to work at will refine itself, as long as we take care not to tamper
confusing men by creating mysteries, and getting advantage with it and hold it down by severe discipline and rigorous
or pleasure from the perplexity you are throwing them into prohibitions. Everything that is civilised in conversation is
by such uncertain talk, is as mean when it is done through due to liberty: we polish one another, and rub off our corners
raillery as when it is done with the greatest seriousness in and rough sides by a sort of friendly collision. To restrain
a solemn attempt to deceive. It may still be necessary, as this is inevitably to cause men’s understandings to rust. It
it was long ago, for wise men to speak in parables with a is to destroy civility, good breeding, and even charity itself,
double meaning, so that the enemy will be confused and only under a pretence of maintaining it. [Here ‘charity’ seems to mean,
those who have ears to hear will hear. [This echoes Matthew 13:9 roughly, ‘kindness’.]
where Jesus, after presenting a parable, says ‘Who hath ears to hear, let
him hear’.] But it is certainly a mean, impotent, and dull sort
Section 3
of ‘wit’ that confuses everyone and leaves even one’s friends
unsure what one’s real opinions are on the topic in question. To describe true raillery would be as difficult and perhaps as
This is the crude sort of raillery that is so offensive in good pointless as defining good manners.
company. And indeed there’s as much difference between the
Shaftesbury’s next sentence: None can understand the spec-
two sorts of raillery as between •fair-dealing and •hypocrisy,
ulation, besides those who have the practice.
or between the most genteel wit and the most scurrilous
clowning. But this illiberal kind of wit will lose its credit—·i.e. meaning: To understand what true raillery is, you have to
will be exposed for the low device that it is·—by freedom of know how to engage in it. To understand what good manners
conversation. That is because wit is its own remedy; its true are, you have to be well-mannered.
value is settled by free trade in it; the only danger is setting Yet everyone thinks himself well-mannered; and the most
up an embargo. The same thing happens here as in the case dry and rigid pedant imagines that he can rally with a
of trade: tariffs and restrictions reduce trade to a low ebb; good grace and humour. I have known cases where an
nothing is as advantageous to it as a free port. author has been criticised for defending the use of raillery
We have seen in our own time the decline and ruin of a by some of those grave gentlemen who at the same time
false sort of wit that delighted our ancestors so much that have constantly used that weapon themselves, though they
their poems and plays, as well as their sermons, were full had no gift for it. I think this can be seen in the case of
of it. All humour involved some sort of play on words; the many zealots who have taken it upon themselves to answer
very language of the ·royal· court was full of puns. But now our modern free-writers [= ‘writers who are free-thinkers’ = ‘writers
such word-play is banished from the town and from all good who are atheists or anyway don’t shrink in horror from atheism’]. When

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these severe gentlemen, with the grim look of true inquisitors, current, their answers to them can hardly make their way
condescend to leave their austerity and deal in a joking and into the world or be taken the least notice of. Pedantry and
pleasant manner with an adversary whom they would prefer bigotry are millstones that can sink the best book if it carries
to treat very differently, they don’t do it gracefully. To do the least part of their dead weight. The temperament of the
them justice, I’m sure that if they had their way their conduct •pedagogue doesn’t suit the times, and the world may be
and tone would be pretty much the same all through; they willing to learn but it isn’t willing to be •tutored. When a
would probably give up ·occasional· farce and stay with philosopher speaks, men hear him willingly as long as he
continuous tragedy! But as things are, there’s nothing so keeps to his philosophy. A Christian is heard as long as
ridiculous as the two-faced performance of writers who with he keeps to his professed charity and meekness. And in
one face force a smile and with another show nothing but a gentleman we allow of joking and raillery as long as it is
rage and fury. Having signed up for the tournament and managed with good manners and is never crude or clownish.
agreed to the fair laws of combat by wit and argument, they But if a mere academic scholar—impersonating all these
have no sooner tried their weapon than you hear them crying characters and in his writings bouncing back and forth from
aloud for help and delivering ·their adversary· over to the one to another—appears over-all to be as little able to keep
secular arm. [That is a joke. At some times and places, when a court of the temperament of Christianity as to use the reason of a
some Church found a person guilty of a crime for which it was unwilling philosopher or the raillery of a well-mannered gentleman, is
or legally unable to enforce punishment, it would ask ‘the secular arm’ it any wonder if the monstrous product of such a jumbled
of government to do the punishing.] brain strikes the world as ridiculous?
There can’t be a more preposterous sight than an execu- If you think, my friend, that by this description I have
tioner and a clown acting their part upon the same stage! But done wrong to these zealot-writers in religious controversy,
I’m convinced that anyone will find this to be the real picture just read a few pages in any one of them. . . .and then
of certain modern zealots in their controversial writings. They pronounce.
are no more masters of solemnity than they are of good
humour, always running into •harsh severity on one side
Section 4
and •awkward buffoonery on the other. Between anger and
pleasure, zeal and joking, their writing is about as graceful Now that I have said this much about authors and writings,
as the play of cantankerous children who at the same instant you’ll hear my thoughts (which you asked for) on the subject
are both peevish and wild, and can laugh and cry almost in of conversation, and especially a recent free-ranging con-
the same breath. versation that I had with some friends of yours whom you
There’s no need for me to explain how agreeable such thought I should have very solemnly condemned.
writings are like to be, and what effect they’ll have towards It was, I must admit, a very entertaining conversation,
winning over or convincing those who are supposed to be despite its ending as abruptly as it did and in a confusion
in error! It’s not surprising to hear the zealots publicly that almost annihilated everything that had been said. Some
lamenting the fact that while their adversaries’ books are so details of this conversation oughtn’t to be recorded on paper,

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I think. It will be enough if I remind you of the general bigotry of those who reign in them and assume themselves
lines of how the conversation went. Many fine schemes to be dictators in these provinces.
were destroyed; many grave reasonings were overturned: The ancient the satirist’s complaint in poetry—‘Must I
but because this was done without offence to the parties always be only a listener?’—is an equally natural complaint
concerned and with improvement to the good humour of in theology, in morals, and in philosophy. Taking turns is a
the company, it gave us a still keener appetite for such mighty law of discourse, and mightily longed for by mankind.
conversations. And I’m convinced that if Reason herself In matters of reason, more is done in a minute or two of
were asked to judge how her own interests fared in this question and reply than is achieved by hours of continuous
conversation, she would answer that she received more discourse. Orations are fit only to move the passions; and
advantage in the main from that easy and familiar way the power of rhetoric is to terrify, exalt, enchant or delight,
of conversing than from the usual stiff adherence to one rather than to satisfy or instruct. A free conversation is •a
particular opinion. close fight, compared with which the other way—·the lecture
Perhaps you are still in the frame of mind of not believing or oration·—is merely •a waving of weapons in the air. So
me to be in earnest about this. You may continue to tell me being obstructed and manacled in conferences, and being
that I am merely trying to be paradoxical when I commend as restricted to hearing orations on certain subjects, is bound
advantageous to reason a conversation that ended in such to give us a distaste for those subjects, making them—when
total uncertainty concerning things that had seemingly been managed in that way—as disagreeable to us as the managers
so well established. are. Men would rather reason •about trifles if they can
I answer that according to my notion of reason, one can’t reason freely and without the imposition of authority than
learn how to use it from the written treatises of the •learned reason •about the best and most useful subjects in the world
or from the set lectures of the •eloquent. The only way when they are held under restraint and fear.
someone can be made a reasoner is through the habit of And it’s no wonder that men are generally such weak
reasoning. And men can never be better invited into the reasoners who don’t much care for strict argument in con-
habit than when they find pleasure in it. Now, the only way versations on minor topics, given that they’re afraid to exert
for such speculative [see Glossary] conversations to be at all their reason in greater matters, and are forced to argue
agreeable is for them to have feebly in contexts where they need the greatest activity and
•a freedom of raillery, strength. What happens here is like what happens in strong
•a liberty in decent language to question everything, and healthy bodies that are debarred from their natural
and exercise and confined in a narrow space. They are forced
•permission to unravel or refute any argument without to use odd gestures and contortions. They have a sort of
giving offence to the arguer. action; they do still move; but they do it utterly ungracefully.
The fact is that conversations on theoretical matters have That happens because the animal spirits [see Glossary] in such
been made burdensome to mankind by the strictness of the sound and active limbs can’t lie dead, i.e. unemployed. And
laws laid down for them, and by the prevailing pedantry and in the same way the natural free ·mental· spirits of clever

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men, if they are imprisoned and controlled, will discover Section 5

other ways of acting so as to relieve themselves in their
constraint. . . . I really think that that’s why the ancients exhibit so little of
If men are forbidden to speak their minds •seriously on this spirit, and why in all the writings of the more polished
certain subjects, they’ll do it •ironically. If they are forbidden ages there’s hardly a sign of mere burlesque or anything like
to speak at all on such subjects, or if they think it really it. Their treatment of the very gravest subjects was indeed
dangerous to do so, they will then redouble their disguise, somewhat different from ours: their treatises were generally
wrap themselves in mystery, and talk in such a way that written in a free and familiar style; they chose to represent
they’ll hardly be understood. . . .by people who are disposed real discourse and conversation by treating their subjects in
to do them harm. Thus raillery comes more into fashion, the manner of dialogue and free debate. . . . The usual wit
and goes to extremes. The persecuting spirit has aroused and humour of their real discourses appeared in the ones
the bantering one; and lack of liberty may account for the that they composed; and this was fair, because without wit
lack of true civilisedness, and for the corruption or wrong and humour reason can hardly be tested, or be identified as
use of joking and humour. such. The magisterial voice and high strain of the pedagogue
commands reverence and awe; it is admirably fitted to keep
[In the next sentence, the italicised words come from the Latin urbs understandings at a distance and out of reach; whereas the
If in this respect we go beyond
= ‘city’ and rus = ‘countryside’.] other manner gives the fairest hold, and allows an antagonist
the limits of what we call urbanity and are apt sometimes to to use his full strength hand to hand, on level ground. . . .
behave in a buffooning rustic manner, we have the ridiculous
But some gentlemen are so full of the spirit of bigotry
solemnity and sour mood of our pedagogues to thank for this;
and false zeal that when they hear principles [see Glossary]
or, rather, they can thank themselves if they in particular
examined, sciences and arts inquired into, and matters of
meet with the heaviest of this kind of treatment. For it will
importance treated with this frank kind of humour, they
naturally fall heaviest where the constraint has been the
quickly conclude that all the professions must collapse,
severest. The greater the weight is, the more bitter will be
all establishments come to ruin, and nothing orderly or
the satire. . . .
decent be left standing in the world. They fear—or say they
To see that this really is so, look at the countries where do—that religion itself will be endangered by this free way
spiritual tyranny is highest. The greatest of buffoons are the ·of discussing things·; so they are as much alarmed by this
Italians. In their writings, in their freer sort of conversations, liberty when it occurs in private conversation and under
on their stages and in their streets buffoonery and burlesque prudent management as if it were crudely used in public
are in the highest vogue. It’s the only way the poor cramped company or before the most solemn assembly. But I see the
wretches can express a free thought. We have to concede situation very differently. For you have to remember, my
that they are better than us at this sort of wit. And it’s not friend, that I am writing to you in defence only of the liberty
surprising that we who have more liberty are less nimble in of the club—the sort of freedom that is employed among
that gross kind of raillery and ridicule? gentlemen and friends who know one another perfectly well.

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That it is natural for me to defend liberty with this restriction Section 6

can be inferred from the very notion I have of liberty itself.
It is surely a violation of the freedom of public assemblies To return now to our argument. If the best of our modern
for anyone to take the chair without having been called or conversations are apt to be chiefly concerned with trifles;
invited to it. To raise questions or steer debates that offend if rational discourses. . . .have become discredited and dis-
the public ear is to be lacking in the respect that is due to graced because of their formality [see Glossary]; then there’s
common society. In public such subjects should be treated all the more reason to allow humour and gaiety. An easier
either •not at all or •in a manner that doesn’t lead to scandal way of treating these subjects will make them more agreeable
or disturbance. The public is not on any account to be and familiar. Disagreeing about them will be like disagreeing
laughed at to its face, or scolded for its follies in such a about other matters; they needn’t spoil good company, or
way that it thinks it is being treated with contempt. And detract from the ease or pleasure of a civilised conversation;
what is contrary to •good manners in this way is equally and the oftener these conversations are renewed the better
contrary to •liberty. Coming across as superior to the will be their effect. We’ll become better reasoners by reason-
vulgar [see Glossary] and as despising the multitude—that’s ing in a pleasant and relaxed fashion, taking up or laying
the conduct of men of slavish principles [Shaftesbury’s phrase]. down these subjects, as we please. So I admit that I can’t be
Men who love mankind will respect and honour gatherings scandalized by the raillery that you took notice of, or by its
and societies of men. And in mixed company [see Glossary], effect on our company. The humour was agreeable, and the
and in places where men have unselectively come together pleasant confusion in which the conversation ended pleases
for amusement or for business, it is an imposition and a me as I look back on it, when I realise that instead of being
hardship to force them to hear what they dislike, and to discouraged from resuming the debate we were so much the
discuss matters in a dialect that is unfamiliar to many of readier to meet again at any time and disagree about the
them. It’s a breach of the harmony of public conversation same subjects, perhaps even with more ease and satisfaction
to say things in a way that •is above the common reach and than before.
•silences others, robbing them of their turn. But in private As you know, we had been occupying ourselves for a
society. . . .where friends meet knowingly, and with the actual long time with the subject of morality and religion. Among
intention of exercising their wit and looking freely into all different opinions presented and maintained with great life
subjects, I see no basis for anyone to claim to be offended at and ingenuity by various participants, every now and then
the way of raillery and humour, which is the very life of such someone would appeal to ‘common sense’. Everyone allowed
conversations—the only thing that makes good company, the appeal, and was willing to have his views put to that
and frees it from the formality of business and the tutorial test, because everyone was sure that common sense would
dogmaticness of the schools. justify him. But when the hearing was conducted—the issue
examined in the court of common sense—no judgment could
be given. This, however, didn’t inhibit the debaters from
renewing the appeal to common sense on the next occasion

6
Freedom of wit and humour Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury I/6

·when it seemed relevant to do so·. No-one ventured to call one ·sect· regards as an inconceivable mystery is easy
the authority of the court into question, until a gentleman for another sect to grasp; what is absurd to one is
whose good understanding had never been brought in doubt rigorously proved for another.
very gravely asked the company to tell him what common ‘(2) As for policy: there is equally a question as
sense was. he said: what “sense” or whose “sense” could be called common.
‘If by the word “sense” we understand opinion and If plain British or Dutch “sense” is right, Turkish and
judgment, and by the word “common” we mean what French “sense” must be very wrong. And although
is true of all mankind or of any considerable part of it, passive obedience [see Glossary] strikes us as mere
it will be hard to discover what the subject of common nonsense, we have found it to be the “common sense”
sense could be! For anything that accords with the of a large party among ourselves, a larger party in
“sense” of one part of mankind clashes with the “sense” Europe, and perhaps the greatest part of all the world
of another. And if ·the content of· common sense were besides.
settled by majority vote, it would change as often ‘(3) As for morals; the difference is still wider, if that
as men change, and something that squares with is possible. Setting aside the opinions and customs
common sense today will clash with it tomorrow or of the many barbarous and illiterate nations, and
soon thereafter.’ attending only to the few nations that have achieved
But despite the different judgments of mankind on most literature and philosophy, even they haven’t yet been
topics, it was thought ·by the members of our conversational able to agree on one single system, or acknowledge the
group· that they agreed on some. The question then arose same moral principles. And some of our most admired
as to what those subjects were. The questioner said: modern philosophers, even, have told us flatly that
‘It is thought that any topic that matters much will be virtue and vice have no other law or standard than
in the categories of (1) religion, (2) policy [here = ‘abstract mere fashion and vogue.’
political theory] or (3) morals. It might have seemed unfair in our friends if they had treated
‘(1) There’s no need to say anything about dif- only the graver subjects in this manner, and allowed the
ferences in religion; the situation is fully known to lighter ones to escape; for our follies in the gayer part of
everyone, and feelingly understood by Christians, in life are as solemn as our follies in the most serious. The
particular, among themselves. They have taken turns fault is that we take the laugh only half-way: we ridicule
in applying rigorous tests to one another. When any the false •pronouncement but leave uncriticised the false
party happened to have the power ·of the state·, it •joke, which becomes as utterly deceitful as the other. Our
did everything it possibly could to make its private entertainments, our plays, our amusements become solemn.
“sense” the public one; but it never succeeded—and We dream of happinesses and possessions and enjoyments
common sense was as hard to pin down as catholic regarding which we have no understanding, don’t know
or orthodox ·when these are taken as general terms, anything for certain; and yet we pursue these as ·though
not the names of two branches of Christianity·. What they were· the best known and most certain things in the

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Freedom of wit and humour Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury II/1

world. There’s nothing so foolish and deluding as a partial in their way of questioning accepted opinions and exposing
scepticism; for while the doubt is cast only on one side, the the ridiculousness of things. If you’ll allow me to continue in
certainty grows so much stronger on the other. While only the tone they adopted, I’ll conduct an experiment: there’s a
one face of folly appears ridiculous, the other grows more way of going about things that you thought •made assured
solemn and deceiving. knowledge impossible and •introduced endless scepticism;
But that’s not how things stood with our friends. They I want to discover whether by proceeding in that very same
seemed better critics, and more intellectually able and fair way we can get that assured knowledge back.

Part II

Section 1 common dress of the Europeans, happens to see someone

with no mask and in his normal clothing; and this makes him
If an Ethiopian were suddenly transported into Europe and laugh as much as ever. By a silly presumption he is taking
placed either in Paris or Venice at a time of Carnival, when nature for mere art, and mistaking a sober and sensible man
almost everyone wears a mask, he would probably be at a for one of those ridiculous amateur actors! Isn’t he making
loss for some time until he discovered the cheat; because at himself ridiculous by carrying the joke too far?
first it wouldn’t enter his head that a whole people could be so
wild as to agree at an appointed time to transform themselves [In this paragraph and the next, Shaftesbury is talking about (i) ways
by changing their clothing ·and wearing masks and· making in which truth has been disguised in terms of (ii) the wearing of masks
a serious solemn practice of deceiving one another by this and fooling around at Carnival. Sometimes he uses the language of (ii)
universal confusion of characters and persons. He might There was a
when really he is talking only about (i); read alertly!]
at first have looked on this with a serious eye, but once he time when men were accountable only for their actions and
discovered what was going on he’d have found it hard to keep behaviour [Shaftesbury’s phrase]. Their opinions were left to
a straight face. The Europeans might laugh back, mocking themselves. They were free to differ in these, as in their
his simplicity. But our Ethiopian would have better reason faces! everyone acquired the manner and look that was
for laughter. It’s easy to see which of the two would be ·more· natural for him. But in the course of time it came to be
ridiculous: someone who laughs and is himself ridiculous thought decent to correct men’s •faces and to make their
bears a double share of ridicule. But then this might happen: •intellectual complexions uniform and of one sort. Thus
Our Ethiopian, still in fits of laughter with his head full of the magistrate [see Glossary] became a dresser, and after he
masks, and knowing nothing of the fair complexion and had given up his power to a new order of clothiers, he in

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Freedom of wit and humour Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury II/1

turn was dressed as he deserved! But although. . . .it was [The ‘Magi’ referred to here are mythical creatures with magical pow-
agreed that only one manner of dress was correct, and only ers who are supposed to have created a kingdom in Persia (here called
one particular manner of behaving to which all people must ‘Asia’). When Shaftesbury compares them with the Knights Templars
conform, the misery was that neither the magistrate nor the whom he calls ‘a body of conjurers’ he is expressing his contempt for
clothiers themselves could settle which of the various styles the supposed magic powers of the supposed Magi.]If, my friend,
and manners was the exactly true one. Imagine now what you had chanced to live in Asia at the time when the Magi
the effect must be •when men came to be persecuted from by a wicked imposture got possession of the empire, no
all sides about their manner and appearance, and had to doubt you would have detested that act; and it might have
struggle and improvise in attempts to adjust and compose happened that the very persons of the men, after all the
their facial expressions according to the right mode; •when a cheats and abuses they had committed, became so odious to
thousand patterns of dress were current, and kept altering you that you would have seen them killed with as relentless
according to fashion and the mood of the times! Judge an eye as our later European ancestors saw the destruction
whether men’s faces weren’t likely to show strain, and the of the Knights Templars—a similar body of conjurers who
natural face of mankind distorted, convulsed, and made had almost become an over-match for the civil sovereign.
hardly recognisable. Your indignation might have led you to propose the razing
But although the general face of things has been made of all monuments and memorials of those ‘magicians’. You
unnatural or artificial by this unhappy concern for dress and might have resolved not to leave so much as their houses
over-tenderness for the safety of complexions, we mustn’t standing. But if it had happened that these magicians when
be led by this to think that •all faces are alike besmeared they were in power had made any collection of books, or
or plastered, that •it’s all a matter of rouge and varnish, written any themselves, treating of philosophy, or morals, or
or that •the face of truth is any less beautiful under all any other science [see Glossary] or branch of learning, would
the counterfeit faces that have been put on her. We must you have carried your resentment so far as to •destroy
remember the Carnival: •what has led to this wild jumble these also and to •condemn every opinion or doctrine the
of people, •who started it, and •why men were pushed into Magi had espoused, simply because they had espoused
this pastime. We may have a good laugh at the original it? Hardly a Scythian, a Tatar, or a Goth would act or
deception, and if pity doesn’t stop us we can have fun at reason so absurdly. Much less would you, my friend, have
the expense of the folly and madness of those who are thus carried out this. . . .priest-massacre with such a barbarous
caught and manipulated by these impostures [see Glossary]. zeal. Seriously, destroying a philosophy out of hatred for a
But we should remember our Ethiopian, and beware lest by man shows thinking as wildly barbaric as murdering a man
taking plain nature for a mask we become more ridiculous in order to plunder his wit and get the inheritance of his
than the people we are ridiculing. Now, if a misplaced joke understanding!
or ridicule can lead the judgment so far astray, it’s probable I must admit that if all the institutions, statutes, and reg-
that an excess of fear or horror may have the same result. ulations of this ancient hierarchy, ·the Magi·, had resembled
the basic law of the order itself, it might have been right to

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Freedom of wit and humour Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury II/1

suppress them, for one can’t read that law of theirs— who had held in awe and overfrightened by the Magi.
a Magus must be born of a mother and her son Yet an able and witty philosopher of our nation was
—without some abhorrence. But the conjurers (which is recently so possessed with a horror of this kind that he
what they were, not magicians) thought that their •principles directly acted in this spirit of massacre—with respect both
should look as good as possible to the world so as better to politics and to morals.1 The fright he got from seeing the
to conceal their •practice; so they found it to be highly in then-governing powers, who had unjustly taken authority
their interests to accept some excellent moral rules and to over the people, gave him such a horror of all popular
establish the very best maxims of this kind. They may have [see Glossary] government, and of the very notion of liberty
thought at the outset that it would be to their advantage to itself, that to extinguish it for ever he recommends the
recommend the greatest purity of religion, and the greatest extinguishing of books, and urges princes [see Glossary] not to
integrity of life and manners. Perhaps they also preached up spare so much as an ancient Roman or Greek historian. Isn’t
charity and good-will. And they may have •presented to the this in truth somewhat gothic? And doesn’t our philosopher
world the fairest face of human nature and, together with look rather like a savage in treating philosophy and learning
their laws and political institutions, have •interwoven the in the way the Scythians are said to have treated Anacharsis
most honest morals with best doctrine in the world. and others ·as punishment· for having visited the wise of
So how should we have behaved towards them? How Greece and learned the manners of a civilised people?
should we have carried ourselves towards this order of men His quarrel with •religion was the same as his quarrel
at the time of the discovery of their cheat and ruin of their with •liberty: the events during his lifetime gave him the
empire? Should we have started to work instantly on their same terror of each. All he could see were the ravages of
systems, struck indiscriminately at all their opinions and •enthusiasm [here = ‘fanaticism’] and the tricks of the people
doctrines, and erected a contrary philosophy in defiance who created and then steered •that spirit. And this good
of them? Should we have attacked every religious and sociable man—savage and unsociable as he tried to make
moral principle, denied every natural and social affection, himself and all mankind appear by his philosophy—exposed
and made men as much like wolves to one another as was himself ·to great hostility· during his life, and took great
possible for them, while describing them as ‘wolves’ and pains that after his death we might be spared the kinds of
trying to make them see themselves as far more monstrous events that led to these terrors. He tried to show us that
and corrupt than with the worst intentions it was ever Both in religion and in morals we are imposed on
possible for the worst of them to become? No doubt you’ll by our governors; there is nothing which by nature
think that this would have been a very preposterous line to inclines us either way, nothing that naturally draws
take, which could have been followed only by mean spirits us to the love of anything beyond ourselves;
1
Hobbes, who expresses himself thus: ‘By reading these Greek and Latin authors, men have from their childhood fallen into a habit (under a false
show of liberty) of favouring riots, and of licentiously controlling the actions of their sovereigns.’ (Leviathan II.21). By this reasoning, it should follow
that there can never be any riots or deposing of sovereigns at Constantinople, or in the Mughal empire. In other passages he expresses his view about
this destruction of ancient literature in favour of his Leviathan hypothesis and new philosophy.

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Freedom of wit and humour Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury II/1

although his love for such great truths and sovereign maxims ‘You are the most mistaken men in the world, to
as he imagined these to be made him the most laborious of imagine that there’s any such thing as natural faith
all men in composing systems of this kind for our use; and or justice. What is right is determined by force and
forced him, despite his natural fear, to run continually the power. There’s no such thing in reality as virtue; no
highest risk of being a martyr for our deliverance. principle [see Glossary] of order in things in heaven or
So let me head off your anxieties and assure you that on earth; no secret charm or force of nature by which
there’s no such mighty danger as we are apt to imagine from everyone is •made to work willingly or unwillingly
these fierce prosecutors of superstition, who are so down towards public good, and is •punished and tormented
on every religious or moral principle. Whatever savages if he does otherwise.’
they may appear to be in philosophy, they are in their Isn’t this the very charm itself? Isn’t the gentleman at this
ordinary lives as civilised as one could wish. Their freedom instant under the power of it? ·The next paragraph is what
in communicating their principles is a witness on their we could say to him·.
behalf: it’s the height of sociableness to be friendly and Sir! the philosophy you have condescended to reveal to
communicative in that way. us is most extraordinary. We are indebted to you for your
If their principles were concealed from us and made a instruction. But please tell us: this zeal of yours on our
mystery, they might indeed become considerable [= ‘become behalf—where does it come from? What are we to you? Are
something that we had to reckon with’]. Things are often made you our father? And even if you were, why this concern for
considerable by being kept as secrets of a sect or party; us? Is there then such a thing as natural affection? If not,
and nothing helps this more than the hostility and anxiety then why all this industry and danger on our account? Why
of a contrary party. If hearing maxims that are thought not keep this secret to yourself? What good does it do you to
to be poisonous immediately pushes us into horrors and deliver us from the cheat? The more that are taken in by it,
consternation, we’re in no state to use the familiar and easy the better. It’s directly against your interests to undeceive
part of reason that is the best antidote. The only poison to us, and let us know that you are governed only by private
reason is passion, for false reasoning is soon corrected when interest, and that nothing nobler or broader should govern
passion is removed. But if merely hearing a philosophical us whom you converse with. Leave us to ourselves and to
proposition is enough to move us into a passion, it’s clear that notable •art by which we are happily tamed and made as
that the poison already has a grip on us and we are effectively mild and sheepish as we are. It’s not fit that we should know
prevented from using our reasoning faculty. that by •nature we are all wolves. Is it possible that someone
If it weren’t for prejudices of this kind, why shouldn’t we who has really discovered himself to be a wolf should work
entertain ourselves with the fancy of one of these modern hard to communicate such a discovery?
reformers we have been speaking of? What should we say to
one of these anti-zealots who, with all the zeal of such a cool
philosophy, should earnestly assure us:

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Freedom of wit and humour Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury II/2

Section 2 an implicit faith. But if each of us supposes all the others

to be by nature outright savages, we’ll take care to come
In reality, my friend, there’s nothing to frown at here, when less into one another’s power; and, taking it that everyone
we’re being challenged to defend common honesty by fair is insatiably hungry for power, we’ll build better defences
honest gentlemen who are so different in practice from how against the evil ·of malign power·—not by putting everything
they want to appear in theory. I know that some people into one hand (as ·Hobbes·, the champion of this cause,
are knaves in •notion and principle as well as in •practice: wants us to do), but on the contrary by a proper division
they think all honesty as well as all religion is a mere and balance of power, and by the restraint of good laws and
cheat, and so in consistency they have resolved deliberately limitations that can secure the public liberty.
to use whatever force or skill they have for their private You may want to ask me ‘Do you really think these
advantage. But men like that never open themselves in gentlemen are fully convinced of the principles they so often
friendship to others. They have no such passion for truth, advance in company?’ My answer is as follows (·it runs to the
or love for mankind. They have no quarrel with religion or end of the paragraph·). I wouldn’t absolutely question the
morals, but they know what use to make of both when the gentlemen’s sincerity, but there is something of a mystery
opportunity arises. If they ever reveal their principles, it is about their conduct, more than has been suspected. Perhaps
never intentionally; they are sure to preach honesty, and go the reason why men of wit delight so much in espousing
to church. these paradoxical theories is not •that they are fully satisfied
On the other hand, the gentlemen whose side I am taking with them, but •that they want to make a better job of
can’t be called hypocrites. They speak as ill of themselves opposing some other theories whose fair appearance has
as they possibly can. If they have hard thoughts of human helped (they think) to bring mankind under subjection. They
nature, it’s still a proof of their humanity that they give such think that by the general scepticism that they want to
a warning to the world. If they represent men as being by introduce they’ll better deal with the dogmatic spirit that
nature treacherous and wild, they do this out of care for prevails in some subjects. And when they have accustomed
mankind, to help them not to be caught easily through being men to putting up with being contradicted and hearing the
too tame and trusting. nature of things being argue over in a general way, it may
Impostors naturally speak the •best of human nature, to be safer (they conclude) to argue separately about certain
make it easier for them to manipulate it. These gentlemen matters of detail over which they aren’t quite so well satisfied.
·whom I am defending·, on the other hand, speak the •worst; From this you may get a better sense of why in conversation
and they would rather be censured along with the rest than the spirit of raillery prevails so much, and notions are taken
allow a few impostors to prevail over the many. It’s the up for no reason except that they are odd and out of the way.
opinion that men are good that makes it easy for them to
trust one another; and it’s through trust that we are betrayed
and put at the mercy of power, with our very reason being
captured by those in whom we have gradually come to have

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Freedom of wit and humour Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury II/3

Section 3 happened in morals. Not satisfied with showing the nat-

ural advantages of honesty and virtue, men have actually
But, speaking for myself, I have no worries about this lessened these in order (they thought) to advance another
sceptical kind of wit. Men may in a serious way be so pushed foundation ·for virtue·. They have made virtue such a
and puzzled by different ways of thinking, different systems mercenary thing, and have talked so much about its rewards,
and schemes imposed by authority, that lose all notion or that one can hardly tell what there is in virtue that is worth
comprehension of truth. I can easily grasp the effect that awe rewarding; for there’s not much honesty or value in being
has over men’s understandings. I can very well suppose men bribed or terrified into behaving honestly. . . .
may be •frightened out of their wits, but I don’t see that they If the love of doing good is not in itself a good and right
can be •laughed out of them! I can hardly imagine that in inclination, I don’t know how there can possibly be such a
pleasant conversation they should ever be talked out of their thing as goodness or virtue. And if the inclination is right, we
love for society, or reasoned out of humanity and common are perverting it if we think of it solely in terms of the reward
sense. Wit framed by good manners can’t hurt any cause or for it, conceiving such wonders of the grace and favour that
interest that I care about; and philosophical speculations, virtue will bring, when so little is shown of the intrinsic worth
managed in a civilised way, surely can’t ever make mankind or value of the thing itself.
more unsociable or uncivilized. That’s not the direction from I’m almost tempted to think that the true reason why
which I can expect an invasion of savageness and barbarity. some of the most heroic virtues have so little notice taken of
What I have found is that virtue never suffers as much from them in our holy religion is that if they had been entitled to a
being •contested as it does from being •betrayed. My fear share of the infinite reward that providence has by revelation
is not so much •from virtue’s witty antagonists, who give it assigned to other duties there would have been no room
exercise defending itself, as from its tender nurses, who are left for disinterestedness. [This seems to mean: there would have
apt to smother it in blankets and kill it by their excess of been no reward left over for disinterestedness, but Shaftesbury can’t have
care! meant that, because it is too obvious that an ‘infinite reward’ is not an
I have known a building that was tilting in one direction Private friendship and (ii) zeal for the
exhaustible quantity.] (i)
and was then so thoroughly ‘fixed’ that it leaned and fell public and for our country are purely voluntary virtues for a
in the opposite direction. Something like that may have Christian.2 They aren’t essential parts of his charity. He isn’t
2
No fair reader can think that by ‘private friendship’ I mean the common benevolence and charity that every Christian is obliged to show towards all
men, and in particular towards his fellow-Christians, his neighbour, his brother, his more or less closely related kindred; but the special relation that
is formed by a consent and harmony of minds, by mutual esteem, and reciprocal tenderness and affection—what we emphatically call a friendship.
That’s what there was between the two Jewish heroes that I shall mention shortly, whose love and tenderness surpassed that of women (2 Samuel, ch.
1). Such were the friendships, described so often by poets, between Pylades and Orestes, Theseus and Pirithous, and many others. Such were those
between philosophers, heroes, and the greatest of men—between Socrates and Antisthenes, Plato and Dion, Epaminondas and Pelopidas, Cato and
Brutus. . . . And such there may have been more recently, and perhaps even in our own age, though envy prevents the few examples of this kind from
being mentioned in public. [This very long footnote continues with Shaftesbury’s response to critics of what he has said about the status of friendship
in the system of Christian virtues, a response based largely on what ‘the learned and pious Bishop Taylor’ wrote in his Treatise of Friendship.]

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Freedom of wit and humour Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury II/3

so tied to the affairs of this life; nor is he obliged to involve friendship, at least on one side. But the heroic virtue of these
himself in this lower world in ways that won’t help him to persons had only the common reward of praise attributed to
acquire a better ·world in the after-life·. His real concerns it, and couldn’t claim a future reward under a religion that
are in heaven, and he has no occasion for any extra cares or didn’t teach any future state and didn’t present any rewards
embarrassments here on earth that may obstruct his way to or punishments except this-worldly ones in accordance with
heaven or hold him back in the careful task of working out the written law.
his own salvation. But if any portion of reward is reserved And thus the Jews as well as the heathens were left to be
hereafter for the generous part of (ii) a patriot, or that of (i) a instructed by their philosophy in the sublime part of virtue,
thorough friend, this is still behind the curtain and happily and induced by •reason to do what they had never been
concealed from us, so that we may be the more deserving of •commanded to do. No premium or penalty being enforced
it when it comes. in these cases, the disinterested part stood alone, the virtue
It seems indeed that in the Jewish scheme of things each was a free choice, and the magnanimity of the act was left
of these virtues had its illustrious examples, and was in some entire. Someone who wanted to be generous, had the means
manner recommended to us as honourable and deserving to do so. Someone who fully wanted to serve his friend or
to be imitated. Even Saul—who is presented to us as a bad his country, even at the cost of his life,3 could do it on fair
prince—appears to have been respected and praised, before terms. his sole reason was that Dulce et decorum est—it was
his death and after, for his love of his native country. And inviting and becoming, ·or sweet and fitting·. It was good
the remarkable love between his son ·Jonathan· and his and honest. And I’ll try to convince you that this is still a
successor ·David· gives us a noble view of a disinterested good reason, and one that squares with common sense. . . .

3
‘Perhaps’, says the holy apostle ·Paul·, ‘for a good man some would even dare to die’ (Romans 5:7) He judiciously supposes this to belong to human
nature; though he is so far from basing any precept on it that he introduces his private opinion with a very dubious ‘perhaps’.

14