Cyber Attacks White Paper

January 2016

Common cyber attacks:

reducing the impact
 Common Cyber Attacks Reducing The Impact Page 2

Contents
Part 1: The Threat Landscape ........................................................................................................................................... 3
Commodity vs bespoke capabilities ..................................................................................................... 3
Un-targeted attacks .............................................................................................................................. 4
Targeted attacks .................................................................................................................................... 4
Every organisation is a potential victim ............................................................................................... 5

Part 2: Understanding Vulnerabilities .............................................................................................................................. 6

Flaws ...................................................................................................................................................... 6
Features ................................................................................................................................................. 6
User error .............................................................................................................................................. 6

Part 3: Common Cyber Attacks - Stages and Patterns.................................................................................................... 7

Stages of an attack ................................................................................................................................ 7

Part 4: Reducing Your Exposure to Cyber Attack ............................................................................................................ 9

Breaking the attack pattern .................................................................................................................. 9
Reducing your exposure using essential security controls ................................................................. 9
Mitigating the stages of an attack ...................................................................................................... 10
I’ve been attacked, what do I do? ...................................................................................................... 11
Closing word: raising your cyber defences ........................................................................................ 11

Case Studies.....................................................................................................................................................................12
Case study 1: Espionage campaign against the UK energy sector.................................................... 12
Case study 2: Hundreds of computers infected by remote access malware ................................... 13
Case study 3: Spear-phishing attack targets system administrator ................................................. 14
 Common Cyber Attacks Reducing The Impact Page 3

Part 1: The Threat Landscape

Although computer systems can be compromised through a variety of means, the NCSC looks to under-
stand malicious actions and the attackers that carry them out.
The risk to information and computer assets comes from a broad spectrum of threats with a broad range of
capabilities. The impact (and therefore the harm) on your business TECHNICAL FOCUS: RISK
will depend on the opportunities you present to an attacker (in
terms of the vulnerabilities within your systems), the capabilities of In cyber security terms, risk is
the attackers to exploit them, and ultimately their motivation for the potential for a threat (a
attacking you. person or thing that is likely to
cause damage) to exploit a
For example, an easily guessed password to an online account takes vulnerability (a flaw, feature or
very little technical capability to exploit. With a little more technical user error) that may result in
knowledge, attackers can also use tools that are readily available on some form of negative impact.
the internet. They can also bring resources (people or money) to
bear in order to discover new vulnerabilities. These attackers will go on to develop bespoke tools and
techniques to exploit them; such vulnerabilities enable them to bypass the basic controls provided by
schemes like Cyber Essentials. To protect against these bespoke attacks will require you to invest in a more
holistic approach to security, such as that outlined in the 10 Steps to Cyber Security.
The motivation of an attacker can vary from demonstrating their technical prowess for personal kudos,
financial gain, commercial advantage, political protest; through to economic or diplomatic advantage for
their country.
Whilst attackers may have the capability and the motivation, they WHO MIGHT BE ATTACKING
still need an opportunity to deliver a successful attack. You have no YOU?
control over their capabilities and motivations, but you can make it
harder for attackers by reducing your vulnerabilities. Cyber criminals interested in
making money through fraud or
from the sale of valuable
Commodity vs bespoke capabilities information.
In this paper, we are using the terms ‘commodity’ and ‘bespoke’ to Industrial competitors and
characterise the capabilities attackers can employ. foreign intelligence services,
interested in gaining an
Commodity capability involves tools and techniques openly available economic advantage for their
on the Internet (off-the-shelf) that are relatively simple to use. This companies or countries.
includes tools designed for security specialists (such as system Hackers who find interfering with
penetration testers) that can also be used by attackers as they are computer systems an enjoyable
specifically designed to scan for publicly known vulnerabilities in challenge.
operating systems and applications. Poison Ivy is a good example of
a commodity tool; it is a readily available Remote Access Tool (RAT)
Hacktivists who wish to attack
that has been widely used for a number of years.
companies for political or
ideological motives.
Bespoke capability involves tools and techniques that are developed Employees, or those who have
and used for specific purposes, and thus require more specialist legitimate access, either by
knowledge. This could include malicious code (‘exploits’) that take accidental or deliberate misuse.
advantage of software vulnerabilities (or bugs) that are not yet
known to vendors or anti-malware companies, often known as ‘zero-day’ exploits. It could also include
undocumented software features, or poorly designed applications. Bespoke capabilities usually become
commodity capabilities once their use has been discovered, sometimes within a few days3. By their very
nature, the availability of bespoke tools is not advertised as once released they become a commodity.

3 ‘When Vulnerabilities are Exploited: the Timing of First Known Exploits for Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities’, Tim Rains, 17
June 2014, http://blogs.microsoft.com/cybertrust/2014/06/17/when-vulnerabilities-are-exploited-the-timing-of-first-known-exploits-
for-remote-code-execution-vulnerabilities
‘Before We Knew It: An Empirical Study of Zero-Day Attacks In The Real World’, Leyla Bilge and Tudor Dumitras, CCS ’12, 16-18
October 2012, http://users.ece.cmu.edu/~tdumitra/public_documents/bilge12_zero_day.pdf
Page 4 Common Cyber Attacks Reducing The Impact

Openly available commodity capabilities are effective because basic cyber security principles, such as those
described in Cyber Essentials and 10 Steps to Cyber Security, are not properly followed. Regardless of their
technical capability and motivation, commodity tools and techniques are frequently what attackers turn to
first.
In part 2 we will look in more detail at the vulnerabilities that THE INSIDER THREAT
attackers exploit using both commodity and bespoke Although this paper is focussed on
capabilities. threats from the Internet, insiders
(anyone who has legitimate access
Un-targeted attacks to your systems as an employee or a
contractor) should also be
In un-targeted attacks, attackers indiscriminately target as many considered as part of a holistic
devices, services or users as possible. They do not care about security regime. They may be
who the victim is as there will be a number of machines or motivated by personal gain or
services with vulnerabilities. To do this, they use techniques that redress against grievances.
take advantage of the openness of the Internet, which include: An insider could simply use their
normal access to compromise your
 phishing - sending emails to large numbers of people information, take advantage of
asking for sensitive information (such as bank details) or unlocked computers or guessable
encouraging them to visit a fake website passwords. They could use social
 water holing - setting up a fake website or compromising engineering techniques (fooling
a legitimate one in order to exploit visiting users people in to breaking normal
security procedures) to gain further
 ransomware - which could include disseminating disk accesses. They may even have the
encrypting extortion malware technical skills to use commodity
 scanning - attacking wide swathes of the Internet at tools and techniques to become a
random ‘hacker within the system’, with the
opportunity to cause greater
damage and steal information at
Targeted attacks will. In the worst case scenario, an
In a targeted attack, your organisation is singled out because the
insider could be working for an
adversary who can develop bespoke
attacker has a specific interest in your business, or has been paid
tools, and introduce these deep
to target you. The groundwork for the attack could take months within your organisation. Assessing
so that they can find the best route to deliver their exploit which (if any) of these scenarios is
directly to your systems (or users). A targeted attack is often likely should be a critical part of
more damaging than an un-targeted one because it has been your risk assessment process.
specifically tailored to attack your systems, processes or
personnel, in the office and sometimes at home. Targeted Without appropriate training,
attacks may include: insiders can also accidentally
compromise a system or the
 spear-phishing - sending emails to targeted individuals information it holds. So make sure
that could contain an attachment with malicious that particular care is taken when
software, or a link that downloads malicious software evaluating all aspects of the insider
threat as part of your organisation’s
 deploying a botnet - to deliver a DDOS (Distributed overall assessment of cyber risks,
Denial of Service) attack referring to external guidance
 subverting the supply chain - to attack equipment or where required.
software being delivered to the organisation
In general attackers will, in the first instance, use commodity tools and techniques to probe your systems for
an exploitable vulnerability.
 Common Cyber Attacks Reducing The Impact Page 5

Every organisation is a potential victim

Before investing in defences, many organisations often want concrete evidence that they are, or will be
targeted, by specific threats. Unfortunately, in cyberspace it is often difficult to provide an accurate
assessment of the threats that specific organisations face.
However, every organisation is a potential victim. All organisations If you openly demonstrate
have something of value that is worth something to others. If you weaknesses in your
openly demonstrate weaknesses in your approach to cyber security by approach to cyber security
failing to do the basics, you will experience some form of cyber attack. by failing to do the basics,
As part of your risk management processes, you should be assessing you will experience some
whether you are likely to be the victim of a targeted or un-targeted form of cyber attack.
attack; every organisation connected to the Internet should assume
they will be a victim of the latter. Either way, you should implement basic security controls consistently
across your organisation, and where you may be specifically targeted, ensure you have a more in-depth,
holistic approach to cyber security.
Page 6 Common Cyber Attacks Reducing The Impact

Part 2: Understanding Vulnerabilities

Vulnerabilities provide the opportunities for attackers to gain access to your systems. They can occur
through flaws, features or user error, and attackers will look to exploit any of them, often combining one or
more, to achieve their end goal. In the context of this paper, a vulnerability is a weakness in an IT system that
can be exploited by an attacker to deliver a successful attack.

Flaws TECHNICAL FOCUS:

A flaw is unintended functionality. This may either be a result of VULNERABILITIES
poor design or through mistakes made during implementation. Vulnerabilities are actively pursued
Flaws may go undetected for a significant period of time. The and exploited by the full range of
majority of common attacks we see today exploit these types of attackers. Consequently, a market
vulnerabilities. In the last twelve months nearly 8,000 unique and has grown in software flaws, with
verified software vulnerabilities were disclosed in the US National ‘zero-day’ vulnerabilities (that is
Vulnerability Database (NVD)4. recently discovered vulnerabilities
that are not yet publically known)
fetching hundreds of thousands of
Features pounds.
A feature is intended functionality which can be misused by an Zero-days are frequently used in
attacker to breach a system. Features may improve the user’s bespoke attacks by the more
experience, help diagnose problems or improve management, but capable and resourced attackers.
they can also be exploited by an attacker. Once the zero-days become
When Microsoft introduced macros into their Office suite in the
publically known, reusable attacks
are developed and they quickly
late 1990s, macros soon became the vulnerability of choice with become a commodity capability.
the Melissa worm in 1999 being a prime example. Macros are still This poses a risk to any computer or
exploited today; the Dridex banking Trojan that was spreading in system that has not had the
late 2014 relies on spam to deliver Microsoft Word documents relevant patch applied, or updated
containing malicious macro code, which then downloads Dridex its antivirus software.
onto the affected system.
The ability for an attacker to find
JavaScript, widely used in dynamic web content, continues to be and attack software flaws or
used by attackers. This includes diverting the user’s browser to a subvert features depends on the
malicious website and silently downloading malware, and hiding nature of the software and their
malicious code to pass through basic web filtering. technical capabilities. Some target
platforms are relatively simple to
access, for example web
User error applications could, by design, be
A computer or system that has been carefully designed and capable of interacting with the
implemented can minimise the vulnerabilities of exposure to the Internet and may provide an
Internet. Unfortunately, such efforts can be easily undone (for opportunity for an attacker.
example by an inexperienced system administrator who enables
vulnerable features, fails to fix a known flaw5, or leaves default passwords unchanged).
More generally, users can be a significant source of vulnerabilities. They make mistakes, such as choosing a
common or easily guessed password, or leave their laptop or mobile phone unattended. Even the most
cyber aware users can be fooled into giving away their password, installing malware, or divulging information
that may be useful to an attacker (such as who holds a particular role within an organisation, and their
schedule). These details would allow an attacker to target and time an attack appropriately.

4https://nvd.nist.gov/
5Fixes such as applying software patches, removing detected malware and updating device configuration to address issues detected
through vulnerability scanning
 Common Cyber Attacks Reducing The Impact Page 7

Part 3: Common Cyber Attacks - Stages and

Patterns
Regardless of whether an attack is targeted or un-targeted, or the attacker is using commodity or bespoke
tools, cyber attacks have a number of stages in common. Some of these will meet their goal whilst others
may be blocked.

Stages of an attack
An attack, particularly if it is carried out by a persistent adversary, may consist of repeated stages. The
attacker is effectively probing your defences for weaknesses that, if exploitable, will take them closer to their
ultimate goal. Understanding these stages will help you to better defend yourself.
A number of attack models describe the stages of a cyber attack (the Cyber Kill Chain® produced by
Lockheed Martin is a popular example6). We have adopted a simplified model in this paper that describes the
four main stages present in most cyber attacks:

Stages in a cyber attack

 Survey - investigating and analysing available information about the target in order to identify
potential vulnerabilities
 Delivery - getting to the point in a system where a
vulnerability can be exploited TECHNICAL FOCUS:
 Breach - exploiting the vulnerability/vulnerabilities to gain SURVEY
some form of unauthorised access The default settings of computer
 Affect - carrying out activities within a system that achieve systems can reveal a lot of useful
the attacker’s goal information about the software
running on them, and how they are
configured. They can broadcast a
Survey range of network protocols and
Attackers will use any means available to find technical, procedural communications channels that can
or physical vulnerabilities which they can attempt to exploit.
be exploited if they aren’t
removed.
They will use open source information such as LinkedIn and The attacker will point network
Facebook, domain name management/search services, and social scanning tools at your network to
media. They will employ commodity toolkits and techniques, and try and identify any of the
standard network scanning tools to collect and assess any following:
information about your organisation’s computers, security systems
and personnel.  open ports
 open services
User error can also reveal information that can be used in attacks.
Common errors include:  default settings
 vulnerable applications and
 releasing information about the organisation’s network on a
operating systems
technical support forum
 the makes and models of your
 neglecting to remove hidden properties from documents network equipment
such as author, software version and file save locations

6 The Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain® can be found at www.lockheedmartin.co.uk/us/what-we-do/information-technology/cyber-

security/cyber-kill-chain.html
Page 8 Common Cyber Attacks Reducing The Impact

Attackers will also use social engineering (often via social media) to exploit user naivety and goodwill to elicit
further, less openly available information.

Delivery
During the delivery stage, the attacker will look to get into a position where they can exploit a vulnerability
that they have identified, or they think could potentially exist. Examples include:
 attempting to access an organisation’s online services
 sending an email containing a link to a malicious website or an attachment which contains malicious
code
 giving an infected USB stick away at a trade fair
 creating a false website in the hope that a user will visit
The crucial decision for the attacker is to select the best delivery path for the malicious software or
commands that will enable them to breach your defences. In the case of a DDOS attack, it may be sufficient
for them to make multiple connections to a computer in order to prevent others from accessing it.

Breach TECHNICAL FOCUS:

BREACH
The harm to your business will depend on the nature of the
vulnerability and the exploitation method. It may allow them to: With the great variety of
potential vulnerabilities in any IT
 make changes that affect the system’s operation system, there is a similar
 gain access to online accounts diversity in the often highly
technical and innovative
 achieve full control of a user’s computer, tablet or
mechanisms used to exploit
smartphone them. Although attackers
Having done this, the attacker could pretend to be the victim and use continue to develop novel
their legitimate access rights to gain access to other systems and techniques to exploit
information. vulnerabilities, attackers are
ultimately successful due to an
unfixed flaw, misused feature or
Affect user error.
Depending on their motivation, the attacker may seek to explore your Some types of attack are much
systems, expand their access and establish a persistent presence (a more obvious or easier to detect
process sometimes called ‘consolidation’). Taking over a user’s than others. DDOS attacks are
account usually guarantees a persistent presence. Taking over an often quickly noticed by system
administrator’s account is an attacker’s Holy Grail. With users, as they struggle to access
administration access to just one system, they can try to install or simply cannot use the
automated scanning tools to discover more about your networks and targeted service. On the other
take control of more systems. When doing this they will take great hand, most malware is designed
care not to trigger the system’s monitoring processes and they may to be stealthy, hiding from users
even disable them for a time. and detection mechanisms alike.
Determined and undetected attackers continue until they have
achieved their end goals. Depending on their objectives, the activities they aim to carry out on your systems
will differ, but they can include:
 retrieving information they would otherwise not be able to access, such as intellectual property or
commercially sensitive information
 making changes for their own benefit, such as creating payments into a bank account they control
 disrupting normal business operation, such as overloading the organisation’s internet connection so
they cannot communicate externally, or deleting the whole operating system from users’ computers
After achieving their objectives, the more capable attacker will exit, carefully removing any evidence of their
presence. Or they could create an access route for future visits by them, or for others they have sold the
access to. Equally, some attackers will want to seriously damage your system or make as much ‘noise’ as
possible to advertise their success.
 Common Cyber Attacks Reducing The Impact Page 9

Part 4: Reducing Your Exposure to Cyber Attack

Preventing, detecting or disrupting the attack at the earliest opportunity limits the business impact and the
potential for reputational damage. Once the attacker has consolidated their presence they will be more
difficult to find and remove.

Breaking the attack pattern

Even though it’s normally
Even though it’s normally the most motivated attackers who have the
persistence to carry out multiple stage attacks, they will frequently do the most motivated
this using commodity tools and techniques, which are cheaper and attackers who have the
easier for them to use. So putting in place security controls and persistence to carry out
processes that can mitigate these will go some way to making your multiple stage attacks,
business a hard target. Equally, adopting a defence-in-depth7 they will frequently do
approach to mitigate risks through the full range of potential attacks
will give your business more resilience to cope with attacks that use
this using commodity
more bespoke tools and techniques. tools and techniques.

Reducing your exposure using essential security controls

Fortunately, there are effective and affordable ways to reduce your organisation’s exposure to the more
common types of cyber attack on systems that are exposed to the Internet. The following controls are
contained in the Cyber Essentials, together with more information about how to implement them:
 boundary firewalls and internet gateways - establish network perimeter defences, particularly web
proxy, web filtering, content checking, and firewall policies to detect and block executable
downloads, block access to known malicious domains and prevent users’ computers from
communicating directly with the Internet
 malware protection - establish and maintain malware defences to detect and respond to known
attack code
 patch management - patch known vulnerabilities with the latest version of the software, to prevent
attacks which exploit software bugs
 whitelisting and execution control - prevent unknown software from being able to run or install itself,
including AutoRun on USB and CD drives
 secure configuration - restrict the functionality of every device, operating system and application to
the minimum needed for business to function8
 password policy - ensure that an appropriate password policy is in place and followed
 user access control - include limiting normal users’ execution permissions and enforcing the principle
of least privilege9

7 Strengthened security achieved by establishing multiple layers of security mechanisms

8 For broader guidance on secure configuration see the following publications:
Cloud Security Principles, www.gov.uk/government/collections/cloud-security-guidance
End user devices security and configuration guidance, www.gov.uk/government/collections/end-user-devices-security-guidance
Bring Your Own Device Guidance, www.gov.uk/government/collections/bring-your-own-device-guidance
9 Applying only those privileges to a user account that are essential to that user's work
Page 10 Common Cyber Attacks Reducing The Impact

If your organisation is likely to be targeted by a more technically capable attacker, give yourself greater
confidence by putting in place these additional controls set out in the 10 Steps to Cyber Security:
 security monitoring - to identify any unexpected or suspicious activity
 user training education and awareness - staff should understand their role in keeping your
organisation secure and report any unusual activity
 security incident management - put plans in place to deal with an attack as an effective response will
reduce the impact on your business
The 10 Steps to Cyber Security sets out the features of a complete TECHNICAL FOCUS:
cyber risk management regime. There are many effective and CiSP
comprehensive schemes and open standards that your organisation The Cyber-security Information
can apply to support a defence-in-depth strategy, if this approach Sharing Partnership (CiSP), part
isn’t already implemented. of CERT-UK, is a joint industry-
government initiative to share
Mitigating the stages of an attack cyber threat and vulnerability
information. It does this in order
We’ll look at each stage of an attack in turn, and highlight where the to increase overall situational
basic security controls mitigate the activities that take place. awareness of the cyber threat,
and therefore reduce the impact
of cyber threat on UK businesses.
Mitigating the survey stage
Any information which is published for open consumption should be systematically filtered before it is
released to ensure that anything of value to an attacker (such as software and configuration details, the
names/roles/titles of individuals and any hidden data10) is removed.
User training, education and awareness is important. All your users should understand how published
information about your systems and operation can reveal potential vulnerabilities. They need to be aware of
the risks of discussing work-related topics on social media, and the potential for them to be targeted by
phishing attacks. They should also understand the risks to the business of releasing sensitive information in
general conversations, unsolicited telephone calls and email recipients. The Centre for the Protection of the
National Infrastructure (CPNI) have published a guide to online reconnaissance to help put into place the
most effective social engineering mitigations11.
Secure Configuration can minimise the information that Internet-facing devices disclose about their
configuration and software versions, and ensures they cannot be probed for any vulnerabilities.

Mitigating the delivery stage

The delivery options available to an attacker can be significantly diminished by applying and maintaining a
small number of security controls, which are even more effective when applied in combination.
Up-to-date malware protection may block malicious emails and prevent malware being downloaded from
websites. Firewalls and proxy servers can block unsecure or unnecessary services and can also maintain a list
of known bad websites. Equally, subscribing to a website reputation service to generate a blacklist of
websites could also provide additional protection.
A technically enforced password policy will prevent users from selecting easily guessed passwords and lock
accounts after a specified number of failed attempts. Additional authentication measures for access to
particularly sensitive corporate or personal information should also be in place.
Secure configuration limits system functionality to the minimum needed for business operation and should
be systematically applied to every device that is used to conduct business.

10‘Metadata’ many programs automatically add metadata to files, including author, their username and the file save location
11‘Online reconnaissance’, CPNI, May 2013, www.cpni.gov.uk/documents/publications/2013/2013007-
online_reconnaissance.pdf?epslanguage=en-gb
 Common Cyber Attacks Reducing The Impact Page 11

Mitigating the breach stage

As with the delivery stage, the ability to successfully exploit known vulnerabilities can be effectively
mitigated with just a few controls, which are again best deployed together.
All commodity malware depends on known and predominately patchable software flaws. Effective patch
management of vulnerabilities ensures that patches are applied at the earliest opportunity, limiting the time
your organisation is exposed to known software vulnerabilities.
Malware protection within the internet gateway can detect known malicious code in an imported item, such
as an email. These measures should be supplemented by malware protection at key points on the internal
network and on the users’ computers where available. Devices within the internet gateway should be used to
prevent unauthorised access to critical services or inherently unsecure services that may be required
internally by your organisation. Equally, the gateway should be able to detect any unauthorised inbound or
outbound connections.
Well-implemented and maintained user access controls will restrict the applications, privileges and data that
users can access. Secure configuration can remove unnecessary software and default user accounts. It can
also ensure that default passwords are changed, and any automatic features that could immediately activate
malware (such as AutoRun for media drives) are turned off.
User training, education and awareness are extremely valuable to reduce the likelihood of ‘social engineering’
being successful. However, with the pressures of work and the sheer volume of communications, you cannot
rely on this as a control to mitigate even a commodity attack.
Finally, critical to actually detecting a breach is the capability to monitor all network activity and to analyse it
to identify any malicious or unusual activity.

Mitigating the affect stage

If all the measures for the survey, delivery and breach stages are consistently in place, the majority of attacks
using commodity capability are likely to be unsuccessful. However, if your adversary is able to use bespoke
capabilities then you have to assume that they will evade them and get into your systems. Ideally, you should
have a good understanding of what constitutes ‘normal’ activity on your network, and effective security
monitoring should be capable of identifying any unusual activity.
Once a technically capable and motivated attacker has achieved full access to your systems it can be much
harder to detect their actions and eradicate their presence. This is where a full defence-in-depth strategy can
be beneficial.

I’ve been attacked, what do I do?

There is no such thing as 100% security and your organisation will probably experience some form of cyber
attack at some time. Having an effective security incident response plan can help to reduce the impact of the
attack, clean up the affected systems and get the business back up and running within a short time. Where
relevant, you should also consider the Cyber Security Incident Response services provided by the NCSC.

Closing word: raising your cyber defences

The Internet can be a hostile environment. The threat of attack is ever present as new vulnerabilities are
released and commodity tools are produced to exploit them. Doing nothing is no longer an option; protect
your organisation and your reputation by establishing some basic cyber defences to ensure that your name is
not added to the growing list of victims.
Page 12 Common Cyber Attacks Reducing The Impact

Case Studies
On a daily basis, we frequently see computer systems - and the information stored on them - being
compromised by malicious attackers. Although the motivations may vary, they nearly always use commodity
tools and techniques at some point.
The following three case studies demonstrate how effective these attacks can be to gain access to
organisations and, conversely, how widely accepted and cost-effective cyber security controls can disrupt
the different stages in the attack model we discussed earlier.
 In the first two case studies, the attackers added malicious code to legitimate websites that staff
from the target companies regularly visited. This code compromised their computers, giving the
attackers access to the companies’ systems.
 The final case study is an example of a single-staged attack that compromised the computer of a
system administrator.
All of the mitigations listed in these case studies are covered in detail in the Cyber Essentials Scheme and the
10 Steps to Cyber Security. To reduce the risk of commodity and bespoke attacks on your business, fully
implement a comprehensive suite of cyber security controls.

Case study 1: Espionage campaign against the UK energy sector

Attackers used a technique known as a ‘watering hole’ attack to distribute malware into businesses working
in the UK energy sector. The attackers added scripts to legitimate websites frequented by energy sector
staff. Many of the websites were managed by the same web design company. Visitors’ browsers were
automatically and surreptitiously redirected to download malware from an attacker-owned server.
The malware targeted known and patchable vulnerabilities in Java, older internet browsers, and all but the
most recent versions of Microsoft Windows. The malware harvested visitors’ credentials and computer
system information, and sent this information back to the controllers via attacker-owned domains.

How it happened: the technical details

In the survey stage, the attackers discovered that a single web design company hosted a number of energy
sector businesses’ websites. Although we can’t say for sure how the attacker delivered the attack to breach
the site, they may have infiltrated the web design company’s networks by masquerading as a legitimate user
with credentials stolen through successful spear-phishing, or by exploiting an unpatched vulnerability on the
web server.
The attacker compromised the web server and then added code12 which caused their own website to be
loaded whenever the legitimate website was visited. The delivery stage then involved the attacker’s website
delivering the malicious code to the victims’ computers. The unpatched browsers were breached through
known software flaws in Java and common internet browsers.
The attacker’s website installed a Remote Access Tool (RAT) on the visitor’s computer, disguised as a
common type of web application script. The malware then started communicating with the attacker-owned
domains by sending ‘beacons’ to show it was active and to request commands from the attackers. The
malware was designed to capture system information, user keystrokes and clipboard contents to enable the
attackers to consolidate their position as they moved towards affecting their target. However, security
monitoring of network activity detected command and control messages from malware on the infected
computers, and in this case the attack was broken before it could affect the targeted businesses.

We believe that these ‘watering hole’ attacks were part of a continuing espionage campaign against the UK
energy sector.

12 An ‘iframe’ was inserted to point to malicious content

 Common Cyber Attacks Reducing The Impact Page 13

Capabilities, vulnerabilities and mitigations

The attackers used a number of commodity techniques to compromise their targets within the energy
sector. They probably gained access to the legitimate websites using automated scanning tools and exploit
kits to identify and exploit unpatched vulnerabilities, or used social engineering to take advantage of poor
user training and awareness. The script hosted on the attacker’s website exploited applications with known
software vulnerabilities to install a RAT.
Whilst the attack was spotted by security monitoring, this control is not 100% effective, as it depends heavily
on technology and skills. If the appropriate essential controls had been in place, this attack would not have
been successful. However, that's not to say they wouldn't have kept on trying by using different techniques.
The most effective mitigations against this attack (both at the website and within the victim organisation)
would have been:
 network perimeter defences - deploying a web proxy, web filtering, content checking, and firewall
policies could have prevented executable downloads and access to known malicious domains on the
Internet
 malware protection defences - might have detected the commodity attack code used to exploit the
victims browser
 patching the known software flaws - would have prevented the script from being successful and the
malware from running
 whitelisting and execution control - would have prevented any unknown software from being able to
run or install itself
 user access control - could have restricted the malware’s capabilities
 security monitoring - in this case did identify the suspicious activity

Case study 2: Hundreds of computers infected by remote access malware

This widespread compromise of a large UK company’s internal network originated from an exploit hosted on
their externally-managed corporate website. This was achieved as a result of poor security practices by the
website provider. The attackers used a commonly available RAT to gain information about the internal
network and control a number of computers. The widespread malware infection took extensive effort to
eradicate and remediate.

How it happened: the technical details

As part of their survey of the victim’s network and services, attackers discovered that the corporate website
was hosted by a service provider, and it contained a known vulnerability. In the survey stage of the attack on
the service provider, the attackers exploited this vulnerability to add a specialised exploit delivery script to
the corporate website.
The script compared the IP addresses of the website’s visitors against the IP range used by the company. It
then infected a number of computers within the company, taking advantage of a known software flaw, to
download malware to the visitor’s computer within a directory that allowed file execution.
Over 300 computers were infected during the delivery stage with remote access malware. The malware then
beaconed and delivered network information to attacker-owned domains. The attackers were eventually
detected early in the affect stage. By this time they had installed further tools and were consolidating their
position, carrying out network enumeration and identifying high value users.

Whilst the compromise was successful, it was detected through network security monitoring, and a well-
defined incident response plan made it possible to investigate the incident using system and network logs,
plus forensic examinations of many computers.
Page 14 Common Cyber Attacks Reducing The Impact

To eradicate the discovered infection it was necessary, at great cost, to return the computers to a known
good state. Further investigation was also required to identify any further malware that could be used to
retain network access. To prevent further attacks through the same route, the contract terms with the
website provider needed to be renegotiated, to ensure they had similar security standards to the targeted
organisation.

Capabilities, vulnerabilities and mitigations

The attackers used a combination of automated scanning tools, exploit kits and technology-specific attacks
to compromise the organisation. They took advantage of a known software flaw and the trust relationship
between the company and its supplier.
The intensive and costly investigation and remediation of the compromise could have been averted by more
effective implementation of the following cyber security controls:
 patching - the corporate website would have not been compromised, nor would the malware
download script have succeeded, had patching on both the web server and users’ computers been
up to date
 network perimeter defences - the malware could have been prevented from being downloaded and
the command and control might not have succeeded with the use of two-way web filtering, content
checking and firewall policies (as part of the internet gateway structure)
 whitelisting and execution control - unauthorised executables such as the exploration tools would
have been unable to run if the company’s corporate computers were subject to whitelisting and
execution control (this could also prevent applications from being able to run from the temporary or
personal profile folders)
 security monitoring - may have detected the compromise at an earlier stage

Case study 3: Spear-phishing attack targets system administrator

A system administrator within a high profile UK organisation was successfully spear-phished and
unknowingly installed a RAT. Taking advantage of the user’s privileged permissions, the attackers were able
to exfiltrate13 information about the network and details for multiple business-critical systems.
Fortunately, the compromise was restricted to one computer, and it was detected and effectively
investigated as appropriate security monitoring and logging were in place. Identifying and mitigating the lost
information impacted the availability of the system to the business and required extensive support from
external forensic and technical architecture specialists.

How it happened: the technical details

The attackers identified the system administrator and their personal subjects of interest. They crafted and
delivered a socially-engineered email to the administrator’s personal email address. Accessing personal
webmail from the admin computer, the administrator read the phishing email and downloaded a Trojanised
document from a file sharing service containing the first stage malware.
When the Trojanised file was opened, the user was prompted to run an executable which then breached the
defences and installed the first stage malware onto the system. The attacker exploited poor security
awareness by repeatedly requesting approval to run until the administrator finally clicked ‘OK’. Unpacking
itself silently into a temporary folder, this first stage malware hid itself as a legitimate file and changed the
system to ensure it continued to run between reboots of the computer. Once installed, it started
communicating with attacker-controlled domains.

13 The unauthorised transfer of data from a computer

 Common Cyber Attacks Reducing The Impact Page 15

After a number of days, the initial malware downloaded a second stage executable (the RAT) and a
configuration file. To discover more about the victim organisation, the attackers configured the malware to
exfiltrate captured screenshots. Data was covertly delivered for nearly a week until the transfers were
detected. The domains were then blocked and the machine was disconnected from the network for forensic
analysis.
The compromise was detected before any significant damage could be done. However, the investigation and
clean-up operation required the assistance of industry experts and disrupted the day-to-day operation of the
organisation.

Capabilities, vulnerabilities and mitigations

The information to identify the system administrator and topics of interest to socially engineer the spear-
phish was likely to have been derived from surveying publically available information. The clean-up operation
could have been averted by more effective implementation of the following cyber security controls:
 user training education and awareness - would have ensured staff understood how personal
information can be openly accessed, and made them suspicious of unsolicited email with
unexpected attachments and being asked to run executable files
 user access controls - enforcing these on the basis of least privilege, for high risk activities (such as
web browsing), could help to protect privileged accounts; allowing completely open browsing from
the admin computer was the critical security weakness
 network perimeter defences - the Trojan and the delivery stage executable should have been
detected and blocked by firewall policies, a filtering web proxy or corporate malware protection
software, none of which were implemented on the system administration computer
 secure configuration - would have prevented such malware from being able to run
 Common Cyber Attacks Reducing The Impact Page 16

Disclaimer
This document is not intended to be an exhaustive guide to potential cyber threats, is not tailored to indi-
vidual needs and is not a replacement for specialist advice. Users should ensure they take appropriate spe-
cialist advice where necessary.
This document is provided without any warranty or representation of any kind whether express or implied.
The government departments involved in the production of this document cannot therefore accept any
liability whatsoever for any loss or damage suffered or costs incurred by any person arising from the use of
this document.
Findings and recommendations in this document have not been provided with the intention of avoiding all
risks and following the recommendations will not remove all such risks. Ownership of information risks
remains with the relevant system owner at all times.
Crown Copyright 2016