CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO, ET

AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DR. MANUEL SINGSON, defendant-appellant.

Felix V. Vergara for defendant-appellant.

B. Martinez for plaintiffs-appellees.

DIZON, J.:

Action for partition commenced by the spouses Consolacion

Florentino and Francisco Crisologo against Manuel Singson in
connection with a residential lot located a Plaridel St., Vigan, Ilocos
Sur, with an area of approximately 193 square meters, and the
improvements existing thereon, covered by Tax No. 10765-C. Their
complaint alleged that Singson owned one-half pro-indiviso of said
property and that Consolacion Florentino owned the other half by
virtue of the provisions of the duly probated last will of Dña. Leona
Singson, the original owner, and the project of partition submitted to,
and approved by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur in special
Proceeding No. 453; that plaintiffs had made demands for the
partition of said property, but defendant refused to accede thereto,
thus compelling them to bring action.

Defendant's defense was that Consolacion Florentino was a mere

usufructuary of, and not owner of one-half pro-indiviso of the
property in question, and that, therefore, she was not entitled to
demand partition thereof.

After trial upon the issue thus posed, the lower court rendered
judgment as follows:

1. Declaring that the plaintiff is a co-owner pro-indiviso with the

defendant of the house and lot described in the complaint to
the extent of each of an undivided 1/2 portion thereof; .
 2. Ordering the aforesaid co-owners to execute an agreement
of partition of the said property within 30 days from receipt of
this judgment unless it be shown that the division thereof may
render it unserviceable, in which case the provisions of Art.
498 of the New Civil Code may be applied; . 1äwphï1.ñët

3. That in the event the said parties shall fail to do so, this
Court will appoint the corresponding commissioners to make
the partition in accordance with law; and .

4. Without special pronouncement as to costs." .

From the above judgment, defendant Singson appealed.

It is admitted that Dña. Leona Singson, who died single on January

13, 1948, was the owner of the property in question at the time of
her death. On July 31, 1951 she executed her last will which was
admitted to probate in Special Proceeding No. 453 of the lower
court whose decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in G.R.
No. 3605-R. At the time of the execution of the will, her nearest
living relatives were her brothers Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio
Singson, her nieces Rosario, Emilia and Trinidad, and her
grandniece Consolation, all surnamed Florentino.

Clause IX of her last will reads as follows: .

NOVENO. — Ordeno que se de a mi nieta por parte de mi

hermana mia y que al mismo tiempo vive en mi casa, y, por
tanto, bajo mi proteccion, y es la CONSOLACION
FLORENTINO: —

(A). La mitad de mi casa de materials fuertes con techo de

hierro galvanizado, incluyendo la mitad de su solar, ubicado
en la Poblacion de Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Calle Plaridel,
actualmente arrendada por los hermanos Fortunato, Teofilo y
Pedro del appellido Kairuz. Pero si falleciere antes o despues
que yo mi citada nieta, esta propiedad se dara por partes
 iguales entre mis tres hermanos Evaristo, Manuel y Dionisio, o
a sus herederos forzosos en el caso de que alguno de ellas
murieie antes ... (Exhibit F.)

The issue to be decided is whether the testamentary disposition

above-quoted provided for what is called sustitucion vulgar or for
a sustitucion fideicomisaria. This issue is, we believe, controlled by
the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code in force in the Philippines
prior to the effectivity of the New Civil Code, in view of the fact that
the testatrix died on January 13, 1948. They are the following: .

Art. 774. The testator may designate one or more persons to

substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs
should die before him, or should not wish or should be unable
to accept the inheritance.

A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to

which it is to apply, shall include the three mentioned in the
next preceeding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise
provided:

Art. 781. Fidei-commissary substitutions by virtue of which the

heir is charged to preserve and transmit to a third person the
whole or part of the inheritance shall be valid and effective,
provided they do not go beyond the second degree, or that
they are made in favor of persons living at the time of the
death of the testator." .

Art. 785. The following shall be inoperative: .

1. Fiduciary substitutions not made expressly, either by giving

them this name or by imposing upon the fiduciary the absolute
obligation of delivering the property to a second heir." ....

In accordance with the first legal provision quoted above, the

testator may not only designate the heirs who will succeed him upon
his death, but also provide for substitutes in the event that said heirs
do not accept or are in no position to accept the inheritance or
legacies, or die ahead of him.

The testator may also bequeath his properties to a particular person

with the obligation, on the part of the latter, to deliver the same to
another person, totally or partially, upon the occurrence of a
particular event (6 Manresa, p. 1112).

It is clear that the particular testamentary clause under

consideration provides for a substitution of the heir named therein in
this manner: that upon the death of Consolacion Florentino —
whether this occurs before or after that of the testatrix — the
property bequeathed to her shall be delivered ("se dara") or shall
belong in equal parts to the testatrix's three brothers, Evaristo,
Manuel and Dionisio, or their forced heirs, should anyone of them
die ahead of Consolacion Florentino. If this clause created what is
known as sustitucion vulgar, the necessary result would be that
Consolacion Florentino, upon the death of the testatrix, became the
owner of one undivided half of the property, but if it provided for
a sustitution fideicomisaria, she would have acquired nothing more
than usufructuary rights over the same half. In the former case, she
would undoubtedly be entitled to partition, but not in the latter. As
Manresa says, if the fiduciary did not acquire full ownership of the
property bequeathed by will, but mere usufructuary rights thereon
until the time came for him to deliver said property to the
fideicomisario, it is obvious that the nude ownership over the
property, upon the death of the testatrix, passed to and was
acquired by another person, and the person cannot be other than
the fideicomisario (6 Manresa p. 145).

It seems to be of the essence of a fideicommissary substitution that

an obligation be clearly imposed upon the first heir to preserve and
transmit to another the whole or part of the estate bequeathed to
him, upon his death or upon the happening of a particular event. For
this reason, Art. 785 of the old Civil Code provides that a
fideicommissary substitution shall have no effect unless it is made
expressly ("de una manera expresa") either by giving it such name,
or by imposing upon the first heir the absolute obligation
("obligacion terminante") to deliver the inheritance to a substitute or
second heir. In this connection Manresa says: .

Para que la sustitucion sea fideicomisaria, es preciso segun el

art. 781, que se ordeno o encargue al primer heredero,
cuando sea tal, que conserve y transmita a una tercera
persona o entidad el todo a parte de la herencia. O lo que es
lo mismo, la sustitucion fideicomisaria, como declaran las
resoluciones de 25 de Junio de 1895, 10 de Febrero de 1899 y
19 de Julio de 1909, exige tres requisitos: .

1.o Un primer heredero llamado al goce de los bienes

preferentemente.

2.o Obligacion claramente impuesta al mismo de conservar y

transmitir a un tercero el todo o parte del caudal.

3.o Un segundo heredero.

A estos requisitos anade la sentencia de 18 de Noviembre de

1918, otro mas, el del que el fideicomisario tenga derecho a
los bienes de la herencia desde el momento de la muerte del
testador, puesto que ha de suceder a este y no al fiduciario.

Por tanto, cuando el causante se limita a instituir dos

herederos, y por fallecimiento de ambos o de cualquiera de
ellos, asigna la parte del fallecido o fallecidos, a los herederos
legitimos o a otras personas, solo existe una sustitucion
vulgar, porque falta el requisito de haberse impuesto a los
primeros herederos la obligacion de conservar y transmitir los
bienes, y el articulo 789, en su parrafo primero, evige que la
sustitucion sea expresa, ya dandole el testador el nombre de
sustitucion fideicomisaria, ya imponiendo al sustituido la
obligacion terminante de conservar y transmitir los bienes a un
segundo heredero.
A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration
shows that the substitution of heirs provided for therein is not
expressly made of the fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a
clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall
only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her,
naked ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the
testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's
death — whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix —
her share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix.

In the light of the foregoing, we believe, and so hold, that the last
will of the deceased Dña. Leona Singson, established a mere
sustitucion vulgar, the substitution Consolacion Florentino by the
brothers of the testatrix to be effective or to take place upon the
death of the former, whether it happens before or after that of the
testatrix.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed judgment is affirmed,

with costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,

Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and De Leon, JJ., concur.
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA
LUISA PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE
and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the

testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez among the principal
beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his
two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion
Wanda de Wrobleski.

The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French

who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who
lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions.

Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on

December 11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will
was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed
administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted an inventory
of the estate as follows:

INVENTARIO

Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un te

rreno, con sus mejoras y edificaciones, situadoen

la Escolta, Manila.............................................................
P500,000.00

Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de dos

 parcelas de terreno situadas en Antipolo,
Rizal................... 658.34

Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones

de la 'Central Azucarera de la Carlota a P17.00

por accion
................................................................................8,347.
00

Diez mil ochocientos seize (10,806) acciones

de la 'Central Luzon Milling Co.', disuelta y en

liquidacion a P0.15 por accion

..............................................1,620.90

Cuenta de Ahorros en el Philippine Trust

Co.......................................................................................
....... 2,350.73

TOTAL..............................................................
P512,976.97

MENOS:

Deuda al Banco de las Islas Filipinas, garan-

tizada con prenda de las acciones de La Carlota ......... P

5,000,00

VALOR LIQUIDO...........................................
P507,976.97

The testamentary dispositions are as follows:

A.—En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge
Ramirez, ambas menores de edad, residentes en Manila,
I.F., calle 'Alright, No. 1818, Malate, hijos de su sobrino
D. Jose Ma. Ramirez, con sustitucion vulgar a favor de
sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con
sustitucion vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.

El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la

participacion indivisa de la finca Santa Cruz Building, lo
ordena el testador a favor de los legatarios nombrados,
en atencion a que dicha propiedad fue creacion del
querido padre del otorgante y por ser aquellos
continuadores del apellido Ramirez,

B.—Y en usufructo a saber: —

a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de la esposa del

testador, Da. Marcelle Ramirez, domiciliada en IE PECO,
calle del General Gallieni No. 33, Seine Francia, con
sustitucion vulgar u fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda
de Wrobleski, de Palma de Mallorca, Son Rapina
Avenida de los Reyes 13,

b.—Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes restantes, a

favor de la nombrada Da. Wanda de Nrobleski con
sustitucion vulgar v fideicomisaria a saber:—

En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes, a

favor de D. Juan Pablo Jankowski, de Son Rapina Palma
de Mallorca; y encuanto a la mitad restante, a favor de su
sobrino, D. Horace V. Ramirez, San Luis Building, Florida
St. Ermita, Manila, I.F.

A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias

precedentemente ordinadas, las usufiructuarias
nombradas conjuntamente con los nudo propietarios,
podran en cualquier memento vender a tercero los
 bienes objeto delegado, sin intervencion alguna de los
titulares fideicomisaarios.

On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition

as follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two
parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in
satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to
Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore,
one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's
usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of
Wanda.

Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds:

(a) that the provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de
Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan
Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's
usufruct are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda)
survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary
substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related
to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided
in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over
real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is
an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution;
and that (d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in the
Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow Marcelle and the
appellants, violates the testator's express win to give this property to
them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition
in its order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and
Roberto have appealed to this Court.

1. The widow's legitime.

The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-

half of the estate in full ownership. They admit that the testator's
dispositions impaired his widow's legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of
the Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or
he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate." And since
Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of
his estate over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance,
condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2,
Civil Code.)

It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants
question and justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo approved
the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the testament provides for
a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The court a
quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en
pleno dominio" as her legitime and which is more than what she is
given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in
the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter
to the testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions even
impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.

2. The substitutions.

It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment

of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default of
the heir originally instituted." (Art. 857, Civil Code. And that there
are several kinds of substitutions, namely: simple or common, brief
or compendious, reciprocal, and fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil
Code.) According to Tolentino, "Although the Code enumerates four
classes, there are really only two principal classes of substitutions:
the simple and the fideicommissary. The others are merely
variations of these two." (111 Civil Code, p. 185 [1973].)

The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code
which reads:

ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more

persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case
such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not
wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the
inheritance.
 A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to
which it refers, shall comprise the three mentioned in the
preceding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise
provided.

The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as

follows:

ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of

which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted with
the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir
the whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid and shall
take effect, provided such substitution does not go
beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and
provided further that the fiduciary or first heir and the
second heir are living at time of the death of the testator.

It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in

respect of the legacies of Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the
appellants, thus: con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos
descendientes, y, en su defecto, con substitution vulgar reciprocal
entre ambos.

The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so

provided. The appellants question the sustitucion vulgar y
fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski" in connection
with the one-third usufruct over the estate given to the widow
Marcelle However, this question has become moot because as We
have ruled above, the widow is not entitled to any usufruct.

The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria

in connection with Wanda's usufruct over two thirds of the estate in
favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace v. Ramirez.

They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because
Wanda survived the testator or stated differently because she did
not predecease the testator. But dying before the testator is not the
only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or
incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the
Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.

As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the

appellants are correct in their claim that it is void for the following
reasons:

(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez)

are not related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of
the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided
such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir
originally instituted."

What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by

Tolentino as follows:

Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as

designation, substitution, or transmission. The Supreme
Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction.
From this point of view, there can be only one
tranmission or substitution, and the substitute need not
be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez
Roman, however, construe the word "degree" as
generation, and the present Code has obviously followed
this interpretation. by providing that the substitution shall
not go beyond one degree "from the heir originally
instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the
second heir must be related to and be one generation
from the first heir.

From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be

either a child or a parent of the first heir. These are the
only relatives who are one generation or degree from the
fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. 193-194.)
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the
usufruct to the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the
Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the testator contradicts
the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits
the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual
agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners." (Brief, p.
26.)

3. The usufruct of Wanda.

The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the
estate in favor of Wanda is void because it violates the
constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.

The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:

SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no

private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in
the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)

The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda
on the ground that the Constitution covers not only succession by
operation of law but also testamentary succession. We are of the
opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to
acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession
for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless.
Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying
money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece
of land.

This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of

Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to
the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in
favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio
Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as follows:

One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;

One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge
Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de
Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo
Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.

The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo.

No special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., De Castro, Ericta and

Escolin, JJ., concur.

Aquino J., took no part.

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED REV. FATHER TEODORO ARANAS, RAMONA B.
VDA. DE ARANAS, ADELIA B. ARANAS-FERNANDEZ, HEIRS
OF THE LATE RODULFO B. ARANAS, ETC., ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE B. ARANAS AND HON. LUIS B. MANTA, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to declare the orders of

respondent Judge dated July 16, 1980 and September 23, 1980 as
an exercise of a gross abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, by ruling that the properties under Group C of the
testate estate of the late Fr.Teodoro Aranas are subject to
remunerative legacies.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic Church, died on

January 19, 1953. He had executed on June 6, 1946 his Last Will
and Testament which was admitted to probate on August 31, 1956.
In said Last Will and Testament, Fr. Teodoro Aranas stipulated the
following:

A. The return to Aniceto Aranas or his heirs of all properties

acquired by Fr. Aranas from his brother Aniceto Aranas and ten (10)
parcels of land described in the Will inherited by the testator from
his parents.

B. The return to Carmelo Aranas or his heirs of all properties

acquired by Fr. Aranas from his brother Carmelo Aranas and ten
(10) parcels of land described in the Will inherited by the testator
from his parents.
C. The special administration of the remainder of the estate of the
testator by Vicente Aranas, a faithful and serviceable nephew and
designating him also as recipient of 1/2 of the produce of said
properties after deducting the expenses for the administration and
the other 1/2 of the produce to be given to the Catholic Church for
the eternal repose of the testator's soul. Said pertinent provision 1 reads
as follows:

Fourth. It is my will that the lands I had bought from other

persons should be converged and placed under a
"special administrator." The special administrator of these
lands, for his office, should receive one half of all the
produce from which shall be deducted the expenses for
the administration, and the other half of the produce
should be received by the Roman Catholic Church and
should be spent for my soul, Vicente B. Aranas
(Tingting), because he is a faithful and serviceable
nephew, should be the first special administrator of said
properties, without bond, until his death or until he should
not want to hold the said office anymore. Anyone of the
sons of my brother Carmelo Aranas can hold the said
office of special administrator, and none other than they.
Their father, my brother Carmelo Aranas shall be the one
to decide who among them shall hold the said office, but
upon the death of my said brother Carmelo Aranas, his
said sons will have power to select the one among them
ourselves. The special administration is perpetual.

The lower court in its Order 2 dated November 17, 1977 ruled, upon
petitioners' (in Sp. Proc. No. 303) "Motion for the Declaration of
Heirs and Partition; and for Removal of the Administrator (Vicente
Aranas) and/or for his Permission to Resign, and appointment of His
Successor" that the "perpetual inalienability and administration of
the portion of the estate of the late Rev. Fr. Teodoro Aranas,
administered by Vicente Aranas, is nun and void after twenty years
from January 19, 1954 ... " and declared in the same order the heirs
of the late Fr. Teodoro Aranas. It also declared that "the removal of
Vicente Aranas will, therefore, not serve the ends of justice and for
the best interest of all the heirs, particularly with respect to the
portion of the estate taken by the heirs of Aniceto Aranas,
represented by the petitioners herein and the rest of the heirs of
Carmelo, represented by the intervenors, coheirs of Administrator
Vicente Aranas." 3

However, the abovesaid Order was subsequently set aside upon

the "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and to Declare Testate and
Intestate Heirs of the late Fr. Teodoro Aranas," filed by the
administrator Vicente Aranas on the allegation that said order was
violative of due process and without legal and factual basis because
only the issue for the removal of the administrator was heard and
not the matter of the declaration of heirs. Thus, the lower court
declared in its Order, 4 dated July 16, 1980 that the Order dated
November 17, 1977 is "set aside and in the interest of justice,
reopened in order that other heirs, successors-in-interest of Felino
Aranas, 5 could likewise assert their claims, as in the case of the
heirs of Aniceto Aranas and Carmelo Aranas." 6

Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the lower

court in its order dated September 23, 1980, petitioners now come
before Us by certiorari raising the issue that the lower court erred in
setting aside its order dated November 17, 1977 and in not applying
the provisions on Usufruct of the New Civil Code with respect to the
properties referred to as Group "C" in the Last Will and Testament.

The court ruled in its questioned order that this particular group of
properties (Group "C") is subject to the following:

1. Remunerative legacy by way of usufruct of the net

proceeds of 1/2 of the estate after deducting expenses
for administration in favor of Vicente Aranas, during his
lifetime and shall continue an administrator of the estate,
and, who, upon his death or refusal to continue such
usufruct, may be succeeded by any of the brothers of the
administrator as selected by their father, Carmelo
 Aranas, if still alive or one selected by his sons if, he,
Carmelo, is dead; Pursuant to the Will. (Article 562, 563,
564 and 603 of the New Civil Code).

2. Legacy in favor of the Roman Catholic Church,

particularly the Archbishop diocese of Cagayan de Oro
City Represented by the Reverend Archbishop Patrick H.
Cronin over one-half of the proceeds of the properties
under Group "C." (Article 603, New Civil Code) and to
last for a period of Fifty years from the effective date of
the legacy, Article 605, New Civil Code). (Annex "L-14,"
p. 87, Rollo)

Assailing the aforementioned ruling, petitioners rely heavily on the

doctrine laid down in Art. 870 of the New Civil Code to wit:

Art. 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or

part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty years
are void.

A cursory reading of the English translation of the Last Will and

Testament shows that it was the sincere intention and desire of the
testator to reward his nephew Vicente Aranas for his faithful and
unselfish services by allowing him to enjoy one-half of the fruits of
the testator's third group of properties until Vicente's death and/or
refusal to act as administrator in which case, the administration shall
pass to anyone chosen by Carmelo Aranas among his sons and
upon Carmelo's death, his sons will have the power to select one
among themselves. Vicente Aranas therefore as a usufructuary has
the right to enjoy the property of his uncle with all the benefits which
result from the normal enjoyment (or exploitation) of another's
property, with the obligation to return, at the designated time, either
the same thing, or in special cases its equivalent. This right of
Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the properties is temporary and
therefore not perpetual as there is a limitation namely his death or
his refusal. Likewise his designation as administrator of these
properties is limited by his refusal and/or death and therefore it does
not run counter to Art. 870 of the Civil Code relied upon by the
petitioners. Be it noted that Vicente Aranas is not prohibited to
dispose of the fruits and other benefits arising from the usufruct.
Neither are the naked owners (the other heirs) of the properties, the
usufruct of which has been given to Vicente Aranas prohibited from
disposing of said naked ownership without prejudice of course to
Vicente's continuing usufruct. To void the designation of Vicente
Aranas as usufructuary and/or administrator is to defeat the desire
and the dying wish of the testator to reward him for his faithful and
unselfish services rendered during the time when said testator was
seriously ill or bed-ridden. The proviso must be respected and be
given effect until the death or until the refusal to act as such of the
instituted usufructuary/administrator, after which period, the property
can be properly disposed of, subject to the limitations provided in
Art. 863 of the Civil Code concerning a fideicommissary substitution,
said Article says:

A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the

fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted with the
obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the
whole or part of the inheritance, shall be valid and shall
take effect, provided such substitution does not go
beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and
provided further, that the fiduciary or first heir and the
second heir are living at the time of the death of the
testator.

It is contended by petitioners that the ruling made by respondent

court dated November 17, 1977 was already final and not subject to
correction as what was set aside and to be reheard was only
regarding the determination of additional heirs. Such contention is
not worthy of credence. Respondents in their Memorandum allege
and it is not disputed by petitioners that the order of November 17,
1977 has not yet become final because it was received only on
January 12, 1978 by the counsel for respondent Vicente Aranas and
the Motion for Reconsideration and to declare testamentary and
intestate heirs dated January 17, 1978 was filed by the said
respondent within the reglementary period. Besides the validity or
invalidity of the usufructuary dispositions would affect the
determination of heirs.

As to petitioners' allegation that the order of July 16, 1980 is without

basis, the record shows that during the hearing of the urgent motion
for reconsideration and to declare testamentary and intestate heirs,
it was proven conclusively by the said respondent Vicente B.
Aranas that he was instituted as a remunerative legatee per
mandate of the Last Will and Testament by way of usufructuary.
Likewise the right of the Roman Catholic Church as the other
usufructuary legatee for the duration of the statutory lifetime of a
corporation, that is, 50 years from the date of the effectivity of said
legacy, was also established. 7

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.