Bitmain Lawsuit

Case 1:18-cv-25106-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/06/2018 Page 1 of 27
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
UNITED AMERICAN CORP., a Florida

company,
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff
Civil Action No. __________
v.
BITMAIN, INC., SAINT BITTS LLC d/b/a

BITCOIN.COM, ROGER VER, BITMAIN
TECHNOLOGIES LTD., BITMAIN
TECHNOLOGIES HOLDING COMPANY,
JIHAN WU, PAYWARD VENTURES, INC.
d/b/a KRAKEN, JESSE POWELL,
AMAURY SECHET, SHAMMAH
CHANCELLOR, and JASON COX,
Defendants.
Plaintiff United American Corp. (“Plaintiff” or “UAC”), by and through undersigned
counsel, hereby sues Bitmain, Inc., Saint Bitts LLC d/b/a Bitcoin.com (“Bitcoin.com”), Roger
Ver, Bitmain Technologies Ltd., Bitmain Technologies Holding Company (together with
Bitmain, Inc. and Bitmain Technologies Ltd., “Bitmain”), Jihan Wu, Payward Ventures, Inc.
d/b/a Kraken (“Kraken”), Jesse Powell, Amaury Sechet, Shammah Chancellor, Jason Cox
(Sechet, Chancellor, and Cox are collectively referred to as “Bitcoin ABC”) (collectively,
“Defendants”), for damages and for injunctive relief. In support thereof, Plaintiff alleges as
follows:
NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. This action involves a scheme by a tight knit network of individuals and
organizations to manipulate the cryptocurrency market for Bitcoin Cash, effectively hijacking the
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AKERMAN LLP, THREE BRICKELL CITY CENTRE, 98 SOUTHEAST SEVENTH STREET, SUITE 1100, MIAMI, FL 33131
Bitcoin Cash network, centralizing the market, and violating all accepted standards, protocols
and the course of conduct associated with Bitcoin since its inception.
2. This well-planned scheme caused a global capitalization meltdown of more than
$4 billion and caused many U.S. Bitcoin holders – including Plaintiff – to suffer damages and
irreparable harm.
3. In addition to the significant damages incurred by all stakeholders in Bitcoin Cash
as a result of the Defendants’ overt take over and manipulation of the market, there are
significant long-term implications for world economies and particularly the U.S. economy.
4. The market manipulation is centralizing what is intended to be a decentralized
transactional system enabling the corruption of the democratic and neutral principles of the
Bitcoin Cash network.
5. As set forth in greater detail below, Defendants have engaged in unfair methods
of competition, and through a series of unconscionable, deceptive and unfair acts and/or
practices, manipulated the Bitcoin Cash cryptocurrency market for their benefit and to the
detriment of the Plaintiff and the other stakeholders.
PARTIES
6. Plaintiff United American Corp. is a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of Florida with its principal place of business at 5201 Blue Lagoon Dr., Suite 800, Miami,
Florida 33126.
7. Defendant Bitmain, Inc. is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
Delaware with its principal place of business in San Jose, California.
8. Defendant Saint Bitts LLC d/b/a Bitcoin.com is a limited liability company
organized and existing under the laws of Saint Kitts and Nevis with its principal place of
business in Tokyo, Japan.
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9. Defendant Roger Ver is an individual domiciled, upon information and belief, in
Tokyo, Japan and is sui juris.
10. Defendant Bitmain Technologies Ltd. is a limited company organized and
existing under the laws of Hong Kong with its principal place of business in Beijing, China.
11. Defendant Bitmain Technologies Holding Company is a corporation registered in
the Cayman Islands.
12. Defendant Jihan Wu is the CEO of Bitmain Technologies Ltd. and, upon
information and belief, is an individual domiciled in San Jose, California, and is sui juris.
13. Defendant Payward Ventures, Inc. is a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of Delaware with its principal place of business in San Francisco, California. Payward
Ventures, Inc. is registered in San Francisco County as the owner of the fictitious business name
“Kraken” and operates the Bitcoin exchange Kraken.com.
14. Defendant Jesse Powell is the CEO of Kraken, is an individual domiciled in San
Francisco, California, and is sui juris.
15. Defendant Amaury Sechet is an individual domiciled in Doue la Fontaine, France
and is sui juris.
16. Defendant Shammah Chancellor is an individual domiciled in San Francisco,
California and is sui juris.
17. Defendant Jason Cox is an individual domiciled in San Mateo, California and is
sui juris.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
18. This Court has federal question jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 because it involves a civil action arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
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United States. Specifically, the allegations of Count I involve violations of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
19. This Court also has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332
because Plaintiff is a citizen of Florida, and Defendants are citizens of different states other than
Florida or citizens or subjects of a foreign state, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000,
exclusive of interest and costs.
20. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants have
engaged in business in the State of Florida and have purposefully availed themselves of the
benefits and privileges of conducting business in this jurisdiction.
21. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because a substantial
part of the events and omissions at issue in this action occurred in this District.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Cryptocurrency
22. Cryptocurrency is a form of digital currency that uses cryptography to secure
electronic transactions and to control the creation of new virtual currency units. Popular forms of
cryptocurrency include Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, and Ethereum.
23. Though a form of “virtual currency,” the value of a cryptocurrency is real and
trades in currency markets.
24. New cryptocurrency is created through a process known as “mining.” People
compete to “mine” virtual currencies using computing power to solve complex math puzzles.
The solutions to these puzzles are then used to encrypt and secure the cryptocurrency. The
computers or pools of computers (nodes) which are the first to solve these puzzles are rewarded
with new cryptocurrency.
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25. Once earned, virtual currency is stored in a digital wallet associated with the
computing device that solved the puzzle.
26. These math puzzles are solved by servers using computer power (or powered by
computers). The puzzles do not require any calculations by the person mining the currency. As
competition to create more virtual currency has increased, the mathematical puzzles have
become more complex, making virtual currency more difficult to obtain. Computers that were
once capable of efficiently mining Bitcoin could now take centuries to obtain the same results.
The Genesis of Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash
27. The original vision of the document known as the “Satoshi Nakamoto
whitepaper” published on October 31, 2008, was a simple one: to create a purely “peer‐to‐peer”
version of electronic cash that would allow online payments from one party to another without
going through a financial institution. The Whitepaper coined the term “Bitcoin” to represent this
digital “cash,” more generally referred to as “digital currency.” A true and correct copy of the
Whitepaper is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
28. At a high level, the integrity of the Bitcoin system relies on a network of
decentralized public ledgers that confirm and maintain the records of digital transactions on a
“blockchain” in a highly cryptographic environment. Whereas centralized ledgers are highly
vulnerable to tampering and fraud, confidence and trust within a blockchain transactional
network is established through decentralized ledgers that are identical and continuously updated
and compared. These decentralized ledgers create an environment where one would have to
tamper with the majority of ledgers simultaneously and in exactly the same manner within the
same cryptographic environment to engage in any sort of tampering.
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29. The strength of Bitcoin Cash as a digital currency lies in it being a
“permissionless” system with a decentralized public ledger (the blockchain). To accomplish and
maintain the system requires mechanisms for reaching a global, decentralized consensus on the
valid blockchain. Two of those mechanisms are: (a) the Proof‐of‐Work1 – which applies on a
block-by-block basis; and (2) assuring that the “main chain” at any given time is whichever valid
chain of blocks has the most cumulative Proofs‐of‐Work associated with it (normally, the longest
chain).
30. A mining pool is the pooling of resources by virtual currency miners, who share
their processing power over a network, to split the reward equally, according to the amount of
work they contributed to the probability of solving the puzzles. Mining pools have been
established because: (1) the difficulty of the math puzzles has increased; (2) a given miner
cannot be working on more than one problem at a time; and (3) there is no way of knowing
which miner will solve a given problem.
31. The reward per miner within a pool will be a direct function of the collective
reward over a period of time divided by the number of miners. Because mining is very energy
consuming and electricity represents the largest operating cost (both in powering the miner and
the cost of air conditioning to cool miners as applicable), to be profitable, miners must generate
higher rewards over a period of time than the cost of electricity needed to mine in the same
period of time. As such, as difficulty increases, so does the cost of mining.
32. For a cryptocurrency network to remain secure and trusted, the entire process
must remain distributed and decentralized so that no single individual, entity or pool can control
1
The Proof-of-Work is designed to eliminate the insertion of fraudulent transactions in the
blockchain.
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more than 50% of computing power. If this 50% figure is exceeded, the network is no longer
decentralized. Then, those using the network will be forced to utilize a centralized network in
which they lack confidence and trust.
United American Corp.
33. In late 2017, Plaintiff announced publicly that it was moving heavily into
blockchain and blockchain technologies. This was to be a multi-phased approach that
encompassed blockchain solutions, both at the network level for the execution of blockchain
transactions and at the mining level for the mining of cryptocurrencies.
34. At the network level for the execution of blockchain transactions, on December
22, 2017, Plaintiff announced the creation of BlockNum, a distributed and decentralized ledger
technology and the first blockchain to be based on SIP-Protocol (Session Initiated Protocol),
which is used by the vast majority of telecommunications companies around the world.
BlockNum allows the execution of blockchain transactions between any two telephone numbers
regardless of their location meaning that transactions can occur simply and without the need for
“cryptocurrency wallets” backed by the Bitcoin Cash network. Plaintiff also filed a patent
application for BlockNum with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
35. Also in late December 2017, Plaintiff incorporated two subsidiaries to be used for
exploitation of its developing business in blockchain: Blockchain Data Centers Inc. and United
Blockchain Corp.
36. At the mining level, Plaintiff focused on the development of a low cost, rapid
deployment solution for operation of cryptocurrency mining – the BlockchainDome. The
BlockchainDome is a passive “cooling ground-coupled heat-exchanger” technology that uses
Canadian well and chimney principals combined with a technique for utilizing negative air
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pressure in its mining rigs. Plaintiff also filed a patent application for the BlockchainDome with
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
37. Plaintiff’s development of these technologies was intended to mine the Bitcoin
Cash network. The reason Plaintiff has focused on a “peer-to-peer” payment system is because it
will eventually generate more in transaction fees than the mining generates.
38. Plaintiff’s construction of the first BlockchainDome commenced in March 2018
and to date it has erected four domes and operated over 5,000 Bitcoin Cash-based miners. The
Plaintiff’s total investment in development and deployment of this infrastructure exceeds $4
million.
39. The economics of the domes depend on mining Bitcoin Cash within normal
market conditions. Cryptocurrency mining, like any other mining, is predicated on the basic
principle that the value of the mining output exceeds the cost to mine that output. Plaintiff has
designed its BlockchainDomes to be highly efficient and among the lowest, if not the lowest,
cost producers.
40. At the same time, the broader, macro-economics of Bitcoin Cash mining are
based on market forces in a decentralized market whereby no one entity controls the market
(allowing for an unbiased value of the currency). Without decentralization, normal market forces
are less effective because mining power can be shifted to control markets. This shift can
ultimately result in predatory pricing thereby reducing the economic value of the output so low
as to eliminate competition and ultimately result in market control and centralization.
The Bitcoin Cash Upgrade
41. Prior to the network upgrade scheduled for November 15, 2018, the Bitcoin Cash
network was mined by several different nodes applying various computer software
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implementations (i.e. Bitcoin Unlimited, Bitcoin ABC, Bitcoin SV, Bitcoin XT, etc.). All of
these software implementations were compatible with each other and were all responding to the
same rules set.
42. On November 15, 2018, at 11:40 am EST, the Bitcoin Cash network was
scheduled for automatic software upgrades for each of the different software implementations.
43. Because two of the software implementations (Bitcoin ABC 0.18.4 or Bitcoin SV
0.1.0)2 decided to proceed with upgrades that would no longer respect the same rules set, a
dispute arose over which of the two rules sets being applied by the two software implementations
would be the rules set that the Bitcoin Cash blockchain was going to follow moving forward.
44. Consistent with Nakamoto’s Whitepaper, the determination over which rules set
would be applied by software implementations on the network going forward, would be based on
the “vote”3 of the various nodes mining the network – i.e., which node implementations
exercised more computer hashing power through its attached mining rigs while working to
continue the chain.
45. Whichever rules set received the most “votes” in the aforementioned “hash war”
was going to continue the Bitcoin Cash blockchain going forward. The “losing” rules set would
be forced to create a new and distinct chain.
46. Upon information and belief, the scheduled Bitcoin Cash network upgrade was
manipulated by Defendants in an effort to artificially take control of the network blockchain
moving forward.
2
Bitcoin Unlimited, XT and others followed the ABC implementation.
3
Nakamoto’s Whitepaper states that nodes in the system “vote with their CPU power,
expressing their acceptance of valid blocks by working on extending them…” See Exhibit A at ⁋
12.
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The Scheme and the Players
47. It is clear that during the Bitcoin Cash software update there was a systematic and
organized scheme by the Defendants to bring forward significant computing hashing power to
the Bitcoin Cash network on a temporary basis for the sole purpose of dominating the Bitcoin
Cash ABC 0.18.4 software chain implementation.
48. Understanding the Defendants’ scheme requires understanding the players
involved as they are not legally affiliated.
49. The China International Capital Corporation (“CICC”) is one of China’s leading
investment banking firms that engages in investment banking, securities, investment
management, and other financial services.
50. CICC has the exclusive mandate for the Initial Public Offering of Bitmain
Technologies Ltd.
51. Bitmain Technologies Ltd. – founded in 2013 by Jihan Wu and Micree Zhan – is
the largest designer of what is referred to as “ASIC” or Application Specific Integrated Circuit
chips for mining operations. The Bitmain ASIC chip powers the Antminer series of mining
servers that are the dominant servers operating on a number of cryptocurrency networks such as
Bitcoin and Bitcoin derivatives.
52. Estimates of Bitmain’s market share for ASIC servers ranges from 67 to 80% and
it is estimated that Bitmain controls well in excess of 60% of the world’s cryptocurrency mining
computer (hashing) power.
53. Bitmain also operates Antpool and BTC.com, two of the largest Bitcoin and
Bitcoin Cash mining pools in the world. As of December 2, 2018 (based on a 7 day average)
these two pools collectively controlled 31% of Bitcoin mining and 40% of Bitcoin Cash ABC.
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54. Bitcoin.com is a privately‐owned company registered in the off shore islands of St
Kitts and Nevis under the organization of Saint Bitts LLC (with headquarters in Tokyo).
Bitcoin.com provides Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash services, such as purchasing and selling these
cryptocurrencies, and choosing a wallet for both. It has servers and programmers in the United
States and operates the Bitcoin.com pool (currently 7.4% of Bitcoin Cash ABC) with hash power
provided by Bitmain. It also offers other services such as news, an online store and online
gaming.
55. Bitcoin.com was founded and remains owned by Roger Ver (“Ver”), a U.S.
natural citizen who renounced his U.S. citizenship in 2014 after obtaining a Saint Kitts and Nevis
passport. Upon information and belief, Ver is currently living in Tokyo.
56. Ver is a self‐described “Bitcoin Angel Investor” and became interested in
cryptocurrencies early in Bitcoin’s history. He invested in a number of Bitcoin projects and
startups including the Kraken trading platform, Ripple and BitInstant – founded by ex-convict
Charlie Shrem.4
57. Ver is a strong advocate of Bitcoin Cash and the original forking of Bitcoin into
Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash in 2017. He has openly supported the development and implementation
of the ABC version of Bitcoin Cash.
58. Sterlin Lujan is Bitcoin.com’s Communications Ambassador and is responsible
for representing the company in the United States. See https://sterlinlujan.com/about/.
4
Shrem was sentenced to 2 years in prison for his involvement of transferring some $1
million in Bitcoin to the “Silk Road,” a black market platform which was popular for money
laundering and illegal drug transactions on the dark web (the site was shut down by the FBI in
2011). Ver was invested in Silk Road and has tweeted support for the site and the concept. See
https://www.businessinsider.com.au/charlie-shrem-arrested-bitcoin-ceo-2014-1.
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59. During the November 15, 2018 Bitcoin Cash network upgrade, Ver and
Bitcoin.com colluded with Jihan Wu and Bitmain (whose electricity rates are subsidized by the
Chinese government)5 to reallocate pools of Bitmain servers from the Bitcoin Core network
(“BTC”) to Bitcoin.com’s pools in the Bitcoin Cash network minutes before the implementation
of the Bitcoin Cash network upgrade. The effect was to bring pools of servers to mine the
upgrade from another network (i.e., “rent” hashing power), that were not previously mining the
Bitcoin Cash blockchain, thereby increasing Bitcoin.com’s hashing power by over 4,000%.
60. The impact of redirecting hashing power from another network can be seen
clearly in the following graph:
5
It is no secret that access to cheap electricity in China has been a major advantage to
Bitmain. The company has taken advantage of cheap coal-fired power from coal-abundant
regions in China such as Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, which have in recent years taken to
crypto mining to boost their less-developed economies. Local authorities in China have provided
Bitmain with a highly subsidized electricity rate. The subsidized electricity provided to by China
to Bitmain has enabled Bitmain to dump large amounts of hashing power into the Bitcoin
network at a rate that is under cost relative to its competitors. The effect of this is that there is not
a level playing field for those who are not subsidized by the Chinese government.
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The lighter/orange line represents the hashing power of the Bitcoin ABC pool and the darker/red
line the hashing power of the Bitcoin SV pool. Immediately after the software upgrade, the
Bitcoin ABC pool hashing power rises to a level that had not previously been seen indicating the
intermittent deployment of “rented” hashing. This type of hashing peak is not a normal
occurrence. The peaks continued several times in the subsequent days until they leveled off to
normal levels once Bitcoin ABC’s dominance was established.
61. The above described actions were intentional and clearly planned in advance, with
Bitmain organizing deployment (or actually redeployment) of up to 90,000 Bitmain Antminer S9
servers in early November.
62. Ver himself took to Twitter to pat himself on the back on the unprecedented level
of hashing power he brought to bear on the network upgrade – more hashing power than the
entire network had earlier that very same day, stating:
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63. Bitcoin.com itself acknowledges that Bitcoin’s creator Satoshi Nakamoto
“outlined the design of the Bitcoin system and protocol” in his Whitepaper. See
https://www.bitcoin.com/about-us. Yet, the above described actions by Bitcoin.com violated the
central tenets and principles established by his Whitepaper and relied on by stakeholders and the
market.
64. Nakamoto’s Whitepaper makes express that nodes in the system “vote with their
CPU power, expressing their acceptance of valid blocks by working on extending them…”
While nodes “can leave and rejoin the network,” it has always been understood that it is the
nodes that are mining the blockchain that are able to “vote with their CPU power.”
65. By essentially bringing in mercenaries from another network (the BTC network)
to temporarily mine the Bitcoin Cash network during the software upgrade and then leave,
Bitmain and Bitcoin.com effectively hijacked the blockchain. Their actions diluted the “vote”
being exercised by the existing nodes6 during the upgrade, violated the ground rules of the
network that other users had relied on and respected for years, and artificially pumped up the
chain implementation with computer hashes to dominate the temporary software upgrade.
66. To appreciate the effective hijacking of the blockchain, one need only look at the
percentage of Bitcoin blocks being awarded – and the diversity of the miners to which they were
being awarded – immediately before and after the network upgrade on November 15, 2018.
67. The following pie chart illustrates the distribution of Bitcoin Cash Blocks during
the week immediately preceding the network upgrade (as reported by coin.dance). Bitcoin.com
6
Before Bitcoin.com brought its Bitmain mercenaries to bear on the blockchain, over 70%
of the existing nodes had elected to mine the Bitcoin SV chain.
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and the Bitmain pools (AntPool, BTC.com, and ViaBTC) were collectively awarded 27.6% of
the blocks during the preceding week.
November 7-14, 2018
68. The next pie chart illustrates the distribution of Bitcoin ABC Blocks on
November 16, 2018, the day after the upgrade. Bitcoin.com and the Bitmain pools (AntPool,
BTC.com, and ViaBTC) were being awarded 100% of the blocks immediately after the network
upgrade.7
7
At one point, the Bitmain/Bitcoin.com pool controlled 90-95% of all hashing on the
resulting Bitcoin Cash network (BCH).
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November 16, 2018
69. But the scheme did not end there. The next day on November 16, 2018, Bitcoin
ABC through defendants Amaury Sechet, Shammah Chancellor, and Jason Cox, implemented a
“poison pill” in the chain referred to as a “checkpoint.”
70. The implemented checkpoint is problematic because it also “centralized” what
should be a decentralized market due to the way the checkpoint was added and its location close
to the tip of the blockchain.
71. The integrity of a blockchain depends on a consensus being reached on the
longest blockchain and that blockchain being accepted by all nodes on the network. While in
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theory the blockchain ledger becomes more and more immutable as time passes, a fork can arise
at any depth on the chain and become the main chain if that is the consensus.
72. The decision by Bitcoin ABC to “lock down” the block chain after an arbitrary
number of blocks close to the tip of the blockchain – through a mechanism referred to as
“checkpoints” and “Deep Reorg Prevention” – will allow anyone with 51% hashing power to
quickly cement control of the blockchain ledger. They would also cement control over future
changes to Bitcoin cash functionality as well as changes to the consensus rules. Combining this
checkpoint power with the hashing power of Bitcoin ABC backers amounts to centralization.
Anyone who combines hashing power and checkpoints in this fashion will be able to override
any consensus reached by the rest of the network, forcing others to conform or create an
unwanted hard fork.
73. Making a centralized checkpoint that destroys the core principle of decentralized
consensus was a significant and fundamental change to the blockchain that was made without
consulting other Bitcoin development groups and the community at large.
74. Indeed, as early as the next day after the update, individuals in the cryptocurrency
industry such as Andreas Brekken (self-proclaimed “advisor to some of the most successful
blockchain projects in the world” and software engineer at Kraken), held online forums
acknowledging that Bitcoin ABC developers and crypto exchanges such as Kraken agreed to
implement centralized checkpoints. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UjAHJY0QZhs; see
also https://brekken.com/about. Brekken goes on to admit in the video “this has been planned for
a long time” and “we knew within 30 minutes we had it.” The following is a screenshot of the
referenced video:
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75. Indeed, days after Bitcoin.com hijacked the network and introduced checkpoints,
Lujan himself tweeted the following on behalf of and regarding Bitcoin.com taking control:
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76. Shortly after Bitcoin.com and Ver’s hostile takeover of Bitcoin Cash, Kraken – a
well-known Bitcoin exchange8 in which Ver himself is a principal investor – and Kraken’s CEO
Jesse Powell, decided that Kraken would maintain the BCH ticker for the ABC chain and
indicated to users that the SV chain was a high-risk environment. By doing so, Kraken and
Powell effectively recognized the ABC chain as the official blockchain of Bitcoin Cash and the
“winner” of the network upgrade.
77. As a result of the aforementioned market manipulation, the value of the
cryptocurrency that Plaintiff mines in its BlockchainDomes has fallen significantly. The
combined value of the forked currency is lower than the pre-fork currency and the resulting
confusion has been severely detrimental to the market overall. Some trading platforms have
chosen to list only one of the two resulting currencies, thus reducing liquidity and the value of
the currencies.
78. The Defendants’ collective actions and manipulation of the market by among
other things, violating the Nakamoto Whitepaper and consensus rules and hijacking the Bitcoin
Cash network have created significant uncertainty and a lack of confidence in the network.
Under normal decentralized market conditions, this type of uncertainty would not exist.
79. Plaintiff has suffered and continues suffering significant damages through the loss
of value of the currency – a direct result of the centralization of what should be a decentralized
network and the lack of democracy within the network as anticipated by the industry.
8
Kraken is a US‐based cryptocurrency exchange established in 2011 by Jesse Powell with
the support of Ver (his friend from high school) which operates in the U.S., Canada, the E.U. and
Japan. The exchange provides the mechanism to trade between Euros/US dollars/Canadian
dollars/Japanese Yen and various cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash and several
other cryptocurrencies. It purports to be the largest Bitcoin exchange in Euro volume and
liquidity.
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COUNT I
(VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT)
80. Paragraphs 1-79 of this Complaint are incorporated as if fully set forth here.
81. Defendants and their unaffiliated co-conspirators entered into and engaged in a
conspiracy in unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and
Section 4 of the Clayton Act.
82. During the applicable period, Defendants took control of the Bitcoin Cash
cryptocurrency market by artificially pumping up the chain implementation with computer
hashes to dominate the temporary software upgrade and implemented a new software version
with checkpoints that controlled and manipulated the value of the Bitcoin Cash network going
forward.
83. The conspiracy consisted of a continuing agreement, understanding or concerted
action between and among Defendants and their co-conspirators in furtherance of which
Defendants manipulated the cryptocurrency market for Bitcoin Cash, effectively hijacked the
Bitcoin Cash network, centralized the market, and violated all accepted standards and protocols
associated with Bitcoin since its inception, and fixed, maintained, suppressed, stabilized and/or
otherwise made artificial the values associated with the Bitcoin Cash network. Defendants’
conspiracy is a per se violation of the federal antitrust laws and is, in any event, an unreasonable
and unlawful restraint of trade and commerce.
84. Defendants’ conspiracy, and resulting impact on the market for Bitcoin Cash,
occurred in or affected interstate and foreign commerce.
85. As a proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and others like it
have suffered injury to their business or property. The Plaintiff is entitled to treble damages for
the violations of the Sherman Act alleged herein.
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COUNT II
(NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION)
87. As participants in the Bitcoin Cash network, Defendants represented to Plaintiff
and the market that they would abide by the Whitepaper and accepted standards and protocols.
88. Since its inception, the design of the Bitcoin system and protocol have been
established by Nakamoto’s Whitepaper. It has always been understood that it is the nodes that
are mining a blockchain that are able to “vote with their CPU power.”
to temporarily mine the Bitcoin Cash network during the software upgrade and then leave the
network, Bitmain and Bitcoin.com effectively hijacked the blockchain. They diluted the “vote”
being exercised by the existing nodes9 during the upgrade, violated the ground rules of the
chain implementation with computer hashes to dominate the temporary software upgrade. Then,
for good measure, the Defendants implemented a checkpoint that “centralized” what should be a
decentralized market due to the way the checkpoint was added and its location close to the tip of
the blockchain.
90. Defendants knew or should have known that they did not intend to abide by the
fundamental principles and protocols accepted by users of the Bitcoin Cash network.
91. Plaintiff justifiably relied on Defendants’ misrepresentations by investing millions
of dollars in development and deployment of infrastructure specifically for the mining of Bitcoin
Cash.
9
Before Bitcoin.com and Ver brought their Bitmain mercenaries to bear on the blockchain,
80% of the existing nodes had elected to mine the Bitcoin SV chain.
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92. As a result of Defendants’ misrepresentations, Plaintiff has been damaged and
will continue to suffer damages.
COUNT III
(NEGLIGENCE)
94. As participants in the Bitcoin Cash network, Defendants owed a duty of care to
the Plaintiff to abide by the Whitepaper and accepted standards and protocols.
95. Defendants breached their duty of care to the Plaintiffs by failing to conform to
and abide by the Whitepaper and accepted standards and protocols and hijacking and assuming
control of the Bitcoin Cash network and market.
96. The Plaintiff has suffered actual damages as a result of the Defendants’ conduct.
97. The damages suffered by the Plaintiff as a result of the Defendants conduct were
foreseeable.
COUNT IV
(EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL)
99. As participants in the Bitcoin Cash network, Defendants caused Plaintiff and the
market to believe that they would abide by certain accepted standards and protocols.
100. Since its inception, the design of the Bitcoin system and protocol have been
established by Nakamoto’s Whitepaper certain accepted standards and protocols. It has always
been understood that it is the nodes that are mining a blockchain that are able to “vote with their
CPU power.”
to temporarily mine the Bitcoin Cash network during the software upgrade and then leave the
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network, Bitmain and Bitcoin.com effectively hijacked the blockchain. They diluted the “vote”
being exercised by the existing nodes during the upgrade, violated the ground rules of the
chain implementation with computer hashes to dominate the temporary software upgrade. Then,
for good measure, the Defendants implemented a checkpoint that “centralized” what should be a
decentralized market due to the way the checkpoint was added and its location close to the tip of
the blockchain.
102. Defendants knew or should have known that they did not intend to abide by these
fundamental principles and protocols accepted by users of the Bitcoin Cash network.
103. Plaintiff justifiably relied on the fact that Defendants would abide by the accepted
standards and protocols of the network by investing millions of dollars in development and
deployment of infrastructure specifically for the mining of Bitcoin Cash.
104. As a result of Defendants’ failure to do so, Plaintiff has been damaged and will
continue to suffer damages.
COUNT V
(UNJUST ENRICHMENT)
106. Bitmain, Bitcoin.com, and Ver have been unjustly enrichment by the conduct
described above.
107. It would be inequitable for Defendants to be permitted to retain the benefit which
Defendants obtained from their manipulative acts and at the expense of Plaintiff.
108. Unjust enrichment requires the receipt of a benefit and unjust retention of the
benefit at the expense of another.
47165362;2
- 23 -
109. Bitmain, Bitcoin.com, and Ver received the benefit of mining significant sums of
Bitcoin Cash through their aforementioned scheme while other users such as Plaintiff were cut
out of the network and lost the value of their significant investments.
110. These parties should be required to disgorge all monies, profits and gains which
they obtained and will unjustly obtain at the expense of Plaintiff and reimburse Plaintiff for the
loss of investment resulting from their actions.
COUNT VI
(CONVERSION)
112. The Defendants are wrongfully exercising dominion and control over Bitcoin
Cash and its blockchain network and market inconsistent with the use and possessory rights of
the Plaintiff.
113. The Defendants’ conduct has deprived the Plaintiff of the right to utilize and
possess Bitcoin Cash and its blockchain network as intended pursuant to the Whitepaper and its
accepted standards and protocols and the conduct is inconsistent with the Plaintiff’s rights to use
the network pursuant to said standards and protocols.
114. The Plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of the Defendant’s unlawful
conversion of the Bitcoin Cash network and market.
115. Demand for the Defendants to return the converted property is unnecessary as it
would be futile.
COUNT VII
(INJUNCTIVE RELIEF)
47165362;2
- 24 -
117. As previously articulated, Defendants have engaged unfair methods of
competition, and through a series of unconscionable, deceptive and unfair acts or practices,
manipulated a cryptocurrency market for their benefit and to the detriment of Plaintiff and many
others.
118. The Defendants’ collective actions and manipulation of the market by violating
the Nakamoto Whitepaper and consensus rules and hijacking the Bitcoin Cash network have
created significant uncertainty and a lack of confidence in the network. Under normal
decentralized market conditions, this type of uncertainty would not exist.
119. Consequently, Plaintiff’s ability to conduct its operations has been virtually shut
down.
120. Defendant’s actions have caused and will continue to cause irreparable harm to
Plaintiff and many others.
121. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law and the entry of an injunction will not
disserve or affect the public interest, but will promote the public interest in maintaining a
decentralized Bitcoin Cash network.
122. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks an injunction: (a) precluding Amaury Sechet,
Shammah Chancellor, and Jason Cox via Bitcoin ABC from continuing to implement
checkpoints on the Bitcoin Cash network and any other implementation of the software that
would prevent the resulting chains from being able to be re-merged; and (b) requiring them to
return the blockchain to its previously decentralized form with the previous consensus rules.
47165362;2
- 25 -
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, as a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment, as
follows:
A. For an order declaring that the Defendants conduct violates the statutes and
common law claims referenced herein;
B. That the unlawful conduct alleged herein be adjudged and decreed to be an
unlawful restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 4 of the
Clayton Act;
C. Awarding restitution, compensatory damages and/or disgorgement in favor of
Plaintiff against Defendants for all harm suffered as a result of Defendants’ wrongdoing, in an
amount to be proven at trial, including interest thereon;
D. Awarding injunctive relief against Defendants to: (1) prevent Bitcoin ABC from
continuing to implement checkpoints on the Bitcoin Cash network and any other implementation
of the software that would prevent the resulting chains from being able to be re-merged; and (b)
requiring them to return the blockchain to its previously decentralized form with the previous
consensus rules;
E. For an order of restitution and/or disgorgement and all other forms of equitable
monetary relief;
F. Awarding Plaintiff reasonable costs and expenses incurred in this action,
including counsel fees and expert fees; and
G. Awarding such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
47165362;2
- 26 -
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all claims so triable in this action.
Dated: December 6, 2018
Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Brian P. Miller

BRIAN P. MILLER
Florida Bar Number: 980633
Email: [email protected]
MICHAEL O. MENA
JOANNE GELFAND
AKERMAN LLP
Three Brickell City Centre
98 Southeast Seventh Street, Suite 1100
Miami, FL 33131
Phone: (305) 374-5600
Fax: (305) 374-5095
Attorneys for Plaintiff United American Corp.
47165362;2
- 27 -
Case 1:18-cv-25106-XXXX Document 1-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/06/2018 Page 1 of 10
Exhibit “A”
Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System
Satoshi Nakamoto
[email protected]
www.bitcoin.org
Abstract. A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online

payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a
financial institution. Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main
benefits are lost if a trusted third party is still required to prevent double-spending.
We propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer network.
The network timestamps transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of
hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing
the proof-of-work. The longest chain not only serves as proof of the sequence of
events witnessed, but proof that it came from the largest pool of CPU power. As
long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not cooperating to
attack the network, they'll generate the longest chain and outpace attackers. The
network itself requires minimal structure. Messages are broadcast on a best effort
basis, and nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the longest
proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they were gone.
1. Introduction
Commerce on the Internet has come to rely almost exclusively on financial institutions serving as
trusted third parties to process electronic payments. While the system works well enough for
most transactions, it still suffers from the inherent weaknesses of the trust based model.
Completely non-reversible transactions are not really possible, since financial institutions cannot
avoid mediating disputes. The cost of mediation increases transaction costs, limiting the
minimum practical transaction size and cutting off the possibility for small casual transactions,
and there is a broader cost in the loss of ability to make non-reversible payments for non-
reversible services. With the possibility of reversal, the need for trust spreads. Merchants must
be wary of their customers, hassling them for more information than they would otherwise need.
A certain percentage of fraud is accepted as unavoidable. These costs and payment uncertainties
can be avoided in person by using physical currency, but no mechanism exists to make payments
over a communications channel without a trusted party.
What is needed is an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust,
allowing any two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted
third party. Transactions that are computationally impractical to reverse would protect sellers
from fraud, and routine escrow mechanisms could easily be implemented to protect buyers. In
this paper, we propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer distributed
timestamp server to generate computational proof of the chronological order of transactions. The
system is secure as long as honest nodes collectively control more CPU power than any
cooperating group of attacker nodes.
1
2. Transactions
We define an electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures. Each owner transfers the coin to the
next by digitally signing a hash of the previous transaction and the public key of the next owner
and adding these to the end of the coin. A payee can verify the signatures to verify the chain of
ownership.
Transaction Transaction Transaction
Owner 1's Owner 2's Owner 3's

Public Key Public Key Public Key
Hash Hash Hash

Ver Ver
if y ify
Signature Signature Signature
gn gn
Si Si
Private Key Private Key Private Key
The problem of course is the payee can't verify that one of the owners did not double-spend
the coin. A common solution is to introduce a trusted central authority, or mint, that checks every
transaction for double spending. After each transaction, the coin must be returned to the mint to
issue a new coin, and only coins issued directly from the mint are trusted not to be double-spent.
The problem with this solution is that the fate of the entire money system depends on the
company running the mint, with every transaction having to go through them, just like a bank.
We need a way for the payee to know that the previous owners did not sign any earlier
transactions. For our purposes, the earliest transaction is the one that counts, so we don't care
about later attempts to double-spend. The only way to confirm the absence of a transaction is to
be aware of all transactions. In the mint based model, the mint was aware of all transactions and
decided which arrived first. To accomplish this without a trusted party, transactions must be
publicly announced [1], and we need a system for participants to agree on a single history of the
order in which they were received. The payee needs proof that at the time of each transaction, the
majority of nodes agreed it was the first received.
3. Timestamp Server
The solution we propose begins with a timestamp server. A timestamp server works by taking a
hash of a block of items to be timestamped and widely publishing the hash, such as in a
newspaper or Usenet post [2-5]. The timestamp proves that the data must have existed at the
time, obviously, in order to get into the hash. Each timestamp includes the previous timestamp in
its hash, forming a chain, with each additional timestamp reinforcing the ones before it.
Hash Hash
Block Block
Item Item ... Item Item ...
2
4. Proof-of-Work
To implement a distributed timestamp server on a peer-to-peer basis, we will need to use a proof-
of-work system similar to Adam Back's Hashcash [6], rather than newspaper or Usenet posts.
The proof-of-work involves scanning for a value that when hashed, such as with SHA-256, the
hash begins with a number of zero bits. The average work required is exponential in the number
of zero bits required and can be verified by executing a single hash.
For our timestamp network, we implement the proof-of-work by incrementing a nonce in the
block until a value is found that gives the block's hash the required zero bits. Once the CPU
effort has been expended to make it satisfy the proof-of-work, the block cannot be changed
without redoing the work. As later blocks are chained after it, the work to change the block
would include redoing all the blocks after it.
Block Block
Prev Hash Nonce Prev Hash Nonce
Tx Tx ... Tx Tx ...
The proof-of-work also solves the problem of determining representation in majority decision
making. If the majority were based on one-IP-address-one-vote, it could be subverted by anyone
able to allocate many IPs. Proof-of-work is essentially one-CPU-one-vote. The majority
decision is represented by the longest chain, which has the greatest proof-of-work effort invested
in it. If a majority of CPU power is controlled by honest nodes, the honest chain will grow the
fastest and outpace any competing chains. To modify a past block, an attacker would have to
redo the proof-of-work of the block and all blocks after it and then catch up with and surpass the
work of the honest nodes. We will show later that the probability of a slower attacker catching up
diminishes exponentially as subsequent blocks are added.
To compensate for increasing hardware speed and varying interest in running nodes over time,
the proof-of-work difficulty is determined by a moving average targeting an average number of
blocks per hour. If they're generated too fast, the difficulty increases.
5. Network
The steps to run the network are as follows:
1) New transactions are broadcast to all nodes.

2) Each node collects new transactions into a block.
3) Each node works on finding a difficult proof-of-work for its block.
4) When a node finds a proof-of-work, it broadcasts the block to all nodes.
5) Nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid and not already spent.
6) Nodes express their acceptance of the block by working on creating the next block in the
chain, using the hash of the accepted block as the previous hash.
Nodes always consider the longest chain to be the correct one and will keep working on
extending it. If two nodes broadcast different versions of the next block simultaneously, some
nodes may receive one or the other first. In that case, they work on the first one they received,
but save the other branch in case it becomes longer. The tie will be broken when the next proof-
of-work is found and one branch becomes longer; the nodes that were working on the other
branch will then switch to the longer one.
3
New transaction broadcasts do not necessarily need to reach all nodes. As long as they reach
many nodes, they will get into a block before long. Block broadcasts are also tolerant of dropped
messages. If a node does not receive a block, it will request it when it receives the next block and
realizes it missed one.
6. Incentive
By convention, the first transaction in a block is a special transaction that starts a new coin owned
by the creator of the block. This adds an incentive for nodes to support the network, and provides
a way to initially distribute coins into circulation, since there is no central authority to issue them.
The steady addition of a constant of amount of new coins is analogous to gold miners expending
resources to add gold to circulation. In our case, it is CPU time and electricity that is expended.
The incentive can also be funded with transaction fees. If the output value of a transaction is
less than its input value, the difference is a transaction fee that is added to the incentive value of
the block containing the transaction. Once a predetermined number of coins have entered
circulation, the incentive can transition entirely to transaction fees and be completely inflation
free.
The incentive may help encourage nodes to stay honest. If a greedy attacker is able to
assemble more CPU power than all the honest nodes, he would have to choose between using it
to defraud people by stealing back his payments, or using it to generate new coins. He ought to
find it more profitable to play by the rules, such rules that favour him with more new coins than
everyone else combined, than to undermine the system and the validity of his own wealth.
7. Reclaiming Disk Space

Once the latest transaction in a coin is buried under enough blocks, the spent transactions before
it can be discarded to save disk space. To facilitate this without breaking the block's hash,
transactions are hashed in a Merkle Tree [7][2][5], with only the root included in the block's hash.
Old blocks can then be compacted by stubbing off branches of the tree. The interior hashes do
not need to be stored.
Block Block
Block Header (Block Hash) Block Header (Block Hash)
Prev Hash Nonce Prev Hash Nonce
Root Hash Root Hash
Hash01 Hash23 Hash01 Hash23
Hash0 Hash1 Hash2 Hash3 Hash2 Hash3
Tx0 Tx1 Tx2 Tx3 Tx3
Transactions Hashed in a Merkle Tree After Pruning Tx0-2 from the Block
A block header with no transactions would be about 80 bytes. If we suppose blocks are
generated every 10 minutes, 80 bytes * 6 * 24 * 365 = 4.2MB per year. With computer systems
typically selling with 2GB of RAM as of 2008, and Moore's Law predicting current growth of
1.2GB per year, storage should not be a problem even if the block headers must be kept in
memory.
4
8. Simplified Payment Verification

It is possible to verify payments without running a full network node. A user only needs to keep
a copy of the block headers of the longest proof-of-work chain, which he can get by querying
network nodes until he's convinced he has the longest chain, and obtain the Merkle branch
linking the transaction to the block it's timestamped in. He can't check the transaction for
himself, but by linking it to a place in the chain, he can see that a network node has accepted it,
and blocks added after it further confirm the network has accepted it.
Longest Proof-of-Work Chain
Block Header Block Header Block Header
Prev Hash Nonce Prev Hash Nonce Prev Hash Nonce
Merkle Root Merkle Root Merkle Root
Hash01 Hash23
Merkle Branch for Tx3
Hash2 Hash3
Tx3
As such, the verification is reliable as long as honest nodes control the network, but is more
vulnerable if the network is overpowered by an attacker. While network nodes can verify
transactions for themselves, the simplified method can be fooled by an attacker's fabricated
transactions for as long as the attacker can continue to overpower the network. One strategy to
protect against this would be to accept alerts from network nodes when they detect an invalid
block, prompting the user's software to download the full block and alerted transactions to
confirm the inconsistency. Businesses that receive frequent payments will probably still want to
run their own nodes for more independent security and quicker verification.
9. Combining and Splitting Value

Although it would be possible to handle coins individually, it would be unwieldy to make a
separate transaction for every cent in a transfer. To allow value to be split and combined,
transactions contain multiple inputs and outputs. Normally there will be either a single input
from a larger previous transaction or multiple inputs combining smaller amounts, and at most two
outputs: one for the payment, and one returning the change, if any, back to the sender.
Transaction
In Out
In ...
...
It should be noted that fan-out, where a transaction depends on several transactions, and those
transactions depend on many more, is not a problem here. There is never the need to extract a
complete standalone copy of a transaction's history.
5
10. Privacy
The traditional banking model achieves a level of privacy by limiting access to information to the
parties involved and the trusted third party. The necessity to announce all transactions publicly
precludes this method, but privacy can still be maintained by breaking the flow of information in
another place: by keeping public keys anonymous. The public can see that someone is sending
an amount to someone else, but without information linking the transaction to anyone. This is
similar to the level of information released by stock exchanges, where the time and size of
individual trades, the "tape", is made public, but without telling who the parties were.
Traditional Privacy Model
Identities Transactions Trusted Counterparty Public

Third Party
New Privacy Model
Identities Transactions Public
As an additional firewall, a new key pair should be used for each transaction to keep them
from being linked to a common owner. Some linking is still unavoidable with multi-input
transactions, which necessarily reveal that their inputs were owned by the same owner. The risk
is that if the owner of a key is revealed, linking could reveal other transactions that belonged to
the same owner.
11. Calculations
We consider the scenario of an attacker trying to generate an alternate chain faster than the honest
chain. Even if this is accomplished, it does not throw the system open to arbitrary changes, such
as creating value out of thin air or taking money that never belonged to the attacker. Nodes are
not going to accept an invalid transaction as payment, and honest nodes will never accept a block
containing them. An attacker can only try to change one of his own transactions to take back
money he recently spent.
The race between the honest chain and an attacker chain can be characterized as a Binomial
Random Walk. The success event is the honest chain being extended by one block, increasing its
lead by +1, and the failure event is the attacker's chain being extended by one block, reducing the
gap by -1.
The probability of an attacker catching up from a given deficit is analogous to a Gambler's
Ruin problem. Suppose a gambler with unlimited credit starts at a deficit and plays potentially an
infinite number of trials to try to reach breakeven. We can calculate the probability he ever
reaches breakeven, or that an attacker ever catches up with the honest chain, as follows [8]:
p = probability an honest node finds the next block

q = probability the attacker finds the next block
qz = probability the attacker will ever catch up from z blocks behind
q z=
{ 1
z
if p≤q
q / p if pq }
6
Given our assumption that p > q, the probability drops exponentially as the number of blocks the
attacker has to catch up with increases. With the odds against him, if he doesn't make a lucky
lunge forward early on, his chances become vanishingly small as he falls further behind.
We now consider how long the recipient of a new transaction needs to wait before being
sufficiently certain the sender can't change the transaction. We assume the sender is an attacker
who wants to make the recipient believe he paid him for a while, then switch it to pay back to
himself after some time has passed. The receiver will be alerted when that happens, but the
sender hopes it will be too late.
The receiver generates a new key pair and gives the public key to the sender shortly before
signing. This prevents the sender from preparing a chain of blocks ahead of time by working on
it continuously until he is lucky enough to get far enough ahead, then executing the transaction at
that moment. Once the transaction is sent, the dishonest sender starts working in secret on a
parallel chain containing an alternate version of his transaction.
The recipient waits until the transaction has been added to a block and z blocks have been
linked after it. He doesn't know the exact amount of progress the attacker has made, but
assuming the honest blocks took the average expected time per block, the attacker's potential
progress will be a Poisson distribution with expected value:
q
=z
p
To get the probability the attacker could still catch up now, we multiply the Poisson density for
each amount of progress he could have made by the probability he could catch up from that point:
{ }
∞ k −  z−k 
∑  ke! ⋅ q / p1 if k ≤ z
if k  z
k =0
Rearranging to avoid summing the infinite tail of the distribution...

z
k e−
1−∑ 1−q / p z− k 
k =0 k!
Converting to C code...
#include <math.h>
double AttackerSuccessProbability(double q, int z)
{
double p = 1.0 - q;
double lambda = z * (q / p);
double sum = 1.0;
int i, k;
for (k = 0; k <= z; k++)
{
double poisson = exp(-lambda);
for (i = 1; i <= k; i++)
poisson *= lambda / i;
sum -= poisson * (1 - pow(q / p, z - k));
}
return sum;
}
7
Running some results, we can see the probability drop off exponentially with z.
q=0.1
z=0 P=1.0000000
z=1 P=0.2045873
z=2 P=0.0509779
z=3 P=0.0131722
z=4 P=0.0034552
z=5 P=0.0009137
z=6 P=0.0002428
z=7 P=0.0000647
z=8 P=0.0000173
z=9 P=0.0000046
z=10 P=0.0000012
q=0.3
z=0 P=1.0000000
z=5 P=0.1773523
z=10 P=0.0416605
z=15 P=0.0101008
z=20 P=0.0024804
z=25 P=0.0006132
z=30 P=0.0001522
z=35 P=0.0000379
z=40 P=0.0000095
z=45 P=0.0000024
z=50 P=0.0000006
Solving for P less than 0.1%...
P < 0.001
q=0.10 z=5
q=0.15 z=8
q=0.20 z=11
q=0.25 z=15
q=0.30 z=24
q=0.35 z=41
q=0.40 z=89
q=0.45 z=340
12. Conclusion
We have proposed a system for electronic transactions without relying on trust. We started with
the usual framework of coins made from digital signatures, which provides strong control of
ownership, but is incomplete without a way to prevent double-spending. To solve this, we
proposed a peer-to-peer network using proof-of-work to record a public history of transactions
that quickly becomes computationally impractical for an attacker to change if honest nodes
control a majority of CPU power. The network is robust in its unstructured simplicity. Nodes
work all at once with little coordination. They do not need to be identified, since messages are
not routed to any particular place and only need to be delivered on a best effort basis. Nodes can
leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the proof-of-work chain as proof of what
happened while they were gone. They vote with their CPU power, expressing their acceptance of
valid blocks by working on extending them and rejecting invalid blocks by refusing to work on
them. Any needed rules and incentives can be enforced with this consensus mechanism.
8
References
[1] W. Dai, "b-money," http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt, 1998.
[2] H. Massias, X.S. Avila, and J.-J. Quisquater, "Design of a secure timestamping service with minimal
trust requirements," In 20th Symposium on Information Theory in the Benelux, May 1999.
[3] S. Haber, W.S. Stornetta, "How to time-stamp a digital document," In Journal of Cryptology, vol 3, no
2, pages 99-111, 1991.
[4] D. Bayer, S. Haber, W.S. Stornetta, "Improving the efficiency and reliability of digital time-stamping,"
In Sequences II: Methods in Communication, Security and Computer Science, pages 329-334, 1993.
[5] S. Haber, W.S. Stornetta, "Secure names for bit-strings," In Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, pages 28-35, April 1997.
[6] A. Back, "Hashcash - a denial of service counter-measure,"
http://www.hashcash.org/papers/hashcash.pdf, 2002.
[7] R.C. Merkle, "Protocols for public key cryptosystems," In Proc. 1980 Symposium on Security and
Privacy, IEEE Computer Society, pages 122-133, April 1980.
[8] W. Feller, "An introduction to probability theory and its applications," 1957.
9
BITMAIN, INC., et al.







AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the
Southern District of Florida
UNITED AMERICAN CORP.
Plaintiff(s)
V. Civil Action No.
Defendant(s)
SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION
To: (Defendant's name and address) AMAURY SECHET

8 RUE NAPOLEON,49700
DOUE LA FONTAINE
FRANCE
A lawsuit has been filed against you.
Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) or 60 days if you
are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney,
whose name and address are: Brian P. Miller
Michael 0. Mena
AKERMAN LLP
Three Brickell City Centre
98 Southeast Seventh Street, Suite 1100
Miami, FL 33131
If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.
You also must file your answer or motion with the court.
CLERK OF COURT
Date:
Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk
AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action (Page 2)
Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE
(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (1))
This summons for (name of individual and title, if any)

was received by me on (date)
CI I personally served the summons on the individual at (place)

on (date) ; or
O I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with (name)
, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,
on (date) , and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or
E I served the summons on (name of individual) , who is
designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization)

on (date) ; or
n I returned the summons unexecuted because ; or
❑ Other (specify):
My fees are $ for travel and $ for services, for a total of $ 0.00
I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.
Date:
Server's signature
Printed name and title
Server's address
Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:




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Case 1:18-cv-25106-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/06/2018 Page 1 of 27

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

UNITED AMERICAN CORP., a Florida

BITMAIN, INC., SAINT BITTS LLC d/b/a

Plaintiff United American Corp. (“Plaintiff” or “UAC”), by and through undersigned

NATURE OF THE ACTION

2. This well-planned scheme caused a global capitalization meltdown of more than

3. In addition to the significant damages incurred by all stakeholders in Bitcoin Cash

4. The market manipulation is centralizing what is intended to be a decentralized

Bitcoin Cash network.

detriment of the Plaintiff and the other stakeholders.

Delaware with its principal place of business in San Jose, California.

8. Defendant Saint Bitts LLC d/b/a Bitcoin.com is a limited liability company

business in Tokyo, Japan.

9. Defendant Roger Ver is an individual domiciled, upon information and belief, in

Tokyo, Japan and is sui juris.

10. Defendant Bitmain Technologies Ltd. is a limited company organized and

11. Defendant Bitmain Technologies Holding Company is a corporation registered in

the Cayman Islands.

“Kraken” and operates the Bitcoin exchange Kraken.com.

Francisco, California, and is sui juris.

15. Defendant Amaury Sechet is an individual domiciled in Doue la Fontaine, France

and is sui juris.

16. Defendant Shammah Chancellor is an individual domiciled in San Francisco,

California and is sui juris.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

exclusive of interest and costs.

benefits and privileges of conducting business in this jurisdiction.

22. Cryptocurrency is a form of digital currency that uses cryptography to secure

cryptocurrency include Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, and Ethereum.

trades in currency markets.

24. New cryptocurrency is created through a process known as “mining.” People

with new cryptocurrency.

computing device that solved the puzzle.

The Genesis of Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash

Whitepaper is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

“blockchain” in a highly cryptographic environment. Whereas centralized ledgers are highly

same cryptographic environment to engage in any sort of tampering.

29. The strength of Bitcoin Cash as a digital currency lies in it being a

which miner will solve a given problem.

period of time. As such, as difficulty increases, so does the cost of mining.

which they lack confidence and trust.

United American Corp.

blockchain and blockchain technologies. This was to be a multi-phased approach that

transactions and at the mining level for the mining of cryptocurrencies.

deployment solution for operation of cryptocurrency mining – the BlockchainDome. The

BlockchainDome is a passive “cooling ground-coupled heat-exchanger” technology that uses

the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.

38. Plaintiff’s construction of the first BlockchainDome commenced in March 2018

Plaintiff’s total investment in development and deployment of this infrastructure exceeds $4

as to eliminate competition and ultimately result in market control and centralization.

The Bitcoin Cash Upgrade

same rules set.

continue the chain.

be forced to create a new and distinct chain.

manipulated by Defendants in an effort to artificially take control of the network blockchain

The Scheme and the Players

Cash ABC 0.18.4 software chain implementation.

48. Understanding the Defendants’ scheme requires understanding the players

involved as they are not legally affiliated.