Loadmasters V Glodel
Loadmasters V Glodel
Loadmasters V Glodel
179446
SERVICES, INC.,
Petitioner, Present:
GLODEL BROKERAGE
CORPORATION and
R&B INSURANCE Promulgated:
CORPORATION,
Respondents. January 10, 2011
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DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court assailing the August 24, 2007 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 82822, entitled R&B Insurance Corporation v. Glodel Brokerage
Corporation and Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc., which held petitioner
Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. (Loadmasters) liable to respondent Glodel
Brokerage Corporation (Glodel) in the amount of P1,896,789.62 representing the
insurance indemnity which R&B Insurance Corporation (R&B Insurance) paid to
the insured-consignee, Columbia Wire and Cable Corporation (Columbia).
THE FACTS:
On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-00105/2001 in
favor of Columbia to insure the shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes
against All Risks. On August 28, 2001, the cargoes were shipped on board the vessel
Richard Rey from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila. They arrived on
the same date.
Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of
the cargoes from the pier and the subsequent delivery to its
warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for the use
of its delivery trucks to transport the cargoes to Columbias warehouses/plants in
Bulacan and Valenzuela City.
The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by Loadmasters,
driven by its employed drivers and accompanied by its employed truck helpers. Six
(6) truckloads of copper cathodes were to be delivered to Balagtas, Bulacan, while
the other six (6) truckloads were destined for Lawang Bato, Valenzuela City. The
cargoes in six truckloads for Lawang Bato were duly delivered in Columbias
warehouses there. Of the six (6) trucks en route to Balagtas, Bulacan, however, only
five (5) reached the destination. One (1) truck, loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces
of copper cathodes, failed to deliver its cargo.
Later on, the said truck, an Isuzu with Plate No. NSD-117, was recovered but without
the copper cathodes. Because of this incident, Columbia filed with R&B Insurance
a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount of P1,903,335.39. After the requisite
investigation and adjustment, R&B Insurance paid Columbia the amount
of P1,896,789.62 as insurance indemnity.
On August 24, 2007, the CA rendered the assailed decision which reads in
part:
Considering that appellee is an agent of appellant Glodel,
whatever liability the latter owes to appellant R&B Insurance
Corporation as insurance indemnity must likewise be the amount
it shall be paid by appellee Loadmasters.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Hence, Loadmasters filed the present petition for review on certiorari before
this Court presenting the following
ISSUES
2. Under the set of facts established and undisputed in the case, can
petitioner Loadmasters be legally considered as an Agent of
respondent Glodel?[6]
To totally exculpate itself from responsibility for the lost goods, Loadmasters
argues that it cannot be considered an agent of Glodel because it never represented
the latter in its dealings with the consignee. At any rate, it further contends that
Glodel has no recourse against it for its (Glodels) failure to file a cross-claim
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Glodel, in its Comment,[7] counters that Loadmasters is liable to it under its cross-
claim because the latter was grossly negligent in the transportation of the subject
cargo. With respect to Loadmasters claim that it is already estopped from filing a
cross-claim, Glodel insists that it can still do so even for the first time on appeal
because there is no rule that provides otherwise. Finally, Glodel argues that its
relationship with Loadmasters is that of Charter wherein the transporter
(Loadmasters) is only hired for the specific job of delivering the merchandise. Thus,
the diligence required in this case is merely ordinary diligence or that of a good
father of the family, not the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers.
R&B Insurance, for its part, claims that Glodel is deemed to have interposed a cross-
claim against Loadmasters because it was not prevented from presenting evidence
to prove its position even without amending its Answer. As to the relationship
between Loadmasters and Glodel, it contends that a contract of agency existed
between the two corporations.[8]
As subrogee of the rights and interest of the consignee, R&B Insurance has
the right to seek reimbursement from either Loadmasters or Glodel or both for breach
of contract and/or tort.
The issue now is who, between Glodel and Loadmasters, is liable to pay R&B
Insurance for the amount of the indemnity it paid Columbia.
At the outset, it is well to resolve the issue of whether Loadmasters and Glodel are
common carriers to determine their liability for the loss of the subject cargo. Under
Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are persons, corporations, firms, or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passenger or goods,
or both by land, water or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.
Based on the aforecited definition, Loadmasters is a common carrier because
it is engaged in the business of transporting goods by land, through its trucking
service. It is a common carrier as distinguished from a private carrier wherein
the carriage is generally undertaken by special agreement and it does not hold itself
out to carry goods for the general public.[10] The distinction is significant in the sense
that the rights and obligations of the parties to a contract of private carriage are
governed principally by their stipulations, not by the law on common carriers.[11]
In the present case, there is no indication that the undertaking in the contract
between Loadmasters and Glodel was private in character. There is no showing that
Loadmasters solely and exclusively rendered services to Glodel.
In the same vein, Glodel is also considered a common carrier within the
context of Article 1732. In its Memorandum,[13] it states that it is a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and is
engaged in the business of customs brokering. It cannot be considered otherwise
because as held by this Court in Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation v.
Transport Venture, Inc.,[14] a customs broker is also regarded as a common carrier,
the transportation of goods being an integral part of its business.
Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the
nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them according to all the
circumstances of such case, as required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code. When the
Court speaks of extraordinary diligence, it is that extreme measure of care and
caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection observe for securing
and preserving their own property or rights.[15] This exacting standard imposed on
common carriers in a contract of carriage of goods is intended to tilt the scales in
favor of the shipper who is at the mercy of the common carrier once the goods have
been lodged for shipment.[16] Thus, in case of loss of the goods, the common carrier
is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. [17] This presumption
of fault or negligence, however, may be rebutted by proof that the common carrier
has observed extraordinary diligence over the goods.
With respect to the time frame of this extraordinary responsibility, the Civil
Code provides that the exercise of extraordinary diligence lasts from the time the
goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier
for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the
carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them.[18]
Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and
Glodel are jointly and severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject
cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, the responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
Loadmasters claim that it was never privy to the contract entered into by
Glodel with the consignee Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid
defense. It may not have a direct contractual relation with Columbia, but it is liable
for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts which
expressly provide:
xxxx
It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of
Loadmasters whose employees (truck driver and helper) were instrumental in the
hijacking or robbery of the shipment. As employer, Loadmasters should be made
answerable for the damages caused by its employees who acted within the scope of
their assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the warehouse.
The Court now resolves the issue of whether Glodel can collect from
Loadmasters, it having failed to file a cross-claim against the latter.
Undoubtedly, Glodel has a definite cause of action against Loadmasters for
breach of contract of service as the latter is primarily liable for the loss of the subject
cargo. In this case, however, it cannot succeed in seeking judicial sanction against
Loadmasters because the records disclose that it did not properly interpose a cross-
claim against the latter. Glodel did not even pray that Loadmasters be liable for any
and all claims that it may be adjudged liable in favor of R&B Insurance. Under the
Rules, a compulsory counterclaim, or a cross-claim, not set up shall be
barred.[25] Thus, a cross-claim cannot be set up for the first time on appeal.
For the consequence, Glodel has no one to blame but itself. The Court cannot
come to its aid on equitable grounds. Equity, which has been aptly described as a
justice outside legality, is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory
law or judicial rules of procedure.[26] The Court cannot be a lawyer and take the
cudgels for a party who has been at fault or negligent.