Dailisan vs CA

Same; Property; CoOwnership;

The regime of coownership
exists when ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to
different persons.—Petitioner’s action before the trial court was
properly captioned as one for partition because there are
sufficient allegations in the complaint that he is a coowner
of the
property. The regime of coownership
exists when ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. By the
nature of a coownership,
a coowner
cannot point to a specific
portion of the property owned in common as his own because his
share therein remains intangible.
Sanchez vs CA
Civil Law; Coownership;
Definition.—Sanchez Roman
defines coownership
as “the right of common dominion which two
or more persons have in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially
or physically divided.” Manresa defines it as the “manifestation of
the private right of ownership, which instead of being exercised by
the owner in an exclusive manner over the things subject to it, is
exercised by two or more owners and the undivided thing or right
to which it refers is one and the same.”
Same; Same; Characteristics; Coownership
has the following
characteristics.—The characteristics of coownership
are: (a)
plurality of subjects, who are the coowners,
(b) unity of or
material indivision, which means that there is a single object
which is not materially divided, and which is the element which
binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which
determines the rights and obligations of the coowners.
Same; Same; Nature; In coownership,
the relationship of such
coowner
to the other coowners
is fiduciary in character and
attribute.—In coownership,
the relationship of such coowner
to
the other coowners
is fiduciary in character and attribute.
Whether established by law or by agreement of the coowners,
the
property or thing held proindiviso
is impressed with a fiducial
nature so that each coowner
becomes a trustee for the benefit of
his coowners
and he may not do any act prejudicial to the
interest of his coowners.
Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to
preserve the properties in coownership
is to create an express
trust among the heirs as coowners
of the properties. Coownership
is a form of trust and every coowner
is a trustee for
the others.
Same; Same; Coowners;
Rights; He may validly lease his
undivided interest to a third party independently of the other coowners.—
Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an
undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell and
dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly lease his
undivided interest to a third party independently of the other coowners.
But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific
or determinate part of the thing owned in common because his
right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion
without any physical adjudication.
Panganiban vs Oamil
CoOwnership;
During the existence of the coownership,
no
individual can claim title to any definite portion of the community
property until the partition thereof, and, prior to the partition, all
that the coowner
has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the entire land or thing.—Under a coownership,
the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs
to different persons. During the existence of the coownership,
no
individual can claim title to any definite portion of the community
property until the partition thereof; and prior to the partition, all
that the coowner
has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the entire land or thing. Before partition in
a coownership,
every coowner
has the absolute ownership of his
undivided interest in the common property. The coowner
is free
to alienate, assign or mortgage this undivided interest, except as
to purely personal rights. The effect of any such transfer is limited
to the portion which may be awarded to him upon the partition of
the property.
Civil Law; CoOwnership;
Under Article 497 of the Civil Code,
in the event of a division or partition of property owned in
common, assignees of one or more of the coowners
may take part
in the division of the thing owned in common and object to its
being effected without their concurrence.—Under Article 497 of the
Civil Code, in the event of a division or partition of property owned in common,
assignees of one or more of the coowners
may take part in the
division of the thing owned in common and object to its being
effected without their concurrence. But they cannot impugn any
partition already executed, unless there has been fraud, or in case
it was made notwithstanding a formal opposition presented to
prevent it, without prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor
to maintain its validity.
Same; Sales; In a contract of sale of coowned
property, what
the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as
the vendor had as coowner,
and the vendee merely steps into the
shoes of the vendor as coowner.—
The decision in Special Civil
Action No. 340086,
which is an action for judicial partition of the
subject property, determines what Partenio, and ultimately,
respondent, as his successorininterest,
is entitled to in Civil
Case No. 140093.
As Partenio’s successorininterest
to the
property, respondent could not acquire any superior right in the
property than what Partenio is entitled to or could transfer or
alienate after partition. In a contract of sale of coowned
property,
what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same
rights as the vendor had as coowner,
and the vendee merely steps
into the shoes of the vendor as coowner.
Same; Partition; Jurisdictions; A court trying an ordinary
civil suit has no jurisdiction to act as a partition court—trial
courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts
pertaining to a special proceeding because the latter are subject to
specific prescribed rules.—The court in Civil Case No. 140093
is
not a partition court but one litigating an ordinary civil case, and
all evidence of alleged acts of ownership by one coowner
should
have been presented in the partition case, there to be threshed
out in order that the partition court may arrive at a just division
of the property owned in common; it is not for the trial court in
the specific performance case to properly appreciate. Being a court
trying an ordinary civil suit, the court in Civil Case No. 140093
had no jurisdiction to act as a partition court. Trial courts trying
an ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a
special proceeding because it is subject to specific prescribed
rules.
Vda de Cabrera vs CA
Land Registration; Land Titles; Ownership: Registration does
not vest title—it is merely evidence of such title over a particular
property.—As can be discerned from the established facts, the
Certificates of Title of the vendees Orais are, to say the least,
irregular, and were issued in a calculated move to deprive
Felicidad Teokemian of her dominical rights over the property
reserved to her by descent. Plaintiff could not have registered the
part reserved to Felicidad Teokemian, as this was not among
those ceded in the Deed of Sale between Daniel/Albertana
Teokemian and Andres Orais. It must be remembered that
registration does not vest title, it is merely evidence of such title
over a particular property. (Embrado vs. Court of Appeals, 233
SCRA 335)
Same; Same; The defense of indefeasibility of the Torrens Title
does not extend to a transferee who takes the certificate of title with
notice of a flaw in his title.—The defense of indefeasibility of the
Torrens Title does not extend to a transferee who takes the
certificate of title with notice of a flaw in his title. (Añonuevo vs.
Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 28) The principle of indefeasibility of title is
unavailing where there was fraud that attended the issuance of
the free patents and titles. (Meneses vs. Court of Appeals, 246
SCRA 162)
Same; Same; Trusts; Prescription; Actions; An action for
reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive
trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of
registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate
of title over the property, but this rule applies only when the
plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the
property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in
actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance,
which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe.—Be that as it may, that the right of the defendants for
reconveyance of the subject property arising from an implied trust
under Article 1456 of the Civil Code is material to the instant
case, such remedy has not yet lapsed, as erroneously submitted by
the plaintiff, and, is thus, a bar to the plaintiff’s action. In the
case of Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. Court of Appeals, we observed that
an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference
being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the
issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule
applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is
not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be
the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the
defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek reconveyance,
which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual
possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may
wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before
taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being,
that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to
seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the
nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his
own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in
possession.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites before the period of
prescription may start in regard to an action based on implied
trust.—As it is, before the period of prescription may start, it must
be shown that: (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust, (b)
such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust, and,
(c) the evidence thereon is clear and positive.
Same; Same; Laches; Ownership; Possession; Where the action
for reconveyance (quieting of title) was instituted only after thirty
years from the time a party was able to acquire a Certificate of
Title covering a particular property, while the occupant has been
in active possession of the same, this surely constitutes such
tardiness on the part of the former constituting the basis for
laches.—On the other hand, the action for reconveyance (quieting
of title) of the plaintiff was instituted only in 1988, that is, thirty
years from the time the plaintiffs husband was able to acquire
Certificate of Title covering the properties inherited by the
Teokemians, and apparently including that portion belonging to
Felicidad Teokemian. In the meantime, defendant Felicidad vda.
De Cabrera and her late husband have been actively in possession
of the same, tilling it, and constructing an irrigation system
thereon. This must surely constitute such tardiness on the part of
the plaintiff constituting the basis for laches.
Same; Same; CoOwnership;
Possession; When there has been
a partial partition, as where the transferees of an undivided
portion of the land allowed a coowner
of the property to occupy a
definite portion thereof and had not disturbed the same, for a
period too long to be ignored, the possessor is in a better condition
or right.—In Go Ong vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that
the heirs, as coowners,
owners, shall each have the full
ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining to it.
An heir may, therefore, alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when the
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
mortgage, with respect to the coowners,
shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the coownership,
Undisputed is the fact that since
the sale of the twothird
portion of the subject property to the
plaintiff, the latter had allowed Felicidad Teokemian to occupy
that onethird
portion allotted to her. There has, therefore, been a
partial partition, where the transferees of an undivided portion of
the land allowed a coowner
of the property to occupy a definite
portion thereof and has not disturbed the same, for a period too
long to be ignored—the possessor is in a better condition or right
(Potior est conditio possidentis).
Torres vs Lapinid
Civil Law; CoOwnership;
A coowner
has an absolute
ownership of his undivided and pro indiviso share in the coowned
property.—A coowner
has an absolute ownership of his undivided
and pro indiviso share in the coowned
property. He has the right
to alienate, assign and mortgage it, even to the extent of
substituting a third person in its enjoyment provided that no
personal rights will be affected. This is evident from the provision
of the Civil Code: Art. 493. Each coowner
shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the coowners,
shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the coownership.
A coowner
is an owner of the
whole and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he
is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract.
Hence, his coowners
have no right to enjoin a coowner
who
intends to alienate or substitute his abstract portion or substitute
a third person in its enjoyment.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) had repeatedly held
that no individual can claim title to a definite or concrete portion
before partition of coowned
property.—In a catena of decisions,
the Supreme Court had repeatedly held that no individual can
claim title to a definite or concrete portion before partition of coowned
property. Each coowner
only possesses a right to sell or
alienate his ideal share after partition. However, in case he
disposes his share before partition, such disposition does not
make the sale or alienation null and void. What will be affected on
the sale is only his proportionate share, subject to the results of the partition. The coowners
who did not give their consent to the sale stand to be unaffected
by the alienation.
Same; Same; Even if a coowner
sells the whole property as
his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other
coowners
who did not consent to the sale.—This Court has ruled
in many cases that even if a coowner
sells the whole property as
his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the
other coowners
who did not consent to the sale. This is because
the sale or other disposition of a coowner
affects only his
undivided share and the transferee gets only what would
correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in
common.
De Guia vs CA
Civil Law; Property; Coownership;
A coowner
of an
undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole, and over the
whole he exercises the right of dominion but he is at the same time
the owner of a portion which is truly abstract; There is no coownership
when the different portions owned by different people
are already concretely determined and separately identifiable even
if not yet technically described.—Under Article 484 of the Civil
Code, “there is coownership
whenever the ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.” A coowner
of an undivided parcel of land is an “owner of the whole, and over
the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same
time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract.” On the other
hand, there is no coownership
when the different portions owned by different people are already
concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet
technically described. Same; Same; Same; Any coowner
may file an action under
Article 487 not only against a third person but also against
another coowner
who takes exclusive possession and asserts
exclusive ownership of the property.—Any coowner
may file an
action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also
against another coowner
who takes exclusive possession and
asserts exclusive ownership of the property. In the latter case,
however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of
the coownership.
The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the
defendant from the property because as coowner
he has a right of
possession. The plaintiff cannot recover any material or
determinate part of the property.
Same; Same; Same; Each coowner
may demand at any time
the partition of the common property unless a coowner
has
repudiated the coownership
under certain conditions.—Since a coownership
subsists between ABEJO and DE GUIA, judicial or
extrajudicial partition is the proper recourse. An action to demand
partition is imprescriptible and not subject to laches. Each coowner
may demand at any time the partition of the common
property unless a coowner
has repudiated the coownership
under certain conditions. Neither ABEJO nor DE GUIA has
repudiated the coownership
under the conditions set by law.
Aguilar vs CA
Civil Law; Property; Coownership;
No coowner
shall be
obliged to remain in the coownership
and that each coowner
may
demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common
insofar as his share is concerned.—Article 494 of the Civil Code
provides that no coowner
shall be obliged to remain in the coownership,
and that each coowner
may demand at any time
partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is
concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that
whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the coowners
cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall
indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly
distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the right to partition the
property is invoked by any of the coowners
but because of the
nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision
would prejudice the interests of the coowners,
and (b) the coowners
are not in agree ment as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the
entire property upon proper reimbursement of the coowners.
In
one case, this Court upheld the order of the trial court directing
the holding of a public sale of the properties owned in common
pursuant to Art. 498 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Each coowner
of property held pro
indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use
and enjoy the same with no other limitations than that he shall not
injure the interests of his coowners.—
However, being a coowner
respondent has the right to use the house and lot without paying
any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property owned
in common so long as it is in accordance with the purpose for
which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest
of the other coowners.
Each coowner
of property held pro
indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use
and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not
injure the interests of his coowners,
the reason being that until a
division is made, the respective share of each cannot be
determined and every coowner
exercises, together with his coparticipants
joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in
addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
Same; Same; Same; Coownership
deemed terminated and the
right to enjoy possession jointly also ceased upon filing and the
granting of action to compel the sale of the property and the
ejectment of respondent.—When petitioner filed an action to
compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the
petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the coownership
was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the
possession jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the continued stay of
respondent and his family in the house prejudiced the interest of
petitioner as the property should have been sold and the proceeds
divided equally between them. To this extent and from then on,
respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals until he and
his family vacate.
Sering vs Plazo
Civil Law; Coownership;
Anyone of the coowners
of an
immovable may bring an action in ejectment.—The application of
settled principles is all that is needed to resolve the instant
appeal. Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that anyone of the
coowners
of an immovable may bring an action in ejectment. A
coowner
may thus bring an ejectment action without joining the
other coowners,
the suit being deemed instituted for the benefit
of all. And the term, “action in ejectment,” includes a suit of
forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio).
Adlawan vs Adlawan
Actions; Parties; Ejectment; CoOwnership;
A coowner
may
bring such actions for recovery of possession without the necessity
of joining all of the other coowners
as coplaintiffs
because the suit
is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of his coowners;
However, if the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who
claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the
litigated property, the action should be dismissed.—Petitioner
contends that even granting that he has coowners
over Lot 7226,
he can on his own file the instant case pursuant to Article 487 of
the Civil Code which provides: ART. 487. Any one of the coowners
may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers all
kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487
includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal),
recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of
ownership (accion de reivindicacion). A coowner
may bring such
an action without the necessity of joining all the other coowners
as coplaintiffs
because the suit is presumed to have been filed to
benefit his coowners.
It should be stressed, however, that where
the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be
the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated
property, the action should be dismissed. The renowned civilist,
Professor Arturo M. Tolentino, explained—. . . A coowner
may
bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other
coowners
as coplaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit
of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for
himself and not for the coownership, the action will not
prosper.
Plasabas vs CA
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action for
ejectment. The article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including
1avv phi1.zw+

an accion publiciana and a reivindicatory action. A co-owner may file suit without necessarily
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the
benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff will benefit the other co-owners,
but if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-
owners.

With this disquisition, there is no need to determine whether petitioners’ complaint is one for
ejectment or for recovery of title. To repeat, Article 487 of the Civil Code applies to both actions.

Thus, petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead their co-owners as parties. The only
exception to this rule is when the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be
the sole owner and is, thus, entitled to the possession thereof. In such a case, the action will not
prosper unless the plaintiff impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.

Cruz vs Catapang