Theft 1. Viray-v.-PP
Theft 1. Viray-v.-PP
Theft 1. Viray-v.-PP
FACTS:
Private complainant ZENAIDA VEDUA y SOSA maintains 75 dogs at her compound in Caridad, Cavity City. To
assist her in feeding the dogs and cleaning their cages, private complainant employed the accused, Ryan Viray,
who would report for work from 6:00 am to 5:30 pm.
On October 19, 2006, Vedua, before leaving for Batangas, locked the doors of her house, and left Viray to
attend to her dogs.
Later, Vedua arrived home, entering through the back door of her house. As she was about to remove her
earrings, she noticed that her other earrings worth 25k were missing. She then searched for the missing
earrings but could not find them.
She also discovered that her jacket, jewelry, a Gameboy, a compact disc player, a Nokia phone and a Nike Air
cap were likewise missing.
The total value of the missing items supposedly amounted to P297, 800.00.
Witnesses:
Nimfa Sarad, the laundrywoman of Vedua’s neighbour: testified seeing Viray at Veduas house at 6:00
am by 11:00 am. She went out on an errand and saw Viray with an unidentified male companion leaving
Veduas house with a big sack.
Leon Young, who prepares official/business letters for Vedua: testified that he went to Veduas house
between 10-11 am of October 19, 2006 to retrieve a diskette and saw petitioner with a male companion
descending the stairs of Vedua’s house. He alleged that since he knew Viray as an employee of Vedua,
he simply asked where Vidua was. When he was told that Vedua was in Batangas, he left and went
back 3 days after, only to be told about the robbery.
Prosecution Witness:
Beverly Calagos, Vedua stay-out laundrywoman: testified that on October 19, 2016, she reported for
work at 5:00 am. Her employer left for Batangas at 7:00 am leaving her and the petitioner Viray to go
about their chores. She went home around 8:30 am leaving petitioner alone in Vidua’s house.
Meanwhile, petitioner never reported for work after the day.
For his defense, Viray averred that he did not report for work on the alleged date of the incident as he was
then down with the flu. Petitioner’s sister and aunt corroborated his version.
RTC RULING:
The offense charged should have been robbery and not qualified theft as there was an actual breaking
of the screen door and the main door to gain entry to the house (force upon things), and that he was
not a domestic servant but more of a labourer paid on a daily basis for feeding the dogs of the
complainant.
The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ROBBERY and sentenced him, thus.
CA RULING:
The instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The RTC decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
accused be convicted for the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT.
The CA found that the information filed against Viray shows that the prosecution failed to allege one
of the essential elements of the crime robbery, which is the use of force upon things. Thus, to convict
him of robbery, a crime not necessarily include in a case of qualified theft, would violate the
constitutional mandate that an accused must be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
The CA still held that a conviction of the accused for qualified theft is warranted considering that Viray
enjoyed Vedua’s confidence (abuse of confidence), being the caretaker of the latter’s pets.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should be held guilty of simple theft.
SC RULING:
Yes. The petitioner should be held guilty of simple theft.
Article 308 in relation to Article 310 of the RPC describes the felony of qualified theft:
Article 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but
without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of
another without the latter’s consent.
Article 310. Qualified Theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or
with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists
of coconuts taken from the premises of the planation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or property is
taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance.
In this case, the crime charged is theft qualified by grave abuse of confidence. In this mode of qualified
theft, the SC has stated that the following elements must be satisfied before the accused may be convicted of
the crime charged:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against person, nor force upon
things; and
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
As pointed out by both RTC and the CA, the prosecution had proved the existence of the first 4
elements enumerated above beyond reasonable doubt. The fifth and sixth elements, however, the RTC and
the CA diverge in their respective decisions.
This Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the taking committed by petitioner cannot be qualified
by the breaking of the door, as it was not alleged in the information. However, we disagree from its finding
that the same breaking of the door constitutes the qualifying element of grave abuse of confidence to
sentence petitioner Viray to suffer the penalty for qualified theft. Instead, we are one with the RTC that private
complainant did not repose on Viray confidence that the latter could have abused to commit qualified theft.
The very fact that the petitioner forced open the main door and screen because he was denied access
to private complainant’s house negates the presence of such confidence in him by private complainant. In
other words, where the accused had never been vested physical access to or material possession of, the stole
goods, it may not be said that he or she exploited such access or material possession thereby committing such
grave abuse of confidence in taking the property. Thus, in People v. Maglaya:
“...this Court refuse to impose the penalty prescribed for qualified theft when the accused was not given
material possession or access to the property.”
Without the circumstances of a grave abuse of confidence and considering that the use of force upon
things in breaking the door was not alleged in the information, petitioner can only be held accountable fof the
crime of SIMPLE THEFT under Art. 308 to Art. 309 of the RPC.