Stronghold Insurance V Republic Asahi

CONTRIBUTOR: Kimberly Q.
Arizala
CASE: (M) STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS
CORPORATION, Respondent. G.R. No. 147561, June 22, 2006
PRINCIPLE: Death of a Party; As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not
extinguish the obligation—obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is
prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation.
FACTS: Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation (Asahi) entered into a contract with Jose D. Santos, Jr., the
proprietor of JDS Construction (JDS), for the construction of roadways and a drainage system in Asahi’s
compound in Pasig City. Asahi was to pay JDS P5,300,000.00 for the construction, which was supposed to
be completed by JDS within 240 days.
To guarantee the faithful and satisfactory performance of its undertakings, JDS shall post a performance
bond of P795,000. JDS executed solidarily with Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. (Stronghold) the
Performance Bond.
During the construction, Asahi called the attention of JDS to the alarmingly slow pace of the construction,
which resulted in the fear that the construction will not be finished within the stipulated 240-day period.
However, said reminders went unheeded by JDS.
Dissatisfied with the progress of the work undertaken by JDS, Asahi extrajudicially rescinded the contract.
Because of the rescission, Asahi had to hire another contractor to finish the project, incurring an additional
P3,256,874.00.
Asahi then sent a letter to SICI filing its claim under the performance bond, but the letter went unheeded.
Asahi eventually filed a complaint against JDS and Stronghold for damages. However, Jose D. Santos, Jr.
had already died and JDS Construction was no longer at its registered address, with its whereabouts
unknown.
In its defense, On July 10, 1991, Stronghold filed its answer alleging that Asahi could not claim damages
because their obligation had been extinguished by the death of Santos. Even if this was not the case, SICI
had been released from its liability under the performance bond because there were no liquidation with
the active participation of the surety and Santos. Since SICI was not informed of the extrajudicial unilateral
rescission of Asahi, SICI was deprived of the right to protect its interest as a surety and therefore shall be
released from liability.
ISSUE: Whether or not Stronghold’s liability under the performance bond was automatically extinguished
by the death of Santos, the principal?
RULING: No.
Petitioner contends that the death of Santos, the bond principal, extinguished his liability under the surety
bond. Consequently, it says, it is automatically released from any liability under the bond.
As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation.
Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law, the
stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations that are personal or are
identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death.
Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising from a
contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually
extinguished. What is extinguished is only the obligee's action or suit filed before the court, which is not
then acting as a probate court.
In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts with
respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law. Hence, his
death did not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to
his estate. Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under the
performance bond. Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot use his death to escape its monetary
obligation under its performance bond.
"Art. 1216. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which may
subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully collected."
the Court in Garcia v. Court of Appeals stated thus:
"x x x. The surety's obligation is not an original and direct one for the performance of his own act, but
merely accessory or collateral to the obligation contracted by the principal. Nevertheless, although the
contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to a valid principal obligation, his liability to the creditor
or promisee of the principal is said to be direct, primary and absolute; in other words, he is directly and
equally bound with the principal. x x x."
Under the law and jurisprudence, respondent may sue, separately or together, the principal debtor and
the petitioner herein, in view of the solidary nature of their liability. The death of the principal debtor will
not work to convert, decrease or nullify the substantive right of the solidary creditor. Evidently, despite
the death of the principal debtor, respondent may still sue petitioner alone, in accordance with the
solidary nature of the latter's liability under the performance bond.
BAR QUESTION:
Asahi Corporation entered into a contract with Jose Santos, the proprietor of J Construction, for the
construction of roadways and a drainage system in Asahi’s compound in Pasig City. Asahi was to pay J
Corp P5,300,000.00 for the construction, to be completed by J Corp within 240 days. To guarantee the
faithful performance of its undertakings, J Corp shall post a performance bond of P795,000 which was
executed solidarily with Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. (Stronghold) the Performance Bond. However, due
to the slow pace of the construction and dissatisfaction with the progress of the work made by J Corp,
Asahi extrajudicially rescinded the contract. Asahi then sent a letter to Stronghold filing its claim under
the performance bond, but the letter went unheeded. Asahi eventually filed a complaint against J Corp
and Stronghold for damages. However, Jose Santos had already died and J corp was no longer at its
registered address, with its whereabouts unknown.
In its defense Stronghold filed its answer alleging that Asahi could not claim damages because their
obligation had been extinguished by the death of Santos. Is Stronghold’s contention correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO. As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation.
Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law, the
stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations that are personal or are
identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death.
In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts with
respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law. Hence, his
death did not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to
his estate. Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under the
performance bond. Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot use his death to escape its monetary
obligation under its performance bond

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CONTRIBUTOR: Kimberly Q.

the Court in Garcia v. Court of Appeals stated thus:

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