First Division: Decision Decision
First Division: Decision Decision
First Division: Decision Decision
DECISION
BERSAMIN , J : p
The dismissal of an employee for a just or authorized cause is valid despite the
employer's non-observance of the due process of law the Labor Code has guaranteed to
the employee. The dismissal is effective against the employee subject to the payment by
the employer of an indemnity.
Under review on certiorari is the July 23, 2004 Decision promulgated in C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 81798 entitled Maria Lourdes C. De Jesus v. Hon. Raul T. Aquino, Presiding
Commissioner, NLRC, Second Division, Quezon City, and Supersonic Services, Inc. , 1
whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) a rmed the validity of the dismissal from her
employment of Maria Lourdes C. De Jesus (petitioner in G.R. No. 164622), but directed her
employer, Supersonic Services, Inc. (Supersonic), to pay her full backwages from the time
her employment was terminated until the nality of the decision because of the failure of
Supersonic to comply with the two-written notice rule, citing the ruling in Serrano v.
National Labor Relations Commission. 2
Antecedents
The antecedent facts, as summarized by the CA, follow:
On February 20, 2002, petitioner Ma. Lourdes De Jesus (De Jesus for
brevity) led with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal against
private respondents Supersonic Services, Inc., (Supersonic for brevity), Pakistan
Airlines, Gil Puyat, Jr. and Divina Abad Santos praying for the payment of
separation pay, full backwages, moral and exemplary damages, etc. DCAHcT
After due proceedings, on October 30, 2002, the Labor Arbiter ruled against De
Jesus, 4 declaring her dismissal to be for just cause and nding that she had been
accorded due process of law.
SO ORDERED.
The NLRC denied the Motion for Reconsideration led by De Jesus on October 30,
2003. 6
De Jesus brought a petition for certiorari to the CA, charging the NLRC with
committing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in nding
that she had not been denied due process; and in nding that her dismissal had been for
just cause.
On July 23, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, 7 relevantly stating as
follows:
The petition is partly meritorious. EHCaDS
There appears to be no dispute upon the fact that De Jesus failed to remit
and account for some of her collections. This she admitted and explained in her
letters dated April 5, 2001 and May 15, 2001 to Santos, the company's general
manager. Without totally disregarding her allegations of duress in executing the
promissory note, the facts disclose therein also coincide with the fact that De
Jesus was somehow remiss in her duties. Considering that she occupied a
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con dential and sensitive position in the company, the circumstances presented
fairly justi ed her termination from employment based on just cause. De Jesus'
failure to fully account her collections is su cient justi cation for the company
to lose its trust and con dence in her. Loss of trust and con dence as a ground
for dismissing an employee does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is
su cient if there is " some basis" for such loss of con dence, or if the employer
has reasonable grounds to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for
the misconduct, as to be unworthy of the trust and con dence demanded by his
position.
The evidence on record is bereft of any indicia that the two written notices
were furnished to De Jesus prior to her dismissal. The various memoranda given
her were not the same notices required by law, as they were mere internal
correspondence intended to remind De Jesus of her outstanding accountabilities
to the company. Assuming for the sake of argument that the memoranda
furnished to De Jesus may have satis ed the minimum requirements of due
process, still, the same did not satisfy the notice requirement under the Labor
Code because the intention to sever the employee's services must be made clear
in the notice. Such was not apparent from the memoranda. As the Supreme Court
held in Serrano, the violation of the notice requirement is not strictly a denial of
due process. This is because such notice is precisely intended to enable the
employee not only to prepare himself for the legal battle to protect his tenure of
employment, but also to nd other means of employment and ease the impact of
the loss of his job and, necessarily, his income. acHDTA
Conformably with the doctrine laid down in Serrano vs. NLRC, the
dismissal of De Jesus should therefore be struck as ineffectual .
SO ORDERED.
De Jesus appealed by petition for review on certiorari to the Court (G.R. No.
164662), while Supersonic rst sought the reconsideration of the Decision in the CA. Upon
the denial of its motion for reconsideration on October 21, 2004, Supersonic likewise
appealed to the Court by petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 165787). The appeals
were consolidated on October 5, 2005. 8
In G.R. No. 164662, De Jesus avers that:
I. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in nding that respondent
Supersonic is liable only on the backwages and not for the damages
prayed for.
II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in nding that the dismissal was
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valid and at the same time, declaring it ineffectual. 9
In G.R. No. 165787, Supersonic ascribes the following errors to the CA, to wit:
I. Respondent Court of Appeals committed serious errors which are not in
accordance with law and applicable decisions of the Honorable Supreme
Court when it concluded that the two-notice requirement has not been
complied with when respondent De Jesus was terminated from service.
II. Respondent Court of Appeals committed serious errors by concluding
that the Serrano Doctrine applies squarely to the facts and legal issues of
the present case which are contrary to the law and jurisprudence.aIcETS
III. Serrano Doctrine has already been abandoned in the case of Agabon v.
NLRC, which is prevailing and landmark doctrine applicable in the
resolution of the present case.
Based on the foregoing, the decisive issues to be passed upon are: (1) Whether or
not Supersonic was justi ed in terminating De Jesus' employment; (2) Whether or not
Supersonic complied with the two-written notice rule; and (3) Whether or not De Jesus was
entitled to full backwages and damages.
Ruling
We partially grant the petition for review of Supersonic in G.R. No. 165787.
Anent the rst issue, Supersonic substantially proved that De Jesus had failed to
remit and had misappropriated the amounts she had collected in behalf of Supersonic. In
that regard, the factual ndings of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC on the presence of the just
cause for terminating her employment, being already a rmed by the CA, are binding if not
conclusive upon this Court. There being no cogent reason to disturb such ndings, the
dismissal of De Jesus was valid.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes by which the employer may
validly terminate the employment of the employee, viz.:
Article 282. Termination by employer. — An employer may terminate
an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of
the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; STcHEI
The CA observed that De Jesus had not disputed her failure to remit and account for
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some of her collections, for, in fact, she herself had expressly admitted her failure to do so
through her letters dated April 5, 2001 and May 15, 2001 sent to Supersonic's general
manager. Thereby, the CA concluded, she defrauded her employer or willfully violated the
trust reposed in her by Supersonic. In that regard, the CA rightly observed that proof
beyond reasonable doubt of her violation of the trust was not required, for it was su cient
that the employer had "reasonable grounds to believe that the employee concerned is
responsible for the misconduct as to be unworthy of the trust and con dence demanded
by [her] position." 1 1
Concerning the second issue, the NLRC and the CA differed from each other, with
the CA concluding, unlike the NLRC, that Supersonic did not comply with the two-written
notice rule. In the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, then, this Court should now re-evaluate
and re-examine the relevant findings. 1 2
A careful consideration of the records persuades us to a rm the decision of the CA
holding that Supersonic had not complied with the two-written notice rule.
It ought to be without dispute that the betrayal of the trust the employer reposed in
De Jesus was the essence of the offense for which she was to be validly penalized with the
supreme penalty of dismissal. 1 3 Nevertheless, she was still entitled to due processing
order to effectively safeguard her security of tenure. The law affording to her due process
as an employee imposed on Supersonic as the employer the obligation to send to her two
written notices before nally dismissing her. This requirement of two written notices is
enunciated in Article 277 of the Labor Code, as amended, which relevantly states: DHITCc
and in Section 2 1 5 and Section 7, 1 6 Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the
Labor Code. The rst written notice would inform her of the particular acts or
omissions for which her dismissal was being sought. The second written notice would
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notify her of the employer's decision to dismiss her. But the second written notice must
not be made until after she was given a reasonable period after receiving the rst
written notice within which to answer the charge, and after she was given the ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend herself with the assistance of her representative,
if she so desired. 1 7 The requirement was mandatory. 1 8
Did Supersonic observe due process before dismissing De Jesus?
Supersonic contends that it gave the two written notices to De Jesus in the form of
the memoranda dated March 26, 2001 and May 12, 2001, to wit: EHSTDA
Our books show, that as of today, March 26, 2001, the following accounts have
outstanding balances:
Wafa $6,585
Monaliza/Ragab 4,326.39
Salah 1,950
Jerico 1,300
Rafat 4,730
Mahmood/Alhirsh 3,205
Amina 2,000
MMML 1,653
RDRI 361
HMD 2,100
Amru 1,388
Iyad Ali 97
Ali 740
Maher 675
Sharikat 350
Imad 905
Rubies 2,678
Adel 1,125
——————————
$36,168.39
=========
Please give us an updated report on your collection efforts and the status of
each of the above accounts to enable us to take necessary actions. This would
be submitted on or before April 2, 2001.AcSCaI
MEMORANDUM
TO : MA. LOURDES DE JESUS
SALES PROMOTION OFFICER
FROM : DIVINA S. ABAD SANTOS
GENERAL MANAGER
SUBJECT : PAST DUE ACCOUNTS
You are hereby directed to explain in writing within 72 hours from receipt of
this memorandum, why you should not be dismissed for cause for failure to
account for above amounts. cDTIAC
Conformably with the doctrine laid down in Serrano vs. NLRC, the
dismissal of De Jesus should therefore be struck (down) as ineffectual . 2 1 STaAcC
On the third issue, Supersonic posits that the CA gravely erred in declaring the
dismissal of De Jesus ineffectual pursuant to the ruling in Serrano v. National Labor
Relations Commission; and insists that the CA should have instead applied the ruling in
Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, 2 2 which meanwhile abandoned Serrano.
In Serrano, the Court pronounced as follows:
. . ., with respect to dismissals for cause under Art. 282, if it is shown that
the employee was dismissed for any of the just causes mentioned in said Art.
282, then, in accordance with that article, he should not be reinstated. However, he
must be paid backwages from the time his employment was terminated until it is
determined that the termination of employment is for a just cause because the
failure to hear him before he is dismissed renders the termination of his
employment without legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of the National
Labor Relations Commission is MODIFIED by ordering private respondent Isetann
Department Store, Inc. to pay petitioner separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month pay for every year of service, his unpaid salary, and his proportionate 13th
month pay and, in addition, full backwages from the time his employment was
terminated on October 11, 1991 up to the time the decision herein becomes nal.
For this purpose, this case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for computation of
the separation pay, backwages, and other monetary awards to petitioner.
SO ORDERED. 2 3
The CA did not err. Relying on Serrano, the CA precisely ruled that the violation by
Supersonic of the two-written notice requirement rendered ineffectual the dismissal of De
Jesus for just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, and entitled her to be paid full
backwages from the time of her dismissal until the nality of its decision. The Court
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cannot ignore that the applicable case law when the CA promulgated its decision on July
23, 2004, and when it denied Supersonic's motion for reconsideration on October 21, 2004
was still Serrano. Considering that the Court determines in this appeal by petition for
review on certiorari only whether or not the CA committed an error of law in promulgating
its assailed decision of July 23, 2004, the CA cannot be declared to have erred on the basis
of Serrano being meanwhile abandoned through Agabon if all that the CA did was to fully
apply the law and jurisprudence applicable at the time of its rendition of the judgment. As a
rule, a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that the law was
originally passed, subject only to the quali cation that when a doctrine of the Court is
overruled and the Court adopts a different view, and more so when there is a reversal of
the doctrine, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to
parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. 2 4 To hold otherwise would
be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice, for, then, there is no recognition
of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. 2 5 CDHcaS
Footnotes
1.Rollo (G.R. No. 164662), pp. 20-26; penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-
Fernando, with Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia (later Presiding Justice, and a
Member of the Court, but now retired) and Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid
concurring.
2.G.R. No. 117040, January 27, 2000, 323 SCRA 445.
3.Rollo (G.R. No. 164662), pp. 21-23.
4.Rollo (G.R. No. 165787), pp. 149-154.
5.Id. at 175-178.
6.Id. at 194-195.
7.Supra note 1, at 24-26.
12.Lopez v. Bodega City , G.R. No. 155731, September 3, 2007, 532 SCRA 56, 64; Tiu v. Pasaol,
Sr., G.R. No. 139876, April 30, 2003, 402 SCRA 312, 319; Manila Water Company, Inc. v.
Pena, G.R. No. 158255, July 8, 2004, 434 SCRA 53, 58-59.
13.Caingat v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 154308, March 10, 2005, 453
SCRA 142, 151-152; Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Macaraeg, G.R. No.
145800, January 22, 2003, 395 SCRA 720, 727; Quezon Electric Cooperative v. NLRC,
G.R. Nos. 79718-22, April 12, 1989, 172 SCRA 88, 94.
14.As amended by Section 33, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989.
15.Section 2. Security of Tenure. — . . .
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the
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assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the
charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon
due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to
justify his termination.
16.Section 7. Termination of employment by employer. — The just causes for terminating the
services of an employee shall be those provided in Article 282 of the Code. The
separation from work of an employee for a just cause does not entitle him to the
termination pay provided in Code, without prejudice, however, to whatever rights, benefits
and privileges he may have under the applicable individual or collective bargaining
agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or practice.
17.Lim v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 118434, July 26, 1996, 259 SCRA
485, 498.
18.Colegio de San Juan de Letran-Calamba v. Villas, G.R. No. 137795, March 26, 2003, 399
SCRA 550, 559; Equitable Banking Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 102467, June 13, 1997,
273 SCRA 352, 378.
19.Rollo (G.R. No. 165787), p. 120.
20.Id. at 121.
26.See Co v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100776, October 28, 1993, 227 SCRA 444, 448.
27.Culili v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 165381, February 9, 2011,
642 SCRA 338, 363; RTG Construction, Inc. v. Facto, G.R. No. 163872, December 21,
2009, 608 SCRA 615, 623; Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. 159625,
January 31, 2008, 543 SCRA 364, 374; Magro Placement and General Services v.
Hernandez, G.R. No. 156964, July 4, 2007, 526 SCRA 408, 417-418; King of Kings
Transport, Inc. v. Mamac, G.R. No. 166208, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 116, 127; Aladdin
Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152123, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 468,
472; Jaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot, G.R. No. 151378, March 28, 2005, 454
SCRA 119, 124.
29.Id. at 617.
30.E.g., Culili v. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc., supra note 27.
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