Crisostomo B. Aquino vs. Municipality Of Malay, Aklan ordinance and yet it failed to do so.

led to do so. If such was the case, the

G.R. No. 211356; September 29, 2014 grace period can be deemed observed and the establishment
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. was already ripe for closure and demolition by the time EO 10
was issued in June.
FACTS: 2. No, petitioner’s right to due process was not violated
In a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner for lack of judicial proceedings prior to the issuance of
Crisostomo Aquino, the president and chief executive officer demolition order.
of Boracay Island West Cove, assailed the decisions of the The government may enact legislation that may interfere with
Municipality of Malay, Aklan for denying his application for personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations
zoning compliance and issuing demolition closure and to promote the general welfare. One such piece of legislation
demolition order and the CA for denying his petition for is the Local Government Code (LGC), which authorizes city and
certiorari for being the improper remedy. municipal governments, acting through their local chief
Petitioner’s application for zoning compliance and building executives, to issue demolition orders and to hear issues
permit covering the construction of an additional three-storey involving property rights of individuals and to come out with
hotel over a parcel of land covered by a Forest Land Use an effective order or resolution thereon. Pertinent herein is
Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) were denied by the Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to
Municipal Zoning Administrator on the ground that the order the closure and removal of illegally constructed
proposed construction site was within the "no build zone" establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits.
demarcated in a Municipal Ordinance. Thereafter, the Though the court agreed with Petitioner’s contention that,
respondent issued a 1) Cease and Desist Order enjoining the under the LGC, the Sanggunian does not have the power to
expansion of the resort, and 2) EO No. 10 ordering the closure authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of a
and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel. EO 10 was nuisance per accidens, still the SC ruled that the LGU may
partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Also, respondents nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition without
demolished the improvements introduced by Boracay West due hearing thereon in a tribunal, because in the exercise of
Cove. police power and the general welfare clause provided in the
Petitioner alleged that the order was issued and executed with Constitution, property rights of individuals may be subjected
grave abuse of discretion. He argued that judicial proceedings to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the
should first be conducted before the respondent mayor could government.
order the demolition of the company’s establishment. Hence, the right to due process was satisfied in the case at bar.
On the other hand, respondents argued that the demolition
needed no court order because the municipal mayor has the
express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to
order the removal of illegally constructed buildings.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the procedural due process (of due
notice and hearing) was complied with.
2. Whether or not judicial proceedings should first be
conducted before the respondent mayor could order
the demolition of the company’s establishment.
RULING:

1. Yes, the procedural due process (of due notice and

hearing) was complied with.
First, basic is the rule that public officers enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties.
The burden is on the petitioner herein to prove that Boracay
West Cove was deprived of the opportunity to be heard before
EO 10 was issued. Regrettably, copies of the Cease and Desist
Order issued by the LGU and of the assailed EO 10 itself were
never attached to the petition before this Court, which
documents could have readily shed light on whether or not
petitioner has been accorded the 10-day grace period
provided in Section 10 of the Ordinance. In view of this fact,
the presumption of regularity must be sustained.
Second, as quoted by petitioner in his petition before the CA,
the assailed EO 10 states that petitioner received notices from
the municipality government on March 7 and 28, 2011,
requiring Boracay West Cove to comply with the zoning
1. BROWN MADONNA PRESS INC., THADDEUS ANTHONY A. The Clearance and Quitclaim document discloses that Casas
CABANGON, FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (now would "cease to be connected with the company at the close
Fortune General Insurance Corporation) and/or ANTONIO of office on January 16, 2007." The document, which was even
CABANGON CHUA, introduced as evidence by the petitioners, was prepared
vs. unilaterally at Cabangon’s instructions. It shows the company’s
MARIA ROSARIO M. CASAS, intent to sever its employment relationship with Casas.
FACTS: Considered together with the letter Casas sent Cabangon-Chua
In 1984, Casas was hired as an accounting clerk at Fortune asking for her reinstatement on May 17, 2007, these
General Insurance. She eventually rose from the ranks; she documents back Casas’sr assertion that she was compelled to
was transferred to BMPI, another ALC member company, as its leave her job on January 5, 2007.
Vice President for Finance and Administration. As their main defense, BMPI and Cabangon claim that they
Casas met with BMPI’s company president, and the Vice never dismissed Casas from work, and that she instead
President for the Central Human Resource Department of the requested a graceful exit from the company.
ALC Group of Companies. During the meeting, Casas was Jurisprudence has established that employers interposing
allegedly told not to report to work anymore starting January their employee’s resignation as a defense from illegal dismissal
8, 2007, upon the instructions of Cabangon-Chua, ALC’s cases have the burden of proving that the employee indeed
Chairman Emeritus. Casas claims that the reason for her voluntarily resigned.33 Resignation — the formal
abrupt dismissal was not disclosed to her, but she was pronouncement or relinquishment of a position or office — is
promised a separation pay. She thus packed her things and the voluntary act of an employee compelled by personal
left. reason(s) to disassociate himself from employment.34 It is
BMPI, on the other hand, asserts that it was Casas who done with the intention of relinquishing an office,
requested a graceful exit from the company. The meeting was accompanied by the act manifesting this intent.35
supposedly held to confront Casas about certain complaints In the present case, the petitioners allege that Casas asked for
against her, and about the growing rift between her and a graceful exit from the company to avoid an administrative
another company officer. BMPI asserts that Casas opted to investigation against her. They claim that Casas had grossly
leave the company to avoid an administrative investigation failed to manage and take control of BMPI’s ex-deal assets,
against her and to give her the chance to jumpstart her career which caused the company serious losses. When Casas was
outside the company. She succeeded in convincing Cabangon confronted about these reports of mismanagement, she
to grant her some form of financial assistance as they were voluntarily resigned from office in exchange for separation
friends.4 pay.
Casas no longer reported for work and BMPI, for its part, NLRC and CA correctly disregarded these allegations in
started the processing of her clearance. Casas sent Cabangon- concluding that Casas had been terminated from office.
Chua a letter asking for the reconsideration of his decision to First, the pieces of evidence that the petitioners submitted are
terminate her employment. Cabangon-Chua did not act on this insufficient to establish their claim. To prove that Casas
letter. voluntarily abandoned her work, the petitioners submitted
Casas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and for payment of affidavits from their employees, Domingo Almoninia, Jr. and
separation pay, backwages, retirement benefits and attorney’s Victoria C. Nava, who both testified to the events leading to a
fees. private conversation between Casas and Cabangon.
ISSUE: WON Casas had been illegally dismissed. Domingo Almoninia, Jr., BMPI’s former Chief Audit Executive,
(Did she voluntarily resign from, or abandon her work at, BMPI, Testified36 that he had informed Cabangon of reports
or was she summarily dismissed by Cabangon?) regarding Casas’s mismanagement of BMPI’s ex-deal assets on
January 5, 2007. Casas, together with Vice President for
HELD: YES, Casas had been illegally dismissed. Human Resources Victoria Nava, were then summoned to
The CA did not err in affirming the NLRC’s factual finding that Cabangon’s room. According to Almoninia, he witnessed
Casas had been dismissed from work Cabangon confront Casas regarding reports about her
In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of mismanagement and certain unauthorized transactions. In the
proving that the employee’s dismissal was course of the discussion, Cabangon allegedly told Casas that
legal.1âwphi1However, to discharge this burden, the the reports against her would have to be investigated, and
employee must first prove, by substantial evidence, that he instructed her to settle her differences with a certain Mr.
had been dismissed from employment. Tayag. Casas asked Cabangon if she was being dismissed, to
The CA, in affirming the NLRC’s conclusion that Casas had been which the latter answered in the negative. Both Almoninia and
dismissed, gave emphasis to the existence of two documents Nava were then asked to leave the room.
on record: first, the unsigned clearance and quitclaim Nava, on the other hand, corroborated Almoninia’s narration,
document unilaterally prepared by BMPI, and second, the and added insinuations that Casas had been having problems
letter Casas sent to Cabangon-Chua, asking the latter to in the company.37
reconsider her termination. In considering their affidavits, we emphasize that neither
These pieces of evidence sufficiently establish Casas’ dismissal Almoninia nor Nava were present in the private conversation
from the company. that ensued between Cabangon and Casas, after the
confrontation that they witnessed. This leaves Cabangon’s Thus, two separate inquiries must be made in resolving illegal
claim that Casas asked for a graceful exit from the company dismissal cases: first, whether the dismissal had been made in
uncorroborated; what stands is Casas’ statement contradicting accordance with the procedure set in the Labor Code; and
the claim that she had not been dismissed from her job. second, whether the dismissal had been for just or authorized
Second, Cabangon failed to provide any documentary cause.
evidence supporting Casas’ voluntary resignation. BMPI failed There can be no doubt that the procedural requirements had
to show any resignation letter from Casas. The Clearance and not been complied with in the present case: shortly after a
Quitclaim document, which shows Casas’ severance from the private conversation between Cabangon and Casas, Casas took
company, does not contain her signature. 38 Neither was Casas her belongings from the office and left the building. As
given any return to work order, notice of infraction, or notice explained earlier, Casas’s acts after this private conversation
of termination, all of which could have supported BMPI’s reveal that she had been summarily dismissed: Casas gave no
theory that Casas was never prevented from going back to resignation letter, refused to sign the Clearance and Quitclaim
work. document that the company issued, and sent a letter asking
Third, Cabangon, Almoninia and Nava’s testimonies show that for her reinstatement.
Casas could have entertained the motive to resign from her Notably, the private conversation that led to Casas’s summary
work, but does not prove her intent to leave her office. Intent dismissal did not conform, in any way, to the procedural due
to relinquish one’s office is determined from the acts of an process requirements embodied in Rule XIV of the Omnibus
employee before and after the alleged resignation. Casas’ acts Rules Implementing the Labor Code, viz:
after allegedly resigning from work negate this intent: she RULE XIV Termination of Employment
wrote a letter asking Cabangon-Chua to reconsider her SECTION 1. Security of tenure and due process. — No workers
termination from office; she refused to sign the Clearance and shall be dismissed except for a just or authorized cause
Quitclaim document; and she filed an illegal dismissal case provided by law and after due process.
against her employers. SECTION 2. Notice of dismissal.— Any employer who seeks to
The CA did not err in affirming the NLRC’s conclusion that dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the
Casas’ dismissal violated the procedural requirements of the particular acts or omission constituting the grounds for his
Labor Code The sudden termination from office was without dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, the notice shall be
just cause and violated procedural due process. served at the worker's last known address.
According to the NLRC, despite the serious allegations that the xxx
BMPI lodged against Casas, it never asked her to explain her SECTION 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer
acts, and instead opted to sever its employment relations with the allegations stated against him in the notice of dismissal
her. On this basis alone, the NLRC concluded that Casas’ within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The
dismissal had been illegal and non-compliant with procedural employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be
due process. heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
Casas had been dismissed prior to any probe on her reported representative, if he so desires.
violation of company rules and regulations. SECTION 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall
In determining whether an employee’s dismissal had been immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss
legal, the inquiry focuses on whether the dismissal violated his him stating clearly the reasons therefor.
right to substantial and procedural due process. An Cabangon failed to show any written notice provided to Casas
employee’s right not to be dismissed without just or informing her of the charges against her, and neither had she
authorized cause as provided by law, is covered by his right to been informed in writing of her dismissal and the reasons
substantial due process. Compliance with procedure provided behind it.
in the Labor Code, on the other hand, constitutes the Even assuming arguendo that Casas had indeed voluntarily
procedural due process right of an employee. abandoned her work – an uncorroborated claim by Cabangon
The violation of either the substantial due process right or the – Cabangon had the duty to give Casas a written notice of the
procedural due process right of an employee produces grounds leading to her dismissal.
different results. Termination without a just or authorized Thus, Cabangon failed to comply with the two-notice
cause renders the dismissal invalid, and entitles the employee requirement under the law, resulting in a violation of Casas’s
to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other right to procedural due process.
privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and The CA did not err in finding no grave abuse of discretion in
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the NLRC’s decision to hold that Casas had been dismissed
the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of without just cause
actual reinstatement. Casas’s dismissal had not been for just cause, because at the
An employee’s removal for just or authorized cause but time she was dismissed, not one of the charges against her had
without complying with the proper procedure, on the other been proven. Casas was, at the time of her dismissal,
hand, does not invalidate the dismissal. It obligates the erring presumed innocent until proven guilty; thus, there existed no
employer to pay nominal damages to the employee, as penalty just cause to terminate her employment at the time she was
for not complying with the procedural requirements of due summarily dismissed.
process.
In reaching this conclusion, the CA reviewed whether the NLRC which these rights usually refer. Agabon v. NLRC 51 described
acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding that Casas’s the due process required in dismissing employees as statutory
dismissal had no just cause. The NLRC, in its decision, held that – requirements that the law imposes on employers to comply
Casas’s dismissal had not been for just cause because she was with, in contrast to constitutional due process rights that
not even allowed to explain the supposed acts that had been guarantee against overreach from the government.
inimical to BMPI’s interests. Although statutory in nature, the procedural and substantive
In affirming the NLRC’s decision, the CA clarified the due process requirements in illegal dismissal cases stem from
application of procedural and substantial due process in the the protection that the Constitution provides labor – the
present case: Casas had not been given the two-notice Constitution has tasked the State to promote the workers’
requirement in the law, and hence, her procedural due process security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living
rights had been violated. And because not one of the wage. These guarantees, as well as a host of other rights and
allegations against her had been proven at the time she was responsibilities, find implementation through the Labor Code,
summarily dismissed, there existed no cause to terminate her which fleshed out the concept of security of tenure54 as the
services. continuance of regular employment until an employee's
We have, in the past, affirmed the NLRC in ruling that an services are terminated because of just or authorized causes
employee’s act not proven at the time he had been dismissed enumerated in the law.
does not constitute just cause for his dismissal. In other words, Thus, despite the differences in origin and application between
for an act to justify an employee’s dismissal, it should have constitutional due process rights and the statutory
been proven, with substantial evidence, at the time he was requirements in the Labor Code, we have applied concepts
dismissed. Otherwise, the dismissal would not be for just implementing constitutional due process rights to the
cause. statutory due process requirements of the Labor Code. We did
This conclusion finds support in cases emphasizing that an this in the present case, when we emphasized the need for
unsubstantiated accusation will not ripen into a holding that substantial evidence to support the just cause for the
there is just cause for dismissal.47 A mere accusation of employee's dismissal at the time her services were terminated.
wrongdoing is not sufficient cause for a valid dismissal of an In the same way that the crime charged against an accused
employee. The facts for which a dismissal is based should be must first be proven before his or her right to liberty is taken
backed by substantial evidence at the time the employee is away, or that a government employee's infraction must first
dismissed, and not at the time his dismissal is being questioned be proven before the accused is deprived of the right to
before the courts. continue !o hold office, so too, must just cause against an
In the present case, the petitioners allege that Casas had employee be proven before he or she may be deprived of a
committed various infractions that would have warranted means of livelihood. Otherwise, the employee's right to
disciplinary action against her. At the time that Casas was substantive due process would be violated.
dismissed, however, these alleged infractions were mere In these lights, and in order to give full effect to the
speculations. The present petition for review on certiorari embodiment of substantive due process in illegal dismissal
admits this reality in two instances: first, in the body of the cases, it is necessary to rule, that an employee, in this present
petition itself stating that at the time of the January 5, 2007 case Casas, cannot be terminated from service without
meeting, disciplinary proceedings had yet to be initiated sufficient substantial evidence of the just cause that would
against Casas and that the reports against her would still have merit her dismissal.
to be verified;48 and second, through its annexes, which
provided that the result of the investigation in the ex-deal
assets that Casas allegedly mismanaged was produced only on
February 17, 2007, or a full month after Casas’ dismissal.
Thus, at the time Cabangon asked Casas to leave her
employment, all he had as basis for Casas’s dismissal were
speculations. Worse, Cabangon’s summary dismissal of Casas
left her with little opportunity to adequately defend herself
from the allegations against her.
In these lights, we support the CA in holding that Casas’
summary dismissal had not been for just cause.
Just cause must be proven with substantial evidence at the
time of
dismissal
At its core, substantive due process guarantees a right to
liberty that cannot be taken away or unduly constricted,
except through valid causes provided in the law.
The concepts of procedural and substantive due process had
been carried over and applied to illegal dismissal cases,
although notably, employers are not governmental bodies to
ATTY. JANET D. NACION v. COA discretion. The abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave"
FACTS: must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a
Petitioner was administratively charged by Commission on positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act
Audit (COA) for grave misconduct. She was assigned by COA in at all in contemplation of law.[20] (Citations omitted)
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewage System (MWSS). Thus, the Court emphasized in Dycoco v. Court of
During the petitioner’s assignment in MWSS from 2001 to Appeals[21] that "[a]n act of a court or tribunal can only be
2003, she availed of the MWSS Multi-Purpose Loan Program, considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is
such as car loan, housing loan, and received benefits and done in a 'capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
bonuses from the latter. Petitioner avers that she availed of equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.'"[22]
the housing and car loan in an honest belief that she could
avail of the benefits in the absence of any prohibition thereon, Upon review, the Court holds that no such grave abuse of
considering that COA Resolution that prohibited COA discretion may be attributed to the COA for the procedure it
personnel from availing of all forms of loan, monetary benefits observed, its factual findings and conclusions in Nacion's case.
from agencies under their jurisdiction was issued only on 2004.
She denied receiving any allowances and bonuses and argued Due Process in Administrative Proceedings
that the documents submitted to establish the same are not In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is
conclusive evidence that she indeed received the money. COA the opportunity to explain one's side or seek a reconsideration
cited violation of Sec. 18 of RA 6758 prohibiting COA personnel of the action or ruling complained of, and to submit any
from receiving salaries, bonuses, allowances or other evidence he may have in support of his defense. The demands
emoluments from government entity, local government unit, of due process are sufficiently met when the parties are given
GOCCs and government financial institution, except the the opportunity to be heard before judgment is
compensation directly paid by COA. She was given one-year rendered.[23] Given this and the circumstances under which the
suspension as penalty, finding in her favor mitigating rulings of the COA were issued, the Court finds no violation of
circumstances her waiver of the formal investigation and Nacion's right to due process. As the Office of the Solicitor
admission of availment of MWSS Housing and Car Loans. General correctly argued, the constitution of a separate fact-
The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. She finding team specifically for Nacion's case was not necessary
avers that she was denied of the right to due process as she for the satisfaction of such right.
argues that the records during her tenure with the MWSS
should not have been included by the audit team in It bears stressing that Nacion was formally charged by
its investigations, as no office order covering it was issued by Chairperson Tan, following evidence that pointed to
the COA Chairman. irregularities committed while she was with the MWSS. Being
the COA Chairperson who, under the law, could initiate
administrative proceedings motu proprio, no written
ISSUE: complaint against Nacion from another person was necessary.
whether or not the COA committed grave abuse of discretion Section 2 of the COA Memorandum No. 76-48,[24] which
in finding Nacion guilty of grave misconduct and violation of Nacion herself invokes, provides:
reasonable office rules and regulations.
Sec. 2. How commenced.
To support her petition against the COA, Nacion invokes due
process as she argues that the records during her tenure with (1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a
the MWSS should not have been included by the audit team in subordinate official or employee of the Commission by the
its investigations, as no office order covering it was issued by Chairman motu proprio, or upon sworn, written complaint of
the COA Chairman. Furthermore, the documentary evidence any other person. (Sec. 38 [a], PD 807).
considered by the Fraud Audit and Investigation Office (FAIO) x x x x (Emphasis ours)
did not constitute substantial evidence to prove the The power of the COA to discipline its officials then could not
commission of the offenses with which she was charged. be limited by the procedure being insisted upon by Nacion.
Neither is the authority of the Chairperson to commence the
Ruling of the Court action through the issuance of the formal charge restricted by
The petition is bereft of merit. At the outset, the Court the requirement of a prior written complaint. As may be
reiterates: gleaned from the cited provision, a written complaint under
oath is demanded only when the administrative case is
The concept is well-entrenched: grave abuse of discretion commenced by a person other than the COA Chairperson.
exists when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in Contrary to Nacion's claim, the COA also did not act beyond its
contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not jurisdiction when her case was considered by the FAIO
based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim, and investigating team, notwithstanding the fact that the office
despotism. Not every error in the proceedings, or every order which commanded an inquiry upon MWSS personnel
erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of merely referred to alleged unauthorized receipt of bonuses
and benefits from the agency by Atty. Norberto Cabibihan FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC,
(Atty. Cabibihan) and his staff. Since Nacion's stint in MWSS COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN, COMPOSTELAVALLEY
was before Atty. Cabibihan's, she argued that the team should PROVINCE, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL,
not have looked into the records and circumstances during her Respondent.
term. In including benefits received during her term, Nacion Summary:
claimed that the investigating team acted beyond its  Petitioner applied for a position as a judge in a second
jurisdiction and deprived her of the right to due process. level court but JBC did not include his name in the list of
applicants since he failed to qualify.
The contention fails to persuade; a separate office order was  This is because the JBC put priority to incumbent judges
not necessary for the audit team's investigation of Nacion's who served their position for at least five years and
case. It should be emphasized that prior to the issuance of the petitioner here only served as judged for more than a
formal charge, the investigations conducted by the team were year.
merely fact-finding. The crucial point was the COA's  The petitioner assailed, inter alia, the authority of the JBC
observance of the demands of due process prior to its finding to add another qualification (5-year-qualitification)
or decision that Nacion was administratively liable. The because the said qualification was already prescribed
formation of a separate fact-finding team that should look  The Supreme Court ruled that the internal process of
specifically into Nacion's acts was not necessary to satisfy the choosing people who would qualify done by the JBC was
requirement. The formal charge was as yet to be issued by the valid since under Sect. 8 (5), Art. VIII of the Constitution
COA Chairperson, and Nacion's formal investigation gave the JBC principal function of recommending
commenced only after she had filed her answer to the charge. appointees to the judiciary
It was undisputed that Nacion, despite a chance, did not
request for such formal investigation, a circumstance which FACTS:
the COA later considered as mitigating. In any case, she was Herein petitioner, Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva was a
still accorded before the COA a reasonable opportunity to presiding judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
present her defenses, through her answer to the formal charge Compostela- New Bataas, Poblacion, Compostela Valley
and eventually, motion for reconsideration of the COA's Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. He applied on
decision. second-level courts such as Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13,
Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Adusan Del Sur.
The Judicial and Bar Council’s (JBC) Office of Recruitment,
Selection and Nomination, informed the petitioner through a
letter that we failed to qualify for the said position he applied
on. On the same day, petitioner sent a letter (electronic mail).
He seeks reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of the
considered applicants. He also protested the inclusion of
applicants who failed the prejudicature examination.
Through a letter, the JBC Executive officer informed him that
his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC
en banc. Still the non-inclusion of his name in the list of
applicants was upheld. The reason was, the JBS’s long standing
policy of giving priority to incumbent judges that served
their current position for at least five years. Since
the petitioner only served as a judged for more than a year
only, his name was not included in the list.
Petitioner argues that: 1.) Qualifications was already
prescribed so the JBC could add no more, 2.) The five-year-
requirement violates the equal protection and due process
clauses of the constitution, 3.) The same requirement violates
theconstitutional provision on Social Justice and Human Rights
for Equal Opportunity of employment, and 4.) The
requirement of passing the prejudicature exam should be
mandatory.
Respondents argue that 1.) The writ of certiorari and
prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing
itsprincipal function under the constitution to recommend
appointees to the judiciary because the JBC is not a
tribunalexercising judicial or quasi-judicial function, 2.)
Remedy of mandamus and declaratory relief will not lie
because petitioner doesnot have any legal right that need to
be protected, 3.) Legal protection clause is not violated
because the 5-year-requirement is performance and Formulating policies which streamline the selection process
experience based, and 4.) No violation of due process since the falls squarely under the purview of the JBC. No other
policy is merely internal in nature. constitutional body is bestowed with the mandate and
competency to set criteria for applicants that refer to the more
HELD: general categories of probity, integrity and independence.
Equal Protection
The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a
There is no question that JBC employs standards to have a second-level court, which is five years experience as judge of a
rational basis to screen applicants who cannot be all first-level court, is a direct adherence to the qualities
accommodated and appointed to a vacancy in the judiciary, to prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a premium on many
determine who is best qualified among the applicants, and not years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying one of
to discriminate against any particular individual or class. the stringent constitutional standards requiring that a member
of the judiciary be of "proven competence." In determining
The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not competence, the JBC considers, among other
require the universal application of the laws to all persons or qualifications, experience and performance.
things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Based on the JBC's collective judgment, those who have been
Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a judges of first-level courts for five (5) years are better qualified
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification for promotion to second-level courts. It deems length of
stands as long as it bears a rational relationship to some experience as a judge as indicative of conversance with the law
legitimate government end.[21] and court procedure. Five years is considered as a sufficient
span of time for one to acquire professional skills for the next
"The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude level court, declog the dockets, put in place improved
classification of individuals who may be accorded different procedures and an efficient case management system, adjust
treatment under the law as long as the classification is to the work environment, and gain extensive experience in the
reasonable and not arbitrary."[22] "The mere fact that the judicial process.
legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not A five-year stint in the Judiciary can also provide evidence of
violative of the right to equal protection, for every the integrity, probity, and independence of judges seeking
classification of persons or things for regulation by law promotion. To merit JBC's nomination for their promotion,
produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby they must have had a "record of, and reputation for, honesty,
rendered invalid."[23] integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity
to sound moral and ethical standards." Likewise, their
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC decisions must be reflective of the soundness of their
merely exercised its discretion in accordance with the judgment, courage, rectitude, cold neutrality and strength of
constitutional requirement and its rules that a member of the character.
Judiciary must be of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence.[24] "To ensure the fulfillment of these standards Hence, for the purpose of determining whether judges are
in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to worthy of promotion to the next level court, it would be
screen aspiring judges and justices, among others, making premature or difficult to assess their merit if they have had less
certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all than one year of service on the bench.[26] (Citations omitted
qualified and suitably best for appointment. In this way, the and emphasis in the original)
appointing process itself is shielded from the possibility of At any rate, five years of service as a lower court judge is not
extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and the only factor that determines the selection of candidates for
mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or RTC judge to be appointed by the President. Persons with this
disqualified."[25] qualification are neither automatically selected nor do they
automatically become nominees. The applicants are chosen
Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing based on an array of factors and are evaluated based on their
recommended appointees does not constitute a violation of individual merits. Thus, it cannot be said that the questioned
the equal protection clause. The JBC does not discriminate policy was arbitrary, capricious, or made without any basis.
when it employs number of years of service to screen and
differentiate applicants from the competition. The number of Clearly, the classification created by the challenged policy
years of service provides a relevant basis to determine proven satisfies the rational basis test. The foregoing shows that
competence which may be measured by experience, among substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges
other factors. The difference in treatment between lower with five year experience and those with less than five years of
court judges who have served at least five years and those who experience, like the petitioner, and the classification enshrined
have served less than five years, on the other hand, was in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its
rationalized by JBC as follows: legitimate purpose. The Court, thus, rules that the questioned
policy does not infringe on the equal protection clause as it is rule, have at least five years of experience as an RTC judge,
based on reasonable classification intended to gauge the thus:
proven competence of the applicants. Therefore, the said
policy is valid and constitutional. RULE 9 - SPECIAL GUIDELINES FOR NOMINATION TO A
VACANCY IN THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SANDIGANBAYAN
Due Process
Section 1. Additional criteria for nomination to the Court of
The petitioner averred that the assailed policy violates Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. - In addition to the foregoing
procedural due process for lack of publication and non- guidelines the Council should consider the following in
submission to the University of the Philippines Law Center evaluating the merits of applicants for a vacancy in the Court
Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR). The of Appeals and Sandiganbayan:
petitioner said that the assailed policy will affect all applying
judges, thus, the said policy should have been published. 1. As a general rule, he must have at least five years of
experience as a judge of Regional Trial Court, except when he
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the assailed JBC policy has in his favor outstanding credentials, as evidenced by, inter
need not be filed in the ONAR because the publication alia, impressive scholastic or educational record and
requirement in the ONAR is confined to issuances of performance in the Bar examinations, excellent reputation for
administrative agencies under the Executive branch of the honesty, integrity, probity and independence of mind; at least
government.[27] Since the JBC is a body under the supervision very satisfactory performance rating for three (3) years
of the Supreme Court,[28] it is not covered by the publication preceding the filing of his application for nomination; and
requirements of the Administrative Code. excellent potentials for appellate judgeship.

Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of x x x x (Emphasis ours)
service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as The express declaration of these guidelines in JBC-009, which
applicants to second-level courts should have been published. have been duly published on the website of the JBC and in a
As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all newspaper of general circulation suggests that the JBC is
statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to aware that these are not mere internal rules, but are rules
enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and implementing the Constitution that should be published. Thus,
effect. There are, however, several exceptions to the if the JBC were so-minded to add special guidelines for
requirement of publication, such as interpretative regulations determining competence of applicants for RTC judges, then it
and those merely internal in nature, which regulate only the could and should have amended its rules and published the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public. same. This, the JBC did not do as JBC-009 and its amendatory
Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of rule do not have special guidelines for applicants to the RTC.
instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the Moreover, jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a
performance of their duties.[29] statute should be published. Thus, by analogy, publication is
also required for the five-year requirement because it seeks to
Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the implement a constitutional provision requiring proven
administrative rules and regulations exempted from the competence from members of the judiciary.
publication requirement. The assailed policy involves a
qualification standard by which the JBC shall determine proven Nonetheless, the JBC's failure to publish the assailed policy has
competence of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation, not prejudiced the petitioner's private interest. At the risk of
because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the being repetitive, the petitioner has no legal right to be included
members of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies since the
process involves a call to lawyers who meet the qualifications possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications
in the Constitution and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to legally
apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is but a natural demand that one's name be included in the list of candidates
consequence thereof that potential applicants be informed of for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the shortlist is strictly
the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they would within the discretion of the JBC.[30]
be able to prepare for and comply with them.
As to the issue that the JBC failed or refused to implement the
The Court also noted the fact that in JBC-009, otherwise known completion of the prejudicature program as a requirement for
as the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, the JBC had put its appointment or promotion in the judiciary under R.A. No.
criteria in writing and listed the guidelines in determining 8557, this ground of the petition, being unsubstantiated, was
competence, independence, integrity and probity. Section 1, unfounded. Clearly, it cannot be said that JBC unlawfully
Paragraph 1 of Rule 9 expressly provides that applicants for the neglects the performance of a duty enjoined by law.
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, should, as a general
Finally, the petitioner argued but failed to establish that the
assailed policy violates the constitutional provision under KABATAAN PARTY LIST, et. al., Petitioners,
social justice and human rights for equal opportunity of vs.
employment. The OSG explained: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 221318 December 16, 2015
[T]he questioned policy does not violate equality of FACTS:
employment opportunities. The constitutional provision does RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a
not call for appointment to the Judiciary of all who might, for mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters in
any number of reasons, wish to apply. As with all professions, order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated
it is regulated by the State. The office of a judge is no ordinary list of voters through the adoption of biometric technology.
office. It is imbued with public interest and is central in the
administration of justice x x x. Applicants who meet the RA 10367 likewise directs that “registered voters
constitutional and legal qualifications must vie and withstand whose biometrics have not been captured shall submit
the competition and rigorous screening and selection process. themselves for validation.” “Voters who fail to submit for
They must submit themselves to the selection criteria, validation on or before the last day of filing of application for
processes and discretion of respondent JBC, which has the registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections shall
constitutional mandate of screening and selecting candidates be deactivated x x x.”
whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the
President. So long as a fair opportunity is available for all COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 as amended by
applicants who are evaluated on the basis of their individual Resolutions No. 9863 and 10013. Among others, the said
merits and abilities, the questioned policy cannot be struck Resolution provides that: “the registration records of voters
down as unconstitutional.[31] (Citations omitted) without biometrics data who failed to submit for validation on
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the petitioner has not or before the last day of filing of applications for registration
established a clear legal right to justify the issuance of a for the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National and Local
preliminary injunction. The petitioner has merely filed an Elections shall be deactivated.
application with the JBC for the position of RTC judge, and he
has no clear legal right to be nominated for that office nor to Herein petitioners filed the instant petition
be selected and included in the list to be submitted to the with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
President which is subject to the discretion of the JBC. The JBC writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the
has the power to determine who shall be recommended to the constitutionality of the biometrics validation requirement
judicial post. To be included in the list of applicants is a imposed under RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos.
privilege as one can only be chosen under existing criteria 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto. They contend that:
imposed by the JBC itself. As such, prospective applicants, (a) biometrics validation rises to the level of an additional,
including the petitioner, cannot claim any demandable right to substantial qualification where there is penalty of
take part in it if they fail to meet these criteria. Hence, in the deactivation;[41] (b) biometrics deactivation is not the
absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of an injunctive writ disqualification by law contemplated by the 1987
is not justified. Constitution;[42] (c) biometrics validation gravely violates the
Constitution, considering that, applying the strict scrutiny test,
As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching it is not poised with a compelling reason for state regulation
for, screening, and selecting applicants relative to and hence, an unreasonable deprivation of the right to
recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC has the suffrage;[43] (d) voters to be deactivated are not afforded due
authority to determine how best to perform such process;[44] and (e) poor experience with biometrics should
constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the JBC serve as warning against exacting adherence to the
issues various policies setting forth the guidelines to be system.[45] Albeit already subject of a prior petition[46] filed
observed in the evaluation of applicants, and formulates rules before this Court, petitioners also raise herein the argument
and guidelines in order to ensure that the rules are updated to that deactivation by November 16, 2015 would result in the
respond to existing circumstances. Its discretion is freed from premature termination of the registration period contrary to
legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the Section 8[47] of RA 8189.[48] Ultimately, petitioners pray that
JBC is shielded from any outside pressure and improper this Court declare RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution
influence. Limiting qualified applicants in this case to those Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, unconstitutional and that the
judges with five years of experience was an exercise of COMELEC be commanded to desist from deactivating
discretion by the JBC. The potential applicants, however, registered voters without biometric information, to reinstate
should have been informed of the requirements to the judicial voters who are compliant with the requisites of RA 8189 but
positions, so that they could properly prepare for and comply have already been delisted, and to extend the system of
with them. Hence, unless there are good and compelling continuing registration and capture of biometric information
reasons to do so, the Court will refrain from interfering with of voters until January 8, 2016.
the exercise of JBC's powers, and will respect the initiative and
independence inherent in the latter.
ISSUE: RA 10367, and its penalty of deactivation in case of failure to
Petitioners further aver that RA 10367 and the COMELEC comply. Thus, there was no violation of procedural due
Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013 violate the tenets of process.
procedural due process because of the short periods of time
between hearings and notice, and the summary nature of the
deactivation proceedings.[102]

HELD:
Petitioners are mistaken.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that the COMELEC,

through Resolution No. 10013, had directed EOs to: (a) "[p]ost
the lists of voters without biometrics data in the bulletin
boards of the City/Municipal hall, Office of the Election Officer
and in the barangay hall along with the notice of ERB hearing;"
and (b) [s]end individual notices to the affected voters
included in the generated list of voters without biometrics
data.[103] The same Resolution also accords concerned
individuals the opportunity to file their opposition/objection
to the deactivation of VRRs not later than November 9, 2015
in accordance with the period prescribed in Section
4,[104] Chapter I, Resolution No. 9853. Meanwhile, Resolution
Nos. 9721 and 9863 respectively state that "[d]eactivation x x
x shall comply with the requirements on posting, ERB hearing
and service of individual notices to the deactivated
voters,"[105] and that the "Reactivation for cases falling under
this ground shall be made during the November 16, 2015
Board hearing."[106] While the proceedings are summary in
nature, the urgency of finalizing the voters' list for the
upcoming May 2016 Elections calls for swift and immediate
action on the deactivation of VRRs of voters who fail to comply
with the mandate of RA 10367. After all, in the preparation for
the May 2016 National and Local Elections, time is of the
essence. The summary nature of the proceedings does not
depart from the fact that petitioners were given the
opportunity to be heard.

Relatedly, it deserves emphasis that the public has been

sufficiently informed of the implementation of RA 10367 and
its deactivation feature. RA 10367 was duly published as early
as February 22, 2013,[107] and took effect fifteen (15) days
after.[108]Accordingly, dating to the day of its publications, all
are bound to know the terms of its provisions, including the
consequences of non-compliance. As implemented, the
process of biometrics validation commenced on July 1, 2013,
or approximately two and a half (2 1/2) years before the
October 31, 2015 deadline. To add, the COMELEC conducted a
massive public information campaign, i.e., NoBio-NoBoto,
from May 2014 until October 31, 2015, or a period of eighteen
(18) months, whereby voters were reminded to update and
validate their registration records. On top of that, the
COMELEC exerted efforts to make the validation process more
convenient for the public as it enlisted the assistance of malls
across Metro Manila to serve as satellite registration centers
and declared Sundays as working days for COMELEC offices
within the National Capital Region and in highly urbanized
cities.[109] Considering these steps, the Court finds that the
public has been sufficiently apprised of the implementation of