Cities Words and Images From Poe To Scorsese

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Cities, Words and Images
From Poe to Scorsese

Patrizia Lombardo
Professor of French and Comparative Literature
University of Geneva

© Patrizia Lombardo 2003
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Cities, words and images : from Poe to Scorsese / Patrizia Lombardo.
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Includes bibliographical references and index.
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Contents
Preface vii

Acknowledgements xiii
1 Edgar Allan Poe: The Domain of Artifice 1

2 Van Gogh and Hofmannsthal: Colours and Silence 46
3 Baudelaire, Haussmann, Fustel de Coulanges:
The Modern Metropolis and the Ancient City 62
4 Trieste as Frontier: From Slataper to Bazlen and Del Giudice 80
5 Aldo Rossi: The White Walls of the City 96
6 Massimo Cacciari and the Philosophy of the City 108
7 Absence and Revelation: Photography as the Art of Nostalgia 150
8 The Image versus the Visible: From Baudelaire’s The Painter
of Modern Life to David Lynch’s Lost Highway 174
9 Martin Scorsese and the Rhythm of the Metropolis 186
Notes 216
General Bibliography 238
Index 242

Preface

In spite of the current academic fixation on the idea that all is rhetoric,
it seems impossible to deny that cities are concrete realities. A city is a
living body, which can be harmed and maimed. Words and images
have long been used to describe the presence of cities, their physical
and mental impact on human life. In this book, I am interested in
words and images – or in literature, criticism, and the visual arts – in so
far as they are concerned with urban reality, aware that such a reality
creates a way of life and new conditions for modern art. This book
would like to emphasize the cultural role of the city.
The city is a recurrent and essential theme in literature, painting,
architecture, photography, and film. Cities have been scrutinized from
a great variety of perspectives. A substantial bibliography presents
diverse visions of a number of cities in different historical periods, as
well as of the urban phenomenon in general as a mode of living. A
classic book on this theme is The City in History: Its Origins, its
Transformations, and its Prospects, by Lewis Mumford, which explores
the architecture of a number of cities from the classical age to the
twentieth century. In Cities, Words and Images, the historical period I
investigate corresponds to the two centuries of modern life and
modern art, ‘from Poe to Scorsese’, as suggested by the subtitle. I
endorse the modernist vision of the nineteenth century as the epoch
when the urban phenomenon became overwhelming and affected the
way in which people lived and thought. From the German school of
urban sociology at the beginning of the twentieth century (Max
Weber, Georg Simmel), to Walter Benjamin and Raymond Williams,
many critics and thinkers have felt that literature and the arts – or
words and images – changed thoroughly when human beings had to
face the rise of massive industrial production and urbanization. The
metropolitan experience hinges on the continuous exchange process
that, as suggested by Max Weber, has characterized the city and its
market since the Middle Ages, and, as hinted by Simmel, has increased
since the advent of the nineteenth-century city, with the rapid circula-
tion of money and goods. This experience is fundamental for the
understanding of modern art, whatever the media, of the culture of
modernity, regardless of national frontiers. The metropolitan phenom-
enon is at the basis of today’s world.
vii

viii Preface
Edgar Allan Poe and Charles Baudelaire are inevitable references.

They are not simply two writers who described cities – so many writers
have done so. They represent, in opposition to their contemporaries,
the awareness that the urban or, more precisely, the metropolitan land-
scape is the place where modern sensitivity and modern art begin. The

emergence of the metropolis in the nineteenth century was an
awesome phenomenon: Paris and London profoundly impressed those
who observed their tantalizing growth. But the rise of metropolises
belongs also to the geography of the mind, since it entails a new way
of perceiving, feeling, thinking, and acting. This book reflects on the
link between the changes in human perception created by urbaniza-
tion, and the way in which these changes were expressed in the arts. In
order to cope with the complexity of urban reality, city dwellers had to
develop their faculty of abstraction. As understood by Poe and
Baudelaire, modern art had to include a high level of abstraction. Poe
and Baudelaire are the key figures of modernity for the most celebrated
twentieth-century critics, such as Walter Benjamin, whose visions of
the metropolitan experience have become standard references in the
global market-place of ideas.
Within Western culture, the opposition of the natural and the urban
has long inspired critical choices in aesthetics and politics. This book
first focuses on ardent reactions to the metropolitan explosion in the
nineteenth century. The visions of Poe and Baudelaire are contrasted
with those of some of their contemporaries, and I give great import-
ance to their attempt to create literary forms consistent with the pace
of modern life. Poe insisted on questions of composition and tech-
nique and thought that short forms such as the poem or the short
story best responded to the speed of contemporary life. Baudelaire’s
aesthetic conceptions integrate the relationship between the metro-
politan reality and an art capable of representing modern life, both its
concrete manifestations and its powerful abstract component. His com-
ments on Delacroix and Constantin Guys are as crucial for modern
aesthetics as his themes and style, in the verses of Les Fleurs du Mal and
in the prose poems of Le Spleen de Paris.
More recent, often incompatible attitudes towards the city are then
probed, in Europe and the United States, from rejection to idolatry. The
artistic movements in Vienna at the end of the nineteenth century and
at the beginning of the twentieth were an immediate response to the
growth of the Hapsburg capital; and they became the object of further
theoretical investigation in the late twentieth century. The urban theme
makes it necessary to consider the visions of several architects and

Preface ix
theoreticians of architecture: two central chapters in this book treat this

topic. The Italian architect Aldo Rossi conceived, from the early 1960s,
of a close relationship between the city and architecture itself; in his
reading of the Viennese architect Adolf Loos, the Italian philosopher
Massimo Cacciari provided in the 1970s the ground for the discussion

of different ideologies on the urban phenomenon.
Finally, my inquiry concentrates on a third medium: the cinema.
The works of certain film-makers, such as David Lynch and Martin
Scorsese, and particular critical issues in contemporary film theory
raised by André Bazin, Raymond Williams and Fredric Jameson, bring
into focus the role of images in our world. Films have represented
various cities for more than a century. Nevertheless, not unlike liter-
ature, film can do much more than merely capture the visual aspect of
urban landscapes. First of all, because cinema in general is itself the
realization of what has been called ‘the aesthetic of disappearance’,
which characterizes the conditions of perception in modern life.
Second, because film techniques, for example in Scorsese’s master-
pieces, render the rhythm of metropolitan life.
As I have already suggested, I am interested in the metropolitan
theme in its connection with the problem of representing and express-
ing modern life both in terms of content and form. Without the spark
of that connection, the urban landscape in literature or the arts is mere
décor, and the thematic approach remains a mere list of descriptive
examples. My perspective aims at being dynamic: this requires a con-
tinuous interplay between theoretical concern and analytical concen-
tration on specific cases. Textual scrutiny, intellectual history, and
aesthetic study do not involve, in my opinion, antagonistic methods,
just as disciplines are not isolated realms. The same urban theme or
motif links writers, architects, historians, critics and film-makers, as it
links the nineteenth century and the contemporary world, European
experiences and American ones. As I propose in one chapter, cultural
phenomena do not tally with the model of evolution but with that of
contagion.
Cultural phenomena spread like viruses, breaching temporal and geo-
graphical boundaries. Cities are at the centre of cultural life. It seems to
me that Poe’s vision of the man of the crowd as the allegory of the
metropolis, as well as the insights of Baudelaire’s aesthetics, should be
drawn on if many contentions about modern art and modern life are to
be cogent. For that reason, I interpret David Lynch’s or Martin Scorsese’s
choices in filmmaking in the light of Baudelaire’s ideas. This book
studies the real Paris of Baudelaire, the fantasized London and Paris in

x Preface
Poe’s short stories, Hofmannsthal’s or Musil’s Vienna, New York as seen

by Aldo Rossi and Martin Scorsese, and Trieste, Venice, Parma, etc., as
conceived by architects, writers, film-makers. All these images of cities
shift like a kaleidoscope that spins again and again, arranging the same
pieces in unique configurations. The visions of the artists I consider are

joined with the interpretations of contemporary critics, historians and
philosophers, for instance Massimo Cacciari, Manfredo Tafuri, Carl
Schorske, Raymond Williams, Fredric Jameson.
I always try to recreate debates within the atmosphere in which they
took place. In my reading of Cacciari, while reconstructing an intellec-
tual context now almost three decades old, I retrace the rather complex
background that makes up the general set of references for a European
scholar of my generation, who lived and taught in Europe and in the
United States. This book responds to the realization that the metropol-
itan theme has been a constant preoccupation in my research, through-
out time, a range of institutions, major influences, the real and virtual
debates with people and books, and changes in my intellectual life.
Cities, Words and Images is the result of the images and culture of the
cities that have been at the centre of my thinking and my personal ex-
perience – from years studying in Venice and Paris, to years teaching in
the USA, in Princeton, Los Angeles, and Pittsburgh, and later in Geneva.
Following a distinctive characteristic of modern aesthetics, I have
never been inclined to separate the arts and the disciplines. Cities,
images and words constitute a network of relationships that jeopardize
disciplinary divisions within the human sciences, and enhance a criti-
cal vision suspicious of post-structuralist dogmas. Although I do not
attempt to construct a linear history of the urban theme, but rather
concentrate on clusters of intellectual debate, I resist the ahistorical
trend typical of postmodernism and the contemporary mistrust of
reason; I keep away from ideological interpretive grids characteristic of
the theory of the last 30 years (logocentrism, hegemonic versus subal-
tern, female versus male, high culture versus low culture, etc.). If my
perspective is obviously influenced by contemporary critical issues,
nevertheless it remains distinct both from the traditional methods of
literary history and the latest fads of cultural studies. I could also say
that, following the logic of my metropolitan theme, I take a clear stand
in favour of the modern as opposed to the postmodern. Or I could
repeat what Roland Barthes used to say in the last years of his life: ‘I
am not afraid of being outmoded.’ On the contrary, I deplore the pro-
liferation of clichés in academic research in literature and culture: there
is now a pressing need to refurbish some of the main mottoes of the

Preface xi
seventies that my generation believed in, as in a sacred but subversive

word, and which are now so rooted in critical productions that they
have become mere academic tools. To renew might mean to go back,
within another frame of mind, to what seemed surpassed in the out-
burst of the late sixties and seventies. For example, I hold – without

any idealist or biographical purpose, simply for practical and aesthetic
reasons – to the controversial notions of authorship, work of art, and
representation. Literary criticism would probably be less dull and repet-
itive if it gave up its most popular topics and reconsidered the role of
aesthetic evaluation – a work is good or bad, successful or not success-
ful, for example, in expressing some reality. I actually try in this book
to identify some moments and ideas that are at the dividing line
between a rational analysis and an ideological reduction. I am also
convinced, like many others today, that a proper textual analysis
cannot be sustained without an effort to recreate the context or the
contexts in which the specific example gets and takes its meanings.
My method is comparative, since I believe that, in criticism, con-
tentions are made up of examples and counter-examples, of similarities
and differences, of close readings and attempts at generalization.
Therefore, I often present contrasts between two texts or authors, and I
refer, especially in the case of Baudelaire, to the same texts or even
quotations more than once in the course of this book. To focus on the
metropolitan theme also indicates that, in my opinion, literary criti-
cism deals essentially with topics and issues rather than with purely
theoretical puzzles. The thematic approach should finally allow us to
see that, in spite of the difference of media and notwithstanding
the myth that all is rhetoric, cinema carries on today many of the
important ends of literature, in particular of the novel in the nine-
teenth century: to represent the external and the internal world, to
express emotions and ideas.
If the subject of this book is the metropolitan motif in literature,
architecture and film, its form is the most typical of modern and con-
temporary criticism: the essay, a collection of essays. Several modern
critics have reflected on the form of the essay, from Simmel to
Benjamin, Musil and Barthes. The essay, as Sartre defined it, is a hybrid
genre, which blends journalistic and academic traits. It responds to the
modern need for relatively short pieces, which are adapted to today’s
rhythm of life and to the numerous situations and opportunities in
which writing may occur. The essay derives from the struggle to render
the nervous beat of an argumentation that has to be brief, effective and
persuasive. Contemporary experience cannot but reinforce the raison

xii Preface
d’être of this form. We are bombarded by empty words and images; in

the age of internet and the remote control, we are used to jumping
from one image to another: repetitions and differences spasmodically
converge and diverge. The true form of the essay resists such scattering
of perception. If it is shaped by the tensions of the contemporary

world, it nevertheless aims at an ancient value: of being composed,
finished and polished like a crafted object. Suspended between journal-
ism and erudition, research in the libraries and the impulse to speak to
the contemporary world, blurring past and present, the essay is the
form that encompasses an intellectual search and a stylistic necessity
where form and content are one.
In the emblematic ‘Man of the Crowd’, Poe’s protagonist moves
around the metropolis in a circuitous and repetitive way. Often, and
particularly in the first essay on Poe and in the last on Scorsese, I try to
construct my argument in accordance with that circuitous return to
the same point. It is, in my own stylistic terms, my homage to the city,
whose cultural values I want to endorse, all the more so after what
recently happened to New York. As Anthony Vidler wrote on
23 September 2001 in The New York Times:
real community, as evident over the last week, is bred in cities more
strongly than suburbs. The street as a site of interaction, encounter
and the support of strangers for each other; the square as a place of
gathering and vigil; the corner store a communicator of information
and interchange. These spaces, without romanticism or nostalgia,
still define an urban culture, one that resists all efforts to ‘secure’ it
out of existence.

Acknowledgements

Versions of some of the chapters of this book originally appeared,
usually in very different form, in periodicals and edited books, and some
were first presented as lectures. Chapter 3 is reprinted from Home and its
Dislocations in Nineteenth-Century France, edited by Suzanne Nash; by
permission of State University of New York Press © 1993. Chapter 4 was
published as ‘Lieu de retour ou lieu de fuite? De Slataper à Bazlen’,
Critique, 435–6 (1983). Chapter 5, as ‘Piazza d’Italia: l’architecture d’Aldo
Rossi’, Critique, 447–8 (1984). Chapter 6 was the introduction to
Massimo Cacciari, Architecture and Nihilism: On the Philosophy of Modern
Architecture (‘Theoretical Perspectives in Architectural History and
Criticism’, Mark Rakatansky, editor), translated by Stephen Sartarelli
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993), copyright © 1993
by Yale University Press. Chapter 7 appeared in Colin MacCabe and
Duncan Petrie, eds, New Scholarship from BFI Research (London: British
Film Institute, 1996). I am grateful to the respective publishers for
permission to reprint.
I am profoundly grateful to Colin MacCabe, who first suggested that
I write this book: his friendly encouragement was as precious to me as
our team-teaching at the University of Pittsburgh. Many thanks to
Thomas Martin for helping with the translation of the texts that had
been initially written in French, and to Joanna Jellinek for her thor-
ough rereading of the texts written in English. I am greatly indebted to
Antoine Compagnon and Kevin Mulligan, who read and criticized my
manuscript with generosity and acuity.
xiii

1
Edgar Allan Poe: The Domain of
Artifice

This interpretation of Poe is based on some of his most important critical
principles and emphasizes his appeal for artifice and for imagination.1
His essays, poems and short stories are strikingly coherent with his aes-
thetic beliefs and judgements. Sometimes his tales, so often connected
with fear and terror, are fictions constructed on a deep rejection of his
contemporaries, and their ethical and aesthetic myths. Although Poe did
not often mention Ralph Waldo Emerson, he relentlessly attacked his
ideas and American Transcendentalism in general. His praise of artifice
was meant to jeopardize the ideal of nature so overwhelming all through
the nineteenth century, and in the United States in particular. I will
identify key oppositions confirming the main opposition between nature
and artifice, such as a type of symbolism which understands nature as a
sign of God, as opposed to a type of symbolism which is completely
formal. In order to highlight the struggle that Poe fought against the
Transcendentalists, I lay great stress on two very different ways of treat-
ing the term ‘eye’. While for the Transcendentalists the eye is a powerful
symbol of the spirit, for Poe it is either a concrete object – a part of the
body which can be separated from the whole – or an isolated word – oral
and written.
Perhaps it is the destiny of literature and art, as much as that of
the urban setting: to trigger off an array of examples, connections,
similarities and contrasts. Meanings have to be found in this
network of relationships. My reading of Poe starts with a similarity
with Bataille: the veiled eye of Poe’s ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’ and the eye
in Bataille’s ‘Histoire de l’oeil’. My reading of this imaginative link
leads into an analysis of several essays, poems and tales by Poe,
developing the motifs implied in them, suggesting and confirming a
strong formal intention in his work. Poe was, in the first half of the

2 Cities, Words and Images
nineteenth century, aware of the need for a certain type of order in

writing: he called it ‘the poetic principle’, the mastery of the flux of
images and words by the work of composition (one of his famous
essays is called ‘The Philosophy of Composition’). Rejecting any
romantic myth of prophetic inspiration, Poe was convinced that the

author of a literary text could be something other than an almost
divine creator, could in effect be a technician using pen, paper and
words, a rational human being using logic and thought in the
process of writing and composing. Even the new was, in Poe’s
opinion, the result of composition: it was the reconstitution of old
elements according to a different order. He liked to mention other
writers:
Some Frenchman – possibly Montaigne – says: ‘People talk about

thinking, but for my part I never think, except when I sit down to
write.’ … It is certain that the mere act of inditing, tends, in a great
degree, to logicalization of thought. Whenever, on account of its
vagueness, I am dissatisfied with a conception of the brain, I resort
forthwith to the pen, for the purpose of obtaining, through its aid,
the necessary form, consequence and precision.2
The pen is the sole means we have to create the necessary order and
precision in thinking.
The image of the veiled eye which appears in ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’
may recall the eye that appeared much later, in the twentieth century,
in Bataille’s short story. The eye motif and a crime are present in both
stories. But a more striking justification for the association has to do
with the way in which a story is ‘technically’ composed with words.
The work of composing and its logic often form the basis of the
strangest short narratives. At the end of the ‘Story of the Eye’, Bataille
sets out to account for the composition of his story, and for the twists
and turns of his imagination.3 He had already thought out in some
detail the scene in the church, and Simone’s sexual behaviour, when a
host of images crowded into his mind: images from his own lived
experience fused with other mental images, which were joined by the
bookish memory of Hemingway and his account of a corrida. Then
came two other sequences of very violent images. The first sequence
turned upon a surgical, organic vision of the testicles of a bull, and of
their resemblance to the eye, while the second involved a childhood
memory of his blind father and of the white cornea of his eyes. All
these images apparently formed the basis of a mental fixation. The

Edgar Allan Poe 3
images in the ‘Story of the Eye’ thus derive at one and the same time
from books, from real life, from scientific observation and from a
psychic interiorization. This heterogeneity in turn gives rise to an
association of the eye with other elements, such as the egg that recurs
continually throughout the text. An alliterative link between the oe in

oeil and the oe in oeuf establishes an anagrammatic association. The
image is then confused with the sound: the white of the cornea and
the white of the egg, the roundness of the eyeball and the roundness
of the bull’s testicles.
Roland Barthes thinks that the ‘Story of the Eye’ is not the story of
something or of someone, but rather the story of an object, the eye.4 It
is a sequence of migrations of this object and a linguistic game that
simply reverses the terms of ordinary language and the figures in every-
day use. The narrative is disquieting because it is the eyes, not the eggs,
that are broken. The conventional correspondences are disrupted, and
it is no longer a matter of casser un oeuf (‘breaking an egg’) and crever un
oeil (‘blinding an eye’), but of casser un oeil (‘breaking an eye’) and
crever un oeuf (‘blinding an egg’).
What could be more violent or more scandalous than to treat the
eye as a banal object, to be trampled, forgotten, broken, reduced to
detritus, annihilated in the violence of death and blood? For the eye is
the quintessential romantic and idealist symbol, representing know-
ledge and the perfection of nature. It is the privileged locus of the
myth of expressivity, and signifies the transparency of the soul and of
the subject, the metaphor of truth – so dear to Goethe and his
follower Emerson. Above all else, the eye must not be veiled, although
that is precisely what happens in the case of the old man in Poe’s ‘The
Tell-Tale Heart’.
In the texts of Bataille and of Poe, the eye loses both its scientific and
its metaphysical dignity, its value as moral symbol and as an instrument
of precision. It loses its ideal transparency and its clinical cleanliness,
becoming instead an obscene thing and the object of an absurd act and
of a veritable fixation.
The eye as object
Poe rehearsed many possible readings of the eye as object. Thus,

Annabel Lee has eyes that shine like stars:
And the stars never rise, but I feel the bright eyes
Of the beautiful ANNABEL LEE.5

In the poem ‘To Helen’, the poet sees celestial eyes:
All – all expired save thee – save less than thou:

Save only the divine light in thine eyes –
Save but the soul in thine uplifted eyes.

I saw but them – they were the world to me.
I saw but them – saw only them for hours –
Saw only them until the moon went down.6
And the narrator of ‘Eleonora’ while telling the sad story of the death
of his beloved cousin Eleonora recalls that ‘the bright eyes of Eleonora
grew brighter at my words’.7 Above all there are the eyes of Ligeia in
‘Ligeia’. The setting and mood of this tale are romantic, even to excess:
like characters in a Gothic novel, the narrator and his beloved, Ligeia,
live in an isolated castle, worshipping solitude, literature and meta-
physics. The large black eyes of Ligeia are suffused with an expression
which transcends any physical attribute, touching the very soul. The
narrator tries to describe Ligeia’s eyes, their extraordinary effect: ‘The
“strangeness,” however, which I found in the eyes was of a nature distinct
from the formation, or the color, or the brilliancy of the features, and
must, after all, be referred to the expression.’8
The expression of the eyes of Ligeia is so compelling that the narrator
loses himself in the eyes of his beloved, resolved to discover the secret
hidden in their expression. ‘I found, in the commonest objects of the
universe, a circle of analogies to that expression.’ Words and phrases in
this avowal derive from transcendentalist thought, which both Ligeia
and the narrator are familiar (‘Her presence, her readings alone rendered
vividly luminous the many mysteries of the transcendentalism in
which we were immersed’). Thus, ‘circle’, ‘analogy’ and ‘expression’ are
terms that seem to be taken directly from R. W. Emerson’s theory of
symbols; perhaps from ‘Circles’, an essay devoted entirely to eyes and
their transcendental power. However, using this same terminology, Poe
in fact undermines Emersonian doctrine.
Once Poe’s narrator realizes that Ligeia’s eyes are extraordinary, he
reverses the equivalencies posited by the Transcendentalists. For Emerson,
neither the universe nor any objects in it could ever compare with the
expression of eyes. On the contrary, it was the eye which gave meaning
to the beauty of the universe – a reference to the perfection of the Spirit.
(Emerson read Hegel belatedly, and was astonished to find how similar
their conceptions were). The key Emersonian formula is ‘each and all’,
which is the title of one of his poems9: ‘each’ – the detail, microcosm,

Edgar Allan Poe 5
little object or singular thing – could be a representation of ‘all’, of the

whole. The microcosm only has meaning as part of the macrocosm. Thus,
Emerson would speak of the shells that captivated him, and that he loved
to gather by the seashore. When he returned home, however, and looked
at the shells, separated from their whole, from the sea, the sun and the

sand – in short, from the organic system of which they were a part – they
lost their beauty and were no more than dull little grey objects. Each
thing has its meaning in the whole to which it belongs.
Ligeia’s eyes are a part, or a physical detail, but they mean every-
thing in themselves. Poe’s narrator seeks to bend the whole – all the
objects in the universe – in order to regain something of this detail that
he loves so much. He completely reverses the transcendentalist relation
between microcosm and macrocosm. The separate object has much
more meaning then the wholeness of nature. Moreover, vision was for
idealist thinkers the least sensual of the senses. Indeed, it was held to
be a spiritual sense allowing a glimpse of God, or of the divine forms.
S. T. Coleridge, who had exerted a profound influence upon all the
American transcendentalists and upon Poe, reckoned that ‘nothing is
wanted but the eye, which is the light of this House, the light which
is the eye of this soul. The seeing light, this enlightening eye, is
Reflection.’10 Emerson would sometimes elaborate still further upon
this religious symbolism, derived from Saint Matthew, who had called
the eye the light of the body. In his famous essay ‘Nature’, the New
England transcendentalist relived the Saint’s ecstatic experience of the
universality of Spirit:
Standing on the bare ground, – my head bathed by the blithe air and
uplifted into infinite space, – all mean egotism vanishes. I become a
transparent eyeball. I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the
Universal Being circulate through me; I am part or parcel of God.11
The eye, in Emerson’s opinion, has a natural magic, and is capable of

becoming transparent and of apprehending nature as representation of
Spirit. This chain of idealist symbols is infinite. Emerson, concerned to
define precisely what an idealist is, insists that, rather than denying ‘the
sensuous facts’, the idealist indeed yields to the evidence, but at the same
time knows how to see beyond: ‘He does not deny the presence of this
table, this chair, and the wall of this room, but he looks at these things as
the reverse side of the tapestry, as the other end, each being a sequel or
completion of a spiritual fact which nearly concerns him.’12 The sensuous
fact is supposed to be merely the other side of a spiritual fact.

Emerson uses the image of the tapestry and, given that the eye is a
symbol, the tapestry becomes one also: they both lead to nature and the
Spirit. Poe, having reversed the idealist’s ‘each’ and ‘all’ in his quest for
objects in the universe that might resemble the expression in Ligeia’s
eyes, disrupts the Emersonian image of the tapestry still more. He takes

the image literally, for metaphor in his texts merges into words and casts
off their symbolism (in ‘The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar’, Valdemar
can say quite literally ‘I am dead’, because he was mesmerized at the very
moment he dies, in articulo mortis). In ‘Ligeia’, the protagonist of the
story, confined to his decadently furnished apartment, after Ligeia’s
death, is hemmed in and haunted by the tapestry, on the other side of
which there is indeed something, namely mechanical objects that
produce a wind and cause the fabric to move with a hideous and disturb-
ing animation: ‘The phantasmagoric effect [of the tapestry] was vastly
heightened by the artificial introduction of a strong continual current of
wind behind the draperies – giving an hideous and uneasy animation to
the whole.’13 The spirit behind things has become a technical device
pure and simple and nothing more.
One cannot forget that, despite all the tenets of Romantic naturalism
and symbolism, Ligeia’s eyes resemble (the Greek for resemble is
symballein) something that is not of the order of nature, but of reading or
of books. What the narrator feels upon seeing the extraordinary eyes of
his wife is a sensation markedly similar to the impression left ‘by certain
sounds from stringed instruments, and not infrequently by passages from
books’.14
Not only does Ligeia have eyes that may be compared to passages
taken from books, but she is herself a woman who lives, and has lived,
among books. The narrator says at the beginning of the story: ‘I have
spoken of the learning of Ligeia: it was immense’,15 as was that of
Morella, another woman in Poe’s tales, whose life was taken up with
serious study and intense discussion of ‘the wild Pantheism of Fichte; the
modified Παλιγγενεσια of Pythagoreans; and, above all, the doctrines of
Identity as urged by Schelling’.16
The women in Poe’s stories have often been likened to ghosts or
vampires, and critics have interpreted them in biographical terms, as if
they suggested that Poe was impotent or haunted by women who were
life and death at one and the same time.17 But in fact these women are
often the materialization of a reading, of a book, or of a fragment of a
text. Ligeia, for example, dies because of the lack of will shown by
human beings when faced with death, yet she mysteriously returns
after death by an act of will when the narrator’s second wife is on her

Edgar Allan Poe 7
deathbed. Ligeia did not wish to die, nor to be dead. She is pale and
delicate, slender as the leaf of a book; the characteristics of German
erudition are embodied in her. Like a philologist in the Romantic tradi-
tion, ‘in the classical tongues [she was] deeply proficient’, and, the
narrator continues, ‘as far as my own acquaintance extended in regard

to the modern dialects of Europe, I have never known her at fault’.18
Thus does her husband, who is the narrator, describe her, and for him
her whole being, her fascination, charm and beauty are summed up in
a passage taken from a book by Joseph Glanvill. Ligeia is this quotation,
which stands as an epigraph at the beginning of the tale, and which is
repeated when the narrator says that her eyes have the same effect on
him as the reading of certain passages. The passage quoted, one of a
thousand which might equally well have been chosen, runs as follows:
And the will therein lieth, which dieth not. Who knoweth the
mysteries of the will, with its vigor? For God is but a great will
pervading all things by nature of its intentness. Man doth not yield
himself to the angels, nor unto death utterly, save only through the
weakness of his feeble will.19
This passage forms Ligeia’s own story, until, by her extreme act of will,
she comes back, or appears in person, in front of her husband at the
end of the tale.
Likewise, the story of Morella, a woman who dies giving birth to a
child whom the narrator will call by the mother’s name, is merely the
enactment of a passage from Schelling on identity. The identity of the
two Morella is such that the narrator is not surprised to discover, when
burying his daughter, that her mother’s tomb is empty. He laughs a
long and bitter laugh. For he had never been truly seized by love for this
deeply learned woman, despite the genuine affection he felt for her, and
he had never shared her passion for mysticism and for German litera-
ture. If he allows himself be drawn into the study of the accursed
pages, entering the labyrinth of Morella’s reading, it is not without a
sense of terror, and a shadow falling across his soul. Morella, for her
part, touches him with her cold hand, which seemed like the hand of a
dead woman, gathering up a few strange words ‘from the ashes of a
dead philosophy’.20 The hand is chill as death, and dead too is the
philosophy upon which Morella fed. The narrator is anything but
fascinated by all that Morella loves, whether it is theological morality,
or the theories of Fichte and of Schelling. Elsewhere, in an aphorism
from his ‘Marginalia’, Poe says that nine times out of ten it is a pure

waste of time to expect to extract any meaning from a German maxim.

Here, in ‘Morella’, German philosophy, the doctrines of identification
and of the totality of the self, and the faith in the eternally homogeneous
(the initial epigraph, on unity, is taken from Plato’s Symposium: ‘Itself, by
itself solely, ONE everlasting, and single’), are judged to be dead.

Like ‘Ligeia’, ‘Morella’ is also the story of the relationship with
books, but Morella materializes books that are not loved, and that are
concerned with a philosophy the narrator cannot accept. Although Poe
had written a prose poem on unity, entitled Eureka, this tale is a cri-
tique of idealism and of its mystical aspect:
Morella’s erudition was profound… . I soon, however, found that,

perhaps on account of her Pressburg education, she placed before me
a number of those mystical writings which are usually considered the
mere dross of the early German literature. These, for what reason I
could not imagine, were her favourite and constant study – and that,
in process of time they became my own, should be attributed to the
simple but effectual influence of habit and example.
In all this, if I err not, my reason had little to do. My convictions,
or I forget myself, were in no manner acted upon the ideal, nor was
any tincture of the mysticism which I read, to be discovered, unless
I am greatly mistaken, either in my deeds or in my thoughts.21
‘Morella’ is to some extent the negative image of ‘Ligeia’. For the two
tales do in fact form part of what one may term the cycle of women,
along with ‘Berenice’ and ‘Eleonora’. But the latter two women are vital,
full of energy, agile, graceful and youthful, while Morella and Ligeia are
erudite, one educated at Pressburg, the other from an old German family.
Both are immersed in their books, steeped in their culture. But Ligeia is
like a beautiful and beloved quotation, and loved in much the same
fashion; and she writes a poem, ‘The Conqueror Worm’, which also
features among Poe’s own poems; like a beautiful quotation, and one that
has made an impression on us, she does not die, she comes back. As the
figure for the will to live, she can finally win death, in accordance with
the passage from Glanvill that inspired the same feelings as her eyes had
done. Conversely, Morella, who is not wholly loved, returns a second
time as the baleful outcome of her own reading; once dead, she lives
again in her own daughter, named after her, in order to die yet again, so
that she may efface herself in the absolutely identical, in the terrible
identity of death. Should we not hear in the name of both mother and
daughter the initial letters of the sombre Latin word mors?

Edgar Allan Poe 9
Poe’s tales are peopled with books, readings and libraries, but the
book as object differs completely from the book as symbol of the
Transcendentalists. The Bible, the book of the truth according to
them, and to Emerson in particular, effaces all the other books, since
it is the one book capable of saying everything, and renders all the

others pointless. The Good Book would thus be unique, and would
annihilate the thousands upon thousands of quotations from various
texts that gave so much pleasure to the narrator of ‘Ligeia’. Emerson,
on the other hand, praised Plato in terms of a paradox that would be
quite inconceivable for Poe’s characters: ‘Among secular books, Plato
only is entitled to Omar’s fanatical compliment to the Koran, when
he said: “Burn the libraries; for their value is in this book.”’22 Anti-
Transcendentalists cannot conceive of the one and only Book, but
seek out the plurality of objects, and thus of books in their infinite
quantity, or fragmented into the innumerable passages that could be
reconstituted here and there, according to a hidden order. If, in his
tales, Poe invariably, or almost invariably, feels obliged to refer to a
book, or to a sentence that he has read, it is because he realizes that
nothing exists in the first degree, that life is already in books, that, in
some ways, there is no difference between literature and life and that
we live in a forest of references. Before Borges, Poe constructed his
stories around erudite or fictitiously erudite references. 23
There is an uncountable number of books. Since the world is not
nature, the world is a library, an infinite collection of sheets of paper
accumulated over time. Hermann Melville laid down an equally
violent challenge to the transcendentalist love of nature. In a
chapter of Moby Dick called ‘Cetology’, he classifies the family of
whales. Yet it is not exactly a zoological sketch, for these mammals
are catalogued after the fashion of books in libraries, as quarto,
octavo, folio, etc.:
First: According to the magnitude I divide the Whales into three

primary BOOKS (subdivisible into CHAPTERS), and these shall
comprehend them all, both small and large. 1. The FOLIO WHALE,
2. The OCTAVO WHALE, 3. The DUODECIMO WHALE. As the
type of the FOLIO I present The Sperm Whale, of the OCTAVO,
The Grampus, of the DUODECIMO, The Porpoise.24
What could be more anti-transcendentalist? Melville completely over-

turns Emerson’s concept of nature, seeing the organic in non-natural
terms, in that order of written objects known as books.

Objects are artificial, constructed, produced by a technique, and are

something other than nature. Where Emerson loved the countryside
and the open air, Poe, and his narrators, love objects, rooms furnished
in curious ways, as in ‘The Philosophy of Furniture’, and cities, like
London, as in ‘The Man of the Crowd’, or Paris, as in ‘The Murders in

the Rue Morgue’. The anti-transcendentalist programme was to
denaturalize nature, to treat symbols as objects or as mathematical
symbols, and to love artifice. Nature is not perfect. Mr Ellison, the
wealthy heir in ‘The Domain of Arnheim, or the Landscape Garden’, is
quite prepared to play down the role of nature:
In the most enchanting of natural landscapes, there will always be

found a defect or an excess – many excesses and defects … In short,
no position can be attained on the wide surface of the natural earth,
from which an artistical eye, looking steadily, will not find matter of
offence in what is termed the ‘composition’ of the landscape.25
Artistic vision and analytic observation lay bare the shortcomings of

the natural landscape. Poe’s character delivers on nature a judgement
that reverses Emerson’s pronouncement regarding shells: for Mr Ellison
it is in the detail that nature can defy ‘the highest skill of the artist’.26
How could one ever hope to imitate the colours or the proportions of
flowers? Yet human skill is far more effective than nature when it
comes to combining and assembling: the same mathematical laws and
the same variations and contrasts in style may be employed in the art
of designing a garden as are used in the construction of a building. The
totality of nature that so delighted Emerson failed to satisfy Poe, for
whom the whole had to be the effect of a calculated combination.
Besides, for Poe, original beauty is not the greatest beauty. Where
Emerson regretted the loss of natural synthesis when he looked at
shells separated from the sea, the fortunate owner of the domain of
Arnheim asserted his anti-transcendentalist principle: ‘The original
beauty is never so great as that which may be introduced.’27 Mr Ellison
treats nature as one might treat objects, or the parts of a machine.
Ligeia’s eyes are a whole world in themselves, and yet they undergo a
dangerous, hallucinatory metamorphosis, which completely trans-
forms them into objects. These big black eyes, that bear comparison
with no others, will appear long after the death of Lady Ligeia, at the
wake for the second dead wife, Lady Rowena, when the narrator is
gripped by a profound doubt. An ‘inexpressible madness’ makes him
think that she whom he sees rising up again from her deathbed is not

Edgar Allan Poe 11
Lady Rowena, but Ligeia. The eyes are the proof, for they are not pale
blue, as those of the English woman are, but black:
And now slowly opened the eyes of the figure which stood before
me. ‘Here then, at least,’ I shrieked aloud, ‘can I never – can I never

be mistaken – there are the full, and the black, and the wild eyes –
of my lost love – of the Lady – of the LADY LIGEIA.28
In her psychoanalytical study, Marie Bonaparte, Freud’s student,

took the view that the four tales concerned with women were a cycle
that hinged upon the theme of the living-dead mother, and she noted
the importance of Ligeia’s eyes, interpreting their appearance as a verit-
able obsession, with the big black eyes being those of Elisabeth Arnold,
Poe’s mother. ‘It is with this exalted fervour,’ she wrote, ‘that Edgar
Poe spoke, without knowing it, of the maternal eyes, which had
remained forever living in his unconscious memory.’29 Marie
Bonaparte further emphasizes that Poe himself had recalled that the
tale of Ligeia had been conceived ‘after a dream in which some eyes,
simply some strange and fascinating eyes, had appeared to him’. 30 The
eyes are themselves perceived as isolated, separated from everything
else, as if they were pure objects. They thus disturb the habitual paths
of meaning, because they offer themselves literally, eluding romantic
metaphor and moral symbolism. Poe, like Bataille, sees eyes as objects.
One could do what one wished with those little round objects. One
could look at them through a microscope, as Bataille does, to discover
if they resemble something else. One could also remove them from a
head, a temptation that can assail even the mildest of men, such as the
narrator of ‘The Black Cat’. The poor wretch had drunk too much one
night, came home late, was scratched by the cat and, possessed by a
furious rage against the animal, drew ‘from his waistcoat-pocket a
penknife’, a tiny little object, and ‘opened it, grasped the poor beast by
the throat, and deliberately cut one of its eyes from the socket!’31 He
removed one of the eyes, just as one might remove the stone of an
apricot: ‘I blush, I burn, I shudder, while I pen the damnable atrocity.’32
In English, of course, you merely have to delete an s to pass from eyes
to eye. Language thus lends its authority to the deed: why not do with
‘a penknife’ what one can do with ‘a pen’, in the most innocent of
grammatical exercises, and add or take away the plural?
As objects, the eyes can become unbearable, and betoken disgust,
monstrosity or obscenity. This is because ‘eye’ or ‘eyes’, taken for the
totality of the body and its spiritual existence, then cease to be treated

as a direct expression of love and of the soul, and come to be regarded

as a metaphor for the gaze that can see all – that is, the eye of God.
Without the metaphor of knowledge, Oedipus would stand con-
demned; without the natural symmetry of the body, you would have a
monster like Polyphemus. For the blind have a symbolic dignity. Thus,

Oedipus could only see when he could no longer see in the physical
sense; Homer and Milton, with their blinded eyes, are the quintessen-
tial poets. But the one-eyed man prompts the violence of the sacred; he
provokes laughter (Bataille) or horror (Poe). The single eye, the literal
eye or the eye-as-object, detached from the body and from medical
observation, is anti-natural, escapes the organically natural, the natur-
ally accepted metaphors. Taking a metaphor literally means perverting
meanings, passing from a symbol burdened with signification to the
material violence of the word; it means treating a word as a thing or as
another kind of symbol, no longer moral but mathematical, and one
which does not refer to some higher transcendental entity. Words for
poets are like colours for painters or notes for musicians: the matter
upon which or with which the artists manufacture their work. The
poetic word is not a message, and is not didactic; it has a life of its
own, combines with other words, and is then open to suggestions and
associations. Suggestion is the opposite of a clear-cut message, and is
akin to a subterranean current of thoughts, invisible and indefinite, as
Poe likes to point out in his ‘Philosophy of Composition’. It is the
nakedness of a word, like that of an object, that alone can engender a
cascading sequence of images. In his essay, Poe speaks of the bare word
that shocks the eye and the ear of the artist and therefore gives rise to
suggestion. ‘Nevermore’, the adverb which continually comes back in
the poem ‘The Raven’, has to be said, uttered, heard, repeated,
expected in the refrain, and it carries ‘the most delicious because the
most intolerable of sorrow’.33 As Mallarmé observed, one merely has to
speak of a flower and ‘out of the oblivion to which my voice consigns
no outline, there rises up musically, as something other than the
flower’s known chalices, the idea itself, and sweet, the fragrance of all
posies’.34
Suppose we take the word eye – sole, isolated – and let it become
voice or sound. We then have to listen to it, to hear it and to rehearse
all its virtualities. Suppose we complete the isolation of the word, as
Mallarmé suggests, suspending the swing between ‘meaning and
sound’, and we can feel ‘the surprise of never having heard such a
banal fragment, at the same time as we feel that the reminiscence of
the said object is bathed in a new atmosphere’.35

Edgar Allan Poe 13
Eye-I
Where as Ligeia’s eyes and the eye of the cat in ‘The Black Cat’ are treated
as single objects, the eye of the old man in ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’ is both a
specific object and a word-as-object, ‘eye’. As I have suggested at the

beginning, the composition of texts is a theme of great importance in
Poe’s criticism. Baudelaire translated ‘The Philosophy of Composition’
under the title ‘La Génèse d’un poème’. The term ‘composition’ has two
advantages over ‘genesis’. It does not refer to anything natural or organic
and it belongs wholly within a technical or artisan terminology. In this
essay, Poe countered the Transcendentalist exaltation of content with an
insistence upon form. He deemed a formalist approach essential to the
composition of a poem. It matters little whether Poe wrote his poem ‘The
Raven’ before he formulated his theory or vice versa, for what counts is
that he behaved as a poet confronting the bareness of the isolated word:
the word is a precise matter for the poet and it is a source of suggestion,
an infinite vagueness.
Poe identified two types of the vague: one negative the other positive.
Negative vagueness is confusion in the brain, the lack of clarity in
thought, which demands the work of the pen in order to think, as in the
passage from ‘Marginalia’ quoting Montaigne above. Positive vagueness
is the element of ‘indefinitiveness’ that produces a ‘spiritual effect’.
Praising Tennyson, Poe wrote in 1844: ‘There are passages in his works
which rivet a conviction I had long entertained, that the indefinite is an
element of the true ποιησις… . I know that indefinitiveness is an element
of the true music – I mean of the true musical expression.’36
Poe was particularly entranced by diction and by the letters of the
alphabet. He contemplated the effects of sounds and written letters with
‘the attentive faculty’ that characterized many of his protagonists, both
the dreamy types such as Egaeus, for example, and the ratiocinative types
such as Dupin. He was fascinated with various alphabets, alliterations,
anagrams, rebuses, secret codes, and the peculiar mixture of sound and
meaning that is in itself a word or sometimes a single letter. As Poe
explained in ‘The Philosophy of Composition’, his poem ‘The Raven’ was
composed as a kind of music owing its rhythm to the refrain
‘Nevermore’, its sound conjuring a flux of melancholy dreams – what in
the article on Tennyson he called the ‘luxury of dreams’ or the ‘atmos-
phere of the mystic’.37 The sequence of rhymes, and letters were to him
akin to musical notes, with a life of their own, and with the power of sug-
gestion. These principles are at the root of his poetics. Poe would allow
himself to be captivated by the sound of letters to the extent of confusing

the written letter with the sound; he chose names full of liquid and nasal
sounds such as ‘Morella’, ‘Ligeia’ or ‘Annabel Lee’. He was as acquainted
with the music of vowels as the symbolist poets of the second half of the
century, and he knew how to listen to anagrams and alliterations. This is
the case with the protagonist of ‘Berenice’, Egaeus, who, shut up in his

library, surrounded by his precious books, would endlessly repeat a word
until all its meaning was quite lost, and only the fascination with the
pure sound remained. And then there is the suggestive effect of that
name: ‘Berenice! – I call upon her name – Berenice! – and from the gray
ruins of memory a thousand tumultuous recollections are startled at the
sound!’38
In Poe’s oeuvre, then, the highly rich, vague and elusive, and the
extremely precise, are two complementary sides of the same temptation.
He speaks both of ‘ratiocinative tales’ and of ‘suggestive tales’, and for
him rigorous mathematic is one aspect of poetry, as implied in the essay
‘The Rationale of Verse’, the other aspect being suggestion. Traditionally,
critics have acknowledged this dual aspect of poetry in Poe, but have
turned it into an opposition between the rational and the irrational. It is a
matter, however, of two tendencies deriving from a single movement: a
concern with the possibilities of sounds and letters. The relationship
between logic and suggestion is of the same order as that between theory
and practice. Literature and poetry do not arise from the kind of sponta-
neous impulse, that would be characteristic of ‘a simple soul’, according
to the belief of many of Poe’s American contemporaries, for example the
poet James Russel Lowell, who was ‘infected with the poetical conven-
tionalities of the day’.39 To argue in such terms is to fall into a ‘common
error’, failing to acknowledge the importance of theoretical principles in
the work of a writer. Theory means a thorough consideration of the effect
upon the reader. It implies rhetorical awareness, since all the parts of
rhetoric are important to Poe, as is evident in his critical works: inventio,
dispositio, elocutio and actio, or the subject, the composition of the differ-
ent parts, the words and figures chosen, and finally the diction.
Logic and suggestion both possess the same exacting quality, for
analysis is essential to each, with the writer needing to consider the
smallest details and be adept at cutting up or laying bare the elements
of speech. Division, and work on the separate parts is followed by
recombination, as in a laboratory experiment. Poe himself employs
terms drawn from chemistry in his discussion of the imagination, a
faculty crucial both to suggestion and to logic:
The pure Imagination chooses, from either Beauty or Deformity, only

the most combinable things hitherto uncombined; the compound,

Edgar Allan Poe 15
as a general rule, partaking, in character, of beauty, or sublimity, in

the ratio of the respective beauty or sublimity of the things com-
bined – which are themselves still to be considered as atomic – that
is to say, as previous combinations. But, as often analogously
happens in physical chemistry, so not unfrequently does it occur in

this chemistry of the intellect, that the admixture of two elements
results in a something that has nothing of the qualities of one of
them, or even nothing of the qualities of either.40
A concern with details, or the most minuscule parts of things, may

eventually become a reverie, even a fixation. This was the case with
Egaeus in ‘Berenice’, who, in his fascination with the monotonous
repetition of a word, was capable of studying for days a small drawing
on the cover of a book. He explains his ‘morbid irritability of those
properties of the mind in metaphysical science termed the attentive’:
To muse for long unwearied hours, with my attention riveted to

some frivolous device on the margin or in the typography of a book;
to become absorbed, for the better part of a summer’s day, in a
quaint shadow falling aslant upon the tapestry or upon the floor; to
lose myself, for an entire day, in watching the steady flame of a
lamp, or the embers in a fire; to dream away whole days over the
perfume of a flower; to repeat, monotonously, some common word,
until the sound, by dint of frequent repetition, ceased to convey any
idea whatever to the mind.41
This intense contemplative activity leads Egaeus to become obsessed

with Berenice’s teeth:
The teeth! – the teeth! – they were here, and there, and everywhere,
and visibly and palpably before me; long, narrow, and excessively
white, with the pale lips writhing about them … Then came the full
fury of my monomania, and I struggled in vain against its strange
and irresistible influence. In the multiplied objects of the external
world I had no thoughts but for the teeth.42
It may be that the object of the fixation, the word subject to detailed
analysis, is eye. Thus, in Bataille’s ‘Story of the Eye’ there is a fixation
with oeil-oeuf (eye-egg), while in Poe’s ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’ there is a
fixation with ‘eye-I’. ‘Eye’ and ‘I’ are homophones in English, and Poe,
in order to disrupt romantic metaphors, puts a terrible, maddening
leucoma upon the eye, ‘a pale blue eye, with a film over it’43. The

narrator, who lives with the old man, becomes obsessed with the white
eye of the old man.
The Transcendentalists, and Emerson in particular, had often been the
target of Poe’s polemics, and ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’ seems to be a veiled
comment on Emerson, who had expressly written ‘Circles’ in order to

vaunt the moral value of the eye as a symbol. Poe’s judgement is clear:
‘When I consider the true talent – the real force of Mr. Emerson, I am lost
in amazement at finding in him little more than a respectful imitation of
Carlyle.’44 The conclusion to this passage, which involves a comparison
between Emerson and Aruntius, the historian of the Punic Wars and
imitator of Sallust, is still more cutting in tone: ‘If there is any difference
between Aruntius and Emerson, this difference is clearly in favor of the
former, who was in some measure excusable, on the ground that he was
as great a fool as the latter is not.’ Poe, who was well acquainted with
Emerson’s Essays, rejected both their ideology and their style.
If for the Transcendentalists, followers of Fichte, the eye represented
the fullness of the self, the plenitude of spiritual vision and of idealist
Reason, of the world and the soul, eye could never be understood as a
pure sound, or as a naked word, and could never be cut free from the
chains of Spirit. For, transcendentalist Reason was not the mathematical
logic of ‘The Rationale of Verse’. Conversely, the reason of which Poe
speaks corresponds to the formal and metrical technique employed in
the composition of poems. For the Transcendentalists, Reason is more or
less equivalent to the Hegelian Spirit. Poe only mentions Hegel twice:
once in order to qualify as ‘jargon’ the language of the philosopher,45
and a second time in order to criticize the ‘shamefully over-estimated’
poet Rufus Dawes,46 who was terribly keen on German philosophy and
its obscurity. ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’, the short story of the eye, should be
read as a profound critique of the blindness of idealist reason, and begins
with an allusion to madness. The transcendental symbol of the eye has
become the object of an absurd crime, of an intricate mental operation
that questions the boundary between reason and madness:
True! – nervous – very, very dreadfully nervous I had been and am;
but why will you say that I am mad? … How, then, am I mad?
Hearken! and observe how healthily – how calmly I can tell you the
whole story.47
The crime had no precise object, and yet the narrator soon realizes
that he wished to kill the old man because of his veiled eye, which
resembled that of a vulture. It was the eye that haunted him. ‘Object

Edgar Allan Poe 17
there was none’, but it was on account of the object-eye that the narra-
tor committed his crime, for he had nothing against the old man. It was
necessary to be rid of this eye, perhaps because the object was not very
clear, for the eye was veiled. The first person, the I, has consciousness,
and consciousness – Emerson would claim – is transparent to itself and

apprehends itself as such. But in ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’ subject and object
coincide and there is little room for consciousness: everything depends
on ‘I’/‘eye’, a word, a sound, a little piece that can be composed and
recomposed. The narrator has then to ‘rid [him]self of the eye forever’.
This may appear the act of a madman, yet the crime is executed with
such care and intelligence that it seems to represent the purest logic.
So it is that the tale translated by Baudelaire under the title ‘Le Coeur
révélateur’ begins with an allusion to both logic and madness. However,
révélateur is not an accurate rendering of the term ‘tell-tale’, which con-
tains a verb and a noun, and functions as an adjective. ‘Eye’ and ‘I’ share
the same sound, so that the shift from the written to the oral word
opens up a gulf of suggestions. For the poet who was mesmerized by
‘Nevermore’, suggestions come both from sound and meanings. ‘Tell-
tale’ produces a burst of alliterations around the letters t and l, modu-
lated across a scale of vowels that runs from the sound e to the sound a,
while the lexicon likewise causes the grammar to shelter verb, noun and
adjective in the heart of words: ‘Tell-tale heart (title)’ – ‘True’! (the first
word of the text). Within the acrobatic movement of alliteration, the tale
thus begins with a judgement qualifying the statement as true.
A logical absurdity (killing someone because of his veiled eye, and not
for his money), is also a moral absurdity (you must not kill), but here the
dividing line between positive and negative is uncertain. So much for
Kantian morality in Poe’s view (Poe knew Kant through Coleridge): his
scorn for the great masters of morality among his contemporaries is
evident in his reduction of questions of moral duty of to a linguistic
game. Human consciousness in Poe’s stories is either the world of crime
and fear or what he called ‘the attentive faculty of the mind’ – the capac-
ity of concentrating intellectually and emotionally on a detail.
The narrator of ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’ continues his account of events up
to the crime and the final revelation to the police. Why should you think
me mad if I have committed my crime by means of actions so precisely
performed that they seem to embody the most perfect logic? This is the
argument of the narrator who, being a sort of pathological Cartesian,
knows that if one can reason, one cannot be mad. ‘You fancy me mad.
Madmen know nothing.’ He carefully applies all the rules of reason: his
self is the subject of his knowledge: ‘Object there was none. Passion there

was none… . For his gold I had no desire.’ Subsequently, the evidence
appears, and he attains certainty: ‘I think it was his eye! yes, it was this!’48
The initial utterance (‘True!’) is immediately merged with the
emphatic adverbs ‘very, very dreadfully’, and the twice-repeated adjec-
tive ‘nervous’ lends an air of excess to the word I when it first appears,

reinforced by the inversion of the whole sentence, which runs: ‘nervous
– very, very dreadfully nervous I had been and am’. I, the subject, shows
up, while speaking. But who is this subject? And who is he speaking to?
In ‘Morella’, Poe undermines Fichte’s doctrine of the absolute
subject. Here Poe constructs a dark and sardonic parody of the subject,
who hallucinates around a detail, the veiled eye, and a sound in lan-
guage, I. Poe often complained about the lack of a satirical tradition
within American poetry; he wrote many humorous tales – namely The
Tales of the Grotesque and Arabesque – and he burned, in the presence of
his friends, his very first work, a comic tale entitled ‘Gaffy’.49 The
pathological quality of Poe’s characters has therefore a double aspect:
on the one hand it investigates the labyrinth of mental terror, and on
the other it is the satirical, exaggerated representation of a theory taken
to such extreme consequences that it inevitably fails. Thus, the narra-
tor of ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’ is both the parody of a Cartesian and a
haunted mind. This second aspect explains Poe’s strong appeal to
the modern appetite for the tragic and the negative, but too often his
satirical or even sardonic mood is neglected.
Poe knows that a well-thought-out composition makes a strong
emotional impact on the reader, and that some stereotypes are effec-
tive; he maintains that ‘The Raven’ is constructed on the combined
effects of the musical refrain of ‘Nevermore’ and the image of a beauti-
ful dead woman. Why should a tale not work in the same way as a
poem? It can play simultaneously on the powerful idea of murder and
on the effect of words with the same sound and different meanings. So
the elements of the alchemy can simply be ‘eye’-‘I’ and a crime: then it
is up to the writer to combine all this in the most extraordinary way.
The writer, or the poet, is an alchemist, a technician of the pen,
working with letters, words, sentences and images – just as a mathe-
matician works with numerals. For there are only twenty-six letters,
and all these little symbols are combined to form words, which in their
turn make up sentences – just as numerals combine to form complex
numerals and equations. There are also laws of composition, language
allowing a constant interplay between rules and freedom. I can choose
my words but I must subject them to some rules, and bind them
together according to syntax.

Edgar Allan Poe 19
Words are akin to numeral symbols; they are not moral symbols.
They are abstract, not spiritual, correspondences of Nature and God. A
non-natural conception of language, such as Poe had, entails an inves-
tigation of anagrams, since these are a real linguistic game and show
the ‘chemistry’ of letters and phonemes. Poe in fact built up a whole

story around an anagram, ‘A Tale of the Ragged Mountains’. The tale
featured a Mr Bedloe, who had an extraordinary adventure. One day,
while taking his customary walk in the mountains, a sequence of
curious events befell him. He found himself in the Indies, with the
battle of Benarez raging around him. This battle had taken place some
years before, and had cost the life of a dear friend of Dr Templeton, the
doctor who was then treating Bedloe with mesmerism techniques. The
name of the friend in question was Oldeb, an anagram of Bedloe.
The latter found himself transported back to the battle of Benarez just
when the doctor was writing the unfolding of the event. Bedloe is as
fragile and evanescent as a word written in ink, and responsive to the
tricks of an anagram. The new word, produced through an operation
performed upon letters, is at once the same and an other word; it can
interweave an old story with the one under way.
To write a word or a sentence implies a sort of surgical operation,
taking the words and laying them on the operating table that is the white
page. There the writer operates, works, arranges the letters in different
ways, combining them in various patterns. Poe took just such a pleasure
in filling the pages of his article ‘A Few Words on Secret Writing’ with
letters and schemes of the alphabet and of a crypto-alphabet.50
A word, a single word, or a proper name was for Mr Bedloe what a
sentence, or the quotation of a sentence, had been for Ligeia. Poe thus
manipulates books and letters: a fragment, a passage, a citation, a
phoneme here, a phoneme there. He cuts, breaks into pieces, puts
together, cites in the etymological sense of the term, which implies a
movement (cire = to come). Suppose there is a passage from a book: the
writer can set it in motion, can cite it, in a certain order and context
(Poe was much taken with quotations, ‘misapplication of quotations’
and their ‘capital effect when well done’51). Suppose there is a single
word: it can be cut it up into letters, aptly, so as to compose another
word or another name. There will no doubt be remainders, for
example, passages that have not been quoted, letters that have not
been recombined, such as the e in the anagram BEDLOe-OLDEB. In
fact, after the death of Mr Bedloe, a conversation takes place around
that little e between the narrator and the editor of the newspaper
announcing the death of Mr Bedloe, whose name had been misspelled.

If the editor suggests that ‘it is a mere typographical error’, the narrator
knows the mystery:
‘Then,’ said I mutteringly, as I turned upon my heel, ‘then indeed

has it come to pass that one truth is stranger than any fiction – for

Bedlo, without the e, what is it but Oldeb conversed! And this man
tells me it is a typographical error.’52
In these ways, Edgar Allan Poe could combine his passion for books,
libraries and reading with his obsession for cryptography and hiero-
glyphs. He wrote an essay, ‘Cryptography’ on the subject of ciphered
codes. The well-known tale ‘The Gold Bug’ deciphers a message on parch-
ment left by Captain Kidd. Artifice is at the root of reading and writing.
This is the law of the domain of Arnheim: original beauty is never as great
as the beauty that can be produced through the elaboration of artifice.
The natural landscape has to be reworked, almost rewritten, by human
skill; only thus can it be original and artistic. If Arnheim is a perfect place,
it is because it is the product of arrangements. Indeed, its canal, trees,
foliage, gorges, ravines and architectural elements are really quotations.
The ‘closely scrutinized’, separated, well-analysed details are first disman-
tled and then reassembled, like a code in cipher; they form a new set on
the basis of preconceived data. Gardening is subjected to the same princi-
ple as the anagram. The letters of the alphabet, like the elements of
nature, belong to the realm of artifice and of intellectual construction.
The artificial is not founded upon a transcendent nature, and it implies a
complete network of necessary laws in order for it to be a system.
But the most extreme case of the presence of the alphabet is elab-
orated in Poe’s novel Arthur Gordon Pym. Hills, grottoes and the figures
of what is termed the natural world become here letters of the alpha-
bet, or indeed of three different alphabets, Ethiopian, Arabic and
Egyptian, as the long, concluding note to the novel explains. Just as
Melville’s whales had become books and chapters, the physical forms
of the region where Gordon Pym disembarks have become huge letters
in several different languages. The most unexpected hieroglyphs
conceal all the mystery of nature within the convention of language.
The whole adventure is totally determined by two roots: the root for
the Arabic verb ‘to be white’ and the Egyptian word meaning ‘the
region of the south’. Nature thus takes on the form of letters, the
meaning of roots and words; it complies with the alphabet. The first
root gives ‘all the inflections of shadow and darkness’, the second one
‘all the inflections of brilliancy and whiteness’.53 And, as the Egyptian

Edgar Allan Poe 21
word presaged, white was the colour in which Gordon Pym’s adven-
ture was to be forever engulfed: ‘We were nearly overwhelmed by the
white ashy shower which settled upon us and upon the canoe.’54 This
immense whiteness is also always in contrast with the darkness. What
Poe himself called ‘the power of words’ is realized in that the roots of

two verbs steer the destinies of Gordon Pym and of his friend. Dark
and white, or black and white, like ink on the page: ‘The darkness had
materially increased, relieved only by the glare of water thrown back
from the white curtain before us.’55 Finally, in the mysterious conclu-
sion to the novel, a huge human figure is conjured up, in ‘the wide and
desolate Antarctic Ocean’,56 ‘and the hue of the skin of the figure was
of the perfect whiteness of snow’.57 (This reminds the reader of that
other case of a famous unnatural whiteness: Melville’s Moby Dick.)
This terrifying whiteness is also the main feature of Berenice’s teeth,
upon which Egaeus, the narrator, constructs his terrible hallucination:
‘the white and ghastly spectrum of the teeth’.58 Poe’s character is deeply
immersed in the volumes of the family library: there he can cultivate
his obsessions, being haunted by the quotation from Tertullian on the
resurrection of Christ and by the quotation from the poet Ebn Zaiat on
the sepulchre of the beloved, the quotation that stands as epigraph to
the tale: ‘Dicebant mihi sodales, si sepulchrum amicae visitarem, curas
meas aliquar tulum fore levatas.’59 (‘My friends told me that if I had
visited my friend’s grave, my sorrow would for a while be relieved.’)
These words are so powerful that they dictate the narrator’s acts. Thus,
after the death of the young woman, he visits her tomb, extracts her
teeth, and mixes them up with surgical instruments. Egaeus blurs the
organic boundary between life and death, and disfigures the still-living
body of his beloved cousin, just as he breaks into pieces the box in
which he has hidden the extracted teeth:
in my tremor, it slipped from my hands, and fell heavily, and burst

into pieces; and from it, with a rattling sound, there rolled out some
instruments of dental surgery, intermingled with thirty-two small,
white, and ivory-looking substances that were scattered to and fro
about the floor.60
In opposition to the group of American idealists, Melville and Poe

asserted the strength of culture – in the form of books and language –
over nature. The white whale and the white land of Gordon Pym
manifest themselves as a terrifying mockery of Emerson’s idea of nature,
and his conception of language. For him, indeed, language was a natural

tool: ‘Nature is the vehicle of thought and in a simple, double, and three-
fold degree.’61 This is the starting-point for idealist symbolism, and for the
chain of symbols and representations that refer to spirit. Idealist symbols
are meant to be the sign of some transcendent reality. Gradation and
sequence are necessary, and everything stems from a simple origin. Hence

Emerson sees the moral realm as being derived from nature: ‘every word
which is used to express a moral or intellectual fact, if traced to its root, is
found to be borrowed from some material appearance.’62 In his essay
‘Language’, the following propositions were taken to be self-evident:
1. Words are signs of natural facts.

2. Particular natural facts are symbols of particular spiritual facts.
3. Nature is the symbol of spirit.
David Thoreau, another Transcendentalist, held that letters had

things as their roots.63 Emerson could see and feel the divine nature of
the universe:
A subtle chain of countless rings

The next unto the farthest brings;
The eye reads omens where it goes,
And speaks all languages the rose.64
In the years during which Emerson was formulating his theories of

nature, symbols and language, Melville perforce saw something alto-
gether different. Pierre, or the Ambiguities is a novel that met with a dis-
tressingly poor response from his contemporaries. The novel stages the
opposition between Pierre’s life in the country and in New York and rep-
resents a tragic questioning of all transcendentalist optimism. Nature is
compared in it to an alphabet, and is not held to be the gentle interpreter
of itself, nor does the rose speak all languages. Nature is merely the
agency that furnishes us with this ‘surprising alphabet’ in which each of
us may study our own particular lesson, choosing and combining as we
fancy, depending upon our mood and specific temperament.65
Metaphorically and literally, the organic is to be dissolved into what does
not resemble it, namely language considered as artifice or alphabetic con-
struction, where we choose and combine various little symbols.
In the essay ‘History’, Emerson thought that:
It is the universal nature which gives worth to particular men and

things. Human life, as containing this, is mysterious and inviolable,

Edgar Allan Poe 23
and we hedge it round with penalties and laws. All laws derive
hence their ultimate reason, all express more or less distinctly some
command of this supreme, illimitable essence.66
In Pierre, on the contrary, Melville makes the case for a type of prob-

abilism that banishes idealist theology. The protagonist of the novel
realizes that the crude reality of metropolitan life is not ‘the will of
God’, but merely a play of possibilities. Out of this evidence, Melville
built a tragedy, replacing transcendentalist optimism by pessimism. He
wrote Pierre after reading Schopenhauer, just as he wrote Moby Dick
after studying Shakespeare. Poe, on the other hand, took artifice as the
starting-point, and was not concerned with the overall human tragedy
but with the game in which each individual mental activity is impli-
cated. As his haunted characters respond to his theory of the effect on
the reader, Poe constructs the drama not of the will but, rather, of the
combination of circumstances in which both intelligence and dream
operate, since they both need the faculty of imagination.
Emile Benveniste’s observation that human beings organize their
subjectivity through the use of pronouns is well known. For ‘I’ has no
intrinsic nature; it is a linguistic convention that, together with ‘you’,
organizes utterances and the other personal pronouns (in a large
number of languages). The protagonist of ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’, the
character who speaks in the first person, has no name, and remains
nameless, as the interlocutor or interlocutors ‘you’ remain nameless.
The tale that develops on the phonetic resemblance of ‘I’ and ‘eye’ is
also constructed on the pronominal symmetry of ‘I’, the narrator,
‘you’, the mysterious interlocutor, and ‘he’, the old man. Poe found
immense suggestive power in proper names, yet in ‘The Tell-Tale
Heart’, he resisted any temptation to give names to his characters: he
relies upon the barest linguistic elements – the use of pronouns and
the similarity of sounds.
The first person is usual in the Tales of Mystery and Imagination and in
the Tales of Horror. Indeed, Poe invariably wrote fiction in the first
person. Critics have often observed that the characters in his stories are
never much developed psychologically. Poe’s fictions tend not to hinge
upon studies of individuals and their personalities. His protagonists
never live out that opposition between individual and society, which is
typical of the nineteenth century – an opposition which was so import-
ant within American culture. An example among many is provided by
the socio-psychological investigations of Nathaniel Hawthorne in his
celebrated novel The Scarlet Letter, in which the protagonist is torn

between her desire and her duty. But Poe conceived his stories according
to the poetic principle: in poetry one cannot separate emotion and
mood from its linguistic form and rhythm. The word and its phonetic
and expressive implications are the material upon which the poet or the
story-teller constructs his composition. Grammar, syntax, words, meter

and rhyme, all belong to the rationality of versification.
Thus, long before Benveniste had developed the theory of grammati-
cal persons, Poe’s texts, ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’ in particular, expressed
the polarity of ‘I’ and ‘you’. These two pronouns define the act of
speech, are opposed to one another and yet are complementary. We
cannot conceive of one without the other, and they are wholly
reversible, so that the one that is ‘you’ at the moment ‘I’ speak, becomes
‘I’ the moment ‘I’ listen. But ‘I’ and ‘you’ need a the third term, ‘he’,
the pronoun for the one who does not take part in the act of speech.
Could not a tale tell the story of the general linguistic situation in
which utterances take place? Could not a story stage the act of speak-
ing, of telling a story? I tell the tale, I am the tell-tale heart. I am all
voice, all sonority, yet I do not adhere to a voice but pass from one
person to another, from one mouth to another. I is a vocal mask, a
sound, a cry, as at the very beginning of Poe’s tale, with the words
emphasized in the text: ‘True! – nervous – very, very dreadfully nervous
I had been and am; but why will you say that I am mad?’
Those who know the power of words are capable of working on them
as objects or forms in themselves. Poe speaks often of his belief in the
‘power of words’ meaning that language can give shape to any thought,
even to ‘the evanescence’ of the most delicate fancies. 67 If the
Transcendentalists saw words as the signs of the divine Truth, Poe
himself never tired of repeating in a provoking way that art has nothing
to do with the truth, and that it is not didactic. As he suggested in ‘The
Poetic Principle’, his contemporaries harboured a misunderstanding: ‘I
allude to the heresy of The Didactic. It has been assumed, tacitly and
avowedly, directly and indirectly, that the ultimate object of all Poetry
is Truth.’68 Poetry has to do with beauty and all the artifice used to
achieve it. Poetry has to do with the most mathematical calculation.
The power of words is the possibility of expressing everything through
them, even what seems almost impossible to say, such as the depth and
the mystery of Ligeia’s eyes, or the most unexpected feelings of horror,
terror, and criminal impulses.
But to be aware of the power of words is also, as Berenice shows, to be
sensitive to the ineffable, the vague, what Poe called the ‘suggestion’ of
words or of images. Some readers of Poe, like Georges Poulet, for

Edgar Allan Poe 25
example, posited an opposition between the rational power of words

and the ineffable, between logic and reverie, as if they were incompat-
ible.69 Nevertheless, as it has already been suggested, for Poe, it is not a
question of an opposition but of complementarity: the all-powerfulness
of words verges on the ineffable and finally succeeds in suggesting it.

‘The Tell-Tale Heart’ conjugates the double face of words up to the
point that the suggestive power of the sentence, ‘it was his eye, his
veiled eye’, becomes an obsessive image, creates the decision to kill and
the action. (Agathos tells Oinos in the dialogue entitled ‘The Power of
Words’: ‘And … did there not cross your mind some thought of the
physical power of words? Is not every word an impulse on the air?’70)
Everything is very carefully performed until finally one night the pro-
tagonist can see the light illuminating just the eye of the old man: the
eye appears alone, separated from the body of the person, from his
being, and finally the narrator kills the old man, cuts him into pieces,
hides these pieces under the floor, until the police come to investigate.
The police do not even perceive the crime, until finally the narrator
declares it, haunted by what he thought he was hearing: the beating of
the old man’s heart.
The story concentrates on just a single event, and not on a sequence of
episodes nor in the development of the psychology of the characters.
There is here no contradiction external to the crime and no personal
conflict between the old man and the narrator. Moreover, the decision
to kill the old man arises out of a trifle, the veiled eye, for there was no
reason for the crime: ‘Object there was none.’
It would, however, be incorrect to say that Poe’s tales have no narra-
tive structure, even if they do not tell of a hero over an expanse of time
corresponding to the development of a consciousness. A story exists
but it is a detailed story or, rather, the story of a detail, of a single
event. An episode is analysed like a fragment with a magnifying glass,
in the same way that a word or a phoneme, separated from the linguis-
tic chain, can dictate a series of suggestions. Poe explained this proce-
dure at great lengths in ‘The Poetic Principle’ and named it ‘the unity
of effect’. Another tale, ‘The Sphinx’, is an allegory for this mechanism,
which consists in concentrating on a single episode and analysing it in
detail – and corresponds to what can happen with the letters of the
alphabet or with passages from books. The narrator is obsessed by a
huge and terrible monster, every part of which is described in minute
detail. Only at the end do we discover that this monster is simply a
tiny insect as seen through a pane of glass and therefore enlarged out
of all proportion.

Such attention to detail was the monomania of Egaeus, totally con-

centrated upon the whiteness of Berenice’s teeth. Indeed, the density
of many of Poe’s stories and the intensity of the vision derive neither
from the relation between character and time, nor from the ordered
sequence of a beginning, middle and end. The end in a tale by Poe is

almost never a conclusion, but can bring us back to the beginning. In
‘The Philosophy of Composition’, he actually maintained that a work
of art only begins at the end. Eventually, we know from the start what
is to happen in the narrative. Thus, from the beginning of ‘The Tell-
Tale Heart’, we know that the protagonist has committed a crime.
There is no element of surprise. Poe pointed out the shortcomings of a
form of writing that tends to use surprise as the main element to hold
the attention of readers. The writer has to involve the readers, but
ought not to employ for this purpose vulgar means, such as surprise. In
the Dupin’s stories, it is immediately made clear that Dupin has solved
the case. There is no revelation unfolding as the tale proceeds. What
should interest the reader is the way in which things connect and are
built up, with priority being given to the construction and not to the
outcome of the analysis. The stages in Dupin’s analysis are clearly set
out, like an argument. As Poe remarks in his ‘Marginalia’: ‘It is the
curse of a certain order of mind, that it can never rest satisfied with the
consciousness of its ability to do a thing. Still less is it content with
doing it. It must both know and show how it was done.’71
Writing and reading are thus two aspects of the same activity. Poe
attacked his Romantic contemporaries for concealing the resources
they drew upon, and for talking always of inspiration and creation. Art
is a technique, and writers or artists are not a class of especially privi-
leged people touched by divine grace, but artisans who work with the
letters of the alphabet, with words and with quotations, rather than
confused metaphysical ideas. Metaphysics was, in his view, an obstacle
to good poetic work. He espoused an ostensibly rationalist and analytic
attitude, which served to stave off the inextricable chaos, the lack of
precision and the preoccupation with essence so characteristic of the
metaphysics of his time:
‘What is Poetry?’ notwithstanding Leigh Hunt’s rigmarolic attempt

at answering it, is a query that, with great care and deliberate agree-
ment beforehand on the exact value of certain leading words, may,
possibly, be settled to the partial satisfaction of a few analytical
intellects, but which, in the existing condition of metaphysics,
never can be settled to the satisfaction of the majority.72

Edgar Allan Poe 27
According to Poe, contemporary metaphysics could not adequately

define poetry, for two-thirds of the domain of versification pertained to
mathematics. How can one fail to note a polemical attitude against
those who, like Emerson, thought that the poet is almost divine? The
poet, writes Emerson, is ‘the sayer, the namer, and represents beauty.

He is a sovereign, and stands on the centre.’73 The poet for transcen-
dentalist metaphysics is an individual with a mission to perform,
capable of responding to the will of God: ‘For poetry was all written
before time was.’74 The poet would be the one who was sent into the
world ‘to the end of expression’. He has to name and express to the
others what exists before him. In Emerson’s essays, the poet is
described in terms of sight and the eye:
This insight, which expresses itself by what is called Imagination, is a

very high sort of seeing, which does not come by study, but by the
intellect being where and what it sees, by sharing the path or circuit
of things through forms, and so making them translucid to others.75
Poe’s criticism did not spare some of the most well-regarded

Romantic poets, such as Shelley, whom he considered utterly obscure:
His rhapsodies are but the rough notes – the stenographic memo-
randa of poems – memoranda which, because they were all-
sufficient for his own intelligence, he cared not to be at the trouble
of writing out in full for mankind. In his whole life he wrought not
thoroughly out a single conception. For this reason it is that he is
the most fatiguing of poets. Yet he wearies in having done too little,
rather than too much; what seems in him the diffuseness of one
idea, is the conglomerate concision of many; – and this concision it
is which renders him obscure.76
Emerson stressed the key words defining the activity of the poet:
‘The condition of true naming, on the poet’s part, is his resigning
himself to the divine aura which breathes through forms, and accom-
panying that.’77 The poet bathes in a divine aura.
If, for the Transcendentalist, ‘the poet did not stop at the color or
the form, but read their meaning’, for Poe, the word ‘genius’ meant
‘ingenuous’ – endowed with genius – and the men of genius were far
more numerous than was commonly supposed. In order to be a man of
genius, one has to have an ability that might be termed constructive
ability. It is the capacity for analysis that enables the artist to compose.

Several virtues are required for the work of genius, which, in Poe’s
opinion, do not derive from the divine aura:
This ability [of the man of genius] is based, to be sure, in great part,
upon the faculty of analysis, enabling the artist to get full view of

the machinery of his proposed effect, and thus work it and regulate
it at will; but a great deal depends also upon properties strictly
moral – for example, upon patience, upon concentrativeness, or the
power of holding the attention steadily to the one purpose, upon
self-dependence and contempt for all opinion which is opinion and
no more – in especial, upon energy or industry.78
And he liked to say that the highest praise a Roman could give to a
poem would be to say that it was ‘written industria mirabili or incredibili
industria’.79
The genius is somebody who has developed his mental features, who
has focused on the analytical skill, which, as stated in ‘The Murders in the
Rue Morgue’, is ‘much invigorated by mathematical study’.80 Since poetry
has a lot to do with mathematics, the poet and the analyst have much in
common. The good analyst, like Dupin, can retrace the pieces of a com-
position and likes to exercise what Poe identifies as ‘that moral activity
which disentangles’. The good reader, the good writer is a true analyst:
He is fond of enigmas, of conundrums, hieroglyphics; exhibiting in

his solutions of each a degree of acumen which appears to the ordi-
nary apprehension preternatural. His results, brought about by the
very soul and essence of method, have, in truth, the whole air of
intuition.81
Attention and intuition constitute therefore two essential mental qual-

ities – as Poe argues at length in the famous first part of ‘The Murders
in the Rue Morgue’, where he distinguishes between chess and
draughts – the first one requiring powerful attention, and the second
one calling for acumen (intelligence, intuition).
Finally, just as a character in Poe’s narratives is not a psychological
whole but an enhanced mental faculty, so the author is no longer a
prophetic figure but a condensation of certain forces, namely concentra-
tion, industry and analytical skill. As I have said, classical or eighteenth-
century rhetorical values allowed Poe to escape the Romantic myth of
prophetic inspiration. These views of authorship anticipated Paul Valéry’s
Monsieur Teste: ‘I was affected by the acute illness of precision. I pushed to

Edgar Allan Poe 29
an extreme degree the maddening urge to understand, and I sought

within myself the critical points of my faculty of attention.’82 In this
famous fiction, Monsieur Teste is nothing but the architect of the literary
text, almost an anonymous force, capable of manipulating words and
sentences with, and of purifying language from the deterioration of its

everyday use. The author is serving the cause of Art, ‘while exterminating
all the illusions of the artist’,83 and is the untiring observer of the power
of words. For it is industry that actually makes a work. As he wrote in his
‘Marginalia’, Poe is convinced that:
In the hands of the true artist the theme, or ‘work’, is but a mass of
clay, of which anything (within the compass of the mass and
quality of the clay) may be fashioned at will, or according to the
skill of the workman.84
The unity of effect
Poe’s insistence on the value of the short story as against the novel is
part of a polemic directed against his contemporaries. A ‘short prose
narrative’, like a poem, can be read in a continuous, short amount of
time, ‘requiring from a half-hour to one or two hours in its perusal’;
therefore its length corresponds to its effect, to the unity of effect, ‘the
immense force derivable from totality’.85 Poe developed this idea in his
1842 review of Hawthorne’s Twice-Told Tales:
Were we bidden to say how the highest genius could be most advanta-
geously employed for the best display of its own powers, we should
answer, without hesitation – in the composition of a rhymed poem,
not to exceed in length what might be perused in an hour. Within this
limit alone can the highest order of true poetry exist. We need only
here to say, upon this topic, that, in almost all classes of composition,
the unity of effect or impression is a point of the greatest importance.
It is clear, moreover, that this unity cannot be thoroughly preserved in
productions whose perusal cannot be completed at one sitting.86
It was not really a matter of genres, even if a novel ‘cannot be read in

one sitting’ – for Poe had himself written a novel, Gordon Pym – but of
theoretical position. Romantic writers in Britain and in the United
States were concerned with a question that may be traced back to
Coleridge, namely the organic principle. This principle also featured in
German Romanticism, especially in Schlegel (whom Morella read

assiduously). In his discussion of Shakespeare, Coleridge spoke of a

quality amounting to genius that had little in common with Poe’s
industria. As F. O. Matthiessen argued in his American Renaissance,
Coleridge allowed that genius could not be ‘lawless’, but that his laws
represented the capacity for ‘acting creatively’, where this capacity was a

happy correspondence between the creator (genius, artist) and the mater-
ial that he worked. Without such harmony, the outcome would be a
mechanical form: ‘The form is mechanic, when on any given material we
impress a predetermined form, not necessarily arising out of the pro-
perties of the material.’87 Work, industry, according to the Romantic view
of creation, was contemptible, for skill in constructing was the attribute
of machines, not men. The nostalgic ideologies of the period held
mechanism to be in opposition to the organism. A mechanism was
deemed a shameful, impoverished variation that violated the laws of
nature. According to Coleridge, what the artist should seek was the
organic form: ‘The organic form, on the other hand, is innate; it shapes as
it develops itself from within, and the fullness of the development is one
and the same with the perfection of its outward form – such as the life is,
such is the form.’88 Coleridge’s conclusion, largely indebted to Goethe,
was of a sort that would delight Emerson, Thoreau and the American
Transcendentalist group: ‘Nature, the prime genial artist, inexhaustible in
diverse powers, is equally inexhaustible in forms.’89 The love for Nature
fostered the use of natural comparisons. Thus, Thoreau wrote that man
bears a poem ‘as naturally as the oak bears an acorn, and the wine a
gourd’,90 and readily spoke of a poem as if it were a natural fruit. The
most developed expression of the organic principle is the work of Walt
Whitman, and, as Matthiessen pointed out, his Leaves of Grass served as
its manifesto. For Whitman, even prosody has a natural liberty, and
poems grow like the buds of lilies, roses, melons or pears.
Poe clearly rejected any such idea of nature, and, in order to assert his
difference, he praised ‘a skilful literary artist’ like Hawthorne who, ‘having
conceived, with deliberate care, a certain unique or single effect to be
wrought out’, composed the events according to his ‘pre-established
design’.91 Poe preferred ‘arabesques’ or ‘devices’ to roses and plants. The
narrator of ‘Ligeia’ enjoys the haunting metamorphosis of the tapestry he
had chosen for his chamber: the dreamy pattern of arabesque is the final
and most exquisite touch of a man whose architectural taste goes back to
ancient cultures and decorating techniques:
The material [of the tapestry] was the richest cloth of gold. It was
spotted all over, at irregular intervals, with arabesque figures, about

Edgar Allan Poe 31
a foot in diameter, and wrought upon the cloth in patterns of the

most jetty black. But these figures partook of the true character of
the arabesque only when regarded from a single point of view. By a
contrivance now common, and indeed traceable to a very remote
period of antiquity, they were made changeable in aspect. To one

entering the room, they bore the appearance of simple monstrosities;
but upon a further advance, this appearance gradually departed;
and, step by step, as the visitor moved his station in the chamber,
he saw himself surrounded by an endless succession of the ghastly
forms which belong to the superstition of the Normand, or arise in
the guilty slumbers of the monk.92
What attracts Poe is artifice, and not only in the interior decoration
of old mansions. As we see in ‘The Domain of Arnheim’, even nature,
or physis, is an artificial construction. Thus, the gardens in Poe’s tales
are works of architecture realized according to a very precise plan.
Mr Ellison reckons that even the happiness of human beings can be
the outcome of a preconceived design. Decision, project and construc-
tion are pitted against organic development. As far as Poe is concerned,
nothing is organic or natural – neither the characters in a novel, nor
the writer, nor the work, nor language, nor nature. Neither death nor
life are natural either. If Poe’s tales place so much emphasis upon a life
that is not life – as in ‘The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar’ – and
upon a death that is not death – such as in ‘Ligeia’ or ‘Berenice’ – it is
because the organic is in his opinion invariably false, an illusion. What
is called organic is in fact a mechanism. As in a mechanism, all you
have are pieces that need to be put together, to be assembled, and that
can always be dismantled. This holds even for the human body. Thus,
‘Loss of Breath’ and ‘The Angel of the Odd’ turn out to be tales of the
dismantling of the body. Poe clearly had something of a taste for irony
and for strangeness: little in these two stories is clear, save the fact that
a person has been cut up, a piece here and a piece there. This calls to
mind Kleist’s Käthchen von Heilbronn, in which the lovely mechanical
woman, as she undresses, removes a leg or an arm. Mechanical forms
flourished alongside the organic principle, and the nineteenth century
was an age of dolls as beautiful as women of flesh and blood.
E. T. A. Hoffmann, with whose work Poe was probably familiar, wrote a
famous tale, ‘The Sand Man’, which tells the story of a man who falls in
love with a mechanical woman, Olympia. This is a case of a true reversal
of stereotypes. Thus, whereas it is generally machines that are regarded as
cold and steely, here it is men who are cold, for they do not understand

the love Nathaniel feels for Olympia. A good-hearted friend tries to put
the lover on his guard. For Olympia seems very odd, both too quiet and
too rigid: ‘She has appeared to us in a strange way rigid and soulless …
She might be called beautiful if her eyes were not so completely lifeless. I
could even say sightless.’93 In short, the great problem with the machine

is that it does not see; it does not possess the divine attribute of mankind,
which is sight. Sigmund, Nathaniel’s friend, realizes that the girl’s step is
peculiarly measured, so that each movement seems determined by the
turning of a wound-up cogwheel. There is something about Olympia that
is not consistent with an organic, living being: she has the monotonous,
soulless precision of a machine. But Nathaniel is in love with the
machine and when he discovers his insane error he can do nothing but
hurl himself over the balustrade of the Town Hall tower, shrieking, and
still searching for the eyes of the mechanical woman. What madness is it
that causes this young man to fall in love with a machine? Man finds
himself in a machine. In spite of transcendentalism, the human being
can be explained in terms of a mechanism – and not in terms of Nature
and God. Nathaniel explains his attraction to Olympia thus: ‘It is only to
the poetic heart that the like unfolds itself.’94
Once one had known the beauty of machines, one could no longer
believe in nature or in the myth of the organic. The same phenome-
non had also fascinated Hawthorne, the contemporary author most
admired by Poe. Hawthorne’s ‘Rappaccini’s Daughter’ is the story of a
girl who is the product of a laboratory, of the most advanced scientific
experiment. It is often said, with good reason, that Poe invented
science fiction. This invention was made possible by his rejection of
the organic, a rejection which he took to its furthest limit.
From Coleridge, Wordsworth and the English Romantics, to
Heidegger, the cult of poetry has fled the towns for the countryside,
the mountains, the forests and the pure air. Poe, on the other hand,
adored cities, the metropolis, Paris, London and the haunting urban
crowds. A town is wholly constructed, artificial, designed by human
beings; an inextricable mixture of the rational and the irrational, of
order and disorder, of that which is planned and that which is incalcu-
lable. This process is endless in the life of a big city, and seems to know
no respite, like the old man in ‘The Man of the Crowd’ who, night and
day never stops walking, down boulevards and along alleyways,
through crowds and in gloomy, secluded corners. He is both decrepit
and lithe, poor and rich, for beneath his shabby clothes we can catch a
glimpse of a very fine fabric and the sparkle of a diamond. Who is this
altogether elusive old man, forever walking and walking? ‘Yet’, declares

Edgar Allan Poe 33
the narrator of the story, ‘he did not hesitate in his career, but, with a
mad energy, retraced his steps at once, to the heart of the mighty
London.’95 Where does the great city begin, and where does it end?
Building are constructed, demolished, reconstructed, and there is
accumulation of different historical periods and styles, different visions

from different points of view, in an endless phantasmagoria, as if the
arabesques of ‘Ligeia’s narrator were magnified on a huge scale. Stories
are intersected, interlocked, sunken into an abyss whose beginning or
end it would be quite senseless to seek. The mystery of the city, of the
man of the crowd, is the same as the story of Isabel that, in Melville’s
Pierre, the protagonist, hoping to leave his New England village and to
live in New York, never manages either to know or to write about in
the form of a classical novel. Poe’s man of the crowd, the allegory of
the metropolis, is like a book that does not allow itself to be read:
‘This old man’, I said at length, ‘is the type and the genius of deep
crime. He refuses to be alone. He is the man of the crowd. It will be in
vain to follow; for I shall learn no more of him, nor of his deeds.
The worst heart of the world is a grosser book than the ‘Hortulus
Animae’, and perhaps it is but one of the great mercies of God that
“er lässt sich nicht lesen”.’96
This old man, who is ‘the worst heart of the world’, is no more trans-
parent than the old man in ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’, whose eye was covered
by a hideous film. In the streets of the great modern cities, there are as
many different stories as there were types perceived by the narrator at the
beginning of ‘The Man of the Crowd’. Simply following them for a
moment implies a collage of fragments from stories. A piece here and a
piece there, like a fragmented body, or organism. Suggestion and logic are
both involved in the cutting-up. And the cutting-up is indispensable for
the analysis which is at the root of the detective story, of Dupin’s conjec-
tures in ‘The Purloined Letter’ or in ‘The Murders in the Rue Morgue’.
Narrating
Edgar Allan Poe uses various narrative modes in his tales. Three differ-
ent routes may be mapped out:
1. elimination of the fantastic;

2. merging of plot and of analysis;
3. narrative-as-confession in front of the law.

1. The tales are clearly in the fictional mode. Poe rejected third-
person narrative, and refused what can be called the illusion of realist
objectivity. Yet he also disdained one of the, so to speak, extreme
forms of fiction, namely the fantastic. In fact, fancy, a key term in the
English literature of the period, is one that he almost invariably

rejects. Thus, although he retains Coleridge’s distinction between
fancy and imagination, he does not build a Kantian metaphysical
theory upon either the one or the other. Coleridge had himself com-
plained of the linguistic confusion between the two terms, and said
that no more inappropriate translation for the Greek phantasia could
have been found than the Latin imaginatio. Coleridge considered the
distinction between fancy and imagination akin to that between delir-
ium and mania: ‘You may conceive the difference in kind between the
Fancy and the Imagination in this way; that, if the check of the senses
and the reason were withdrawn, the first would become delirium and
the last mania.’97 Fancy is the capacity to combine images that ‘have
no connection natural or moral, but are yoked together by the poet by
means of some accidental coincidence’.98 Conversely, imagination
respects the natural and moral connection between images: ‘[It]
modifies images, and gives unity to variety, it sees all things in one,
il più nell’uno.’99
Coleridge defined imagination ‘esemplastic power’, and distin-
guished between productive and reproductive imagination, or primary
imagination and secondary imagination. The former is ‘the living
power and prime agent of all human perceptions, and is a repetition in
the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I am’.100
Secondary imagination, for its part, is an echo of primary imagination,
different in degree and in its mode of operation. ‘It dissolves, diffuses,
dissipates in order to recreate: or where this process is rendered impos-
sible, yet still at all events, it struggles to idealize and to unify.’101
Secondary imagination is therefore the law of association, whereas
fancy is simply ‘a mode of memory emancipated from the order of
time and space’. Poe could not accept this idealist discussion of imagin-
ation and fantasy, although he was willing to preserve its associationist
quality. He never spoke of natural and moral connection, since for him
ethics is a heresy, at any rate in artistic matters, and nature is simply an
artifice. In his critical discussion of imagination, Poe repeated what he
had made Mr Ellison say on landscape and original beauty: ‘Thus, the
range of Imagination is unlimited. Its material extend throughout the
universe. Even out of deformities it fabricates that Beauty which is at
once its sole object and its inevitable test.’102

Edgar Allan Poe 35
Poe even goes so far as to assert that the distinction between fancy and
imagination is ‘one without a difference; without even a difference of
degree. The fancy as nearly creates as the imagination; and neither creates
in any respect. All novel conceptions are merely unusual combina-
tions.’103 Poe treated the two terms of fancy and imagination as inter-

changeable because he was mainly interested in the material aspect of the
act of composition: the extreme limit to imaginative activity would be
set by the industria of the artist, the artist’s pure artisanal skill.
Consequently, he stated, in ‘The Murders in the Rue Morgue’ for
example, that the difference between ingenuity and the capacity for
analysis is much greater than, although similar to, the difference between
fancy and imagination. By eliminating Coleridge’s difference, Poe ended
up erasing fancy and its consequence, the fantastic, since everything is
included in the alchemical work of artistic composition.
With ‘The Thousand-and-Second Tale of Scheherezade’ Poe pro-
ceeded to eliminate the fantastic, paradoxically adopting the title of
the famous Arabian tale. Poe’s Schehrezade has at her disposal one
more night than Eastern tradition allowed. The fabulous stories that
the young woman tells in order to avoid the death sentence are no
longer fantastic, but, rather, true accounts of real marvels actually
occurring in the world, and directly linked to science. The king thus
hears of the laws of physics, of velocity, the eruption of volcanoes, the
morphology of insects, the electric telegraph, and the astonishing
details that could only be seen through a microscope. Science and
technique have become the stuff of story-telling. The fantastic no
longer exists since fiction has already become reality.
2. The second mode in which Poe constructs many of his stories can
be defined as a fusion between the narrative and the analysis of the
data comprising a particular fact (especially in the case of the ‘ratioci-
native tales’); or, to put it another way, the narration is simply the
account of the analysis of a fact. It is therefore not so much the fact in
itself that is essential as the way, or ways, in which a fact is read, cut
into pieces, analysed, and interpreted. Dupin is a man who carries out
good analyses, capable of yielding good results. Poe formulated, at the
start of ‘The Murders in the Rue Morgue’, the famous distinction
between the chess player and the draughts player. The game of chess,
which allows for a wide variety of moves, only needs ingenuity. One
requires a great capacity for concentration, for ‘to observe attentively is
to remember distinctly’.104 But an analyst’s skill transcends any system
of rules. An analyst is silent, capable of reading between the lines, and
of paying heed to things that would appear to have no bearing upon

the game: ‘He makes, in silence, a host of observations and inferences.

So, perhaps, do his companions; and the difference in the extent of the
information obtained, lies not so much in the validity of the inference
as in the quality of the observation.’105 What one must know is what to
observe: ‘Our player confines himself not at all; nor, because the game

is the object, does he reject deductions from things external to the
game.’106 It is a question of seeing, or rather of listening: ‘He examines
the countenance of his partner, comparing it carefully with that of
each of his opponents. He considers the mode of assorting the cards in
each hand.’ To the analyst every gesture means something, and
nothing must escape him: ‘He notes every variation of face as the play
progresses, gathering a fund of thought from the differences in the
expression of certainty, of surprise, of triumph or chagrin.’107
The analyst carries out a genuine operation of dismantling, to be fol-
lowed by editing. Small pieces have to be cut up and reconstructed, in
a work of montage. That is precisely what the plot consists of.
Narrative is simply the composition of different parts so that they may
acquire a fictional unity. Dupin’s analyses constitute the plot, in which
we may discern a method at work, a modus operandi that becomes the
actual subject of the tale. Narrating means surveying the steps in an
analysis, describing the pieces that are to be put in place. Narrating
also means knowing how to read, and a good narrator, or a good
analyst, is a good reader.
Dupin is endowed with a remarkably acute analytic mind but, not
unexpectedly, he has something in common with Ligeia. For he too
belongs to an old family, and is in even more distressing circumstances
than Ligeia, since he does not have much money and has to make the
most stringent economies in order to get by. He lives abstemiously:
‘Books, indeed, were his sole luxuries, and in Paris these are easily
obtained.’108 As was the case with Ligeia and Morella, his dominant
passion is for books. Furthermore, he met the narrator in an obscure
bookstore on the rue Montmartre, when seeking a rare item. Dupin likes
to tell stories and to display his analytic skill. He is blasé, eccentric, and a
worshipper of the night, a creature of the big city and a flâneur. He loves
books, exercises his analytic skills, and works for cash, not out of pure
heroism. Money, the letters of the alphabet, chess, draughts, and the
stages in an analysis are all systems of forms or of symbols that have
little to do with Nature and its transcendental meanings.
3. The third mode of narration used by Poe in his fictions is con-
structed on a paradoxical motif such as in ‘The Imp of the Perverse’,
‘The Black Cat’ and ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’. Here the confession of the

Edgar Allan Poe 37
narrator is dramatically staged at an extreme moment. These tales,

which form a sort of cycle, are set just prior to a condemnation to
death, and enact a very particular situation, in which the narrator feels
a compelling need to tell his own story. This is not in fact for the plea-
sure of telling, as with Dupin, but in the hope of gaining relief; as the

narrator of ‘The Black Cat’ says: ‘But to-morrow I die, and to-day I
would unburden my soul.’109
The action of the crime is always described with great precision, in
terms of feelings and gestures. Everything can be named, even the
most terrifying things, such as the coagulated blood of the corpse, the
eye torn out of the cat’s head, the physical terror and the mental
horror. We learn, therefore, of the decision to act, of the rigorous logic
underpinning the plan, or of the violent impulse to act. In ‘The Imp of
the Perverse’, the assassin lays stress upon the premeditated nature of
his deed: ‘For weeks, for months, I pondered upon the means of the
murder. I rejected a thousand schemes, because their accomplishment
involved a chance of detection.’110 It was a book, and the reading of it,
that gave him the idea: ‘in reading some French memoirs, I found an
account of a nearly fatal illness that occurred to Madame Pilau,
through the agency of a candle accidentally poisoned.’111 In ‘The Black
Cat’, the narrator, having tried to kill his much-hated cat, and having
been thwarted in this by his wife, finds that he cannot curb his fury,
and slays his wife instead: ‘Goaded by the interference into a rage more
than demoniacal, I withdrew my arm from her grasp and buried the
axe in her brain. She fell dead upon the spot without a groan.’112 In a
similar way, in ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’, the protagonist insists from the
beginning upon the force of his logic and patient work during the
whole course of events.
‘The Imp of the Perverse’ supplies the key to a reading of the three
tales. It begins with a long psychological and philosophical discussion
of perversity:
Induction, a posteriori, would have brought phrenology to admit, as

an innate and primitive principle of human action, a paradoxical
something, which we may call perverseness, for want of a more char-
acteristic term. In the sense I intend, it is, in fact, a mobile without
motive, a motive not motiviert. Through its promptings we act
without comprehensible object; or, if this shall be understood as a
contradiction in terms, we may so far modify the proposition as to
say, that through its promptings we act, for the reason that we
should not.113

Driven by this inner force, the narrator, who has committed a perfect
crime, feels impelled to betray himself and speak out about his actions.
The story analyses each stage in the progress of this urge towards self-
destruction, this compulsion that causes a reasonable human being to
act for no comprehensible reason or for an irresistible ‘unreasonable’

reason; a few words at the end make it clear that the whole narration in
the first person has been given in a very precise setting, that of a prison:
‘I have said thus much, that in some measure I may answer your ques-
tion … that I may assign to you something that shall have at least the
faint aspect of a cause for my wearing these fetters, and for my tenant-
ing this cell of the condemned.’114 The narrator is, then, in his cell. He
declares himself the victim, ‘one of the many uncounted victims’, of
the imp of perversity: driven by an invincible force, the subject yields to
the law. He must tell of his crime precisely because he should not. His
madness does not lie in having committed the crime but in feeling
compelled to speak out about it.
Indeed, this is precisely what happens in ‘The Black Cat’ and in ‘The
Tell-Tale Heart’. All three tales are in their various ways concerned with
the predicament of a narrator who is telling or writing his story imme-
diately before being condemned to death. Whereas in ‘The Imp of the
Perverse’ the narrator confesses halfway through the tale that the place
where he is recounting his deeds is his cell, in ‘The Black Cat’ he
declares, right from the start, that he is engaged in the writing of his
own story: ‘For the most wild yet most homely narrative which I am
about to pen, I neither expect nor solicit belief.’115
Once again the narrator is in his prison cell, and there he writes of
his crime. He has killed his wife because of his hatred for the black cat.
After the murder, he hid her corpse in the cellar, and finally showed it
to the police, just when he was out of danger. No one had discovered
his crime, nor could anyone have discovered it. It was he who, prey to
‘the imp of the perverse’, wished to prove to the police how solid the
walls of his house were, and, in so doing, struck with a cane precisely
where the corpse had been for several days. An inhuman, terrifying cry
was heard. The wall collapsed to reveal the already decomposed body
of the woman and the hideous cat, with just one eye, still alive, seated
on her head: ‘with red extended mouth and solitary eye of fire, sat the
hideous beast whose craft had seduced me into murder, and whose
informing voice had consigned me to the hangman.’116
So the prison may appear at the beginning or in the middle or at the
end of the story, which may be spoken or written. Whereas the scene
of the crime, and of its consequences, is described in great detail, the

Edgar Allan Poe 39
place where the narrator confesses is merely alluded to in a sentence at

the beginning, at the end or in the middle of the tale. The allusion is
brief, sharp, and without description. It is not the specific but the
generic that dominates: the non-identified cell of the condemned man;
the anonymous, faceless agents of the law and the executioner; the use

of the second person, ‘you’, to indicate interlocutors, judges or police-
men who do not utter so much as a single word in the course of the
whole story. The entire confession is internalized, and not because of
some Kantian interior morality. The murderer does not exactly feel
guilty, nor is he eaten up by remorse. Rather, impelled by the whim to
which he has fallen victim, he is led to follow in reverse the course of
his acts, decisions and impulses. Thus, in relation to the crime, the
subject plays two parts. The crime was perfect in its execution, and the
narrator knew exactly how to hide it; but, once the deed is done, a
perverse impulse destroys the whole thing.
The Tell-Tale Heart
The Tell-Tale Heart’ can therefore be read as a variation on the perver-

sity motif, around the paradox of the narrator who betrays himself,
revealing his own crime. The three tales were all written between 1843
and 1845. Nevertheless, while in ‘The Imp of the Perverse’ and ‘The
Black Cat’ the prison cell from which the narrator speaks or writes is
actually mentioned, in ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’ the place in which the nar-
rator tells the story is not defined, so that it could be the house where
he committed the crime, or the court, or the prison, as if this tale were
designed to represent an extreme case of the imp motif.
In the three tales, the narrator remains nameless: ‘I’, in English, is a
letter of the alphabet, a sound that appears in all sentences where the
subject speaks about himself; it is a pronoun, a linguistic function. ‘I’ is
one of the letters Poe loved, that resounds in the much-cherished name
of Ligeia. ‘I’ conjugates with ‘you’ and declines with the tenses of verbs –
the verb ‘to be’ for example: ‘I had been and am … ‘ The past and the
present of the verb to be in the first person appear in the first lines of the
tale, and then the future of the second person: ‘ … will you say’.
The narrator longs to tell, and merges with ‘you’, because this
unidentified interlocutor could also be he himself, because that same
doubt that might have gripped ‘you’ could also haunt the ‘I’: am I
mad? No, do not think that I am mad since I am going to show you
how logically I proceeded: ‘Now this is the point. You fancy me mad.
Madmen know nothing. But you should have seen me. You should

have seen how wisely I proceeded – with what caution – with what
foresight – with what dissimulation I went to work!’117
But the sound designating the first person singular can also be
written ‘eye’, like the old man’s ‘vulture eye’, ‘his Evil Eye’ that haunts
the narrator. I have committed the perfect crime – suggests the narra-

tor – even if ‘object there was none’. And here it comes, the imp of the
perverse that causes one to act for a trifle, ‘a mobile without motive, a
motive not motiviert’. Like the ticking of a watch, or the beating of a
heart, the sentences follow on one after the other: ‘Object there was
none. Passion there was none. I loved the old man. He had never
wronged me. He had never given me insult. For his gold I had no
desire.’118 The short, cutting sentences follow until: ‘I think it was his
eye!’ One must read this sentence aloud, hear it, hear it with what was
the most well-developed sense in the narrator: hearing. One must
listen to the sound occurring at both the beginning and the end of the
sentence: ‘I’, ‘eye’. The story told at the first person, is the story of the
‘eye’: as suggested at the beginning of this chapter, it is similar to
Bataille’s story, since it is the story of an object, the eye, and a linguis-
tic game based on the homophony between two words in English.
‘I think it was his eye’: the brevity of the sentence, with its jerky
rhythm hinging on the letter i, is such that it resembles a line of verse
or a motto, and it is thereby turned into a single word, in the breath of
diction: ‘eye’. Unlike ‘eyes’ at the plural, ‘eye’ in the singular, by itself,
isolated, does not hint at a human face, at a whole person: it is a sub-
stantive designating an object. ‘Eye’ is the term as found in the dic-
tionary, open to every occurrence, but almost unreal, abstract, cut off
from the life of a whole sentence. It can easily become an obsessive
sound, and, like in Bataille’s ‘Story of the Eye’, it can lead to crime.
‘I’ is the subject and ‘eye’ is the object, but the homophony opens up
to the undercurrent of suggestion, and dilutes the difference. ‘The Tell-
Tale Heart’ has as its subject – or object – an object, the eye; the object
of the crime is the eye, but ‘eye’ sounds like ‘I’, namely the subject in
the first person that tells the story. Sounds, words, meanings are the
matter of poetry and prose. As we know, Poe believed in both the
logical power and the suggestive power of words:
I do not believe that any thought, properly so called, is out of the

reach of language … There is, however, a class of fancies, of exquis-
ite delicacy, which are not thoughts, and to which, as yet, I have
found it absolutely impossible to adapt language. I use the word
fancies at random, and merely because I must use some word.119

Edgar Allan Poe 41
The analyst, not unlike the poet, likes rebuses, enigmas, hieroglyphs,
conundrums: ‘He derives pleasure from even the most trivial occupa-
tions bringing his talent into play.’120 Words and sounds, grammar and
syntax offer many possibilities of games and suggestions. What if one
could eliminate the grammatical persons, or decline pronouns: ‘I’, ‘he’,

‘it’? The narrator of ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’ accumulates short sentences
where the personal pronouns resound with all their suggestive power:
I loved the old man. He had never wronged me. He had never given
me insult. For his gold I had no desire. I think it was his eye! yes, it
was this! One of his eyes resembled that of a vulture – a pale blue eye
with a film over it. Whenever it fell upon me, my blood ran cold;
and so by degrees – very gradually – I made up my mind to take the
life of the old man, and thus rid myself of the eye for ever?121
‘I think it was his eye.’ ‘It’ is the neuter; ‘it’ is in the middle of the short
sentence. It designates the thing, whatever object might be familiar. It,
the eye of the old man, is veiled. ‘It’ is the neuter, a trifle, or a film on
the eye.
One should perform a chemical analysis of Poe’s tales and identify the
elements, as Poe himself suggested. Ciphering and deciphering, that is
the continuous work of the skilful reader and the skilful writer, constantly
manipulating words, letters and sounds, endlessly composing them,
always aiming at the unity of effect. Where an operation succeeds, the
calculation must have been right, the intuition must be correct. The heart
appears in ‘The Man of the Crowd’ as in ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’, since the
old man in ‘The Man of the Crowd’ is ‘the type and genius of deep
crime’, and also ‘the worst heart of the world [my emphasis]’. He is ‘a
grosser book than the “Hortolus Animae”’, a book that lässt sich nicht
lesen. Through the arabesque of words and sounds, one can neutralize or
hold together opposite meanings. So, secret, as in ‘The Man of the
Crowd’, and revelation, as in ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’, cease to be mutually
exclusive, but lie rather on the same axis, like to say, or to tell, and to
read, lesen in German, for legein in ancient Greek means to say.
Thus ‘The Man of the Crowd’, probably written in 1840, is to a
certain extent the photographic negative of ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’. The
former takes place in London, in wide open metropolitan places, in the
streets and in the midst of the crowd of a real city, the latter in
the close space of an apartment and mainly in the old man’s bedroom.
In one tale the scene is set with a very small number of architectural
elements, a bedroom, a door, a bed, the floorboards, whereas in the

other there is all the variety of the big city. In ‘The Man of the Crowd’,
everything is traffic, movement, speed, shortness of breath and, indeed,
chance, for the narrator begins to follow the unknown old man out of
curiosity and without any precise plan. He follows him for a whole night
and a day, leaving him only on the second evening, for the time experi-

enced is infinite, and perpetual recommencement takes place.
Conversely, in ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’, the narrator knows the old man,
lives with him, and the action is unique, predetermined, slow and
studied, unfolding within the well-defined timescale of eight nights.
Yet the two tales are linked by the genius of ‘deep crime’, or the
demon, the imp of perversity. The narrator of ‘The Man of the Crowd’
saw the neutral, empty gaze of the mysterious old man: ‘And, as the
shades of the second evening came on, I grew wearied unto death, and,
stopping fully in front of the wanderer, gazed at him steadfastly in the
face. He noticed me not.’122 The old man in the other tale also has an
eye without a gaze; and, because it is veiled, the narrator never knows
if it is looking at him or not. It haunts him. ‘I think it was his eye! yes,
it was this.’ This, th, teeth: the narrator of Berenice, for his part, was
haunted by teeth: ‘The teeth! – the teeth! – they were here, and there,
and everywhere, and visibly and palpably before me… . They – they
alone were present to my mental eye, and they, in their sole individu-
ality, became the essence of my mental life.’123 In this stream of
rhymed terms and alliterations of th, it is the eye, the mental eye, that
constantly sees the teeth. Those of Berenice were ‘long narrow, and
excessively white, with the pale lips writhing about them’. Likewise,
the old man’s eye in ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’ was ‘a pale blue eye, with a
film over it’. The horrible eye that haunts the narrator is pale in colour.
After her illness, Berenice too had eyes without a gaze, and without
light: ‘The eyes were lifeless, and lustreless, and seemingly pupilless.’124
The cycle of obsession is infinite, following the movement of sugges-
tion. Berenice then resembles Poe’s old man, just as Ligeia had done,
since the indescribable effect of her eyes’ expression was comparable to
that of the eyes of old people: ‘I have felt it in the glances of unusually
aged people.’125
The alchemy of the mind demands equations between some frag-
ments of the tales: refrains, neutralizing effects, contrasts as in the
rhymes of a poem, arise out of such a chemistry. Words, sounds and
images turn in a kaleidoscope.
When chemical elements are combined, one should see the
outcome, which can be unexpected. Thus, the old man in ‘The Man of
the Crowd’ is the genius of crime, ‘the worst heart’, while in ‘The

Edgar Allan Poe 43
Tell-Tale Heart’ the old man becomes ‘his Evil eye’, but ‘eye’ sounds
like ‘I’, and the gaze I cannot meet is above all my own gaze. So it is ‘I’
that am the old man; ‘I’ is the ‘Evil eye’, and in that respect something
wicked, impish, namely the genius of crime, the one ‘I’ have committed
and ‘I’ tell. Or else ‘the worst heart in the world’ is the one that tells, or

‘the tell-tale heart’. It is the heart that corresponds to the crime; it is
there under the floorboards, it is the corpus delicti, the body of the old
man cut up into pieces, the beating heart. But of whom? ‘I’ and ‘eye’,
the subject of the crime and the object of it, are merged through the
hallucination of the same sound. The first-person narrator of ‘The
Tell-Tale Heart’ undergoes a process of identification with the old man.
The old man had been completely identified with the unbearable
image of his veiled eye. He will be ultimately destroyed because of the
enormity of a detail, as it happens to the narrator at the very end,
when, after the crime, he cannot stop hearing the beating of the heart.
Everything merges, as if ‘I’ and ‘eye’ were finally the same body.
The murderer is wholly comparable to his victim, being himself the
victim of the demon of perversity that is pushing him to betray
himself. The execution of the crime is slow and precise. Seven nights
pass before the narrator can perform the deed, the old man’s eye being
not open; because, as we know, it was not the old man who annoyed
him ‘but his Evil eye’. The narrator has to wait until the eighth night,
when the old man hears a noise, wakes up and yells: ‘Who is there?’
And then, the narrator explains: ‘He was still sitting up in the bed lis-
tening; – just as I have done, night after night.’126 Then a moan went
up. Which the narrator knew only too well:
I knew the sound well. Many a night, just at midnight, when all the
world slept, it has welled up from my bosom, deepening, with its
dreadful echo, the terrors that distracted me. I say I knew it well. I
knew what the old man felt … 127
How, at this stage, can one distinguish the narrator’s terror from that
of the old man? ‘His fears had been ever since growing upon him. He
had been trying to fancy them causeless, but could not. He had been
saying to himself – “It is nothing but the wind in the chimney”.’128
The narrator can feel exactly what the old man feels.
The old man is terrified, and his heart beats loudly. Indeed, it beats
too loudly, and the neighbours might hear it. There is therefore no
time to lose, and the old man must be killed at once. Yet when the
deed is finally done, the identification with the old man, now dead, cut

into pieces, and well hidden, becomes unbearable. The pieces of his body
are under the floorboards, and the murderer plants his chair on the self-
same spot, in order to chat with the policemen. He then hears the beating
of the heart, very loud, too loud, ever louder, until at last, goaded beyond
measure, convinced that the noise is coming from beneath the floor-

boards, from the old man heart, he has to confess his crime.
One can be very logical, master everything, and finally become the
victim of an idea, a sensation that comes from the body, from one of
its senses, namely hearing. The story of the eye is also the story of
hearing, for the beating of the heart is clipped and rhythmical, like all
the short sentences resounding in the tale.
Poe rejected the belief in Nature and the organic principle. Yet the
organic would reappear from a very different angle as organ – be it the
eye, or ears, an acoustic sense that is only too acute, or the heart that
beats as if it would never stop. And the body is cut into pieces. In Poe’s
tale, detail and fragment assert themselves against the whole, against
the Emersonian idea of ‘each and all’. The eye is an isolated organ,
separated from the whole, and such is the heart – an isolated organ.
‘Funes or Memory’ is the tale by Borges which the author himself has
described as the metaphor for insomnia – a sort of expanded faculty of
attention that allows the protagonist to see everything in the most perfect
detail from all possible perspectives. It is the story of the detail that kills,
becomes the whole world and a true obsession. ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’ may
likewise be read as a metaphor for the heart. For finally the whole story is,
as Barthes said of Bataille’s ‘Story of the Eye’, a sequence of migrations of
the eye as an object and a linguistic artifice that reverses the terms and
the most common figures of speech. From sequence to sequence, ‘The
Tell-tale Heart’ finally concentrates at the end on one thing, an organ
called heart, with a final ‘t’, and the letter ‘t’ features in ‘it’, in the title of
the story, ‘The Tell-tale heart, and likewise in the beating of the heart.
The letter ‘t’ beats like a hammer, contributing to the unity of effect that
is quite the opposite of the transcendentalist unity. Poe, who loved
Nathaniel Hawthorne’s tales, knows the importance of that hammering
in order to induce ‘an exaltation of the soul which cannot be long sus-
tained’. The short narrative, like a poem, has to hammer in the reader’s
mind: ‘Without a certain continuity of effort – without a certain duration
or repetition of purpose – the soul is never deeply moved. There must be
the dropping of the water upon the rock.’129
‘The Tell-Tale Heart’ was written at the end of 1842. In the spring of
the same year, Edgar Allan Poe had a heart attack. His stepfather, John
Allan, suffered from a weak heart.130 Edgar Allan Poe could never quite

Edgar Allan Poe 45
bring himself to accept the name of his stepfather, so he dropped Allan

or, rather, only kept the initial letter, the first in the alphabet, and he
always wrote Edgar ‘A.’ Poe. ‘A’, as in Ligeia, and at the very heart of
heart.
Ciphering and deciphering are, for Poe, the work of the writer and of

the reader. Letters and sounds are for Poe, as for Bataille, the domain of
literature. They constitute the basis of a poetic or narrative composition;
like an arabesque, they develop a motif or a theme, aiming to the unity of
effect. The writer and the reader should both have the faculty of attention
that characterizes many of Poe’s protagonists – Egaeus, Dupin and the
narrator in the first person of the ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’.

2
Van Gogh and Hofmannsthal:
Colours and Silence

This chapter will treat, from a Baudelairean perspective, the unexpected
link between Hugo von Hofmannsthal and Vincent Van Gogh as
pointing to some crucial questions in modern art: the interplay
between the past and the present, the discrepancy between reality and
language, and the attempt to express this very discrepancy through the
link between literature and painting.1
The term ‘modern’ can be understood in two different ways. On the
one hand it implies a belief in the totally new, in the breaking off of
tradition – typical of avant-gardes; on the other, the modern is appre-
hended as weighed down by culture, by the past, capable of becoming
classical or even decadent. Baudelaire demonstrated both aspects of
modernity. In his long poem ‘Le Voyage’, he invites anyone who loves
spiritual adventures to strive for the new: ‘Let’s plunge to the bottom
of the Unknown, to discover something new!’2 But in Le Peintre de la vie
moderne, where he investigated the question of contemporary art and
aesthetics through the sketches of Constantin Guys, Baudelaire stated
the equal value of the past and the present:
The past is interesting not only by reason of the beauty which could
be distilled from it by those artists for whom it was the present, but
also precisely because it is the past, for its historical value. It is the
same with the present. The pleasure which we derive from the repre-
sentation of the present is due not only to the beauty with which it
can be invested, but also to its essential quality of being present.3
While discussing the concept of ‘modernity’, he suggested that the

modern should deserve to become ancient: ‘In short, for any “modern-
ity” to be worthy of one day taking its place as “antiquity”, it is
46

Van Gogh and Hofmannsthal 47
necessary for the mysterious beauty which human life accidentally

puts into it to be distilled from it.’4
Baudelaire constantly affirms that Delacroix is the ‘most original
painter of ancient or of modern times’.5 He is both ancient and
modern, since he excels both in the grandeur of composition typical of

the ancient masters and in the expression of the melancholy feeling
characterizing modern sensitivity. Delacroix’s art makes a deep impres-
sion on the soul and ‘quickly enough guides our thoughts towards the
fathomless limbo of sadness.’6
In one of his first enthusiastic comments on Delacroix (Salon de
1845), Baudelaire praised La Mort de Marc Aurèle (The Death of Marcus
Aurelius), a painting which had not been appreciated by contempo-
rary critics: Marcus Aurelius is dying and his son Commode appears
light-hearted as if he were thinking about something else. The vision
of Roman decadence is depicted with the modern use of colour and
with the modern feeling par excellence, melancholy: for Baudelaire,
past and melancholy are tied together in the representation of that
Roman scene. Perhaps, ever since Baudelaire there has been an inex-
haustible complicity between the modern and the decadent – a
feature which characterized the endeavours of a host of artists of the
turn of the century in Vienna. A line of Rilke’s Der Letzte expresses
the feeling that haunted so many writers: ‘And I feel myself to be the
heir of something that transcends today.’ The same mood is evident
in Georg Trakl’s Amen: ‘Corruption gliding through the crumbled
room; Shadows on yellow hangings; in dark mirrors the ivory sorrow
of our hands is arched. Brown beads trickle through fingers that have
died … ’7
The connection between Hofmannsthal, who has that Viennese
frame of mind, and Van Gogh, whose works made such an impact on
the Viennese writer, shows that the relationship between literature and
painting does something more than respond to the classical wish of
Horace: ut pictura poesis. It corresponds to the attempt to express
modernity, modern life, the one art being a continuation of the other,
as suggested by Baudelaire. In his essay ‘The Life and Work of Eugène
Delacroix’, he defined the ‘strange, mysterious quality’ of Delacroix as
‘the invisible, the impalpable, the dream, the nerves, the soul’ that the
artist was able to interpret ‘with the perfection of a consummate
painter, with the exactitude of a subtle writer, with the eloquence of an
impassioned musician.’8 But, in addition to this praise which both
summarizes and blends the qualities of the various arts, Baudelaire
stated an essential feature of modern aesthetics: ‘It is moreover one of

the characteristic symptoms of the spiritual condition of our age that

the arts aspire if not to take one another’s place, at least reciprocally to
lend one another new powers.’9 Van Gogh, not unlike Delacroix, was
aware of the importance of literature for painting. No sooner had Van
Gogh resolved to become a painter than he began to read:

So I studied fairly seriously the books within my reach, like the Bible
and French Revolution by Michelet, and last winter Shakespeare and a
few by Victor Hugo and Charles Dickens … So you would be wrong
to persist in the belief that, for instance, I should now be less enthu-
siastic for Rembrandt, or Millet, or Delacroix, or whoever it may be,
for the contrary is true. But you see, there are many things which
one must believe and love. There is something of Rembrandt in
Shakespeare, and of Correggio in Michelet … If now you can forgive
a man for making a thorough study of pictures, admit also that the
love of books is as sacred as the love of Rembrandt, and I even think
the two complete each other.10
Deeply impressed by Van Gogh, Hofmannsthal believed that painting

starts where literature becomes silence, and lends new powers to
literature.
My method here will be to present the reader with a montage of
literary and figurative passages showing the struggle of those who con-
sidered words to be inadequate to express the modernity of 1900. A
new language was necessary.
One can see a threefold link between Van Gogh and Hofmannsthal.
To begin with, there was the violence of the landscape of Provence, of
the south of France, Van Gogh’s best-loved place, which captured
Hofmannsthal’s imagination during his first journey through France in
1892. Secondly, when the Viennese poet stayed in Paris in 1900, he
became acquainted with Mallarmé, Manet and Rodin, and also with
Gauguin, who had been Van Gogh’s friend. Hofmannsthal saw some of
Van Gogh’s pictures. Finally, and most important of all, there is a text
by Hofmannsthal, Die Briefe des Zurückgekehrten (The Letters of a Man
Who Returned; published in 1907, but dated 1901). Hofmannsthal’s
traveller, having returned to Germany and to Austria after an absence
of several years, has been forcefully struck by the evidence of the
European crisis. The gestures of ordinary Germans and Austrians
remind him of automata, while he senses their inner emptiness. He too
is afflicted by a sort of inner sickness, which leads him to perceive
objects, trees, houses as if everything were ‘filled with inner uncer-

tainty, malicious unreality’, ‘a breath not of death but of Not-life, inde-

scribable’. When this condition has all but overwhelmed the traveller,
so that he can no longer contemplate even walking slowly up and
down the avenues or sitting in a café and reading the newspaper, he
stops in front of a gallery:

My dear friend, there’s no such thing as chance; I was meant to see
these pictures, was meant to see them at this hour, in this agitated
condition, in this sequence. There were in all about sixty paintings,
middle-sized and small, a few portraits, otherwise mostly land-
scapes; in only very few was the human figure important; on most
of them it was the trees, meadows, ravines, rocks, ploughed fields,
roofs, garden plots. As to how they were painted I cannot offer any
information … Nevertheless, I remember … frequently having seen
[in Paris] in studios and in exhibitions things which bore a certain
resemblance to these – very bright, almost like posters, in any case
quite different from paintings in the galleries. At first sight these
here seemed to me loud and restless, quite crude, quite strange; in
order to see the first of them as pictures at all, as a unity, I had to
prepare myself – but then, then I saw, then I saw them all thus, each
single one, and all together, and Nature in them, and the strength
of the human soul in them which here had transformed Nature, and
tree and bush and field and slope which were painted here, and also
that other strength, that which was behind the paint, that essence,
that indescribable sense of fate – all this I saw, so that I lost the sen-
sation of myself to these pictures, and got it back powerfully, and
lost it again!11
As revealed by a postscript at the end of Hofmannsthal’s text, those

extraordinary paintings were Van Gogh’s. Hofmannsthal had thus
spoken of Van Gogh, and had grasped the sense in which he was a
painter of modern life, and that in a highly Baudelairean fashion, in
accordance with the formula that ‘the best account of a picture may
well be a sonnet or an elegy’.12 These pages by Hofmannsthal, to my
knowledge the best criticism of Van Gogh before Antonin Artaud’s Van
Gogh, ou le suicidé de la société, form a narrative, a prose elegy, which
insists upon the value of expressive colour. This prose elegy shows an
understanding of painting very similar to Baudelaire’s vision of
Delacroix’s use of colour as expressive of feelings and thoughts.
Hofmannsthal gives a description of the paintings not at the beginning
but at the end of his letter, as if Van Gogh’s colours were the solution, the

point of arrival that would serve to assuage the anxiety, the sense of a loss
of reality experienced by his traveller. The traveller in effect recovers
through the pictures the reality he lacked: the violence of the art enables
a dumb reality to speak; it is a substitute for the unreality of the real and,
finally, it overcomes the sense of loss. Thus, the traveller, after looking at

the pictures, goes on to a business appointment, where he manages to
obtain for his firm ‘more than the board of directors, in their wildest
hopes, had expected from me, and I procured it as in a dream one picks
flowers from a bare wall.’13
Hofmannsthal’s traveller recovers precisely what the colours had
been for the painter himself, who, once the most tormented pictures
were finished, wrote to his brother Theo as follows: ‘these canvasses
will tell you what I cannot say in words, what I see as healthy and
invigorating in the countryside.’ The sense of reality regained by the
traveller – his vision of the pictures, his success in business – like the
health of the countryside invoked by Van Gogh, serves to scotch
the romantic myth of the mad, tormented painter. By the same token,
it reveals his artistic mastery, which is not so different from
Hofmannsthal’s mastery of words, and the power of art, which not
only restores meaning to objects but also helps toward an understand-
ing of reality itself – be it a painting, a poem or a political or financial
deal. All avant-gardes trusted in this power of art.
If there is a link between Van Gogh, a towering but solitary figure,
and the notion of the avant-garde, it is one of solitude, exile and fore-
sight. It is sometimes said that Cézanne paved the way for cubism, and
Van Gogh for expressionism. Van Gogh, who could not sell his can-
vases when he was alive, forms part of the artistic avant-garde after the
event, given a historical perspective whereby the future is encompassed
by the past. It is as if Van Gogh foresaw the painting that was to come.
As for Hofmannsthal, a Viennese aristocrat best known as the libret-
tist of Richard Strauss and as a supporter of the idea of conservative
revolution in his patriotic essays of the 1920s, it seems a little wayward
to associate him with the avant-garde. Hofmannsthal had belonged to
the literary group Jung-Wien, around Hermann Bahr (Die Jungen were
originally, that is, towards the end of the 1870s, the new left of the
Constitutional Party). The young practitioners of the decorative arts,
Gustav Klimt at their head, founded the Secession, which was an
avant-garde for a few years at least, and Hofmannsthal contributed for
a time to the Secessionist review, Ver Sacrum.
Hofmannsthal may be said to embody the intrinsic ambiguity of the
Secession, which combined old and new, progressive taste and conser-

vative taste, and which would ultimately fall apart, thus facilitating the
rise of the other Viennese avant-garde, which was tougher and rejected
any idealized notion of the work of art and its unique character. By
contrast, then, with Oskar Kokoschka, Karl Kraus and Adolph Loos, the
great negative spirits of the epoch, Hofmannsthal, together with Klimt,

represented the backward-looking dream of the Secession, the lovely
illusion that art would not only not lose its aura of the ideal but would
further intensify it, covering it with a golden veneer of nostalgia –
witness the golden colours of some of Klimt’s best-known paintings.
The poster for the first exhibition, in 1897, of the Secession shows an
asymmetrical frame around a blank space given shape by drawings in
linear perspective of Athena and of Theseus battling with the
Minotaur. One can regard this blank space in the centre of the compo-
sition as at once an interrogation, a suspension and a possibility. This
void is a suspension of representation and of judgement; it is therefore
expectation or silence, and is thus akin to a mirror that reflects no
image, like the empty mirror that Nuda Veritas holds in her hand in
the 1898 poster by Klimt. Therefore, Ver Sacrum begins its Spring in
this fashion, with a void, which is the opposite of a manifesto.
This blank space in the poster questions modernity itself, and shows
it waiting for answers; in this regard it reflects very accurately the
actual programme of the Secession, as formulated by the architect Otto
Wagner, who spoke of the need to show modern man his true face.
Another version of the same project was inscribed on the door of the
house of the Secession – the building, or rather the temple, of Josef
Olbrich – in the words, Der Zeit ihre Kunst. Der Kunst ihre Freiheit (‘An
art fit for the times, and liberty for art’). In the poster representing
Theseus, the new possibilities are indicated through the use of linear
perspective, and through geometrical retrenchments that would prove
to be more symbolic and more expressive than academic painting,
whether realist or impressionist. Indeed, if one disregards the represen-
tational aspect and concentrates on the lines and the large blank
square of Klimt’s drawing, one can almost see it as anticipating
Mondrian’s use of space. This poster seems to mark the end of Klimt’s
first period, as painter and decorator of the Ringstrasse, a period
framed, so to speak, by academic realism and by a sort of historical
impressionism. Carl Schorske14 commented that that which is
repressed invariably returns, and it is true that Klimt’s paintings would
in his last period be characterized by the most extreme pleasures of the
eye, by the most vibrant portrayal of light and by a gilded geometricism
transfiguring reality. Such works call to mind the joie de vivre of Der

Rosenkavalier, the melancholic waltz and languorous vertigo of

Hofmannsthal, several of whose comedies are set in Venice, the quin-
tessential impressionist city.
I shall not concern myself here with the refined use of colour and
the diffused sensuality of Klimt’s maturity, since these are attributes

belonging to another moment in history. I want to concentrate upon
the poster of the Secession, taking into account a short period to be
treated here not in a historiographic, Hegelian fashion, but photo-
graphically, in the manner of the photograph that, as Walter Benjamin
put it, captures the hic et nunc of the thing, or, as Roland Barthes
expressed it, the ‘that has been’, the contingency of the event.
The event in this case is the 1897 poster and the hole, void, or silence
at its centre, which can be compared, in visual terms, to another event,
which is not figurative but literary, namely, a short text by Hofmannsthal
of very nearly the same date. In Lord Chandos’s Letter (1901–2), the
English lord explains to his friend Francis Bacon that he has found it
increasingly impossible to write, to pursue literary projects conceived at
an earlier date, to believe in words, in language, or in the perfection of
adjectives. The earlier projects rested upon harmonious correspondences
between nature, science and the self. Now, for no definable reason, with
no external fact having precipitated a crisis, all of that was no longer
possible. Thus, Lord Chandos could no longer bring himself to utter
abstract words, to carry on a normal conversation, or use such words as
‘nature’, ‘soul’ and ‘body’. It was the end of an era, and the crisis of the
old order, and here the England of 1603, the year of Queen Elizabeth’s
death and of the solar eclipse, becomes an allegory for Hapsburg Austria
at the beginning of the twentieth century.
Lord Chandos’s Letter marks the moment at which Hofmannsthal’s
impressionist period abruptly ended, for after that he stopped using
the signature ‘Loris’. This name had been used as a pseudonym of an
unabashed aesthete, who had been enamoured of forms colours and
sensations, and who had known the pleasure, both fresh and nostalgic,
to be derived from the ephemeral, from the magic of words, from the
dance of words, and from the fascination and absorption of the exter-
nal world. Loris could accumulate impressions and his language could
express all of them in a rich and sensual tongue, while Chandos suf-
fered such a devastating spiritual collapse that no existing language
could help him. Words, which had Loris so much in thrall, floated
around Chandos, isolated and threatening, empty of meaning and
heavy as objects – and no longer sounding like a most lovely and con-
tinuous stream of music. Lord Chandos could no longer write in any

language, whether it were German, Latin, English, French or Italian.

Silence, the interruption of any and every production of language, was
what Chandos now held to. He did what Karl Kraus, the critic at odds
with the Jung-Wien, would suggest in 1914: ‘Let whoever has some-
thing to say, step forward and shut up.’

But one can only fully understand Lord Chandos’s Letter if one places
it alongside the aforementioned letter, which continues and completes
it, namely that of The Letters of a Man Who Returned, in which
Hofmannsthal speaks of Van Gogh. Like Lord Chandos, the traveller is
prey to a spiritual vertigo which disturbs his vision of objects, and
which makes them appear to him to be as isolated, unreal and threat-
ening as words do to Chandos, who writes to his friend Francis Bacon:
How shall I try to describe to you these strange spiritual torments,

this rebounding of the fruit-branches above my outstretched hands,
this recession of the murmuring stream from my thirsting lips?…
My case, in short, is this: I have lost completely the ability to
think or to speak anything coherently …
Single words floated round me; they congealed into eyes which
stared at me and into which I was forced to stare back – whirlpools
which gave me vertigo and reeling incessantly, led into the void.15
The traveller confesses a very similar feeling:
I felt myself growing ill from within, but it wasn’t my body; I know
my body too well. It was the crisis of an inner indisposition … Now
and again in the mornings it happened, in these German hotel
rooms, that the jug and the wash-basin – or a corner of the room
with the table and clothes-rack – appeared to me so non-real,
despite their indescribable banality so utterly non-real, ghostly as it
were, and at the same time ephemeral, waiting, so to speak
temporarily, to take the place of the real jug, the real wash-basin
filled with water … From it there emanated a slight unpleasant
vertigo, but not a physical one … it was like a momentary floating
above the abyss, the eternal void.16
Klimt’s poster and Lord Chandos’s Letter reveal the shortcomings of

impressionism when faced with the violence of the contemporary world,
and the limitations of the art used in either case. In the poster, given the
fact that it is a sheet of paper and that it belongs to the sphere of the
graphic arts, we mourn the painting. The poster lies somewhere between

the artisanal product – of the sort to be found in the Viennese workshops,

the Wiener Werkstätte, established in 1903 by artists from the Secession –
and the work of art, which nevertheless could be readily reproduced. The
poster, in which Theseus features, has the radical qualities of an anti-
picture; it contains almost as many written as drawn signs; it attains the

greatest possible economy of representation, even going so far as to give
figurative expression to the void – thus lending itself to an infinite
number of different interpretations – even opting for a complete rejection
of colour, of the positive richness of impressionist colour. Just as, accord-
ing to Hofmannsthal, speech was indecorous, it could have been
suggested by Klimt that painting was indecent.
Thus, Lord Chandos’s text, a letter in narrative form, reproduces the
characteristics of the poster, for in the short narrative letter we mourn the
poem, or indeed any fully achieved literary form, be it novel, tale, critical
essay, play, prose poem or aphorism. The letter is cast in the style of a
journalistic feuilleton, which was excoriated by Kraus, and which was the
most popular literary genre of the period, just as the poster was the most
prominent form in the visual arts. Hofmannsthal’s story uses the fewest
possible words to say what it has to say, seeming almost to lapse into
silence at times. He likewise espoused the principle of economy when
writing for the stage, and this well before he had begun to collaborate
with Strauss. In his 1903 essay, ‘Die Bühne als Traumbild’ (‘The Stage as
Dream-image’), ornamentation seems akin to a crime, much as it does in
the famous essay by the architect Adolf Loos, Ornament und Verbrechen
(Ornament and Crime), which is perhaps the loveliest and most poetic
formulation of an essentialist approach to the question of ornamentation.
Where the task is to produce a design for the stage, Hofmannsthal
suggests sacrificing all ornament and stylistic refinement:
[The stage designer’s] eye should be creative in much the same

fashion as is the eye of the dreamer who perceives nothing that is
without meaning … Dreams are indescribably economical. Who can
overlook the tremendous violence they contain, combined with an
astonishing barrenness and nakedness?17
To pass from the liveliness of impressionism to stubborn silence,

from trust in sensations to the sickness that sunders the ties between
the self and the world, between thought and language, is equivalent to
lifting the veil from truth, to seeing it naked: this indeed is the index
of the modern. I am not concerned here with what Klimt and
Hofmannsthal would subsequently do, but rather with these particular

intellectual events, Hofmannsthal’s two letters and Klimt’s two posters

for the Secession, and I like to would focus upon them as if they were
two photographs. I am not concerned here with what Benjamin quite
rightly takes objection to, but with the very moment at which he
points out to Adorno the significance of Lord Chandos’s Letter:

Julian [in Hofmannsthal’s Die Turm (The Tower)] betrays the Prince:
Hofmansthal has turned aside from the task he had identified in
Lord Chandos’s Letter. His falling silent was a kind of punishment.
The language that was withdrawn from Hofmannsthal could be the
very same one that was at that same period given to Kafka. For
Kafka took upon himself the task that Hofmannsthal had embraced
morally and therefore politically.18
Warheit ist Feuer und Warheit reden heisst leuchten und brennen (‘Truth
is fire and telling the truth means shining and burning’) reads the Nuda
Veritas poster by Klimt. In referring to the fire of truth, the text might
be taken to mean that silence had to be made to speak its terrifying
language, so that, by means of fire, another language and another use of
colour, that of violence, might be found.
Van Gogh, who is known to have been deeply influenced by the
impressionists, sensed the shortcomings of impressionism, and there-
fore the need to discover another colourism, that of expressing through
colour:
And I should not be surprised if the impressionists soon find fault with
my way of working, for it has been fertilized by the ideas of Delacroix
rather than by theirs. Because, instead of trying to reproduce exactly
what I have before my eyes [realist trompe-l’oeil, as he puts it in
another passage], I use colour more arbitrarily so as to express myself
more forcibly.19
Sight becomes an organ aiming to distort the real, doing violence to

objects and to perspective, in order to express inner feelings, as in the
famous poem ‘Le Cygne’, where Baudelaire defines the sky as being
‘cruellement bleu’ (‘cruelly blue’), as, too, in Van Gogh’s picture of the
cornfield with the black crows, in which the blue is ‘terrible’ – as
terrible as Delacroix’s blue is for Van Gogh:
When Paul Mantz saw at the exhibition the violent and inspired
sketch by Delacroix that we saw at the Champs Elysées – The Bark of

Christ – he turned away from it, exclaiming in his article: ‘I did not
know that one could be so terrible with a little blue and green.’
Elsewhere Van Gogh speaks of an ‘absolutely harrowing malachite’.20

He dreams of a colour that would express the truth of being, the fire of

truth:
I want to paint men and women with that something of the eternal
which the halo used to symbolize, and which we seek to confer by
the actual radiance and vibration of our colourings. Portraiture so
understood…would be more in harmony with what Eug. Delacroix
attempted and brought off in his Tasso in Prison, and many other
pictures, representing a real man. Ah! Portraiture, portraiture with
thought, the soul of the model in it, that is what I think must
come.21
Hofmannsthal’s traveller understood that Van Gogh’s blue, green

and yellow, his landscapes and his portraits were truly terrifying. He
could sense all this because he too had inside himself the brutality of
the real or, indeed, the unreality of the real, all those objects that
appeared to him so ‘un-real despite their indescribable banality, so
utterly not real’ as if they were ghosts. What is awaited is expression, or
rather expressionism capable of giving to colours the power of signify-
ing ‘more forcibly’, as suggested by Van Gogh. Hofmannsthal, at the
moment of crisis, when, through Chandos and the traveller, he contem-
plated silence and the possibility of the loss of meaning, when he
brushed against the language of Kafka, understood the strength of
expressionism which, like the interiorization of the shocks of metro-
politan life, is both the presence of anxiety and the actual mastery of it:
It was in a storm that these trees were born under my eyes, were
born for my sake, their roots stretching into the earth, their
branches stretching against the clouds; in a storm these earth rifts,
these valleys between hills, surrendered themselves; even in the
bulk of the rock blocks was frozen storm. And now I could from
picture to picture, feel a Something, could feel the mingling, the
merging of formation, how the innermost life broke forth into
colour and how the colours lived one for the sake of the others, and
how one, mysteriously powerful, carried all the others; and in all
this could sense a heart, the soul of the man who had created it,
who with this vision did himself answer the spasm of his own most

dreadful doubt. I could feel, could know, could fathom, could enjoy
abyss and summit, without and within, one and all in a ten-
thousandth part of the time I take to write these words – and it was
as though two men, were master over my life, master over my
strength, my intellect, felt the time pass, knew there were now only

twenty minutes left, now ten, now five, and stood outside, hailed a
carriage, and drove away.22
In like fashion, Van Gogh knew what was healthy and invigorating
about the countryside.
Lord Chandos’s Letter and the traveller’s letters exemplify two differ-
ent expressionist modes. The first mode is stasis, like the reified words
and the objects seen by the traveller, which are somehow detached
from the space around them, condensed and isolated, and which seem
to be fragments of an impossible continuity, cut away from their func-
tion, things perpetuated in their actual nature as things, like the bare
words that so obsessed Lord Chandos. The literary equivalent would
be the spectral classicism of Trakl, or the spare, geometrical and
petrified language of Kafka. The second mode is dynamic and spas-
modic, as is exemplified by number of Van Gogh’s canvases or
Munch’s The Scream. It is in this mode that the dying rats appear; they
are not seen by Lord Chandos with his actual eyes, with the realist or
impressionist optic nerves responding to the external world in front of
them, but with the mental eye, since Lord Chandos imagines the
scene. All of a sudden, as he moves forward on his horse and sees
nothing but a freshly ploughed field and a quail, Lord Chandos is
assailed by the vision of dying rats in a cellar in which he had ordered
poison to be put down:
As I was trotting along over the fresh-ploughed land … there

suddenly loomed up before me the vision of that cellar, resounding
with the death-struggle of a mob of rats. I felt everything within me:
the cool, musty air of the cellar filled with the sweet and pungent
reek of poison, and the yelling of the death-cries breaking against
the mouldering walls; the vain convulsions of those convoluted
bodies as they tear about in confusion and despair; their frenzied
search for escape, and the grimace of icy rage when a couple
collided with one another at a blocked-up crevice.23
As he narrates this scene, Lord Chandos compares it to scenes in

battles described by Livy; for example, in the hours preceding the

destruction of Alba Longa. This scene aroused a feeling which is close

to the pietas of the Ancients, although it is not exactly pity:
Forgive this description, but do not think that it was pity I felt. For
if you did, my example would have been poorly chosen. It was far

more and far less than pity: an immense sympathy, a flowing over
into these creatures, or a feeling that an aura of life and death, of
dream and wakefulness, had flowed for a moment into them – but
whence?24
Perhaps, the best figurative equivalent for the state described by

Hofmannsthal would be Kokoschka’s Pity, for there too we sense an
immense sympathy, an aura of life and death. The painting does not
represent the external world, it expresses its effect on the mind; as if
things and words were bare in front of astonished eyes, of mouths
incapable of any utterance.
Once impressionism, and with it the simple reproduction of the
outside world, has been superseded, both reality and sight became
quite alien one to the other. Where an earlier language had given
promise of correspondences, in the balance between joy and melan-
choly, the new language was expected to express that gap between
reality and vision, words and meanings. The world is internalized,
anxiety colours any feeling, expression is taken to its furthest limits.
The Viennese had been influenced by Mach’s theories and, in parti-
cular, the idea that the subject is a knot of feeling (Einfühlung). If
Hofmannsthal’s traveller is so moved by Van Gogh’s paintings, it is
because he already feels that intensity within himself. ‘But what
are colours if the innermost life of objects doesn’t break through
them!’:25 the traveller writes, and Van Gogh wrote in a similar vein to
Theo: ‘It is colour not locally true from the point of view of the
trompe-l’oeil realist, but colour to suggest some emotion of an ardent
temperament.’
In 1900, modernity could only be grasped with an intellectual inten-
sity that combines thought and feeling. It could only be expressed
without sentimentalism, by the raw endeavour of expressionism,
understood not only as historical movement but also as the tension
and the strong need to express emotions. In one of his letters Van
Gogh told Theo that he sought to ‘express not something sentiment-
ally melancholic, but a deep sorrow’, and Hofmannsthal’s traveller
asked: ‘why colours could … not be sisters of sorrow, since both
colours and sorrows draw us into eternity.’ Lord Chandos formulates

the basic principle of Viennese philosophy, and of modernity (and of

what would later in the century be the novel of the modern man,
Robert Musil’s Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften), namely, the chiasma of
thought and feeling: ‘we could enter into a new and hopeful relation-
ship with the whole of existence universe, if only we begin to think

with the heart.’26
And to feel with the brain, one should perhaps add, as Ulrich, in
Musil’s novel, believes, when he writes the treatise on feeling, dis-
covered by his sister Agathe. There is an interpenetration of reason and
emotions, according to a strongly held principle of Austrian philo-
sophy, reacting against the Kantian division between the soul and the
intellect. This might well be what was meant by Klimt’s poster, in
which Athena, or intelligence, and the Minotaur, or instinct, meet. The
modern man would have to know the tragic, violent aspect of modern
existence, but would also need to win his or her inner battles, and to
master life with a new language that would be equal to the new reality.
The modern man would finally have to search out a language with the
power to express the nuances of feelings. While looking at a beetle in
the murky water of a watering-can, Lord Chandos says: ‘what was that
made me want to break into words which, I know, that, were I to find
them, would force to their knees those cherubim in whom I do not
believe?’27 But Chandos believes in new, unsettling objects. Hence the
description of the scene that struck Benjamin, and that shows, as
Baudelaire wished, that modernity is worthy of being ancient. In the
scene in question, which is set in a full meeting of the Senate,
Domitius reproaches Crassus, the orator, for having wept at the death
of his fish and Crassus answers that he has done what Domitius has
not done over the death of his wives. The scene is imprinted in Lord
Chandos’s mind:
I know not how oft Crassus with his lamprey enters my mind as a
mirrored image of my Self, reflected across the abyss of centuries.
But not on account of the answer he gave Domitius. The answer
brought the laughs on his side, and the whole affair turned into a
jest. I, however, am deeply affected by the affair, which would have
remained the same even had Domitius shed bitter tears of sorrow
over his wives. For there would still have been Crassus, shedding
tears over his lamprey.28
Seeing and saying break one against the other. Chandos is faced with
the shortcomings of literature, the impossibility of speaking and

writing in any language, silence; but Chandos discovers Crassus’s feel-

ings for his fish, and the traveller the paintings of Van Gogh:
How can I make it even half clear to you the way this language
talked into my soul, the way it threw toward me the gigantic

justification of the strangest indissoluble condition of my inner self,
the way it made me understand at once what, in my intolerable
stupor, I could hardly bear to feel, and which, nevertheless (so much
did I feel it!) I could no longer tear out of myself! And here an
unknown soul of incomprehensible power was giving me the
answer, by revealing to me a whole world!29
In marked contrast to the coquettish imitation of one art by the

other, or to the famous rivalries of pen and pencil (such as that of the
Goncourt brothers), each art shows for the artist the void in its actual
essence. Not only does each art wish to be what it is not, one therefore
aspiring to be colour and the other words, or music, but also and above
all the arts join forces so as not to be blinded by modern reality, so as
to allow the language of silence to speak, showing therefore modern
man his true face. Such a complicity between the different arts in no
way resembles Wagner’s notion of the total art-work, that ideal of a
cohesive community united in a coherent composition of arts. Art would
correspond, rather, to metropolitan reality, to what Hofmannsthal calls,
in the wake of Poe and Baudelaire, ‘the vast desert of our cities that teem
with humanity’.30 The identification of the modern with the big city is
what gave rise to a poetics equal to the nervous life of the great city.
Metropolitan life asks of literature that it transcend speech and the
harmony of sounds, the pleasure of the eyes and the ears, that it learns
to see and to express more deeply. The modern metropolitan artist
should know how to open his or her eyes and eschew pity or, at least,
classical pity, in favour of the violent pity expressed by Kokoschka, or
by Lord Chandos’s when thinking about the dying rats. Words in
modern literature are now themselves meant to be eyes: ‘Individual
words swam around me: they melted into eyes, which stared at me,
and which I had to stare back at: they are like whirlpools, it gives me
vertigo to look up at them, they turn without cease, and transport you
into nothingness.’31
The emptiness to which Lord Chandos refers, and these words that
are eyes, are not dissimilar to the empty gaze of the old man in Poe’s
famous metropolitan tale ‘The Man of the Crowd’ (which had been
translated by Baudelaire and gave its title to a chapter in Baudelaire’s

The Painter of Modern Life). Seeing becomes an uncontrollable obsession.

The silence and emptiness of Lord Chandos, and of the traveller upon
his return, culminate in a powerful image in the 1907 essay by
Hofmannsthal, ‘Der Dichter und diese Zeit’ (‘The Poet and the Present
Time’). The poet is described as one whose eyes have no eyelids: ‘He [the

poet] is there and changes place noiselessly, he is but eyes and ears … On
no being, no thing, no ghost and no spectre engendered by the human
mind should he close his eyes. It is as if his eyes had no eyelids.’32
The same note is struck by Trakl when he writes in the last stanza of
‘Helian’: ‘O ihr zerbrochenen Augen in schwarzen Mündern’ (‘O you
broken eyes in black mouths’). For Hofmannsthal, the poet is not simply
one who writes verses, he is anyone, or no one, an impersonal being that,
like a seismograph, records every movement, every vibration of his
epoch, a being without eyelids, who never stops seeing, who cannot stop
seeing, just as ‘The Man of the Crowd’ could not stop walking through
the city, just as Van Gogh could not stop painting. The poet’s eye ‘was
touched by the living fire’, suggests Hofmannsthal. Might it not be the
fire of the Nuda Veritas of the modern man, a fire that is perhaps the
night and enables the expression of emotion. ‘It often seems to me,’
wrote Van Gogh to Theo on 8 September 1888, ‘that the night is much
more alive and more richly coloured than the day.’

3
Baudelaire, Haussmann, Fustel de
Coulanges: The Modern Metropolis

and the Ancient City
– Tell me, enigmatical man, whom do you love best, your

father, your mother, your sister, or your brother?
– I have neither father, nor mother, nor sister, nor brother.
– Your friends?
– Now you use a word whose meaning I have never known.
– Your country?
– I do not know in what latitude it lies …
Baudelaire, Le Spleen de Paris
One of the first metropolitan heroes is homeless: the protagonist of

Poe’s ‘The Man of the Crowd’ (1840) – terrible, mysterious, decrepit – is
an old man who wanders day and night in London. The narrator tries
to follow him, day after day, night after night: impossible to see him
resting anywhere.1 ‘The big city’s genius’ is continuously rushing,
running, retracing his steps ‘with a mad energy’. To the narrator’s
surprise, there is no rationale in the old man’s circuits. Disquieting
allegory of the city, the man of the crowd inhabits the streets, con-
demned to be eternally outside, without a home, without a name. If he
gets inside, it is in a public place, in ‘one of the huge suburban temples
of Intemperance’, in ‘the most noisome quarter of London, where
everything wore the worst impress of the most deplorable poverty, and
of the most desperate crime’,2 next to anonymous, wretched people,
drinking gin, mixing misery and despair.
Like Poe, Baudelaire characterized the big city as the place of the
homeless. ‘Les Sept Vieillards’ (1859) tells of an hallucination similar to
the one of Poe’s narrator. The voice speaking in the poem recounts a
terrifying encounter in the ‘Swarming city, filled with dreams’. The
poet-narrator sees an old man multiplying until he finally gets home,
62

Baudelaire, Haussmann, Fustel de Coulanges 63
sick and exhausted, ‘wounded by mystery and absurdity’. ‘Les Petites

Vieilles’ (1859), ‘dismembered monsters who once were women’, hang
about the streets dragging themselves along, exposed to urban traffic,
‘like wounded animals’.3
For the great writers of modernity, those whom Walter Benjamin

chose as the most poignant examples of a new nineteenth-century
consciousness and perception, to be homeless is much more a mental
than a physical condition. The awareness of this condition is what
distinguishes two modes of realism in literature and art: I would call
one mode simple, external realism, and the other complex, interiorized
realism.
The simple realist writer, the only one whom Georg Lukács would
acknowledge, stresses social status, economic condition, visible struc-
tures. Balzac’s Illusions perdues starts with the spectacular change in the
mode of production of an old typography, Zola’s Au bonheur des dames
with a swarm of people coming out of the Saint-Lazare train station
early in the morning. The state of mind of the characters is directly
determined by their material condition. The more dearly, precisely,
richly the writer describes people, objects, places, the more successfully
he represents his world and his time. Description acts didactically,
offering a message that can be either a moral warning or a political
explanation. The other type of realism identifies the effects of the new
nineteenth-century reality upon the mind. The new material reality of
the century becomes a total psychological condition that affects
perception and sensibility. Description is almost irrelevant to this type
of realism, characterized by an enigmatic allegorical power. In ‘Spleen
LXXVIII’, using one of his favourite rainy urban landscapes associated
with anguish and despair, Baudelaire perverts the old Christian
allegory of Hope into a violent Piranesi-like sketch:
When earth is changed into a damp prison cell.

Hope, like a bat, goes beating at the wall,
Knocking its head against the rotten ceilings …4
What was once a virtue now suffocates all feelings of expectation into
an overwhelming prison formed by the rain and the dark sky. Nature is
transformed into the unnatural space of the prison according to the same
negative comparison that made Hope similar to a bat. The final headache
suggested in the last two lines takes on a universal dimension of pain:
‘Atrocious, tyrannical Anguish, /Plants its black flag onto my bent head.’
The image remains suspended between literal and metaphorical meaning.

Is the poet’s headache – his very physical condition of pain – transfigured

into a metaphor of anguish, in the same way that Borges declares ‘Funes,
or Memory’ (Fictions) a metaphor of insomnia, or Poe’s ‘Tell-Tale Heart’
can be read as the story of a heart attack? Or is it atrocious, tyrannical
Anguish that conquers the body and becomes a headache? This suspen-

sion between literal and metaphorical meanings shapes Baudelaire’s
allegory. This allegory is not the baroque one that embodies the Catholic
vision of the world, making clear that under a visible meaning there is
another meaning spectacularly staged.5 Because of this peculiar intertwin-
ing of abstract and concrete, observation and hallucination, external and
internal, we can speak of another type of realism, actually more realistic
than the most obvious realism.
Brecht fought for the breadth and variety of realist writing. Around
1938, he accused of formalism what he called ‘the theory of realism’,
because it was founded on very few ‘bourgeois novels of the last
century.’ Why only novels? What about realism in poetry or in
drama?6 While not rejecting Balzac and Tolstoy, he believed that
Lukács was wrong in his determination to consider only the old
masters of realism. One should understand, for example, that Dos
Passos, who uses the technique of montage extensively, is a realist.
This technique, used by Brecht himself, consists of constructing some-
thing like ‘intersecting and antagonistic actions and reactions.’7
Montage is far from the mode in which Balzac conceived his plots,
around the centrality of the individual, according to an inexhaustible
organic principle. Brecht said that Balzac ‘writes gigantic genealogies’,
and ‘families are organisms, individuals ‘grow’ within them.’8 The
technique of montage viewed by Brecht is very similar to Baudelaire’s
allegory, which cuts and concentrates antagonistic images in the most
non-organic way. Even the famous correspondences are anti-organic.
Benjamin seemed to think that the theory of correspondences contra-
dicted what he called Baudelaire’s ‘renunciation of nature.’9 But in
‘Correspondances’, Nature is perceived as a temple, as an enigmatic
puzzle of words, as language, the symbolic activity par excellence:
Nature is a temple where living pillars

Sometimes utter confused words;
Man reaches it through forests of symbols
That watch him with a familiar gaze.10
‘Forests of symbols’ is an allegory that joins two antagonistic forces:

the natural and the symbolic. But the symbolic is stronger the natural,

since symbols look at man with ‘a familiar gaze’. This image perverts
the cliché of nature as a temple, and the balance between the terms of
the correspondences: the third and fourth lines of the quatrain twist the
allegory towards the world of culture, construction, and artifice. No
wonder that the last lines betray nature, expressing what Benjamin

called Baudelaire’s ‘renunciation of nature.’ Even though perfumes are
involved, those which produce the ecstasy of the spirit and the senses
are not the natural and fresh one but the ‘corrupted ones.’ The first
alexandrine is a false correspondence since it cannot be harmoniously
divided into two hemistichs respecting the wholeness of a word, since
temple is the term where the verse is divided into two parts: ‘La Nature
est un temple où de vivants piliers’ (Nature is a temple where living
pillars). Similarly a false symmetry links fresh and corrupted perfumes:
There are perfumes as innocent as children’s flesh,

As sweet as oboes, as green as meadows,
– And others that are corrupt, rich and triumphant,
They have the vastness of infinite things,

Such as amber, musk, benjamin and incense,
Which sing the ecstasies of mind and senses.
Only corrupt perfumes offer transcendental powers, leading to the

infinite. Moreover, they resemble opium and paradis artificiels more
than sacred nature. At the same time poems with titles like ‘Le
Crépuscule du soir’ or ‘Le Crépuscule du matin’ derive from urban
reverie, as Baudelaire himself wrote to Desnoyers who asked him for
some verses on Nature. He declared himself incapable of being moved
by plants and vegetables. In the woods, he could only think of cathe-
drals. He could only be moved by urban landscapes, ‘by our extraordi-
nary cities’, whose ‘prodigious music’ seemed to him ‘the translation of
human lamentations’.11
In his criticism of simplistic understanding, Brecht reads allegorical
poems as powerful examples of realism, like Percy Bysshe Shelley’s ‘The
Mask of Anarchy’, a poem written in 1819 immediately after the
Manchester riots.
I met Murder on the way –

He had a mask like Castlereagh –
Very smooth he looked, yet grim;
Seven blood-hounds followed him.12

Shelley’s poem suggests a broader and deeper notion of realism.

Brecht underlined the concreteness of Shelley’s allegory: ‘We follow
anarchy’s procession up to London, we see great symbolic images, but,
at every line, we know that it was reality that spoke through such
images.’13 The effect of what can be called allegorical realism has an

intensity that no detailed description can reach. A little text by
Baudelaire of 1855, ‘Puisque réalisme il y a’, quotes in its title a few
words of a letter written by Gustave Courbet to Champfleury while the
painter was working on his L’Atelier du peintre: Allégorie réelle. In this
text Baudelaire attacked Champfleury, the champion of realism: ‘Since
he studies in minute detail, he believes he is grasping an exterior
reality. Therefore, he calls it realism – he wants to impose what he
thinks is his method.’14 Baudelaire was always aware of the multiple
meanings that could be given to the term realism, which after belong-
ing to the philosophical vocabulary, became, during the nineteenth
century, an artistic term. In August 1857, at the trial of Les Fleurs du
Mal, Baudelaire himself was condemned for ‘a coarse realism that
offended decency’.15 He relentlessly scorned the ‘vulgar people’ for
whom, as he wrote in his essay on Madame Bovary, the term meant ‘a
minute description of accessories’.16 Baudelaire was convinced that true
art was capable of renouncing details, as he often said while comment-
ing Delacroix’s paintings.17
Flaubert can describe beyond the usual sphere of description, not
because his style is objective, as a simplistic criticism has pointed out,
but because it implies the reification of literature itself. Simple descrip-
tion is founded on the objectification of language.18 We identify liter-
ary modernity with this process because it challenges representation
itself. The reification of literature or of language is the symptom of a
disturbed relationship between language and reality; Baudelaire spoke
of ‘confused words’ in ‘Correspondances’. The old language that relies
on description is inadequate to express the formidable new reality of
the huge urban crowds, the most disconcerting result of industrializa-
tion. This reality affected perception and the awareness of the self.
Literary, or artistic, modernity acknowledges the discrepancy between
language and reality.19 The excess of description or the lack of it are
two similar modes of dealing with literature’s deep realism, while
didactic description is limited to realism as a form, as a school.
When art reaches what I call deep realism, or allegorical realism, it
always escapes definitions in terms of schools. Is Manet an impression-
ist? A realist? How can we read the disquieting gaze of some of the men
and women he painted? Why, looking at the Gare Saint- Lazare, do we

notice the lost gaze of the woman in black more than her dress, or the
gate, or the black smoke coming from the train at a distance? The
simple level of description, in the realistic mode or in the impressionistic
mode, is overwhelmed by the ‘allegorical’ power of those two watery
eyes looking in an unidentified direction, following unpredictable

dreams, or by the invisible gaze of the little girl whom we see from the
back, facing the gate. I would say that realism as form, or as school,
helps the reader or the spectator to understand the world, take a posi-
tion, while allegorical realism pushes our understanding further,
refines our thought, forcing it to go in different directions, suspending
it between dream and a cruel, almost algebraic logic.
In the cruel realism of Les Fleurs du Mal a quick descriptive remark
turns into a condensed imagery, where the most brutally physical
details encompass the most subtle metaphysical reflections. The
famous metropolitan poem, ‘To a Passerby’ (‘A une passante’), begins
with a sentence that sounds like a description but is immediately
charged with allegory: ‘The deafening street screamed round me.’20
Benjamin commented on this poem suggesting that the crowd is for
Baudelaire such an inner reality that we cannot expect him to depict
it.21 After a quick glimpse whereby the reader, like the poet speaking in
the first person, catches the movements of a mysterious woman
passing by, the sonnet elaborates an interrogation on time and space.
But, with a tough sense of reality, of the big city’s nervous life, the
interrogation is contracted into the spasm of a few lines carrying the
marks of solitary, metropolitan eroticism:
And I, tense and irritable like a wild eccentric,

Drank in her eyes, sombre stormy sky,
The sweetness that enthrals, the pleasure that kills.
These lines, as Benjamin pointed out, ‘show, in their internal

configuration, the marks that love itself receives from the big city’.22
Issued from the metropolitan experience, the ephemeral moment and
eternity are juxtaposed in their interminable disproportion and never-
theless disquieting proximity, since they are both impossible to grasp.
And the poems ends with this question: ‘Fugitive beauty … Shall I not
see you till eternity?’ The descriptive mode, of Balzac or Hugo, even if
directed toward the representation of a growing city, needs length and
accumulation of details. It lacks what Georg Simmel called ‘the
intensification of nervous stimulation, which results from the swift
and uninterrupted change of outer and inner stimuli’,23 and which

implies continuous intellectual activity. Description, in its slowness,

misses metropolitan nervousness, that contracted brevity which
characterizes the most inner experience of the metropolis. Therefore,
paradoxically, the writers of nineteenth-century Paris, of modern life
and modern crowds, use a mode of literary construction that corre-

sponds more to country than to city life. The point for Baudelaire’s
allegorical realism is never to depict what he saw, but to render the big
city’s physical and psychological rhythm in language itself, in the sen-
tences’ spasms, in the lines’ pauses, in the jamming together of images
belonging to different logical orders. The verb hurlait (screamed) applied
to the rue assourdissante (the deafening street) gives to the first line of
‘A une passante’ the violence of some expressionist paintings, dehu-
manizing the human voice, disfiguring architectural structures into
devouring monsters. Baudelaire bathed in the crowd; as Benjamin
wrote, he let ‘the crowd act upon himself’. The poet of Paris could never
write as Shelley did in what Benjamin calls a brutal and direct way:
Hell is a city much like London –

A populous and smoky city;
There are all sorts of people undone, …24
Baudelaire’s livid urban illumination sparkles abruptly, burning all

parallel terms: not a single adjective nor adverb lingers on the compar-
ison between the metropolis and a monster, the comparison on which
Balzac or Hugo would have dwelled for pages. The rhythm of the
metropolis does not allow the pause of as or like. In the convulsive
rhetoric of the huge capital, associations burst forth – violent, quick,
condensed. When Baudelaire expressed his enthusiasm for the sketches
of Constantin Guys he was fascinated by the rapidity of their execu-
tion: ‘in trivial life, in the daily metamorphosis of external things,
there is a rapidity of movement which calls for an equal speed of
execution from the artist.’25
The emergence of the metropolis in the nineteenth century caused
different reactions. They can all be read as variations of the sense of
fear that, as Benjamin suggested in his essay on Baudelaire, pervaded
any one who observed the crowds – the German provincial Engels, as
well as Hugo, who introduced the masses into the titles of his novels
(Les Misérables, Les Travailleurs de la mer). Obviously, in the century of
the big city, people developed both urban and anti-urban feelings –
more than feelings: whole attitudes and ideologies. We can even trace
trends: for example, since the first decades of the nineteenth century,

the English literary tradition is strongly anti-urban. The myth of nature

in the Romantic poets carries the imprint of the rejection of the city, of
industrialization and modern life. Mobs and machines are the horror
of modern life. The opposition between the city and the country con-
stitutes an intellectual theme displaying the most stubbornly anti-

modern attitudes and the most blunt progressivist hopes. The
opposition between city and country becomes the struggle between
past and present. If John Stuart Mill embraced the utilitarian philoso-
phy of the present, Thomas Carlyle identified the crisis of his own time
in what he called the worship of machinery. Mechanization, according
to him, had not only diffused itself into ‘the external and physical’,
but also into ‘the internal and spiritual’. In the Mechanical Age,
‘nothing follows its spontaneous course, nothing is left to be accom-
plished by old natural methods’.26
For the detractors of the city, country life and closeness to nature
bring the sole possibility of salvation for a human race corrupted by
modern life. The hatred of the city is strong in the American
Transcendentalists. Countless passages by Emerson could be cited to
show how the ideology of nature is founded on the rejection of the
new metropolitan reality. The best critic of the idealist position is
Melville: the novel Pierre, or The Ambiguities powerfully stages the
opposition between the country and the metropolis. Melville is close to
the thought of Baudelaire, in that they both recognize in their own
ways that the only truth is the metropolis, its rhythm, its monstrosity.
It is useless to be actively nostalgic for an idyllic past, or an idyllic
nature. The closest brother to Poe’s man of the crowd, or to the many
Baudelairean homeless, is Melville’s anti-hero of the short story
Bartleby, the bodiless clerk of Manhattan who, dried up by his repeti-
tive life, knows nothing but his office. We can see in Bartleby a sort of
Weberian intuition, whereby Melville identified the city with bureau-
cracy and administration.27
Negative thought, devotion to nature, worship of the past, opti-
mism, pessimism, and a cruel lack of both – all these elements show
that the new reality of the nineteenth century never stops inspiring
illusions and disillusion. This does not mean that a single author or
artist fully embraces just one attitude. Everything is nuanced and com-
plicated. It would be too reductive to see Balzac simply and solely as
the writer of modernity because he depicted the metropolis. Again, if
Balzac wrote powerful descriptions of Paris, his descriptive mode is
nevertheless backward, a literary means of production, closer to the
rhythm of the country than to that of the big city.

The dream of total rationalization
Amongst the great variety of attitudes toward the big city stands the
triumphal vision of the Baron Haussmann, who made Paris the capital
of the nineteenth century, as Benjamin called it in the title of his

famous essay. Most of the images of Paris that belong to our repertory
of cultural stereotypes – from impressionist painting to the main
boulevards, to café life – derive from Haussmann’s transformation of
Paris. The intention of Napoleon III’s protégé‚ was clear: a total ratio-
nalization, cleaning and opening the city, was necessary for the circu-
lation of the thousands of people pouring into Paris by rail every day,
as well as to establish a well-organized civic centre in the Ile de la Cité.
Haussmann was appointed as the Prefect of Paris in June 1853. Thanks
to the Emperor who had endowed him with absolute power of deci-
sion, he defeated the strong opposition of the old administration, who
were afraid of his grandiose and astronomically expensive projects. He
looked down upon the people at the Hôtel de Ville as well-intentioned
administrators, incapable of a broad, up-to-date economic vision. The
Baron wrote in his Mémoires that they were still thinking in terms of
the traditional cash economy. They thought they could run the city as
a ‘good father runs his family business, by following the rules of tight
economy, prudent reserve and provident hoarding, that a rich man
observes in his private life.’28
The Baron, on the contrary, thought that a new economical vision
should inform the decisions of the Hôtel de Ville, and that he was the
inventor of the economic logic of ‘productive expenditures’. Deficit
financing, far from being perceived as a danger, represented for him a
productive force: taxes had to be increased and the tax revenue of the
city would pay the long-term debts contracted for the transformation,
or embellishment, as the Baron liked to say, of Paris. The idea of deficit
financing was actually not his invention, but a rather common theory
among the Saint-Simonians who surrounded the Emperor. Their econ-
omist, Michel Chevalier, sat at Napoleon’s Conseil d’Etat as soon as it
was established in 1851. Haussmann wanted to realize the imperial
dream of the Emperor, his state capitalism, and succeeded in bringing
together the political conservatism and the economic progressivism of
the Second Empire:
Now, a Big City, especially a Capital, has the duty of keeping up

with the role it plays within the country; and when this country is
France, when centralization, which is the principle of its strength,

made its own Capital at the same time the head and the heart of the
social body, the Capital itself would miss its glorious function, if, in
spite of everything, it systematically lingered in the mechanism of
an outdated routine.29

Haussmann’s urban planning included the cutting of new streets
through old quarters, with two main axes – one east-west and the other
north-south. He liked to recall in his Mémoires how Paris was gloomy
with narrow streets, and unhealthy because of the lack of a sewer
system. He wanted to give the Parisians water, air, shade, and wide
streets. The utopia of Haussmann’s state capitalism is a big city in
which everything can be controlled. This rationalized metropolis
pushes the panoptical utopia one step further. Bentham’s prison
implied perfect visibility and control over a small number of people.
The Capital of France would be festive, a panopticon turned into a
street festival, a clear-cut metropolis capable of avoiding urban disorder
as well as social and political unrest. The astronomical expenditures of
the Paris prefect, the rationality of his figures and daring planning,
embody the ethos of the Second Empire: Bonaparte’s populism and
fear of revolutions. The large boulevards would fulfil a doubly healthy
function: they ‘will permit the circulation not only of air and light but
also of troops. Thus by an ingenious combination, the lot of the people
will be improved, and they will be rendered less disposed to revolts.’30
In his 1938 essay ‘Second Empire Paris in Baudelaire’, Benjamin con-
nects the phenomenon of flânerie to Haussmann’s changes of Paris. It
was impossible to wander around the city without entering the large
boulevards and passages, the arcades filled with shops and people,
without seeing all the invention and display of industrial luxury. In a
straightforward Marxist way, Benjamin links a cultural phenomenon to
the new material condition of life. One cannot understand Baudelaire’s
lyric, the Baudelairean figure of the flâneur, the poet’s double, without
understanding the Haussmannization of Paris. Baudelaire wrote his
poem ‘Le Cygne’ before Hausmann’s interventions but already at the
moment the Rue du Carrousel was dismantled. It would be difficult to
find a poem that could comment on Paris’s transformations more
powerfully than ‘Le Cygne’ (1860): ‘Near a dried-up stream the animal,
opening its beak/Nervously bathed its wings in the dust.’31 Wounded
allegory of all the homeless, marginal and subalterns, the swan stands
as the embodiment of Baudelaire’s social awareness,32 one with no
humanitarian sentimentalism, no militant endeavour, no intellectual
good will. Just bare allegorical realism. Even more than Courbet’s

Atelier du peintre, Baudelaire’s swan becomes an allégorie réelle, a real

allegory. It bathes in dry reality:
I think of the thin, consumptive negress

Trampling in the mud, and searching with her haggard eyes

For the absent palm-trees of splendid Africa,
…
I think of the prisoners, of the vanquished! … and of many
others besides!33
Baudelaire’s vision of sorrow and suffering sounds like a blunt response

to Haussmann’s triumphant rhetoric claiming that the wide boulevards
will improve the lot of people. What I called Baudelaire’s negative
thought – modern, urban, ironic, disillusioned – is to be read as a radical
criticism of Haussmann’s imperial vision and faith in rationalization.34 In
fact, the most violent opposition to Haussmann’s rationalist utopia was
neither the socialist hope in progress, nor the regret for a backward,
rustic, pre-industrial world. The most violent rejection of Haussmann ‘s
rationalization was the perception of Paris as the defeat of reason: Paris,
haunted reality, with its anguish, its misfits, its grey sky.
The ancient city
Among the many responses to the phenomenon of the metropolis in

nineteenth-century France, Haussmann’s response represents what can
be called the utopia of the present, absolute faith in the metropolis.
Balzac, who described Paris as a monster, regretting a previous form of
more human life, shows an irresistible attraction for the monster.
Baudelaire represents the allegorical-realistic perception of the necessity
and at the same time the danger of the metropolis. The English
Romantics and the American Transcendentalists opposed the country,
the purity of nature, to the horror of big cities. But sometimes the city –
the polis, or the urbs – was erected as the counterpart of the metropolis,
the first being human, the latter being inhuman. In the same years in
which Haussmann destroyed parts of the old city of Paris in order to
open up the modern metropolis, the historian Fustel de Coulanges
thought of the ancient city as the beginning of Western civilization, as
the place beyond modern contradictions between nature and culture,
the individual and the state.
Criticism of the present can take various shapes and political colours.
The reactionary might complain about the spirit of the age, like Carlyle

in Past and Present, the conservative might take shelter in some illu-
sion; the militant might see everywhere the cunning of capital, the
trap of ideology. The most peculiar phenomenon of homelessness in
the nineteenth century, the beginning of our modernity, is probably a
generalized feeling of not being completely at home in the present

time. The dialectic of the new and the old, the ambivalent relationship
that the nineteenth century, followed by the twentieth, entertains with
tradition – what is called today the canon – are symptoms of dis-
comfort with images of the present. On one hand a tradition seems to
suffocate any new crisis, on the other any new form institutes a habit,
if not a school, that paradoxically becomes the ephemeral tradition of
those who recognize themselves in a small intellectual home, a broken
fortress in the world’s wasteland.
Baudelaire fully embodied the ambiguity of the modern. He enthusi-
astically greeted the future painter of modern life ‘who can snatch its
epic quality from the life of today’, and hoped to celebrate ‘the advent
of the new’, as he wrote at the end of his Salon de 1845.35 But he also
thought that any worthwhile modernity must inevitably become
ancient, as he wrote in Le Peintre de la vie moderne.36
The new is tantalizing: the poet thought of inventing a new form, or
giving it a new impulse. In 1864, the ideal that haunted Baudelaire
became true: Le Figaro, La Vie parisienne, L’Artiste, La Revue de Paris,
published several of his prose poems under the title of Le Spleen de
Paris. The prose poem is the new musical form with no rhymes ‘supple
enough and rugged enough to adapt itself to the lyrical impulses of the
soul, the undulations of reverie, the jibes of conscience’. Baudelaire
knew where this nervous form came from: ‘It was, above all, out of my
exploration of huge cities, out of the medley of their innumerable
interrelations, that this haunting ideal was born.’37
The ancient has to be well known: the historian tries to understand
it beyond the deformations of the present. In 1864, Numa-Denys
Fustel de Coulanges published La Cité antique. A historian can indeed
choose to focus on the past in order to escape or to clarify the present.
In any case, every historian would claim that history is dealing with
what happened, with reality, or to use a phrase from the critical termi-
nology, history legitimizes itself as the writing of the real. The most
famous statement establishing history as the narration of the real is
Leopold von Ranke’s definition of history as aiming ‘to show what
actually happened’ (wie es eigentlich gewesen), a dictum that, rightly or
wrongly, embodied the conception of positivist historiography, its
concern for the real.38 The thirst for reality repeatedly acts as the

impetus for any intellectual activity, in the realist novel, in

Baudelairean allegory, or in historical research. Fustel de Coulanges
took the proper positivist position, as he wrote in 1875:
History is a pure science, a science like physics and geology. It aims

solely to find some facts, to discover some truths. History studies the
human being in its innumerable diversity, incessant modifications,
as physiology studies the human body, or as geology observes and
counts the globe’s revolutions.39
This vision of history as the science of facts perfectly corresponds to

the obsession of the second half of the century. Haussmann, too, in his
contrast with the old generation at the Hôtel de Ville, spoke of ‘the
beautiful language that is the language of facts’.40 The Baron was
undoubtedly convinced that his figures, so dry and clean, had the same
persuasive power as a scientific experiment, or a mathematical truth.
Fustel de Coulanges was convinced that his thorough verification of
ancient documents was capable of bringing back the language of facts
as they really happened; only by the precise reading of the documents
could history be rendered scientific. Nevertheless, in spite of the
emphasis on facts and the enthusiasm for science that sum up the epis-
temology of the century, the historian represents a core of resistance to
Haussmann’s urban dream. If Baudelaire perceived the metropolis as
the very place of the defeat of reason, Fustel de Coulanges’s reading of
the ancient city stands as a mental construction contradicting all the
physical and spiritual features of Haussmann’s Capital. Fustel never
mentioned the Baron, but the main thesis of his La Cité antique is an
implicit critique of the modern city, in spite of Fustel’s good relationship
with the Empire. The Haussmannization of Paris was such a gigantic
phenomenon that any cultural aspect of the period is bound to be
related to it. Haussmann’s state capital meant: money, market, inclu-
sion of the suburbs into Paris, transformation of places, values, desires.
The most spectacular episode concentrating all the new endeavours
was the Exposition Universelle of 1855. Even if Haussmann served only
as consultant in its preparation, the exhibition embodied his ideology
of the new and was conceived on the large scale he envisioned for the
imperial capital.
Fustel’s interpretation of ancient life was, on the contrary, conserva-
tive and religious. This entitled him to privileges under the Empire. As
an ex-student of the École Normale, he was asked to teach there a few
years after the publication of La Cité antique, in 1870. He became the

special lecturer of the Empress Eugénie and her circle, to whom he

taught the origins of French civilization. After the Franco-Prussian War
and the fall of the Empire with the German victory, he became fully
committed to the cause of a French Alsace, defining the principle of
nationalities on continuity with the past.41

The first modern idea that is explicitly attacked in La Cité antique is
the vision of antiquity as it was imagined by the thinkers of the French
Revolution:
The idea that we had of Greece and Rome has often clouded our
generation. As we poorly observed the ancient city’s institutions, we
imagined that they could live again among us. We were deluding
ourselves about liberty among the ancients, and simply because of
that, liberty among the moderns was in danger.42
By insisting on the difference between the ancients and the moderns

Fustel suggested a criticism of revolutionary intoxication. The main target
was obviously Rousseau, who considered that the Romans were the
‘model of all free Peoples’ and Greece the place where ‘the love of liberty’
flourished.43 Fustel suggested studying the ancients ‘without thinking of
ourselves, for they were total strangers’.44 Nothing in the moderns resem-
bles the ancients. Fustel is convinced that, even if they are studied in
schools, and a cultivated Frenchman is exposed from a very early age to
classical culture and becomes acquainted with the Parthenon before the
Louvre, antiquity is far away from us. The historian thought that one
should study the Greeks and the Romans seriously and comparatively, in
order to understand what they meant by their term ‘liberty’. As Benjamin
Constant had already objected to Rousseau in his famous 1819 speech at
the Athénée, De la liberté des anciens comparée à celle des modernes, their
liberty was not our liberty; their institutions were not our institutions.
Against Rousseau’s dichotomy between state of nature and society,
Fustel wanted to prove that neither the individual nor the state but the
family, was the foundation of Western civilization. Therefore, there
was no state of nature. The family is both nature, the blood, the genus,
and culture, a societal organization. Nature and culture were one and
the same; the symbolic activity of religious cults could not be separated
from concrete sacrifice – the food and beverage offered to the dead –
nor from the territory where the living and the dead lived together.
The family was characterized by the ‘ritual’ it performed in the home
or, better, on the nearby land, the space where the family settled and
continued to settle for generations.

The ancient city was constituted on the model of the family: it was
defined by a common religion and a spatial enclosure. The city was
based on the juridical notion of family property. Later, the city
included more and more citizens – clients and plebeians. In Rome, for
example, at the time of Servius Tullius, plebeians became part of the

city and could perform their religious rituals. For both Greece and
Rome, wars changed the social balance between the aristocracy and the
plebs. This change caused a discrepancy between political constitutions
and social status, which inevitably led to democracy. Against all demo-
cratic illusions, Fustel liked to stress that ‘democracy did not suppress
poverty; on the contrary, it made it even more visible. The equality
of political rights increased the inequality of conditions.’45 Then
Christianity introduced new elements. As Momigliano remarked, Fustel
thought that ‘Christianity therefore made possible the transformation
in the right of property, based no longer on religion but on labour’.46
Ancient society was ruled by institutions, which are the network of
beliefs instituted by a community, while modern society, after the
advent of Christianity, is ruled by associations of individuals.
The two main theses of La Cité antique are that the state was more
recent than the family, and that the first cult was the cult of the
ancestors. Fustel went very far back in time, to the beginning of
civilization among Aryan people, to make his point. He studied the
very heart of tradition, tradition as the foundation of that ‘far away
and obscure time when there were neither Greeks, nor Latins, nor
Hindus, but only Aryans’. All these people ‘belong to the same race;
their ancestors, in an extremely distant epoch, had lived together in
central Asia’.47 If the ideological implications of the whole concept of
the Aryan Western tradition are nationalistic and inevitably racist, the
intellectual implications are such that Fustel is one of the forefathers
of sociology. He believed that history is the science of social facts,
sociology itself. The most innovative feature of Fustel’s thought is the
important role he gives to belief, and the link he establishes between
beliefs and institutions. A little later Durkheim, who dedicated to
Fustel his thesis on Montesquieu,48 would define sociology as the
science of institutions, their genesis and their functioning.
Durkheim’s work, and especially Les Formes élémentaires de la vie
religieuse (1912), is founded on the idea central to Fustel’s Cité antique,
that religion creates the social system. That same idea is seminal in
Max Weber’ s reading of Protestantism as the religious foundation of
the capitalist spirit. Questions of property and economy are to be read
as deriving from the symbolic activity of religion.

The idea that religion is the beginning of social life created misun-
derstanding about Fustel’s religious beliefs.49 He actually did not
believe in God. His respect for religion was the effect of his love for tra-
dition: la patrie, the homeland, was not a piece of land, but a network
of traditions.50 Stressing the value of religion as the beginning of the

social contract is not necessarily a profession of faith, but a point of
resistance against the overwhelming power of money and interest as
social motors. Haussmann’s dream figured a total homo oeconomicus.
The sharpness of figures, the economic plan of productive expenses
would mould urban planning; the clarity of the city would make life
easier. Good estimates would guarantee order on every level – political,
social, psychological. Money is worshipped in its most abstract essence,
in its financial logic. Haussmann’s finances are closer to software than
to money as it appears in Balzac’s novels – heavy and full like matter,
as concrete as land or gold. Financial logic would triumph, grasping
present and future, sweeping the darkness of the past, as so many old
buildings and old streets had been swept from the heart of the old
Paris. Therefore, the state had to carry on this financial logic, with
technological coldness, like a machine, as coordinated and effective as
the sewer system Haussmann conceived and put into practice. The
British theorists of interest, the champions of utilitarianism, always
perceived the individual as the principal agent. Money, wealth, is a
kind of prolongation of individuals pushing for their needs and desires.
But, on the contrary, for state capitalism the individual does not really
count. Central power has to proceed pitilessly.
Against the economic rationale stands the religious impulse; against
the timeless purity of figures, the temporal richness of beliefs; against
the abstractness of modern man, the concreteness of the ancients.
Fustel insisted on the importance of the ancient cult which prescribed
that the dead of the family should enjoy the light and warmth of fire,
and be nourished every day. The terror of death for the ancient was
not the loss of life, but the fear of remaining unburied and not receiv-
ing the honour of the ritual of fire and food. Ancient poems talk about
wandering souls, and Fustel suggests that Virgil should be understood
literally when he wrote, about Polydorus’s burial: ‘We lock the soul
into the grave.’51 Being dead without burial: that is the most horrible
kind of homelessness in ancient times, times the historian cannot even
date when he finds in the well-known texts of Greek and Latin poets
and historians the traces of an earlier civilization, told as old stories,
legends and beliefs, or curled up in a stereotyped formula, a verbal
root, a word, a phrase, an inflection. Then, in order to avoid the misery

of an unhappy death, a sacred fire was always burning and food was
constantly brought by the family to the ancestors in the grave, which
was in the house. Indeed, the home represented the physical centre in
which religious belief, family, and private property were one and the
same. No foreign person could be admitted, and men continued the

family tradition, since women, at marriage, had to leave their family’s
cult and embrace that of the new family. According to Fustel, the
family is composed of all the descendants from a common ancestor
following the male branch. The Greeks called it genos, and the Romans
gens. Momigliano comments: ‘the gens, for Fustel, was not submitted to
any superior authority: it was a State governed by the pater … each gens
had its own cult, territory and selfish morality.’52
Fustel’s ancient city proposed a world in which the values were
totally opposite not only from the revolutionary vision of antiquity,
but also from the contemporary world as one could see it around 1860.
Life and death formed a continuity inconceivable for the scattered
condition of the moderns. ‘Any Where Out of the World’, one of the
prose poems by Baudelaire, starts with the sketch of the modern condi-
tion of interior exile: ‘Life is a hospital where every patient is obsessed
by the desire to change beds.’53
In 1864, the year of the publication of Fustel’s Cité antique and of
several prose poems by Baudelaire, Haussmann appointed a commission
to solve the problem of Paris’s cemeteries – Montmartre, Montparnasse,
Père-Lachaise – which had been established by Napoleon I just outside
Paris and, by 1860, were within the limits of the city. The Baron’s idea,
which met strong opposition and remained unrealized, was to build a
huge cemetery at Méry-sur-Oise, a few miles north-west of Paris. It was a
sort of supersonic project conceived by the most audacious of engineers:
the cemetery would be connected to the city by a special funeral railway.
Even death had to become part of calculation and technology. Cult and
piety were reduced to a question of hygiene and efficiency.
But death, as envisioned by the poet, broke through the positivistic
reconstruction of the historian and the triumphant figuring of the
urban planner. Beyond any rational utopia, beyond the solid soil
where traditions hold, without roots, without projects, Baudelaire’s
poetic creations incessantly move through life, in perennial exile:
But the real travellers are those alone who leave

For leaving’s sake; hearts as light as balloons
They never step back from their destiny,
And, without knowing why, always say: Let’s go!54

‘Le Voyage’, the last of the death poems in Les Fleurs du Mal, carries
on the allegory of a trip, perverting classical memories, figuring pieces
of a new Odyssey, since here the travellers, intoxicated with space and
light, escape from being transformed into animals by Circe. The poem
ends with the personification of death:

O Death, old captain, it’s time! Let’s weigh anchor!
This country bores us, O Death! Let us get ready!
…
Since this fire consumes our brains, we want
To plunge to the bottom of the abyss, whatever it is, Hell or Heaven!
Plunge to the bottom of the Unknown, to find something new!55
In this poem, as in several poems, in ‘Le Cygne’, which begins

‘Andromache, I am thinking of you!’, fragments of classical images are
juxtaposed with the new, as in the modern metropolis where bits of
the past live together with novelty, as in Paris, capital of the nine-
teenth century, where everything becomes allegory (‘tout pour moi
devient allégorie’).
An enigmatical being with no father, mother, friends, or country, the
inhabitant of the modern metropolis is restless, similar to the lost,
unburied soul of the ancient city, always rushing, running, roving, fret-
ting, on a perpetual voyage.

4
Trieste as Frontier: From Slataper to
Bazlen and Del Giudice

People think it is a matter of eternal truths when it is merely a
matter of adjectives.
Roberto Bazlen
Scipio Slataper described himself as Slav, and wished to be Slav and a bar-
barian.1 In 1912, when he was only 24 years old, he published Il mio
carso, a novel which, despite being subtitled ‘lyrical autobiography’,
begins with a dramatic movement in three parts, in which ‘I’ is opposed
to ‘you’, ‘savagery’ to ‘Italianità’, and the ‘fatherland’ to ‘here’:
I would like to tell you: I was born in the Carso, in a hut with a
thatched roof, blackened by rain and smoke … I would like to tell
you: I was born in Croatia, in the great oak forest …
I would like to tell you: I was born on the Moravian plain and I
used to run like the hare … Then I came here, I tried to tame myself,
I learned Italian, I chose my friends from among the most educated
youth; but soon I must return to my fatherland, for here I don’t feel
too good.2
Slataper thus defines himself as Slav, barbarian and poor, by contrast

with the Italians, who are ‘here’, that is, in Florence, where he had
gone to study at the University. These friends of his were aligned with
the Florentine review, La Voce,3 with which he himself had been asso-
ciated since he went to live in that city, where he published his Lettere
triestine. Indeed, Slataper was in close touch with the writers Soffici,
Papini and Prezzolini in 1912, when the review was passing through a
critical period.
80

Trieste as Frontier 81
For a man from the North, Florence is the South. Thus, in Nel paese
degli aranci, which appeared in La Voce in 1911, there is a reference to
Goethe’s ‘Mignon’, and to her famous song, ‘Kennst du das Land wo
die Zitronen blühn?’ The Carso, on the other hand, stands for the
North, or the symbolic meeting-point of North and South, as Slataper

suggested in his study of Ibsen.
It would be tempting to lie, but the Florentines, being so cultivated and
refined, are too intelligent and cunning for that. They would immediately
grasp, thought Slataper, that ‘I am a poor Italian trying to pass off his
solitary preoccupations as barbarian. I would do better to confess that I
am your brother’.4 Slataper could not reject the values that he had in
common with the Voce group, in spite of the critical period he went
through. He had in fact hoped to become the editor of the review, but
then he joined Salvemini and Amendola who had left. La Voce, according
to Prezzolini, its founder, was a review that ‘considered ethical and moral
values to be of great importance in the lives of Italians’. The review was
meant to represent the voice of Italian intellectuals, and to symbolize
their moral commitment irrespective of political parties. Il mio carso there-
fore ended with a message of fraternity and a renewed commitment to
work.
Trieste was the fatherland, Florence was ‘here’, and in Slataper’s
mind the two places were at once opposed and fused. Yet he wished to
leave Florence, to regain Trieste and the Carso, which had been his
past and would be his future. He wanted to return to Trieste, a city of
three cultures, Slav, German and Italian. The ‘Carso’ is the name given
to the mountains around Trieste, which are white and barren. Slataper
wrote it as carso, with a small c, since for him it was an essential sub-
stance, the rock itself, as he wrote in his wartime notebook from 1915,
a few months before dying on Mount Podgora. In Celtic, ‘carso’ means
rock, or the life of rock, and one writes it much as one might write
‘earth’, ‘sea’ or ‘wind’.
Savage and barbarous Slataper then was, though his Florentine friends
were not. Savage and barbarous too are the sea, the mountains and the
wind of Trieste, and likewise the narrator’s soul and the language of
Il mio carso. It was, declared Slataper, more a Nordic book than an
Italian one. One can clearly hear how classical language is violated, how
it is littered with items from the triestino dialect mixed with toscano. The
syntax is mangled, with words twisted into audacious neologisms –
sometimes harsh and rough words beginning with s, the quintessenti-
ally Nordic consonant according to Mallarmé: squarciapancia (bursting
out), strascinato (dragged away), sguazzacchiando (splashing), scricchia

(it creaks), etc. ‘It is a new book,’ said Slataper in 1911, ‘a call to arms, a
promise of salvation. Italian critics insist that, after Carducci and
D’Annunzio, it is stupid to write barbaric[5] poetry. Therefore, I am
stupid.’ Slataper wanted to be obstinate, stubborn and hard as a rock.
Slataper is an author who identifies both his prose and his person

with Trieste, where there is no separation between man and nature, or
between memory and myth. The image of his grandmother and of his
father’s house belongs to the past, and to autobiographical memory,
but the image of the child who swims in the Adriatic so far transcends
memory as to be integrated into the eternal present of vital elements.
Here the myth of strength and of youth emerges; the sea is simply at
one with the muscles of the youthful body. The sea is the principle of
true life, according to the Viennese writer Otto Weininger, an author
dear to Slataper.
The mountain, the carso, is a life force too, so that the stones of
Mt. Kâl (bald) near Trieste, and the bones of the young man share the
same hardness. (When Benjamin Crémieux translated Il mio carso into
French, in 1920, he called it Mon frère le Carso, thus underlining the
kinship between Slataper and his mountains.)
Water and rock are part of the mythical body of the fatherland; they
are primary elements, barbaric nature, so to speak without landscape,
and therefore wholly different from the land of orange trees, of
Papini’s sweet and soft countryside. But one needs to add another
primordial element, the wind of Trieste, its violent bora. Alboin, the
barbarian king, descended upon the city in the Middle Age, fighting
against this wind, against Trieste’s hard nature.
The vital force, élan vital, rising up out of the primordial elements,
was a constant motive in Henri Bergson, who had been launched in
Italy by La Voce. Nature fuses with myth and history, constituting the
force linking past to present, and gives notice of the age to come. Thus,
like Alboin leading the Lombards into Italy, Slataper, the brother of the
Carso, exhorts the other brothers of stone, the Slavs, poor peasants
from the Carso, to go down to the sea.
Slataper is writing almost a song, and the singing resembles that of
Walter Whitman; Il mio carso is a sort of Song of Myself in prose, in
which the individual contains in himself the history of the past, a
history of heroes and rebels, a history of work and of conquest. It is
time for the Slavs to come into their own. They came from the North,
had learned to fish in Venice. Trieste belongs to them, is to become
their new Venice. The new race is barbarian, and must continue
history, to forge the new age, and to reinvigorate the weak Italian

blood, now ‘sick with cerebral anaemia’. The prose too is barbarian,
like that of the quintessential Italian poet, Gabriele D’Annunzio, whose
images recur in Slataper’s novel. One finds there D’Annunzio’s
favourite poetic clichés: the earth is bread on which we feed, the soul
blooms like water in a bowl, and a nascent idea is the first flower of

Spring. The reader is in no way surprised to find that the song ends,
not unlike D’Annunzio’s, with the announcement that ‘Today a poet is
born to the world.’6
Savage, barbarian Slataper. One can hear that the name does not
sound Italian. His ancestors came down from the North, when Trieste
was declared a free port by the Emperor Charles VI (at the beginning of
the eighteenth century). Slata is Slovenian for ‘golden’, and Pero means
‘Pen’, so that the name Slataper may be rendered ‘golden pen’; in
Italian ‘Pennadoro’, which was what the writer liked to be called. It was
as if destiny marked him out to be a poet, to write with a golden pen,
like D’Annunzio, to write barbarously, like Carducci and D’Annunzio.
Barbarism is an integral part of the Italian tradition, that of the great
poets whom Slataper had studied so much.
His family had long been Italian; from Trieste, the city of three
cultures. Their frontier identity made them at once more Italian and
less Italian than the others, for instance, the Florentines. Slataper took
pleasure in beginning a major article for La Voce on contemporary
theatre by referring to Lessing, Goethe, Schiller, Wagner and Nietzsche
as the ‘writers who stand closest to my own culture’. Yet he ought not
really to be taken at his word here, since, as he himself recounted in
Il mio carso, he was turned down for a job at the Austrian Bank in
Trieste on the grounds that his knowledge of German was limited (and
on his journey to Vienna he himself would complain of this).
It was the custom in the early part of the century for people from
Trieste to go to university at Vienna, Prague or Florence. The latter was
the most obvious choice for Slataper, who had attended the Italian
Liceo Dante Alighieri. Besides, his family was staunchly anti-Austrian
and so, unlike Italo Svevo, he spoke the Triestino dialect, a form of
Italian, at home. The Emperor’s birthday was not celebrated in his
family, and Slataper was encouraged to follow the reporting on the war
in Ethiopia in a Trieste newspaper, Il Piccolo. The child exulted in
Italian victories, and thought of his fatherland as being on the other
side of the sea. The Italians of Trieste could cry ‘Italia, Italia’ as if they
were still living out the drama of the Risorgimento, for they had not
yet freed themselves from the grip of the Hapsburg Empire. ‘Viva
l’Italia!’ was the refrain of Slataper’s uncle, whom he loved so much as

a child. Slataper’s grand-father was a follower of Garibaldi in his strug-

gle for the unification of Italy. Later, as an adolescent, the young Scipio
was taken aback by the spineless patriotism of the group La Giovane
Trieste. To compensate for this lack of vigour, he dreamed of the heroes
of the fatherland, among them Garibaldi, and the Trieste irredentist,

Guglielmo Oberdan, who had been hung on the Emperor’s orders, after
he attempted to kill him in 1898.
Slataper had been in the forefront of a demonstration in favour of an
Italian university for Trieste. Captured by an Imperial guard, he broke
free, cried ‘Long live liberty, I am Italian’, and ran towards the sea, so
as to wash in the Adriatic, mare nostrum: ‘I washed my hands and my
face in the see. I drank the salty water of the Adriatic.’7
Yet no sooner had Scipio regained his freedom than his sense of
happiness drained away and, with salt still on his face, he felt the
blight of difference. Dirty and savage as he felt himself to be, he could
not identify with the city of Trieste, with the elegant Italians, with the
perfectly turned-out people who promenaded on the lungomare, on the
sea-front. He had nothing in common with the young men dressed in
long, swirling cloaks, or with the beautiful, bourgeois girls. For he was
a brother to stone, to the carso.
One can now understand better Slataper’s initial yearning to declare
himself a Slav. It aimed to mark both origin and political alignment, for
the Slavs were not only the fathers, but also the oppressed, exploited
brothers. If only they could rebel and unite with the Italians! What was
needed was a genuine Adriatic irredentism, like that foreseen by Angelo
Vivante, a friend whom Slataper has met at the Trieste Circolo
Socialista. Vivante played an important role in the cause of Adriatic
irredentism. The cause of national liberty was also a social cause.
So it was that Slataper, before plunging into the most sordid taverns
in the old town, would turn his back on the lungomare and gaze at
Mt. Kâl. The ‘carso’, the mountain, once again took on all its symbolic
value as a place of origin. The ‘carso’ is pure, perfect and barbarous.
Slataper dreamt of a complete retreat to its stones such as that suggested
by Ibsen in The Mountain, a text that Slataper greatly admired. But this
could just be an aesthetic choice. Slataper felt compelled to lose himself
in the city. Zarathustra-Pennadoro would not stay on the mountain, for
the city, tiresome though it might be, was beautiful, rich and active.
City and mountain were not opposed one to the other, but in a crucial
relation of recognition, both being indispensable to all who aspired to
live morally. Thus, even Florence had its ‘carso’, Mt. Secchieta, where
the young man would go from time to time, when he could no longer

bear Florence, his books, his work for La Voce and his work on Il mio
carso, which had originally borne the title Sviluppo d’un’anima a Trieste
(The Development of a Soul in Trieste). Once on the mountain, he could
find nature again; and yet, on the snow, he wrote the name of what
took so much of his energy, namely, La Voce. For Slataper believed that

one must keep one’s commitments. He did not share the longing to
retreat, the rustic pessimism of Giovanni Papini, nor the annihilatory
violence of his compatriot from Trieste, Carlo Michelstaedter, who
committed suicide at the age of 22.
Slataper himself, like so many readers of Weininger, was tempted by
suicide. In 1910, his friend Gioietta, to whom Il mio carso is dedicated,
had killed herself with a gun in Trieste, leaving nothing but assurances
of her everlasting love for him. When Slataper heard of her death, he
wanted to let himself die, to stop everything, just as he had wished to
do some years before, when his mother was ill. Gioietta’s death is the
theme of the third part of the book, which talks about the author’s
youth. Yet, out of this tragic experience, Slataper acquired a renewed
awareness of the value of life and of love. One has to go on living in
order to love. A welling up of religious feeling overwhelms the writer:
‘Nature, I thank you. You have set me free, and I thank you. I was full
of law and of duty. I knew what goodness and what evil was … in your
goodness I obey you, divine nature.’8
Other writers in the group around La Voce had sought for a new
religiosity of very much the same kind, involving faith in humanity
and an aspiration towards fraternity and social commitment. One had
to suffer and to work, to leave the forest and the wilderness behind,
and become aware of the world, be in history, in all humility. The man
who lives and obeys his conscience is a hero or a God.
Scipio’s plan was both grand and simple. Once he had finished his
studies, he declared that he would return to Trieste, become a school-
teacher and live modestly with his sisters and a small circle of friends.
Slataper could not accept the death that he had desired, for that would be
a cowardly path to take. He is the very picture of a lofty idealist, and liked
to refer to himself as the brother of Hebbel, the German writer whose
journal and plays he had translated. For Slataper, literature culminates in
a plenitude of awareness, in life, and sounds as a message of love.
Il mio carso has a religious overtone and moralism has the last word.
What did Slataper understand of Nietzsche, whom he both invoked
and criticized for having ‘stifled life with words’. Slataper’s moralism
was in fact anti-Nietzschean, consisting as it did of the moralism of
La Voce plus the driven identity of Trieste. The train runs directly from

Trieste to Vienna, as Il mio carso stresses and Slataper went to Vienna

(in pursuit of a pretty prostitute who could, he thought, resolve his
sexual problems – as he confessed in his diary); though he was a writer
from Trieste, he was not familiar with the great central European
culture of the period. He knew only of Otto Weininger, and that

thanks to La Voce. In addition, he was familiar with the German
Romantics and post-Romantics, through his courses at Florence, but he
knew neither Freud, nor Kraus, nor Hofmannsthal. Slataper believed in
nature, in everything in fact that Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s Lord
Chandos could no longer believe in. He is wholly lost to the cause of
modernity. He died young, terribly young, but young though he was
he found Picasso’s pictures horrible. Slataper is a poet and moralist, he
is committed and at the same time mistrusts books and knowledge; he
is the prototype of the Italian organic intellectual. (This is how
Antonio Gramsci describes the committed and omnipresent intel-
lectual, an ideal central to thirty years of Italian Marxism.) A populist
and convinced of the shortcomings of any purely aesthetic choice, he
sought organic form and Goethean integrity.
Slataper has become a sort of document in the history of Italian liter-
ature, and in that of Trieste also, his provincialism and his passage
through Florence earning him a national reputation. Paradoxically,
what survives of his oeuvre are only fragments and scattered songs.
There are also some passages on cities, on the traffic of ports, on the
teeming mass of workers and prostitutes, which have led some contem-
porary Italian critics to compare him to Walter Benjamin although one
cannot really credit Slataper with important insights of modern art and
consciousness. (The comparison seems to be part of an effort to see
Slataper as part of modernity after all.)
I cannot resist slipping in a personal memory here which dates from
a period when Slataper was all but unknown except in Friuli and
Venezia-Giulia, where he was, if anything, perhaps too celebrated. I
entered a regional competition for young school children sponsored by
Coca-Cola, the theme being the passage from Il mio carso on Mt. Kâl.
Empires change their names and forms. Austria, a bureaucratic empire,
belonged to the past, while the United States, a military and industrial
Empire, belonged to the present. Besides, the American Consulate for
the Venetian area was in Trieste until the 1980s, in one of the loveliest
apartments on the Via Roma, a far-flung stronghold of the West, from
the windows of which one could glimpse Yugoslavia. I did not write of
Slataper as the great national hero who died in the war, nor of the
Carso that is so precious to the fatherland. For I was much taken by his

sentences and by his harsh prose. I won the prize: a bag full of bottles
of Coca-Cola and a visit to the factory which had just been set up in
the region on the road from Udine to Trieste. (A diabolic complicity
between ‘formalism’ and American capital?) A Coca-Cola salesman
drove me to the factory. He spoke with a strong American accent, like

that of the soldiers at the base in Aviano, not far away from Udine.
Since Slataper seemed not to interest him, I quizzed him about
Kennedy, the White House and the skyscrapers of New York, which
used to feature so often on television, until the Coca-Cola factory
appeared on the road, built on a bigger scale than any other. I toured
the factory and, when I saw the bottles dancing in a line, filling up
with brown liquid and being capped in the twinkling of an eye, I
forgot Slataper and all the rest of it, my soul gripped by advanced capi-
talist technology. Not long afterwards I would immerse myself in the
gloomy annals of Buddenbrooks and of Felix Krull.
The values of Slataper were rooted in the tradition, in spite or
perhaps because of his frontier identity. They were mother, fatherland
and nature – all of those plain, homely things to which it is good to
return. Trieste, said Roberto Bazlen, is ‘a province because [it is] a
root’.9 Slataper, full of provincial moralizing, is not a free spirit (Piero
Gobetti, an internationalist and a modernist, had savaged him in
print). Slataper exemplifies the perennial backwardness, in relation to
Europe, of modern Italian literature, which smacks of the provinces, of
the limited horizons of provincial pedagogy and of provincial intel-
lectuals. Thus, in an interview from Note senza testo, Roberto Bazlen
allowed that Trieste was ‘so very far from being culturally homoge-
neous that it has been a perfect echo-chamber’, but observed that it
had produced no new element in European culture. Svevo was an
exception, being ‘one of the rare contributions that literature in the
Italian language has made to fin-de-siècle Europe’, and besides Italy
had failed to accord him proper recognition. One should not forget
that ‘Trieste, in spite of certain cosmopolitan features which, after all,
are only such when considered within the non-European level of the
Italian petite bourgeoisie – is a small city of 250,000 inhabitants’.10
It was Bazlen’s misfortune that the cosmos itself made him claustro-
phobic. Bobi Bazlen, a Jew from Trieste, born in 1902, spent 16 years in
Austria and in German schools, and, after the war and 16 years of Italy,
left Trieste in 1934, and virtually never set foot there again. He lived in
Milan, Rome and London; he worked in publishing and did not write.
There is a gulf between Bazlen and Slataper, which is why they
cannot be read together, but only against each other. This gulf, which

has its origin in what Slataper termed Trieste’s double soul, Austrian
and Italian, is of greater significance than was the difference between
the generation before the First World War and the generation immedi-
ately after the Second World War. What divides Slataper and Bazlen is
the awareness of modernity, of the crisis of the old order and of the

necessity of silence.
Bazlen, who was an Italian irredentist because ‘one had to’ be on the
side of the oppressed, did not really have too much to reproach the
Austrians for. ‘Austria, a wealthy country, with a ponderous and
precise bureaucratic machinery that could obviously appear ridiculous
and pedantic … but it worked perfectly.’11
Bazlen was a genuine Central European, who understood Robert
Musil’s greatness. In 1951, after reading all three volumes of The Man
without Qualities, he wrote an enthusiastic letter to the publisher
Einaudi, declaring that, notwithstanding problems regarding its trans-
lation and its great length, the book should be published ‘blind’, since
it indubitably represented one of the greatest experiments in the
‘non-conformist novel’ in the aftermath of the First World War.
A passionate reader, with boundless curiosity, Bazlen is a Lord
Chandos, who knows the impossibility of writing. As far as he is con-
cerned, no language and no literature will do. His refuge, in the crisis
of the West and its values, would be Taoism, the wisdom of the East:
‘I believe that one can no longer write books. So I do not write books.
Almost all books are merely notes, written at the foot of pages, that
have swelled to the size of volumes (volumina). I merely write notes at
the foot of pages.’12 His Note senza testo, assembled in his notebooks,
were published by Adelphi in 1970, five years after his death (while his
Lettere editoriali were published in 1968).
Bazlen was highly sensitive to historical ruptures, to those moments at
which an epoch faces its own crisis: ‘Up to Goethe, biography was sub-
sumed by the oeuvre. Since Rilke, life did not correspond to the
oeuvre.’13 Yet the opposition between life and works is an old story. The
quasi-aphorisms of the Note betoken the disaster of modernity, or its
shipwreck, to use a term cherished by Bazlen, to whom the present day
seemed rather gloomy: ‘The world now is a world of death – formerly
one was born alive and gradually one would die. Nowadays one is born
dead – and some manage to come gradually to life.’14 What Bazlen left us
was a writing of disaster, which sometimes calls to mind Maurice
Blanchot and his Ecriture du désastre, since the native of Trieste knew full
well that the idea of an end is simply a prejudice, that end and begin-
ning endlessly coincide, and that the oeuvre is absent, or can never be

finished. But what was only a metaphor for Blanchot was a literal fact for
Bazlen, since the former has always written about the impossibility of
writing, while the latter did not really write. His notes and his unfinished
novel, Il capitano di lungo corso, left in the drawer of his desk, were taken
in hand by posterity. Publishers made him an author, but he was simply

a reader, for Einaudi between 1951 and 1962, and then for Adelphi, a
publishing house whose policies he did much to shape.
In his introduction to the Note, published by Adelphi, Roberto
Calasso observes that the fact of Bazlen did not produce an oeuvre
forms part of his oeuvre. The last of the Hapsburgs obeyed
Wittgenstein and, having nothing to say, managed to keep silent: ‘I
have no ear for music I only manage to decipher the silences.’15
Whether we judge Roberto Bazlen to be one of the precious stones of
modernism, or the black sun of the West in crisis, his very existence
embodies the truth of some of the most repeated contemporary nihilist
clichés: the end of literature, the absence of the work, the death of the
author. Here we have to do with a writer without books and, sub-
sequently, posthumously, with books without a writer. However,
Bazlen did not write his own Lord Chandos letter, nor aphorisms in
the style of Cioran. No matter how much we speak of the fragment as
the literary form of modernity, here the fragments are crumbs.
Why, then, did Roberto Bazlen of Trieste not write and publish?
Daniele Del Giudice’s novel, Lo stadio di Wimbledon (1983), is woven
around the selfsame question, which determines the quest, or enquiry,
of the first-person narrator. If it can be called an enquiry this is because
the method employed in the narrative at first seems to resemble that
used by the police. However, the method is really the professional
interview. The protagonist starts his search with preliminary written
information, then follows the live trail, going to all the right places,
calling by phone, arranging an appointment, meeting up with people
who are in the know, who ought to know a great deal about Bazlen. So
the protagonist-narrator gets in touch with Bazlen’s old friends from
Trieste and with Ljuba Blumenthal, with whom he lived in London.
The narrator seeks an answer that, as the novel goes on, is less and less
concerned with Bazlen and more and more with himself and with his
own longing to write. The narrator, for his part, has no name, while
the name of Roberto Bazlen appears from the very first page as the
object of highly detailed dialogues, and these take up a large part of the
novel. Italo Calvino, in his note, says that the fact that the novel has
to do with Bazlen is actually of no importance,16 since the whole
search is simply the story of a decision, namely, the decision to write.

But this is surely wrong. The references to Bazlen persist right up to the
end of the novel, as if to signify that the narrator’s decision belongs to
a highly specific debate in contemporary Italy, a debate about the
myths of Trieste and of Bazlen that Daniele Del Giudice accepts and
rejects at one and the same time.

Trieste gives Italy a real link with European culture; Bazlen, together
with Michelstaedter, are conscious about of the European crisis. What
troubled them was the cult of authority with which, later, in the seven-
ties, Italy in crisis surrounded them. Bazlen and Michelstaedter are, it is
suggested, genuinely ‘great’, the former because he did not write and
the latter because he committed suicide when very young, like Otto
Weininger. Wholly bereft of hope, lacking in illusions and brooking no
compromise, they showed modern man his true face, much as Gustav
Klimt and Otto Wagner had aspired to do at the turn of the century.
But that was long past, and ‘crisis’ would perhaps be the word that
Lord Chandos could not bring himself to utter now, because it is so
worn out that it no longer means anything. Bazlen, who understood
The Man without Qualities, was in any event well aware of this. He
wrote in his notes: ‘the next culture would already exist if one could
eliminate the residues of the past.’17
Instead of just regarding Bazlen’s silence and lack of an accomplished
work as a justification for considering him a great thinker, might we not
say that he experienced some difficulty in writing? Thus, the narrator of
Lo stadio di Wimbledon, feeling faintly vexed, put this point to one of
Bazlen’s friends, who seemed to accept it: ‘Yes, he had some difficulty in
holding things together, in organizing.’18 Daniele del Giudice, on the
other hand, seems to have had no such difficulties, for the novel is per-
fectly organized: everything in it coheres. Thus, the two halves of the
novel are set in the two different cities, Trieste and London; there is a
series of journeys to Trieste, all by train, without the narrator ever spend-
ing a single night there, and yet all the journeys are framed by brief naps
taken to the rhythm of the train – a sleep as allegorical as is the flight by
airplane from Rome Fiumicino to London Heathrow. Whereas London is
presented as a great cosmopolitan city, Trieste seems a sluggish place,
removed from the modern world, turned in upon itself and afflicted by
‘a sort of precariousness, an atmosphere of war’. In Trieste, the anti-
quarian bookshop is hostile, while the one covering ‘current affairs’
offers only remainders, and the passers-by are Africans, Slavs or old
Triestini who mistrusted foreigners. Trieste seems to sink irremediably
into the past. The eighteenth-century book that attracts the narrator’s
attention in the local library is entitled How an Old Place Ages the Writer.

Bobi Bazlen is quite a mystery, then, as is Trieste, his birthplace,

located between Italy and Yugoslavia, with a town hall square that is
perfectly Nordic, says the narrator, ‘as in Salzburg’. Was Bazlen a great
man, whose life had been his work? Yet what if he had been an
unpleasant character, as it had been hinted by one, just one of his

friends, a woman, the famous Gerti who features in the poem by
Montale? He was a baleful influence, she claimed, who had taken an
excessive interest in other people and in their liaisons. He was merely a
failure who had lived his life by proxy.
And what if to write is also to devour things and people? The narrator
of Lo stadio di Wimbledon, seeming to be pro-Bazlen and anti-Bazlen at
one and the same time, both discreet and self-effacing and yet capable
of making decisions, has to go to Trieste several times. He has to cross
all that silence in order to overcome it, and he has to see the place that
had been Bazlen’s primal scene, and which for that reason had been
repressed. The narrator is an ‘anti-Ulysses’. His conduct is informed by
Bazlen’s words as delineated in a sequence from the Note, itself entitled
‘anti-Ulysses’, designed to undermine the myth of Ulysses who, in
Bazlen’s opinion, is the epitome of the petit-bourgeois intellectual:
‘until the end every path is but a false path – deceiving oneself means
not accepting the path chosen.’ Bazlen was caught in the snare of his
own aphorism, whereas the narrator of Daniele Del Giudice’s novel
deviates from the chosen path, that of solving the Bazlen enigma, in
order to pursue a personal decision, ‘the path beyond death’. He wants
to write in order that he himself should not remain stuck forever in
death. The Bazlen thread, in the novel, is sustained right up to the very
end of the plot, in spite of the narrator’s wish to let it drop. If in
London he sets off in pursuit of Bazlen, he gets tired of that, and
finally he wants to rid himself from the weight of Bazlen’s mystery.
Discreetly, the narrator has thus devoured the other person. That is the
cruel law of writing, and it would be cheating to fall back here upon
the slogan of the perfect coincidence between reading and writing, for
the work of the reader, which was Bazlen’s work, is not that of the
writer. Before the two activities can be merged, there is a need for the
whole difficult process of wishing-to-write, the complex business of
arriving at a decision.
’Writing is not important, but one cannot do anything else’, so the
protagonist of Lo stadio di Wimbledon proclaims to Ljuba Blumenthal,
thus drawing a conclusion that is precisely the reverse of that drawn by
Bazlen. The narrator of the novel considers that no moralism whatsoever
is justifiable, whether it be the organic humanism that Slataper had

espoused, and which is now so outdated, or critical nihilism in the style

of Bazlen and Michelstaedter, which has become the contemporary
obsession. The only possible morality is indeed that of form, or of litera-
ture as form. Such, then, is the process by which a writer commits
himself, as a professional of writing, just as one might be a professional of

some other thing, without there being any further mention of intellectu-
als, either for or against (Bazlen could never resist sounding off about
intellectuals, who were to him quintessentially petit-bourgeois).
Existentialism is long dead. Nihilism is something from the past, and so
pretentious. Daniele Del Giudice belongs to the new, objective genera-
tion. He has understood the evidence, namely, that Lord Chandos’s Letter
does indeed mark a crisis, the impossibility of writing and of order, but
that it also implies the possibility of a new look at new objects, which
could only be achieved by adopting a beautiful form that rehearsed the
classical styles. Daniele Del Giudice’s writing is thus in a classical vein, his
use of simple sentences imbued with a sort of tension resulting in a
‘rhythmical balance between clarity and madness’, to borrow Bazlen’s
observations on Goethe.19 For example, we can read in the novel
sentences like this: ‘Who knows when, I am a ghost and must terrorize
visitors. A horrible, heart-rending cry would be needed. I concentrate, I
draw breath; I am awake, I cry. At first I am glad to have succeeded, then I
resign myself to the raucous, bestial sound to which I belong.’20
It is perhaps a quality peculiar to Italian that can realize an ideal of
simplicity in language, a sort of power inherent in vowels. There is a
dance of form and chaos, a vocalic geometry that does not span the
sounds but alternates vowels and consonants. Language is then like a
well-turned, well-made object; in a sentence, the words follow each other
as objects follow each other in space. Daniel Del Giudice’s novel is as
perfect as a designer object, and it does indeed contain precise, technical
descriptions of several objects. By contrast with Bazlen, the young Italian
author of the eighties is not afraid of banality. What could be more banal
than the world of the things we live among, the trains, cars, furniture and
clothes? What could be more banal than the small everyday acts –
making a cup of coffee, having a bath, dialling a telephone number or
going to a restaurant? Yet it is solely through such actions and objects
that our life is constituted; there is no privilege accorded to man allowing
him to eliminate the importance of objects. The captain in Bazlen’s
unfinished novel brought order to his cabin by getting rid of objects, or at
least this is what the narrator of Lo stadio di Wimbledon thinks. Poor little
objects, dealing with them is not easy, ‘their presence is ineffaceable. Yet
it is easy to be rid of them, they are terrible and defenceless.’21

Existentialism was the affair of the World War II generation, and exis-
tentialism does not interest the narrator, ‘even if it was moving to think
that all this was truly felt’. For it is only when he sets eyes on a military
cemetery that he grasps that ‘the Germans did not only exist in films’.22
He belongs to a different generation, one familiar with advanced tech-

nology, with technical languages, with televised images and science
fiction. This is a generation that has Walter Benjamin’s aesthetic in its
blood and therefore does not even need to invoke him – as people often
do; it may be that Benjamin himself will no longer serve, his aesthetic
having been superseded by the present state of technology, for it is the
reproduction of the artistic object that nowadays preserves a kind of
aura, that of the uniqueness of the series. But the unique series is being
replaced by simultaneous series, as when we watch television using the
remote control switch. Between Calvino and the nouveau roman, and
notwithstanding Bazlen, who, in an editorial letter, violently attacked
Robbe-Grillet, Daniele Del Giudice puts into effect ‘the simultaneity of
times and places’, as it happens in the network of air-traffic. The airplane
features on the cover of the novel – the cover being what makes a book a
finished object, and here it is a reproduction of a hyperrealist picture by
Elsie Driggs. The plane is central to the novel, because it represents the
passage from Trieste to London, and the passage from the enquiry into
why Bazlen did not write to the decision to write.
The plane is itself an enormous designer object, an achievement of
perfect form and precise technology, and a realization of spatial and
temporal simultaneity – on land and in the air, in the captain’s cabin and
in the control tower. As such, the plane eliminates provinces and links up
the metropolis. And nobody today is impressed by the technological
miracle.
The map regulating airborne navigation is called Mercator’s Map; it
is also called Representation. By means of this detail, the author sug-
gests that literature, like this map, can be invented ‘by means of a
precise calculation, an almost perfect mathematics’. It is beside the
point to object that literature is not a representation of the real. For it
is the real as mathematically conceived through figures, or else it is the
meeting-point of the possible and the real, in the same way as photo-
graphy is the image that has grasped the real.
The allusion to photography brings us to one of the most important
scenes in the novel, the one that frames and renders objective the
narrator’s long-delayed decision to write. There had been intimations
of such a decision ever since his final journey to Trieste, but it was the
first conversation with Ljuba that precipitated it. Words or sentences

would not do, for the decision had to be wholly concrete, taking the
form of a blindingly obvious image, an object or a thing. There was
indeed an only too real thing, sitting there, forgotten, on a bench in
Wimbledon stadium. It was a camera. The narrator had always been
reluctant to look at the photos of Bobi Bazlen that his women friends

had wished to show him, but now, when his moment of decision had
come, he would have liked to fix his overall vision of Wimbledon Park,
since it is the place where he made this resolution.
Being timid, phlegmatic and unsure of himself, the narrator fails to lay
hands on the camera, which is grabbed by someone else. This was
because, in the last analysis, he was in the process of committing himself
to a different art of images, not photography but literature. The only
possible answer to the Bazlen enigma lay in the thing itself, in writing a
book, and not a book of critical essays but a story. There are really not
many other instances in Italian literature of the process, much com-
mented upon by Roland Barthes and already announced by Oscar Wilde,
that Daniele Del Giudice’s novel exemplifies, and that involves a fusion
of critical with poetic or fictional writing. Here the fusion is achieved in
the form of the novel, in opposition to all myths of criticism at any price,
and above all to the Marxian critique of ideology, such as has character-
ized interesting intellectual experiments in Italy over the last twenty
years. In fact, a sort of critical excess, even if not Marxist but rather
nihilist – a perpetual wariness about the snares of illusion, of historical
illusions – was precisely the sickness of Roberto Bazlen, which led him to
view the work as itself a crime. Almost timidly, Lo stadio di Wimbledon is
pitted against all those who would impute guilt to production, whether
literary, architectural or of any other kind, and thus against all those who
revere Bazlen for his silence. Between the inanity of pure artistic creativity
and the terrorism of negativity, there is perhaps room for something else,
the ethics of form, the pleasure taken in an object that is well made, the
pleasure taken in making an object.
Conversely, Bazlen may himself already have recommended the
novel form, and, in Ljuba’s presence, he in fact gave the following
advice to a young woman who wished to write an essay on a German
writer: ‘But why do you want to write essays? Tell these things as you
imagine them, or as you have just told them to us.’23
Being anti-Bazlen and pro-Bazlen at one and the same time, the
narrator of Lo stadio di Wimbledon does not dare to refuse the pullover
that used to belong to Bazlen and that Ljuba Blumenthal insists upon
giving him. He does not wish to wear it either and, once he has left her
house, takes it off in an obsessively ritualistic fashion. For, at the

moment of decision, with the date of his journey confirmed and his
ticket already bought, when he feels himself to be on the brink of his
venture, ‘uncertain and determined’, the risk of identification is still
there, and the power of objects could still be unleashed, just as Bazlen
conceived of it in ‘The mechanics of the Tao’: ‘(where man does not

disappear) in the middle: a psychology of the inanimate (flats, bed-
spreads … ).’24 So the narrator does not throw away the pullover but
holds it in his hand, tenderly, ‘as one would hold a child’.25 This, the
last sentence in the novel, while the narrator is in London, gets back to
its starting-point in Trieste: the psychology of the inanimate featured
in the opening scene, in which the train broke down before reaching
Trieste station, as if to signify the difficulty of arriving in that town.
The psychology of the inanimate begins and ends the cycle of the
novel, in its ‘alternations of movement and rest’.
Thanks to Trieste, and the aura with which that city surrounds
objects and places, the author manages to speak, in terms of ‘objective’
literature, of what represents the most subjective of choices, the ‘fun-
damental’, and therefore crucial, decision of a subject. Nevertheless no
indulgence is shown to the psychology of the character; the psychol-
ogy is wholly in the objects. Moreover, like the whole city of Trieste,
the objects in the novel are profoundly allusive (and it is this that rules
out any direct comparison with Robbe-Grillet).
Just as Scipio Slataper addressed himself to the Italian intellectuals of
the day, to the Florentines with whom he was connected, so too
today’s young writers have quite specific interlocutors in mind,
namely, all those who, in the 1960s and 1970s, deployed the Marxist
critique of ideology, read Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Heidegger,
Benjamin and Adorno, imagined the contradictions of the modern and
of the big city, and discovered Bazlen and Michelstaedter. The parti-
cular decisions taken by the narrator, and so by the author, can only be
understood in terms of such an intellectual context. To the mystical
answer implicit in negative philosophy, Daniele Del Giudice opposes
the choice of writing and the form of the novel. Furthermore, his is a
novel of Trieste, not only because more than half of it is set there, but
because, although deserted and strange, the frontier city serves as a
point of departure for a new endeavour, one related to the great Italian
experiments of Italo Svevo, and also to other European experiments. If
Trieste is so alluring, it is because it lives inside the myth of
fin-de-siècle Vienna, and because it represents a bridge to Europe.

5
Aldo Rossi: The White Walls
of the City

For Aldo Rossi, every architectural project is ‘an unfinished love affair: it
is most beautiful before it ends’.1 In architecture, as in love, it is when
happiness reaches its height that we would like to withdraw, regain our
freedom, since ‘every moment that we become aware of things is
coloured by the longing to be able to give them up’. Forgetting
Architecture is the title that Aldo Rossi would have liked to give to his
Scientific Autobiography (1981), a work published in English, in the
United States, as if it were necessary to get away from Italy in order to
be an Italian architect. The forgetting of architecture could be taken lit-
erally: Aldo Rossi does not just build but, to an ever greater extent, he
draws, as is shown by Il libro azzurro, an exquisite sketch-book compris-
ing a set of 48 drawings accompanied by notes, which encompass the
habitual forms of his architecture: lighthouses (how can one help being
reminded of those by Giorgio de Chirico?), cabins and the primary
elements of architecture such as cylinders, columns, pillars, walls. But
forgetting architecture also means breaking up its outlines, integrating
architecture into a broader comprehension of the discipline, where the
written page, the sketch, the plan and the construction are not too
different from each other, since each repeats the same idea by different
means. Above all, the forgetting of architecture implies the weight of
time, the history of nature, of the human kind and the personal history
that unfolds in buildings and cities. Speaking about his interest in art
since his childhood, Aldo Rossi almost confesses:
I knew that architecture was made possible by the confrontation of

a precise form with time and the elements, a confrontation which
lasted until the form was destroyed in the process of this combat.
Architecture was one of the ways that humanity had sought to
96

Aldo Rossi 97
survive; it was a way of expressing the fundamental search for

happiness.2
Rossi’s poetic, almost intimate vision – architecture is like a love story,

architecture should be forgotten – seems to be very much at odds with

the positive tone of L’architettura della città, a fundamental text in the
contemporary debate, which first came out in 1966 and has been
republished several times in various languages: it suffices to look at the
table of contents to see the crucial role played by architectural facts,
and urban structures and elements: Fatti urbani e teoria della città,
Struttura dei fatti urbani, Gli elementi primari e l’area, etc. Aldo Rossi
often remembers with tender irony his sound convictions at the time
he wrote that book. There he declared:
I understand architecture in the positive sense, as a creation insepa-

rable from civil life and from the society in which it is made mani-
fest … thus architecture is consubstantial with the formation of
civilization, being a permanent, universal and necessary fact.3
But actually for him there has never been any discontinuity between
theory, project, construction and the artist’s own life.
The work of Aldo Rossi lends itself to various kinds of interpretation:
the architect sees in him the rationalist legacy of the Viennese Adolf
Loos4 or of Italian classicism; the art historian sees in him the metro-
politan atmosphere of Giorgio de Chirico and of Mario Sironi; the
historian of ideas might perceive, in the differences between the text of
1966 and the Autobiography of 1981, the transition from public to
private man, from commitment to history to absorption in the self,
typical of periods of crisis; the critic of ideology will see in Aldo Rossi’s
repetitions of form the ambiguity of the poetic, the nostalgia for art
and order; those who love literature will be touched by Rossi’s sense of
responsibility in a personal choice, the identification of the self with
the totality of a work. Poetry is so important for Rossi himself, who
quotes several poets as having influenced his wish to be an architect,
and reports his answer to the persistent questions he is asked about
some features in his architecture: ‘I have translated the last lines of a
Hölderlin poem (“Halfte des Lebens”) into my architecture: “Die
Maurern stehn / Sprachlos und kalt, im Winde / Klirren die Fahnen” [The
walls stand / mute and cold, in the wind / the banners creak].’5
The political optimism of the sixties obviously cannot return, but
Rossi’s fundamental ideas about architecture which first appear in his

early theoretical text are still present in his 1981 autobiography: the
rejection of any functionalist conception of architecture, which cannot
be reduced to functions, despite the efforts of many modern schools to
do so; the idea that city and architecture coincide, one being inconceiv-
able without the other, and that the city (or architecture) lives through

time. This means that the city has a history in which memory and
forgetting are intertwined, for cities change through time but still keep
their identity. Because of this vision of the city across time, functional-
ism is ineffectual, as Rossi says in his autobiography, at one point where
he is referring to his own book, L’architettura della città. In fact places
that have been built for one purpose can subsequently be put to a dif-
ferent use: ‘I have seen old palaces now inhabited by many families,
convents transformed into schools, amphitheatres transformed into
football fields; and such transformations have always come about most
effectively where neither an architect nor some shrewd administrator
have intervened.’6 This typological freedom fascinates the architect,
who loves unexpected events that jeopardize function, such as the
taverns under the arches of the Schnell-Bahn in Berlin, or the two-
storey kiosks behind the cathedral of Ferrara. His motto will never be
‘form and function’, but is rather form and memory.
In cities, different historical periods accumulate, within the buildings
different functions follow one another, making room for people’s lives.
Of all the photographs of the Gallaratese (the housing estate in Milan
built by Carlo Aymonino and Aldo Rossi in 1969–74), Rossi says he
likes best the ones where children are playing under the arcades of the
building near the pilasters: he likes this proximity of human beings
and stone, of biography and construction; he likes the interplay of the
stable and the transitory, of the scientific and the existential, or the
dream of an architecture seen through a child’s eyes.
Lombardy
Indeed what has been seen through a child’s eyes lasts forever. The
images of childhood, the buildings of one’s childhood, ‘in the flux of
the city’ are fundamental; they form the core of a constant quest,
creating an expectation, that of an event which, as in Giorgio de
Chirico’s pictures, may never materialize: ‘I am more interested in
preparations, in what might happen on a midsummer night. In this
way, architecture can be beautiful before it is used; there is beauty in
the wait, in the room prepared for the wedding, in the flowers and
silver before High Mass.’7

Aldo Rossi 99
Aldo Rossi feels he has never lost his ties with Lombardy: the beloved
Sacri Monti,8 the statue of San Carlone in Arona (Lake Maggiore
between Piedmont and Lombardy), the lakeside Hotel Sirena (a building
of bad taste with its acid green walls, but promising happiness, holidays,
meetings with young girls), the Galleria in Milan, where the fog

penetrates on winter days, and the horrible piazza Leonardo da Vinci,
also in Milan, where Rossi, with other students of the Politecnico, spent
long hours taking measurements.
Take, for example, that architectural structure typical of Lombardy
and which can be found in Milan, in the working-class quarter of porta
Ticinese dating from the end of the nineteenth century: houses with
balconies. This Milanese typology is a concrete image of the city where
Aldo Rossi was born, and fully inspired his Gallaratese project, where
the whole construction extends along a gallery or passage with
balconies. Thus time and geography, the past and the local style
combine to provide the model for a piece of modern architecture, for
the gallery is also ‘an internal raised street’.
The places of childhood and of youth also include those experienced
on journeys and long visits: Lombardy and its images blend with Belo
Horizonte in Brazil, and with Seville. They can also stretch as far as
Modena and Parma, as far as the image of the Tempio Malatestiano in
Rimini or of Leon Battista Alberti’s Sant’Andrea church in Mantua,
which Rossi loved so much. The natural and urban landscape of the Po
valley prompted the construction of his cemetery in Modena (1971
competition), whose conception is influenced by the ‘world’ of the Po
and by what Rossi felt in the public gardens at Ferrara or Seville:
‘a mixture of real experience, image, and afternoons wasted in Ferrara
or along the river itself.’9 Architecture is time and place: stones and
buildings, chronological time, existential time, and weather merge in a
strange feeling where movement and stillness are not contradictory:
Between the houses of childhood and death, between those of play

and work, stands the house of everyday life, which architects have
called many things – residence, habitation, dwelling, etc. – as if life
could develop in one place only. Through my own life and craft I have
partly lost the concept of a fixed place, and at times I superimpose
different situations and different times, as my reader has already
seen.10
Aldo Rossi’s Italy is that of Milan and ‘need not contradict the notion of
the citizen of the world’;11 his Italy it is the Italy of certain interiorized

post-war images; of the Renaissance; of the Po valley. One can find the
atmosphere of some of Rossellini, Fellini, Bertolucci or Visconti’s films.
Rossi’s Italy is also international Italy, brimming over with different
cultures. It is above all the Italy of the Hapsburgs, imbued with modern
German and Viennese culture: Aldo Rossi’s influences include Adolf Loos,

Georg Trakl, Walter Benjamin, Mies van der Rohe (the modern architect
who, along with Loos, he admires the most), and even Raymond Roussel,
Melville and Conrad. An image, a sentence, a city, a building recalls
others, beyond any frontier, in an endless flow of connections.
The analogous city
Rossi has often spoken of the analogous city – he refers to it in his

Autobiography – suggesting that it is not a concept or a stable definition
but an image, the very possibility of joining images, ‘a circle’ of
relationships ‘that is never closed’, ‘the unlimited contaminatio of things,
of correspondences’.12 The analogous city is very close to Baudelaire’s
‘Correspondances’: an urban image can be associated to another urban
image, but also to an atmosphere, a mood, a feeling. Rossi’s style in the
Autobiography is very different from the assertive tone of The Architecture
of the City; it is elliptical, not conforming to an idea of treatise or system,
nor to that of a continuous narrative. His mode of writing is that of frag-
mentation in the modern style, it belongs to the tradition of Italian her-
meticism, proceeding by brief statements which, in their apparent
simplicity, refer to suggestions in which theoretical intent and personal
experience are inseparable, just as in his architecture the rational
approach is combined with a violent and chilling effort striving to recap-
ture an emotion, an event reconsidered and reviewed at a distance. There
is no impressionism in Rossi’s work, either in his writing or in his archi-
tecture, since his respect for the subjectivity of the artist is not sentimen-
tal but intellectual. Rossi’s work eschews all irrationalism, aiming to
integrate modern rationalism with that complex thing that is the human
person with his feelings, obsessions, contradictions, memories. While
organizing the international architecture section at the fifteenth
Triennale exhibition in Milan, Rossi wrote the introduction to the joint
work Architettura razionale13 and made the film – called, after Adolf Loos’s
essay, Ornament and Crime – which was ‘a collage of architectural works
and pieces of different films which tried to introduce the discourse of
architecture into life and at the same time view it as a background for
human events’.14
For the Milanese architect, his discipline is a sort of science of the
subject, where the universal and the general of known and recognizable

Aldo Rossi 101
forms would not annihilate the peculiarity, the uniqueness of a personal

experience. Rossi’s concept of the analogous city should not be inter-
preted in the abstract, Platonic sense, for it is the idea that comes after the
event, after individual experiences, and it is presented in a realistic
manner. The analogous city is the image of a place, of an architectural

pattern, of an existing town, which might be composed by elements of
different existing cities, and one that persists in the memory. Rossi’s
analogy is produced by an accumulation of objects, in a richness of refer-
ences that, paradoxically, results in simplicity – the purism of the primor-
dial elements or elementary forms that have often been discussed in
connection with him. Memory can superimpose various elements or rec-
ognize similarity within difference: recollection and analogical associa-
tion produce changes and metamorphosis in the same way as the altered
usage of buildings transforms functions: ‘Ever since my first projects,
where I was interested in purism, I have loved contaminations, slight
changes, self-commentaries, and repetitions.’15 Taking the example of the
Milan Galleria or Alberti’s Sant’Andrea, Rossi proposes an analogy
between architectural structures and mist. Constructed forms and geogra-
phy merge together – contaminate, to use the term cherished by Rossi: ‘If
one enters Sant’Andrea in Mantua on those days when the fog has pene-
trated the interior, one sees that no space so resembles the countryside,
the Po lowland, as the measured and controlled space of this building.’16
The ‘contamination’ produced by analogy is the principle itself of
collage – and one of Rossi’s 1977 collages was called ‘Analogous city’.
Nevertheless analogy consists in the detachment, in the rational division
among elements, without any fusion or confusion. Aldo Rossi’s analogy
belongs to the type of the catalogue, where hierarchies are expunged and
flattened out (mist, a meteorological element, is on the same level as a
building), but order is indispensable (the mist is a different thing from the
building, it is the feature of the Po landscape that inspires the re-exami-
nation of this landscape in terms of Alberti’s rational forms). Aldo Rossi
finds an analogy to his art in the work of Raymond Roussel, where a deci-
sion orders the composition: ‘I detested the arbitrary disorder that is indif-
ference to order, a kind of moral obtuseness, complacent well-being,
forgetfulness.’17
Nostalgia
The architecture of Aldo Rossi, in the projects that have never been
carried out as well as those that have, is born out of the tension
between mathematical, scientific order and the relative disorder of per-
sonal, subjective life. Yet although a building, a town, is always in a

profound relationship with the memory of the artist, Rossi does not
mean to propose any myth of the artist, of art: a passionate reader of
Adolf Loos and Walter Benjamin, he claims that the only people he
admires in the contemporary world are the engineers (this is why his
autobiography is labelled as scientific). The architect does not pursue

the ideal of aesthetic purity. In fact, he entitled one of his 1975 engra-
vings, where a series of architectural objects is assembled as if in a cata-
logue, Diese ist lange her (Now all that is lost).
Rossi is not nostalgic for a past, bygone world, where architecture
was beautiful and triumphant; like Baudelaire, or Benjamin, he is
aware of the need for the modern; that is, in the manner of Loos, he is
so uncompromisingly rational that he is forced to accept all the aspects
of the contemporary metropolis, even the ones he finds ugly. The city,
that mixture of past and present, is alive in all its parts: how can one
deny, for example, the existence of suburbs? To this reality of the
present day Rossi responded with his projects for working-class
housing and with his 1965 project in Segrate, where one sees, on the
outskirts of Milan, the nudity of absolute, almost atemporal, architec-
tural forms (such as the hollow trapezoidal triangle of the fountain in
the piazza del Municipio). A similar atemporality is expressed by the
suspension between two cultural identities, that of an agrarian society
and that of an industrial society, which is precisely the condition in
which Milanese immigrants from the south of Italy live every day,
passing from one type of society to another.
Aldo Rossi’s nostalgia is not nostalgia for the past, for an heroic past.
He is aware that is no longer possible to give expression to the hopes of
the seventies when, for instance, he wrote in the review Casabella-
Continuità that ‘traffic, today the chaotic symptom of congestion, will
become the regular pulse of a dynamic and ordered society’.18 The
utopia of 1968 is far off, even if Aldo Rossi shows – briefly, swiftly, as if
it were the recollection of a dream – a glimpse of the celebration of the
Revolution. In the critical end of the twentieth century, in ‘the poverty
of modern culture’ which makes necessary ‘a popular movement’, one
must be content with ‘small things, having seen that the possibility of
great ones was historically precluded’.19
Aldo Rossi feels a strange nostalgia for the moment in which the
event takes place, whether in life or in the theatre. The aim of the artist
is to represent and fix the present, while it flickers:
Every midsummer evening has its companionship and its solitude,

and the architect or the playwright must grasp the broad outlines of

Aldo Rossi 103
a scene quickly because he knows that the character and even their
feelings may change, or that in any case the representation will be
different in time.20
The architect writing his autobiography feels a nostalgia for life, for

youth, that inescapable law of time that erodes human lives far more
than it does buildings, that requires the repairing of forms, gestures,
thoughts, making every change imperceptible and derisory: ‘As I have
said, Forgetting architecture comes to mind as a more appropriate title
for this book, since while I may talk about a school, a cemetery, a
theatre, it is more correct to say that I talk about life, death, imagina-
tion.’21 Rossi feels nostalgia not only for the purism of his early style,
but also for the end of architecture, that moment when time is
stronger than any matter: ‘Thus the temporal aspect of architecture no
longer resided in its dual nature of light and shadow or in the ageing of
things: it rather presented itself as a catastrophic moment at which
time takes things back.’22
Time swallows our desires and indicates that an event is over, and
that it can never be repeated, even if one repeats the scenario. Roland
Barthes saw photography as the crystallizing of what has been lived
and the harrowing ambiguity set up by the presence of an image that
tells us: never again. Aldo Rossi sees the same thing in architecture, in
the city, in the beautiful illusion of the Modern movement destroyed by
the bombs of the Second World War. Nevertheless, for him the project
is only possible when destruction has taken place, when the emotive
appearance of the event is over: ‘everything becomes representable once
desire is dead … Almost paradoxically, whenever there is a loss of
desire, the form, the project, the relation, love itself are cut from us
and so can be represented.’23
Wanting pre-exists, but cannot coexist with ‘the drawing, the project
or the ritual’. And architecture is more a ritual than a creation, at once
exorcism trying to conjure up the end and an image of the end; it is
made up, like nostalgia, of this alarming dual aspect of the loss of any
wish and the necessity of this loss for representation in order to make
possible the representation: ‘I do not know how much of this is joy or
is in fact melancholy.’24
A sense of ending overtakes us when we look at one of the drawings
from Il libro azzurro, where, in the very persistence of stones, the oblivion
or destruction of architecture takes place through a collage of various
urban images and objects: a large blue coffee-pot is on the same scale
as the buildings, the factory chimney, the telescopic tower, the house

recalling the buildings of New York with fire escapes made of black iron
on their façades. And, to increase this disconcerting equation of man,
stone and objects, the profile of the statue of San Carlone, which belongs
to the landscape of Rossi’s childhood, stands between the New York-style
building and the tower, on the same scale as the house and the objects:

the head of the statue cannot be seen but its hand extends upwards like a
mute cry at the centre of the drawing, bigger than the roofs and chim-
neys. The whole drawing is a disquieting collage of more or less familiar
images and gives them an atmosphere of death. This sort of spectral clas-
sicism of urban landscape can be found in the verses of the poet Rossi
likes so much, Georg Trakl, such as ‘Immer klingen die weissen Mauern
der Stadt’ (‘Always the white walls of the city resound’). This is in fact
Rossi’s commentary, traced in that other kind of drawing which is hand-
writing: ‘The urban landscape seems to me more and more characterized
by those features that arise from abandoned constructions, collapsed
buildings or sundry sedimentation … ’25
There has been a great deal of talk about monumentality in Rossi’s
designs and, especially in the United States, he has also been seen in the
tradition of Italian Fascist architecture.26 But Rossi’s forms, even when
they are monumental (as in the cemetery in Modena), never testify to
the power of the monument; rather they are the archaeological relics of
an abandoned, lost or remote city, or one that has been destroyed by
war: far from the glamorous din of history, or of heroic grandeur, they
absorb the silence that history or time itself, imposes on them, and
which was always there: ‘I love the beginning and end of things; but
perhaps above all I love things which are broken and then reassembled,
as in archaeological and surgical operations.’27 Mythically, the moment
of ending is Lorca’s ‘Cinco de la tarde’, the time of great equality that is
death; it is the time always shown by the clocks in Rossi’s drawings.
Aldo Rossi often puts together elements of the ancient city and fea-
tures of contemporary reality – like Giorgio de Chirico in the series of
paintings called Piazze d’Italia – while his pencil line or the sombre
atmosphere of several of his urban landscapes recalls the painting of
Mario Sironi – as in the black and white drawing of the project for the
theatre in Parma. But the reference to Sironi or to de Chirico28 (of
which Aldo Rossi hardly ever speaks) is echoed by self-reference
because every building is now just a citation of Rossi himself: one can
see again the passage with columns of the Gallaratese building, the tri-
angular prism of the fountain in Segrate, the round shape of the school
of Fagnano Olona; and, maybe, the three people in the square on the
right are not raising their arms towards the end of architecture.

Aldo Rossi 105
At times, for example in the middle of the campus of Princeton

University, in those suburban places where nature and architectural
objects do not make up a town – missing that coincidence of Rossi’s
between town and architecture – I feel the lack of the skyscrapers and
subway of New York, of urban space and life (one feels so much in the

Autobiography the presence of friends, the intellectual excitement at an
evening get-together in a Milan bar): then I know what it means to be
European. It just means having in one’s head, in one’s very being,
images of towns, and the atmosphere of a street or a square, that combi-
nation of stone and sky that de Chirico could only find in Italian cities.
Nothing is simpler than a piazza, the culminating point of the fusion
between architecture and city, centre and suspension of the town. And
out of this simplicity arises a multitude of things, memories, allusions
and dreams as in Rossi’s drawings and as in this passage by de Chirico:
I find myself in a square of great metaphysical beauty; perhaps it is

the piazza Cavour in Florence; or perhaps one of those very fine
squares in Turin, or perhaps neither the one nor the other; to one
side can be seen porticoes surmounted by apartments with closed
shutters and solemn balconies. On the horizon can be seen hills
dotted with villas; over the square the sky is very clear, washed
clean by the storm.29
But cities, images of cities, pile up in our memory, through analogy,

‘through a kind of cross-referencing’,30 and one can find the city of
stone and of monuments not just in European cities but anywhere and
also in the United States, that place where ‘modern architecture failed
so badly’.31 Stating the importance of the United States for the autobi-
ography of his projects, Rossi admits: ‘New York is a city of stone and
monuments such as I never believed could exist.’32 It is actually the
city which made Rossi understand the truth of his arguments in
L’architettura della città, since, as in Loos’s design for the Chicago
Tribune, it is ‘a synthesis of the distortions created in America by an
extensive application of a style in a new context’.33 And if one walks
around the Wall Street district on a Sunday morning, one gets the
impression of walking ‘through a realized perspective by Serlio or some
other Renaissance treatise-writer’. And Rossi continues: ‘I have had a
similar experience in the villages of New England, where a single build-
ing seems to constitute the city or the village, independent of its size.’
From town to town, from analogy to analogy, one can compare, as
Aldo Rossi does, Trieste – white and desperate as in Italo Svevo’s novel

Senilità (Senility) – to New York, the city-monument34: ‘The compari-

son of these cities is not so unusual, not only because in both there is
the presence of the sea, but also because both are related to that
primordial city built on the sea, Venice.’35

Theatrum mundi
Venice is a city, an experience, essential to Aldo Rossi. Not only

because he has taught there but also because this city is the site of one
his most extraordinary projects: the floating theatre designed and built
for the Biennale of 1979–80.
Several features of Rossi’s art are concentrated in this construction
which, unfortunately, was demolished after the Biennale ‘with an
efficiency rare in this country’36, Rossi says in his 1982 book Teatro del
mondo: in the first place the floating theatre revives a traditional struc-
ture, for its model belongs to the history of the Venetian Renaissance;
secondly, its relationship with the city is simultaneously one of discon-
tinuity and continuity, since the simple, naked and unornamented
forms of the theatre are in contrast with the Venetian palaces, but they
are nonetheless wholly bound up with the wooden architecture and
the landscape of the Venetian lagoon, the neighbouring islands and
the Po delta. The floating theatre also reproduces a pre-monumental
Venice that ‘is not yet white with the stone of Sansovino and Palladio.
It is the Venice of Carpaccio, and I see it in the internal light, in the
wood, and it reminds me of certain Dutch interiors which call to mind
boats and are near the sea.’37
Against the backdrop of this analogous city par excellence, Venice,
the floating theatre may offer an unlimited number of analogies: its
tower, for instance, could be a minaret, or one of the spires of the
Kremlin. Moreover, the form of the theatre is one that has cropped up
on several occasions in the career of Aldo Rossi. The primitive stage of
the theatre is based on a memory from his childhood: the puppet
theatre in Bergamo, in the summer. Rossi’s passion for the theatre is
rooted in his fascination with time and its mystery: ‘For certainly the
time in the theatre does not coincide with time measured by clocks;
nor are emotions bound to chronological time; they are repeated on
stage every evening with impressive punctuality and exactitude.’38
Theatres induce the charm of repetition of identical movements
broken by an unexpected action. The theatre is the structure that best
expresses the link between architecture and human events.

Aldo Rossi 107
Aldo Rossi often speaks of Raymond Roussel, of his Théâtre des incom-
parables, where ‘the theatre is surrounded by an imposing capital city
formed of innumerable huts’.39 The hut is a simple, primordial
and essential model in Rossi’s imagery, imbued with the memory of
holidays, like the cabins on the island of Elba, which turn up several

times in his drawings. On the outside the floating theatre of Venice
resembles them. But it also resembles another model dear to the Italian
architect, the lighthouses of New England and Maine in particular, the
land of Melville – pensive forms, between land and sea, between sky
and rock, between beginning and end. The exterior of the Biennale
theatre derives from the contamination of all these forms, while the
interior derives from the study of the Anatomical Theatre in Padua
(1594), which had already provided the inspiration for a drawing
crammed with self-citation, the Teatrino scientifico.
The interior and the exterior ‘are also part of the meaning of the
theatre’ and ‘the beauty resides in the place where the subject encoun-
ters different meanings’. Nothing can be beautiful ‘if it only signifies
itself, only signifies its use’. What is beautiful today is the ‘contamina-
tion’ of various elements, the superimposition of different images and
impression imprinted in the artist’s memory, since, as Rossi writes:
‘The emergence of relations among things, more than the things them-
selves, always give raise to new meanings.’40 And so, in connection
with his Venetian theatre, Aldo Rossi returns to his rejection of the
idea of function and use: architecture is symbolic and profoundly
poetic. Thus Venice, city of stone, and the floating theatre, immense
ephemeral form, invite one to forget architecture, to grasp the beauty
of the Adriatic sea that Rossi loves so much, of the ‘seashell, daughter
of stone and the whitening sea’, as the poet Alcaeus wrote, quoted by
Rossi.41 Venice with its Rossian theatre invites us to rediscover, by for-
getting, the wonder of architecture, its astonishment, as if seen
through a child’s eyes: ‘Astonishment has a hard crust made of stone
and shaped by the sea, like the crust of the great constructions of steel,
stone, and cement which form the city.’42

6
Massimo Cacciari and the
Philosophy of the City

Ne suis-je pas un faux accord
Dans la divine symphonie,
Grâce à la vorace Ironie
Qui me secoue et qui me mord?
(Am I not a discordant note

In the divine symphony,
Thanks to the voracious Irony
Which shakes me up and bites into me?)
Baudelaire, ‘L’Héautontimorouménos’,
from Les Fleurs du Mal
Venice’s spleen
Venice, June 1973: the city was overrun by the national Festival
dell’Unità, the yearly festivities of the PCI, the Italian Communist
Party.1 Venice itself was transformed: in every campo (square) there were
red flags, bookstalls, public speeches, food, wine, music, songs, compagni
(comrades) from everywhere, Italy and abroad, of every age, every social
class. One could hear a lot of discussion, a mixture of voices and accents
from various regions of Italy, with different local political experiences
and also different political lines, following the tendency of a given
Federazione, or even Sezione (the hierarchical organizations of the
Communist Party, active at the level of the nation, region, city, town,
suburb). In the city there was a sense of feast, the pleasure of the crowd,
of community life, of the polis, of political debates. Venice was ours; it
was the ‘red city’ for a few days, in spite of the Christian Democratic
tradition of the Veneto, the most ‘white’ region of Italy. Maybe the
108

Massimo Cacciari 109
Revolution – a word used in those years, not yet bereft of its sound and
meaning – is like a great Festival dell’Unità in an unreal city like Venice,
a huge coming together, a vast Communist International, workers and
intellectuals together, as if there were no gap. We were all there at the
culminating moment of the Festival, when the General Secretary of the

Communist Party, Enrico Berlinguer, spoke. It was impossible not to be
moved by the city, the sense of a large community of people from every-
where with a similar political vision, the buildings, the sky, the water,
the noise, and then that silence when Berlinguer, who died 11 years
later addressing the crowd in a square in Padua, started his speech:
It is the first time that a national festival of the Unità takes place in
Venice and in the Veneto region. The choice of Venice is a good
one, because in this city – unique in the world – the activity and ini-
tiative of comrades, friends, workers made the festival a mass event.
It represented a new and unusual experience for the city, for all
Venetians, as well as for our Party. The Venetian people responded
enthusiastically to the Party’s initiative proving how fake is the con-
ception of those who believe that only a small elite can enjoy
culture, art and science, and would like to give to the people
nothing but a vulgar and commercialized under-culture.
It is not by chance that the will to make culture belong to all
people is coming from a Party like ours. We want the working class
to inherit the entire progressive, beautiful, true things that mankind
created in its secular path. We want the working class to embody
the new universal values that will renovate social and economic life,
the relation between people and classes, as well as the science, art
and culture of the whole world.2
We students and intellectuals of Venice’s Sezione Universitaria,

listening to that redemptive, humanistic language, felt as Stendhal did
in a church, not believing but being deeply moved by the ritual of
the Mass. We were thrilled by the crowd, the city and the event, but,
obviously, could not believe in those sentimental words about progress,
universal new values, new relations among classes. We knew Massimo
Cacciari’s lesson, as he writes it in ‘The Dialectics of the Negative and
the Metropolis’,3 the first essay in Architecture and Nihilism: On the
Philosophy of Modern Architecture: ‘In a Metropolitan situation, the revo-
lutionary process itself is totally intellectual… The geometric clarity
with which, in the final analysis, class interest is posited, eliminates all
possible teleological or ethico-sentimental synthesis.’4

To deny the metropolitan situation – we knew it by heart – means to

believe in the conservative nostalgia of a better, more natural human
life, or in the progressive utopia of a realized good society. To eschew
the Metropolis, as Cacciari says, inevitably means to propose a back-
ward attitude: ‘And therefore any discourse of the city in itself neces-

sarily becomes at this point reactionary.’5 We were nevertheless aware
that the public square where Berlinguer spoke to the masses was not
our group at the Sezione universitaria nor Tafuri’s seminar at the
Istituto di storia dell’architettura. But we were especially aware that
behind Berlinguer’s celebration of Venice and the Party there was a
political project that would eliminate any Stalinist mentality: he had
been secretary since 1972 and, when he was vice-secretary, at the 24th
Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in Moscow, he had already
stated that every communist party had the right to follow an
autonomous line dictated by the specific conditions of every country.
He was opening the way within the left to a different understanding of
politics and alliances.
A few months after Venice’s Festival dell’Unità, Berlinguer proposed
to the country the compromesso storico (historical compromise) – a new
relation of collaboration between the Italian left and centre, and a
Communist Party for all of Europe. Berlinguer obviously disturbed
many of the old generation in the PCI who were attached to a central-
ized party structure; at the same time he disgusted the revolutionary
purists so typical of the extreme left in those years after 1968, who so
virulently opposed any institutional structure. But, together with the
clear tendency towards social-democratic positions, a new wind was
blowing within the Italian Communist Party, an organization that
traditionally represented the working-class voice, constituted a large
opposition presence within the Italian Parliament, and was always
much more that a simple electoral machine: an institution really con-
nected to the mass movement of workers. This made possible for
Cacciari to join the Party. He was coming from an extreme left
operaista experience (operaista meaning supporter of the doctrine that
power should be given to the workers), and his collaboration with the
review Contropiano marked his move in the direction of the party.
Contropiano was started in 1968; its title was clearly indicative of its
stand against capitalist planning (from economic to urban planning),
and opened with Antonio Negri’s article on Keynes and capitalist state
theory in 1929, followed by Mario Tronti’s study on the changes in the
content of working-class struggles at the international level from the
thirties to the sixties.6 The first issue of Contropiano listed three editors:

Antonio Negri, from Padua, who was the leader of the group Potere
Operaio, Alberto Asor Rosa, from Rome, who was a member of the PCI
and had always been committed to an operaista direction within the
party,7 and Cacciari, from Venice. Cacciari had been active in the
factory agitations and other working-class fights since 1968, during

important years in Italian politics when new working contracts were
negotiated among trade unions, government, and the employers of the
largest Italian factories and corporations. Fiat in Turin and Pirelli near
Milan, as well as the huge industrial area next to Venice, Mestre and
Porto Marghera (with its chemical plants of Montedison and
thousands of workers),8 had been one of the centres of the fight
between the working class and capital – as one said at that time in
‘straightforward’ Marxist language.
Cacciari’s theory of the metropolis reflects on problems of organiza-
tion, from work and revolution to services and industrial growth, to
state and institutions. The militant practice in the factory necessarily
confronts questions of organization. Cacciari, together with others
writing in Contropiano, had given much thought to the question of the
relationship between the workers’ struggles and an institution like the
PCI, even when he was politically active outside the party and some-
times strongly critical. The debate over the PCI and the entrista position
(which favoured joining the party in spite of disagreements with its
main tenet) brought about the schism with Negri, who reinforced the
operaista, interventionist and anti-state position. Negri’s article on Marx,
in the second issue of Contropiano, was his last as he left the helm of the
journal, which continued under Asor Rosa and Cacciari through 1971.
That crucial second issue of 1968 began with an eloquent editorial
stressing the complex class situation and the necessity ‘to get rid of an
excessively unilateral vision of theoretical and political work’.9 This edi-
torial insisted on the balance between theory and action, but neverthe-
less considered the reflexive component as indispensable ‘before’
experience or political action: ‘We will continue to think that the
working-class slant on capitalist society implies, if correctly formulated,
a clear and totally demystified description of the object to be known
and a similarly clear indication to transform that knowledge into
action.’10 Knowledge and action – or theory and practice – were
perceived as equally important, but the stress on the priority of know-
ledge, description and analysis of phenomena implied the criticism of
an agitation for its own sake. This criticism, particularly important
coming from operaisti activists, shows a certain faith in institutional
forms and implies the recognition that the modern and contemporary

world is made of abstraction: the process of intellectualization, under-

standing and rationalization presides over all activities from economics
to politics to law to everyday life, as in the metropolitan situation where
institutions, the circulation of money, and the transformation of any
material reality into figures shape experience itself.

The question of how to relate mass movements to institutions and
institutions to mass movements was important to Contropiano’s political
exploration, at a time in Italy when the line between action and terror-
ism was to become tragically blurred. Nevertheless, Cacciari did not
romanticize the Party and its role, as he had clearly pinpointed in
public speeches, meetings and writings that there are phases and crises
in the relation between party and class movements. In Ciclo capitalistico
e lotte operaie: Montedison Pirelli Fiat 1968, he saw a radical change since
1960: the workers began to form an essential avant-garde who contested
the traditional role of the party at the moment it was losing control of
the class movement and seemed incapable of organizing the workers’
struggles.11 Cacciari wrote extensively on the workers’ movement in the
sixties, and, already in that second 1968 issue of Contropiano, previously
mentioned, in a review article on May 1968 in France, he spoke of the
difference between the situation in Italy and that in France, where the
students’ movement had been attacked by the official communist news-
paper, L’Humanité, and by the communist trade union, the CGT. Both
were stuck in an old position, a frozen institution, incapable of making
the vital link between movements and party. Cacciari focused on the
strength of the Italian workers’ movements as indispensable in deter-
mining the interactions among the working class, Party, and trade
unions. He also stressed the role of the ‘political mediation that the
party expresses at the institutional level’.12 Cacciari voiced his suspicion
for immediacy of any spontaneous agitation without organized struc-
tures, and his belief that the intervention of the party can be larger and
stronger than that of any group. The overture toward the Italian
Communist Party was clear; at the same time, within the Party, there
was openness to social forces and people capable of renewing the Party
itself.13 After the first issues of Contropiano appeared, Cacciari joined the
PCI, where the Berlinguer’s line would blow the dust off an old way of
understanding politics.
As we stood there, at the Festival dell’Unità, we had neither populist
dreams of an idyllic society nor any illusion about a subversive culture,
or a subversive use of culture. We were convinced that art and culture
have ‘an inevitable bourgeois nature’, as Alberto Asor Rosa writes in a
1968 article on Trockij and Majakovskij, where he attacked the literary

Stalinism of the first Congress of Soviet Writers (1934) as founded on

the utopia of the coincidence between the intellectual and the revolu-
tionary. He was aiming at that whole myth constantly present in the
avant-garde attitude:

In our opinion, the use of art and literature as instruments to com-
municate the political discourse should be completely rejected …
Socialism has never been necessary to make good literature. Writers
will not be necessary to make revolution. Class struggle, if it is real
class struggle and not just populist protest, peasant agitation, senti-
mental admiration for masses’ virgin strength, does not need to take
the road of this illusion. Class struggle has other voices to express
itself, to make itself be understood. And poetry cannot keep track of
it, because poetry, great poetry speaks a language where things – the
hard things of everyday strife and fatigue – have already taken the
value of a symbol, of a gigantic metaphor of the world. The often
tragic price of poetry, the price of its greatness is that what it says is
not practice, nor will ever get back to it.14
We were suspended between the heart and the brain, feeling and
intellect, the inevitable emotion of the great ethico-sentimental syn-
thesis sketched in Berlinguer’s speech, and scorn for that community
illusion, conscious as we were that there is no other reality than the
tough, tragic ‘geometrical clarity’ of the metropolis, with its endless
social and political tensions. We had no choice other than intellect, or
Verstand: we had negative thought in our veins.
In order to understand the concept of negative thought, so essential
to achieve the architecture of fulfilled nihilism Cacciari talks about in
the epilogue of Architecture and Nihilism, it is necessary to keep in mind
that the essays in this book offer an overall view of Cacciari’s trajec-
tory, from the late sixties to the beginning of the eighties, from his
Marxian-oriented investigation on the German urban sociologists of
the beginning of the twentieth century to his metaphysical inquiry
into some aporias in the work of the Viennese architect Adolf Loos. It
is necessary then to reconstruct Cacciari’s network of references. I
would say that this configuration operates in a whirling movement,
where synchronic and diachronic elements of various order clash, in
an disorderly order, as in a theatre, where the actor’s voice, the
physical presence of people and objects, the setting of the scene, the
visible and invisible work make everything come together. There is no
linear history; and, probably, intellectual history should be conceived

like a choreography constructed by the intellectual historian who

makes practical choices to sketch the puzzle that is historical analysis.
Cacciari’s choreography is formed by the political experience of the
working-class movements and the Communist Party; by the passage
from an avant-garde position to militancy in a large party institution;

by the four years of intense work for Contropiano, equally devoted to
class analysis and what would today be called cultural criticism or cul-
tural studies; by the interdisciplinary and radical setting of Venice’s
Istituto di Storia, directed by Manfredo Tafuri since 1968 and commit-
ted to a Marxian critique of ideology and of the ideology of architec-
ture. In this complex choreography made of various people and
institutions – a party, a school, a journal – at least two names are indis-
pensable: Alberto Asor Rosa, whom I have already cited, and Manfredo
Tafuri, whose importance will be stressed below. Then, of course, there
is Venice, the city and its inland, with its Porto Marghera, whose chim-
neys one can see from the Giudecca Canal, as in a De Chirico painting
where the desolate and dark towers of a warehouse or a factory are jux-
taposed with the ancient columns of a white, classical square. One can
also think of that beautiful photograph of Aldo Rossi’s floating theatre
built for the 1979–80 Venice Biennale: the theatre seems almost
attached to the Punta della Dogana, to the Salute Church, moving in
the water between the Giudecca and the Grand Canal; its roof points
to the line of ancient palaces followed by one row of wrecking cranes
and then another of industrial chimneys fading away in the sky.15
This juxtaposition of Palladio’s churches and Marghera’s factories
suggests why one of the most sophisticated and difficult theories of the
metropolis came from the city that seems most untouched by the con-
temporary world. It is as if in Venice one finds the reaction against its
mellow and touristic image, an elaboration of a philosophy that fuses
together political militancy, Adolf Loos’s hatred for ornament,
Baudelaire’s vision of Paris, George Simmel’s ‘nervous life’, and Walter
Benjamin’s understanding of anguish and shock as the basis of modern
experience. Maybe the contrast between the city in the Adriatic lagoon
and the industrial setting is so visible, so violent in the Venetian
skyline that the philosopher or the cultural critic can forge exactly
from this contrast the difference between city and metropolis, together
with the ideological construction that hides, in the very heart of the
modern mode of production and life, the metropolitan reality, while
fabricating the illusion of a city with human relationships. Venice,
small and ancient as it is, with no cars, apparently so ideal a refuge
from the hustle and bustle of today’s world, allows a powerful intuition

of modernity. Venice overcomes its physical dimension and becomes

larger than Paris, London, or New York; it becomes an allegory, as the
buildings of Paris did for Baudelaire in ‘Le Cygne’, the famous metro-
politan poem which I have already referred to, that is a splendid com-
mentary on the great works of urban renovation in the second half of

the nineteenth century:
Paris changes! but nothing changed in my melancholy!

New buildings, scaffoldings, blocks,
Old suburbs, everything to me becomes allegory.16
Real allegory
The term ‘Metropolis’ is an abstraction, an allegory, as Cacciari suggests

by using the capital letter. Today, we would say that the metropolis is
an impersonal agent. Negative thought, or the negative or negativity,
should be synonymous with metropolis, if the metropolis is correctly
understood in its total impersonal reality and in its power of abstrac-
tion. Cacciari’s philosophy of the metropolis should not be interpreted
in simple realistic terms. Of course, behind it there is the concrete
experience of Porto Marghera’s fights in the late sixties and early
seventies, but in the texts collected in Architecture and Nihilism,
Cacciari is not speaking of a specific city with precise chronology and
statistical data, even if Paris, the capital of the nineteenth century, and
the German Werkbund and Vienna at the beginning of the twentieth
century constitute clear references. Cacciari grasps, through the
concept of the metropolis, the German urban sociology of Weber,
Simmel and Benjamin, the nihilistic architecture of Adolf Loos, the real
allegory of the modern (as in L’Atelier du peintre: Allégorie réelle, the title
of Courbet’s famous painting that questions the status of pictorial
representation itself). Cacciari stresses the modern condition of a crisis
that is and should be completely assumed as the inevitable foundation
of life, experience, subjectivity itself. His work is not historical
research. His work is strictly interpretative: interpretation of inter-
pretations, illuminations and sparks that provoke a sort of general
understanding of abstractions or give keys to further readings of
important moments in the making of our modernity.
The metropolis is the reality and the metaphor of the modern world,
and also our contemporary world as Cacciari defines it: ‘the general
form assumed by the process of the rationalization of social relations’,
following the ‘rationalization of the relations of production’.17 The

metropolis implies traffic, factories, services, commercial life, market

economy, offices, administrative institutions, the state, political organ-
ization, crowds, social tensions, the constant law of the circulation of
money. The metropolis in a nineteenth-century world constitutes the
opposite of nature, the country, the village, the suburb. But some

metropolitan features were already typical of the European Medieval
city, studied by Max Weber, at the moment it forsook tribal life. The
metropolis shows the impossibility of synthesis, of the city as synthesis
where conflicts disappear or are hidden or preventively repressed, as
Cacciari states in ‘Loos and His Contemporaries’ (the second part of
Architecture and Nihilism). The metropolis defeats any community
mentality: the conservative or regressive attitudes, from family life to
the image of people coming back from work to ‘cultivate their kitchen-
gardens’, as well as the progressive ones, from the image of technologi-
cal comfort and individual freedom to the dream of mass liberation
and to the vision of Venice as unique city in the world. Any progres-
sive attitude becomes backward because, in spite of its futuristic
glamour, it dreams of old types of relationships among people.
Cacciari’s militant experience in the factory could not but help his
formulation of the political problem of the metropolis as capitalistic
system and site of social conflict. The factory experience would offer
ground for reflection within a review whose aim was to present ‘Marxist
materials’. Contropiano was committed to political and theoretical rigor
in ‘an epoch of deep change’, as the political situation of western
Europe’s working class was transformed by ‘the breaking off of the
Soviet system and the global return of the European working class to
the revolutionary front’.18 (This was written more than 30 years ago.) In
that rich, exalting, ‘multiple and contradictory class situation’ that
‘manifested itself at several levels’, the review stressed its working-class
point of view, while ‘facing an extremely vast gamut of interests’,19 pro-
viding therefore a thorough critique of ideology from economics, to
working-class history, architecture, urban planning, literature, film and
philosophy. Contropiano insisted on its negative role, centred on the
destruction of bourgeois culture yet refusing the illusion of constructing
a working-class culture; in the political language of the time, when we
spoke of the ‘bourgeoisie’ and ‘working class’, the editors of the review
refused to be hampered by ‘any exclusive discourse’ and planned to
offer various hypotheses and themes of research.20
In those exhilarating years of political confrontation and intellectual
creativity, there was no fundamental discrepancy then between
Cacciari’s article ‘Porto Marghera’s Montecatini-Edison’ and an essay

on ‘The Genesis of Negative Thought’21 (whose Nietzschean insight is

close to ‘The Dialectics of the Negative and the Metropolis’). There was
no contradiction between Asor Rosa’s readings of Lukács or of Thomas
Mann, and the militant political and economical articles on the trade
union, the Party, the salary contracts, and the class composition. One

could continue the list, showing that it was part of the same intellec-
tual battle to publish Mario Tronti’s essays on the working class, on
extremism and reformism, Antonio Negri’s study on John M. Keynes,
and Manfredo Tafuri’s reading of Weimar and of Vienna socialist urban
planning from 1920 to 1933.
Cacciari’s philosophy of the city – or of the metropolis – was the
logical continuation of his political activity, in the double practice of
militancy and intellectual research. Asor Rosa had put it in his cutting
operaista tone, which would be a perfect antidote against what I would
call the campus illusion of cultural studies in the United States: the idea
that an academic community is politically radical because leftists fight
to introduce new fields of study and new contents in the curriculum.
In the 1966 preface to the second edition of Scrittori e popolo, Asor Rosa
clarified his position:
We were saying that the elimination of cultural battle meant for us

the full assumption of the political discourse of class … To practice
cultural analysis … is impossible – doesn’t have any sense – if one is
not capable of fully carrying on the political work that the situation
demands. We do not simply allude to the plurality of levels that a
serious movement must keep present all at once: but, in a very direct
and elementary way, we speak even of the physical simultaneity of
the two levels [of political work and cultural analysis] in the persons
themselves of the comrades-researchers.22
The plurality of levels or doubleness in physical terms, even beyond

the level of political militancy, is an almost necessary condition of
modern life, of modern subjectivity. Cacciari suggests in the epilogue
of Architecture and Nihilism that the ‘inconsistencies and conflicts’
between the seventies essays and his later work on Loos (1981) are not
as strong as they might seem at first and represent a development into
his inquiry of nihilism. I would say that they are coherent parts of an
intellectual movement centred on a plurality of levels and on a con-
tinuous acknowledgement of contradiction or breaking off. Cacciari is
even more double or multiple or inhabited by differences than any of
the well-known gurus of the late twentieth century: for almost three

decades he has been a professor in Tafuri’s Department of Historical

and Critical Analysis (previously the Istituto di Storia dell’Architettura),
an intellectual and a public political figure, back and forth from the
local to the national levels.
First, as said before, an activist in the factory at the time of the

operaisti movements, later a well-known Communist deputy in the
Italian Parliament (from 1979 to 1984), then briefly within the PDS
(Democratic Party of the Left), after the secretary, Ochetto, gave a new
direction of what was the PCI until a few years ago, Cacciari was in
1992 an independent on the left (he created the group ‘Il Ponte’, the
bridge) and is essential to the political life of Venice: he nearly become
mayor in 1990 and is a member of the City Council. Further, he has
been major of Venice from 1993 until 1998. But in order to grasp the
multifaceted mind of Cacciari, it would be enough to focus on the dif-
ferent layers of his writings. Beside the richness of his references coming
from various disciplines – from literature to economics – the most
evident scandal is his move from his early works to his later ones. Up to
Krisis (1976) his research can be defined in the terms of his commit-
ment to Marxist analysis. From Icone della Legge (1985) to his third
revised edition (1992) of L’Angelo necessario,23 Cacciari pursues a theo-
logical investigation, studying ancient Greek, Christian and Jewish texts
as well as the mystical component of Benjamin, Rilke and Heidegger.
But if one considers how important Benjamin has always been for
Cacciari, there is no scandal then, not even a conversion, because mys-
ticism and Marxism are the two halves of Benjamin’s work. There is
rather what might be called a conversation, the constant dialogue that
one work has with another, regardless of time and location.
Conversations
To insist on the theory of the metropolis is for Cacciari the full, almost
physical awareness of the fact that cultural analysis cannot eschew politi-
cal work. To insist on the metropolis means to grasp, via the urban theme
so important in Benjamin, the most basic Marxist touchstones: the
factory, capital, the cycle of money and goods, state organization as the
foundation of political economy. As Benjamin understands it, there is
continuity from factory work to metropolitan life. He compares the un-
iformity Edgar Allan Poe saw in the attire, behaviour and facial expres-
sions of the metropolitan crowd in ‘The Man of the Crowd’ to the
uniformity Marx saw in industrial labour, where in the assembly line the
workers have to move like automatons.24 The metropolis, Cacciari insists,

is a system: ‘a multi-articulated urban type – a comprehensive service … a

qualified organization of the labor force, a scientific reserve-supply for
industrial growth, a financial structure, a market, and the all-inclusive
center of political power.’25 The metropolis implies the physical space of
the big city as well as the network of ideological constructions of different

kinds around it, embodies both the awareness of urban proletariat and
the abstract dimension of work: the reality of the factory and the sophis-
ticated cycle of the circulation of money.
The theory of the metropolis, combined with the militant practice in
the factory at the time when Italy encountered its own industrial revolu-
tion through workers’ struggles, confronts the devouring strength of
advanced capital that is capable of restructuring itself on its own crisis,
the conflicts antagonizing it. The Cacciarian theory perceives crisis as
fundamental to capitalist development; then the point becomes, in
strictly militant terms, how to use it, how to make the crisis functional
to the working class and not to the capital. For the sake of cultural analy-
sis it is worthwhile identifying tendencies and formulating, as suggested
by Contropiano’s editorial in 1968, ‘a clear and totally demystified
description of the object to be known’. In this way Cacciari perceived
negative thought and its dialectics, or a negative thought in motion.
In his 1969 essay ‘On the Genesis of Negative Thought’, Cacciari
analysed Schopenhauer, Kirkegaard and Nietzsche as the thinkers of
negative thought. Their critical reading of Hegel marked the beginning
‘of a rigorous systematization of an anti-dialectical thought’.26 Cacciari
opposes dialectics and negative thought. Dialectics are historically pos-
itive, operate in a logical and temporal order, synthesize everything,
even what appears as ‘eccentric’, unfamiliar ‘to the structure, needs
and purposes of that order’.27 Cacciari states that, in contrast to this
positive side of dialectics, he calls ‘negative’ that mode of thought that
rejects the dialectical synthesis and tries to determine as central what is
eccentric, what is crisis. The philosophical analysis encompasses ideo-
logical awareness, as Cacciari continues: ‘There is no doubt that the
opposition [of what he defines, that is, negative thought] to dialectics
means the criticism of the ideological and social structure of the bour-
geois system, as well as the refusal to be integrated positively and
actively in its process of rationalization.’28 At this point there is a
switch that is not a reversal but what can be called a leap, or better a
trembling. The trembling of negative thought makes it the most
refined engine of the development of the system it wants to reject.
Negative thought becomes functional in the system exactly because it
is capable of interrogating all the non-functional – today we would say

‘marginal’ – elements that cannot be synthetically absorbed into the

system itself. Cacciari leaps to the extreme consequence: ‘Precisely
because of its negativity, of its obstinate radical refusal of bourgeois
system and ideology, the anti-dialectic thought can present itself as
ideological function of this same system.’29

Cacciari, in his philosophical investigation, was echoing Antonio
Negri’s inquiry on economy and law. In the first issue of Contropiano,
Negri launched his reading of 1929 and Keynes:
[The year] 1929 represents a moment of exceptional importance …

1929 sweeps away even the nostalgia for those values that 1917
destroyed. In the black Thursday of Wall Street, in the catastrophic
falling down of the Stock Exchange, are rightly falling the state
myths, the political myths of a century of renewed bourgeois hege-
mony on the working class … It is the end of laissez-faire … The
beginning of a new period in the history of the contemporary state is
marked by the fact that, in this already socialized world, the recogni-
tion of the emergency of the working class – and of the ineliminable
character of this antagonism – can no longer be denied… . The
capitalist reconstruction of the state is conceived on the discovery of
the radical antagonism of the working class.30
But in addition to this conversation with Negri’s analysis, Cacciari was

actually pinpointing, in what I called the trembling of negative
thought, the tragedy of any radical thought, from the political radicals
like Marx, obsessed by the fact that he had to use the language of capi-
talism, to the poetic or aesthetic radicals like Baudelaire who knew the
devouring shocks of irony.
Cacciari’s interpretation of the German urban sociologists in
Architecture and Nihilismus continues that of Schopenhauer, Kirkegaard
and Nietzsche in his early essay on negative thought. Both Simmel and
Benjamin reached the negativity of the metropolis, but at a different
level and with different implications.
According to Cacciari, Simmel grasped the metropolitan ‘nervous life’,
that disagregation of subjectivity typical of the modern. He pictured the
violence of the process of intellectualization that determines every gesture
in the metropolitan reality. But Simmel could not stand up to the most
radical consequences of what he himself perceived: at the very limit of
modern tragedy he found signs of the freedom and development of
humankind. He found the individual, and not the capitalist machine that
grinds away all possible human conditions, all possible synthesis.

Therefore Simmel operated an ideological construction, where the

metropolis ended up being human, like the community, the city, as in
the past. Close to Simmel is Lukács, reader of Simmel. Lukács perceived
the impressionistic character of the German sociologist, but missed his
negative thought on the question of tragedy. Lukács understood tragedy

as the full form of essence. But there is no essence in the negative
thought, only leaps and points of breaking off. Benjamin extends this
insight, to reveal the radical negativity of the metropolis. Together with
Benjamin, Nietzsche appears as the one who did not return to nostalgic
positions of synthesis and fully understood the inevitability of tragedy
with no hope of consolation.
Cacciari is actually interested by two positions that can be called the
almost negative one and the fully negative; or the utopian and the
tragic; or the synthetic and the radical; or one oriented toward histori-
cal continuity and one embracing crisis as the engine of changes that
defy programmatic prediction. Nevertheless, the failure of prediction
should not be interpreted as the praise of irrational forces. Cacciari is
suspicious of immediacy even in political fights, and, as a thinker inter-
ested in a critique of ideology, he rejects as ideological construction
any irrationalist interpretation even of the Romantic period – of
Novalis and Schlegel – that precedes what he calls negative thought.31
No rhyzomes, no philosophy of imagination au pouvoir (imagination in
power) in the Italian theory of the metropolis.32
The reader should then be aware that there are two types of rational-
ity or rationalizations: one positive, hopeful, sunny, even if in contact
with modern negativity, and the other one dark, with no hopes, no
nostalgia, no projects, but endlessly at work as a process of rationaliza-
tion, integrating the failure of reason into its total rationalization. As
Cacciari will phrase it in his 1980 Opposition article, ‘Eupalinos or
Architecture’: ‘The uprooted spirit of the Metropolis is not “sterile” but
productive par excellence.’33
Many rapprochements are possible, connecting the theory of the
metropolis to other important European trends of the sixties and the
seventies, fashionable in the US since the eighties. One could disregard
what I would call more internal discrepancies, and, in a sort of quick
survey of the most important theories of the second half of the twenti-
eth century, see the proximity of Cacciari’s philosophy with Jacques
Derrida’s, as if Cacciari constructed a deconstructionist thought not on
language but on the allegory of the metropolis. The Derridian input is
justified both by the emphasis given by Cacciari to difference, and by
the fact that Cacciari was introduced to Derrida’s work by his aesthetics

professor at the University of Padua, Dino Formaggio. One could also

see, in spite of the Cacciari’s short critical note against Jacques Lacan,
some affinity with the Lacanian psychoanalytical nihilism, since his
unconscious is at work exactly where the cogito fails. All these are theo-
ries of reason below degree zero, where the old reassuring rationality is

broken, and negativity colours everything with its dark hue. But there
is no alternative, no hymn towards irrational forces finally liberated
after the oppression. Such is the harsh law of negative thought.
The various authors mentioned by Cacciari would finally enter either
in the position of the quasi-negative or in that of the fully negative
thought. But Cacciari’s ability – and sophistic touch – relies in that he
is constantly juggling with that unbalanced point where one position
drastically changes into the other. The readers follow for several pages
Simmel as an example of negative thought, while Cacciari gives a voice
to his negative thought; at the same time they hear another voice com-
bined with Simmel’s – Cacciari’s voice – and they are already warned
by a few sentences here and there that the German sociologist will not
finally get to the fullness of the negative. When the reader finally gets
to Benjamin and Nietzsche, he or she is brought back to the almost
negative position by the rich debate within the Werkbund, by the
reading of Goethe, by the critique of Lukács, reader of Simmel.
Cacciari’s philosophy of the metropolis offers an insight to all those
who believe that architecture is more than constructing a building, a
complex act condensing visible and invisible political and ideological
implications, aesthetic and moral choices. Cacciari does not help those
who want to get more detailed information about Vienna or the
German Werkbund or Loos or Benjamin, although he offers a daring
interpretation of all these figures and movements, sketching what
Pierre Bourdieu would call an intellectual field where various agents
take up various positions.34 In Cacciari’s lectures and essays there
always resounds a tone that does not come from the quiet of the class-
room nor the peace of the library. Sure, one can find the obscurantism
and the love for abstract terms typical of the philosophy of the Kantian
and Hegelian tradition (of Continental philosophy), but this style
shows also the power of a cutting word or a condensed sentence that
needs to reach a conclusion when agreement is urgent to come to a
decision, to conclude a final negotiation.
Cacciari’s style does not have the political illusion of the avant-
garde: changing the world through language, or feeling different,
radical because a few oppositional stereotypes are combined with an
approved set of references and quotations. His language is broken by

the practice of political activism in the real world, and shows the exist-
ence of an untenable contradiction: the fact that there is a cultivated,
preposterous language for professors and that there are words burning
with action, loaded with work and rage, and nevertheless controlled,
intellectual in their formulation. Cacciari’s words aim at a political

effect, a cold reason overcoming the simplistic opposition of victory
and defeat, while continuing a precarious balance, veering to identify
the right targets. Cacciari’s rhetoric, perhaps even more brutal in
English, does not obey to the rules of radiant clarity and soft persua-
sion of the ancient polis. His style recaptures the spoken word in the
metropolis where there is no warmth for passions nor peace for
reflection, but the anxiety to master reality, failing which one is over-
whelmed by the traffic, the crowd, the unexpected event. In the
metropolis, unlike the polis, meetings do not take place in a reassuring
public space, but in a hall next to the noise of the assembly line, to the
acid smell of chemical products. The rhythm of metropolitan life and
metropolitan relations is embodied in Cacciari’s language, in the
spasms of allusions, ellipses, endless inverted commas and italics,
harsh German philosophical terms thrown every two lines without
translation as if they were provocatorily breaking the classical musical-
ity of Italian vowels. This language, continuously chopped in short
sentences obsessively constructed on the third person singular of the
verb to be, is disturbing, non-harmonious, violent; it carries the trace of
the harshness of metropolitan life, what Baudelaire called:
… the hour when, under the cold and clear skies,

Work is waking up, when works in the streets
Scream like a dark tornado in the silent atmosphere.35
The reader should hear in Cacciari’s difficult, nervous, broken, repet-

itive style the echo of discussions in moments of struggle, the raising
of the voice when the contractual tension comes to a crucial point; the
sharpness of a political assurance that corners those who think differ-
ently and are not as quick as the speaker; the pauses to let other people
talk, while the speaker is nevertheless thinking about his next inter-
vention in that effort of listening and at the same time mentally organ-
izing his own reply; the hammering of a conviction that must become
evident and effective in lobbying. In the fights in factories, where a
minute is money for both workers and capitalists, there is no time for
demagogic effects nor for the seduction of great humanitarian visions.
Even political rage has to be controlled, intellectual: it aims for the

metallic clarity of figures. Everything has the dryness of a contract, the

cruel logic of a negotiation under pressure, in a confrontational peak,
where no passion is allowed because it would create confusion. The
Italian autunno caldo (warm fall) of 1969, the period of violent strikes
that led to new agreements between workers and capital, left its indeli-

ble imprint in Cacciari’s style. That imprint will stay forever, also in his
later books, even if they seem so far away from the preoccupations of
the sixties and the seventies.
Architectural theory against the historiographical tradition
Cacciari devoted a section of ‘The Dialectics of the Negative and the

Metropolis’ to artistic representation, clearly leading to Loos’s architecture
of nihilism. Against any irrationalist illusion of redemption by art,36 of an
art that would finally save the world by proposing a different use of itself
or new content, Cacciari identifies the tragic dimension of some artistic
languages that do not try to eschew the negativity of the metropolis. Poe,
Baudelaire, Kafka and Nietzsche speak the language of contradiction, dis-
playing all the signs of alienation, dismissing any hope in any possible
alternative. This is the true nihilistic position, that also frames Loos’s
architecture, as Cacciari writes in ‘Loos and His Contemporaries’ (the
second essay in Architecture and Nihilism): ‘All anti-expressive, anti-
synthetical, anti-natural composition is nihilistic.’37 The repetition and
calculation of Poe’s short stories recalls that of Loos’s architectural
exteriors: they mimic the standardized production of the metropolis and
are ‘pure use value – as in the “rail-car” of the Stein house (1910) and the
house at Northartgasse (1913)’.38 That artistic choice is searching for
neither salvation nor consolation nor escape: the great, tragic forms of
the artists mentioned by Cacciari can do nothing but be analogous with
the negativity of the metropolis. They obsessively describe, present the
hard lines of alienation, in the most literal sense of the term, alius, other,
always different, never coincident with anything, never reconciled with a
supposed origin or nature.39
Poe, Baudelaire and Kafka are also some of the writers on whom
Benjamin concentrated in constructing his reading of the effects of
metropolitan life on human perception and everyday life.40 The line
from Poe to Benjamin constitutes a crucial trajectory for any radical
thought. All the texts by Cacciari collected here are contained within a
reading of Benjamin; it could be said, using a term so important in
‘Loos and his Angel’ (the third essay in Architecture and Nihilism), that
they are commentaries on various passages from Benjamin. They are

comment and not criticism, since the aim is not to explain Benjamin
but to follow the associations inspired by his texts, or fragments and
images coming from his texts.
There is a modern Italian trend in the twentieth century that caught
and even enhanced the European dimension of urbanization and

metropolitan life: Giorgio De Chirico’s metaphysical cities and squares;
Mario Sironi’s urban industrial landscape; Alberto Savinio’s enigmatic
irony; the architect Sant’Elia’s buildings that seem to belong to a
science-fiction film; Italo Svevo’s novels where the tormented inhabi-
tant of Trieste lives all the contradictions of the modern. The list could
continue, stressing Italo Calvino’s mathematical literature, forged by
the logic of metropolitan life. It would impossible to leave aside the
feeling of harsh metropolitan emptiness and uprootedness that derives
from Aldo Rossi’s Fontana di Segrate, or from many of his sketches
where all natural dimensions are perverted, where a coffee-pot is as big
as a building. Or one can think of the totally unnatural, stony scenarios
of Massimo Scolari’s paintings.
This important Italian anti-organic, metropolitan tendency fiercely
opposes the construction of a little Italy(!), a Strapaese41 totally immersed
in village life, peasant, petit-bourgeois reality, pathological provincialism.
The peasant type of Italy is imbued with a populist ethos that has a
nineteenth-century origin, when Italy had a huge historical delay in its
economic and political development compared to England and France.
The peasant type is also the image of an agrarian Italy that corresponded
to the fascist economic plan, the populist vein of fascism as well as a
left-wing populism attached to the image of the national-popular. In his
complex reading of Antonio Gramsci in Scrittori e popolo, Asor Rosa
pin-pointed the paternalistic position of Gramsci, who himself insisted
that the new literature cannot but be historical, political and popular:
It must tend to elaborate what is already existing, polemically or in

whatever other way; what really matters is that it should be rooted
in the humus (earth) of popular culture, as it is, with its taste and
inclinations, etc., with its moral and intellectual world, even if it is
backward and conventional.42
The debate on Italian populism, on its conservative and progressive

forms, is extremely complicated, and offers an interesting case for some
crucial questions in cultural analysis, such as national identity, canon,
popular culture. Asor Rosa often suggests venturing ‘in a very delicate
but tantalizing area of experimentation’, that would question the

substance itself of the Gramscian vision.43 Any Italian radical enterprise

cannot but oppose the myth of origins, roots, countryside, nature. It
must reject the motif of the organic, wherever it comes from, even the
leftist thought of Gramsci, whose most simplistic slogan is that the
intellectual must be organic.

The theory of the metropolis, its non-nostalgic negativity, its
favourite references from Paris, capital of the nineteenth century, to
Vienna, capital of the beginning of the twentieth century, express very
well the multicultural frame of mind of a technological age; at the same
time they reject the sentimentalism, the tears, the countryside and the
rural dream of two or three centuries of Italian literature. This ideology
seems to go on and to please the most conventional, folklore image of
Italy: Giuseppe Tornatore’s film Cinema Paradiso, cited at the Cannes
Festival in 1989, is one example. This sentimental and successful film
reinforces a nostalgic view of simple, pre-industrial community life in a
Sicilian Village, while some Italian metropolitan films are completely
unknown outside Italy, such as Ricky Tognazzi’s Ultrà, or Marco Risi’s
Meri per sempre (1989) and Ragazzi fuori (1991). Tognazzi presents a met-
ropolitan and violent Italy in his story of young hooligans going from
Rome to Turin; Risi depicts a desperate Palermo. For the two directors
the metropolitan dimension does not simply rely in the story about
urban realities, but also in the formal rhythm of the film itself, mimetic
of the nervous, fragmented life of the metropolitan experience.44
Fredric Jameson, in his 1985 article on Manfredo Tafuri, entitled
‘Architecture and the Critique of Ideology’, pin-pointed the peculiar
blend of the Italian weariness with the Gramscian vision: ‘There are, of
course many reasons why radical Italian intellectuals today should have
become fatigued with the Gramscian vision, paradoxically at the very
moment when it has come to seem reinvigorating for the Left in other
national situations in Europe and elsewhere.’ Jameson, who criticized
Tafuri for his ‘stark and absolute position’, proposed a position that
‘may be called neo-Gramscian’, recalling ‘the “organic” formulations’ of
the classical Marxian text.45 Jameson is fully aware of the Italian reac-
tion against the ‘institutionalization of Gramsci’s thought within the
Italian Communist party’, and suggests that Gramsci is assimilated, ‘in
the Italian context, to that classical form of dialectic thought which is
everywhere repudiated by a Nietzschean post-Marxism’.46 But Jameson
prefers to read Tafuri within the frame of mind of what I would call a
general history of Marxist thought, not within the frame of mind of a
theory of the metropolis, which I consider the indispensable perspective
to approach both Tafuri and Cacciari.

The theory of the metropolis uproots any organic nature, any humus,
any belonging, just as architectural theory, as developed at the Venice
Department of Critical and Historical Analysis, breaks through com-
fortable divisions of disciplines and through habits of thought. In this
perspective it has its historical reasons within Italian culture; it cannot

be locked into a deterministic pattern and should be seen as a con-
ceptual device that allows one to rewrite history – or the history of
architecture, or the analysis of the work of a single architect, such as
Adolf Loos.
The notion of the metropolis is not static like a thematic category,
but rather has the dynamic movement, the nervous life of a work-in-
progress. Lewis Mumford, for example, collected examples of cities, but
he did not construct a theory of the metropolis.47 Or, to cite another
example, Raymond Williams uses the theme of the country and the
city to explain different phenomena: this opposition identifies a
tension present in many cultural attitudes of the West.48 The opposi-
tion of country and city has an almost positivistic calm, it serves the
purpose of ideological analysis, always present in Williams’s enterprise.
Nevertheless, Williams’s opposition does not get to that trembling con-
tradiction undermining any statement in the whirlpool of positions
continually on the verge of turning upside-down.
The notion of metropolis is neither thematic nor historiographic. It
belongs to the anti-historiographic mode of Cacciari, a chapter of what
I call a conversation with Tafuri, since conversations can be ideal, but
also part of an institutional enterprise.
Any serious evaluation of cultural studies and its institutionalization
today in many universities in Great Britain and in the United States
should consider not only the famous experience of the Birmingham
Centre for Cultural Studies,49 but also the Venetian experience of
Tafuri’s department at the School of Architecture, and the interplay
between political and cultural struggles suggested above.
I emphasize Cacciari’s collaboration with Contropiano, where Tafuri
published articles that later became well-known books, like his Progetto
e Utopia (1973) which constitutes a whole rewriting of his 1969
Contropiano’s article, ‘For a Criticism of the Ideology of Architecture’.50
Cacciari started to teach at Tafuri’s Department in the early 1970s, and
the interwoven activity of politics and culture is quite clear in the
Venetian experience. It should now be stressed how it challenged the
typical historiographic tradition of more than a century of Italian edu-
cation and academic production, founded on a linear development:
history, or the history of given discipline, understood a series of

authors and movements to be orderly and categorized according to a

seemingly linear definition of the various disciplines.
The anti-historicist stand was also taken by Asor Rosa – the editor of
Contropiano who was teaching at the University of Rome, not at the
Venice School of Architecture – in his Scrittori e popolo, which is organ-

ized around clusters of investigation: the nineteenth century, the
period between the two wars, the Italian Resistance to Fascism, and
then specific writers such as Carlo Cassola and Pier Paolo Pasolini. In
his 1988 preface, he writes that Scrittori e popolo ‘wanted to be a deci-
sively anti-evolutionist, therefore anti-historicist, and therefore anti-
progressist book.’ He then identified the link between the nihilist
attitude and the opposition to the historical mode of thinking: ‘The
criticism of History was then parallel to the criticism of bourgeois
culture, while representing its secret justification: and we cannot hide
that already at that time a substantial nihilistic attraction nourished
our anti-historical position.’51 Asor Rosa stressed his intention of ‘doing
intellectual work’, and not of continuing ‘a cultural tradition’, and
even less that ‘particularly absurd form of cultural tradition, that is the
national cultural tradition, with which, hopefully, we always
succeeded in never identifying.’52
Tafuri suggests a similar anti-historical position – in the sense of
opposing linear history. His 1971 Contropiano article, ‘Austrian
Marxism and City: das Rote Wien’, starts with a complaint about the
textbooks of history of modern architecture: Hitchcock, Zevi and
Benevolo ignored the ‘historically exceptional episode of Vienna’s
social-democratic administration, between 1920 and 1933’.53 Tafuri
notes that only in political history, or in specific works on that
Viennese period, can one find documentation on that event, forgotten
by the history of the discipline. In his seminal 1968 book Teorie e storia
dell’architettura,54 Tafuri makes a clear stand on the question of modern
architecture and the ‘eclipses of history’ – such is the title of the first
long chapter. He criticizes much of the historiographical tradition,
what he called, in a preface to the second edition, the ‘worn out ideal-
ist historicism’, and even the ‘watered-down official Marxism’, of
Lucien Goldmann and Galvano Della Volpe. Here he aims, as in
Progetto e utopia (published in English as Architecture and Utopia: Design
and Capitalist Development), to question the idea of architecture itself,
always presented as if it were an untouchable reality, an eternal value
and not an ideological construction, an institution, a contingent
reality. He specified that the term ‘ideology’ meant structure ‘of the
false consciousness that intellectuals offer to the ruling classes’.55 Later,

moving towards a more Foucaultian understanding of history, he

modifies this straightforward Marxist definition, and reads architecture
and its languages as discursive practices that forge reality. But, beyond
the Marxist tone or within it, Tafuri already indicates in Theories and
History of Architecture a different way of writing history, that rejects the

paradoxically non-historical mode of linear history.56
In the above-mentioned article on Tafuri, Jameson stresses the three
different perspectives in which he thinks Tafuri’s work should be exam-
ined: the Marxist context in which it was produced, the context of a
contemporary event at a global scale, and the discursive form in which
Tafuri works. The Marxist context is that trend of contemporary
Marxism that repudiated ‘what the Athusserians called Marxist
“humanism”’, in which Jameson includes ‘very specifically its “Utopian”
component as symbolically represented by Marcuse and by Henri
Lefebvre.’57 Jameson calls this trend post-Marxism and places within it
the French nouveaux philosophes and ‘Tafuri’s collaborator, Massimo
Cacciari’. Jameson also perceives ‘some kinship with T. W. Adorno’s late
and desperate concept of a purely “negative dialectics”’. 58 The vaster
contemporary event, which has American equivalents, is ‘the critique of
high modernism, the increasingly omnipresent feeling that the modern
movement itself is henceforth extinguished.’ Finally, the perspective of
Tafuri’s form – that is, historiography (or better: narrative history) –
confronts Tafuri himself ‘with the problem of writing history, and in
this case of writing the history of a discipline, an art, a medium.’59
Jameson understands the dilemma that the writing of history poses
to anyone who wants to do more than ‘small-scale semiotic analyses
of discrete or individual text or buildings’, referring to the well-known
‘crisis in narrative or story-telling history since the end of the nine-
teenth century’.60 At the same time, he aims at the description of the
postmodern condition as the determining feature of the Tafurian
dilemmas, all the more so since Tafuri himself did not even mention
postmodernism. Jameson does not miss the formal quality of Tafuri’s
work, and, in a cogent analysis, compares Tafuri’s Architecture and
Utopia, Adorno’s Philosophy of Modern Music and Barthes’s Writing
Degree Zero:
What the three books I have mentioned have in common is not

merely a new set of dialectical insight into literature, but the prac-
tice of a peculiar, condensed, allusive discursive form, a kind of
textual genre, still exceedingly rare, which I will call dialectical
history.61

Nevertheless, Jameson’s wish to give the correct ideological formulation

of Tafuri’s work, pushed him to rush to the labels post-Marxism, post-
modernism. These terms can categorize an episode and indeed can be
clarifying, but they imprison an intellectual effort in definitions that
paradoxically reinforce the linear, historicist approach of what Jameson

himself could not help calling ‘the history of contemporary Marxism’,
even if he grasped the rare achievement of what he calls ‘dialectical
history’.62 In other words, I think that rather than emphasizing the
Adornian kinship, Tafuri and Cacciari are to be placed into the
Benjaminian project, or in the conceptual tension of the metropolis.
The stand against linear histories implies another historical choice:
rereading the past with a clear concern for the present situation – the
present from which we are looking at the past – and trying to read the
past in that dramatic moment in which events produce the ephemeral
spark of their own brief present. But these events are intense and compli-
cated by a network of personal intentions, failures of those same inten-
tions, institutional struggles, historical memory and oblivion, and
conscious and unconscious factors at the collective and individual levels.
How could this complexity be contained in the simple sequence of events
told by linear history, in the notion of an authorial chronology of works
and places, or in the notion of an intellectual movement with a series of
names? To give a sense of the type of history that rejects historicist
flatness, one could quote Benjamin’s ‘Thesis on the Philosophy of
History’, where he discusses the French historian Fustel de Coulanges as
the prototype of nineteenth-century positivistic history, what in France is
called histoire historisante. Benjamin criticized this approach:
To historians who wish to relive an era, Fustel de Coulanges recom-

mends that they blot out everything they know about the later
course of history. There is no better way of characterizing the
method with which historical materialism has broken. It is a process
of empathy whose origin is the indolence of the heart, acedia, which
despairs of grasping and holding the genuine historical image as it
flares up briefly.63
Benjamin defined historicism as being without theoretical armature

and culminating in universal history: ‘Its method is additive: it musters
a mass of data to fill the homogeneous, empty time.’64 Tafuri rejects
this homogeneous time, and conceives his history and theories of
architecture on what Benjamin called ‘a constructive principle’, typical
of materialistic history.

Only an understanding of intellectual work as ornamental limits the

role of technique to that of mere embellishment. Only ‘the indolence
of the heart’ leads to the belief that history is an accumulation of data.
The way in which the object of investigation is chosen, composed, pre-
sented, even mistreated, makes a difference. Benjamin, in his ‘Thesis

on the Philosophy of History’, phrased this other type of investigation
with the words that can sum up a whole direction of research typical of
the second half of the twentieth century, where history and theory are
interwoven:
Thinking involves not only the flows of thoughts, but their arrest as
well. Where thinking suddenly stops in a configuration pregnant
with tensions, it gives that configuration a shock, by which it crys-
tallizes into a monad. A historical materialist approaches a historical
subject only when he encounters it as a monad.65
It is in this anti-historicist mode of understanding history that I

propose to read Cacciari and Tafuri. In the first section I presented an
epoch, an endeavour, and a place that, in my opinion, are indispens-
able background for reading Cacciari’s Architecture and Nihilism, and in
the next section I shall examine the intellectual presence of an institu-
tion, the University of Venice’s Department of Historical and Critical
Analysis.
The shock of history
In 1975, when Cacciari published in Italy the essay ‘Loos and his
Contemporaries’, the Department of Historical and Critical Analysis
was in what I would call its golden age: it had a definite profile and a
publisher, Officina in Rome, where Cacciari published both Metropolis
and his study on Loos.66 The Department played a clear role within
Venice’s School of Architecture, representing an interrogation on the
architectural profession itself, an end to the illusion of producing thou-
sands of architects who would have the opportunity to build. The
Contropiano ethos left its mark in academic research, in the work ori-
ented towards the critique of architectural ideology, such as The
American City: From the Civil War to the New Deal (La città americana:
dalla guerra civile al New Deal, 1973), which brought together four
essays by Giorgio Ciucci, Francesco Dal Co, Mario Manieri Elia and
Tafuri, all of whom taught in the department. The preface of the
American City shows both the type of non-historicist historical

commitment as well as the work of the critique of ideology (which

obviously challenges historicism):
What, in effect, we have discovered with our research, is not a

differing history but certainly another history [of the New World] …

Our efforts have been directed at demonstrating how the levels of
integration of cultural products and ideologies are based not only on
an implicit vocation but also on a well defined complex of techniques,
which, in its turn, is even partly shaped by the intellectual production
as a whole. The direct transformation and utilization of ideology and
culture as a technique – even where the ideology is the most regres-
sive, the culture weakest, and the technique least evident – appears to
us the most important fact to emerge from our studies.67
Against the additive method of historicism, this book also concen-

trates on blocks and clusters, as in Tafuri’s History and Theories. For
example, in the first chapter, ‘Modern Architecture and the Eclipse of
History’, Tafuri identifies a crystallized moment, a moment of shock
where the problem of history and the negation of history emerges
well before twentieth-century artistic avant-gardes with their typical
rejection of history. The moment chosen by Tafuri is the Tuscan
fifteenth century. A new image of Brunelleschi emerges: far from
rooting him in the architectural tradition of an unbroken classical
antiquity, Tafuri shows how the architect dehistoricizes the language
of the past by translating historical values into the present, founding a
new language on fragments of the classical world. The quotations and
allusions of Brunelleschi were aiming at constructing a new reality,
and therefore burnt away their historical value. The churches of San
Lorenzo and Santo Spirito and the dome of Santa Maria del Fiore are
‘autonomous and absolute’68 architectural objects that break the order
of the medieval city.
But the shock is not simply provided by Brunelleschi, as if Tafuri
were moving from a historicistic analysis to a formalist-linguistic
approach. The shock is produced by the double movement of dehis-
toricization offered by Brunelleschi’s symbolic system as well as by
what Tafuri calls ‘the philological rehabilitation’ of Alberti’s De re
aedificatoria. Brunelleschi and Alberti faced each other as two poles of
historiography: the first represents a conception of the past as usable
for the present and disembodied from its connection with antiquity,
whereas the second represents a heroic vision of the past as evasion of
the dullness of the present.

Similarly, Cacciari’s essay ‘Loos and His Contemporaries’ in Architecture

and Nihilism culminates in the two poles of Loos’s ‘Roman’ period and
the seminal house attributed to Wittgenstein. The reading of Loos and his
contemporaries is a monad, a crystallized moment where Cacciari per-
forms his critical construction. Cacciari’s essay is not a monograph,

neither historical nor philosophical, but what Benjamin calls ‘a configura-
tion pregnant with tensions’. The first tension is the notion of the
metropolis as seen in the first essay ‘The Dialectics of the Negative and
the Metropolis’, which gives the constructive principle where tensions are
incessantly at work. Cacciari couples Loos’s essays of the early twentieth
century with the journalism of his friend Karl Kraus: together they consti-
tute a thorough criticism of the German Werkbund and the Viennese
Werkstätte. Cacciari focuses on that period at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century where two avant-gardes – the Vienna Secession and the
‘negative’ group of Kraus and Loos – seem to represent two poles: the
community utopia and the full consciousness of metropolitan alienation.
The community utopia, represented by two architects of the Secession,
Joseph Hoffmann and especially Josef Olbrich, is based on the illusion of
recuperating a use-value of work: handicraft labour appears as a pure
quality escaping the alienation of exchange-value. The reader will find in
‘Loos and His Contemporaries’ arguments that continue to draw on the
basic features of utopias, like the idea that the artist is a free creator and
can be emancipated from the horror of money’s circulation and the loss
of human quality that it implies. Loos’s attack on ornamentalism has
nothing to do with a stylistic attack, Cacciari insists, but rather emanates
from the metropolitan awareness, the metropolitan logic, his refusal to
look for a lost world of use-value.
As usual, Cacciari is interested in the point of instability where intellec-
tual positions shift or are ambiguous, what he sometimes calls ‘unre-
solved dialectics’ – as when he discusses the architect Otto Wagner, who
insists on the importance of the functional aspect of architecture and
opposes the art of building to style. ‘Wagner’s critique of the idea of the
garden city’ is a critique ‘of the city as an image of community’.69 But
the metropolitan ideal of Wagner is to liberate the metropolis from the
vampire of speculation through artistic form; in this way he can be
reintegrated in the ideology of the Werkbund, the Werkstätte and the
Viennese Secession.
In his reading of the Ringstrasse, Carl Schorske offers a similar inter-
pretation of Wagner and of what Cacciari calls his unresolved dialec-
tics, ‘from the “tattooed” house, the Majolikahaus of 1898–1899, to the
building of the Neustiftgasse; from the autumnal, floral, almost

Olbrichian interiors of the first Wagner villa, to the perfectly apparent,

comprehensible space of the Postspaarkasse.’70 Schorske stresses the
link between Klimt and Wagner, who called the painter ‘the greatest
artist who ever walked the earth’.71 If Klimt’s search for the modern
man ‘was essentially Orphic and internal, a quest for that homo psycho-

logicus who had already emerged in the literature of the early 1890s’,
Wagner’s search presented a different type of modern man:
An active, efficient, rational, modish bourgeois – an urban man with

little time, lots of money, and a taste for the monumental. Wagner’s
metropolitan man suffered from only one pathological lack: the
need for direction. In his fast-moving world of time and motion,
what Wagner called ‘painful uncertainty’ was all too easily felt. The
architect must help to overcome it by providing defined lines of
movement. The style of Klimt and the Secession helped Wagner in
this efforts.72
Whereas Schorske follows Wagner’s movements from the primacy of

function to his commitment to the symbolic language of the Secession,
Cacciari sees in Wagner the discrepancy between his understanding of
functional architecture and his Secessionist tendency to worship art. The
difference between Schorske and Cacciari lies in the form of their
research. Schorske confronts the dehistoricization of modern man in his-
torical terms: his analysis of Klimt, or Wagner or Freud is concerned with
a chronological accuracy and situated in the most precisely reconstructed
network of cultural exchanges, friendships and beliefs. Here one can find
not the flatness of historicism, but a genre of comprehensive research
where personal, institutional and political histories are fused within a
closely argued textual analysis of written as well as visual and musical
materials that always shows the contradictions of intellectual pro-
grammes, intentions and realizations. I would say that the actors of the
Viennese Secession are present, as present as concrete realities: the
Ringstrasse becomes the physical centre of the confrontation between
two artistic generations, and the tension culminates in the figures of
Camillo Sitte and Otto Wagner, ‘the romantic archaist and the rational
functionalist’ who ‘divided between them the unreconciled elements of
the Ringstrasse legacy’.73
Cacciari, on the other hand, obsessively moves all the characters of
his early twentieth-century Vienna on the conceptual grid of the
metropolis. This grid twists any biographical continuity and narrative
structure towards the impossible, unreachable, devouring point that

would be the achievement of the metropolis – or the completion of

nihilism. Cacciari couples Wagner with Loos in a comparison where
Loos appears as the one who grasped the multiplicity of languages of
the metropolis and its necessary distortions, from which it will never
be liberated because these distortions are ‘inherent in the language of

the Metropolis’.74 But Loos is not the last term of the metropolitan
tension, as Wittgenstein constitutes the other extreme of the response
to Wagner’s unresolved dialectic.
Cacciari’s thesis rejects the historiographic tradition that simplifies
Loos as a rationalist or proto-rationalist architect.75 Cacciari is aware of
Loos’s unresolved dimension, of his ideological switch after the First
World War that might have increased the tendency to include his work
in the category of rationalism. Up to a certain point the discrepancy
between the exterior and the interior of a building parallels the multi-
plicity of languages of the metropolis. But after the war, the conflict
between outside and inside becomes more and more directed to the
recuperation of the ‘artistic nature of the interior’.76 At this point
another monad comes onto the scene, the way already prepared by
glimpses and allusions, when Cacciari speaks about Loos’s logico-
philosophical attack on the Werkbund. Wittgenstein, one of Loos’s
contemporaries, is already present, in the words and production of the
architect – as Kraus is part of the same struggle against ornament
fought by Loos. But toward the end of Cacciari’s essay, Wittgenstein
returns as an architect, as if philosophy materialized into architectural
forms. How could a historicist history of architecture pay attention to
this episode, so small – one house built by a philosopher, a capriccio
that does not fit with the orderly sequence of buildings, architects,
movements and styles which fill the homogeneous time of historicism?
But within the structuring notion of the metropolis, in a history
concentrated on tensions, the Wittgenstein house, Oikos, constitutes a
culminating moment. The terrible silence of Oikos – a theorem in ‘its
impenetrability and anti-expressivity’77 – is coupled to Loos’s notion of
Roman architecture as similar and yet opposite. In spite of his lucidity in
understanding the metropolitan condition and criticizing his contempo-
raries at the beginning of the century, in spite of the blunt difference
between the exterior and the interior of his buildings, the later Loos, in
his reading of Roman architecture, according to Cacciari, brought a
dimension of sociality: ‘From the Romans, says Loos, we have derived the
technique of thought, our power to transform it into a process of rational-
ization.’78 Technique and time are values: technique is transmitted and
confirms the temporal trajectory expressed by ‘from’. Architecture has a

value within public life. At the other extreme, Wittgenstein’s house never
looses its quality of being a theorem, ‘infinitely repeatable, infinitely
extraneous to all value – but also infinitely unicum’.79
The city of scrambled alphabets

In ‘The Dialectics of the Negative and the Metropolis’ the concept of the
metropolis culminates in a totally assumed negativity – such as that of
Benjamin or writers like Poe, Baudelaire and Kafka. In ‘Loos and His
Contemporaries’ the concept of the metropolis reaches its highest point
with the multiplicity of languages – an argument Loos fully grasped.
Cacciari writes that Loos does not see art as transcending handicraft and
industry; his emphasis is ‘on the mutual “transcendence” of all these
terms: that is, on the functional multiplicity of the languages.’80 Cacciari
continues: ‘To separate means to set in conflict; not to establish abstract
hierarchies of value but to measure-calculate specific differences, on the
basis of specific functions as well as specific histories and traditions.
Where the Werkbund imagines bridges, Loos posits differences.’
Cacciari warns against what could be called the postmodern tempta-
tion, even if he never uses this term, either in the 1970s or in the
1980s. He suggests that it would be completely wrong to interpret
Loos’s multiplicity as compositional eclecticism:
What is most important here is not the variety of languages but their
common logical reference: the need for every element and function
to formulate its own language and speak it coherently and compre-
hensibly, to test its limits and preserve them in every form – to
remain faithful to them, not wanting idealistically or romantically to
negate them.81
Exactly because of this, ‘in the regressive atmosphere of the post-war

period’,82 Loos’s Chicago Tribune project can be seen as Tafuri (quoted
by Cacciari) describes it: as ‘a polemical declaration against the
Metropolis seen as the universe of change’, ‘a paradoxical phantom of
an ordering outside time’, and at the same time an incredible attempt
of control, a ‘total possession of the compositional elements’.83 Loos is
testing the limits of languages and functions. The Chicago Tribune
project is not a divertissement, which would be an eclectic explosion, a
game, a fantasy. What Tafuri calls its gigantic and pathetic will to exist
‘in the face of the Metropolis’ represents the awareness of what
happens to languages when they are not preserved, when one does not

remain faithful to them. In his Scientific Autobiography (1981), Aldo

Rossi, another reader of Loos, could not help thinking of Loos in New
York, at the very moment he grasped the truth of the equivalence he
had posited between city and architecture ever since his Architecture of
the City:

New York is a city of stone and monuments such as I never believed
could exist, and on seeing it, I realized how Adolf Loos’s project for
the Chicago Tribune was his interpretation of America, and not of
course, as one might have thought, a Viennese divertissement: it was
the synthesis of the distortions created in America by an extensive
application of a style in a new context.84
Rossi insists on the importance of the Chicago Tribune project in his

preface to Loos’s essays, and considers Loos’s piece on that competition
together with Ornament and Crime essential to the understanding of
architecture in general:
This latter piece is to my mind particularly pertinent today, at a

time when ‘postmodernism’ is being praised with the same
superficiality and the same arguments as modernism was: with
everything packaged into a discussion of form – forms which
‘change as quickly as a lady’s hats’. For Loos the experience with the
Chicago Tribune competition is a decisive one. In this experience he
measures himself against the classical world, the great architectural
works, and the American city, which made such a deep impression
on him … While European modernists were getting excited about
the constructions of Wright, dreaming about who knows what sort
of exotic democracy, Loos was resolutely exploring the streets of
downtown New York, amazed at the dark, immense buildings of
Broadway and the perspective offered by the buildings of Wall
Street. The beauty of this nucleus of American business struck him
in much the same way that the beauty of aristocratic and capitalist
London had once struck Engels.85
For Cacciari, the multiplicity of languages is an important motif in

‘Loos and His Contemporaries’, the second part of Architecture and
Nihilism, but it does not become a practice until the third part, ‘Loos
and His Angel’. Here Cacciari doesn’t just announce the multiplicity of
languages, his own text is this multiplicity. One may think of his refer-
ences not as simple notes but as conversations with Benjamin, Scholem,

Kraus, Loos, Rilke, Heidegger, Derrida, Levinas, Canetti, Agamben,

Severino, Savinio, Tafuri, Schmitt, Lou-Andreas Salomé and others; or,
in other terms, most of the mental adventures that made the twentieth
century. Cacciari uses all the languages of the twentieth century, from
political and legal thought to mysticism and religion, from the investi-

gation of the foundations of Western metaphysics to the practices that
resist the aporias of thought, from the persistence of a long rationalist
tradition to its fragmentation, its feminization. Because the metropolis
is finally all this: the immense effort to rationalize and the defeat of
reason; the place of exchange-value, of the circulation of money, and of
their opposite, the intimacy, the non-circulation of Lou’s buttons,
which she collected as a child, or the patient artisanal work of Joseph
Veillich, Loos’s friend, on whom the architect wrote what Cacciari calls
some of his ‘most beautiful’ pages.86
Surprisingly, after the insistence on Loos’s criticism of the
Werkstätte’s nostalgic attitude, of their handicraft ideal of quality
objects in the epoch of exchange-value, Cacciari discovers another
Loos who ‘tells us with what patience and endless care Veillich worked
at his furniture’.87 Should one see in Cacciari’s interpretation a conver-
sion from the hardness of the theory of the metropolis to vernacular
and to tradition, as if an organicistic faith had corrected his previous
position? Should one see in Cacciari’s essay a move similar to the one
that took place in architecture, going from what Robert Venturi has
called the moral rigour of the Modern Movement88 to that eclectic,
pluralistic, quotational mood of so-called postmodern architecture?
Did negative thought become postmodern, did it become a written
divertissement, after so much political and theoretical commitment?
It would be misleading to suggest that there is a contradiction between
Cacciari’s two texts of the early 1970s and ‘Loos and His Angel’ (1981).
One should be patient and reread this text – patient like Loos’s Viellich,
or like the reader Nietzsche longs for at the beginning of the Genealogy of
Morals, a reader who would have ‘the skill to ruminate’. There is a strict
logical movement that leads from Wittgenstein’s Oikos to a further
reading of the Viennese philosopher and the entire beginning of the
century in Vienna: between ‘Loos and His Contemporaries’ and ‘Loos and
His Angel’ Cacciari wrote his crucial work on Vienna, Dallo Steinhof
(1980). Or one should proceed with Cacciari’s texts as we are supposed to
with Loos’s buildings, going from an exterior to an interior that does not
try to accommodate the exterior, but is different, and different at every
moment. That Loosian gap, with no hierarchy between the exterior and
the interior, already participates in the multiplicity of languages. One

should always keep in mind the passage cited above about the Loosian
multiplicity of languages, the need that every element has to formulate
its own language, ‘to test its limits and preserve them in every form – to
remain faithful to them’.89
The multiplicity of languages inevitably poses the problem of tradition,

and of ‘being loyal’ to it. In the section of ‘Loos and His Angel’ called
‘Being Loyal’, Cacciari stresses Loos’s insistence on tradition. The
Michaelerplatz is an attempt to solve compositional questions, as Loos
said, ‘in terms of our old Viennese masters’.90 Loos’s view of tradition
stood as a criticism of the creativity of the architect, ‘the architect as dom-
inator’91 wanting to establish the hegemony of one meaning over the
others. Wittgenstein talked about the absurdity of a single language that
pretends to represent the world, and Loos’s craftsman does not impose
the unicity of a language; he does not create but rather interrogates. He
continuously questions ‘language as a combination of linguistic games, a
repetition of the assertion that to speak of one language (or of one game)
is mere abstraction’.92 And Cacciari continues: ‘Language is tradition, use,
praxis, comprehension, and the contradiction existing among the various
openings onto the world.’ All this means transformation.93
This logic of transformation – as Cacciari notes in his epilogue –
rejects any idea of overcoming, or rearrangement of elements in hierar-
chical order. The thought of multiplicity, difference, and transforma-
tion had already appeared in a 1977 essay by Cacciari on Deleuze and
Foucault. Here Cacciari criticizes a fundamental naturalism in the con-
ception of desire as formulated by the two French philosophers,94 and
ends his discussion opposing another understanding of games to their
conception of desire as game. A ‘game’ for Cacciari does not corre-
spond to the liberation of desire, to its totalizing image. A game ‘shows
the new space of the multiplicity of languages’ as well as ‘the plurality
of techniques and the conventional character of their names’. A game
requires rules that were not invented but assumed, transmitted. Only
by recognizing this cruel conventional – not natural – structure of a
game is it ‘possible to affirm its transformability’.95 In order to trans-
form, it is necessary to know the rules, not to have the ‘indecent pre-
tense’ to create the game.
Cacciari indicates in ‘Loos and His Angel’ that Loos’s craftsman
represents exactly the link between game and habit, knowledge of the
rules and new combinations:
The deeper one’s participation in a game, the more these openings

issue from practice itself, from habit. The truly present has deep

roots – it needs the games of the old masters, the languages of

posthumousness. This tradition therefore does not unfold from
book to book, drawing to drawing, line to line, but follows the long
detours, the waits, the labyrinths of the games among the lan-
guages, among linguistic practices.96

‘Loos and His Angel’ insists on the idea of the game, which was also
important in Cacciari’s investigation on Wittgenstein in Dallo Steinhof,
the text that bears testimony to Cacciari’s will to pursue research in
manifold directions: ‘The possibility of variants are immanent to the
game – otherwise the rules of the game will be sublimated in new ideal
forms, in new Invariants.’97
Nothing could be farther away from Cacciari’s concept of games
than postmodern free association and immediacy, that mode in which
some architectural productions or critical productions freely quote,
patching together pieces from here and there without listening to their
specific languages, without being loyal to them.98 Against any fanciful
chattering stands the severity of a desperate transparency that does not
communicate – such as the glass of Mies van der Rohe, or of Loos’s
American Bar, completely different from the glass Scheerbart talked
about, enthusiastically foreseeing a new glass civilization.99 In his
reading of Mies van der Rohe, Cacciari wrote:
The sign must remain a sign, must speak only of its renunciation of
having value – and only by means of this renunciation will it be
able to recognize its true functions and its own destiny: only a
language illuminated by its own limits will be able to operate.100
Clearly the renunciation of the farce of value, great synthesis, and free
fantasy go together with the consciousness that any construction –
written or musical or visual or architectural – is an assemblage of parts.
It is worthwhile to cite again, as Cacciari does, Mies van der Rohe’s
wish that building should ‘signify truly and only building’, and his
conviction that ‘the building is an assemblage of parts, each of which
speaks a different language, specific to the material used’.101 Tautology
and vernacular are at the extreme limits of language.
The fleeting gaze of the angel
In that Nietzschean meditation on the writing of history that is ‘The

Historical Project’, the preface to The Sphere and the Labyrinth, Tafuri

also faces the question of the multiplicity of languages, and warns

against the danger of wirkliche Historie (real history): to conceive
history as recognition, that is to say on the presupposition that there is
a unity of history, ‘based on the unity of the structures on which it
rests, on the unity, as well, of its single elements’.102 Then Tafuri quotes

Foucault and his cruel ‘will to knowledge’ that does not allow the con-
solation of universal truth. But Tafuri also warns against the other
danger, undoubtedly very strong today, that the awareness of multi-
plicity again becomes the reconstitution of some unity:
The danger that menaces the genealogies of Foucault – the genealo-

gies of madness, of the clinic, of punishment, of sexuality – as well
as the disseminations of Derrida, lies in the reconsecration of the
microscopically analysed fragments as new unities autonomous and
significant in themselves. What allows me to pass from a history
written in the plural to a questioning of that plurality?103
Tafuri is the historian who knows what I would call, borrowing from
the terminology of architecture, the historical material, the various his-
torical materials, their nature, limits, characteristics, resistance, ability to
endure time. Tafuri is aware of the importance of the historical project,
the calculations that ensure its realization, and the artisanal work – the
giochi di pazienza, game of patience, as the historian Carlo Ginzburg calls
it – required to put together the historical puzzle. Tafuri explores the risks
of every position, the questions one should ask of the material and the
work – patiently, endlessly, sensitive to the necessity of adjustment, con-
tinuously adding nuance to the reciprocal input of theory and practice, of
documents and concepts. What really matters is the ability to listen to
the voice of transformation, to dare to change – that’s the only way to be
truly loyal. One should not be astonished therefore that Tafuri’s research
in the 1980s, such as his Venice and the Renaissance,104 seems to have
abandoned the cutting edge of Marxian analysis and adopted the mode
of investigation typical of the Annales School. Moreover, an accurate
understanding of the conceptual direction that the Annales School gave
to historical analysis is inconceivable without that questioning of institu-
tions – and the institution of history – coming from Marxism.105 In a
1985 article Tafuri posed the terms of the problem:
If one wants to grasp the complexity of the relational network of con-

temporary art, it is better to give up the simplistic mode of traditional
classifications, or at least recompose in another way its divisions. A

history of architecture that would replace this same history in its social
and political context, will give little importance to purely linguistic
phenomena and will reread texts and documents in the light of
mentalités history.106

The point is not to be imprisoned in an orthodoxy that sticks to dog-
matic formulas that are reassuring in their fixity. This is the profound
lesson of Benjamin.107 There is no abandonment of the initial positions
of Theories and Histories in Tafuri’s research of the 1980s, which shows
the influence of mentalités history. On the contrary, there is the loyalty
of a transformation. One of the founding fathers of the Annales, Lucien
Febvre, rejects linear history as strongly as Benjamin does. It would be
enough to quote Febvre’s paradoxical and emphatic exclamation
against what Benjamin would have called acedia and what Febvre
called the ‘intellectual laziness’ of the historicist mode:
The Past does not exist, the Past is not a given data. The Past is not a
collection of cadavers nor should the historian’s function be that of
finding all these cadavers, giving them a number, taking pictures of
each one of them, and finally identifying them. The Past does not
produce the historian. It is the historian who gives birth to
history.108
Cacciari writes that, for Loos and Kraus, ‘the past is transformed into
the vision and hearing of a living, incessant questioning – into a
problem par excellence’,109 but they never seek in it an ‘eternal image’.
If Tafuri adopts the patience of the historical work, Cacciari follows the
Benjaminian investigation of history, as the entire third part of
Architecture and Nihilism is inspired by Benjamin’s famous image of
‘Angelus Novus’:
A Klee painting named ‘Angelus Novus’ shows an angel looking as

though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly con-
templating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are
spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned
towards the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one
single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and
hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the
dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing
from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that
the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him

into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris
before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress.110
This passage, never fully quoted by Cacciari, is a constant reference;

it can be said, in the words of Nietzsche, to be an aphorism that

‘stands at the head of that essay, and the body of the essay forms the
commentary’.111 Tafuri, the historian, firmly looks into the debris of
history, into its blinding whirl; Cacciari, the philosopher who has
been deeply touched by Heidegger’s questions, traces the movements
of the figure of the Angel. He follows its image, and writes an
enigmatic commentary on it.
The passage from the first essays in Architecture and Nihilism to ‘Loos
and His Angel’ is marked by the movement away from the language of
critique of ideology – even if this language was never compact, unique, as
in Cacciari’s passages on Loos interiors and exteriors, that fully belong to
the mode of art criticism; or by the last pages on Oikos that defy any
definition of genre, and, like the best passages of ‘The Dialectics of the
Negative and the Metropolis’, burst out in a sort of sharp poetic brevity.
Cacciari does not reject or condemn the language of the critique of ideo-
logy but rather perceives its function, understands that it is a language
among others. Studying Wittgenstein in Dallo Steinhof, Cacciari focuses
on the crucial difference between philosophy and mysticism. Philosophy
stumbles on the ‘fetishism’ of showing and describing the world as it is,
while the mystical ‘shows from inside the limits of possible proposi-
tions’.112 Cacciari is fully aware of the dream ‘of an immanent and forever
alert “criticism of ideology”’, as he calls it in his epilogue. He knows that
it belongs to nihilism, to its opposition to synthesis as well as to mere
games of fantasy. He also knows that this lucidity is part of the utopia of
nihilism, of its will to rationally control everything, to reach a fully trans-
parent, functional order. To recognize this extreme utopia means to test
the boundaries of nihilism itself, the boundaries of language, the murmur
of the multiplicity of languages.
The language of ‘Loos and His Angel’ is inhabited by multiple voices:
it is commentary. In his essay Das Andere, ‘Loos teaches by “strolling”,
by indicating, by hinting’,113 as Cacciari observes. Not unlike Loos,
Cacciari has ‘the melancholy rhythm of a stroll’, rather ‘than the insis-
tent tempo of a critique’.114 Strolling is that mode of seeing, thinking
and writing that confronts the limits, not knowing what can be anti-
cipated, not wanting to reach a conclusion. Strolling is a metaphor for
the commentary; it can also indicate the practice of the one who looks
into architectural forms, traditions and habits, wanders into space and

meanings, and reads ‘the difference existing between their present

function and their previous significations’.115
Strolling also allows the opportunity of looking at the visible, but
with an eye to the invisible, with no expectations nor solutions, as in
the initial lines of Dallo Steinhof, that seem to describe a stroll to

Wagner’s Steinhof church:
Two symmetrical rows of thoroughfares, at the foot of the Viennese

forest, lead to Saint Leopold church … Wagner’s church, at the top
of the buildings for the psychiatric hospital of the city of Vienna,
comes out of the deep green wood with its shining copper dome. It
is impossible to say what this work anticipates – it is impossible to
say what reaches it.116
In the epilogue to Architecture and Nihilism, Cacciari points out the

utopia of nihilism, the aporia of what he calls the architecture of
fulfilled nihilism. In the Heideggerian vein, he tries to reach that
uncanny point of thought where difference, flickering like a flame, can
never be grasped but sheds light in perennial movement, and therefore
no definition is ever possible as the final word, as the solution. Cacciari
forces the limits of language, with notions like the completion of the
architecture of fulfilled nihilism, that nevertheless can never be
completed. Cacciari’s style and comments emphasize the nihilistic
elements of the architecture of nihilism, inaugurated by Loos’s Café
Nihilismus. The trajectory of the theory of the metropolis brings negative
thought to the mode of commentary, mystically – not philosophically
– conceived as a plunge into the limits of language.
In Dallo Steinhof, Cacciari quotes Kraus, who says that we are at war
with language. Kraus stressed the continuous character of this fight: ‘the
limit of language is not providentially assigned to us so that we can
simply put order inside it.’117 And citing Wittgenstein, Cacciari suggested
the necessity of immersion, of ‘shipwrecking’ on the limits of language.
The Cacciarian determination to face the limits of language also means
facing the limits of the architecture of nihilism. Cacciari’s research is part
of his Heideggerian reading of Wittgenstein’s reflection on the expressible
and the inexpressible, and the almost ‘gravitational force that the inex-
pressible brings on scientific propositions’.118
But the Heideggerian investigation of language is very different
from Wittgenstein’s logic, even if it belongs to the same twentieth-
century obsession with language; it pertains to the realm of words and
their meanings. I would say that, beyond the vast literature and

debates on his philosophy and his politics, Heidegger’s influence in

our time has been an obscurantist mode of thinking, writing, asking
questions, making endless distinctions – in short, the practice of
deconstruction. It is well known how important this style has been for
Derrida, and it is clear how seminal it is for ‘Loos and His Angel’, for

Cacciari in the 1980s. It would be enough to think of ‘Eupalinos and
Architecture’, where Cacciari follows and interprets in the light of the
theory of the metropolis the Heideggerian interrogation on dwelling
and building.
In this Heideggerian sense, it would be logical to associate Cacciari and
Derrida. But one should always keep in mind a major difference, not of
philosophy, but of temperament (using Baudelaire’s term for painters),
which places Cacciari within a Catholic culture and the political mili-
tancy I discussed above. Derrida contemplates language as writing, and
has a deep suspicion of the voice, whereas Cacciari is endlessly fascinated
by the voice and oral language, precisely because of its instability, its
precarious balance, its dazzling, fleeting, ephemeral character. In a
passage from Dallo Steinhof on Schoenberg, Cacciari comments on the
presence of the text as a structural element in musical composition, and
on the emergence of the voice and song.119 Also, at the very moment
Cacciari unfolds the Wittgensteinian conception of games, his natural
tendency is to refer to the spoken word: ‘But such possibilities [of vari-
ants] cannot be described a priori: they proceed within the dynamics of
language that is contingent on the intention of the speakers – intention
that takes out of accumulated knowledge, testing, experimenting, trans-
forming it, playing with it.’120
Not a home but an adventure
The question of the multiplicity of languages cannot but be present for

someone who has studied so deeply the moment of finis Austriae,121 the
end of Austria, of the Hapsburgs’ Empire (of which Venice was part
until the unification of Italy). In an essay on Hugo von Hofmannsthal,
‘Intransitabili Utopie’, Cacciari points out that the world and the lan-
guage of the Austrian writer did not correspond to the cosmopolitan
vision of the Enlightenment, nor to a totalizing idea of Europe, but to
‘the multiplicity of languages that turn around the great Hapsburg
Reich’.122 Against a conservative reading of Hofmannsthal, Cacciari
insists on the importance of Hofmannsthal’s vision of the poet as a
seismograph, recording all the movements of the earth. This image
shows that the poet does not invent a language but carefully listens to

traditions, to their most imperceptible movements, without trying to

fuse them in a mythical unity.
One of Hofmannsthal’s themes as identified by Cacciari is that of
things and time passing, which poses the problem of the past. How can
one face this fading-away? How to look at it without falling into

nostalgia?
Time goes by, ideologies and beliefs change; institutions, people,
objects and fashions disappear, endlessly. The metropolis itself is an
image of the slipping away of everything, as Baudelaire writes in ‘Le
Cygne’: ‘Paris changes!’ A true theory of the metropolis ought to include
the many voices of the passing away, and the only non-nostalgic way to
look at it, which is to think of transformation. The response of intel-
lectual searches to the slipping away of things and time is probably a
whole history that it is yet to be written. A vast range of attitudes would
come up, from the obstinate repetitions of the same themes, concepts
and forms, to silence. One could look to Aldo Rossi’s intimist attitude
towards architecture, his melancholic nostalgia for youth and for the
great hopes of the past, and, not unlike Loos’s Veillich, his tenderness for
small things; or Roland Barthes’s bold statement that ‘intellectual conver-
sions are the very pulsion of the intelligence’.123 In that history, one
could see melancholia and will to change, fear and bluntness, oblivion
and memory, hope and regret – all those disquieting elements at the
source of a blurred line between the conservative impulse and the thirst
for the new.
How should one face the changes in knowledge, institutions, parties,
political lines? How can one resist the refusal to change of all those very
things that are changing? Where do we place our loyalty? The difference
between Cacciari’s (and Tafuri’s) position and Asor Rosa’s on these issues
should be stressed. As in a de Chirico painting, in Asor Rosa’s 1988
preface of Scrittori e popolo, there is a chilling image of what I would call
stubborn nostalgia for the past, the political life of an almost heroic past.
He insists that the operaista position does not make any sense today,
because there is ‘simply’ no class that would be able to assume that role –
and that adverb, ‘simply’, is loaded with regret. Then, addressing the
young generation, he speaks, almost in spite of himself, of the everlast-
ing validity of those past values, because everything is still, ‘as in a
station where the train did not start moving’.124 In that immobility
everything is waiting for the signal – to start all over again, to go where it
was thought the world would go, 30 years ago or more.
Cacciari, on the other side, is loyal to the theory of the metropolis –
even to its extreme consequences, with no nostalgia for something

which existed before and should be found again – because this nostal-
gia would be the ideology, not the theory of the metropolis. The con-
stitutive vigour and nervous life of the metropolis implies continuous
transformations. The are no motionless trains in stations waiting years
and years for something that will never come back again. As suggested

by Simmel, Cacciari notes that ‘modern, metropolitan life is but the
force that drives things forward toward those transformations due to
which a problem can be solved only “by means of a new problem, and
a conflict by means of a new conflict”.’125 And the metropolis becomes
the metaphor for the contemporary world: or better, it is the letter, the
concrete reality of the contemporary world, as Cacciari suggests in
‘Eupalinos or Architecture’:
We are in an era, says Foucault, in which the world is perceived as a

network that simultaneously joins juxtaposed and distant points.
This space alienates the ‘pious descendants of history’, for whom
the world was like a large street which developed different ‘mean-
ings’ through different ages. Neither does this space resemble the
hierarchical space of the medieval city, where the juxtaposition
of places referred to the ‘value’ of their respective functions.
The present-day space of the metropolis is made up of the non-
hierarchical flow of information connecting disciplines and func-
tions, of discrete aleatory currents, whose movements are not
teleologically comprehensible but only stochastically analyzable.126
In the metropolis of the present the notion of the political itself is

changing: in a 1982 essay on the concept of the left with the emblem-
atic title of ‘Sinisteritas’, Cacciari indicated that in our era the tradi-
tional vision of political parties cannot represent the concrete forces of
the political today. Cacciari started this investigation with the usual
Heideggerian questioning of words, their meanings and their visible
and invisible implications. A major influence in his rethinking of the
political is the controversial figure of Carl Schmitt, who after March
1933 became the ideologue of the Nazis.127 Schmitt is one of the most
important political thinkers who studied the relationship between the
concepts of the state and the political, and stressed, as noted by Leo
Strauss, that ‘all concepts in the mental sphere, including the concept
of “mind”, are in themselves pluralistic, and are to be understood only
from concrete political existence’.128
Against any abstract vision of politics, Cacciari proposes an immer-
sion into the concrete, open, clashing, disorderly, stochastic – in the

statistical and musical senses of this term – situations of the contempo-

rary world, which, like the metropolis, is intrinsically unstable, contin-
uously catastrophic. Neither the classic monolithic, substantialist
language of politics – in which a party corresponds to a precise, stable
ideology – nor the vision of a technocratic future based on a supposed

common scientific language can describe the continuous transforma-
tions of the contemporary world. In its open and competitive system,
there is an incessant ‘rapidity of transformation of directions’, and an
equally incessant ‘experimental mobility of strategies’.129 Even the
modes of political commitment are changing: no existential dramas of
the assumption of a belief, but an a-logical level of responsibility.
Without any political sentimentalism, the same thinker who gave
years of thought and struggle to the workers’ movements, and had
been Communist Deputy and Mayor of Venice, dared to say that the
left could get rid of its foundational myths, such as the one of ‘the
working class and its Promise’. Maybe what ‘the left’ means today,
Cacciari suggested at the end of ‘Sinisteritas’, is an acute sense of the
loss, the fading away of the very myths of the left. The pure political
does not exist any longer, nor the ‘Great Political’, but a ‘Great
Opportunism’ is possible. The political is limited by individual loci, the
contingent, the local, the plurality of the locals; the opportunist – in
the sense of grasping the opportunity – awareness of the changing of
situations and programmes.
The nervous logic of the unstable or transformable was obviously a very
important theme for Simmel, with whom Cacciari started his own theory
of the metropolis. In his preface to The Sphere and the Labyrinth, Tafuri
quoted Simmel’s essay entitled ‘Fashion’: ‘the way in which it is given to
us to comprehend the phenomena of life causes us to perceive a plurality
of forces at every point of existence.’130 To perceive tensions, antago-
nisms, the plurality of forces, to feel the incessant transformation of direc-
tions, and to listen to the multiplicity of languages, ought to uproot the
idea of belonging to a home, of dwelling, in the physical and metaphori-
cal sense. The architecture of the metropolis must be aware, beyond any
utopia of urban planning, beyond that utopia that is the idea itself of
urban planning,131 that there are no more dwellers; the politics of the
metropolis must recognize the same condition of loss of place – since
the local is not the rediscovery of a small organic community but the
epiphany of the ephemeral, the contingent, the migrant.
Simmel, although he had grasped the metropolitan condition of life,
clearly showed in his short 1907 essay on Venice what Cacciari calls
his ideological vision of the community. He opposed Florence to

Venice and seemed frightened and at the same time fascinated by the
impression of artifice he received from Venice:
In Venice one can see realized the duplicity of life … Double is the
sense of these squares, that, because of the lack of vehicles and the

narrowness of streets, look like rooms. Double is the sense of
meeting, pushing, and touching of people in the calli … Double is
the sense of life in this city – now a crossing of streets, now a cros-
sing of canals, so that it does not belong either to the earth or to the
water: and we are always seduced by what appears behind the
Protean shape of Venice, as if it were its real body … Venice has
the equivocal beauty of adventure which floats rootless into life, as a
torn flower floats into the sea. That Venice has been and will be the
city of adventure is just the most perceptible expression of the deepest
destiny of its image: it cannot be a home for our soul, but nothing
but adventure.132

7
Absence and Revelation:
Photography as the Art of Nostalgia

The pleasure that kills
Any research on photography, cinema, video and television necessarily

entails a reflection on technique.1 This reflection is not merely technical
in nature; it is also cultural since it explores the impact of such media on
the ways in which we live, think and act. In making such an assertion
one has to mention Raymond Williams, one of the most important critics
of our time, who from the 1950s to his death in 1988 worked to redefine
the meaning of culture in the post-war world. Against the conception of
culture as a given and eternal set of universal references – epitomized by
the canon of ‘great works of art’, the idea of high culture that informed
British intellectual life for almost two centuries – Williams put forward a
notion of culture which corresponded to the realities and tensions of
Western liberal democracy. In Culture and Society (1958), he wrote: ‘The
history of the idea of culture is a record of our reactions, in thought and
feeling, to the changed conditions of our common life.’2
These changed conditions of life are connected to technical advances
and therefore include material shifts as well as shifts in feeling and
thought. Any mutation is measured by our reactions to it, to its effects
on our minds and gestures. Williams believes that ‘particular changes
will modify an habitual discipline, shift an habitual action’.3 The term
‘discipline’ here can also be pushed to its academic sense, embracing
the disciplinary struggle that Williams found himself caught up in
during the 1950s and 1960s.4
What I want to argue is that one cannot trace a general history of the
study of media without taking into account photography, the tech-
nique underpinning both film and television. There can be no cinema
without photography, since, as Christian Metz notes,5 film is
150

Absence and Revelation 151
comprised of immobile images which are projected on a screen at a

regular pace and separated by black pauses resulting from the occulta-
tion of the camera by a rotating curtain. A discontinuous movement,
passing from one photogram to another, creates the impression of con-
tinuity. Moreover, as Walter Benjamin suggested in a famous essay,

photography is the technique that precipitated a radical change in the
production of the artistic object but also in our perception of the
world. For Benjamin the invention of photography marked a new
configuration in the consumption and meaning of the work of art,
since technical reproducibility ensured that art would loose its ‘aura’ of
uniqueness. The birth of photography in the first half of the nine-
teenth century accompanies the beginning of industrial mass produc-
tion and its also marks the starting-point of art itself as mass
phenomenon bringing together both the artistic object and its recep-
tion – the response of men and women in front of that object.
Therefore the spark of cultural analysis, as opposed to a supposedly
pure art history or a total critique of ideology, relies on the attention
given to the interaction between individuals and the artistic product.
Benjamin proceeds to suggest shifts in the nature of that interaction.
One has to reconstruct the initial surprise – or rejection – provoked by the
technical miracle of fixing transient images. Benjamin cites an article
from the Leipzig City Advertiser, which regarded photography as scan-
dalous on the grounds that only the artist who is ‘divinely inspired’ was
allowed to produce images. The Advertiser’s journalist wrote: ‘To try to
catch transient reflected images is not merely something that is impos-
sible, but, as a thorough German investigation has shown, the very desire
to do so is blasphemy.’6 However, Benjamin continues, after they had
recovered from this initial surprise or shock, people developed an indif-
ference to the multiplication of images in much the same way as they did
towards the proliferation of information through print – that other tech-
nique which did so much to change human perceptions of the world.
Benjamin and Williams share both a Marxist concern for the history
of technique, and that other Marxist touchstone, a vision of the nine-
teenth century as the inauguration of our modernity, of our culture,
which occurs at that point in history precisely because of the explosion
of technique and, in particular, the beginning of the mass production
of words and images. Such new techniques break with past habits and
disciplines, forging new modes of perceiving and feeling.
However, there are slight differences in emphasis between the two
commentators. Benjamin regarded journalism and photography as
being at the root of the ‘absent-minded attention’ of modern men and

women, and, in his Short History of Photography (1931), he sketches a

brief comparison between the two. Williams, on the other hand,
identifies printing as a ‘major technical advance’7 – one of the greatest
technical developments in human history that created new means of
communication – but photography which was so crucial for Benjamin

is not central for him. Indeed, in Williams’s list of the important tech-
nical advances, photography is not even mentioned:
The major advances in transport, by road, rail, sea, and air, them-
selves greatly affected printing: at once in the collection of news
and in the wide and quick distribution of the printed product. The
development of the cable, telegraph, and telephone services even
more remarkably facilitated the collection of news. Then, as new
media, came sound broadcasting, the cinema and television.8
However, Williams does suggest that, similar to the recorded voice,

photography implies the absence of people, which in turn suggests a
possible major effect of the new means of communication: that of
absence as an indispensable component of the audio-visual dimension
of contemporary life. In the attempt to show how culture today
indicates a process rather than a conclusion, he considered the
‘neutral’ or impersonal aspect of techniques:
The only substantial objection that is made to them is that they are
relatively impersonal, by comparison with older techniques serving
the same ends. Where the theatre presented actors, the cinema pre-
sents the photographs of actors. Where the meeting presented a men
speaking, the wireless presents a voice, or television a voice and a pho-
tograph… . The point about impersonality often carries a ludicrous
rider. It is supposed, for instance, that it is an objection to listening to
wireless talks or discussions that the listener cannot answer the speak-
ers back. But the situation is that of almost any reader; printing, after
all, was the first great impersonal medium … Much of what we call
communication is, necessarily, no more in itself than transmission:
that is to say, a one-way-sending. Reception and response, which com-
plete communication, depend on other factors than the techniques.9
Photography here appears as a substitute for human presence, as the

reflected image that stands at the basis of contemporary communica-
tion. The impersonality of media, of one way-sending, voices without
bodies, photographs of actors and people instead of their presence – all

these are the elements which constitute our everyday life where we
constantly face absence as the existential foundation of our experience,
from politics to domesticity.
Indeed, today (much more than at the time Williams wrote Culture
and Society), in what we call our postmodern world, we find ourselves

constantly dealing with hundreds of absent bodies. We are bombarded
by images, voices, computerized instructions, by technical glow and
murmuring, and have become indifferent to the lack of human pres-
ence that the impersonal media carry within themselves. The reception
of media is therefore founded on this almost automatic pact with
absence: in the world of mass communication, in the glimmering
metropolis of computers, TV screens, electronic devices, we act without
surprise, without missing a type of exchange that implies the presence
of interlocutors. Meanwhile the young generation has become as
acquainted with the remote control as the inhabitant of the big city is
used to traffic, automatic movements and anonymous passers-by.
The contemporary familiarity with absence is part of the process of
alienation that nineteenth-century writers such as Poe and Baudelaire
and of course later Benjamin (in the tracks of major German sociologists
such as Max Weber and Georg Simmel writing at the turn of the century)
identified as typical of the modern condition. Indeed, alienation was the
founding experience of metropolitan life. Simmel called it the nervous
life of the modern metropolis; Benjamin the interiorization of shocks –
with shock and anguish becoming such a mental habit that they pre-
ordain human perception. In his essay ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’,
Benjamin regards a poem from Baudelaire’s Les Fleurs du Mal, ‘A une pas-
sante’, as exemplary of metropolitan alienation (I commented on this
poem in Chapter 3). In the big city even eroticism is a solitary experience:
the lyrical voice tells of a sudden street scene, where a man glimpses a
beautiful woman quickly disappearing in the crowd and traffic. There is
no conversation, no human contact, only one-way communication, con-
veyed in broken sentences that cannot even hold together in the conti-
nuity of syntax as the poet mentally addresses a few words to the woman,
an anonymous ‘you’ who will never give an answer:
………………… Fugitive beauty

Whose glance suddenly made me reborn,
Will I ever see you again if not in eternity?
Somewhere else, far from here! too late! probably never!

Because I ignore where you flee, you do not know where I go
You! whom I would have loved, oh, you who knew it!10

This short and convulsive meditation on the ephemeral and the

impossible derives from the power of a glimpsing vision, of two gazes
that seem to cross briefly but fail to meet in any real encounter. The
Baudelairean gaze at the passer-by, her sudden and inaccessible glance,
epitomize a situation which is the opposite of any phenomenological

continuity, of any intersubjective exchange. The broken desire repro-
duced in the fragmented rhythm of Baudelaire’s poem, in the spasm of
its lines, suggests the reaction to the purely visual as the act of gripping
a person through the eyes, of reaching the most unconscious desire,
the barest and bluntest demand of love, for another person who is con-
stitutively absent. As vanishing image, unattainable body (as inconsis-
tent as the photographs of actors which, in Williams’s words, mark the
shift from theatre to cinema and television) the Baudelairean passer-by
is symptomatic of the metropolitan reality that brutally changed the
culture of the nineteenth century, and quietly continues to change
thoughts, feelings, desires and relationships in our contemporary
audio-visual world.
While technological advance has enhanced the effects of the
nineteenth-century metropolitan phenomenon, the alienation inherent
in the reception of mass media stands as a reversal of what we can call
the conditions of representation in the nineteenth century or in the first
half of the twentieth century. Prior to the ascendancy of the techniques
of mass communication the world was comprehended through direct
experience more than through images whereas today one can argue,
rather paradoxically, that there is more representation than material
world. Nineteenth-century artists who have been labelled as ‘realist’ had
to respond to the richness of reality and cope with the poverty of
representational means caused by limitations in particular techniques,
certainly when compared with our own technological power. Particular
forms such as the novel or painting were slow, even if an individual
artist, such as Balzac, tried to produce at a frantic pace – almost as if the
human being could follow the machine rhythm of printing. And, even if
printing in the nineteenth century did undergo major technical
advances, those transformations seem almost irrelevant compared to the
quickness of the media world.
The development of photography served to clarify the connection
between the history of techniques and of ideas – particularly anthropo-
logical and sociological perspectives. However, the study of the new
medium could not be comfortably integrated into the nineteenth-
century disciplinary structures of universities. Photography might relate
to concerns of fine art, history, communication studies or sociology, but

yet cannot be subsumed under any of these categories. How can one
really separate the concern for chemical elements reacting to the sun or
the lights in the photographic studio from the surprise caused by the
rapidity of technical reproduction, and the blasé attitude towards the
very quickness with which representations and images can circulate?

This quickness of reproduction increasingly obfuscates the beginnings of
photography when the camera caught what was present in front of it –
be it a person, an object, or an urban or natural landscape. Nevertheless,
as always when our historical memory is blackened by technical ease,
collective reminiscence is powerfully and unconsciously at work.
Consequently, I would suggest, the indifference of our electronic age is
actually built upon that inaugural surprise at the first mythical photo-
graphs, the astonishment in which, in the nineteenth century,
humankind perceived its own image in the silver mirror of the camera
and the black-and-white shades of the photograph.11
Probably one of the primary objectives of media studies should be to
stress the transformation that took place with the global holding of the
image. Such is the advent of photography, and its continuation in the
film image.
The imprint of what Benjamin called photography’s ‘here and now’ (hic
et nunc) is always there in the photographic print itself, which therefore
accomplishes the miracle of a mirror marked for ever by the outlines of
the reflected image, fixing for all time the transient reflected image. The
real presence of the photographed person, place, object – vanishing in an
inexhaustible absence, always lacking – lingers forever in the halo of
photography, as the unconscious memory of its historical dimension,
even in the most sophisticated contemporary montage and truquage,
which do not need the presence of anything in the flesh. If it were not so
why would we insist on photography’s documentary value? We see,
therefore how could we not believe what we witness as recorded in the
very place (hic), at the very moment (nunc) it happened or is happening?
The realist value of photography and televized images is exactly what
embodies the possibility of information-disinformation, the more or less
nuanced manipulation of the interplay between fiction and reality.
Michelangelo Antonioni’s film Blow-Up (1966) offers an acute reflection
on the intertwining of truth and truquage in photography. How could
photographs be falsified if they did not carry within themselves the trace
of photography’s power, of its inaugural astonishment – that is, its pos-
sibility of grasping the ephemeral moment as it happens? If the repro-
duced image is hellish and dangerous for the correspondent of the Leipzig
City Advertiser, that is because photography is a sort of ménage à trois. It is

where the object (what is photographed) and the subject (the viewer) face
themselves with a precise mental perception: the idea of a presence
turned into absence. In other terms, the object appears to the subject as
something absent (according to Sartre’s definition of the image). The
three terms, then, are: subject, object, absence. Simultaneously real and

evasive, photography, like Baudelaire’s passer-by, exists in the gap
between what it is and its reception, in that discrepancy between the
object and the subject.
The interplay between reality and absence constitutes the status of
photography. Williams understands this when he speaks of the photo-
graph of absent actors in cinema and television, while Benjamin
analysed that absence as a new phenomenon – one which is, I insist, a
variant of the situation of the Baudelairean passer-by. In his essay on
the history of photography, Benjamin did not simply reflect on the
technical aspect of photography – what could be called the photo-
graphic object – he also speculated on the reception of photography,
on the way in which the subject feels and thinks in front of the photo-
graphic object, which in this way marks its difference from art:
In photography … one encounters a new and strange phenomenon:

in that fishwife from New Haven [1843, by David Octavius Mill],
who casts her eyes down with such casual, seductive shame, there
remains something that does not merely testify to the art of Hill the
photographer, but something that cannot be silenced, that impu-
dently demands the name of the person who lived at the time and
who remaining real even now, will never yield herself up entirely
into art.12
Although written in an impersonal mode or in the passive form –

‘something that cannot be silenced, something that impudently
demands’ – what is active in Benjamin’s passage is the spectator, who,
in the moment in which he or she receives the image, cannot but ques-
tion its state of reality, and in doing so almost misses with nostalgia
that piece of reality when the person in the portrait was there, alive,
present in flesh. The spectator of photography holds the same position
as Baudelaire looking at the passer-by in the street, being in that same
situation of alienation and thirst for reality, imprisoned in that ‘impu-
dent demand’ for the real person, that eventually splits up in the many
questions of the Baudelairean voice. Benjamin continues:
However skilful the photographer, however carefully he poses the

model, the spectator feels an irresistible compulsion to look for the

tiny spark of chance, of the here and now, with which reality has, as
it were, seared the character in the picture.13
That irresistible compulsion, that ‘tiny spark’ of time and reality,

which the spectator is seeking is rather different from the famous situ-

ation of the regard de l’autre (the gaze of the other) in Sartre’s L’Être et le
Néant, when one person reaches consciousness of himself or herself
through the gaze of another human being. In a public park, two people
look at each other, they realize that they themselves are looking
because of the other, and they realize that they exist in a perfect two-
way balance. In what can be called the phenomenological stream, one
person has the sense of his or her own identity thanks to the recogni-
tion implied by the other, mirroring with his or her own eyes the
received gaze. The Sartrian scene implies the impact of physical pres-
ence, the consciousness of the self in an adult rather than infantile,
intersubjective exchange where the subject obviously has full control
of his/her own motion and language. The Sartrean action is a dual
fulfilment of the Cartesian cogito14: I look at you looking at me; we
both know that we are looking at each other. The action is slow. Time
has, so to speak, a chronological dimension between the extremes of
the ephemeral and the eternal which we are able to master.
But the passer-by episode, on the other hand, is constructed on the
overlapping of the ephemeral and the eternal and takes place in a ‘tiny
spark of chance, of the here and now’. The two gazes are irredeemably
discrepant; they never meet, their temporal dimension is, literally, that
of the twinkling of an eye, and then comes the solitude of the medita-
tion on eternity. One person watches the other; he looks with desire,
and already violent nostalgia for what is taking place as something
which will never happen. The other person is simply on the other side of
the street – she is beautiful, desirable, impossible, real and unreal at the
same time, as if her action were frozen in the intransitive verb to look,
and not to look at, a verb suspended with no preposition and neither
direct nor indirect object, or the object being so removed that it will
never be reached. The woman is an image, an optical object, and the
subject is left without one-to-one recognition, burning in the tension of
a desire that, far from being fulfilled, stands as alienation, as an anguish-
ing wish for the impossible. Desire is then flickering in a continuous
questioning (‘Will I ever see you again if not in eternity?’), to which
absence inevitably gives rise, reiterating the quest with a powerful fantas-
matic activity. The visual per se has an almost total power, and rejects the
merely physical for an endless mental visualization or representation.15

Benjamin had a clear insight into this when he briefly suggested that
photography ‘makes aware for the first time the optical unconscious’.
One can connect this with the theme of the cultural effects of techno-
logical changes indicated by Williams, and suggest that it is this very
‘optical unconscious’ which is at stake when we are the spectators of

film and, especially, television – the fragmented, sparkling, interrupted
production of images to the rhythm of the remote-control, the glim-
mering of clips. In the act of spectatorship there are subjects situated
beyond the possibility of being recognized by the gaze of the other,
anonymous viewers whose desire is enticed. We look, for example, at
Madonna’s body moving with music and song, ungraspable in the
vertiginous spasms, the jumps and cuts of the convulsive editing of
images. In this act we undoubtedly resemble the inhabitant of the
metropolis perceiving the passer-by in the middle of traffic and noise,
strained in erotic contraction: ‘And I, tense like an eccentric / Drank
in her eyes, sombre stormy sky, / The sweetness that enthrals, the
pleasure that kills.’16
Images have an inevitable pornographic character. Fredric Jameson
begins his book Signatures of the Visible (1990) by stressing the irony of
our civilization, a civilization that has transformed human nature into
just one sense, that of sight:
The visual is essentially pornographic, which is to say that it has its

end in rapt, mindless fascination; thinking about its attributes
becomes an adjunct to that, if it is unwilling to betray its object;
while the most austere films necessarily draw their energy from the
attempt to repress their own excess (rather than from the more
thankless effort to discipline the viewer). Pornographic films are
thus only the potentiation of films in general, which asks us to stare
at the world as though it were a naked body.17
The production of images is founded on both the provocation and

the boredom of pornography – the indifference we can have towards it,
even if we look for excitement. Our perception, our mind and our
senses are so used to the excess of images and their enticement, to the
naked body of the world, that there is no surprise, no possible shock,
because, as Benjamin understood, the shock is already interiorized, is
already part of our internal world, of our psychic predispositions. Our
reactions to the overwhelming world of the audio-visual oscillate
between indifference and appeal. We know that Madonna is absent,
yet we are compelled to question her reality, to desire the fragments of

her body so carefully constructed as sexual machine, as fetish. She, the

image par excellence, wants to be wanted, she is the object of
scopophilic pleasure (pleasure in looking) par excellence, shining on
that spark of unfulfilled desire posed as the condition of desire itself.
The scenario is inevitably, and abstractedly, sado-masochistic: we will

never touch her, she can go on torturing the spectators, giving
glimpses of the pleasure that kills.
It is possible to develop these thoughts into a feminist analysis of
what is at stake in vision. In her famous article, ‘Visual Pleasure and
Narrative Cinema’, Laura Mulvey argues that ‘it is woman as represen-
tation that crystallizes’18 the paradox or the tension between sexual
instinct and narcissistic identification with the image seen. She also
identified that these two crucial terms as used by Freud were ‘formative
structures, mechanisms without intrinsic meaning’.19 They could only
become meaningful thanks to a work of idealization, but their major
feature is non-realistic: ‘Both pursue aims in indifference to perceptual
reality, and motivate eroticized phantasmagoria that affect the subject’s
perception of the world to make a mockery of empirical objectivity.’20
While a thorough theory of the image would necessarily have to take
into account the question of gender (and is a type of analysis perfectly
coherent with my reading of Baudelaire’s female passer-by), this is not
my objective here. Rather, in the reminder of this chapter I will con-
sider some theoretical and historical issues in relation to photography,
and, more specifically, attempt to construct a network of concerns
around photography and image in general through the interplay of key
texts by Williams, Benjamin, Bazin, Barthes and Jameson. My aim is
not a critique of their various positions, either explicit or implicit,
which in several cases obviously lacks an investigation of gender.
Rather, I would like to highlight, within the puzzle offered by some
texts by those writers, something essential to the understanding of
photography, and therefore cinema: that is, the rapport between
absence and reality. If photographs are different from filmic images
and even more so, as Jameson suggests, from ‘the glossy images of
postmodern film’, nevertheless one cannot forget that ‘they are
technically and historically related’.21
Black-and-white is blue
We might think that photography and cinema are a part (alongside

painting) of the history or the anthropology of the idea of the real. Eric
Auerbach, rejecting any narrow academic conception of realism as a

school founded in the nineteenth century, identified realism as the

major concern of Western art from Homer to modernity. The point, of
course, is not that of identifying an eternal cultural value that would
force any human experience into a Western mould, in a sort of teleo-
logical comparative history, but rather to examine the insistence of the

notion of the real, and to ask certain questions of it. For example, what
are the different values given to the real in various historical periods
and in various geographical areas? When and how was it charged with
a particular meaning, so that it became central to the way in which
knowledge has been organized or epistemological problems posed?
How have various techniques and optical means – perspective, photo-
graphy, cinema – intersected to produce antagonistic significations?
How mutually dependent are a positive (and positivistic) and a nega-
tive sense of the real?
I would argue that, from Balzac to the contemporary critics, the
notion of the real has primary importance. Writing in the nineteenth
century, Balzac drowned in the excess of the real world – where
objects, matter, things, books, people, ideas, words piled up in an
uncontrollable quantity. But the master of the French realist novel was
already perceived by Baudelaire as a visionary. Forcing the limits of the
realist experience culminating in Balzac’s descriptions of the big
monster, Paris, Baudelaire carved out another notion of reality: an
allegorical one, where Paris became undescribable, but haunting as a
spectral presence – which is absence. Consequently Paris can be totally
identified with the mysterious woman, the ephemeral passer-by tinged
with the colour of eternity. On the other hand, it is precisely because
of the shifting meanings of the term ‘realism’ that Brecht could later
talk about another realism which does not correspond to the great
organic genealogies of the realist novel, but rather to the technical
power of montage, like in Dos Passos’s novels, or to the allegories of
Shelley.22 Neither did the thirst for the real escape the surrealistically
conceived investigations of Lacanian psychoanalysis. The hard core,
the impossible kernel of the real holds up, ineluctably tied to what is
symbolic and to what is imaginary.23
Visible or invisible, easy or impossible to grasp, full or empty, con-
crete and abstract, opaque and virtual – reality has been a cultural
obsession. In the modernist era a whole host of concepts move around
the real, allowing all the paradigms from reification to de-reification,
passing through the exaltation of the concrete, the nostalgia for the
physical thing, the search for the truth, the belief in the document, the
allegorical value of the fictional, the imprint of the symbolic. Behind

all this an old dream is lurking – the desire to be reality, to be the thing
itself, beyond the representational power of words and images. It is a
dream of blind materialism to immediately turn into the idealism of
the full thing, dispensing with the need for representation in the full-
ness of the presence of the present. God stands at the horizon, in the

divine mystery of creation. Yet how is it possible even to conceive of
such a desire for reality, without that gap that is our thinking and
speaking about it? In the moment I see reality, I am marking the dis-
tance that makes reality problematic, tingeing with absence what is
present. Such is the drama of representation. Any artistic theory –
either holding onto representation or denying it – is part and parcel of
the same drama. Hence the misery and splendour of the term ‘realism’.
In 1945 André Bazin wrote one of the most important essays on photo-
graphy, at a moment when the medium was already a century old, and
cinema half a century. In this essay, ‘The Ontology of the Photographic
Image’, Bazin established a link between cinema and photography within
the perspective of the psychological history of plastic arts. Moreover, in
his subsequent writings, including his seminal work on Italian neo-realist
cinema, Bazin established himself as one of the great interpreters of
realism. His modernist fight to endow cinema with artistic dignity is para-
doxically constructed upon what I would call a non-modernist vision of
the world. This is probably due to his Catholicism, inevitably infused
with a conception of some essential human unity and the belief in some
inner signification of things. If modernism is born with Baudelaire and
his poetics of the ‘modern’ – of the modern metropolis as the only (com-
pletely alienating) reality – then any belief which is founded on unity,
continuity, and the fullness of some spiritual experience through matter,
is inevitably idealist and non-modernist.
As already suggested, Les Fleurs du Mal continually hints at the pres-
ence of Paris, not by describing it but by showing its effects on human
perception. Baudelaire’s poems subvert the poetic idealism of a world
where nature, God and human life respond to each other in a peren-
nial harmony. The lyric poems of Baudelaire are disharmonious,
Satanic, cruel, innovative both at the stylistic level of a versification,
which did not respect traditional metrics, and at the content level,
which was striking in the scandalous choice of themes; they mark, as
Benjamin has shown, the essential cultural switch in the nineteenth
century which corresponded to the new forms of production, and to
the market economy typical of the metropolitan reality. ‘Modern’ here

means fragmentation, expressed in the very form of the other crucial

work by Baudelaire, Paris Spleen, in which the intuition of montage is
already present. The poet announces to his friend Arsène Houssaye
that these poems were conceived as segments, as pieces whose order
was irrelevant but whose rhythm corresponded to the ‘abstract modern

life’, to the broken rhythm of the modern metropolis where the
human subjects are constantly divided, constantly exposed to the
nervous life of their inner perception moulded on the nervous reality
surrounding all their gestures.
The reality of modernism is abstract where the Catholic vision of the
world is spiritual, pointing to a mysterious correspondence between
things and their meanings. However, I would argue that realism cannot
exist without some degree of allegory, because even the most flat concep-
tion of it – namely, that realism is a copy of things – must refer to some
organizing notion, such as the idea of the evidence of facts. Catholic
realism is allegorical in the sense of it being a transfiguration of some-
thing concrete into its hidden meaning, while the modernist realism –
that of Baudelaire – on the other hand, derives from an intellectual
almost mathematical operation. It refuses both description and
transfiguration but it believes in a process of idealization that turns reality
into mockery; it has the power of abstraction and deformation. The
famous poem ‘Les Sept Vieillards’ (‘The Seven Old Men’) recounts the hal-
lucination of the poet-inhabitant of the metropolis, who is convinced he
sees an old man multiplying in front of him. The poem begins with a
powerful vision bordering on absurdity:
Swarming city, filled with dreams,

Where ghosts grab passers-by at full day!
Mysteries rise all over like sap
In the narrow channels of the mighty giant.
One Morning, when, in the sad street,

Buildings, whose height was increased by the mist,
Were similar to the two embankments of a grown river,
When, like a stage setting resembling the actor’s mind
A filthy and yellow fog flooded all the space around,

My nerves stiffed like a hero’s, I followed …24
As in many of Baudelaire’s poems, if we examine this work, if we

catch its reel-movement when, in the following lines, the old man
multiplies to the number of seven, we see hallucination implanted

in the real, or one inextricably connected to the other. The modern

resides in this realistic hallucination. In painting and cinema
modernism moves towards expressionism – exactly that allegorical,
disturbed and distorted technique which perverts ‘realist’ (in the
simplistic sense) reproduction into symbolic colours and shapes,

such as those deformed buildings and that yellow fog hitting the
eyes and the ears of the reader in Baudelaire’s poem, not unlike
the violent images of Fritz Lang’s Metropolis assaulting the viewer’s
perception.
Not surprisingly, expressionism was the type of cinema that Bazin
could not stand, and against German expressionism, he fought for the
virtues of Italian neo-realism. His enthusiasm for Rossellini and neo-
realist cinema in general was founded on the awareness that the illusion
of reality given to the spectator ‘can only be achieved in one way –
through artifice’.25 But Bazin did not see a violent tension between the
epistemological and the aesthetic senses of the phrase ‘reproduction of
reality’. On the contrary, for him:
The ‘art’ of cinema lives off this contradiction. It gets the most out
of the potential for abstraction and symbolism provided by the
present limits of the screen, but this utilization of the residue con-
ventions abandoned by technique can work either to the advantage
or to the detriment of realism. It can magnify or neutralize the effec-
tiveness of the elements of reality that the camera captures.26
Technique, so important for Bazin, is at the service of reality, of the

world that cinema is supposed to represent according to the movement
of our desires. Nothing in Bazin’s writings, not even his most acute
concerns for technical devices, such as in his famous analysis of Citizen
Kane, leads to an identification of technique as that primary force
within which human beings live and change, as that breaking-point
from which a cultural jump is activated in spite of some delays in men-
tality and habits. Rather, for Bazin, technique is always an instrument;
it is never above human spiritual life.
For the spiritualist, technique is often the tangible shape taken by
human spirituality; for the materialist, technique dominates and
shapes the human. The difference between Bazin’s progressive Catholic
approach27 and the modernist-Marxist relies exactly in this value of
technique. (We know, of course, that there is a militaristic and fascist
conception of technique: it is the instrument a few people use to dom-
inate and crush other people.) Jameson, who in ‘The Existence of Italy’

pinpointed the ontological-metaphysical Bazinian project, puts it

clearly:
I am tempted to say that all technological explanation has, as its

strong function or ‘proper use,’ demystification, generally in the

service of a materialist philosophical position: de-idealization, then,
de-spiritualization in whatever sense or context, provided it is under-
stood that is not a position but rather an operation, and intervention,
whose aims and effects depend on what is being demystified, generally
the innate tendency of literary or cultural critics to an idealism of
meaning or interpretation.28
But arguably the main source of Bazin’s enthusiasm for neo-realism is

what might be called the passion for the peculiar melancholy of the
black-and-white – the historical nostalgic essence of photography, that
inescapable longing for reality imprinted in any photograph before the
advent of colour. Jameson is again full of insight on this point. Quoting
Kracauer on Benjamin, he stresses the ‘global relationship between
melancholy and the visual’.29 In the essay ‘In Defense of Rossellini’, Bazin
developed what Jameson sees as his ‘ontological’ nostalgia:
Neo-realism … is always reality as it is visible through an artist, as

refracted by his consciousness – but his consciousness as a whole and
not by his reason alone or his emotions or his beliefs – and reassem-
bled from its distinguishable elements. I would put it this way: the
traditional realist artist – Zola, for example – analyses reality into parts
which he then reassembles in a synthesis the final determinant of
which is his moral conception of the world, whereas the consciousness
of the neo-realist director filters reality. Undoubtedly, his conscious-
ness, like that of everyone else, does not admit reality as a whole, but
the selection that does occur is neither logical nor it is psychological; it
is ontological, in the sense that the image of reality it restores to us is
still a whole – just as a black-and-white photograph is not an image of
reality broken down and put back together again ‘without the colour’
but rather a true imprint of reality [my emphasis], a kind of luminous
mold in which colour simply does not figure. There is ontological
identity between the object and its photographic image.30
Bazin, within the context of neo-realist cinema, once again stressed

his thesis on photography, establishing a necessary link between neo-
realism and black-and-white, which is the kind of rapprochement we

cannot avoid now, in the era of the glamorous colour of the postmod-
ern. What Bazin called the ontological identity between the object and
its photographic image raises up in the consciousness of the spectator
like a revelation.
The idea of revelation is crucial in ‘On the Ontology of the

Photographic Image’, which begins with the precise intention to find a
continuity in a human endeavour. Photography is part of the history
of plastic arts, whose primordial human intention was the sacred battle
against death. Embalming the dead as in Egyptian religion and paint-
ing the portrait of Louis XIV both demonstrate the same human
impulse: the attempt to preserve life by a representation of life, the
need to remember, to win time through the immortal character of
form. Bazin described the tension implied in the history of the plastic
arts by way of the concept that would become his favourite theme in
film criticism: realism. The history of the plastic arts is the history itself
of resemblance or realism. A double realism glimmers through Bazin’s
argument, articulating the aesthetic and the psychological as the two
halves of the same question. Human beings are thirsty for reality and
they move between the aspiration to spiritual reality and the replace-
ment of the external world thanks to its duplication, what Bazin calls
eidolon, or image of the external world.
Bazin reveals his idealistic-spiritual vision as fundamental for human
experience. It is not that he does not see that human beings live in alien-
ation, but rather that they are perceived as going beyond their alienation,
exactly in those miraculous moments in which an ontological identity – a
coincidence – is found between the thing and its image. The spiritual
tension is a promise, a fulfilling synthesis, or a reassuring return to some
previous golden age, before the split. The history of the visual arts, culmi-
nating in photography and cinema, leads humanity to that aim.
Unlike the Marxist-modernist oriented idea of periodization which
emphasizes the new conditions of life in the nineteenth century,
Bazin’s periodization endows photography and cinema with the power
of the happy rediscovery of a more spiritual age. For him they echo
back to some miraculous balance that existed before the invention of
perspective, what Bazin calls ‘the original sin of Western painting’.
Medieval painting, in fact, is not, in his opinion, caught within the
conflict of the spiritual and the psychological, while the invention of
perspective on the other hand is the result of that conflict. This rather
obscure idea hints, I think, at the illusory and especially abstract char-
acter of the representation of reality in the technique of perspective. The
essential task for Bazin is not to represent but to re-create or create

anew. Such is the incantatory power of revelation. Niepce and Lumière

can therefore be seen as redeeming the plastic arts, freeing them from
what Bazin calls ‘their obsession with likeness’. Photography jumps
away from the original sin of Western painting, from the prejudices
with which it affected our perception of the object, and, it can be

added, from the subsequent sin of expressionism. Expressionism is in
fact connected to the a priori of perspective, because it needs to trans-
gress and deform it, and, by doing this, it reconfirms perspective’s
hegemony. Photography is silent and sober. It renounces the dream of
likeness, focusing on what can be called the existential solitude of
things and beings, their phenomenological density, their mysterious
life. Photography is, for Bazin, the revelation of the real:
The aesthetic qualities of photography are to be sought in its power

to lay bare realities [Les virtualités esthétiques de la photographie
résident dans la révélation du réel]. It is not for me to separate off, in
the complex fabric of the objective world, here a reflection on a
damp sidewalk, there the gesture of a child. Only the impassive lens,
stripping its object of all those ways of seeing it, those piled-up
preconceptions, that spiritual dust and grime with which my eyes
have covered it, is able to present it in all its virginal purity to my
attention and consequently to my love. By the power of photo-
graphy, the natural image of a world that we neither know nor can
see, nature at last does more than imitate art: she imitates the artist.31
Bazin’s argument builds up dramatically, surveying human history,

casting light on unconscious attempts and desires, sketching a com-
pelling anthropology capable of finding the dazzling emotion that reveals
the real. In that luminous moment of revelation photography moves
away from the path of the visual arts and fulfils the quest for the object,
giving the certainty that what has been photographed really existed in
space and time. On this point, Bazin’s intuition is similar to Benjamin’s,
despite their ideological differences, in that photography’s revelation is
close to Benjamin’s tiny spark of chance which I commented on above.
But who can, looking a photograph, escape that shade of the nostal-
gia for the real? In his 1980 book Camera Lucida, Roland Barthes, from
a structuralist-phenomenological perspective, reached an understand-
ing of photography similar to Bazin’s revelation (or to Benjamin’s
magic). Barthes is convinced that photography’s essence relies in the
ça a été (it has been). Following Sartre’s work on the imaginary, Barthes
insisted on the absence of the photographed object, finally realizing an

experience of hallucination that is not too far away from the revelation
Bazin talked about:
The image, says phenomenology, is an object-as-nothing. Now, in the

Photograph, what I posit is not only the absence of the object; it is

also, by one and the same movement, on equal terms, the fact that
this object has indeed existed and that is has been there where I see it.
Here is where the madness is, for until this day no representation
could assure me of the past of a thing except by intermediaries; but
with the Photograph, my certainty is immediate: no one in the world
can undeceive me. The Photograph then becomes a bizarre medium, a
new form of hallucination: false on the level of perception, true on the
level of time: a temporal hallucination, so to speak, a modest, shared
hallucination (on the one hand ‘it is not there,’ on the other ‘but it
has indeed been’): a mad image, chafed by reality.32
The startling personal experience of Barthes researching the essence

and meaning of photography culminates in the astonishment of a resur-
rection, when, after his mother’s death, contemplating (not unlike
Proust’s narrator looking at his grandmother’s picture) the photograph of
a 6-year-old girl, he recognized his dead mother as he had never really seen
her. Photography is a snapshot, in the technical and existential senses; it
catches the instant, fixing it for all time. In front of that picture, Barthes
is taken by cathartic revelation that blends the sorrow for an absence with
the melancholy beauty of time, of the time we have never lived but we
can long for in the faded light of the black-and-white image.
Discussing film history and its periodization in his essay ‘The Existence
of Italy’, Jameson rejects a simply linear or evolutionary chronology
progressing from realism, to modernism to postmodernism. He neverthe-
less considers that this ‘three terms’ trajectory is valuable ‘at a more com-
pressed tempo’,33 and, beyond the analogies between what has been
called the realist moment of film and nineteenth-century realist novel, he
faced ‘realism’ as a ‘peculiarly unstable concept owing to its simultane-
ous, yet incompatible, aesthetic and epistemological claims, as the two
terms of the slogan, “representation of reality”, suggest.’34 Jameson
follows the conceptual tension implicit and explicit in that slogan, since
the strength of representational techniques undermines the truth
content, stressing the illusory character of realistic effects, while the
simple claim of a correct representation of the world – of reality –
annihilates the very existence of an aesthetic mode of representation,
exalting a documentary value beyond the realistic artifice, or art. But, in a

very anti-Bazinian way, Jameson insists that we cannot but take into
account the conceptual instability posited by the simultaneity of the epi-
stemological and the aesthetic claims, ‘prolonging and preserving – rather
than “resolving” – this constitutive tension and incommensurability’.35
Photography is condemned to be inextricably linked with reality and

its fluctuations as it necessarily embodies the paradox of the phrase
‘representation of reality’. But Jameson perceives photography as
crucial to understanding something which is, I would say, at the basis
of any historical research – namely the paradox of history itself. Both
history and photography share a concern with the relationship of an
event to the present, or with the presence of an event beyond its
primary phenomenological appearance in that disquieting reinvention
or re-enactment or rediscovery of it – a process that combines immedi-
acy with representational distance.
Still photography remains, however, the archetypal embodiment of
this process and of its paradoxes: in it even ‘fiction photography’
(nineteenth-century mise-en-scène and costumed poses) ultimately
becomes ‘realistic’, in so far as it remains a historical fact that nine-
teenth-century bourgeois people did put on costumes to pose for such
tableaux. On the other hand, one is also tempted to say that in another
sense that there is no photographic realism as such – all photography is
already ‘modernist’ in so far as it necessarily draws attention (by way of
framing and composition) to the act by which its contents are
‘endowed with form,’ as we used to say in the modernist period.
‘Realism’, in this view, would simply consist in the space of the family
photograph and the ‘likeness’ of some sheer personal association and
recognition.36
Jameson’s major point of interest is in film history, but he must
investigate it through a reflection on photographic image and on what
I would call the ‘trembling’, or the flickering, of the term realism,
which is always logically (rather than chronologically) first, even in the
compressed sequence of realism – modernism – postmodernism.
Through photography and its use in certain kinds of cinema Jameson
perceived the nostalgic character inevitably attached to the medium.
The embodied possibility of nostalgia provokes a startling reversal:
Jameson reads Benjamin as being on the side of nostalgia, in spite of
what can sound a non-nostalgic slogan – Benjamin’s idea that photo-
graphy marked the end of art’s aura of uniqueness. In the age of video
and television, according to Jameson, we can identify in cinema a sort
of return to the splendour of the work of art, the famous aura
Benjamin saw as characterizing the artistic object before the advent of

mass production. Because of this return, the ‘good print’ of a film

acquires the value of a renewed authenticity.
Nostalgia also lingers in the immobility of photography, in the
fading away of its nuances. What separates our perception of photo-
graphy from Benjamin’s is obviously a technical aspect: the glossy

colour picture of our age that changes the meaning and perception of
black-and-white photography. This glossiness is the presence itself of
the postmodern, which can cast a nostalgic light on the melancholy
technicality of black-and-white, somewhat blurring the distinction
between realism and modernism, while marking the postmodern.
Jameson tracks down the tie with the past:
In photography, however, as Susan Sontag has pointed out, things

are somewhat different, the marks of ageing – fading, yellowing, and
the like – increase the value of a black-and-white print and heighten
its interest as an object for us. Color prints, however, merely deteri-
orate with age … The distinction is strikingly dramatized in the
Cuban film, The Opportunist! (Un Hombre de éxito, Humberto Solas,
1986), which begins with streaked and faded black-and-white
(fictional) newsreel footage of the return of the police chief figure to
La Havana in 1932, wondrously transmuted into color while the
camera pauses on the monumental interior of the palace.37
I would insist on Jameson’s perspective and reinforce his non-linear

understanding of the series realism–modernism–postmodernism, while
maintaining that realism holds a primary position and can be mapped
with different degrees of intensity and carry various values. Within his
thesis on the nostalgic character of photography, which he argues from
the standpoint of a materialist cultural history of cinema, I will draw
attention to what I call his snapshot, or photographic, method in
writing, in the sense that his argument is constructed not according to a
narrative development, but is rather a mode of writing and thinking
which escapes both the old-fashioned Hegelian analytical-synthetical
endeavour, and the postmodernist taste for a sort of random jamming
together of quotations. Rejecting any master narrative, Jameson pre-
sents neither a linear account of the history of film nor a theoretical
system nor a one-sided ideological demystification. He himself probably
gives a perfect definition of his non-historicist mode of writing through
the term ‘alternate accounts’.38 He precipitates – in the chemical sense,
as in photography – theoretical questions and cases: an interrogation of
the status of the visual, or the problem of realism blended with the

interpretation of some films or literary or critical texts. Moreover, the

cases modify their exemplary value, because they are positioned accord-
ing to different angles of vision, and trigger off in multiple clicks.
In the sequence realism–modernism–postmodernism there is no
eternal value judgement, since the logical and the chronological level

are interchangeable, and because Jameson’s aim is not to stand for one
type or school against the other – that, for example, modernism is
better than realism, postmodernism is better than modernism, and so
on. We cannot, like Bazin, argue that Italian neo-realism is better than
expressionism, because, in the age of post-capitalism, our memory
filled with films’ reminiscences, we see films that mix all categories, or
use them laterally. While there are undoubtedly moments in which its
is clear that Jameson’s battle is against what he calls ‘high modernism’,
so ineluctably tinged with nostalgia, nevertheless a very cogent
example of his research is the reading of Antonioni’s Blow-Up, a classic
in self-reflexive modernism because of course its subject is the mod-
ernist art technique par excellence – photography.
Jameson writes that photography is ‘already a philosophically “exist-
entialist” medium, in which history is subject to a confusion with
finitude and with individual biological time; and whose costume
dramas and historical records are therefore always close to the border-
line between historicity and nostalgia’.39 But he can never be said to
advocate the cause of a triumphant and perfectly liberatory postmod-
ernism, one which would finally get rid of history and its melancholia
in the splendid glossiness of coloured images. For he understands too
well the pressing question:
Is this then to say that even within the extraordinary eclipse of his-
toricity in the postmodern period some deeper memory of history
still faintly stirs? Or does this persistence – nostalgia for that ulti-
mate moment of historical time in which difference was still present
– rather betoken the incompleteness of the postmodern process, the
survival within it of remnants from the past, which have not yet, as
in some unimaginable fully realized postmodernism, been dissolved
without a trace?40
Jameson is always aware that any ‘strange form of vision has formal
and historical preconditions’.41 Take for example his comments on the
postmodern insight at the end of Blow-Up: whether ‘by fulfilling the
realist ontology – that is, by revealing Bazinian realism openly as
ontology (and as metaphysics) – it can be seen as the inauguration of

all those non-ontological impulses which will take its place and which
we loosely term postmodern’.42
Perhaps the borderline, that ‘borderline between historicity and nos-
talgia’ Jameson talks about, is inevitably there in the term ‘inaugura-
tion’ (which recurs often in his essay to indicate the input of certain

works). To invoke this idea of inauguration places one in the stormy
position of Angelus novus, Benjamin’s angel of history, which I dis-
cussed at length in Chapter 6. The angel’s face is turned towards the
past, while he is violently pushed forward by a storm, which ‘is what
we call progress’.43
The term ‘inauguration’ is charged with the momentum of a surprise,
and points to the paradoxical position of all who cannot believe in the
high modernist phenomenon of avant-garde, who reject any idealism of
progress, of history conceived as progress, but nevertheless understand
that techniques are framed by history and that our collective uncon-
scious struggles with the debris, the remnants of the past. We critics
remain at the borderline, like spectators of photography who inevitably
look for that ‘here and there’ of the thing, the event, the theory,
knowing that what we have is an image, a piece of what Jameson calls
an ‘alternate account’. The borderline between historicity and nostalgia
is imprinted as in a black-and-white photograph in the very form of
writing – black on white. Consequently, perhaps the only coherent post-
modern position would be to give up writing altogether, to dissolve our
bodies in gleaming letters breaking the flux of images. By writing we
cannot avoid some lingering between historicity and nostalgia.
Nostalgia is not exactly nostalgia for the past; nostalgia is not only
conservative (I would venture that the conservative type is not nostal-
gic at all, just moralizing about contemporary evil). There is also the
ontological nostalgia of Bazin; the phenomenological variety of
Barthes; and something I would call radical nostalgia, which is an
impossible nostalgia for the future coloured by the past, as well as for
the past readable only through the wind of its future. Radical nostalgia
refers to the longing for the ça a été in the moment we face images,
being inhabited by endless conjectures. Barthes felt this while looking
at an old photograph of 1854: Charles Clifford’s ‘Alhambra’ – an old
house, a porch, a deserted street. Barthes felt he wanted to live there:
This longing to inhabit, if I observe it clearly in myself, is neither

oneiric (I do not dream of some extravagant site) nor empirical (I do
not intend to buy a house … ); it is fantasmatic, deriving from a
kind of second sight which seems to bear me forward to a utopian

time, or to carry me back to somewhere in myself: a double move-

ment which Baudelaire celebrated in ‘Invitation au voyage’ and ‘La
Vie antérieure’.44
But the ‘alternate account’ is at work. Barthes’s perception is openly

inscribed in Baudelaire’s modernism, in his interrogative and fantas-
matic meditation about time in ‘A une passante’. Nevertheless, this
double movement of being carried backward and forward in time is
symptomatic of some decentring, which is our historical condition,
our situation when we try to make a point on historical events –
exactly what Jameson has perceived as the paradox embodied in pho-
tography, the tension between immediacy and the representational
distance which prescribes some re-enactment of what happened.
Benjamin, on his side, seized history’s tension, this double movement,
through the expressionist violence of Klee’s painting.
But the condition of our thinking and being in the world today is
decentred, or – using the concept Jameson suggested in his brilliant
interpretation of Antonioni’s Blow-Up – ‘lateral’:
There is a crucial structure of laterality at work here (demonstrable

elsewhere in contemporary literature), by which perception or experi-
ence requires a kind of partial distraction, a lateral engagement or
secondary, peripheral focus, in order to come into being at the first
place. The empty common is therefore not an image in any of the full
or even post modern senses of the word … Indeed, in these supreme
moments the screen defeats the Gestalt structure of normal percep-
tion, since it offers a ground with a figure, forcing the eye to scan this
grassy surface aimlessly yet purposefully in a spatial exploration that is
transformed into time itself: there is nothing to be seen, and yet we
are, for one long lost instant, looking at it, or at least trying to.45
Thanks to Jameson, via the ideas of Bazin, Barthes and Benjamin, I

believe that the technical strength of photography can be perceived
today in something other than the medium itself, but something
which carries the effects of that theory/history of photography I have
attempted to sketch in this paper. Writing takes place today in the
world of cinematography. To write in a certain way is not simply a
question of style: I would even say that it is not simply a question of
writing but also of seeing. Photography, cinema, television are in our
blood. The point is not just that of writing about contemporary media,
giving dignity to them, in the way Bazin fought a battle against a

stifling culture, pushing for the dignity of cinema. It is to write today

within the world of media, and to write theory or criticism with the
rhythm of media. Perhaps the crossed roads of photography, cinema,
literature and criticism will launch us back to the crucial debate on
photography which neither Barthes nor Bazin could fully articulate,

since they were too busy searching for the real. Photography and
cinema, like language, and writing itself, anchored in the figurative
element, are driven into the symbolic world; they display the immense
hieroglyph of a collective mirror stage, of the identification of a plural
alienating imago, of a fiction line that puts the image at the crossing of
symbols and reality. But did not Bazin get close to this insight by
ending his essay on photography with the bare sentence: ‘On the other
end, of course, cinema is also a language’?46
Only the snapshot can help: there is no theory today that flows in a
linear narration. Intermittence and intervals cannot be ignored; they
offer new beginnings, another montage, another use of pieces where
reminiscence is displaced into another meaning, and continuously
decentred and decentring. Jameson offers a perfect example of his crit-
ical writing and a successful postmodern use of quotations in his essay
‘On Magic Realism in Film’. Interrupting his concern with history with
the consideration of some Latin American films and literary works, he
suggests the importance of colour in postmodernism and focuses on a
long quotation by Lacan concerning the distinction between the eye
and the gaze. Lacan’s point in the original passage (on Zeuxis’s grapes)
had the purpose of illustrating the Freudian concept of instinctual
drive. But here Jameson displaces its theoretical input into his own
argument – which is akin to the rotating curtain of the succession of
photograms, moving on to another element: a wonderful quotation
from Pablo Armando Fernandez’s novel, Los Niños se despiden, about
colour, where the whole spectrum of multiple colours is nuanced ‘in a
wide and varied register from almost pure white to jet black’.47
Photograms are at the basis of the filmic image. We must work like the
protagonist of Blow-Up, with a host of shots, made and unmade by
history, following the snapshots of language, of writing. We must be able
to write – and to read – with the remote control, following pieces of dif-
ferent stories and histories at the same time, ‘laterally’, nevertheless
knowing where we are, in a sort of dense, nervous journalism – aimlessly
yet purposefully. Distracted and concentrated at the same time, we must
see, in writing, through writing, the ‘signatures of the visible’ that shape
our everyday experience, and condition the making of our experience
and existence in the mass-media metropolis of our contemporary world.

8
The Image versus the Visible: From
Baudelaire’s The Painter of Modern

Life to David Lynch’s Lost Highway
Human perception in our contemporary world seems to be increas-

ingly visual.1 The overwhelming presence of the visual calls for a type
of experience where physical sensation and the immediate feelings
connected with it are constantly solicited. The richness of the visual is
boundless: the gaze dominates every human activity. Cinema has
magnified the power of the gaze. One need only think of Michael
Powell’s Peeping Tom (1960): the protagonist is obsessed by the camera,
and his voyeurism turns him into a serial killer. According to Fredric
Jameson in Signatures of the Visible, contemporary civilization ‘has
transformed human nature into this single protean sense, which even
moralism can surely no longer wish to amputate’.2 Media are the
instruments of an ‘all-pervasive visuality’; films ‘are a physical experi-
ence, and are remembered as such, stored in bodily synapses that evade
the thinking mind’.3
The argument developed by Jameson is constructed very generally
on the basis of a Marxist approach. On one hand the inescapable
presence of capitalism turns the visual into an addiction which
bypasses the thinking mind: it is the most contemporary form of alien-
ation. On the other hand, only a historical analysis can help us to
resist this process: ‘This book will argue the proposition that the only
way to think the visual, to get a handle on increasing, tendential, all-
pervasive visuality as such, is to grasp its historical coming into being.’4
Against Jameson’s proposition I shall argue that aesthetic experience
itself furnishes the resistance Jameson has in mind, and always has
done. It is there that we find what Jameson calls ‘other kinds of
thought’ capable of replacing ‘the act of seeing by something else’.5
These different kinds of thought are actually already present in
aesthetic apprehension, or more precisely in an aesthetic experience of
174

The Image versus the Visible 175
high quality. While considering some of the assumptions of several

modern or contemporary critics, this chapter will focus on the analysis
of two examples which show an unexpected similarity: Baudelaire’s
aesthetic principles and David Lynch’s aesthetic implications in Lost
Highway.

It is probably time to rethink the whole problem of aesthetic value
and stop being afraid of evaluating works of art as good or bad, even if,
of course, in the free-market society under capitalism, the art-object
circulates like any other product (as Jameson reminds us in the first
chapter of Signatures of the Visible, ‘Reification and Utopia in Mass
Culture’). If production affects aesthetics, this does not mean that the
appreciation of aesthetic values has to be completely condemned.
High-quality aesthetic experience calls for a type of attention that
resists the absolutism of consumption. Historical analysis can indeed
get to grips with the increasingly addictive power of visuality as such,
but philosophical reflection is equally urgent, reflection which can
overcome the simple opposition between the radical consciousness and
the so-called ‘traditional aesthetic philosophy’.
While emphasizing the ‘force of application’ of the theory of
reification so important to Max Weber and the Frankfurt School,
Jameson insists on the contrast between this new notion and the tradi-
tional definition of art as ‘a goal-oriented activity which nonetheless
has no practical purpose or end in the “real world” of business or poli-
tics or concrete human praxis generally’.6 But disinterested contempla-
tion is not the sole or even the most important tradition of aesthetics
and, crucially, there is more than one traditional aesthetic philosophy.
Two contrasting attitudes can be identified in Western thought: one
separates the world of emotions from the world of reason (der Geist,
spirit; die Vernunft, the intellect); the other insists that emotions and
thought are inseparable, and that both are part of the Geist. The first
attitude is found in the Kantian tradition and is still popular in philos-
ophy and theories of culture; the second goes back to Shaftesbury and
his heirs, and to Austro-German philosophers influenced by Brentano,
such as Robert Musil. It is time to consider this philosophical tradition
seriously in the field of aesthetics, too. The study of the rationality of
emotions has been an important achievement in the last 20 or 30 years
within analytical philosophy, political philosophy, ethics.7 From this
perspective, the artistic product can be appreciated as having a critical
power comparable to that revealed by historical analysis.
The consequences of Kantian dualism are unfortunately widespread.
In philosophy, the irrationality of emotions is often taken for granted;

while in literary and artistic works the obsession with feeling and the
heart has created, and continues to create, much confusion. Finally, in
everyday life the identification of emotion with strong, merely physical
impulses (sex and violence) seems inescapable and hides many subtle
affective phenomena. The overrating of the sentimental is typical of

the nineteenth-century Western romantic attitude (for example,
German Romanticism, the English romantic poets, the American
Transcendentalists or Chateaubriand8). Even the Freudian and post-
Freudian concentration on drives and instincts helps to make many
affective phenomena invisible, since drives are nothing like as rich as
the infinite gamut of emotions.9 Some contemporary critical fashions
which cultivate obscurity, jargon and an overall nihilist flavour also
derive from old dualist habits. Postmodern criticism – whether enthusi-
astic or negative – is often based on an anti-rational impulse, anti-
logocentric (to use the canonical term) response, with a simplistic
association of reason and bourgeois cultural hegemony. The opposition
between low and high culture is often based on the division between
the heart and the head, the rational and the irrational.
Against all these sharp, simplistic divisions, the analysis of the work
of art, its effects, and its composition as a form, can offer an alternative
to the all-pervasive visuality of today’s world. The work of art and the
aesthetic experience can actually oppose the divorce between body and
mind, while revealing the strong link between rationality and emotion.
The Marxist postmodern approach of Jameson simply presupposes
the two separate realms: on one side, the sensationalist, addictive,
completely physical and totalitarian domination of sight; on the other
side, fully rational behaviour within the process of rationalization in
commodification. Here the forms of human activity ‘are instrumentally
reorganized and “taylorized,” analytically fragmented and recon-
structed according to various rational models of efficiency’.10 But a
proper understanding of the imagination and its activity through
different works of art can clarify the real interrelation between the
emotional and the rational. The work of imagination participates in
that specific emotion, which is the aesthetic emotion, as well as all the
emotions that are represented by the work of imagination itself. A
work of art does indeed represent something – a claim all the struggle
against representation which has preoccupied avant-garde criticism
over the last 30 years has not overturned. The aesthetic approach
understands representation not as a way of reinstating the concept of a
supposedly stable reality simply reproduced by art, but, rather, as
something capable of suggesting models of human mental behaviour.

Imagination, even in its most specific expressions, is a faculty imply-

ing human emotions and mental mechanisms that are not separated
from the rational, even if they are unconscious (in the sense that they
do not depend directly on the will). Imagination can elucidate several
aspects of human behaviour in general. Here I would like to draw

attention to Gilberto Freyre who, in several of his many editions of
Casa-Grande e Senzala, talked in a similar vein of the value of art. He
speaks of his pioneering work in sociology and anthropology as similar
to that of Picasso in plastic arts. He concentrated on the study of
‘human behaviour, both the primitive and the civilized, the rational
and the irrational’.11 He mentioned also the examples of Marcel Proust
and Henry James whose fiction is ‘sometimes the equivalent of a social
history that could be also a scientifically psychological history’.12
Human behaviour is in his opinion both objective and imaginative.
The re-reading of Freyre can help today’s theory and criticism to
maintain some distance from the approaches of the 1960s and 1970s,
and their postmodern re-enactment. The recent massive rejection in
European universities of the study of literature and art – as is clearly
evident in the treatment by systems of public funding of the humani-
ties – often assumes the uselessness of art. But the analysis of aesthetic
experience shows that it is not solely concerned with some supposedly
specific and autonomous realm of art. An important assumption of an
aesthetic approach, in line with Walter Benjamin’s The Work of Art
(1936), is the belief that we can understand more about society, con-
temporary or not, if we look at ways of imagining human behaviour,
understanding and feeling. It seems a matter of particular urgency to
understand the value of the imagination in today’s cyberworld as a
conscious resistance against the devaluing of images, since, paradox-
ically, the effect of the frantic post-capitalist circulation of images is
profoundly iconoclastic:13 images do not mean anything any longer.
Understanding works of the imagination can clarify the dangers of
complete human catastrophe described by several thinkers, such as
Guy Debord or Paul Virilio. In a world of spectacle where images
become the ultimate objects of consumption, a reflection upon art
should accompany the historical perspective suggested by Jameson.
The main assumptions of postmodern criticism inevitably lead to the
complete loss of a structuring principle, for example the assumption
that the victory of commodification is total (so total that even the
rationalizing principle of reification is completely debunked: as in
Schumpeter’s vision of capitalism, where reification grows beyond any
control). But the analysis of aesthetic experience shows that emotional

and intellectual life is an open bundle that is nevertheless structured

rather than scattered at random – because some artistic objects, while
embodying in their form and content the commodification process to
which they inevitably belong, nevertheless avoid being entirely dis-
sipated by it, and focus on the interplay between the rational and the

irrational, openness and structure, the head and the heart. When
Freyre talks about Picasso’s unitary art (‘arte unitaria’), he means pre-
cisely such holding together as opposed to all scattering. He finds, in
fact, that in spite of the dismembering of human bodies in his paint-
ings, Picasso shows a strong sense of unity.
In the internet age, commodification has reached a level of globaliza-
tion that even the most futuristic thinkers of the postmodern condi-
tion could not fully foresee. Jameson has suggested, following Guy
Debord’s The Society of the Spectacle,14 that ‘the ultimate form of com-
modity reification in contemporary consumer society is precisely the
image itself. When we buy the new model car, we consume less the
thing itself than its abstract idea, open to all the libidinal investments
ingeniously arrayed for us by advertising.’15 But, as we know, along
with the negative visions of a society of all-pervasive visuality, there
are some thinkers who express enthusiasm for its liberating qualities.
Gianni Vattimo, for example, criticized the utopia of a transparent
society dear to Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel, pointing out the
positive values of the non- transparency of the society of spectacle. The
technological society is non-transparent because it is manipulated by
power, since technological development constitutes the object of pro-
paganda and of the conservation and enhancement of ideology. But
Vattimo’s non-transparent society is also a world where reality takes on
a soft and mobile character, where experience is marked by constant
change and the ludic attitude is pervasive.16 The chaos of the non-
transparent mass-media society, he tells us, is not a phenomenon to be
opposed or rejected; on the contrary, such chaos comprehends the very
change that makes possible the liberation of minorities. The new form
of human experience in the non-transparent society is to be the key to
cultural pluralism.
The general aesthetic approach as well as the examples discussed
below argue against both the tragic pessimism of Debord and the
floating free-associations of postmodern experience. Some artistic pro-
ductions involve a critical power which does not correspond to the old-
fashioned radical avant-garde hope of total subversion. Some works of
art are consciously shaped by the contemporary circulation of images
but resist fashionable views of that circulation. They might illustrate

what Jameson calls ‘the anti-social and critical, negative (although not
generally revolutionary) stance of much of the most important forms of
modern art’.17 But these works of art embody the rejection of the
Kantian dualism between reason and emotion. They manifest an
important affinity with some of Baudelaire’s major intuitions about

modern art or with some of the main ideas of Robert Musil.
Baudelaire’s works obviously furnish the classic example of many
modern aesthetic principles; let these illustrate what I have called the
‘aesthetic approach’. Baudelaire felt the need for art to respond to the
modes of life of the present, which meant metropolitan life and its
consequences in and for human perception. The conditions of sub-
jectivity and experience in the modern big city are a constant concern
in his poems and in his writings on painting. While searching for an
art capable of integrating in its own form and content the real condi-
tions of modernity, he insisted on the abstract aspect of art, thus anti-
cipating the contemporary idea of the persistence of the vision in the
retina and therefore in the mind – as suggested by Paul Virilio. We see,
and the image that we see lingers in our memory while other images
roll in front of our eyes. In order to be able to see, we must abstract,
remember and understand images.
As I have suggested in other chapters, Delacroix’s painting was in
Baudelaire’s opinion the product of thought and intelligence. Memory
requires speedy execution, if the artist is not to lose his ideas.
Baudelaire had seen the connection between memory and speed
already in his Salons of 1845 and of 1846, where he comments on the
works of Delacroix. Later, The Painter of Modern Life, inspired by the
work of the painter Constantin Guys, came to be his fundamental text
on this issue. Baudelaire’s firm belief is that painting needs thought,
strength of conception, and the power to express. For him expression
becomes more important than the ability to represent. Imagination is
that power, and it is based on memory: the recollection of landscapes,
of other paintings, and of personal impressions. For the poet of metro-
politan life, nature is not a pastoral dream nor the object of imitation,
but a dictionary which the good painter knows how to consult. The art
of painting consists not in copying or reproducing the visible world,
but rather in translating mental states onto the canvas.
In The Painter of Modern Life, Baudelaire is particularly interested in the
need for quick execution in works representing everyday life. Low-cost
techniques were crucial: ‘For the sketches of manners, the depiction of
bourgeois life and the pageant of fashion, the technical means that is the
most expeditious and the least costly will obviously be the best.’18 After

pastel, etching and aquatint, lithography appeared the best way for the
modern artist to adapt to the ‘daily metamorphosis of external things’,
and to distribute images of ‘that vast dictionary of modern life’.
Techniques changed the mode of production and circulation of the
artistic object, which then ceased to be a unicum, something unique and

irreplaceable.
But what is most important for my purpose, which is to show the
link between Baudelaire’s intuitions and film aesthetic, is that imagina-
tion is perceived as a moment of struggle between two types of
memory: the one would be capable of repeating the entire range of real
experience, the other selects its main outstanding features.
Imagination does not exist in a sort of vacuum; it implies the artist at
work with his pencils, brushes and all the other material instruments
that should, as Baudelaire suggested with regard to Delacroix, ‘translate
the idea as quickly as possible, otherwise it fades away’.
In The Painter of Modern Life, Baudelaire invents a beautiful story: he
imagines Constantin Guys at work. The painter is a real man of the
crowd:
The crowd is his element, as the air is that of birds and water of fishes.
His passion and his profession are to become one flesh with the crowd.
For the perfect flâneur, for the passionate spectator, it is an immense
joy to set up house in the heart of the multitude, amid the ebb and
flow of movement, in the midst of the fugitive and the infinite.19
The painter spends every night wandering around Paris in order to

observe and absorb with all his senses the external world. Then, at
dawn, instead of sleeping, he sets to work, putting down on paper his
previous night’s impressions, ‘skirmishing with his pencil, his pen, his
brush, splashing his glass of water up to the ceiling, wiping his pen on
his shirt, in a ferment of violent activity, as though afraid that the
image might escape him …’20 Memory must work together with imagi-
nation, it cannot be reduced to a mere bodily impression. And hence
the struggle takes place between the two types of memory, the one
capable of recalling the general contour, and the other concerned with
capturing details. The only way in which the painter can resolve the
tension between the temptation of a total reconstruction and the prin-
ciple of selection, is to execute the work as quickly as possible.
Thus two elements are to be discerned in Monsieur G.’s execution:

the first an intense effort of memory that evokes and calls back to

life – a memory that says to everything, ‘Arise, Lazarus’; the second,

a fire, an intoxication of the pencil or the brush, amounting almost
to a frenzy. It is the fear of not going fast enough, of letting the
phantom escape before the synthesis has been extracted and pinned
down; it is that terrible fear that takes possession of all great artists

and gives them such a passionate desire to become masters of every
means of expression so that the orders of the brain may never be
perverted by the hesitation of the hand and that finally execution,
ideal execution, may become as unconscious and spontaneous as is
digestion for a healthy man after dinner.21
Time is therefore an essential factor in the relationship between

memory and aesthetic experience. But here time is not crucial as exist-
ential recollection (it is not Proustian time), since it is the real time of
artistic execution; it is the short period in which the artist produces
under the pressure of the struggle between the two types of memory. It
is the time of the actualization of imagination. With The Painter of
Modern Life, art entered the age of speed. Contemplation was typical of
a past, agrarian world, while metropolitan life demanded on one hand
the slow and solitary accumulation of data, on the other the frantic
introjection of various impressions whose rhythm had to reflect that of
metropolitan life.
The importance of the time factor in film is obvious: 24 images per
second are impressed on our retina, and any movie is divided into
sequences lasting for a certain amount of real time. Benjamin defined
film as the form of art that corresponds to the ever-increasing danger of
losing one’s own life – and he would make it clear that film is the form
that realizes he essence of any art in the contemporary world. In film,
there is no Geborgenheit, or security, no reconciliation, but only pre-
cariousness, disorientation, in the continuous flux of images, recalling
the situation described in the famous poem interpreted by Benjamin,
‘A une passante’ (which I comment in Chapter 7): the metropolitan
passer-by is perceived in a glimpse and then disappears equally quickly.
Existence in general is precarious. The aesthetic experience – its frantic
absorption of impressions of the external world and its speed – becomes
the model for life in general. The extreme solicitation of our senses and
an increasing quickness shape our lives and our perception in the cyber-
world. From modern art as understood by Baudelaire, to film and to the
internet, speed has become the central issue.
Paul Virilio, deeply concerned with the possibility (now already a
reality) of technology’s tyranny, insists on the question of speed. He

reminds us of the totalitarian and military dimension of new technolo-

gies since the nineteenth century and of the revolution in transporta-
tion. He points to a major feature of our cyber age: speed resembles
more and more the speed of light. It has the divine characteristics of
ubiquity and instantaneity.22 Speed can make everything visible – all

at once and immediately. Virilio calls speed ‘a vision machine’.
Photography and cinema in the nineteenth century offered a vision of
the world that was objective; television and computers give a vision
that is flattened, like the horizon on-screen. The vision of the world
today is compressed, crushed in the close-ups of time and space.
Virilio therefore identifies the period of modernity as stretching from
the industrial revolution to the contemporary electronic age, and talks
about the coming into being, already in the nineteenth century, of ‘an
aesthetic of disappearance’. This aesthetic can of course be identified
with cinema itself and the disappearing of images in the sequences
which follow one another. It is the opposite of ‘the aesthetic of appear-
ance’ in, for example, sculpture and painting, where forms emerge
from their supports, while the persistence of what holds the image is
essential to its appearance. The snapshot already initiated the aesthetic
of disappearance and speed; from the snapshot to the filmic image,
human perception has been integrating the response to rapid images.
The 24 images per second in film represent a great impact on percep-
tion: images disappear in front of us, while they are kept in the retina.
An abstract mental activity is substituted for concrete holders. The con-
ditions of seeing have switched from the persistence of marble or
canvas or any such-like matter to the cognitive persistence of vision.
Memory, indispensable for the cognitive process, is involved in the
process of acceleration. The points made by Virilio were already
present in Baudelaire’s intuitions, and are manifest in the work of
David Lynch, whose film Lost Highway (1997) exemplifies what I have
suggested about the aesthetic approach.
Speed and vision are but one: at the beginning of Lost Highway
(1997) the spectator sees for more than three full minutes the tar on a
road flashing by, rhythmically lit up by gleams. The dividing yellow
line frantically folds in the night up to the point that vision itself
becomes difficult. We understand that this two-lane highway is seen
from a car driven fast, but neither the car nor the hypothetical driver
appear on the screen. The aesthetic of disappearance becomes extra-
ordinarily vivid: nothing but an image running away, which is almost
the vision of speed itself materialized on the road’s moving surface.
The image is forced on our eyes to the limit of the retina’s endurance,

almost as if the abstraction of the persistence of vision has become

tangible. Rather than seeing, our eyes are touching the grey substance
of the pavement’s tar as it runs away. Speed is described in its totally
dehumanized essence: just bare matter hitting the eye and moving
beyond the possibility of fixing vision either on a stable object or on a

movable one. The traditional technique of representing movement,
such as a rapidly travelling camera, is set aside, since the point of
vision is not really above the road, but inside it – as if it were inside
speed itself. Lynch has chosen a magnified close-up on the road. The
close-up, the very means used in general to linger on a human face (or
on an important object) is used to grasp the ungraspable: speed itself.
The Baudelairean passer-by aesthetic has reached the paroxysm of total
hallucination. The hallucinatory atmosphere is increased by the violent
music which accompanies the cast-list and credits (‘I’m Deranged’,
performed by David Bowie). Hearing and touch are summed up by sight.
After this breath-taking beginning, the visual-auditive-mental hallucina-
tion is interiorized in the features of human anxiety: the protagonist’s face
appears in darkness and in total silence. We can scarcely distinguish the
walls of a room, but we can indeed see the expression of suffering, while
our brain cannot reconcile itself to the silence of this scene, since the
impression of the previous shot and its soundtrack persists in our mind.
A complete reading of many elements of Lost Highway would confirm
the interpretation of the aesthetic of disappearance: the story of the
male protagonist, Fred, is continued by another character, Pete, while
the female protagonist splits into two women, Renee and Alice. But,
more importantly, already from the very first cut, the overwhelming
power of the visual – and the visual as speed – is put in question pre-
cisely because of the exaggeration of the image. The ‘visible’ has, so to
speak, such a strong signature that it calls for other senses, highly
solicited in our age, such as hearing. But it also calls for an understand-
ing: the utterly physical moment envisioned by Jameson’s negative
utopia of the visible, is actually the quick shortcut between vision and
the mind since the perception of the image is contracted into some
inevitable questioning about the events in the film.
The most perfect representation of our cyberworld is not the computer
itself, nor a story where some secret file on a drive is the object of
dispute, as we have been seeing now for almost 20 years in so many TV
series. The most perfect representation of cybernetics is the portrait of its
effects on the eyes and the mind. Baudelaire did not so much describe
the big city as show its imprint on human perception. In a similar way,
almost at the end of the twentieth century, Lynch composes a filmic

image, which, without showing any computers, shows the screen-like

electronic movements of the greyish particles of a road flattened in such
an extreme way that it resembles a TV or a computer screen.
Lynch succeeds in condensing the history of roads and speed into the
history of the world of television and computers. At the beginning of

Lost Highway our eyes are surfing on something that looks like a screen.
With that daring, dreadful close-up, Lynch renders the internet in our
brains. The film-maker is especially capable of expressing the equivalent
of its hallucinatory effect on our vision and in our minds. Thanks to
this crucial first scene also, the usual contemporary cocktail of sex and
violence, so important in this film too, becomes much more than
merely physical. The images that we see constantly in all movies here
contain a double meaning which challenges the view of them as mere
objects of consumption. They are, we may say, therefore presented iron-
ically. Peeping Tom, in the early 1960s, hinted at the pornographic and
violent aspect of the visual; Lost Highway, in the 1990s, sketches a pro-
found meditation on the visual through what might at first appear to be
its pornographic and violent essence. Our guts are not solicited per se,
since the spectator is forced to think through images. Images address
intelligence and memory, and become the means to criticize our society
of the spectacle. All the elements of a history of the audiovisual appear
in the film: videotapes, sound-track, photographs, cameras, portable
telephones and portable TVs. They are not simply ornamental, but
suggest a reflection on film, in the same way that Baudelaire’s lyrics
point to a reflection on the very form of lyrical poetry.
If a typical feature of postmodernism is the inclination to quote,
Lynch’s film is fully postmodern, but with a major difference. Its resist-
ance to the postmodern taste for citations can be retraced in the con-
tinuous attempt to recontextualize the world from which quotations
come or could come. Many elements – setting, clothes, hair-style etc. –
bring into the scene the 1940s and, even more, the 1950s; that is to say
the age of the blooming of film and of the spread of television. The
two levels of that epoch and our contemporary age blend without nos-
talgia. The 1950s and the 1990s are periods of major changes in com-
munication techniques, and in the way in which we live and feel. The
spectators cannot completely free-float on clichés as if they were empty
images of a pure postmodern world. The spectators must be active,
must interpret; they have to put their own memory into a historical
context, understanding the interplay of different epochs. Lynch’s style
is indeed postmodern, but not its intention, since he aims exactly to
show up the conditions of existence of postmodern style.

As with another major film by Lynch, Blue Velvet (1984), which makes
use of images and music from the 1950s in the USA, the spectator is led
into the world of imagination that the film-maker has made, and comes
to grasp what Jameson calls the ‘historial coming into being’ of the all-
pervasive character of the visual. A cultural or social historian would have

to write chapters analysing the conditions of communication in the
1950s, and draw comparisons with our present technological revolution;
an artist can contract everything into an image.
Let us cast our minds back to the road in the opening sequence.
While projecting speed in a most contemporary spasm of vision, this
cut alludes not only to the general recurring filmic motif of the road,
but to other films. It obviously works as a quotation from Lynch
himself, since the frantic road constituted a motif in Blue Velvet.
Already in that film, he suggests, through the double reading of the
present time and the 1950s (songs and images), that we are in the age
of the intrusion of film and TV into real life. That is the condition of
our mind today. But, in the Lost Highway road scene, one can also
detect a reference and re-enactment of the first minutes of a famous
film of the fifties: Kiss Me Deadly by Albert Aldrich. Imagination elab-
orates elements of memory; it translates, updates them. Road and speed
are not the same in the 1950s and in the 1990s: in order to show the
jump from one period to the other, the motif needs to be emphasized,
accelerated. Aldrich is an acrobat of the camera, Lynch shows a similar
deftness, already with the initial powerful close-up, and in quoting and
deforming Aldrich’s images in several other scenes: the garage, the
burning house on a Californian beach, some female voices and tones,
the mystery of identities – all these elements recall Kiss Me Deadly.
Lynch obviously uses many features of B-movies but his aim is to
overcome their addictive, purely physical impact. Through the impor-
tance of music and the elaboration of his cuts, he definitely contests
the iconoclastic primacy of the purely visual, claiming for the power of
the image as an experience of thought. Through cinematic effects he
displays the work of artistic imagination intermingled with memory
and creates a complex composition that transcends the mere stereo-
type giving it the depth of film history. Above all, he continues that
chapter of modern aesthetics for which art should be a critical response
to the demands of its own time.
Lynch, like Baudelaire, shows us how the aesthetic experience is
capable not only of placing itself historically but also of displaying
what an intelligent interplay of imagination, emotion and thought
might be. The image lays claim to more than the merely visible.

9
Martin Scorsese and the Rhythm
of the Metropolis

Cities, like people, can be recognized by their walk … So let us
not place any particular value on the city’s name. Like all big
cities it was made up of irregularity, change, forward spurts, fail-
ures to keep step, collision of people and interests, punctuated
by unfathomable silences; made up of pathways and untrodden
ways, of one great rhythmic beat as well as the chronic discord
and mutual displacement of all its contending rhythms. All in
all, it was like a boiling bubble inside a pot made of the durable
stuff of buildings, laws, regulations, and historical traditions.
Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities
How could we possibly think of the cinema without images of cities

springing to mind? Throughout the past century, cities have been caught
by the camera in documentaries and in fictions, continuing the tradition
of the literary works that represent people, events and feelings in a metro-
politan environment. For a whole century urban landscapes have been
coming and going on screens in no particular order and with no recog-
nizable development or thematic unity, since cities have been the canvas
for a story as often as they have been the main subject, the protagonist of
the whole film. Ever since René Clair’s Paris qui dort (1924), which has so
much in common with Guillaume Apollinaire’s visions of Paris, and Fritz
Lang’s Metropolis (1926), which has so much in common with an expres-
sionist painting or a constructivist project, films and cities have been an
irresistible combination, proving that architecture and film-making have
as close a relationship as cinema and theatre or painting or literature – the
arts which have most typically been associated with film (one need only
think of André Bazin’s essays on these topics).1
186

Martin Scorsese 187
New York, Little Italy, the streets and the buildings of Manhattan,
feature a great deal in Martin Scorsese’s work. Paris is essential for
Baudelaire, Vienna for Musil. In a similar way, it is impossible to
understand Scorsese’s films, their ethos, without understanding the
American metropolis, which, like many European cities, is also a

village, a complex of neighbourhoods. An architect, an urban historian
or a sociologist could learn much from Scorsese: his camera dips into
the skyline, stones, colours, atmosphere, violence, people and emo-
tions of New York. No distinction is drawn between the city and its
inhabitants. At the very beginning of Taxi Driver (1976) we see a white
cloud and, from it, the lower body of a yellow taxi emerges with its
bumpers. The typical white steam of Manhattan’s streets, a yellow cab,
a driver with his story, solitude, obsessions, they are all one. The
protagonist, Travis Bickle (in the wonderful interpretation of Robert De
Niro), is a Vietnam veteran who becomes a taxi driver: it could be any-
where in the big city, at any season, at any time of the day or the
night; it could be anybody; it could also be in any metropolis. Taxi
Driver is so real in every detail that it could almost be a documentary of
New York in the 1970s; but it is also the allegory of the metropolis, and
of any big city. Scorsese comments:
There’s a shot where the camera is mounted on the hood of a taxi and
it drives past the sign ‘Fascination’, which is just down my office. It’s
that idea of being fascinated, of this avenging angel floating through
the streets of the city, that represents all cities for me.2
The same mixture of documentary about the city and fiction can be
found in Roberto Rossellini’s Voyage en Italie (1953). All the images of
Naples showing street life, museums, excavations, hotels, restaurants,
capture the reality of local life in the 1950s and blend with the personal
story of a British man and his wife, who live through a critical time in
their marriage. It is hard to tell if the film is more about the two people
than about Naples, since the city and the nearby landscape are not
always perceived through the eyes of the protagonists; they often
become so central that the protagonists are just an excuse to show the
city. One can think of even more tantalizing examples from Rossellini,
such as what might be called the city and war trilogy, Roma, città aperta
(1945), Paisà (1946), and above all Deutschland im Jahre Null (1947).
This film shows that, like Rome at the end of the war in Rome, Open
City, or Florence during the war in one of the most unforgettable
episodes of Paisà, the bombed city of Berlin is not simply the

background against which a terrible story takes place. The devastated

streets and buildings seem to be made of the same matter as the actions
and souls of the people. A child has to learn to steal and even to poison
his grandfather in order to survive the extreme poverty in which his
family lives at the end of the Second World War. He wanders through

streets, buildings, along railway lines, among stone ruins. He embodies
Berlin’s misery and despair. The physical and moral destruction is quite
overwhelming in the last terrible sequences of the film: the child jumps
from the top of a wrecked building from which the only view is a
deadly urban landscape. This landscape is actually both exterior and
interior. The ruins of brick, marble, concrete in Rossellini’s Berlin can
speak and feel as if they were human, as if they were flesh and blood.
The American poet and film critic Vachel Lindsay, recently republished
thanks to Martin Scorsese, gave some examples of urban landscapes as
they are used in films in a chapter on ‘Architecture-in-Motion’ in his
1922 book The Art of the Moving Picture. He points out that peculiar
cinematic phenomenon whereby inanimate matter is given as much
significance as people, and significance of the same sort:
I have said that it is a quality, not a defect, of the photoplays that

while the actors tend to become types and hieroglyphics and dolls,
on the other hand dolls and hieroglyphics and mechanisms tend to
become human. By extension of this principle, non-human tones,
textures, lines, and spaces take on a vitality almost like that of flesh
and blood.3
For examples, the immense machines operated by workers in

Metropolis embody metropolitan and industrial life as much as the build-
ings or the urban skylines themselves: they are living monsters. Or think
of the buildings and the street shot by Lang in M (1931), where the pro-
tagonist looks for shelter when he is identified as the killer of little girls:
in the contrast of light and darkness and in shades of black and white,
the walls, the windows, the street-lamps on the screen tell us as much
about the pursuit as the very faces of both the criminal and the pursuers.
The pavement and the stones, the urban space, all give material sub-
stance to the fear and suspicion, the waiting, the hope and despair.
The steam, the yellow metal and the mirror at the beginning of Taxi
Driver are also flesh and blood. The principle set forth by Vachel
Lindsay helps us to understand that some objects or details are not
simply décor but acquire meaning. The list of such objects is, of course,
potentially infinite, from mirrors to guns, doors, windows; in the first

Martin Scorsese 189
moments of Taxi Driver it is possible to see in the cab’s bumpers and

rear-view mirror what Lindsay calls ‘the vitality of objects’. This shot
from wheel-level perspective is like a huge hieroglyphic, as if a detail in
a dream were taking shape and becoming more important than any-
thing else.4 The steam rising from the pavement is a very real charac-

teristic of Manhattan’s avenues. It can also be an almost involuntary
reference to Lang’s Moloch in Metropolis as it appears in white clouds
of smoke, endowing matter with powerful physical and symbolic fea-
tures, as if it were in hell. The steam, the bumpers and the car’s body
appear in a huge close-up, like the following one showing the face of the
driver inside his cab, reflected in the rear-view mirror. The slow, mechan-
ical movements of his eyes are shot in a camera speed which recalls
Eisenstein’s editing (or, as Scorsese explains, the effect he had seen in
‘the Venitian episode’ of Powell and Pressburger’s The Tales of Hoffmann).
Thanks to the technique of the close-up, mainly used to show the
human face and its expression, the objects themselves have acquired
something human and embody the spirit of the metropolis. New York
and the yellow cab are protagonists just as the main character is.
The presence of New York
In the same way that the metropolis incorporates various aspects of

human life and activity, cinema encompasses various modes of expres-
sion, from image to voice, sound, music and dance. Similar to a big city
made up with what Musil, in the epigraph of this chapter, calls ‘the
chronic discord and mutual displacement of all its contending
rhythms’,5 cinema is a multifaceted, complex world. Moreover, in spite
of the suburban movie-houses and home videos, is not the most myth-
ical, and perhaps nostalgic, image of cinema itself connected with urban
life, theatres, crowds, traffic, city lights, social interaction, night life?
Bernardo Bertolucci said that, when he was living in the countryside
near Parma, cinema meant going to the city and the fascination of the
cinema began to be associated with that of the city.
For me film meant to leave the country, where I lived since I was a
child, and go to the city. Undoubtedly, I identified the city and a real
change in my life with cinema, that meant an expressive universe dif-
ferent from the one at home, and therefore it meant poetry.6
Parma’s streets, squares, parks, opera house and outskirts are every-
where in his first film, Prima della rivoluzione (1964). Martin Scorsese,

who so much admires Bertolucci and especially this first great achieve-
ment, often talks, in interviews and articles, about his own childhood
in New York. He recalls his neighbourhood with its violence and
family outings, when he went to the movies with his father, mother
and brother. Scorsese often describes his life in Little Italy, when he

watched European films on television, against all the different noises
from the street and from the building where his family occupied a
small four-room flat in Elisabeth Street.7 In Scorsese’s interviews and
writings, his memories and comments often refer to New York, as if the
city and its life formed the substance of his imagination. He insists on
the importance of the city for Taxi Driver: ‘The whole film is very much
based on the impressions I have as a result of my growing up in New
York and living in the city.’8 Manhattan is also there as an overwhelm-
ing presence during the shooting of his films:
When one shoots in New York, one gets more than he asked for.
This is what I learned while shooting Taxi Driver … There is some-
thing in New York, a feeling that penetrates the subject one is
working on (whatever it is), and ends up affecting the behaviour of
your characters. This feeling – a sort of buzzing – cannot be defined
but all those who live in this city know what I mean … New York
can be called so many names – vulgar, magical, scarring, dynamiz-
ing, tiring, prosaic – that every time one must evoke it in a movie,
even incidentally, the city ends up imposing its presence. New York
refuses to be just a vague setting, like Los Angeles in so many films.9
Scorsese likes to remember the first time he saw Eisenstein’s

Alexander Nevsky on a summer afternoon in Manhattan, on 96th
Street, in a movie theatre: ‘I noticed they were showing Alexander
Nevsky, which I had read about in a magazine, and I walked in half-
way through, as usual.’10 In this recollection, the rhythm of metro-
politan life – hearing the city noises, strolling in the streets, going to
the movie, walking in half-way through, reading magazines – and the
effect of watching the battle on ice in 1242 as edited by Eisenstein in
1938 are jammed together. In the unpredictability of the metropolis
one can enter a cinema and go back in time thanks to the magic of
film. In the metropolis there is no clear-cut beginning or end, since
anything can take place anytime and anywhere. (‘Anytime, any-
where’: this is the phrase that Travis, in Taxi Driver, constantly repeats
when interviewed for his job.) As in Poe’s The Man of the Crowd, the
life of the big city has no beginning, middle or end; it can start at any

Martin Scorsese 191
point in time and space and continue like an infinite narrative; it

implies repetitions, going back and forth. A linear sequence of time
and events is totally inadequate to represent time in the metropolitan
space.
In many ways, Scorsese is the counterpart in cinema of Aldo Rossi in

architecture, who associated the idea of architecture itself with the city
and claimed that, among all the cities he loved, the experience of New
York was important for his understanding of architecture. Film is by its
very nature movement, while Rossi’s projects emphasize the static
atmosphere typical of design. Nevertheless, both Rossi and Scorsese
confirm the insistent motif in Baudelaire’s aesthetics, which is born out
of metropolitan experience: memory is crucial for the imagination of
the artist, and images dwell in memory. Like many artists, both Rossi,
the architect, and Scorsese, the film-maker, consider the images that
struck them when they were children as essential to their work. In his
Scientific Autobiography, Rossi writes of the importance of some films,
and of Bertolucci’s in particular, for his vision of the city. Rossi also
describes the same experience mentioned by Scorsese when talking
about Alexander Nevsky: that of getting to the cinema when the film
has already started. Arriving ‘half-way through’, or even towards the
end, is one of the chances of metropolitan life, and can influence our
perception of a film. Rossi compares his early fascination with the
statues of some Mannerist chapels in Lombardy to watching a film that
is ‘half-way through’:
As in the statues of the Sacri Monti of S., which I passed almost

every day, what I admired was not their art; rather I pursued the
relentlessness, the story, the repetition … It is like seeing the same
film or play many times and thus being free from the desire to know
the end. To experience this effect I often go to cinema when the
film is half over or just ending; in this way one meets the characters
in their conclusive moments, and then one can rediscover the
action that happened earlier or imagine an alternative.11
These important aesthetic phenomena are also crucial for the film-
maker: the role of memory, the act of ‘walking in half-way through’,
and a particular sense of time, which composes and unfolds the narra-
tive regardless of the sequence of events. The effect of the work of art is
enriched by repetition and liberated from the wish to know the end or
the beginning of a story. In this way it encourages the spectator to
imagine alternatives.

Scorsese mentions a feeling of repetition similar to that described by

Rossi. He tells about his habit of watching the same film over and over
again on a TV programme in the 1950s:
I remember seeing Powell and Pressburger’s The Tales of Hoffmann

on this programme: it was in black and white, cut and interrupted
by commercials (it was not until 1965 that I saw it in colour). But I
was mesmerized by the music, the camera movements and the the-
atricality of the gestures by these actors who were mostly dancers.
There’s a lot to be said against The Tales of Hoffmann, yet I’ve always
said that those repeated views on television taught me about the
relation of the camera and the music: I just assimilated it because I
saw it so often. Even now there is hardly a day when the score of
the picture doesn’t go through my mind, and of course it had an
effect on the way in which I handled the musical sequences in New
York, New York and the fight in Raging Bull. There was another lesson
I learned from it too: when we were doing the close-ups of De Niro’s
eyes for Taxi Driver, I shot these at 38 or 46 frames per second to
reproduce the same effect that I’d seen in the Venitian episode of
The Tales of Hoffmann, when Robert Helpmann is watching the duel
on a gondola.12
Repetitions and alternatives are therefore fundamental both to the

life of a big city and to the imagination which is based on some very
deep impressions imprinted on the memory (dating from childhood or
other experiences). Repetitions and alternatives imply a temporal
dimension which is cyclical or at least disrupts simple sequences, since
parallel events are taking place either in the physical vastness of urban
space or as conjectures of the mind. Possibility is added to reality – and
not opposed or subtracted from it.
An imaginative person must be aware of possibilities. The life of any
metropolis is constituted by the summing up of reality and possibility. At
the beginning of his novel, Musil describes a car accident in Vienna. In
his usual ironic style, the narrator speculates on the sense of possibility:
It is reality that awakens possibilities, and nothing would be more

perverse than to deny it. Even so it will always be the same possibil-
ities, in sum or on the average, that go on repeating themselves
until a man comes along who does not value the actuality above the
idea. It is he who first gives the new possibilities their meaning,
their direction, and he awakens them.13

Martin Scorsese 193
Reality and possibility give the rhythm to any big city. The treat-
ment of space-time in Taxi Driver is a good example of metropolitan
rhythm. The story does indeed take place within a precise sequence of
days, punctuated by the journal that Travis writes and reads in a tempo
which both may and may not coincide with his writing, and both may

and may not correspond to the protagonist’s oral narration. But all the
rides in the cab through the streets, at the beginning and at the end of
the film, place the time of the story in the continuous traffic of New
York: ‘any time, anywhere’, according to Travis’s words. His excep-
tional story, which for a while makes him a hero in the newspaper – he
has saved the life of a young prostitute – is just one piece in the jigsaw
of the metropolis, in the vast network of actual and potential events.
But time belongs more to the city than to people.
The urban experience of watching a movie which may or may not
start at the beginning is often imprinted on Scorsese’s mind: his narra-
tive is his way of dealing both with time in the metropolis, and with the
conjectures of imagination. For example, at the very beginning of
GoodFellas (1989), the three protagonists – Henry, Tom and Jim, inter-
preted by Ray Liotta, Joe Pesci and Robert De Niro – are startled by a
thumping noise coming from the trunk of their car. They open the
trunk and the face of a wounded man becomes visible. They finish him
off with a knife and a round of gun-shots. When Henry shuts the trunk,
the image freezes and Henry’s voice-over begins the story: ‘As far back
as I can remember, I always wanted to be a gangster.’ The whole film
follows Henry’s narration from the glorious period of the 1950s up to
the big raids of the 1960s and 1970s, and finally to the decadence of the
1980s. More or less in the middle of the film, after ‘the wise guys’ have
already achieved some successful raids, we see them in a bar on Queens
Boulevard, at night, at a very precise date, on 11 June 1970. There is a
fight. Tom and Jim beat Billy Batts savagely. Then, after a stop-off at
Tom’s mother’s, we see the first scene over again, with the three friends
and Billy Batts horribly wounded but still alive in the trunk.
This repetition of the initial cut in GoodFellas is modelled precisely on
a type of vision that starts ‘half-way through’, as if the spectator happens
to enter the movie-house just as that very scene is taking place, and
he/she has then to reconstruct the narrative. A similar type of repetition
is played though in Casino (1996), which begins with the explosion of
the protagonist’s car while he tells his own story. Ace (Robert De Niro)
becomes a minuscule image whirling in flames, spectacularly shooting
up into Las Vegas’s phantasmagoria of lights, a visual counterpart of the
way the notes in Bach’s Saint Matthew Passion leap up.14 The sequence of

the car explosion is resumed towards the end of the film and the voice of
Ace explains that he survived the attack thanks to his metal seat.
Urban and suburban motifs: Scorsese and Lynch

Repetitions or interrupted temporal sequences are typical features of
Scorsese’s work, and are very disturbing for anybody who likes a simple
narrative.15 They are based on the metropolitan tempo and not on the
random shifts of a remote control that jumps here and there, joining
different pieces together and jeopardizing any possibility of recon-
structing the story or the stories. Time in Scorsese’s movies is the result
of both the rhythm of the city and the technical characteristics of
cinema; short-cuts, cross-cutting, sequence shots, subtle graphic skills
in the cast and credits are the tools that the film-maker uses in order to
give cohesion to his narrations. Scorsese sometimes chooses to con-
struct the story in a very classical way, within a short, concentrated
period of time, or reduced to a few days, as in the adventures of Charlie
and Johnny Boy in Mean Streets. Sometimes, on the contrary, he tries
the long period of time in a novel-like form, like GoodFellas, where the
dates shown at the beginning of the four sections go from the 1950s to
the 1980s. Within these large temporal structures, time is treated
unevenly, according to the pattern of repetition and interruption, and
there are often discrepancies or ellipses between what is shown in the
cut and what is said by the narrating voice. For example, in GoodFellas,
towards the end, the voice-over of Henry explains that he was worried
that Tom, in his excessive violence, would also murder a friend,
Morrie, and confesses his relief: ‘It was like a load off my mind. Poor
bastard. He never knew how close he came to getting killed. Even if I
told him he would have never believed me.’ But immediately after,
without voice-over, we see Jim, Tom, Frank Carbone and Morrie in a
car: suddenly, in the middle of the conversation, Tom kills Morrie with
an ice pick in his neck. In the brief spasms of time and events typical
of urban life – and in the tense schedule of the shooting of a film – the
film-maker does not need to lose time explaining every detail, to have
everything fit neatly. A spectator who is quick on the uptake, as
anyone entering half-way through needs to be, can connect the pieces
and guess at events and feelings. Why should any narration block the
intelligent and free rein of the imagination?
Scorsese translates into his films the experience of New York, of its
external, concrete presence, which is of course interiorized. His colours,
adventures and marvellous soundtrack disrupt any simplistic, linear

Martin Scorsese 195
sequence of time and events, and create a flexible structure. The city-
dweller knows how to put together elements in order to make sense of
them and, at least partially, must reconstruct a narrative: it is a ques-
tion of life and death, like crossing a street or understanding where
noise and danger are coming from. And this capacity to reconstruct

and comprehend rapidly is interiorized by the inhabitants of the city.
(As I mentioned in the previuos chapters, Walter Benjamin spoke of
the interiorization of shock in metropolitan life, and George Simmel of
‘nervous life’ as the basis of perception in urban life.) As in Stendhal’s
novels, elliptical narration in Scorsese’s films helps to produce a fast
rhythm, not lingering on description. Ellipsis enhances the pace of
action and emotion; it demands intelligence to understand short-cuts
and compose the elements of a story – or an argument.
Ellipsis implies mobility, flexibility, areas of particular density,
changes, irregularities, like the rhythm of a metropolis as suggested by
Musil in the quotation at the beginning of this essay. But ellipsis does
not imply lack of structure. The fragmentation or random piecing
together so typical of postmodernism is a very different phenomenon
from the abrupt narrative which is moulded by urban rhythm. The
contrast between David Lynch and Scorsese might be illuminating.
Lynch likes ‘fragments of narrative’, such as those he finds in Bacon’s
paintings.16 He cleverly builds his images on what can be called the
postmodern suspicion of narrative. His fragments of stories are highly
suggestive: they recall the way in which images come and go in dreams
– both when we are asleep and when we are awake. In Lost Highway
(1997), the characters (Fred and Pete, Alice and Renee) have parallel
identities. Their substitution can also be understood as the composi-
tion of images through skipping around with the remote control, or
the winding and unwinding of a video cassette – the winding and
unwinding of a mysterious cassette is in fact an important element of
the film, and even the scene of Fred killing his wife Renee seems to be
shown from a video at the police office. David Lynch is intimately
inspired by suburban life: a mixture of nature and technology – The
Machine in the Garden, as remarkably summed up in the title of a 1960s
book by Leo Marx17 dealing with nineteenth-century anti-urban
American ideology. Media and technology have shaped the minds of
the inhabitants, they have taken the place of real relationship with the
world. In the suburbs, images are the substitute for reality, while in the
metropolis, images and reality are continuously responding to each
other, at a frantic pace. New York is the ground for Scorsese’s imagina-
tion. California, Los Angeles, which is like an immense suburb, or any

Midwestern suburb, such as the fictional Lamberton in Blue Velvet

(1986), form the background of the glossy colours, the splendid sound-
track, and the maverick adventures of Lynch’s films.
Scorsese and Lynch can be considered two of the contemporary film-
makers who most effectively master their art with the complete under-

standing that cinema is composed of both image and sound. But Scorsese
feeds his imagination with urban life, while Lynch does it with suburban
life (and that infinite suburb that is LA). The initial cut of the road in Lost
Highway (which I discussed in the previous chapter) and the road in a
scene that takes place 15 minutes from the beginning of Taxi Driver will
be examples of the difference between the urban and suburban imagina-
tion, or between the New York and the Los Angeles imprint.
The asphalt rolling in front of our eyes in Lost Highway can be
described as the visual hallucination of speed; it is not a specific road
but almost the image of speed imprinted on the retina. The cut of the
two-lane highway is followed next by a cut with the interior of a villa
where the face of the protagonist appears in the darkness. He looks ter-
ribly distressed. Later the exterior of a Los Angeles villa is shown in full
daylight (it is actually the Lynch’s Pasadena house where he edits the
music for his films). The road at the beginning is an isolated object,
just as the protagonist is isolated in his white villa: within the sub-
urban motif objects are singled out thanks to their plain, glossy
colours: for example the flowers, the grass and the sky at the beginning
of Blue Velvet. Lynch talks about the blue sky with aeroplanes as the
substratum of his personal memory, from his childhood in ‘deep
America’, in Montana, where he was born, to Boise, Idaho, and
Spokane, Washington State, where he moved with his family when
he was about 14 years old: ‘It was a world of dream, blue sky, planes
which passed over the fences, green grass, cherry-trees …’18 Of course,
this dream is not absolute, untouched: Lynch is fully aware of that. He
mentions in fact the presence of industrial dust on every leaf and tree;
this broken pastoral ideal shows that Nature is not as pure as it seemed
in the forests of Montana where he used to go with his father when he
was a child.19 Actually, Lynch’s irony about the American dream is
based on the contrast between the ideal of Nature and industrial
reality. It should also be said that Nature itself is a complex reality:
Lynch likes to show how insects are swarming under what seems the
purity and perfect smoothness of a tree-trunk or the grass (in the first
minutes of Blue Velvet, after the image of the idyllic blue sky and sub-
urban life, we see dark insects moving in a piece of brown thick earth
while their noise comes amplified to our ears).

Martin Scorsese 197
A long tradition of art longing for Nature shows that industrializa-

tion undermines Nature’s wholeness. Hence the terrible noises of the
railroad and factories in Eraserhead (1976), or, in The Elephant Man, the
reconstitution of London as its appears in Dickens’s novels (with a
memorable long scene in Victoria Station where people chase the ele-

phant man). In any event, the urban-industrial landscape is perceived
from outside, as horror, fear and surprise, almost what Lynch himself
felt when he went to New York as a child: ‘Because my grandparents
on my mother’s side lived in Brooklyn, I would go to New York City …
And it scared the hell out of me. In the subway I remember a wind
from the approaching train, then a smell and a sound. I had a taste of
horror every time I went to New York.’20 The urban milieu, which can
produce a maverick fascination, is connected with monstrosity, with
deformed nature, such as the elephant man and the strange baby-
monster in Eraserhead.21
In Taxi Driver, a few minutes from the beginning, the road appears in
a close-up lasting for almost 30 seconds: the shot comes after New York
has already been introduced as a presence, and not simply as a back-
drop, with its thoroughfares, lights, rain, noise, people in the street,
cab-station, and the endless journeys of Travis’s yellow cab. The real
macadam of a New York avenue is there, with its holes and bumps, in a
slow-motion huge close-up on the grey matter. As suggested by Musil,
every city is made of its own rhythm, of events taking place or suscep-
tible of taking place, and of ‘the durable stuff’ of buildings and history.
In Taxi Diver, the ‘stuff’ of New York boils up as if from a pot. And New
York becomes an allegory for all cities, as suggested by Scorsese
himself, precisely because it has a fully concrete existence from which
meaning can be developed. Spectators grasp the documentary dimen-
sion of the shot on the macadam together with the allegorical one,
and, having been able to identify areas in Manhattan, impelled by a
taste for the realistic representation of place and time (don’t we all like
to recognize what we have already seen and what we know?), they
could even be tempted to try and identify the avenue shown in the
shot. In Taxi Driver, as in many of Scorsese’s films, the metropolis is
perceived from within, since the shot on the road forms part of the
complex network of material and mental relations that constitute the
big city. Even the solitude and the madness of the protagonist is repre-
sented within the multiple pattern of the city: we see Travis looking for
a job, speaking with the employee in the interview, and the whole
story follows an election campaign. In the big city lots of people meet,
bump into each other, talk, drive cars, go to the movies, to bars. Even

the anonymity of the crowd is a real presence and creates a network of

relations, however transient they may be. Images, words and urban
reality merge. When Travis is alone in his apartment getting ready with
his guns, the social dimension is not diminished, since his silent ges-
tures are accompanied by the noise of the city – a different noise from

that of insects in Blue Velvet or from the terrible screaming inside the
heads of Fred and Pete, the male protagonists of Lost Highway, whose
identities blend in an incomprehensible way. In Lynch, the external
world is a projection of the internal frame of mind; in Scorsese any
mental state is a response to reality, even if this reality is dream-like.
Scorsese’s films have a lot in common with Baudelaire’s Fleurs du Mal,
with his peculiar, intense way of combining the most concrete and the
most abstract elements in his poetic images.
Nothing can be really isolated in the city, since the city is the social
space par excellence. Family, group, community, neighbourhood,
friends and enemies, ethnic definitions and accents, circulation of
money – all these elements are crucial for Scorsese. The circulation of
money is visible and almost tangible in his movies. So many scenes in
Mean Streets, Taxi Driver, GoodFellas show dollars bills passing from one
hand to another. The sequence in which, in GoodFellas, the young
Henry meets Jimmy for the first time shows the wise guys playing
cards. Henry’s voice-over tells: ‘It was a glorious time’, and, after a
whole account of the bills the legendary Jimmy gives to everybody in
the room, we see him slipping a 20-dollar bill into Henry’s pocket. A
freeze-frame on Jimmy underlines the unforgettable character of this
episode. In Casino, where money plays in a spectacular way the usual
central role in human relationships, an extraordinary sequence shows
the accumulation of money in its most material aspect: cash. Ace, the
narrator who runs a Las Vegas casinos, tells at the beginning of the film
about his thrilling enterprise ‘that’s like selling people dreams for cash’,
while in the casino’s most secret room tons of coins quickly pile up
like objects in an assembly line, and the empoyees count and separate
packages of bills.
Even the apparently most trifling scene in Scorsese’s movies can be
rich in social information: the brief words uttered by Mike in the first
minutes of Mean Streets while a truck is unloaded indicate the Italian-
American community; a certain intonation in the voice of Karen
(Lorraine Bracco) in GoodFellas when she asks policemen if they want
some coffee, reminds us that she is Jewish. And Catherine Scorsese, the
film-maker’s mother, appears in several films, talking in a mixture of
American and Sicilian dialect, as when she speaks about a spaghetti-

Martin Scorsese 199
sauce recipe in Scorsese’s documentary Italianamerica (a 1974 film

financed by a bicentennial award from the National Endowment for
the Humanities, which became part of a TV series about immigrants
and ethnic minorities22).
Similar episodes in public spaces have different flavours in Scorsese

and Lynch. The bars, restaurants, clubs and cafés in Mean Streets, Taxi
Driver, Raging Bull, GoodFellas etc. show a social network, a strong sense
of neighbourhood in spite of violence – Mafia, family parties, young
people hanging out together in the same parts of the city. Every indi-
vidual, whoever they are and whatever their problem, is steeped in that
social atmosphere and, however uncommunicative or violent they may
be, they indicate some urban cohesion, even if it is problematic. Also,
violence in a Scorsese film has a culturally urban quality: its dynamics
are those of a group, however secluded the group or isolated the indi-
vidual may be – even Travis’s mad project takes shape through the
words of one of his fellow taxi drivers and through a ‘business’ transac-
tion with the salesman (in a wonderful scene where the salesman dis-
plays all his guns in front of Travis, in an apartment from whose
windows is visible a corner of the parkways and roads at the foot of
Brooklyn Bridge).
By complete contrast, in Lynch’s films, bars and restaurants seem
like the cinematic equivalent of Edward Hopper’s forlorn bars and
restaurants (Hopper is one of the painters Lynch most admires,
together with Bacon). In the jazz-lounge in Blue Velvet where Dorothy
(Isabella Rossellini) sings the famous Bobby Vinton song which gives
the film its title, we feel that all the characters are contributing their
separate lives through the contingency of the event – a murder, a
mysterious ear found in the grass by the young protagonist, Jeffrey
(Kyle MacLachlan), and Jeffrey’s determination to discover the enigma.
The humour with which Lynch colours the whole scene rests upon a
sort of advertisement for American and imported beers: Jeffrey drinks
Heineken, but the daughter of the detective, Sandy (Laura Dern), only
knows the beer her ‘daddy’ drinks, Budweiser.
Violence and sex in Lynch’s film are isolated, crazy, surreal outbursts
of colour and movement that subtly recreate the well-known stereo-
types of television and B-series and porno films. Suburban life erases
social and historical connections. Facts, people, dreams and events
float around unrelated to time or space, isolated from the impact of the
reality and continuous metamorphosis of the big city. Violence in
Scorsese is a product of social tension: if the brutality of westerns
is imprinted on his memory, his tough scenes always carry some

documentary flavour. Indeed, Scorsese likes to remind us of reality – for

example in the notice following the title GoodFellas: ‘This film is based
on a true story’ (from Nick Pileggi’s book Wise Guy). But, above all,
Scorsese believes that the true violence of some people ‘ought to be
used in a film in order to affirm an ethical point of view’.23 Lynch, on

the contrary, likes to stress the dream component in his films, as much
as in his paintings. He thinks, for example, that the first section of Lost
Highway is like being ‘just on the border of consciousness – or on the
other side of that border’, ‘in someone else’s bad dream’.24
The contrast between love scenes as constructed by the two film-
makers can also be seen in terms of the opposition between urban and
suburban. First of all, lovers are rarely alone in Scorsese’s films; in Mean
Streets, in one of the most open sex scenes, deeply inspired by Godard,
Teresa and Charlie are alone in a hotel room, and Teresa gets up,
naked, and moves towards the window, from which comes the roar of
the traffic outside, overwhelming the conversation between the two
young people. In Lynch, we can see another splendid declination of
the formula ‘the machine in the garden’: Pete and Alice drive at night
to a mysterious isolated cabin, then they make love on the beach, in a
long scene shot in overexposed light, while the golden sand scatters
around their bodies.
Scorsese’s imagination does not find inspiration in nature or wilder-
ness: in Mean Streets, in a rare scene near the sea, in Long Island, Teresa
and Charlie are flirting. The cut, where colour is greatly diminished in
favour of a very white light, recalls the sea as it appears in Truffaut’s
Les 400 coups, and it provides an opportunity to spell out Charlie’s
dislike for nature. ‘I hate the ocean, and I hate the beach, and I hate
the sun … And the grass and the trees …’ When Teresa asks him what
he likes, his ironical answers are unmistakably urban, Italian-American,
New York: ‘I like spaghetti and clam sauce … John Wayne …’
Mountains are for him Manhattan’s ‘tall buildings’. Nature is present
in Casino, but it is just the desert surrounding the area where Las Vegas
has been built: nothing but dust and rocks, and the same violent light
that can be seen above skyscrapers and stone. The protagonist, Ace, is
sent to Las Vegas from New York; Scorsese’s Vegas harbours the same
type of Mafia life as the big city, with Italians and Jews. The contrast
between the city and the country is also fundamental in Scorsese’s first
film when he was 25 years old, Who’s That Knocking at My Door (1967).
Lynch and Scorsese are profoundly interested in the soundtracks of
their movies. Few film-makers have been able to use so intelligently the
music of the 1950s and 1960s. Even when they choose the same type

Martin Scorsese 201
of music, they end up proving the difference between the urban and
the suburban. Bobby Vinton’s ‘Blue Velvet’ is sung by Dorothy in that
forlorn lounge very appropriately called Slow Club. In a composition
showing Lynch’s taste for strong contrasts, the languorous notes and
theme of Roy Orbison’s ‘In Dreams’ accompany the beating-up of

Jeffrey, who has been driven to an isolated house where the group of
thugs meet. But the performance of the song is faked by the actor, who
uses a torch as a microphone and pretends to sing while the record
plays. In a violent scene of Blue Velvet, suburban elements emerge as
though they were in a painting by Edward Hopper: car, road, violence,
music from the car’s radio playing. One of the women of the group is
dancing on the car’s roof while Frank (Dennis Hopper) and his friend
hit Jeffrey, and Dorothy screams and cries. The machine is really in the
garden, and the garden is not an idyllic one. By contrast, Scorsese’s
music is closely connected with urban life: the singer Jerry Vale appears
live in GoodFellas. The world of entertainment, from cinema to restau-
rants, bars, juke-boxes, and shows of any kind, is part of city life, of
crowds, of people going out, meeting up with each other. According to
Baudelaire, the painter of modern life should choose his subjects from
everyday existence in the city: traffic, crowds, theatres and night-life.
The painter of modern life must immerse himself in urban life.
Scorsese belongs to the line of great artists who express the complex-
ity of urban reality, and consider that the imagination composes by
freely combining and putting together elements of the world. We
might say of him what Baudelaire said about Delacroix: ‘Nature, for
Eugène Delacroix, is a vast dictionary whose leaves he turns and con-
sults with a sure and searching eye.’25 The big city is for the film-maker
a vast dictionary. Scorsese believes in the existence and significance of
the external world as an immense source of inspiration, and tries to
represent its effect on the lives and minds of people, convinced as he is
that the history of cinema is a treasure as rich as the world itself.
Actually, for him, there is continuity between the real world and
cinema, again not in the postmodern sense, but in what can be called
the classical modern sense, exactly as in Baudelaire’s poetry where the
abstract and the concrete can never be separated, and external and
internal life respond to each other.
Scorsese’s films are full of action, and could never imply that every-
thing is mere rhetoric or a series of empty images meaning nothing. In
the way he uses his camera, he proves his intense passion for reality,
for matter, for the flesh. This is well illustrated by a famous cut in
GoodFellas: Henry, the Irish-Italian boy who finally, at 21, becomes part

of Paulie Cicero’s Italian Mafia group, takes Karen to his restaurant, the
Copacabana. This extraordinary cut, which lasts three minutes,
engages many of the spectator’s emotions and senses (from sight to
hearing, even smell – or the conjuring up of smell through the visual):
the sixties music ‘Then He Kissed Me’ (performed by the Crystals)

spreads the joy of an evening of conquest amidst food, wine, dollar
bills and tips, various activities, entertainment and flirtation. The
young couple take a thrilling walk through the basement and the
kitchens of the restaurant to their dining table set near the stage, where
the humorist Henry Youngman himself tells his jokes. The soundtrack
with ‘Look in My Eye’ (performed by the Chantels) continues into the
following cut where Henry and Tommy succeed in stealing $420,000
‘without using a gun’ from the Air France cargo area at Idlewild airport.
The overlapping of the soundtrack on this image enhances the rhythm
of the story as it is remembered and told with excitement by Henry:
remembrance becomes as intoxicating as the success of the operation
in the moment it takes place.
Henry and Karen are, during their walk through the basement and
the kitchen, shot from behind: in contempt of Hollywood, Scorsese’s
camera disdains any cosmetic operation on the human body, any of
the hygienic perfection of photography or film, and the flesh of the
actress is as real as flesh can be, especially with the effect of the typical
New York grey and red paint of the restaurant’s basement. The food
displayed on the kitchen’s counters is as real as if Scorsese were shoot-
ing the hustle and bustle of a busy restaurant. As in a novel by Balzac,
matter is acknowledged in all its density. It is as if centuries of Western
painting and baroque art were concentrated in this shot which, far
from denying the strength of cinema, allows it to integrate the charac-
teristics of different arts,26 stressing also what Scorsese relentlessly
affirms, that music is not a sort of ornamentation of the image but has
an equally central role. It is as if New York had stamped its physical
reality onto cinema: isn’t the metropolis perceived equally through the
eyes and through the ears (and through the mind)?
Scorsese is fully aware of the blending of fiction with reality, but the
lesson of his films could never be that of Lynch’s almost surrealist taste
for dreams, nor could it be reduced to the postmodern belief that all
reality is just fiction. For Scorsese, our internal world is shaped by the
external one, and imagination helps us to understand and hold onto
reality. As in Poe’s ‘The Man of the Crowd’, or in Baudelaire’s ‘Les Sept
Vieillards’, reality and hallucination blend, but reality remains the
spark which fires hallucination. Cinema is the art that translates this

Martin Scorsese 203
phenomenon into its language: ‘Much of Taxi Driver’ – said Scorsese –

‘arose from my feeling that movies are really a kind of dream-state, or
like taking dope.’27
Not unlike Baudelaire – not unlike many artists mesmerized by big
cities – Scorsese is hungry for the external world and tries to find an

artistic form that can quickly translate its features and its effects on the
human mind. In a similar way to the painter Constantin Guys in The
Painter of Modern Life, Scorsese likes to get immersed in the reality of
the city, what can be called its carnal presence. Then he selects and
creates images that carry the fullness of his impressions.
Above all, as indicated by the scenes I have analysed, the city is
present in the rhythm of Scorsese’s films, at the level both of sounds
and of music. Rhythm might vary: it might be slow or quick; it might
alternate slowness and rapidity, or it might show a type of slowness
that is already the translation of real time into human perception and
feeling. But what is typical of Scorsese is syncope – exactly what char-
acterizes the rhythm of the jazz or pop music in his soundtracks. This
musical syncope is mimetic of the noise of modern urban life. But it is
also expressive of a state of mind, of what may be called the emotional
structure of modern life. Baudelaire announced in his foreword to
Spleen de Paris his ideal of a poetic prose:
Which one of us, in his moments of ambition, has not dreamed of

the miracle of a poetic prose, musical, without rhythm and without
rhyme, supple enough and rugged enough to adapt itself to the
lyrical impulses of the soul, the undulations of reverie, the jibes of
conscience?28
This prose, Baudelaire insisted, should be the equivalent of the metro-

politan rhythm that generated it: ‘It was, above all, out of my explo-
ration of huge cities, out of the medley of their innumerable
interrelations, that this haunting ideal was born.’29
Syncope, nervous rhythm, irregularities can sometimes result in that
incredible acceleration Scorsese can give to some of his sequences in a
frantic editing of images and sound. Towards the end of GoodFellas,
after the killing of Tom and the disruption of the group, the pulsing
rhythm of ‘Jump into the Fire’ (performed by Harry Nilsson) hits the
spectator together with the black screen indicating the date and the
hour: these are the last stormy moments of Henry’s life as a gangster,
just before the epilogue when he gives the police the names of his
friends. The challenge for Henry is that of keeping a grip on many

different things: his drugs trade in Pittsburgh, his ill brother, his wife
and children, his mistress who mixes dope, some dealers in Queens, a
family dinner party where he has to cook. He has to drive here and
there, while a helicopter is following him. The challenge for the film-
maker is to master real time in film – the actual duration of visual cuts

as much as that of the sound – and the represented time of the action,
through the timing of Henry’s voice-over describing the events.
Scorsese succeeds in composing a most breathtaking 10 minutes of
editing. His cross-cutting intermingles places, people, voices, noises
and an immensely large number of musical segments, sometimes
repeated, sometimes only instrumental, sometimes interrupted and
reiterated later– such as Muddy Waters’ powerful blues voice followed
by the amplified guitar sound in the famous 1955 ‘Mannish Boy’, the
words ‘Yeah, everything, everything will be all right’ emerging in an
overly light-blue sky where the helicopter hovering over Henry’s car
spreads the syncopated noise of its propellers. The instant is, so to
speak, caught with all its charge: it is the event both in its absolute
contingency and within a network of possibilities, premisses and con-
sequences; it is action to the uttermost degree, together with the
feeling of fear or urgency that spurs on action. What could be more
quintessentially metropolitan?
Cinema as a metropolis
Two universes then offer Scorsese the vast dictionary from which he
selects and composes through ‘the jibes of consciousness’, of memory
and invention: one universe is New York, with its infinite life; the
other is the gleaming metropolis that is cinema itself. Scorsese observes
and absorbs the real world and the world of cinema in order to trans-
late his ideas with his camera. He remembers – more or less precisely,
more or less consciously – images from other films. Cinema does not
copy the real world: it dreams of the world. It adds to the impressions
coming from the external world the most intimate, internal feelings
and thoughts. The city for Aldo Rossi was a concrete city – Parma,
Milan, Trieste, Venice, Belo Horizonte, Seville, etc. – with the addition
of what he called the analogous city: pieces of other cities lingering in
the memory of the architect or imagined by him. In a similar way, the
world of cinema for Scorsese is composed of the films he has seen and
those he has imagined, dreamed of. When talking about his early
passion for the cinema, he remembers that, as an adolescent, he
borrowed from the New York public library a book by Deems Taylor,

Martin Scorsese 205
A Pictorial History of the Movies, which is a history of film from silent

cinema to the talkies up to 1949: ‘It was the first course in my film edu-
cation. Its beautiful black-and-white images recreated the visions and
emotions of the movies I’d already seen, and allowed me to dream
about the others.’30 Scorsese is a real cinéphile and likes to pay homage

to cinema: in his A Personal Journey with Martin Scorsese through
American Movies, he declares: ‘I am talking to you about some of the
films that coloured my dreams, that changed my perceptions, and even
my life in some cases. Films that prompted me, for better of for worse,
to become a film-maker myself.’31
The urban imprint on time, which I have discussed in the first part
of this chapter, is very clear in Mean Streets. I will now return to this
urban element to look at how important the world of cinema is for
Scorsese – as important as New York. The metropolis is full of potential
as well as actual events that take place; in a similar way, a film results
from editing but so many rushes could offer alternatives (the inclusion
of what has been excluded either by the director or by the producer is
increasingly today the principal reason for the re-editing of films –
such as Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey, or Coppola’s Apocalypse Now).
Where does the story of Mean Streets start? Where does it end? During
the first minutes we see a young man suddenly waking up in his bed
surrounded by the noise of the city. As suggested in Taxi Driver, it
might be any day, any time, at the beginning or middle or end of the
story. It might be anyone living in the metropolis. Immediately, at the
sound of ‘Be My Baby’ (The Ronetts, 1963), a few photograms run
rapidly across the screen, showing church, marriage, and a new-born
baby. These images could be, already at the beginning, a happy epi-
logue softening the violence of the last part of the movie.32 This anti-
cipated happy end could also be the imagined alternative version of
the story. After all, the tough story that takes place in Little Italy could
be treated with irony: it is just a bunch of young people, and the
neighbourhood Mafia in Mean Streets is not a big enterprise like the
Mafia in Coppola’s film.33 One could start watching the film ‘half-way
through’– for example, when there is an outbreak of violence in the
group – and then, after the terrible shooting-down of Charlie, Johnny
Boy and Teresa, see the opening images of the film. The beginning of
Mean Streets suggests that one should be free from the temptation to
know the end of the film, and that an alternative end is possible.
Conjectures are part of any storytelling.
The ruthless young protagonists in Mean Streets are adolescents
dreaming of cowboy and gangster movies, and living the ethos of some

songs from the 1960s, the era when pop music became big business, a
widespread industrial phenomenon establishing quick contacts
between cities, countries, musical traditions and cultures. The last cuts
of the film concentrate on the car in which Charlie, Johnny Boy and
Teresa are badly wounded by Michael (who carries out his revenge

against Johnny Boy, who has insulted him). In a frantic cross-cutting,
in these tragic final minutes, Scorsese juxtaposes scenes taking place at
the same time in different areas of the city: the three young people are
talking and singing in their car, while speeding at night on the
highway from downtown Manhattan to Brooklyn; Michael and the
killer (played by Scorsese himself) are speeding in another car chasing
after them; Tony is, as always, in the bar he owns, where so many
episodes take place; in the street festival in Little Italy an elderly crowd
dances and listens to old Italian songs; Charlie’s uncle, who is part of a
rather inoffensive Mafia, switches on his television and quietly watches
a film in his flat.
The scene on television comes from Fritz Lang’s The Big Heat (1953):
the protagonist takes his dead wife out of his car. This scene constitutes
a turning-point in the life of the protagonist, and introduces an ethical
dimension to the events. From the uncle’s room, the cross-cutting
jumps to the terrible image of Johnny Boy, wounded in the neck,
limping along a wall, then to Teresa as she is taken out from the car by
the police. Quickly the camera moves to Charlie as he falls to his
knees, his arm bleeding. Chance, coincidences, events taking place at
the same time, mixing fiction and reality – all this is part of the every-
day pulse of the city. Cinema can be documentary and fiction at the
same time. The way in which metropolitan life solicits human percep-
tion is not very different from the way in which cinema does: our
senses and nerves are constantly forced to a high degree of attention,
so high that at some point this nervous excess is integrated in our
minds and constitutes the precondition of our experience.
Scorsese’s reference to Lang is important for another reason: it
stresses the presence of the universe of film. The scene from The Big
Heat is the third and last quotation in the film: the first one was a fero-
cious scene in a western, and the second a sequence from The Tomb of
Ligeia by Roger Corman (the hyperactive film-maker and Scorsese’s
mentor who financed Mean Streets).34 The image taken from The Big
Heat alludes to the circulation of images through different media, from
cinema to television; the two previous quotations come from the
screen of movie-theatres, where Charlie and his friend like to spend
time. Scorsese’s generation became acquainted with films also – and

Martin Scorsese 207
sometimes only – through television. Besides the similarity of a car and

a woman being taken out of it, and the fact that in Mean Streets, too,
the scene marks a turning-point in the adventures of the protagonists,
the short dramatic scene from The Big Heat appears as a statement
about the type of cinema Scorsese seeks. In this way, he openly

acknowledges his multifold European influences, and the link between
the United States and Europe in the 1960s. Cities are space, time and
culture, or, more exactly, a mixing of cultures; audiovisual technology
increases the possibility of cultural exchanges; and the rapidity with
which the image and the sound can be diffused can enhance the urban
dimension of cultures. Metropolises are where cultures cross, constant
movement back and forth characterizes the cultural network: the
meeting of cultures happens in time and space, following not the
model of evolution but that of contagion. Cultures do not develop like
plants, they spread like viruses.
Mean Streets, which has been seen as the most autobiographical of
Scorsese’s works, proves indeed that his childhood and adolescence in
New York, in Elisabeth Street, is important for him. But that presence
of New York can be felt also as a cinematic phenomenon – it belongs
to the film-maker’s intellectual biography, to his cinephilia. Scorsese’s
ideals about film are infused with his life in the Village, in the 1960s, at
the time when he was a film student at New York University. It was the
period, as he said, of ‘the height of the French New Wave, the inter-
national success of the Italian art cinema and the discovery of the new
Eastern European cinema’.35 The New Wave was part of the recent her-
itage; the minds of young film-makers from New York and from Los
Angeles (such as Francis Coppola) were filled with images of American
films from their childhood. Then they discovered Truffaut, Resnais,
Rivette and Godard who, in their turn, had appreciated American
cinema, contrary to the general response in France in the 1950s. The
young crowd who wrote in the Cahiers du cinéma loved westerns,
thrillers, American comedies, gangsters and cowboys. They loved
Howard Hawks and Alfred Hitchcock, and they were deeply influenced
by American cinema when they started making films. Scorsese often
recalls the sense of freedom that the first two minutes of Truffaut’s Jules
and Jim gave and still give to him – a sense of freedom similar to what
one can experience in the first minutes of Mean Streets: the thrill of
making a film, of thinking and feeling through the camera, ‘of using
the camera as a pen’, as Truffaut said. The camera is actually shown in
Mean Streets towards the end of its cast and credits list, as it is shown at
the beginning of Godard’s Le Mépris, and so many times in Michael

Powell’s Peeping Tom. And, as in Jules and Jim, at the beginning of Mean
Streets the rhythm of images is accelerated as if re-enacting the motion
typical of a silent movie.
The young American avant-garde in the sixties was formed by the
‘underground’ international movement, by the experimental cinema

of the New York group ‘Independent Cinema’, and by journals like
Film Culture and The Village Voice: critics like Andrew Sarris and Jonas
Mekas, the founder of the New York Film-makers’ Cooperative in 1962
– and himself a film-maker – were receptive to the French New Wave
and its aesthetics.36
The Big Heat had been condemned in Europe as a banal American
thriller; those who admired the German period of Lang found it very
disappointing. But François Truffaut wrote an enthusiastic review in
an important issue of the Cahiers du cinéma, while at the same time
his long article ‘Une certaine tendance’37 (‘A Certain Tendency’) criti-
cized the so-called ‘réalisme poétique’ (poetical realism) typical of
French cinema. The young writers of the Cahiers du cinéma were com-
mitted to the defence of cinema as a true art; they launched what
they called ‘la politique des auteurs’ (the authors’ politics) – a 1963
issue of Film Culture was devoted to this question. For the New Wave
artists, a film is not an isolated work but belongs fully to a series of
works by the same author, developing certain themes, a certain style
and technique.
Today, postmodern correctness makes it seem criminal to take
authorship into account in a critical study, as if by so doing the critic
would not be a true follower of the dogma of ‘the death of the author’,
so fashionable in the structuralist and post-structuralist critical
approaches of the 1970s and 1980s. But we have moved on since then.
Authorship is not simply a historical and ideological construction, but
also an aesthetic phenomenon. To talk about authorship does not
mean that one considers the artist to be either endowed with divine
power or full of subjective, old-fashioned beliefs; it simply allows one
to take into account the imagination without which artistic production
is impossible (even if we are in the era of absolute consumption and
technological reproduction). In any event, for those who wanted to
make films in the 1960s, the theories of the New Wave were essential,
and did not in the least contradict the commercial aspect of cinema.
And well-intentioned academics should rest easy: the most avant-garde
tendency in film and film criticism in the 1950s and 1960s was not
influenced by Maurice Blanchot’s nihilism. Godard claimed the values
of classicism.

Martin Scorsese 209
An author is an artist who through time and effort tries to define

his/her themes, manners, even obsessions. To be an author means
having a certain style. In a film, the spectator must be able to recognize
a signature, a style, an atmosphere, something that accounts for the
unity of a project. The Big Heat does not, Truffaut insists, betray the

essence of Fritz Lang, who focused on the conflict between the individ-
ual and society, on ‘the moral solitude’ of a hero who ‘becomes the
justice-dispenser of himself’. ‘The favourite theme of Lang is moral
solitude: a single individual fighting alone against a half-hostile, half-
indifferent universe.’38
The Big Heat is not a simple thriller but a real drama about the cor-
rupted world of the Chicago Mafia and police in the 1950s. Not unlike
the protagonist of The Big Heat, Charlie in Mean Streets experiences an
internal conflict in the Little Italy of the early 1970s: he lives and tries
to find his way through an atmosphere of small juvenile Mafia com-
bined with the pop music of the 1960s and even the 1950s, old-
fashioned Neapolitan songs, gun shots, everyday racism, and the
Catholic themes of sin and penitence.39
New York is defined by different perspectives: as a concrete reality,
an allegory, and a cultural network. Streets, bars, apartments, public
spaces, noises, people, violence are filmed by a young artist who has
been influenced by the documentary and low-budget narratives typical
of the New York Film-makers Group, and by a New York artist who
understands the New Wave and their aesthetic preferences. Scorsese
often translates ideas from the French directors into his New York
reality and allegory. Again, think of the famous sequence in Taxi
Driver: Travis, in his miserable flat in Manhattan, practises his skills on
all the guns he has bought. His hands move deftly, testing the guns,
and, using wooden and metal bits and pieces he takes from a drawer,
he patiently puts together an extraordinary machine. This scene
indeed recalls an atmosphere typical of Robert Bresson, of his ‘tran-
scendental style’, to use the expression that Paul Schrader, the screen-
play writer for Taxi Driver, stigmatized in the title of his important
1972 book on Ozu, Bresson and Dryer.40 In the wonderful performance
by De Niro (another New Yorker whom Scorsese met in his neighbour-
hood when they were young),41 the protagonist is totally absorbed in
his work: he does not speak, there is no music, only some sounds
coming from the objects and the outside world. There is no psycho-
logical digression, only the bare facts which constitute an activity with
a very precise aim. One can juxtapose, as is done in the illustrations to
Scorsese by Scorsese, this scene from Taxi Driver with some shots from

Bresson’s Pick Pocket (1959), when the main character is taught by an

accomplice how to move his hands quickly and delicately.
Think, too, of Bresson’s Un condamné à mort s’est échappé (1956):
Lieutenant Fontaine, imprisoned near Lyon by the Germans in 1943, is
determined to escape and, day after day, with the help of a spoon, he

tries remove the nails holding his cell door. In the sequence from Taxi
Driver, it is as if Scorsese had transposed that patient work from the
French prison during the war, into another prison, the American
metropolis in the years following the Vietnam war. Travis’s room does
in fact resemble a prison-cell, with grids, dim light and noises coming
from outside. Travis himself is a prisoner of his suffering and obses-
sions, and of the toughness of Manhattan life. This metropolitan
cowboy, as the character has often been defined, is haunted by the idea
of salvation, like the character portrayed by John Wayne in John Ford’s
The Searchers (1956), who succeeds in ‘saving’ his niece from the
Indians and bringing her back to her family. Actually, Travis, in the
streets of Manhattan, experiences a battle similar to the Vietnam war:
in fact, towards the end of the film, when he is going to accomplish his
project, his head is shaved, as if he belonged to the Mohawk squad, the
most fearsome group in Vietnam, specializing in guerrilla warfare.
Besides direct quotations or allusions to other films, Scorsese cannot
but integrate in his mind some cinematic effects and re-elaborate them
according to his own invention. The famous scene of Travis’s massacre
in the hotel where the young prostitute Iris meets her clients can be
interpreted as an extraordinary example of the way in which the uni-
verse of cinema offers Scorsese the dictionary from which he freely
develops his imagination. Travis wants to save Iris (the adolescent
Jodie Foster); almost unrecognizable in his Mohawk hair-cut, he gets
back to the building where he had previously met Iris’s pimp (Harvey
Keitel). After a short conversation, Travis shoots him and enters the
hotel to find the young girl. He shoots everyone he meets. They shoot
back at him; blood glistens on the staircase and on the walls. In spite
of his wounds, Travis continues to go up the staircase to the room
where Iris is with a man: the interior looks very much like a small
baroque altar in Sicily or in Spain. The shooting goes on incessantly, as
in Hawks’ The Red River; blood flows everywhere, Iris cries among the
dead bodies, and finally Travis sits, bleeding, on an old couch, after
having tried unsuccessfully to kill himself with his last empty revolver.
Suddenly, after all that shooting and screaming, there is a terrible
silence, which inevitably slows down the rhythm of the scene. This
impression is emphasized by the camera’s movement while a policeman

Martin Scorsese 211
enters cautiously, his arm outstretched and pointing his gun. At this
moment the soundtrack starts up again, with Bernard Herrmann’s jazz-
blues sounds. As the notes rise, the image catches their movement: the
music goes higher and higher and the image moves up to that extra-
ordinary, completely vertical shot of the massacre. The camera turns

slowly above the room. Its movement is as slow and ample as the circu-
lar expansion of the music. Slowly, terribly slowly, objects and bodies
become visible. Furniture, bodies and blood are seen from above. The
camera, always slowly and from above, flattens down the heads and the
shoes of the policemen, the threshold of the room and the corridor,
where finally the usual horizontal angle of vision is re-instated.
Fully vertical high-angle shots are unusual.42 When they are used,
the aim is normally to offer a realist perspective – as it would be, for
example, from the height of a building or of an aeroplane. But in Taxi
Driver’s massacre scene the viewpoint cannot correspond to the per-
spective of any character. It can only be an intellectual intervention
that recalls the allegorical presence of the city and the real presence of
the camera and the work of film-making. Obviously, a considerable
amount of practical, costly work has gone into shooting that scene:
drilling the floor in the apartment above the one where the massacre
took place, constructing a sort of rail where the camera could turn to
embrace the whole scene down below. In fact, Paul Schrader and other
people working on the film were strongly opposed to Scorsese’s idea.
Where does that urgency of the imagination come from? It comes
from the layers of memory, from the immense universe that is cinema.
The film-maker can consult both voluntarily and involuntarily the dic-
tionary of cinema. And cinema, like architecture and the city, has to
do with matter (very probably, cinema is facing today yet another
epoch in its history: after the silent movie, and the talkies, now special
effects and images constructed with the aid of the computer are
making an ever stronger impact). When we look at a film, we some-
times try and perceive the other side of the iceberg, the work that went
into realizing the smooth dance of images that is now in front of our
eyes: where, when and how did the shooting take place? It seems
impossible, for example, to look at the famous Odessa steps scene in
Eisenstein’s Battleship Potemkin without thinking of the work it implied
(Eisenstein himself recounts all this in detail in his writings).
The argument of my chapter can now go back to its beginning.
The imagination of Scorsese has stored striking cinematic effects
since his childhood and adolescence. He has lived, so to speak, with
those effects. We know that Scorsese was deeply impressed by

Eisenstein when he entered ‘half-way through’ in a Manhattan theatre

where Alexandre Nevsky was showing. The famous battle on the ice
filled his eyes and imagination: ‘It was like being in a time machine, as
if I were there watching the battle on the ice in 1242! Seeing the design
of the film, I fell under the spell of Eisenstein and his style of editing.’43

In the last part of this battle on the ice, a long series of shots that lasts
for more than three minutes shows the German warriors as they are
swallowed by the ice that breaks under their weight. This cut is spec-
tacular: from an almost completely vertical perspective, we see men
and horses falling through the cracks in the ice. After a useless struggle,
in a frantic scramble of swords, spears, helmets, legs, arms and hooves,
they are sucked down into the pitiless icy-cold water. At the end of this
scene, the Russian warriors appear at the top of a hill, looking down
over their white, chilling ice-victory.
The magic of Eisenstein’s editing is re-enacted by Scorsese, who exag-
gerates the conditions of vertical vision. Taxi Driver’s massacre is not
observed by any human eye, but only by the camera as it moves along
the rail on the smashed floor of the flat from which the scene is shot.
Scorsese goes further than Eisenstein: the presence of the cinema itself is
stronger than that of people – in the same way as the presence of New
York is stronger than that of the characters (and the camera can be an
allegory of the city looking at itself). In his immense theoretical work,
the Russian film-maker had criticized the narrow-minded position of
those who thought that a high angle could only be justified by the pres-
ence of a person looking from above. Eisenstein thought that any exces-
sive perspective and light could be justified by the attempt to express the
intensity of a character’s perception and consciousness.44 But in Travis’s
massacre everything is beyond human perception and consciousness.
The camera, and nothing but the camera, has the possibility of being
ubiquitous. The camera can see what no human gaze can see. The
camera can realize all dreams, fantasies; it can be the instrument of an
incommensurable voyeurism, and of a visual dance in which human
physical limitations are defied. Sight can be from above, from below,
from beneath, defying the boundaries of space and light and move-
ment. The visible and the invisible are equally reachable. Godard’s
message in Le Mépris was right: the camera is to the modern world
what the gods were to the ancient world. As I have mentioned, the
camera is actually visible throughout the cast and credit listing for
Mean Streets. The camera is a tool, a material object which has to deal
with a mise-en-scène composed by objects and bodies. If the camera is
an instrument of thought, one should not forget the amount of matter

Martin Scorsese 213
that is necessary for making a film. An important sequence in Taxi

Driver points to the work of the camera and the film-maker: in a black-
humour scene where Scorsese himself plays one of the many clients for
Travis’s cab, Travis has to listen to a madman who frantically talks of
killing his wife. He wants the cab to stop in front of the building where

his wife is with her lover, and look through a window where a light is
on. Clearly the window looks very much like a screen.
Scorsese, influenced by Powell’s voyeuristic camera and by the
‘caméra stylo’ of the New Wave, is paying tribute to Eisenstein’s talent
with his own invention, with his audacious high-angle shot in Travis’s
massacre scene. Poe said that the new is the result of a different combi-
nation of known elements. In Travis’s massacre many sources of inspira-
tion are condensed to brilliant effect: the lessons of Hawks, Powell,
Truffaut and Orson Welles,45 and especially that almost unconscious
recollection of Alexander Nevsky’s impressive battle on the ice. No words,
no long explanations are necessary: Scorsese may mention Eisenstein
only a couple of times, but films speak the language of images, and
Eisenstein’s editing has worked its spell on Scorsese’s mind.
In his Voyage through American Movies, Scorsese advises young film-
makers to study the great masters (which does not mean simply to
copy them). They can explain what cinema is. They can teach one how
to be daring. All tricks are possible to achieve one’s end: such as alter-
ing the floor of an apartment to obtain a straight vertical vision. No
one understood and felt more fully than Eisenstein, the great pioneer
of the beginning of the twentieth century, that cinema is a wonderful
artifice, an extravagant machine which has to respond to the orders of
the imagination.46 The shooting of Alexander Nevsky required that
nature be turned upside down: the torrid heat of Siberia’s summer had
to be transformed into the chilling winter of the 1242 war between the
Russians and the Germans. All that vast expanse of thick, white ice
that we see on the screen was completely artificial: piles of grass
pressed together and pasted with plaster.
Scorsese does not quote Eisenstein in the scene I am analysing, as he
clearly quotes Lang’s The Big Heat; nor does he directly allude to
Eisenstein, as he does to Bresson in the gun sequence in Travis’s apart-
ment. Scorsese has interiorized a cinematic effect from Eisenstein. I
would call this phenomenon exacerbation or amplification (as pop
music amplifies sounds). There is no resemblance between Travis’s
massacre and the 1242 battle on the ice. What is comparable is the
effect, the impact on the spectator, thanks to the intuition of a certain
way the camera is made to operate through artifice. Variation is a full

right of the imagination: the fall into the broken ice in Alexander
Nevsky takes place in the open air, while Travis’s massacre happens
totally in the interior of an apartment. This fact radicalizes Scorsese’s
vertical shot: it is as if a huge, Kafkaesque insect were moving about on
the ceiling, casting an absent-minded glance over the bloody event.

The slow-motion view of objects, people and décor increases the sense
of absurdity. It appears to be the end; it is the end, even if the story
goes on and the film continues with the sardonic bouncing back of
Travis as a hero, and with his return to his usual business of driving
around the city.
Amplification can give new impetus to cinematic effects, and push
even further the parallelism between Eisenstein and Scorsese. The
making of Alexander Nesvky realized an important idea in Eisenstein’s
film practice – that the very close relationship between image and
soundtrack, which he called ‘vertical montage’, was different from
what he called ‘intellectual montage’, which has to do with the way in
which fragments of montage direct the meaning of images. The
Russian film-maker collaborated with the composer Sergei Prokofiev, as
is well documented by the rich correspondence between the two
artists. In vertical montage, music cannot be reduced to its most
obvious ornamental role. Music has the power of forging the image.
Eisenstein explained how the vertical movement of swords and spears
in the battle was totally inspired by Prokofiev’s ascending notes. The
opposite could also be true: sometimes the visual rhythm of an image
could direct the sound of musical instruments, and Prokofiev would
translate the language of Eisenstein’s images into the language of
music. Many variables are possible, since what really matters is the
vital relationship between the sound and the image.
Taxi Driver is unthinkable without its Bernard Herrmann score.47
Scorsese wanted him to work on the film. He describes how he tried
very hard to convince him. Herrmann accepted after having seen the
scene of De Niro pouring whisky on his cereals. The rhythm of
Herrmann’s notes inspired the splendid credits accompaniment where
the yellow cab drives through Manhattan’s streets in the rain. The city
lights, as they are visible through the car’s windshield covered with
raindrops, recur in the film, and at some length at the end when Travis
resumes his driving along the avenues, among red lights, people cross-
ing the streets, and many other cars with their lights. The traffic moves
like a long river, both fitful and flowing, with steady, melancholy stops
and starts along with Herrmann’s rhythm, which is somewhere
between cool jazz and blues. Actually his notes are those lights and

Martin Scorsese 215
raindrops: they move forward, follow one another, connect up, leap
and spread on the screen, into our ears and eyes. Herrmann’s notes are
pure sound vibrations that become visual matter, as in a famous
passage from Sartre’s Nausea, jazz notes are described by words, become
words. Sartre’s ‘existential novel’ was well known to Schrader and

Scorsese.48 This passage can illustrate the ‘aesthetic of dissapearance’
typical of metropolitan impressions, of film and music:
For the moment, the jazz is playing; there is no melody, only notes, a
myriad of tiny jolts. They know no rest, an inflexible order gives birth
to them and destroys them without even giving time to recuperate
and exist for themselves. They race, they press forward, they strike me
like a sharp blow in passing and are obliterated. I would like to hold
them back, but I know if I succeeded in stopping one it would remain
between my fingers only as a raffish languishing sound.49
Scorsese has been thinking through very thoroughly the relationship

between image and sound, ever since he saw The Tales of Hoffmann,
long before making those of his films whose main subject is music
(New York, New York (1997), The Last Waltz (1978)), and maybe since
the time he edited Woodstock (1969), Mike Wadleigh’s documentary of
the three-day legendary rock concert. With Taxi Driver Scorsese success-
fully tries his own vertical montage, like Eisenstein. Cinema and its
effects are like a metropolis where one can stroll, stopping here and
there. The possibility of various relationships is immense: Herrmann
had written scores for Orson Welles and Alfred Hitchcock, and for
Scorsese’s friend Brian De Palma (for Obsession, 1976). Herrmann’s tune
penetrates Taxi Driver’s massacre room: it carries in its rhythms Iris’s
sobs, the useless click of Travis’s trigger, the ‘psch, psch, psch’ sound
that issues from his lips when, his fingers covered with blood against
his temple, he imitates the noise of a gun – like a child who plays
cowboys. Herrmann’s tune rises up, pours out, invades the space,
spreads its strangely muffled boom; the notes approach inexorably, but
nevertheless slowly, like the vertical slow-motion on the scene. The
sound goes back to the theme of the beginning of the film, amplifying
the mixing of brass and drums. The music is insistent, hammering,
repetitive: it becomes one with the comings and goings of the metro-
polis, with its eternal life.
Scorsese has captured the rhythm of New York: city, cinema, music
and image hold together.

Notes
Chapter 1: Edgar Allan Poe

1 This chapter develops one of the arguments of my book Edgar Poe et la
Modernité: Breton, Barthes, Derrida, Blanchot (Birmingham, AL: Summa
Pubications, 1985), pp. 7–67. All translations, in all chapters, are mine,
unless otherwise indicated. Bibliographical references for texts frequently
cited and for other key texts are listed in the ‘General Bibliography’.
2 Edgar Allan Poe, ‘Marginalia’, Essays and Reviews (New York: Library of
America, 1984), pp. 1382–3. As Mallarmé said, ‘meditating, without
leaving any traces, becomes evanescent’; Stéphane Mallarmé, ‘Crise de
vers’, Oeuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade,
1945), p. 369. Mallarmé translated several poems by Poe.
3 Georges Bataille, The Story of the Eye, trans. J. Neugroschel, with essays by
R. Barthes and S. Sontag (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), pp. 70–4.
4 Roland Barthes, ‘The Metaphor of the Eye’, trans. J. A. Underwood, pub-
lished as an appendix to Georges Bataille, The Story of the Eye, pp. 119–27.
5 Poe, ‘Annabel Lee’, The Complete Tales and Poems (New York: Modern
Library, 1938; repr. New York: Vintage, 1975), p. 958. My emphasis.
6 ‘To Helen’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 950. My emphasis.
7 ‘Eleonora’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 651.
8 ‘Ligeia’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 656.
9 See Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘Each and All’, The Complete Works, Poems, vol. 9
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1903–4; repr. New York: AMS Press, 1968),
p. 4–6.
10 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Aids to Reflection (London: W. Pickering, 1848),
p. 5.
11 Emerson, ‘Nature’, The Complete Works, vol. 1, p. 10. My emphasis.
12 ‘The Transcendentalist’, ibid., p. 330–1.
14 Ibid., p. 656.
15 Ibid., p. 657.
16 ‘Morella’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 668.
17 See Allen Tate, ‘Our Cousin, Mr. Poe’, Essays of Four Decades (Chicago:
Swallow Press, 1968), pp. 385–400.
19 Ibid., p. 654.
20 ‘Morella’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 667 .
21 Ibid.
22 Emerson, ‘Plato; or, the Philosopher’, The Complete Works, vol. 4, p. 41.
23 One effect of Poe’s approach was his constant fear of plagiarism and of
those who appropriate phrases and ideas without admitting it. For that
would bring about the same monstrosity as ‘Morella’, namely the identical
or the homogeneous.
216

Notes 217
24 Hermann Melville, Moby Dick, or the White Whale (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1947), p. 122.
25 ‘The Domain of Arnheim’, The Complete Tales and Poems, pp. 607–8.
26 Ibid., p. 607.
27 Ibid., p. 609.
28 ‘Ligeia’, The Complete Tales and Poems, pp. 665–6.

29 Marie Bonaparte, Edgar Poe, sa vie et son oeuvre: Etude analytique (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1958), vol. 2, p. 287.
30 Ibid.
31 ‘The Black Cat’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 224. My emphasis.
32 Ibid. My emphasis.
33 ‘The Philosophy of Composition’, Essays and Reviews, p. 19.
34 Stéphane Mallarmé, ‘Préface. Avant-dire au Traité du verbe’, Oeuvres com-
plètes, p. 857.
35 Ibid., p. 858.
36 ‘Marginalia’, Essays and Reviews, p. 1331.
37 Ibid.
38 ‘Berenice’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 643
39 ‘James Russell Lowell’, Essays and Reviews, p. 809.
41 ‘Berenice’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 643–4.
42 Ibid., p. 646.
43 ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 303.
45 Ibid., p. 1459.
46 ‘Rufus Dawes’, Essays and Reviews, p. 492. Poe criticizes ‘the queer tone of
philosophical rhapsody’ of Dawes’ poem ‘Geraldine’: ‘There is now much
about Kant and Fichte; about Schelling, Hegel and Cousin (which is made
to rhyme with gang)’ (p. 495).
47 ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’, p. 303.
48 Ibid.
49 See M. Bonaparte, Edgar Poe, sa vie et son oeuvre, vol. 1, p. 38.
50 ‘A Few Words on Secret Writing’, Essays and Reviews, pp. 1277–91.
52 ‘A Tale of the Ragged Mountains’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 686–7.
53 The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym, in The Complete Tales and Poems,
p. 883.
54 Ibid., p. 882.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., p. 878.
57 Ibid., p. 882.
58 ‘Berenice’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 646.
59 Ibid., p. 642.
60 Ibid., p. 648.
61 Emerson, ‘Language’, ‘Nature’, The Complete Works, vol. 1, p. 25.
62 Ibid.
63 See Francis Otto Matthiessen, American Renaissance: Art and Expression in
the Age of Emerson and Whitman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941),
pp. 134–5.

218 Notes
64 Emerson, ‘Nature’, The Complete Works, vol. 1, p. 1.

65 See H. Melville, Pierre, or the Ambiguities (New York: New American Library,
1964), p. 65.
66 Emerson, ‘History’, The Complete Works, vol. 2, pp. 5–6.
67 ‘Marginalia’, Essays and Reviews, p. 1384. One of his tales, taking the form
of a dialogue, is entitled ‘The Power of Words’ (The Complete Tales and

Poems, pp. 440–3).
68 ‘The Poetic Principle’, Essays and Reviews, p. 75.
69 Georges Poulet, Les Métamorphoses du cercle (Paris: Gallimard, 1979),
pp. 295–319.
70 ‘The Power of Words’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 442.
72 Ibid., p. 1409.
73 Emerson, ‘The Poet’, The Complete Works, vol. 3, p. 7.
74 Ibid., p. 8.
75 Ibid., p. 26. My emphasis.
76 ‘Elisabeth Barret Browning’, Essays and Reviews, p. 139.
77 Emerson, ‘The Poet’, The Complete Works, vol. 3, p. 26.
79 Ibid., p. 1364.
80 ‘The Murders in the Rue Morgue’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 141.
81 Ibid.
82 Paul Valéry, Monsieur Teste, in Oeuvres, vol. 2 (Paris: Gallimard,
Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1960), p. 11.
83 Ibid., p. 67.
85 ‘Nathaniel Hawthorne’, Essays and Reviews, p. 572.
86 Ibid., p. 571.
87 Coleridge, cited by F. O. Matthiessen, American Renaissance: Art and
Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman, p. 133.
88 Coleridge, cited by F. O. Matthiessen, ibid., p. 134.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
92 Poe, ‘Ligeia’, Tales, p. 661. No wonder Poe is admired by the decadent hero
par excellence in the French novel of the late nineteenth century: Des
Esseintes, in Joris Karl Huysmans’ A rebours.
93 E. T. A. Hoffmann, ‘The Sandman’, Tales, trans. R. J. Hollingdale
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), p. 116.
94 Ibid., p. 117.
95 ‘The Man of the Crowd’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 481. As is well
known, Walter Benjamin comments on this tale in his essay ‘On Some
Motifs in Baudelaire’, Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn (New York:
Schocken Books, 1969, 1985), pp. 170–2.
96 ‘The Man of the Crowd’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 481. This edition
and some others give ‘er lässt sich nicht lesen’; other edition give the
pronoun ‘es’.
97 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (New York: Putnam & Wiley, 1848) vol. 1,
p. 205.

Notes 219
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., pp. 205–6.
100 Ibid., p. 370.
101 Ibid., p. 378.
102 Poe, ‘Marginalia’, Essays and Reviews, p. 1451.
103 Poe, ‘Thomas Moore’, Essays and Reviews, p. 334.

104 ‘The Murders in the Rue Morgue’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 142.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid., p. 143.
109 ‘The Black Cat’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 223.
110 ‘The Imp of the Perverse’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 283.
111 Ibid.
113 ‘The Imp of the Perverse’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 281.
114 Ibid., p. 283.
116 Ibid., p. 230.
118 Ibid.
120 ‘The Murders in the rue Morgue’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 141.
121 ‘The Tell-tale Heart’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 303. My emphasis.
122 ‘The Man of the Crowd’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 481.
123 ‘Berenice’, The Complete Tales and Poems, p. 646.
124 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
130 Marie Bonaparte, of course, interpreted the story in terms of the mythical
act of killing one’s own father, as in the legend of Chronos and Saturn, or
in the eternal narrative of Oedipus.
Chapter 2: Van Gogh and Hofmannsthal

1 A different version of this chapter was given as a lecture at a colloquium
entitled ‘La modernité’, at the Musée Rodin, Paris, in 1982.
2 Charles Baudelaire, Les Fleurs du Mal, in Oeuvres complètes, vol. 1 (Paris:
Gallimard, 1975), p. 134.
3 Baudelaire, Le Peintre de la vie moderne, Oeuvres complètes, vol. 2 (Paris:
Gallimard, 1976), p. 684. The Painter of Modern Life, and other Essays, trans.
Jonathan Mayne (London: Phaidon, 1964, 1995), p. 3.
4 Ibid., p. 13.
5 Salon de 1845, Oeuvres complètes, vol. 2, p. 353. The Salon of 1845, Art in
Paris, 1845–1862. Salons and Other Exibitions Reviewed by Charles Baudelaire,

220 Notes
trans. and ed. Johnathan Mayne (London: Phaidon Press, 1965; Ithaca, New
York: Cornell Paperbacks, 1981), p. 3.
6 Baudelaire, The Salon of 1846, Art in Paris, p. 65.
7 Georg Trakl, Selected Poems, trans. R. Grenier, M. Hamburger, D. Luke and
C. Middleton (London: Cape, 1968), pp. 18–19.
8 Baudelaire, ‘The Life and Works of Eugène Delacroix’, The Painter of Modern

Life and Other Essays, p. 44.
9 Ibid.
10 Vincent Van Gogh, Lettres à son frère Théo (Paris: Grasset, 1982), pp. 34 and
37 (letter dated July 1880).
11 Hugo von Hofmannsthal, ‘Colours’, from ‘The Letters of the Man Who
Returned’, Selected Prose, trans. Mary Hottinger and Tania and James Stern
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1952), pp. 146–7.
12 Baudelaire, The Salon de 1846, Art in Paris, p. 418.
13 Hofmannsthal, ‘Colours’, Selected Prose, p. 149.
14 See the chapter ‘Gustav Klimt: Painting and the Crisis of the Liberal Ego’, in
Carl Shorske, Fin-de-siècle Vienna (New York: Knopf, 1980), pp. 208–78.
15 Hofmannsthal, ‘The Letter of Lord Chandos’, Selected Prose, pp. 132–4.
16 Hofmannsthal, ‘Colours’, Selected Prose, pp. 142–3.
17 Hofmannsthal, ‘Die Bühne als Traumbild’, Reden und Aufsätze I (1891–1913),
Gesammelte Werke (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1979),
pp. 490–1.
18 Walter Benjamin, Briefe, vol. 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1978), p. 852.
19 Van Gogh, Lettres, p. 202 (Aug. 1888).
20 Ibid., pp. 215–16 (Sept. 1888).
21 Ibid., p. 214.
22 Hofmannsthal, ‘Colours’, Selected Prose, pp. 148–9.
23 Hofmannsthal, ‘The Letter of Lord Chandos’, Selected Prose, p. 136.
24 Ibid., p. 137.
27 Ibid., p. 137.
28 Ibid., p. 139–40.
30 Hofmannsthal, ‘Balzac’, Selected Prose, p. 273.
32 Hofmannsthal, ‘Der Dichter und diese Zeit’, Reden und Aufsätze I,
Gesammelte Werke, p. 78.
Chapter 3: Baudelaire, Haussmann, Fustel de Coulanges

1 This chapter was first published in Suzanne Nash, ed., Home and its
Dislocations in Nineteenth-Century France (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1993), pp. 147–65.
2 See Edgar Allan Poe, ‘The Man of the Crowd’, The Complete Tales and Poems
(New York: Modern Library, 1938; reprint New York: Vintage, 1975),
pp. 480–1.
3 Charles Baudelaire, Les Fleurs du Mal, in Oeuvres complètes, vol. 1, pp. 87–9.
4 Ibid., p. 75.

Notes 221
5 ‘In Baudelaire allegory’s illusory character is not confessed and declared,

opposite from the baroque.’ Walter Benjamin, ‘Zentralpark’, Charles
Baudelaire. Ein Lyrkler im Zeitalter des Hochcapitalismus, Gesammelte Schriften,
vol. 1, pt 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974), p. 659.
6 Bertolt Brecht, ‘Uber den Realismus 1937 bis 1941’, Schriften zur Literatur
und Kunst 2, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 19 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,

1967), p. 299.
7 Ibid., p. 309.
8 Ibid., p. 312.
9 Benjamin, ‘Zentralpark’, p. 658.
10 Les Fleurs du Mal, Oeuvres complètes, vol 1, p. 11.
11 Ibid., p. 1025.
12 P. B. Shelley, ‘Peter Bell and the Third Part’, quoted by Benjamin, ‘Das Paris
des Second Empire bei Baudelaire’, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 562.
13 Brecht, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 19, p. 346.
14 Baudelaire, ‘Puisque réalisme il y a’, Oeuvres complètes, vol. 2, p. 58.
15 Ibid., p. 1123.
16 Ibid., p. 80.
17 Oeuvres complètes, vol. 1, p. 424.
18 See Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, trans. Annette Lavers and Colin
Smith (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), p. 5.
19 Barthes said in Leçon that one is uni-dimensional and the other multi-
dimensional. Literature always tried to come to terms with this discrepancy
between language and reality, therefore ‘literature, whatever the school in
whose name it declares itself, is absolutely, categorically, realist’. See
‘Inaugural Lecture, Collège de France’, in A Barthes Reader, trans. Richard
Howard, with an introduction by Susan Sontag (New York: Hill and Wang,
1981), p. 18. This realism coming out of the discrepancy between language
and reality is what I call allegorical realism.
20 Les Fleurs du Mal, Oeuvres complètes, vol. 1, p. 92.
21 ‘The masses had become so much a part of Baudelaire that it is rare to find a
description of them in his works.’ Benjamin, ‘On Some Motifs in
Baudelaire’, Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken books,
1985), p. 167.
22 Benjamin, ‘Zentralpark’, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1, pt 1, p. 548.
23 Georg Simmel, ‘The Metropolis and Mental Life’, The Sociology of Georg
Simmel, trans. Kurt H. Wolff (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 410.
24 P. B. Shelley, ‘Peter Bell and the Third Part’, quoted by Benjamin, ‘Das Paris
des Second Empire bei Baudelaire’, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1, pt 2, p. 562.
25 Baudelaire, The Painter of Modern Life, The Painter of Modern Life and Other
Essays (London: Phaedon Press, 1964, repr. 1995), p. 4.
26 Thomas Carlyle, ‘Signs of the Time’, Selected Writings (London: Penguin,
1980), p. 65.
27 See Max Weber, The City, trans. D. Martindale and G. Neuwirth (New York:
Free Press, 1958), p. 65–89.
28 Baron Haussmann, Mémoires, vol. 1 (Paris: Victor-Havard, 1890–3), p. 32.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., vol 3, p. 55, quoted by Sigfried Giedion, Space, Time, and Architecture
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 649.

222 Notes

32 Benjamin talks about Baudelaire’s social awareness in ‘Zentralpark’, p. 88.
34 I mean here radical in the intellectual sense, and not in the narrowly politi-
cal sense, since Baudelaire moved quite easily from the 1848 barricades to
his scorn for militant literature. See Baudelaire, Oeuvres complètes, vol. 1,

p. 679 and 691.
35 Baudelaire, The Salon de 1845, Art in Paris, p. 32.
36 On the ambiguity of the modern see Antoine Compagnon, Les Cinq para-
doxes de la modernité (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1990).
37 Oeuvres complètes, vol. 1, p. 275–6. Paris Spleen, trans. Louise Varèse (New
York: New Directions, 1947), p. ix–x. Benjamin quotes these famous pas-
sages in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1, pt 2, p. 617.
38 The bibliography could be endless. See Fritz Stern, ed., The Varieties of
History from Voltaire to the Present (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p. 57.
For a brilliant discussion of the dictum, see Stephen Bann, The Clothing of
Clio (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 8–14.
39 Fustel de Coulanges, in François Hartog, ‘Choix de textes de Fustel de
Coulanges’, Le XIXe siècle et l’histoire: le cas Fustel de Coulanges (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1988), p. 341.
40 Haussmann, Mémoires, vol. 1, p. xi–xii.
41 See Arnoldo Momigliano, ‘The Ancient City of Fustel de Coulanges’, Essays
in Ancient and Modern Historiography (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977), p. 329. For
the most illuminating reading of Fustel de Coulanges, see Hartog, ‘La Cité
antique et la cité moderne’, Le XIXe siècle et l’histoire, pp. 23–95. See also his
foreword to Fustel de Coulanges, La Cité antique (Paris: Flammarion, 1984),
pp. v–xxv.
42 La Cité antique, p. 2.
43 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur l’origine et les fondemens de l’inégalité‚ and
Fragments politiques, Oeuvres complètes, vol. 3 (Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque
de la Pléiade, 1964), pp. 113 and 550.
45 Ibid., p. 307.
46 Momigliano, ‘The Ancient City’, p. 336.
47 La Cité antique, p. 26. Momigliano maintains that ‘the Cité antique would be
inconceivable without the arrival of the Aryans on the scene of ancient
history. The Celts and the Slavs entered Fustel’s mental horizon later on’
(‘The Ancient City’, p. 333).
48 See Momigliano, ‘The Ancient City’, p. 339.
49 He was wrongly perceived as a Catholic although he tried to make clear
that he was not a Christian. See ibid., p. 411, and Hartog, Le XIXe siècle et
l’histoire, p. 17.
50 His notion of patrie was close to Renan’s idea that a nation is ‘a spiritual prin-
ciple resulting from some deep historical complications’. (Qu’est-ce qu’une
nation?, Oeuvres complètes, vol. 1 (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1947), p. 902.) Hartog
exhaustively discusses the connections between Fustel and Renan, Le XIXe
siècle et l’histoire, pp. 44–61.
52 Momigliano, ‘The Ancient City’, p. 415.

Notes 223
53 Baudelaire, Le Spleen de Paris, Oeuvres complètes, vol. 1, p. 356.

54 Les Fleurs du Mal, ibid., p. 130.
55 Ibid., p. 134.
Chapter 4: Trieste as Frontier

1 This chapter was first published as ‘Lieu de retour ou lieu de fuite? De Slataper
à Bazlen’, Critique (‘Les mystères de Trieste’), 435–6 (1983), pp. 653–69.
Scipio Slataper was born in Trieste in 1888. His father Luigi, a Triestino of
Slovak origin, was a tradesman; his mother, the daughter of a German
woman, was the cousin of Scipione de Sandrinelli, who held public office in
Trieste up until 1909, as a representative of the national (liberal) party. In
1899, in the aftermath of a period of nervous depression, and of a serious
financial crisis suffered by his family, the young Scipio spent six months on
the Carso, the high plateau around Trieste. In 1908, he went to Florence,
and to the Istituto di Studi Superiori. While there, he published regularly in
the review La Voce. In 1911, he travelled for two months in central Europe,
visiting Vienna, Prague, Dresden and Berlin. In 1913, he obtained a post as
reader in Italian at the Colonial Institute in Hamburg. He was in Trieste in
1914 when war broke out. He immediately voiced his support for Italian
intervention. On December 1915 he fell in battle, on the Podgora Mt., near
Trieste. He published Il mio carso, in 1912; a translation of Hebbel’s journal,
also in 1912; a study of Ibsen, based upon his thesis, in 1916. Posthumous
writings: Scritti letterari e critici (Rome: La voce, 1920), Scritti politici (Rome:
La voce, 1925), Lettere (Turin: Buratti, 1931) and Appunti e note di diario
(Milan: Mondadori, 1953).
2 Slataper, Il mio carso (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1982), p. 31.
3 La voce, the first number of which appeared in December 1908, was an
exceptionally important review for Italian intellectual life in the early years
of the twentieth century. Founded by Giuseppe Prezzolini and Giovanni
Papini, on essentially Crocean lines (Croce himself had suggested entitling
it La cultura italiana), it may be considered an expression of the liberal intel-
ligentsia in crisis. Intellectual commitment was seen as a remedy for the
political degeneration of the country.
4 Il mio carso, p. 31.
5 The use of the epithet ‘barbaric’ in relation to poetry derives from the poet
Giosué Carducci. In 1889, having already written in Italian in Latin metres,
he published the Odi barbare, in which he employed a metre founded not
on quantity, as is the case with classical Latin metre, but on the tonic
accent. Thus, to the ears of their putative Latin audience, these poems
would have sounded barbaric. In this way Carducci forged his own brand of
classicism, reconciling it with modern notions of rhythm. Gabriele
D’Annunzio followed his example. Slataper’s barbarism entailed rejecting
verse altogether, so as to discover a harsh rhythm in prose.
6 Il mio carso, p. 90
7 Ibid., p. 56.
8 Ibid., p. 104.
9 Bazlen, Note senza testo (Milan: Adelphi, 1970), p. 72.

224 Notes
10 Ibid., p. 144.
11 Ibid., p. 132.
12 Ibid., p. 70.
13 Ibid., p. 39.
14 Ibid., p. 34.
15 Ibid., p. 119.

16 See Italo Calvino, ‘Afterword’, Del Giudice, Lo stadio di Wimbledon (Torino:
Einaudi, 1982), p. 127
17 Bazlen, Note senza testo, p. 41.
18 Lo stadio di Wimbledon, p. 29.
20 Lo stadio di Wimbleton, p. 106.
21 Ibid., p. 108.
22 Ibid., p. 44.
23 Ibid., p. 119.
25 Lo stadio di Wimbledon, p. 124.
Chapter 5: Aldo Rossi

1 A shorter version of this chapter was first published in ‘Piazza d’Italia:
l’architecture d’Aldo Rossi’, Critique (‘E l’Italia va’), 447–8 (1984),
pp. 681–92, as a review article of Aldo Rossi, A Scientific Autobiography,
postscript by Vincent Scully, trans. Lawrence Venuti (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1981), and Il libro azzurro. I miei progetti 1981 (Zurich: Jamileh
Weber Galerie-Edition, 1981).
The quotation is from A Scientific Autobiography, p. 78.
2 Ibid., p. 2.
3 Aldo Rossi, L’architettura della città (Padua: Marsilio, 1966), p. 11.
4 Rossi wrote the preface to Adolf Loos (Milan: Electa, 1982).
5 A Scientific Autobiography, p. 44.
6 Ibid., p. 75.
7 Ibid., p. 66.
8 ‘The Sacri Monti, characteristic forms of Lombard mannerism, were series of
chapels with depictions of sacred history, which pilgrims followed in their
narrative order culminating in the reproduction of a view of the Holy
Sepulchre.’ A. Tomlison, ‘Sacri Monti’, The Architectural Review, 116
(Dec. 1954), quoted in a note to A Scientific Autobiography, p. 2.
10 Ibid., p. 55.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., p. 35.
13 E. Bonfanti, R Bonicalzi, A. Rossi, M. Scolari and D. Vitale, Architettura
razionale (Milan: Electa, 1973); on Rossi’s rationalism, see A. Vidler, ‘La
troisième typologie’, Architecture rationnelle: la reconstruction de la ville
européenne, ed. L. Krier (Brussels: Editions des Archives d’architecture
moderne, 1978).

Notes 225
15 Ibid., p. 1.
16 Ibid., p. 54.
17 Ibid., p. 23.
18 Rossi, ‘Nuovi problemi’, in Casabella-Continuità, 264 (1962), p. 6. See Vittorio
Savi, L’architettura di Aldo Rossi (Milan: F. Angeli, 1976).

20 Ibid., p. 72.
21 Ibid., p. 78.
22 Ibid., p. 16.
23 Ibid., p. 57.
24 Ibid., p. 72.
25 Aldo Rossi, Il libro azzurro. I miei progetti, p. 32.
26 See the postscript to A Scientific Autobiography by Vincent Scul1y (pp. 114–15),
who finds that the cemetery in Modena recalls the Fascist monument of the
EUR in Rome.
28 For Rossi’s parallels with de Chirico, see Peter Eisenman, ‘The House of the
Dead as the City of Survival’, in Aldo Rossi in America, 1976 to 1979, ed.
Kenneth Frampton (New York: Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies,
1979), pp. 4–19.
29 Giorgio de Chirico, ‘Rêves’, La Révolution surréaliste, 1 (1 Dec. 1924).
31 Ibid., p. 76.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Aldo Rossi has spent a long time in Trieste, especially in 1974 on the occasion
of the competitions for the Palazzo della Regione and the Casa dello studente.
He has made several journeys to the United States; in 1977 be was Mellon
Professor at Cooper Union School of Architecture in New York.
36 Aldo Rossi, Teatro del Mondo, (Venice: Cluva, 1982), p. 12. This book
includes articles by Francesco Dal Co and Manfredo Tafuri; the photographs
are by Antonio Martinelli.
37 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., p. 19.
41 Ibid., p. 25.
42 Ibid., p. 66.
Chapter 6: Massimo Cacciari

1 This chapter was first published as the introduction to Massimo Cacciari,
Architecture and Nihilism: On the Philosophy of Modern Architecture, trans.
Stephen Sartarelli (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993),
pp. ix–lviii.
2 Enrico Berlinguer, ‘La politica che il paese esige dopo la caduta del governo
Andreotti-Malagodi (comizio al Festival Nazionale dell’Unità a Venezia,

226 Notes
24 giugno 1973)’, La questione comunista, 1969–1975, a cura di Antonio

Tato, vol. 2 (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1975), p. 584.
3 See Cacciari, Metropolis. Saggi sulla grande città di Sombart, Endell, Scheffler e
Simmel (Roma: Officina, 1973). This essay, constituted by materials dis-
cussed in Manfredo Tafuri’s seminars at Venice’s School of Architecture, is
the introduction to selected texts by the German sociologists and the

German architect (August Endell) mentioned in the Italian title.
4 Cacciari, Architecture and Nihilism, p. 6.
5 Ibid., p. 30.
6 See Antonio Negri, ‘La teoria capitalistica dello stato nel ’29: John M.
Keynes’, Contropiano, 1 (1968), pp. 3–40; and Mario Tronti, ‘Estremismo e
riformismo’, pp. 41–58. Works by Antonio Negri published in English
include: The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics,
trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991);
The Politics of Subversion: A Manifesto for the Twenty-first Century, trans.
James Newell (Cambridge, UK; Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, Blackwell,
1989); Marx beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse, trans. Harry Cleaver,
Michael Ryan and Maurizio Viano (South Hadley, Mass.: Bergin and
Garvey, 1984).
7 Alberto Asor Rosa, one of the editors of two essential journals in the early
1960s – Quaderni rossi and Classe operaia – is a professor of Italian literature
at the University of Rome, ‘La Sapienza’. Among his most important
works: Intellettuali e classe operaia: Saggi sulle forme di uno storico conflitto e di
una possibile alleanza (Florence: La nuova Italia, 1973), La lirica del Seicento
(Bari: Laterza, 1975), Storia della letteratura italiana (Florence: La nuova
Italia, 1985).
8 On the question of economic development of the Veneto region, see Silvio
Lanaro, ed., Storia d’Italia: Le regioni dall’unità a oggi: Veneto (Turin:
Einaudi, 1984).
9 Contropiano, 2 (1968), p. 240.
10 Ibid., p. 241.
11 See Cacciari, Ciclo capitalistico e lotte operaie. Montedison Pirelli Fiat 1968
(Padua: Marsilio, 1969), pp. 21–22.
12 Cacciari, ‘La Comune di maggio’, Contropiano, 2 (1968), p. 462.
13 Berlinguer addressed women, young people and a large section of the ‘pro-
ductive middle classes’ as possible allies of the traditional basis of the PCI.
See Enrico Berlinguer, ‘Le masse femminili, forza di rinnovamento della
società’, La questione comunista, vol. 1, p. 301.
14 Alberto Asor Rosa, ‘Rivoluzione e letteratura’, Contropiano, 1 (1968),
pp. 235–6.
15 Aldo Rossi, Teatro del mondo, p. 104.
16 Charles Baudelaire, Les Fleurs du Mal, Oeuvres complètes, vol. 1, p. 86.
17 Cacciari, Architecture and Nihilism, p. 4.
18 Alberto Asor Rosa and Cacciari, ‘Editorial’, Contropiano, 2 (1968), p. 238.
19 Ibid., pp. 239, 243.
20 In 1988 Alberto Asor Rosa wrote a preface to a new edition of the 1964
Scrittori e popolo, a controversial book that was seminal for an entire gener-
ation in Italy. He alluded to the weight of time and the changes in politics
and expectations: ‘Twenty years have gone by since that time [the publica-

Notes 227
tion of his book]: but they seem many more. Something of enormous
importance happened in the meantime: at that time we thought that the
factory working class would take power; today we think that, in the social
displacements that took place in these twenty years, no class is able to take
and control power: for the good reason that there is no longer a class that
would be capable of taking power.’ Alberto Asor Rosa, ‘Vent’anni dopo’,

Scrittori e popolo (Turin: Einaudi, 1988), p. vii.
21 Cacciari, ‘La Montecatini-Edison di Porto Marghera’, Contropiano, 3 (1968),
pp. 579–627, and 2 (1969), pp. 579–627; ‘Sulla genesi del pensiero nega-
tivo’, Contropiano, 1 (1969), pp. 131–200.
22 Asor Rosa, ‘Prefazione alla seconda edizione’, Scrittori e popolo, p. 9.
23 See Cacciari, Krisis (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1976); Dallo Steinhof (Milan: Adelphi,
1982); Icone della legge (Milan: Adelphi 1985); L’Angelo necessario (Milan:
Adelphi, 1986); Dall’Inizio (Milan: Adelphi, 1990). Earlier works by Cacciari
include his preface to Georg Lukács, Kommunismus (Padua: Marsilio, 1972),
his preface ‘Negative Thought and Rationalization’, for Eugene Fink,
Nietzsche (Padua: Marsilio, 1973), and Pensiero negativo e razionalizzazione
(Venice: Marsilio, 1977).
24 See Walter Benjamin, ‘On Some motifs in Baudelaire’, Illuminations, p. 175.
25 Cacciari, Architecture and Nihilism, pp. 31–3.
26 Cacciari, ‘Sulla genesi del pensiero negativo’, Contropiano, 1 (1969), p. 138.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 139.
30 Antonio Negri, ‘La teoria capitalista dello stato nel ‘29: John M. Keynes’,
Contropiano, 1 (1968), p. 7.
31 ‘The “irrationalism”of the romantic period here analysed is only apparent.’
Cacciari, ‘Sulla genesi del pensiero negativo’, Contropiano, 1 (1969), p. 133.
32 See Cacciari, ‘Il problema del politico in Deleuze e Foucault’, in Franco
Rella and Georges Teyssot, eds, Il dispositivo Foucault (Venice: Cluva, 1977),
pp. 57–69. Asor Rosa stressed his distance from Herbert Marcuse’s position,
which he labelled ‘political romanticism’. See Asor Rosa, ‘Dalla rivoluzione
culturale alla lotta di classe’, Contropiano, 3 (1968), pp. 472–4.
33 Cacciari, ‘Eupalinos or Architecture’, Oppositions, 21 (1980), p. 107, trans.
Stephen Sartarelli.
34 See Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Intellectual Field and and Creative Project’, Social
Sciences Information, 8 (1969), pp. 89–119; and Fritz Ringer, ‘The
Intellectual Field, Intellectual History, and the Sociology of Knowledge’,
Theory and Society, 19 (1990), pp. 269–94.
35 Baudelaire, ‘Le Cygne’, Les Fleurs du mal, in Oeuvres complètes vol. 1, p. 86.
See my Chapter 3 above.
36 A critique, from a Nietzschean perspective, of the persistence of a redemp-
tive ideology in the conception of art, is offered by Leo Bersani, The
Culture of Redemption (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
37 Architecture and Nihilism, p. 111.
38 Ibid., p. 118.
39 On the question of alienation as the foundamental form on which is con-
structed the radical concept of the State during the Enlightement, see
Cacciari, ‘Entsagung’, Contropiano, 2 (1971), p. 411.

228 Notes
40 See Benjamin, ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’, Illuminations, pp. 155–200;

and ‘Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century, Reflections, pp. 146–62.
41 Cantata di Strapaese, such is the title of a satyrical poem by the Tuscan poet
Mino Maccari, who edited the review symptomatically titled Il selvaggio from
1934 until 1943. ‘Selvaggismo’ is the trend of some Italian twentieth-century
literature (Papini, Soffici and Malaparte) completely focused on a rural, anti-

urban ideology. On the Italian attachment to a rural tradition, see Asor Rosa’s
exhaustive Storia d’Italia. Dall’unità a oggi, vol. 4, pt 2 (Turin: Einaudi, 1975).
42 Antonio Gramsci, Letteratura e vita nazionale, quoted by Asor Rosa, Scrittori
e popolo, p. 177.
43 Asor Rosa, ‘La teoria marxista e le altre’, Le due società. Ipotesi sulla crisi ital-
iana (Turin: Einaudi, 1977), p. 88.
44 The Italian film critic Roberto Escobar wrote about Ultrà: Tognazzi ‘looked
for the story of an Italy that has never been loved by cinema: that metro-
politan and violent Italy – so hard that ideology and good feelings cannot
tame it. Then he developed that story privileging elliptical narration and
montage technique’ (Il sole 24ore, 31 March 1991).
45 Fredric Jameson, ‘Architecture and the Critique of Ideology’, The Ideologies of
Theory: Essays 1971–1986: Syntax of History, vol. 2 (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 48.
46 Ibid., p. 49.
47 See Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.,
1938); and The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations and Its
Prospects (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961).
48 See Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1973). Nuova Corrente, a review where Cacciari published
many of his articles, published several translations of Raymond Williams’s
work, and mainly of essays that became part of his The Long Revolution
(London: Chatto and Windus, 1961).
49 See Stuart Hall, ‘The Emergence of Cultural Studies and the Crisis of the
Humanities’, October, 53 (Summer 1990), pp. 11–23.
50 See Manfredo Tafuri, Progetto e Utopia (Bari: Laterza, 1973); Architecture and
Utopia: Design and Capitalist Development, trans. Barbara Luigia La Penta
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1976). See also ‘Per una critica dell’ideologia
architettonica’, Contropiano, 1 (1969), pp. 31–79.
51 Alberto Asor Rosa, ‘Vent’anni dopo’, Scrittori e popolo, p. xiii.
52 Ibid. pp. ix–x.
53 Manfredo Tafuri, ‘Austro-marxismo e città: das Rote Wien’, Contropiano,
2 (1971), p. 259.
54 Manfredo Tafuri, Teorie e storia dell’architettura (Bari: Laterza, 1968).
Theories and History of Architecture, trans. Giorgio Verrecchia (New York,:
Harper and Row, 1980).
55 Manfredo Tafuri, ‘Avvertenza alla seconda edizione’, Teorie e storia
dell’architettura (Bari: Laterza, 1973), p. 5.
56 See a similar argument in Roland Barthes, ‘History or Literature?’, On
Racine (New York: Hill and Wang, 1964), pp. 154–5.
57 Fredric Jameson, ‘Architecture and the Critique of Ideology’, The Ideologies
of Theory, vol. 2, p. 38.
58 Ibid.

Notes 229
59 Ibid., p. 39.
60 Ibid., p. 38–9.
61 Ibid., p. 40.
62 Ibid., p. 38.
63 Walter Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, Illuminations, p. 256.
64 Ibid., p. 262.

65 Ibid., pp. 262–3.
66 This essay was published in Massimo Cacciari and Francesco Amendolagine,
Oikos: Da Loos a Wittgenstein (Rome: Officina, 1975). Officina published,
among others, Giangiorgio Pasqualotto, Giorgio Ciucci, Georges Teyssot,
Paolo Morachiello, and Donatella Calabi.
67 Giorgio Ciucci, Francesco Dal Co, Mario Manieri-Elia, Manfredo Tafuri,
The American City. From the Civil War to the New Deal, trans. Barbara Luigia
La Penta (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1979), pp. x–xi.
68 Tafuri, Teorie e storia dell’architettura (Bari: Laterza, 1968), p. 25.
70 Ibid., p. 130.
71 Carl Schorske, ‘The Ringstrasse and the birth of Urban Modernism’, Fin-de-
siècle Vienna, p. 84.
72 Ibid., p. 85.
73 Ibid., p. 100.
75 See Renato De Fusco, Storia dell’architettura contemporanea (Bari: Laterza,
1974, 1988) pp. 127–30. In ‘Loos and His Angel’, Cacciari writes that it is
‘fundamentally impossible to assimilate him into the currents of progres-
sive rationalism, in architecture and elsewhere’ (Architecture and Nihilism,
p. 173).
77 Ibid., p. 132.
78 Ibid., p. 133.
79 Ibid., p. 134.
80 Ibid., p. 106.
81 Ibid., p. 107.
82 Ibid., p. 134.
83 Manfredo Tafuri, ‘The Disenchanted Mountain’, The American City, p. 403.
Tafuri discusses the Chicago Tribune project also in Theories and History of
Architecture (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), p. 85.
84 Aldo Rossi, A Scientific Autobiography, p. 76.
85 Aldo Rossi, Introduction to Adolf Loos, Spoken into the Void, Collected
Essays 1897–1900 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Oppositions Books, 1982),
pp. viii–xiii. Rossi perceives no contradiction between the Loos of
‘Ornament and Crime’ and the creator of the Chicago Tribune project, and
feels in it the presence of that metropolis that Loos discovered in New
York. Tafuri and Cacciari consider, in the words of Tafuri quoted by
Cacciari, ‘that in 1922 Loos seemed to have lost touch with the clarity of
his prewar attitudes’ (Manfredo Tafuri, ‘The Disenchanted Mountain’, The
American City, p. 432). If we reread today Tafuri’s words in Theories and
History, we can say that, unlike Rossi, he hinted at a postmodern element
of the Chicago Tribune: ‘The Doric column planned by Loos for the Chicago

230 Notes
Tribune competition, as a first and violent experiment in extracting a

linguistic element from its context and transferring it to an abnormally
sized second context, is the anticipation of a caustic and ambiguous Pop
Architecture’ (p. 84).
87 Ibid.

88 ‘Architects can no longer afford to be intimidated by the puritanical lan-
guage of orthodox Modern architecture.’ Robert Venturi, Complexity and
Contradiction in Architecture (New York: Museun of Modern Art, 1966), p. 16.
90 Ibid., p. 150.
91 Ibid. The horror of this figure – the architect-artist-dominator – appears in
a satire by Loos that sounds almost like one of Baudelaire’s Prose poems.
The despotic architect does not even allow the poor little rich man to buy
a painting at the Secession! See Adolf Loos, ‘The Poor Little Rich Man’,
Spoken into the Void, pp. 125–7.
93 The real loyalty to negative thought cannot be completed nihilismus, nor
‘weak thinking’, as Gianni Vattimo calls the postmodern thought that
abandons any systematic attempt to organize the world. See Gianni
Vattimo and Pier Aldo Rovatti, eds, Il pensiero debole (Milan: Feltrinelli,
1984).
94 ‘Desire is after all the desire to reconcile with the “naturality” of Desire.’
Cacciari, ‘Il problema del politico in Deleuze e Foucault’, Il dispositivo
Foucault, p. 66.
95 Ibid., p. 68.
97 Massimo Caccciari, Dallo Steinhof (Milan: Adelphi, 1980), p. 31. At the end
of a chapter on Trauerspiel, Cacciari quotes Roberto Bazlen: ‘True life
means: to invent new places on which to be able to shipwreck … ; every
new work is nothing but the invention of a new death’ (p. 49).
98 See Charles Jencks, The Language of Postmodern Architecture (New York:
Rizzoli, 1977). For a critique of this postmodernist immediacy, see
Kenneth Frampton, Modern Architecture: A Critical History (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 292. See also Anthony Vidler,
‘Academicism: Modernism’, Oppositions, 8 (1977), pp. 1–5.
99 See Architecture and Nihilism, p. 187.
100 Cacciari, ‘Eupalinos or Architecture’, Oppositions, 21 (1980), p. 115.
101 Ibid.
102 Manfredo Tafuri, La sfera e il labirinto: avanguardie e architettura da Piranesi
agli anni ’70 (Turin, Einaudi, 1980); The Sphere and the Labyrinth: Avant-
gardes and Architecture from Piranesi to the 1970s, trans. Pellegrino d’Acierno
and Robert Connolly. (Cambridge, MA: MIT University Press, 1987), p. 4.
Cacciari expresses the same type of fear abour the sense of multiplicity
when he talks about the revêtement character of linguistic games
(Architecture and Nihilism, p. 163).
103 Tafuri, The Sphere and the Labyrinth, pp. 4–5.
104 See Tafuri, Venezia e il Rinascimento (Turin: Einaudi, 1985); Venice and the
Renaissance, trans. Jessica Levine (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989).

Notes 231
105 See Michel Vovelle, Idéologie et Mentalités (Paris: François Maspero, 1982);
Ideologies and Mentalities, trans. Eamon O’Flaherty (Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1990).
106 Tafuri, ‘Réalisme et architecture’, Critique, 476–7 (1987), p. 23. Tafuri posits
the problem similarly to the historian Paul Veyne. See Paul Veyne,
L’Inventaire des différences (Paris: Seuil, 1976), pp. 48–9.

107 On the question of orthodoxy, the conflict over expressionism between
Benjamin and Lukács is important. See Ernst Bloch et al., Aesthetics and
Politics (London: Whitstable, 1977), including Fredric Jameson’s
‘Reflections in Conclusion’, pp. 196–209.
108 Lucien Febvre, ‘Avant-propos’, in Charles Morazé, Trois essais sur histoire et
culture (Paris: Cahiers des Annales, 1948), p. vii.
110 Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, Illuminations, pp. 257–8.
111 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals (New York:
Anchor Press, 1956), p. 157.
112 Cacciari, Dallo Steinhof (Milan: Adelphi, 1980), p. 31.
114 Ibid., p. 156.
115 Ibid., p. 205.
116 Cacciari, Dallo Steinhof, p. 13.
117 Ibid., p. 48.
118 Ibid., p. 29.
119 See ibid., pp. 76–80. Cacciari devoted an entire essay to the power of singing:
see ‘Il fare del canto’, Le forme del fare (Naples: Liguori, 1987), pp. 47–74.
120 Cacciari, Dallo Steinhof, p. 31. One might also think of Cacciari’s early fas-
cination with Chomsky. See ‘Vita Cartesii est simplicissima’, Contropiano,
2 (1970), pp. 375–99.
121 This is the title of a chapter of Claudio Magris, Il mito asburgigo nella letter-
atura moderna (Turin: Einaudi, 1963), pp. 185–260. See also Claudio
Magris, L’anello di Clarisse (Turin: Einaudi, 1984), especially the essay ‘La
ruggine e i segni. Hofmannsthal e La lettera di Lord Chandos’, pp. 32–62.
122 Cacciari, ‘Intransitabili utopie’, in Hugo von Hofmannsthal, La Torre,
trans. Silvia Bortoli (Milan: Adelphi, 1978), p. 158.
123 Roland Barthes, ‘Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure’, The Rustle
of Language (New York: Hill & Wang, 1986), p. 286.
124 Alberto Asor Rosa, Scrittori e popolo, p. 10.
126 Cacciari, ‘Eupalinos or Architecture’, Oppositions, 21 (1980), p. 114.
127 See Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 1976), and George Schwab’s introduction, pp. 3–16.
128 Leo Strauss, ‘Comments on Carl Schmitt’s Der Begriffe des Politischen’, in
Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 81.
129 Cacciari et al., ‘Sinisteritas’, Il concetto di sinistra (Milan: Bompiani, 1982),
p. 12.
130 Tafuri, ‘The Historical Project’, The Sphere and the Labyrinth, p. 5.
131 See Cacciari, ‘Eupalinos or Architecture’, Oppositions, 21 (1980), pp. 113–14.
132 Georg Simmel, ‘Roma, Firenze e Venezia’, translated into Italian in
Cacciari, Metropolis, p. 197.

232 Notes
Chapter 7: Absence and Revelation

1 This chapter was first published in Colin MacCabe and Duncan Petrie, eds,
New Scholarship from BFI Research (London: British Film Institute, 1996),
pp. 58–85.
2 Raymond Williams, Culture and Society (London: Chatto and Windus,

1963), p. 285.
3 Ibid.
4 The Birmingham Centre institutionalized the existence of a new discipline,
communication or cultural studies, with its emphasis on cinema and
television.
5 See Christian Metz, ‘A propos de l’impression de réalité au cinéma’, Cahiers
du cinéma, 166–7 (1965), pp. 75–82.
6 Walter Benjamin, ‘A Short History of Photography’, Screen, 13(1) (Spring
1972), pp. 5–6.
7 Williams, Culture and Society, p. 290.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., pp. 290–1.
10 Charles Baudelaire, Les Fleurs du Mal, Oeuvres Complètes, vol. 1, p. 93.
Benjamin commented on this poem in ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’,
Illuminations, p. 167.
11 Jacques Lacan suggests that the human subject, aquainted with the world,
has forgotten the inaugural scene of the discovery of his/her own image.
Yet that scene is formative and dictates the function of the self. In a famous
1949 paper, ‘The Mirror Stage’, Lacan, deeply influenced by Jean Piaget,
draw the attention to the euphoric, foundational moment in which the
child – when it is approximateley six months old and is as yet unable to
walk or talk – recognizes with exultation its own imago in the mirror, as
well as the image of its reflected environment, and enjoys the repetition of
this scene. See Jacques Lacan, ‘Le stade du miroir comme formateur de la
fonction du Je’, Ecrits (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966), pp. 93–100.
12 Benjamin, ‘A Short History of Photography’, p. 6.
13 Ibid.
14 One should also investigate the distinction between the eye and the gaze.
Lacan sketched this distinction, as noticed in a remarkable analysis of
colour and glossiness by Fredric Jameson, ‘On Magic Realism in Film’,
Signatures of the Visible (New York; London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 139–40.
15 Some psychoanalysts maintain that the era of neurosis is over and
psychosis is much more representative of our age. Wouldn’t this be
confirmed by the psychic effects of the contemporary plethora of images?
See Contardo Calligaris, Introduction à une clinique différentielle des psychoses
(Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1992).
16 Baudelaire, ‘A une passante’, Les Fleurs du Mal, in Oeuvres complètes, vol. 1,
p. 92.
17 Fredric Jameson, Introduction, Signatures of the Visible, p. 1.
18 Laura Mulvey, ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’, Visual and Other
Pleasures (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1989). This article, written in 1973, was
first published in Screen (1975).
19 Ibid., p. 18.

Notes 233
20 Ibid.
21 Jameson, ‘The Existence of Italy’, Signatures of the Visible, p. 186.
22 See Bertold Brecht, ‘Uber den Realismus 1937 bis 1941’, Schriften zur
Literature und Kunst 2, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 19. On this point see my
Chapter 3. Jameson made a Brechtian argument when he wrote: ‘Returning
now to the historical issue of realism itself, the most obvious initial way of

estranging and renewing this concept would seem to consist in reversing
our conventional stereotype of its relationship to modernism. The latter,
indeed, we celebrate as an active aesthetic praxis and invention, whose
excitement is demiurgic, along with its liberation from content; while
realism is conventionally evoked in terms of passive reflection and copying,
subordinate to some external reality… . Something will certainly be gained,
therefore, if we can manage to think of realism as a form of demiurgic
praxis; if we can restore some active and even playful experimental
impulses to the inertia of this appearance as a copy or representation of
things.’ (‘The Existence of Italy’, Signatures of the Visible, p. 162.)
23 To speak of the real is already to be in the symbolic order, because ‘the real,
whatever disruption we might operate, is always and in any event at its own
place.’ (Jacques Lacan, ‘Le séminaire sur “La Lettre Volée”’, Ecrits, p. 25.) The
real will be there even after the most devastating atomic explosions; the real
is always at its place, insists Lacan.
24 Baudelaire, Les Fleurs du Mal, Oeuvres Complètes, vol. 1, p. 87.
25 André Bazin, ‘An Aesthetic of Reality’, What Is Cinema?, trans. Hugh Gray
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), vol. 2, p. 26.
26 Ibid., pp. 26–7.
27 Dudley Andrew stressed in his study on Bazin the importance of the intel-
lectual atmosphere around the Catholic and Bergsonian journal Esprit, and
the influence of the Catholic critic Albert Béguin. Béguin believed in a
double reality where things have a natural relationship to mystery and spir-
ituality, not unlike the medieval religious tradition where reality is the rev-
elation of a spiritual sense. See Dudley Andrew, André Bazin (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1978).
29 Ibid, p. 209.
30 Bazin, ‘In Defense of Rossellini’, What is Cinema?, vol. 2, p. 98.
31 Bazin, ‘The Ontology of the Photographic image’, What Is Cinema?, vol. 1,
p. 15.
32 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard
Howard (London: Vintage, 1993), p. 115.
34 Ibid., p. 158.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 191.
37 Ibid., p. 217.
38 ‘What has been absent from these alternate accounts of realism – the
experimental-oppositional, Hollywood, documentary, and photographic-
ontological – is any trace of the older valorization of a realistic “work” within
a dominant stylistic or narrative paradigm’ (ibid., p. 197, my emphasis).
39 Ibid., p. 191.

234 Notes
40 Ibid., p. 229. It is the end of this essay provocatively entitled ‘The Existence
of Italy’.
41 Ibid., p. 196. Jameson wrote this sentence while analysing Antonioni’s
Blow-Up.
42 Ibid., p. 194.
43 Walter Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, Illuminations, p. 258.

44 Barthes, Camera Lucida, p. 40.
45 Jameson, Signatures of the Visible, pp. 195–6.
46 Bazin, ‘The Ontology of the Photographic Image’, What Is Cinema?, p. 16.
47 See Jameson, ‘On Magic Realism in Film’, Signatures of the Visible, pp. 139–41.
This quotation from Fernandez is on p. 140.
Chapter 8: The Image versus the Visible

1 A version of this chapter was given as a lecture at the International
Colloquium entitled ‘Os limites do imaginario’, Candido Mendes
University, Rio de Janeiro, May 2000.
2 Fredric Jameson, Signatures of the Visible, p. 1.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., p. 10.
7 See Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions
(Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Strong
Feelings: Emotion, Addiction, and Human Behavior (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1999). Ronald De Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1987); ‘Fetishism and Objectivity in Aesthetic Emotion’, in Mette
Hjort and Sue Laver, eds, Emotion and the Arts (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1997); Martha C. Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy
and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
8 This passage from the Génie du Christianisme is eloquent: ‘By what incom-
prehensible fate is man an exception to this law (harmony) which is so
necessary for the order, conservation, peace and happiness of human
beings? The lack of unity of qualities and movements in man is as striking
as their harmony is visible elsewhere in nature. There is a perpetual clash
between his intellect and his desire, between his reason and his heart.
When he reaches the highest degree of civilization, he is morally on the
lowest rung; if he is free, he is coarse; if he refines his manners, he makes
chains for himself. If he is scientifically distinguished, his imagination dies;
if he becomes a poet, he loses his ability to think. His heart profits at the
expense of his head, his head at the expense of his heart.’ René de
Chateaubriand, Essai sur les revolutions. Le Génie du Christianime (Paris:
Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1978), p. 534.
9 The obsessive use of Freudian categories disturbed Roberto Rossellini. In an
essay he wrote a few months before his death in 1977, ‘La société du spec-
tacle’, the film-maker attacked contemporary society and its use of media. He
also meditated on what happened to Freud’s discovery of the unconscious,
regretting that ‘it has been condemned, by means of a huge reduction, to

Notes 235
became the sole platform on which is based today’s whole intellectual exer-
cise.’ (Roberto Rossellini, Fragments d’une autobiographie (Paris: Ramsay,
1987), pp. 21–2.)
10 Jameson, Signatures of the Visible, p. 10.
11 Gilberto Freyre, Casa-grande e Senzala (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1973),
p. 11.

12 Ibid., p. 2.
13 As suggested by Luis Castro Nogueira in his talk at the Colloquium ‘Os
limites do imaginario’.
14 Guy Debord, La Société du spectacle (Paris: Buchet-Chastel, 1971); Society of
the Spectale, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone Books, 1994).
15 Signatures of the Visible, pp. 11–12.
16 See Gianni Vattimo, La società trasparente (Milan: Garzanti, 1989), p. 83.
17 Jameson, Signatures of the Visible, p. 9.
18 Baudelaire, ‘The Painter of Modern Life’, The Painter of Modern Life and Other
Essays, p. 4.
19 Ibid., p. 9.
20 Ibid., p. 11.
21 Ibid., p. 17.
22 See Paul Virilio, La Vitesse de libération (Paris: Galilée, 1995).
Chapter 9: Martin Scorsese and the Rhythm

of the Metropolis
1 See André Bazin, ‘Théâtre et cinéma’, ‘Peinture et cinéma’, Qu’est-ce que le
cinéma? (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1990), pp. 129–78 and 187–92.
2 David Thomson and Ian Christie, eds, Scorsese on Scorsese (London: Faber
and Faber, 1990), p. 54.
3 Vachel Lindsay, The Art of the Moving Picture (New York: Modern Library,
2000), p. 95. The editor of the series is Martin Scorsese.
4 This phenomenon is described by Poe in ‘The Sphinx’. See Chapter 1 above.
5 Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities, vol. 1, trans. Sophie Wilkins
(London: Picador, 1995), p. 4.
6 Bernardo Bertolucci, ‘Entretien’, in Aldo Tassone, Parla il cinema italiano
(Paris: Elig, 1982), p. 47.
7 See Scorsese on Scorsese, pp. 4–6.
8 Ibid., p. 54.
9 Scorsese, ‘New York’, Cahiers du Cinéma, 500 (March 1996), p. 41.
10 Scorsese on Scorsese, p. 8.
11 Aldo Rossi, A Scientific Autobiography, p. 38.
13 Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities, vol. 1, p. 12.
14 See Scorsese, Interviews, Peter Brunette, ed. (Jackson: University Press of
Mississippi, 1999), p. 234.
15 Scorsese remembers the objection expressed by many critics to his way of
narrating. See Scorsese, Interviews, pp. 140–1.
16 Chris Rodley, ed., Lynch on Lynch (London: Faber and Faber, 1997), p. 17.
17 Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).

236 Notes
18 Lynch, ‘Interview’, Premiere, vol.4, 1 (1990). Quoted by Michel Chion,

David Lynch (Paris: Cahiers du cinéma, 1998), p. 16.
19 See Chris Rodley, Lynch on Lynch, p. 5. See also Michel Chion, David Lynch,
p. 17.
20 Lynch on Lynch, pp. 7–8.
21 Obviously this monster has been interpreted as anguish about fatherhood.

22 See Scorsese on Scorsese, pp. 51–3.
23 Martin Scorsese, ‘Casino. Entretien avec Thelma Shoonmaker’, Cahiers du
Cinéma, 500 (March 1996), p. 19.
24 Lynch on Lynch, p. 225.
25 Baudelaire, The Salon de 1846. Art in Paris, 1845–1862, pp. 58–9.
26 Of course David Lynch is also a painter.
28 Baudelaire, ‘To Arsène Houssaye’, Paris Spleen, p. ix.
29 Ibid., p. x.
30 Scorsese, ‘Introduction to Modern Library: The Movies’, in Vachel Lindsay,
The Art of the Moving Picture, p. v.
31 Martin Scorsese and Henry Wilson, A Personal Journey with Martin Scorsese
Through American Movies (New York: Hyperion, 1997), p. 2. Beside this illus-
trated book, Scorsese also made a documentary of the same title with BFI,
produced by Colin MacCabe.
32 On violence see Jake Horsley, The Blood Poets: A Cinema of Savagery
1958–1999 (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press), 1999.
33 ‘It [GoodFellas] is Scorsese’s antidote to the romanticized Mafia of the
Godfather.’ Lawrence S. Friedman, The Cinema of Martin Scorsese (New York:
Continuum, 1999), p. 171.
34 Scorsese tells the whole story in a 1975 interview, in a style that sounds like
the dialogue of a film: ‘I said, “Can we do it?” Roger said, “Marty, I under-
stand we got a script from you and everybody here says it is one of the best
scripts we’ve ever received. However I would like to ask you one thing.” He
said, “I haven’t read it. Has it got gangsters?” I said, “Yes, it’s got gangsters.”
He said, “Has it got guns?” I said, “Yes, it’s got guns.” He said, “Has it got
violence? Has it got sex?” I said, “Yes.” He said, “My brother just made a
picture called Cool Breeze, which is the first time that my brother Gene is
making money. It’s making a lot of money.” He said, “Now if you’re willing
to swing a little, I can give you $150,000, and you can shoot it all with a
non-union student crew in New York.’ (Scorsese, Interviews, p. 22.)
36 See ibid., pp. 21–2.
37 See François Truffaut, ‘Une certaine tendance du cinéma français’, Cahiers
du Cinéma, 31 (Jan. 1954), pp. 15–29.
38 François Truffaut, ‘Aimer Fritz Lang’, Cahiers du Cinéma, 31 (Jan. 1954),
p. 52.
39 See Michael Bliss, The Word Made Flesh: Catholicism and Conflict in the Films
of Martin Scorsese (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1995).
40 See Paul Schrader, Transcendental Style in Film: Ozu, Bresson, Dreyer (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1972).
41 ‘Robert De Niro was introduced to me by Brian De Palma, who’d discovered
him in the early sixties and cast him in The Wedding Party … He’d heard

Notes 237
that I had made a film about his neighborhood – Who’s That Knocking at My
Door? – though he used to hang out with a different group of people, on
Broome Street, while we were on Prince Street. We had seen each other at
dances and said hallo.’ (Scorsese on Scorsese, pp. 41–2.)
42 A powerful high-angle shot appears in Welles’ Touch of Evil (1955) (on
Quinlan and his friend); and after Taxi Driver, at the beginning of De

Palma’s The Untouchables (1987). Some brief high-angle shots on New York
streets are already used by Scorsese both in Who’s That Knoking at My Door
and in Mean Streets.
44 See S. M. Eisenstein, ‘El Greco y el cine’, Cinématisme, ed. François Albéra
(Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1980), pp. 57–58.
45 Besides the high-angle scene in Touch of Evil, the low ceiling effect typical
of Citizen Kane and Touch of Evil, which plays an important role in Mean
Streets and Raging Bull.
46 See Baudelaire on Delacroix: ‘He [Delacroix] professes a fanatical regard for
the cleanliness of his tools and the preparation of the elements of his work.
In fact, since painting is an art of deep ratiocination, and one that demands
an immediate contention between a host of different qualities, it is import-
ant that the hand should encounter the least possible number of obstacles
when it gets down to business, and that it should accomplish the divine
orders of the brain with a slavish alacrity; otherwise the ideal will escape.’
(Baudelaire, ‘The Salon of 1846’, Art in Paris, p. 58.)
47 Herrmann died the night ‘he had finished the score’ for Taxi Driver. See
Scorsese on Scorsese, p. 63. On Taxi Driver and Herrmann’s score, see
Leighton Grist, The Films of Martin Scorsese 1963–1977, pp. 130–2.
48 Schrader was in those years highly influenced by Sartre. See Scorsese on
Scorsese, p. 53.
49 Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, trans. Lloyd Alexander (New York: New Directions,
1964), p. 21.

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Index

400 coups, Les (film), 200 architecture: philosophy of Cacciari,
2001: A Space Odyssey (film), 205 108–49; Rossi, 96–107, 191
Architettura razionale (exhibition), 100
absence in photographic age, 152, Arnold, Elisabeth (Poe’s mother), 11
153, 156, 166–7 art: modern art, 46–61; value of,
Adorno, Theodor, 55, 95, 129 176–7
‘aesthetic of disappearance’, 182, 183, Artaud, Antonin, 49
215 artifice, 1–45, 163
aesthetics, 175–85, 191 Aruntius, 16
Agamben, Giorgio, 138 Aryan race, 76
Alberti, Leon Battista, 99, 101, 132 Asor Rosa, Alberto, 111, 112–13, 114,
Alboin, 82 117, 125–6, 128, 146
Alcaeus, 107 attentive faculty, 15, 17
Aldrich, Albert, 185 Auerbach, Eric, 159–60
Alexander Nevsky (film), 190, 191, 212, authorship, 207–8
213–14 automatons, 118
alienation, 153–4, 174 autunno caldo, 124
Allan, John (Poe’s father), 44 avante-garde movements, 50–1, 113,
allegorical poetry, 63–4, 64–6, 67, 68, 122, 133, 208
71–2, 79, 115, 160, 162–3 Aymonino, Carlo, 98
allegorical realism, 65–8, 71–2, 79,
115–18, 160, 162–3 Bahr, Hermann, 50
alliteration in Poe’s work, 13, 17, 42 Balzac, Honoré de, 63, 64, 67, 68, 69,
Amendola, Giorgio, 81 72, 77, 154, 160, 202
American Transcendentalism, 1, 4–6, barbaric poetry, 82, 83
9, 16, 21–3, 27, 30, 69, 176 Bark of Christ (Delacroix), 55–6
amplification, 213–14 Barthes, Roland, 3, 44, 52, 94, 103,
anagrams, 13, 19–20 129, 146; on photography, 166–7,
analogous city, 100–1, 105, 106, 204 171–2, 173
analysis in Poe’s fiction, 33, 35–6, 41 Bataille, Georges: ‘Histoire de l’oeil’,
Anatomical Theatre, Padua, 107 1, 2–3, 11, 15, 40, 44, 45
ancient city, 72–9 Battleship Potemkin (film), 211
Andreas-Salomé, Lou, 138 Baudelaire, Charles, 59, 69, 102, 114,
Angelus Novus (Klee), 142–3, 171, 124, 136, 183, 184, 187; aesthetic
172 principles, 175, 179, 191;
Annales School, 141, 142 allegorical poetry, 63–4, 64–5, 67,
anti-historicism, 128, 131–6 68, 71–2, 79, 115, 160, 162–3;
antiquity, 46–7, 75 ‘Correspondences’, 64–5, 100; ‘Le
Antonioni, Michelangelo, 155, 170–1, Cygne’, 55, 71–2, 79, 115, 146;
172 death poems, 78–9; on Delacroix,
Apel, Karl-Otto, 178 47–8, 49, 66, 201; Fleurs du Mal,
Apocalypse Now (film), 205 66, 67, 161–2, 198; modernist
Apollinaire, Guillaume, 186 images, 62–3, 73, 78, 161–2, 172;
242

Index 243
Peintre de la vie moderne, 46–7, Brentano, Franz, 175

60–1, 179–81, 203; as Poe Bresson, Robert, 209–10, 213
translator, 13, 17, 60–1; ‘Les Sept Brunelleschi, Filippo, 132
Vieillards’, 62–3, 162–3, 202;
‘Spleen’, 63–4, 73, 203; ‘To a Cacciari, Massimo, 108–149;
Passerby’, 67, 153–4, 172, 181 Architecture and Nihilism, 108,

Bazin, André, 161, 163–6, 170, 171, 113–14, 115, 116–17, 119–25, 133,
172–3, 186 136–9, 142–5; as communist, 110–12,
Bazlen, Roberto (Bobi), 87–92; Lettere 113–14, 116–18; Dallo Steinhof, 138,
editoriali, 88; Note senza testo, 87, 140, 143, 144, 145; shifts in focus,
88, 91 118; ‘Sinisteritas’, 147–8
Benjamin, Walter, 55, 63, 86, 93, 95, Café Nihilismus, 144
100, 102, 115, 118, 120, 121, 122; Cahiers du Cinéma, 207, 208
‘Angelus Novus’, 142–3, 171, 172; Calasso, Roberto, 89
anguish and shock of modern life, Calvino, Italo, 89–90, 93, 125
114, 195; on Baudelaire, 59, 64, 67, camera-work in film, 211, 212–13
68, 71–2, 153–4, 161, 181; Cacciari Canetti, Elias, 138
on, 124–5, 137–8; on film, 181; capitalism, 77, 177
flâneur, 71–2; on Haussmann, 70, Carducci, Giosué, 82, 83
71–2; on history, 130–1, 142; on Carlyle, Thomas, 69, 72–3
photography, 52, 151–2, 155, Carso landscape, 80, 81, 82, 84, 86
156–8, 166, 169; Work of Art, 177 Casabella-Continuità, 102
Bentham, Jeremy, 71 Casino (film), 193–4, 198, 200
Benveniste, Emile, 23, 24 Cassola, Carlo, 128
Bergson, Henri, 82 Catholicism, 161, 162
Berlin, 187–8 cemeteries: Modena, 99, 104; Paris, 78
Berlinguer, Enrico, 108–9, 110, 112, Cézanne, Paul, 50
113 Champfleury (Jules Husson), 66
Bertolucci, Bernardo, 100, 189–90 Chateaubriand, François René de, 176
Bible, 9, 48 Chevalier, Michel, 70
Biennale theatre, Venice, 106–7, 114 Chicago Tribune project, 105, 136–7
Big Heat, The (film), 206–7, 208, 209, Christianity, 76
213 cinema, 150–1, 159, 168–71, 174–5; of
Birmingham Centre for Cultural David Lynch, 175, 182–5, 195–201;
Studies, 127 of Martin Scorsese, 186–215; neo-
black-and-white photography, 164–5, realism, 161, 163, 164–5, 170;
171 repetitive viewing, 192; soundtracks,
Blanchot, Maurice, 88–9, 208 200–1, 202, 203, 204, 205, 211,
Blow-Up (film), 155, 170–1, 172, 173 214–15; and time, 181, 182; ‘walking
Blue Velvet (film), 185, 195–6, 198, in halfway through’, 190, 191, 193,
199, 201 194, 212; see also photography
Blumenthal, Ljuba, 89, 91, 93, 94 Cinema Paradiso (film), 126
Bonaparte, Marie, 11 cities: analogous city, 100–1, 105,
books, 9 106, 204; ancient city, 72–9;
bora (wind), 82 attitudes towards, 68–9; death in,
Borges, Jorge Luis: ‘Funes or Memory’, 78–9; in film, 126, 186–215;
44, 64 Haussmann’s rationalization of
Bourdieu, Pierre, 122 Paris, 70–2, 74, 77; Metropolis as
Brecht, Bertolt, 64, 65, 66, 160 allegory, 115–18; modernist images,

244 Index
60, 62–3; philosophy of, 108–49; in deconstruction, 121–2, 145

Poe’s fiction, 32–3, 41–2; in realist Del Giudice, Daniele: Lo stadio di
description, 67–8; rhythm of, 193, Wimbledon, 89–95
194, 195, 197, 203, 215; see also Delacroix, Eugène, 47–8, 49, 55–6, 66,
Metropolis 179, 180, 201
Ciucci, Giorgio, 131–2 Deleuze, Gilles, 139

Clair, René, 186 Della Volpe, Galvano, 128
Clifford, Charles, 171 Derrida, Jacques, 121–2, 138, 141, 145
Coca-Cola, 86–7 descriptions, realistic, 63, 66–8
Coleridge, S. T., 5, 29, 30, 32, 34 desire, 139, 158–9; for reality, 160–1
collage, 100, 101, 103–4 Deutschland im Jahre Null (film), 187–8
colour: in expressionism, 49–50, 51, dialectics, 119; ‘dialectical history’,
55–6, 58, 61; in postmodernism, 129, 130
173 Dickens, Charles, 48
commodification, 177–8 ‘disapperance, aesthetic of’, 182, 183,
communism: in France, 112; in Italy, 215
108–14, 116–18, 126 Dos Passos, John Roderigo, 64, 160
composition, 2, 13, 18 Driggs, Elsie, 93
compromesso storico, 110 dualism, 175–6, 179
confession in Poe narratives, 33, 36–9 Durkheim, Émile, 76
Congress of Soviet Writers (1934),
112–13 Eisenstein, Sergei, 189, 190, 191,
Conrad, Joseph, 100 211–12, 213–14, 215
Constant, Benjamin, 75 élan vital, 82
contamination, 101, 107 Elephant Man, The (film), 197
contradiction, 124 Elia, Mario Manieri, 131–2
Contropiano, 110–12, 114, 116, 119, ellipses in film narratives, 194, 195
120, 127, 128 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 1, 4–6, 9, 10,
Coppola, Francis Ford, 205 17, 21–2, 30, 69; on art of poetry,
Corman, Roger, 206 27; ‘Circles’, 4, 16; ‘History’, 22–3
Courbet, Gustave, 66, 71–2, 115 Engels, Friedrich, 68
Crémieux, Benjamin, 82 Eraserhead (film), 197
Croatia, 80 exacerbation, 213–14
cubism, 50 existentialism, 92, 93
cultural analysis: impact of media, experimental cinema, 208
150–73; institutionalization, 127; Exposition Universelle (1855), 74
political work, 117, 118 expressionism, 50, 56–7, 58–9, 163,
166, 170, 186
Dal Co, Francesco, 131–2 ‘eye’ motifs, 60–1; in Poe’s fiction, 1,
D’Annunzio, Gabriele, 82, 83 2–12, 15–18, 23, 24, 25, 40, 41,
Dawes, Rufus, 16 42–3, 60
de Chirico, Giorgio, 96, 97, 98, 104,
105, 114, 125, 146 Fagnano Olona, 104
De Niro, Robert, 187, 192, 193, 209, family: cult of, 76, 77–8
214 fancy/fantasy, 33, 34–5, 40
De Palma, Brian, 215 Fascist architecture, 104
death: in antiquity, 77–8; in Febvre, Lucien, 142
modernity, 78–9 feelings, 59
Debord, Guy, 177, 178 Fellini, Federico, 100

Index 245
Fernandez, Pablo Armando, 173 Gramsci, Antonio, 86, 125–6

Festival dell’Unita, Venice, 108–10, Greece, ancient, 75–6, 78
112–13 Guys, Constantin, 46, 68, 179, 180–1,
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 6, 7, 16, 18 203
film see cinema; photography
Film Culture, 208 Habermas, Jürgen, 178

fixation, 15 hallucination, 183, 196, 202
flâneur, 71–2, 180; see also strolling Haussmann, Georges Eugène, 70–2,
Flaubert, Gustave, 66 74, 77, 78
floating theatre in Venice, 106–7, 114 Hawks, Howard, 207, 210, 213
Florence, 80–1, 84–5, 105, 148–9, 187 Hawthorne, Nathaniel, 30, 44;
Ford, John, 210 ‘Rappaccini’s Daughter’, 32; Scarlet
Formaggio, Dino, 122 Letter, 23–4; Twice-Told Tales, 29
Foster, Jodie, 210 Hebbel, Friedrich, 85
Foucault, Michel, 139, 141, 147 Hegel, G. W. F., 4, 16, 95, 119
France: communism in, 112; New Heidegger, Martin, 32, 95, 118, 138,
Wave films, 207–8, 209, 213 143, 144–5
Frankfurt School, 175 Helpmann, Robert, 192
French Revolution, 75 Hemingway, Ernest, 2
Freud, Sigmund, 11, 86, 134, 159, 176 Herrmann, Bernard, 211, 214–15
Freyre, Gilberto, 177, 178 ‘high modernism’, 170
functionalism, 98, 133, 134 history/historicism, 73–4, 127–36,
Fustel de Coulanges, Numa-Denys, 140–2, 143; anti-historicism, 128,
72–9, 130 131–6; and photography, 168
Hitchcock, Alfred, 207, 215
Gallaratese, Milan, 98, 99, 104 Hoffmann, E. T. A.: ‘Sand Man’, 31–2
Galleria, Milan, 99, 101 Hoffmann, Joseph, 133
games, 139–40, 145 Hofmannsthal, Hugo von, 46, 47–61;
‘garden cities’, 133 Briefe des Zurückgekehrten, 48–50,
Gare Saint-Lazare (Manet), 66–7 53, 57; ‘Bühne als Traumbild’, 54;
Gaugin, Paul, 48 Cacciari on, 145–6; ‘Dichter und
gaze, 12, 42, 173, 174 diese Zeit’, 61; Lord Chandos’s Letter,
Geist, 175 52–5, 57–61, 86, 92
genius, 28 Hölderlin, J. C. F., 97
gens/genos, 78 homelessness, 62, 63, 73
German Romanticism, 29–30, 86, Homer, 12
121, 176 Hopper, Edward, 199, 201
Ginzburg, Carlo, 141 Houssaye, Arsène, 162
Giovane Trieste, La, 84 Hugo, Victor, 48, 67, 68
Glanvill, Joseph, 7, 8
Gobetti, Piero, 87 ‘I’: first-person narrative, 23, 39–40,
Godard, Jean-Luc, 207, 208, 212 43; ‘I’/‘eye’ motif, 15–18, 23, 24, 40,
Goethe, J. W. von, 30, 81, 83, 88, 92, 41, 42–3
122 Ibsen, Henrik, 81, 84
Gogh see Van Gogh identity, 6, 7
Goldmann, Lucien, 128 image: consumption of, 178
Goncourt brothers, 60 imagination, 14–15, 34–5, 176–7,
Goodfellas (film), 193, 194, 198, 199, 180, 185, 192–3
200, 201–2, 203–4 impersonality of media, 152–3

246 Index
impressionism, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, 83

inauguration, 170–1 Levinas, Emmanuel, 138
‘Independent Cinema’, 208 lighthouses, 96, 107
‘intellectual montage’, 214 Lindsay, Vachel, 188–9
irredentism, 84, 88 Liotta, Ray, 193
Istituto di storia dell’architettura, literature: literary Stalinism, 112–13

Venice, 110, 118 Livy, 57–8
Italian Communist Party, 108–14, Lombardy, 98–100, 101
116–18, 126 Loos, Adolf, 51, 54, 97, 100, 102, 105,
Italian populism, 125–6 114, 115; Cacciari on, 113, 116–17,
Italianamerica (film), 199 122, 124–5, 127, 133, 135–40, 141;
Roman architecture, 135–6, 137
James, Henry, 177 Lorca, Federico García, 104
Jameson, Fredric, 177, 185; Lost Highway (film), 175, 182–5, 195,
‘Architecture and the Critique 196, 198, 200
of Ideology’, 126, 129–30; Lowell, James Russell, 14
‘Existence of Italy’, 163–4, 167–71; Lukács, Georg, 63, 64, 117, 121, 122
‘On Magic Realism in Film’, 173; Lumière brothers, 166
Signatures of the Visible, 158, 172, Lynch, David: aesthetic implications
174, 175, 176, 178–9 of Lost Highway, 175, 182–5; nature
Jules et Jim (film), 207, 208 in films, 196–7; and Scorsese,
Jung-Wien group, 50, 53 195–201, 202; soundtracks, 200–1;
suburban locations, 195–6
Kafka, Franz, 55, 56, 57, 124, 136
Kant, Immanuel, 17, 34 M (film), 188
Kantian dualism, 175–6, 179 Mach, Ernst, 58
Keitel, Harvey, 210 Madonna, 158–9
Keynes, J. M., 110, 117, 120 Majakovskij, Vladimir 112–13
Kirkegaard, Soren, 119, 120 Mallarmé, Stéphane, 12, 48, 81
Kiss Me Deadly (film), 185 Manet, Édouard, 48, 66–7
Klee, Paul, 142–3, 171, 172 Mann, Thomas, 87, 117
Kleist, Heinrich von, 31 Mantz, Paul, 55–6
Klimt, Gustav, 50, 51–2, 53, 54–5, 90, Marcuse, Herbert, 129
134 Marx, Karl, 118
Kokoschka, Oskar, 51, 58, 60 Marx, Leo, 195
Kracauer, Siegfried, 164 Marxist humanism, 129
Kraus, Karl, 51, 53, 54, 86, 133, 135, Matthew, Saint, 5
138, 141, 144 Matthiessen, F.O., 30
Kubrick, Stanley, 205 Mean Streets (film), 194, 198, 199, 200,
205–7, 209, 212
Lacan, Jacques, 122, 160, 173 mechanical form, 30, 31–2; distrust of
Lang, Fritz, 163, 186, 188, 189, 206, Mechanical Age, 69; industrial
208, 209, 213 labour, 118–19
language: limits of, 144; multiplicity media: cultural impact, 150–73, 174,
of languages, 136–40, 141, 145–6 183–4; in Scorsese’s films, 206–7
Last Waltz, The (film), 215 Mekas, Jonas, 208
laterality, 172 Melville, Hermann, 100, 107; Bartleby,
Lefebvre, Henri, 129 69; Moby Dick, 9, 21, 23; Pierre, or
Leipzig City Advertiser, 151, 155 the Ambiguities, 22, 23, 33, 69

Index 247
memory: and architecture, 98, 101–6, dislike for, 200; symbolism in,
107; and art, 180–1, 182, 185; and 64–5; see also Transcendentalism
film-making, 189–90, 196, 204–5, ‘negative dialectics’, 129, 130
211–12 negative thought, 113, 115, 116–17,
Mépris, Le (film), 207, 212 119–24, 136, 138
Meri per sempre (film), 126 Negri, Antonio, 110–11, 117, 120

metaphysics, 26–7, 34 neo-realist cinema, 161, 163, 164–5,
Metropolis: as allegory, 115–18; in 170
Italian film, 126; theory of, 115–49; New England Transcendentalism see
see also cities American Transcendentalism
Metropolis (film), 163, 186, 188, 189 New Wave films, 207–8, 209, 213
Metz, Christian, 150–1 New York: architecture, 105–6, 137,
Michelet, Jules, 48 191; in Scorsese films, 187,
Michelstaedter, Carlo, 85, 90, 92, 95 189–204, 209–15
Mies van der Rohe, Ludwig, 100, 140 New York Film-makers’ Cooperative,
Milan, 98, 99, 102, 104 208, 209
Mill, John Stuart, 69 New York, New York (film), 192, 215
Milton, John, 12 Niepce, J.N., 166
mist and architecture, 101 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 83, 85, 95, 117,
Modena cemetery, 99, 104 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 138, 143
modernity: architecture, 96–107, nihilism, 92; and architecture,
133–4; art and literature of, 46–61; 113–14, 115, 116–17, 119–25, 144
contrasted with antiquity, 72–9 non-transparent society, 178
Momigliano, Arnoldo, 76, 78 nostalgia, 101–6, 146–7; and
Mondrian, Piet, 51 photography, 150–73
montage, 64, 155, 160, 162, 214, 215 nouveau roman, 93
Montaigne, Michel de, 2, 13 Novalis, 121
Montale, Eugenio, 91
monumentality in architecture, 104, Oberdan, Guglielmo, 84
106 objects: significance in film, 188–9
moralism, 91–2 Oedipus, 12
Mort de Marc Aurèle (Delacroix), 47 Oikos, 135–6, 138, 143
multiplicity of languages, 136–40, Olbrich, Josef, 51, 133
141, 145–6 ontological identity, 165
Mulvey, Laura, 159 operaista movement, 110, 111, 117,
Mumford, Lewis, 127 118, 146
Munch, Edvard, 57 Opportunist, The (film), 169
Musil, Robert, 59, 187, 189, 192–3, ‘optical unconscious’, 158
197; aesthetic philosophy, 175, organic principle, 29–30, 31, 32, 44, 86
179; Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, Ornament and Crime (film), 100, 137
59, 88, 90 ornamentalism, 54, 131, 133, 135
mysticism, 143
Paisà (film), 187
Naples, 187 Palladio, Andrea, 106, 114
Napoleon III, 70, 71 panopticon, 71
narrative modes: in Poe’s fiction, 23, Papini, Giovanni, 80, 85
33–9; in Scorsese’s films, 194–5 Paris, 115, 160, 187; cemetery
nature, 20–2, 30, 32, 69; in David problem, 78; Haussmann’s
Lynch films, 196–7; Scorsese’s transformation, 70–2, 74, 77

248 Index
Paris qui dort (film), 186 Verse’, 14; ‘Raven’, 12, 13, 18;
Pasolini, Pier Paolo, 128 ‘Sphinx’, 25; ‘Tale of the Ragged
PCI see Italian Communist Party Mountains’, 19–20; Tales of Horror,
Peeping Tom (film), 174, 184, 207–8, 23; Tales of Mystery and Imagination,
213 23; ‘Tell-Tale Heart’, 1, 2, 3, 13,
philosophy of Cacciari, 108–49 15–18, 23, 24, 25, 26, 36–7, 38,

photography, 93–4, 103, 150–73; 39–45, 64; ‘Thousand-and-Second
spectator of, 156–8; see also cinema Tale of Scheherezade’, 35; unity of
piazzas, 99, 105 effect, 25–33
Picasso, Pablo, 86, 177, 178 ‘poetic principle’, 2, 24, 25, 26–7
Pick Pocket (film), 210 polis, 123
Pileggi, Nick, 200 political transformations, 146–8
pity, 58 Polyphemus, 12
Plato, 9 populism in Italy, 125–6
Poe, Edgar Allan, 1–45, 60, 124, 136, pornography of visual, 158–9, 184
153, 213; analysis in narratives, 33, Porto Marghera, Venice, 111, 114,
35–6, 41; ‘Angel of the Odd’, 31; 116–17
anti-Transcendentalism, 9, 10, 16, possibility, 192–3
27; Arthur Gordon Pym, 20–1; poster of Secession group, 51, 52,
‘Berenice’, 8, 14, 15, 21, 24, 26, 31, 53–4, 55, 59
42; ‘Black Cat’, 11, 13, 36–7, 38, 39; post-Marxism, 129, 130
confession in front of law postmodernism, 129, 130, 136, 137,
narratives, 33, 36–9; 138, 140, 159, 176, 177–9; of David
‘Cryptography’, 20; ‘Domain of Lynch films, 184–5
Arnheim’, 10, 31; ‘Eleonora’, 4, 8; Potere Operaio, 111
elimination of fantasy in, 33, 34–5; Poulet, Georges, 24–5
‘eye’ motifs, 1, 2, 3–12, 15–18, 23, Powell, Michael, 174, 184, 189, 192,
24, 25, 40, 41, 42–3, 60; ‘Facts in 207–8, 213
the Case of M. Valdemar’, 6, 31; Pressburger, Emeric, 189, 192
fascination with letters and sounds, Prezzolini, Giuseppe, 80, 81
13–14, 17, 19–21, 41, 44–5; ‘A Few Prima della rivoluzione (film), 189–90
Words on Secret Writing’, 19; printing, 151, 152
first-person narrators, 23, 39–40, Prokofiev, Sergei, 214
43; on genius, 28; ‘Gold Bug’, 20; pronouns in Poe’s fiction, 23, 24,
on imagination, 14–15, 34–5; ‘Imp 39–40, 41
of the Perverse’, 36, 37–8, 39; Proust, Marcel, 177
importance of books, 9; ‘Ligeia’, psychoanalysis, 11, 122, 160, 173
4–5, 6–7, 8, 10–11, 13, 30–1, 33, 36,
42; ‘Loss of Breath’, 31; ‘Man of the radical nostalgia, 171
Crowd’, 10, 32–3, 41–3, 60–1, 62, Ragazzi fuori (film), 126
118, 190, 202; ‘Marginalia’, 26, 29; Raging Bull (film), 192, 199
‘Morella’, 7–8, 18, 29–30, 36; Ranke, Leopold von, 73
‘Murders in the Rue Morgue’, 10, rationality: of emotions, 175–6;
28, 33, 35–6; narrative modes, 23, theories of, 121–2, 135
33–9; ‘Philosophy of Composition’, realism, 154, 159–61; allegorical
2, 12, 13, 26; ‘Philosophy of realism, 65–8, 71–2, 79, 115–18,
Furniture’, 10; ‘Poetic principle’, 2, 160, 162–3; in art, 66–7; instability
24, 25, 26–7; poetry, 3–4; of, 167–8; in literature, 63–5, 66,
‘Purloined Letter’, 33; ‘Rationale of 67–8, 154; see also neo-realism

Index 249
reality: desire for, 160–1 Schorske, Carl, 51, 133–4

Red River, The (film), 210 Schrader, Paul, 209, 211, 215
reification theory, 175, 178 Schumpeter, Joseph A., 177
religion, 76–7 science fiction, 32
repetition, 192, 194 Scolari, Massimo, 125
Resnais, Alain, 207 Scorsese, Catherine, 198–9

revelation, 165, 166 Scorsese, Martin, 186–215;
rhythm of metropolitan life, 193, camera-work, 211, 212–13; on
194, 195, 197, 203, 215 city life, 190–1; dislike for nature,
Rilke, Rainer Maria, 47, 88, 118, 138 200; influences from world of
Ringstrasse, Vienna, 133–4 cinema, 204–15; narrative modes,
Risi, Marco, 126 194–5; soundtracks, 200–1, 202,
Rivette, Jacques, 207 203, 204, 205, 211, 214–15;
Robbe-Grillet, Alain, 93, 95 syncope, 203; time in, 194, 204,
Rodin, Auguste, 48 205
Roma, città aperta (film), 187 Searchers, The (film), 210
Romanticism, 6, 7, 26, 28, 29, 32; Secession, 50–1, 133, 134; poster, 51,
anti-urbanism, 69; German 52, 53–4, 55, 59
Romanticism, 29–30, 86, 121; Segrate, Milan, 102, 104
sentimentalism, 176 sentimentalism, 176
Rome, ancient, 75–6, 78; Roman Severino, Emanuele, 138
architecture of Loos, 135–6, 137 Shaftesbury, 3rd Earl of, 175
Rosenkavalier, Der, 51–2 Shakespeare, William, 23, 30, 48
Rossellini, Roberto, 100, 163, 187–8 Shelley, Percy Bysshe, 27, 65–6, 68,
Rossi, Aldo, 96–107, 125, 146, 191, 160
204; Biennale theatre, 106–7, 114; Simmel, Georg, 67–8, 114, 115,
L’architettura della città, 97, 98, 100, 120–1, 122, 147, 148–9, 153, 195
105, 137; Il libro azzurro, 96, 103–4; Sironi, Mario, 97, 104, 125
Scientific Autobiography, 96, 97–8, Sitte, Camillo, 134
100, 102–3, 105, 137, 191 Slataper, Scipio, 80–8, 91–2, 95; Il mio
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 75 carso, 80, 81–3, 85–6; Lettere
Roussel, Raymond, 100, 101, 107 triestine, 80; Nel paese degli aranci,
81
Sacri Monti, 99, 191 sociology, 76–7, 115
Salvemini, Gaetano, 81 Soffici, Ardengo, 80
San Carlone statue, Arona, 99, 104 Sontag, Susan, 169
Sant’Andrea church, Mantua, 99, 101 soundtracks, 200–1, 202, 203, 204,
Sant’Elia, Antonio, 125 205, 211, 214–15
Sarris, Andrew, 208 Soviet Union: literature in, 112–13
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 156, 157, 215 spectacle, 178
Savinio, Alberto, 125, 138 speed and art, 181–3, 184, 196
Scheerbart, Paul, 140 Stalinism, 112–13
Schelling, Friedrich von, 6, 7 stasis, 57
Schiller, Friedrich von, 83 Stendhal, 108, 195
Schlegel, A. W., 29–30, 121 Strapaese, 125
Schmitt, Carl, 138, 147 Strauss, Leo, 147
Schoenberg, Arnold, 145 Strauss, Richard, 50, 54
Scholem, Gershom Gerhard, 137–8 strolling, 143–4; see also flâneur
Schopenhauer, Artur, 95, 119, 120 suburbs in film, 195–6

250 Index
Svevo, Italo, 83, 87, 95, 105–6, 125 unitary art, 178
symbols, theory of, 4 United States: modern architecture in,
symobolist poetry, 14, 64–5 105, 137
syncope, 203 unity of effect, 25–33
Tafuri, Manfredo, 110, 114, 117, 118, vagueness, 13

126, 127, 128–30, 138, 140–2, 143, Vale, Jerry, 201
148; American City, 131–2; on Loos, Valéry, Paul: Monsieur Teste, 28–9
136–7 Van Gogh, Vincent, 46, 47–50, 53,
Tales of Hoffmann (film), 189, 192, 55–6, 57, 58, 60, 61
215 Vattimo, Gianni, 178
Taxi Driver (film), 187, 188–9, 190, veiled eye image, 1, 2, 3, 15–18, 25,
192, 193, 196, 197–8, 199, 202; 40, 41, 42–3
influences in, 205, 209–11, 212, Veillich, Joseph, 138, 146
213–15 Venice: as city of adventure, 148–9; as
Taylor, Deems, 204–5 city of modernity, 114–15;
technique: conceptions of, 163–4 Department of Historical and
television, 150 Critical Analysis, 118, 127, 131–6;
Tempio Malatestiano, Rimini, 99 Festival dell’Unita, 108–10, 112–13;
Tennyson, Alfred, Lord, 13 floating theatre design, 106–7, 114;
Tertullian, 21 industrial area, 111, 114; Istituto di
theatres: architectural design, 106–7, storia dell’architettura, 110, 118
114 Venturi, Robert, 138
Thoreau, (Henry) David, 22, 30 Ver Sacrum, 50, 51
time: and film production, 181, 182; Vernunft, 175
and Rossi’s architecture, 103, 104, ‘vertical montage’, 214, 215
106; in Scorsese’s films, 194, 204, video, 150
205 Vienna, 115, 128, 138, 187;
Tognazzi, Ricky, 126 Ringstrasse, 133–4; Werkstätte, 54,
Tolstoy, Leo, 64 133
Tomb of Ligeia, The (film), 206 Village Voice, 208
Tornatore, Giuseppe, 126 Vinton, Bobby, 201
tradition, 76, 77 Virgil, 77
traffic, 102 Virilio, Paul, 177, 179, 181–2
Trakl, Georg, 47, 57, 61, 100, 104 Visconti, Luchino, 100
Transcendentalism see American vision/visual, 174–5, 176, 182–3; as
Transcendentalism pornographic, 158–9, 184
Trieste, 80–95, 105–6, 125 vital force, 82
Trockij, Leon, 112–13 Vivante, Angelo, 84
Tronti, Mario, 110, 117 Voce, La, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85
Truffaut, François, 200, 207, 208, 209, Voyage en Italie (film), 187
213
truquage, 155 Wadleigh, Mike, 215
Wagner, Otto, 51, 90, 133, 134, 135,
Ultrà (film), 126 144
Ulysses, 91 Wagner, Richard, 60, 83
Un condamné à mort s’est échappé Wayne, John, 210
(film), 210 Weber, Max, 76, 115, 116, 153, 175
Unità, 108–10, 112–13 Weininger, Otto, 82, 85, 86, 90

Index 251
Welles, Orson, 213, 215 wirkliche Historie, 141

Werkbund, 115, 122, 133, 135 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 89, 133, 135–6,
Werkstätte, 54, 133, 138 138, 139, 140, 143, 144, 145
Whitman, Walt: Leaves of Grass, 30; Woodstock (film), 215
Song of Myself, 82 words, power of, 24–5
Who’s That Knocking at My Door Wordsworth, William, 32

(film), 200 workers’ movements in Italy, 111, 112
Wilde, Oscar, 94
Williams, Raymond, 127, 150, 151, Zaiat, Ebn, 21
152, 154, 156, 158 Zola, Émile, 63, 164

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Cities, Words and Images: From Poe to Scorsese

General Editors: Stephen Heath, Colin MacCabe and Denise Riley

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Language, Discourse, Society

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1 Edgar Allan Poe: The Domain of Artifice 1

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Edgar Allan Poe and Charles Baudelaire are inevitable references.

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theoreticians of architecture: two central chapters in this book treat this

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Poe’s short stories, Hofmannsthal’s or Musil’s Vienna, New York as seen

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seventies that my generation believed in, as in a sacred but subversive

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d’être of this form. We are bombarded by empty words and images; in

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nineteenth century, aware of the need for a certain type of order in

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Some Frenchman – possibly Montaigne – says: ‘People talk about

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The eye as object

Poe rehearsed many possible readings of the eye as object. Thus,

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In the poem ‘To Helen’, the poet sees celestial eyes:

All – all expired save thee – save less than thou:

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little object or singular thing – could be a representation of ‘all’, of the

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The eye, in Emerson’s opinion, has a natural magic, and is capable of

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waste of time to expect to extract any meaning from a German maxim.