866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paulmitan vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 61584.November 25, 1992.

DONATO S. PAULMITAN, JULIANA P. FANESA and

RODOLFO FANESA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, ALICIO PAULMITAN, ELENA PAULMITAN,
ABELINO PAULMITAN, ANITA PAULMITAN, BAKING
PAULMITAN, ADELINA PAULMITAN and ANITO
PAULMITAN, respondents.

Civil Law; Succession; In every inheritance the relative

nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones.—Since it is well-
settled by virtue of Article 777 of the Civil Code that “[t]he rights
to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent,” the right of ownership, not only of Donato but also
of Pascual, over their respective shares in the inheritance was
automatically and by operation of law vested in them in 1953
when their mother died intestate. At that stage, the children of
Donato and Pascual did not yet have any right over the
inheritance since “[i]n every inheritance the relative nearest in
degree excludes the more distant ones.” Donato and Pascual
excluded their children as to the right to inherit from Agatona
Sagario Paulmitan, their mother.
Same; Property; Co-ownership; Even if a co-owner sells the
whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but
not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.—
This Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole
property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not
those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale
[Punsalan v. Boon Liat, 44 Phil. 320 (1923)].
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since a co-owner is entitled to sell
his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner
without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void.—
This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale
or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the
transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the
partition of the thing owned in common.
 Remedial Law; Appeal; The settled rule is that only questions
of law may be raised in a petition for review; Generally, findings of
fact made by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final and
conclu-

________________

* THIRD DIVISION.

867

VOL.215,NOVEMBER25,1992 867

Paulmitan vs. Court of Appeals

sive and cannot be reviewed on appeal.—Petitioners dispute the

order of the trial court, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, for
them to pay private respondents P5,000.00 per year from 1966
until the partition of the estate which represents the share of
private respondents in the fruits of the land. According to
petitioners, the land is being leased for P2,000.00 per year only.
This assigned error, however, raises a factual question. The
settled rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review. As a general rule, findings of fact made by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and
cannot be reviewed on appeal.

PETITION for review on certiorari, from the decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

ROMERO,J.:

This is a petition for1 review on certiorari seeking the

reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated July
14, 1982 in CA-G.R. No. 62255-R entitled “Alicio
Paulmitan, et al. v. Donato2 Sagario Paulmitan, et al.”
which affirmed the decision of the then Court of First
Instance (now RTC) of Negros Occidental, 12th Judicial
District, Branch IV, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 11770.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Agatona
3
Sagario Paulmitan, who died sometime in
1953, left the two following parcels of land located in the
Province of Negros Occidental: (1) Lot No. 757 with an area
of 1,946 square meters covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. RO8376; and (2) Lot No. 1091 with an area
of 69,080 square meters and covered by OCT No. RO-
11653. From her marriage with Ciriaco Paulmitan, who is
also now deceased, Agatona begot two legitimate children,
namely: Pascual Paulmitan, who also

________________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Crisolito Pascual with the concurrence of

Associate Justices Guillermo P. Villasor and Vicente V. Mendoza.
2 Penned by Judge Oscar R. Victoriano.
3 Petition, page 3; Rollo, page 15.

868

868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paulmitan vs. Court of Appeals

4
died in 1953, apparently shortly after his mother passed
away, and Donato Paulmitan, who is one of the petitioners.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa is Donato’s daughter while
the third petitioner, Rodolfo Fanesa, is Juliana’s husband.
Pascual Paulmitan, the other son of Agatona Sagario, is
survived by the respondents, who are his children, namely:
Alicio, Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking and Anito,
all surnamed Paulmitan.
Until 1963, the estate of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan
remained unsettled and the titles to the two lots mentioned
above remained in the name of Agatona. However, on
August 11, 1963, petitioner Donato Paulmitan executed an
Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship, extrajudicially
adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757 based on the claim
that he is the only surviving heir of Agatona Sagario. The
affidavit was filed with the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental who, on August 20, 1963, cancelled OCT No.
RO-8376 in the name of Agatona Sagario and issued
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 35979 in Donato’s
name.
As regards Lot No. 1091, Donato executed on May 28,
1974 a Deed of Sale over the same5
in favor of petitioner
Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter.
In the meantime, sometime in 1952, for non-payment of
taxes, Lot No. 1091 was forfeited and sold at a public
auction, with the Provincial Government of Negros
Occidental being the buyer. A Certificate of Sale over the
land was executed by the Provincial Treasurer
6
in favor of
the Provincial Board of Negros Occidental.
 On May 29, 1974, Juliana P. Fanesa redeemed the
property from the Provincial Government 7
of Negros
Occidental for the amount of P2,959.09.
On learning of these transactions, respondents children
of the late Pascual Paulmitan filed on January 18, 1975
with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a
Complaint against petitioners to partition the properties
plus damages.

________________

4 Record on Appeal, pages 63, 65.

5 Record on Appeal, pp. 21-24.
6 Record on Appeal, page, 72.
7 Record on Appeal, page 92.

869

VOL.215,NOVEMBER25,1992 869
Paulmitan vs. Court of Appeals

Petitioners set up the defense of prescription with respect

to Lot No. 757 as an affirmative defense, contending that
the Complaint was filed more than eleven years after the
issuance of a transfer certificate of title to Donato
Paulmitan over the land as a consequence of the
registration with the Register of Deeds, of Donato’s
affidavit extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No.
757. As regards Lot No. 1091, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa
claimed in her Answer to the Complaint that she acquired
exclusive ownership thereof not only by means of a deed of
sale executed in her favor by her father, petitioner Donato
Paulmitan, but also by way of redemption from the
Provincial Government of Negros Occidental.
Acting on the petitioners’ affirmative defense of
prescription with respect to Lot No. 757, the trial court
issued an order dated April 22, 1976 dismissing the
complaint as to the said property upon finding merit in
petitioners’ affirmative defense. This order, which is not
the object of the present petition, has become final after
respondents’ failure to appeal therefrom.
Trial proceeded with respect to Lot No. 1091. In a
decision dated May 20, 1977, the trial court decided in
favor of respondents as to Lot No. 1091. According to the
trial court, the respondents, as descendants of Agatona
Sagario Paulmitan were entitled to one-half (1/2) of Lot No.
1091, pro indiviso. The sale by petitioner Donato
Paulmitan to his daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa,
did not prejudice their rights. And the repurchase by
Juliana P. Fanesa of the land from the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental did not vest in Juliana
exclusive ownership over the entire land but only gave her
the right to be reimbursed for the amount paid to redeem
the property. The trial court ordered the partition of the
land and directed petitioners Donato Paulmitan and
Juliana P. Fanesa to pay private respondents certain
amounts representing the latter’s share in the fruits of the
land. On the other hand, respondents were directed to pay
P1,479.55 to Juliana P. Fanesa as their share in the
redemption price paid by Fanesa to the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental. The dispositive portion
of the trial court’s decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the second cause

of action pleaded in the complaint as follows:

870

870 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paulmitan vs. Court of Appeals

“1. The deed of sale (Exh. ‘F’) dated May 28, 1974 is
valid insofar as the one-half undivided portion of
Lot 1091 is concerned as to vest ownership over
said half portion in favor of defendant Juliana
Fanesa and her husband Rodolfo Fanesa, while the
remaining half shall belong to plaintiffs, pro-
indiviso;
“2. Lot 1091, Cadastral Survey of Pontevedra, Province
of Negros Occidental, now covered by TCT No. RO-
11653 (N.A.), is ordered partitioned. The parties
must proceed to an actual partition by property
instrument of partition, submitting the
corresponding subdivision within sixty (60) days
from finality of this decision, and should they fail to
agree, commissioners of partition may be appointed
by the Court;
“3. Pending the physical partition, the Register of
Deeds of Negros Occidental is ordered to cancel
Original Certificate of Title No. RO-11653 (N.A.)
covering Lot 1091, Pontevedra Cadastre, and to
issue in lieu thereof of a new certificate of title in
the name of plaintiffs and defendants, one-half
portion each, pro-indiviso, as indicated in
paragraph 1 above;
 Plaintiffs are ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
“4. defendant Juliana Fanesa the amount of P1,479.55
with interest at the legal rate from May 28, 1974
until paid;
“5. Defendants Donato Sagario Paulmitan and Juliana
Paulmitan Fanesa are ordered to account to
plaintiffs and to pay them, jointly and severally, the
value of the produce from Lot 1091 representing
plaintiffs’ share in the amount of P5,000.00 per
year from 1966 up to the time of actual partition of
the property, and to pay them the sum of P2,000.00
as attorney’s fees as well as the costs of the suit.”
***

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s

decision. Hence this petition.
To determine the rights and obligations of the parties to
the land in question, it is well to review, initially, the
relatives who survived the decedent Agatona Sagario
Paulmitan. When Agatona died in 1953, she was survived
by two (2) sons, Donato and Pascual. A few months later in
the same year, Pascual died, leaving seven children, the
private respondents. On the other hand, Donato’s sole
offspring was petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa.
At the time of the relevant transactions over the
properties of decedent Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, her son
Pascual had died, survived by respondents, his children. It
is, thus, tempting to apply the principles pertaining to the
right of representation
871

VOL.215,NOVEMBER25,1992 871
Paulmitan vs. Court of Appeals

as regards respondents. It must, however, be borne in 8

mind
that Pascual did not predecease his mother, thus
precluding the operation of the 9
provisions in the Civil Code
on the right of representation with respect to his children,
the respondents. When Agatona Sagario Paulmitan died
intestate in 1952, her two (2) sons Donato and Pascual
were still alive. Since it is well-settled by virtue of Article
777 of the Civil Code that “[t]he rights to the succession are
transmitted10
from the moment of the death of the
decedent,” the right of ownership, not only of Donato but
also of Pascual, over their respective shares in the
inheritance was automatically and by operation of law
vested in them in 1953 when their mother died intestate.
At that stage, the children of Donato and Pascual did not
yet have any right over the inheritance since “[i]n every
inheritance the relative
11
nearest in degree excludes the
more distant ones.” Donato and Pascual excluded their
children as to the right to inherit from Agatona Sagario
Paulmitan, their mother.
From the time of the death of Agatona Sagario
Paulmitan to the subsequent passing away of her son
Pascual in 1953, the estate remained unpartitioned. Article
1078 of the Civil Code provides: “Where there are two or
more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its
partition, owned in common by such 12
heirs, subject to the
payment of debts of the deceased.” Donato and Pascual
Paulmitan were therefore, co-owners of the estate left by
their mother as no partition was ever made.
When Pascual Paulmitan died intestate in 1953, his
children, the respondents, succeeded him in the co-
ownership of the disputed property. Pascual Paulmitan’s
right of ownership over an undivided portion of the
property passed on to his

________________

8 The records of the case do not indicate the exact date when Agatona
Sagario Paulmitan and her son Pascual died in 1953 but all parties,
including petitioners, do not dispute that Agatona died ahead of her son
(See Petition, p. 3; Rollo p. 15.)
9 See Articles 970-977, 981 of the Civil Code.
10 Jimenez v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 46364, April 6, 1990, 184 SCRA 190;
Quion v. Claridad, 74 Phil. 100 (1943).
11 Article 962, Civil Code.
12 See also Mendoza I v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 44664, July 31,
1991, 199 SCRA 778.

872

872 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paulmitan vs. Court of Appeals

children, who, from the time of Pascual’s death, became co-

owners with their uncle Donato over the disputed decedent
estate.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claims ownership over Lot
No. 1091 by virtue of two transactions, namely: (a) the sale
made in her favor by her father Donato Paulmitan; and (b)
her redemption of the land from the Provincial Government
of Negros Occidental after it was forfeited for non-payment
of taxes.
 When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No.
1091 to his daughter Juliana P. Fanesa, he was only a co-
owner with respondents and as such, he could only sell that
portion which may 13
be allotted to him upon termination of
the co-ownership. The sale did not prejudice the rights of
respondents to one half (1/2) undivided share of the land
which they inherited from their father. It did not vest
ownership in the entire land with the buyer but transferred
14
only the seller’s pro-indiviso share in the property and
consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the land until
15
it
is partitioned. In Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, The
Court, through Justice Irene R. Cortes, outlined the effects
of a sale by one co-owner without the consent of all the co-
owners, thus:

“The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly

specified in Article 493 of the Civil Code. Thus:
Art.493.Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect
to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. [Italics supplied.]
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner
sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own
share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to
the sale

________________

13 Article 493, Civil Code; Reyes v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 56550, October 1, 1990,
190 SCRA 171.
14 Abad v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84908, December 4, 1989, 179 SCRA 817.
15 G.R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 738, 744-745.

873

VOL.215,NOVEMBER25,1992 873
Paulmitan vs. Court of Appeals

[Punsalan v. Boon Liat, 44 Phil. 320 (1923)]. This is because

under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other
disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee
gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of
the thing owned in common. [Ramirez v. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528
(1909)]. Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and
Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect to their
proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which
culminated in the sale to private respondent Celestino Afable, the
said Afable thereby became a co-owner of the disputed parcel of
land as correctly held by the lower court since the sale produced
the effect of substituting the buyers in the enjoyment thereof
[Mainit v. Bandoy, 14 Phil. 730 (1910)].
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is
entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property
by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not
null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property.”

Applying this principle to the case at bar, the sale by

petitioner Donato Paulmitan of the land to his daughter,
petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not give to the latter
ownership over the entire land but merely transferred to
her the one half (1/2) undivided share of her father, thus
making her the co-owner of the land in question with the
respondents, her first cousins.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa also claims ownership of
the entire property by virtue of the fact that when the
Provincial Government of Negros Occidental bought the
land after it was forfeited for non-payment of taxes, she
redeemed it.
The contention is without merit.
The redemption of the land made by Fanesa did not
terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to the entire
land subject of the co-ownership. Speaking on the same
issue raised
16
by petitioners, the Court, in Adille v. Court of
Appeals, resolved the same with the following
pronouncements:

“The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire

exclusive ownership over the property held in common?
Essentially, it is the petitioners’ contention that the property
subject of dispute devolved upon him upon the failure of his co-
heirs to

________________

16 G.R. No. L-44546, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 455, 459-460.

874

874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paulmitan vs. Court of Appeals
join him in its redemption within the period required by law. He
relies on the provisions Article 1515 of the old Civil Code, Article
1613 of the present Code, giving the vendee a retro the right to
demand redemption of the entire property.
There is no merit in this petition.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with
respect to his share alone (CIVIL CODE, art. 1612; CIVIL CODE
(1889), art. (1514.). While the records show that petitioner
redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses
therefor, that did not make him the owner of all of it. In other
words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership
(Supra, Art. 489). There is no doubt that redemption of property
entails a necessary expense. Under the Civil Code:
ART.488.Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other
co-owners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the
thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the
latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so
much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share
of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is
prejudicial to the co-ownership.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of
co-ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the
Code, “may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption,”
the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its
totality does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part
of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to
retain the property and consolidate title thereto in his name
(Supra, art. 1607). But the provision does not give to the
redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does not
provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.”

Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over

the entire lot by virtue of the redemption she made,
nevertheless, she did acquire the right to be reimbursed for
half of the redemption price she paid to the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental on behalf of her co-
owners. Until reimbursed, Fanesa holds 17
a lien upon the
subject property for the amount due her.
Finally, petitioners dispute the order of the trial court,
which

________________

17 Guinto v. Lim Bonfing, 48 Phil. 884 (1926).

875

VOL.215,NOVEMBER25,1992 875
 Paulmitan vs. Court of Appeals

the Court of Appeals affirmed, for them to pay private

respondents P5,000.00 per year from 1966 until the
partition of the estate which represents the share of private
respondents in the fruits of the land. According to
petitioners, the land is being leased for P2,000.00 per year
only. This assigned error, however, raises a factual
question. The settled rule is that only questions of law may
be raised in a petition for review. As a general rule,
findings of fact made by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals18 are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on
appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision
of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

          Gutierrez, Jr. (Chairman), Bidin, Davide, Jr. and

Melo, JJ., concur.

Petition denied; decision affirmed.

Note.—Rights to the succession are transmitted from

the moment of the death of the decedent (Jimenez vs.
Fernandez, 184 SCRA 190).

——o0o——

_______________

18 Bustamante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89880, February 6, 1991,

193 SCRA 603; De Ocsio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 44237, February 28,
1989, 170 SCRA 729.

876

© Copyright 2017 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.