Article by an MPIfG researcher

Patrik Aspers: The Second Road to Phenomenological Sociology. In: Society 47(3), 214-219 (2010). Springer
Soc (2010) 47:214–219 The original publication is available at the publisher’s web site: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12115-010-9306-6
DOI 10.1007/s12115-010-9306-6

SYMPOSIUM: PETER BERGER’S ACHIEVEMENT IN SOCIAL SCIENCE

The Second Road to Phenomenological Sociology

Published online: 27 March 2010

Abstract This article outlines and discusses the second (1859–1938). Thus, the first, and by far the most well-
road to phenomenology. It is argued that Martin Heideg- known, road to phenomenology goes from Berger to Schütz
ger’s approach to phenomenology represents a radical break and ends with Husserl.
with the first, and egological, road paved by Edmund Clearly, the idea of social construction has been crucial
Husserl. The article shows that sociologists who have for the influence of phenomenological sociology. It was, if I
followed Husserl and Schütz, or more generally have am correct, in a review by Peter Berger that the notion with
assumed the egological approach, in fact operate with a the meaning it has today was first introduced. In the review
non-sociological starting point. Husserl brackets the life- of “Truth in the Religions: A Sociological and Psycholog-
world in order to get to true knowledge. In his view, ego ical Approach” by W. Montgomery Watt, Berger used the
tries to reach out to other egos, and social relations is a phrase “the social construction of reality” (1964:292).
consequence of egos attempts. Heidegger, in contrast, Today, more than 40 years after this term was coined, it is
argues that our lifeworld is the starting point of any in fashion to call a paper, dissertation or a book “The Social
knowledge, and this means that man is essentially consti- Construction of...”
tuted as being together with other men. It would be easy to continue, and in a text like this only
discuss Peter Berger’s different contributions to sociology.
Keywords Phenomenology . Sociology . Socioontology We would then, however, have to cover much ground, and
obviously not restrict our investigation to the first road of
Few social scientists have taken the direct route to phe- phenomenology. Such a study would take us, for example,
nomenology. They have instead been lead, guided and from phenomenology, to Max Weber, to the role of society
accompanied by others, whose works have been like in man, to capitalism and religion. More specifically, I
bridges of knowledge leading back to the original sources. would like to mention the role of values in society, and the
The work that has spawned the interest among social centrality of conflicting values in modern society (Berger
scientists in phenomenology the famous work The Social 1997). Berger is thus a Gesellschaftsforscher, who has
Construction of Reality (Berger 1970:15; Berger and analyzed our contemporary social life in a Weberian spirit,
Luckmann 1991), by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann taking the different life-spheres into account. It is to me
has also profoundly affected the social sciences, and above clear that Berger’s work points at the importance of
all sociology. It is primarily through their work that social meaning, and meaning production. Religion plays here a
scientists have come to appreciate another Austrian, namely central role (Berger 1969), and also capitalism is a large
Alfred Schütz (1899–1959). And through Schütz, some theme (Berger 1986) in his list of publications. His work is,
have travelled the road all the way back to the father of hence, deeply rooted in the European tradition of sociology,
phenomenology, the German philosopher Edmund Husserl with a clear focus on the most central concept in the social
sciences, meaning.
P. Aspers (*)
In this article I will neither review nor discuss Berger’s
Department of Sociology, Stockholm University,
10691 Stockholm, Sweden work in detail, instead I will do what I think is the best way to
e-mail: [email protected] pay tribute to a thinker (Heidegger 1985:6), namely a kind of
Soc (2010) 47:214–219 215

Auseinandersetzung (“confrontation”) with the central idea Phenomenology is a descriptive science, which in the
of the first—the epistemic—road to phenomenology. end results in an eidetic science, or a universal ontology, as
This article takes the reader on a tour along the second it is the “science of the transcendental inter-subjectivity or
road to phenomenology, which will lead us to the German universum of fact” (Husserl 1945:702). This starting point
phenomenologist and philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889– aims at generating an ontology, a formal ontology, upon
1976). Heidegger worked close together with Husserl, but which all regional ontologies, for example of the empirical
he gradually developed his own approach (Frede 2006). sciences, can be based (Wolf 1984:1195). To address this
More specifically, I shall claim that Heidegger’s ontological issue, Husserl readdresses the Kantian question of how
approach points at a radically sociological starting point knowledge is possible (Zahavi 2003:8). To follow this path,
compared with the Cartesian epistemic-egological approach Husserl could not take anything of what is considered as
that has come to dominate the social sciences. There are true by ordinary people, or by the scientists and philoso-
two important, though related, distinctions to be made to phers, for granted; everything has to be put into question.
clarify the two different roads; one between epistemology He follows Descartes and asks if there is a justification for
and ontology, and one between egology and sociology. As his experience, and he answers: “No! I have based my
shall be clear, these two are interrelated. I begin by previous life and scientific activities on it without even
discussing the first road to phenomenology. I shall focus justifying it” (Husserl 1981:318). Husserl’s study aims at
on the defining characteristics, and in the second step, creating a new beginning, a “radical beginning”, or “first
critically discuss it. philosophy” as he (1962:19–20) calls it. Husserl explains
his approach: “transcendental phenomenology is not a
theory ...it is a science founded in itself...that stands
The First Road to Phenomenology: Egological absolutely on its own ground” (Husserl 1962:13).
Epistemology Husserl claims that to accomplish true knowledge, one
must perform the psychological reduction, which puts the
The first road to phenomenology is well-known. When world as we know it in bracket, and which leaves two parts,
talking to people in the social sciences who have a serious the way things are experienced (“the noetic”) and what is
interest into phenomenology, their story is often identical. experienced (“the noematic”). This means that the study is
After having read Berger and Luckmann, they got interest- epistemic in its nature, starting with the question of what
ed in Schütz, and they may even have looked at or studied there is, based on the idea of a pure ego (the knowing
the works of Husserl. Husserl will be the example of the subject).
Cartesian epistemic position because of the clarity of his
presentation. My argument is that the discussion of
Heidegger will uncover the paradigmatic assumptions Bracketing the Real World
(Kuhn 1962) of the social sciences that are taken for
granted. It must always be remembered that the reductions proposed
Phenomenology can broadly be defined as the study of by Husserl start from the experiences of the real world (cf.
“that what appears”. To Husserl, who wanted to establish a Husserl 1981:337), and these experiences are analyzed
new scientific foundation based on phenomenology, the from within the transcendental sphere, not the natural
central question was epistemic, as it had to do with the attitude (Husserl 1980:20). He proposes the method of
problem of how the Cartesian ego would gain knowledge reduction, and this implies bracketing of the natural
about the world. His starting point, however, was man living attitude. This bracketing includes, man, personality, gender,
in the real life—the lifeworld. Husserl argues that each history, including all sciences (Husserl 1962:155–167). The
person lives in a world, in the natural attitude, as a “human various sciences are bracketed since they lack the ground-
person living among others in the world” (Husserl 1989:411). ing that can be used as a stepping-stone for further analysis
It is the world I perceive: I hear the breaking waves, I see my of knowledge; they lack the ability to reflect on their own
neighbor go to work, and I talk to my family; this world is foundation. Consequently, the theoretical results of empir-
immediately there for me, and I need not do anything but to ical sciences, cannot be assimilated by phenomenology
take part in this world (cf. Husserl 1962:91–93). In this (Husserl 1962:56–57). Only after the transcendental reduc-
attitude people take, for example, the social surrounding, tion is performed, which is done, and can only be done, in
houses, values and social life, including one’s friends and the the first person, the ego is able see the essential being, and
court of appeal, for granted. Husserl, however, argues that this seeing is based on pure intuition (e.g., Husserl
this world cannot serve as the foundation of true knowledge. 1962:174–175).
This basic idea led Husserl into a major project of The transcendental (Cartesian) reduction does not only
establishing a true base of knowledge. bracket the real world, but the existence of souls as well.
216 Soc (2010) 47:214–219

Husserl says that it provides the foundation for the lifeworld. The egological approach is a historically created
existence of subjectivity and that “which makes the world” doctrine (Heidegger 2001b:22–23) of man as an ego, which
([1929] 1945: 701). Through this reduction the Ego pole is has its root in Greek thinking, perpetuated by Christian
reached. Bracketing represents a shift from “external ideas, and which Descartes refined. This idea was taken
experiencing of the world…into transcendental subjectivi- over as a tacit foundation by the social sciences.
ty” (Husserl 1997:245). It means that the world, including
me as a person living among others is no longer the center
of attention; it is bracketed, and the center of attention is the The Schützian Turn to Sociology
world as mere phenomenon (Husserl 1997:246).
The epistemic relation is clearly expressed by Husserl; Husserl did not show much direct interest in sociology, his
the world is experienced and known by the transcendental ambition was to provide a foundation for all sciences,
subject in isolation—the ego. It follows that the ego is the including sociology. Despite this, the phenomenological
constituting pole of both everyday knowledge and the ideas of Husserl were one main source of inspiration for
knowledge of the objective world of science that is built on Alfred Schütz. Though he acknowledges the centrality of
that everyday knowledge (Husserl 1960:§40, 59). The phenomenology, Schütz clearly says that he does not follow
mental becomes the foundation, rather than the external Husserl: “as we proceed to our study of the social world,
world of objects, as in the objectivistic tradition. This is a we abandon the strictly phenomenological method. [...] The
radical shift, and Husserl refers to this as a “Copernican object we shall be studying, therefore, is the human being
turn” (Husserl 1960:§61). who is looking at the world from within the natural
Phenomenology, according to Husserl appears so far to attitude” (Schütz 1976:97–98, cf., 43–44). According to
be an activity of egos in solitude. But Husserl is, in Schütz, the starting point of the social sciences is, the
addition, outlining a transcendental “community” of iden- “intentional conscious experiences directed toward the
tical egos. What sociologists see as the problem of the other self” (Schütz 1976:144). This approach is clearly
social is also by Husserl seen as central problem, but it is oriented to the mental side of human life, but it says less on
clearly a derivative question, and social communities are human practice.
“personalities of a higher order” (Husserl 1960:132). This is Schütz, in his attempt to develop a full theory of action,
the grounding of what may be termed egology. This is no takes theory of meaning from phenomenology and adds it
interpretation as he says: “This universal concrete ontology to Max Weber’s theory of action. Weber’s idea of sociology
(or universal and concrete theory of science theory of refers to actions that are oriented to others, but this is
science—this concrete logic of being) [transcendental merely a sub-category of action (Weber 1978). This is clear
phenomenology] would therefore be the intrinsically first from the following quotation from Weber. “We shall speak
universe of science grounded on an absolute foundation. In of ‘action’ insofar as the acting individual attaches a
respect to order, the intrinsically first of the philosophical subjective meaning to his behavior—be it overt or covert,
disciplines would be the ‘solipsistically’ reduced ‘egology’, omission or acquiescence. Action is ‘social’ insofar as its
the egology of the primordially reduced ego. Then only subjective meaning takes into account of the behavior of
would come intersubjective phenomenology, which is others and is thereby oriented to its course” (Weber
founded on that discipline” (Husserl 1960:155). 1978:4). It should be acknowledged that from a logical
In other words, this egological approach assumes a point of view, Schütz makes a valid move: to combine the
subject (ego) who somehow reaches out and tries to egological starting point of Husserl’s theory of knowledge
understand everything, its environment, including others and meaning with Weber’s non-social (and essentially
and what we call social life. It is, in my view, a fictitious egological) starting point.
approach as it turns its back on every-day knowledge, and Husserl’s work is the condition for any later phenome-
Husserl argues, “Daily practical living is naive. It is nology, but it has also created a somewhat strange gulf
immersion in the already-given world, whether it be between philosophical phenomenology and sociological
experiencing, or thinking, or valuing, or acting...Nor is it phenomenology, as the latter has tried to stay outside of
otherwise in the positive sciences. They are naivetés of a the transcendental sphere, following Schütz who abandons
higher level. They are products of an ingenious theoretical the “strictly phenomenological method”. Peter Berger has
technique” (Husserl 1960:152–3). That this is a non-social taken up the Schützian approach and says that the
starting point is thus clear, especially in the fifth Cartesian “Lebenswelt” is the world “in der wir, zusammen mit
meditation (Husserl 1960). It is, moreover, an approach that anderen Menschen unseren ‘normalen’ Tätigkeiten nachge-
is “first of all monadic, and then intermonadic” (Husserl hen” (Berger 1970:15), and it is the reality of the lifeworld
1960:156). Its social science offspring is the knowing and that is the “natural” environment for us. I have in my own
acting subject, though this subject is often located in the work built on this sociological tradition of phenomenology
Soc (2010) 47:214–219 217

with its roots in Husserl, Schütz and Berger and Luckmann, making the individual subject somehow dependent upon
but taking it in a more empirical direction (Aspers 2006, shared social practices” (Dreyfus 1991:14; Schmid 2009).
2009), which lead me to develop what I call empirical To Heidegger, the starting point is our everyday life
phenomenology. Though it may be too early to finally (Heidegger 2001b:28–31) with its practices. Heidegger
judge the value of this approach, not the least as Husserl’s argues that we are part of this world, and it follows that
main contribution to the discussion of the lifeworld has we cannot do science as if we were not part of it. We are in
only recently been published (Husserl 2008), it looks as if the world, and it is because of this that he talk of Dasein
the old Cartesian approach holds a firm grip of phenome- [“being-there”] (Heidegger 2001b:15). Dasein is a being
nological researchers (Moran 2000; Zahavi 2003). that is always mine—it is me (Heidegger 1979:325), and I
Most of these approaches have nonetheless maintained a cannot escape being there (Dasein).
more or less explicit idea of an egology. They have come to Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology is radically
stress the mental, and essentially followed the tradition of different from Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. It is
sociology to start with the idea of man as something that is in this light that Heidegger argues that Husserl aims to solve a
not inherently social; man becomes, and is capable of construed problem, which itself is the result of the epoché-
being, social, but is not socially constituted. If we follow method developed by Husserl. Heidegger says that the
Husserl and Weber, meaning is individually constituted and detached subject (“Rumpsubjekt”) in the tradition of Des-
only occasionally social. This bias in the social sciences, cartes and Leibniz is unable to communicate with others.
though it is often only a bias when it comes to the Husserl has tried to solve this by imposing “empathy”
assumptions, towards Husserlian egology is not necessary. between the different ego-poles (Heidegger 2001b:140).
However, it is frequently the case that thinkers reject Heidegger’s approach, moreover, is entirely different from
Heidegger and defend the “subjective” or “egological” what Mead (1934:221–226) represents. Also Mead essen-
starting point. Emmanuel Levinas speaks of the “ontolog- tially represents an epistemic-egological perspective when
ical root of solitude”, which means that he “repudiate[s] the compared with Heidegger (Malhotra 1987). Heidegger’s
Heideggerian conception that views solitude in the midst of approach—which perhaps is obvious—consequently stands
a prior relationship with the other” (Levinas 1987:40–41). in contrast to the “thinking” ego-centered approaches, like
In fact, had social science phenomenologists also studied rational choice (cf. Moran 2000:238).
Heidegger, we could have been better off. Heidegger proposes an hermeneutic starting point that
accounts for our historically contingent positioning and
knowledge (Heidegger 1994:109–114). We as human
The Second Road to Phenomenology: Social Ontology beings, or what Heidegger calls Dasein, are encapsulated
in a structure of concepts, which has to be the focus of a
Heidegger’s phenomenology can fruitfully be read as a deconstruction (“Abbau”), or taking apart, to understand
critique of Husserl’s idea of phenomenology. Both, Dasein (Heidegger 1994:117). According to Heidegger, any
however, claim to have defined phenomenology. Heideg- question must necessarily departure from “what we know”
ger defines philosophy as universal phenomenological which is knowledge rooted in the lifeworld. He acknowl-
ontology (Heidegger 2001b:436), which means that the edges that this lifeworld is a historical product of human
point of departure is the human being living in society, and culture, which is to say that our logic and ontology are
not an externally existing world to be discovered by products of the past (Heidegger 1994:113). The study is, as
solitary egos. it were, affected by the point of view which we have, and
The ontological question, Heidegger argues, must start thus conditioned by history (Heidegger 1994:115), reflect-
with who we are. The epistemic approach, in contrast, ing the importance of temporality. Heidegger presents a
presumes a distinction between man and the world “out holism in which the constitution of man must, on the one
there”. Thus, the distinction between a subject that is there hand, be understood in relation to “tools” (Zeuge) that we
to detect the world in the epistemic tradition already use. Humans, however, have a form of being that is more
assumes an ontology (Heidegger 2001b:58–66). However, profound than “objects;” they have a special role as the
the main problem, Heidegger says, is not ontology, but to centre of constitution of the world. Let us look closer at
find a ground for any ontology (Heidegger 2001b:68). these two relations.
Heidegger puts man at the centre of the “creation” of To Heidegger, any knowledge must be grounded in man
ontology, instead of posing the Cartesian question of how I as living among other men, as this is constitutive
—the ego—can get to know the “externally existing world” (Heidegger 2001b:53–60). This is the relation between
in an true way by a process of reduction, as suggested by Dasein and das Man (the others). What does the idea of das
Husserl. This has been noted by others: “the strategy of Man imply? Man is from the very “beginning” part of a
Being and Time...is to reverse the Cartesian tradition by larger whole, the world, and never alone, others are always
218 Soc (2010) 47:214–219

there. This is a strong proposal. Also when one or more Safranski 1994), but one thing should be perfectly clear:
others are not there (presence in the same spatio-temporal as one part of the constitution of man, i.e., what one cannot
moment), they are there, as, for example, when someone is think away, is other men. We are now ready to pose the
missed. This relation to others is constitutive, and also inevitable question: what, if any, are the consequences of
when Dasein is alone, the others are existentially there. Heidegger’s approach for the social sciences? According to
Obviously, we also meet others directly, when they or we Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, man cannot be
are doing something, for example, at work (Heidegger analyzed as something that is non-social. Any making of
2001b). They are, of course, noticeable in their indirect institutions and order is conditioned by man, according to
presence, in the form of tools that are made for man, and Heidegger. We have seen that Husserl, Schütz and Weber in
the table that is made by someone, the umbrella that is fact do not start with a social man. The egological
forgotten by someone, in addition to the direct presence of approach, thus, penetrates sociology much deeper than
others (Heidegger 1979:326–329). merely being the ground rational choice or the idea of
An important aspect of Heidegger’s analysis of man, economic man.
which he indeed shares with Nietzsche (Aspers 2007) is the What I have proposed is an ontological foundation based
insight that man is not alone; he is essentially “social.” In on the socioontology of Martin Heidegger. This foundation
fact, man is so much “together” and conditioned by others is not to be found in biological (Park 1936) or psycholog-
that it is even hard to be alone. No metaphysical reductions ical traits. It is man’s relation to others, direct and indirectly
can undo this. Furthermore, this is indeed a different (through das Man), which constitutes him; “biology” and
problem that the “existential” problem of Kierkegaard; the “psychology” are more like modes of being and not first
problem of how to come closer to God (and perhaps to one principles of knowledge.
another). This problem is merely an issue given the The critique of Husserl and other followers of the
ontological constitution of man. Cartesian tradition—which is the foundation of economic
It is important to note that being together in the world is theory, rational choice, and Weberian sociology—is that
not the same as being together with stones. Objects are man does not have to solve all problems from within the
Vorhanden, there, but in another sense. Though also stones egological house. This egological approach creates quasi
and the see are part of the world, man cannot be with them. problems, such as prisoners’ dilemma, the emergence of the
Man can only be with others, i.e., other men (which state and yet other problems.
Heidegger calls Mitsein), which is a special ontological An insight of the more sociological starting point is that
relation that characterizes man (Heidegger 2001b:137). man is not born existentially free as his existential relation
Mitsein refers to others in a special form; a man who uses to the world is contingent upon others. This idea is clear in
the boat at the lake, and is not standing in the same as the writings of Nietzsche, who presents an analysis of how
ontological relation as the boat to me. man is “embedded” in a social world, than presenting a
The Dasein-Das Man relation is hence an essential normative view of an Übermensch (Aspers 2007). Put in
relation, and one may say that man is man because one has another language: man cannot escape this situation in which
taken over the institutions and knowledge of one’s he is thrown (Heidegger 2001b). Man is social, and
predecessors. Man’s activities are directly, as in activities Heidegger suggests that man is indeed more social than
by a supplier to a buyer, or indirectly, as when one reads a sociologists have assumed. Man is ontologically over-
journal article, related to others (one reads a journal article socialized (Wrong 1961), which is not to deny that man is
as “one” reads it, talks as one does, to take a few examples). ontically undersocialized.
The socially constructed norms and activities can never be The central argument in this paper is that the social
excluded from how man acts, if so man would no longer be sciences have not taken what I have called the second route
man. Dasein is in-the-world (Heidegger 2001a:138) doing to phenomenology. This route takes us to its starting point,
things with others, for others, in the position of others, and were we find the works of Martin Heidegger. Though this
with tools and knowledge generated by others, orienting to road is not directly visible to most social sciences, as there
the norms of man. This ontological constitution, hence, is are few links between Heidegger and the social sciences, I
social. We may thus speak of an socioontological con- have tried to show that there is a fruitful road to establish a
sititution, or for short: socioontology. social foundation for the social sciences. Of the two kinds
of phenomenology: the Cartesian egology and Heidegger’s
socioontology, it is, unfortunately, the first one that was
The Socially Primed Man taken by the founding fathers of sociology, most notably
Weber. I have not shown what perhaps is too evident,
It is here not possible to elaborate on the full meaning of namely that neoclassical theory starts with egological
Heidegger’s project (see for example Dreyfus 1991; approach, and claims this to be the correct way of reasoning
Soc (2010) 47:214–219 219

for almost any field of research (Becker 1991). This, Heidegger, M. 1985. Nietzsche: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst,
Gesamtausgabe, II Abteilung: Vorlesungen 1923–1944, Band 43.
however, can only be done against the background of a
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Further Reading Husserl, E. 2008. Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen der vorgegebenen
Welt und ihrer Konstitution. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1916–
Aspers, P. 2006. Markets in fashion, a phenomenological approach. 1937): Husserliana LXXXII. Dordrecht: Springer.
London: Routledge. Kuhn, T. 1962. The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago:
Aspers, P. 2007. Nietzsche’s sociology. Sociological Forum, 22, 474– Chicago University Press.
499. Levinas, E. 1987. Time and the other. Pittsburgh: Duquesne
Aspers, P. 2009. Empirical phenomenology: A qualitative research University Press.
approach (The Cologne seminars). Indo-Pacific Journal of Malhotra, V. 1987. A comparison of mead’s ‘self’ and heidegger’s
Phenomenology 9. ‘dasein’: Toward a regrounding of social psychology. Human
Becker, G. 1991. A treatise on the family. Cambridge: Harvard Studies, 10, 357–382.
University Press. Mead, G. 1934. Mind, self, and society, from the standpoint of a social
Berger, P. 1964. Review of ‘Truth in the Religions: A Sociological and behaviorist. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Psychological Approach’ by W. Montgomery Watt. American Moran, D. 2000. Introduction to phenomenology. London: Routledge.
Sociological Review, 29, 291–292. Park, R. E. 1936. Human ecology. The American Journal of
Berger, P. 1969. A rumor of angels: Modern society and the Sociology, 42, 1–15.
rediscovery of the supernatural. New York: Doubleday & Safranski, R. 1994. Ein Meister aus Deutschland, Heidegger und
Company Inc. seine Zeit. München: Carl Hanser Verlag.
Berger, P. 1970. Auf den Spuren der Engel: Die moderne Gesellschaft Schmid, H. B. 2009. Plural action, essays in philosophy and social
und die Wiederentdeckung der Transzedens. Frankfurt am Main: science. Dordrecht: Springer.
Fischer. Schütz, A. 1976. The phenomenology of the social world. London:
Berger, P. 1997. Die Bewältigung der Sinnkrise eine zentrale Heineman Educational Books.
Herausforderung für moderne Gesellschaften. In W. Weidenfeld Weber, M. 1978. Economy and society, an outline of interpretive
(Ed.), Dialog der Kulturen: Orientierungssuche des Westens- sociology. Berkeley: University of California Press.
zwischen gesellschaftlicher Sinnkrise und globaler Zivilization Wrong, D. 1961. The oversocilized conception of man in society.
(pp. 27–32). Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung. American Sociological Review, 26, 183–193.
Berger, P. L. 1986. The capitalist revolution. New York: Basic Books. Zahavi, D. 2003. Husserl’s phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford
Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. 1991. The social construction of reality, a University Press.
treatise in the sociology of knowledge. London: Penguin Books.
Dreyfus, H. 1991. Being-in-the-world, a commentary on heidegger’s
being and time, division 1. Cambridge: The MIT. Patrik Aspers is Associate Professor of Sociology at Stockholm
Frede, D. 2006. The question of being: Heidegger’s project. In The University. His most recent book is Orderly Fashion, A Sociology of
Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (pp. 42–69). Cambridge: Markets (Princeton University Press 2010). He was for many years at
Cambridge University Press. the MPIfG in Cologne, researching markets. His main fields of interest
Heidegger, M. 1979. Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitrbegriffs, are sociological theory and the basic questions of social sciences, and
Gesamtausgabe, Abteilung II, Vorelesungen 1923–1944. Frank- economic sociology, especially markets. He is currently working on
furt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. the sociology of Martin Heidegger.