Mariano Jr. v.

COMELEC
G.R. 118577 & 118627, March 7, 1995

FACTS
Two petitions were filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, “An Act Converting the Municipality
of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati” as unconstitutional.

G.R. 118577 involved a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. The petitioners assailed the
unconstitutionality of Secs 2, 51 and 52 of RA 7854 on the following grounds:

1. It did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and by
bounds
2. It attempted to alter or restart the 3 consecutive term limit for local elective officials
3. It increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law; increased in legislative district
was not expressed in the title of the bill; and addition of another legislative district in Makati
was not in accord with Sec. 5 (3), Art. 6 of the consti (population was 450,000 only)

In G.R. 118677, the petitioner (Sen. John Osmeña) claimed that Sec. 52 of RA 7854 was
unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.

ISSUE: W/N RA 7854 is unconstitutional

HELD:
NO. Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the
charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than
250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress
from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly
what was done by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati’s legislative
district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law,
with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create
an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative
representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a
new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only
450,000. Said section provides that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its
legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000.
 Gallego v. Verra
G.R. No. 48641, November 24, 1941

FACTS:
This a petition for certiorari to review the decision of CA affirming that the CFI, which declared
illegal and void Gallego’s election to the office of municipal mayor in the general elections of December
1940.

Gallego was a native of Abuyog, Leyte. After studying in Samar, he was employed as a school
teacher in the municipality of Catarman, as well as in the municipalities of Burawen, Dulag, and Abuyog,
Leyte. In 1937, he resigned and presented his candidacy for municipal mayor of his home town, but was
defeated. Finding himself in debt and unemployed, he went to Mindanao in search for a job.

He first went to Misamin Orietal, but finding no work there, he proceeded to sitio Kaato-an,
municipality of Malaybalay, Bukidnon on June 20, 1938, and immediately found employment as nurseryman
in the cinchona plantation of the Bureau of Forestry. On July 30, he returned to Abuyog due to a job offer
as teacher but he did not accept, and returned to Malaybalay on Aug. 23, 1938 and stayed there until
September 1940.

During his stay in Malaybalay, his wife and children remained in Abuyog. He visited them on August
1939-1940. He never availed of the offers of the Government (land, house etc.). On Oct. 1, 1938, he
registered himself as an elector in Lantanpan, municipality of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and voted there in the
election for assemblymen. He didn’t fill the blank corresponding to the length of time he had resided in
Malaybalay.

On Jan 20, 1940, he obtained and paid for his residence certificate, in which it was stated that he
had resided in the municipality for 1 ½ year.

ISSUE: W/N Gallego had been a resident of Abuyog for at least 1 year prior to December 10, 1940.

HELD
YES. The term residence is synonymous with domicile, which imports not only such intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur:

1. Residence or bodily presence in the new locality

2. An intention to remain there
3. An intention to abandon the old domicile

On the case at bar, the Court ruled that Gallego did not reside in Malaybalay with the intention of
remaining there indefinitely and of not returning to Abuyog. Despite his periodic absences, he always
returned there. His departure after his defeat in the election was temporary and only for the purpose of
looking for employment to make up for the financial drawback he has suffered. He bought a piece of land
in Abuyod and did not availed the offer of the Gov’t of Malaybalay of 10 hectares of land.
 Puyat v. De Guzman
G.R. No. 51122, March 25, 1982

FACTS:
On 14 May 1979, an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries (IPI), a
private corporation, was held – six of the elected directors were herein petitioners that may be called the
Puyat Group, while the other five were herein respondents, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would
be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.

On 25 May 1979, the Acero Group instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings questioning the
election. Conferences were held on 25-31 May 1979 and the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional
grounds the appearance of Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, as counsel for the Acero group. Section 11, Article VIII, 1973 Constitution, then in force,
provided that, “no member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before before any court in
any civil case wherein the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality is the adverse party"
and SEC was an administrative body. The prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not
continue his appearance.

When SEC Case was called on 31 May 1979, it turned out that Assemblyman Fernandez had
purchased on 15 May 1979 ten shares of IPI stock for Php200.00, but the deed of sale was notarized only
on 30 May 1979. He then filed on 31 May 1979 an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the
owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation, which motion was granted by the
SEC Commissioner.

ISSUE: W/N Assemblyman Fernandez, as then stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC case without
violating Sec.11 Art. 8 of the 1973 Consti

HELD:
The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman
Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. His appearance could theoretically be for the
protection of his ownership of ten (10) IPI shares.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman

Fernandez. He had acquired a mere Php200.00 worth of stock in IPI. He acquired them "after the fact", that
is, on 30 May 1979, after the contested election of Directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed, and
one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to
intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for the Acero group, but which was objected
to by petitioners Puyat group. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to
"intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.

Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before
an administrative body, which is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was
an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.

A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an
Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation
in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly
prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the
objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.

Thus, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case falls within the ambit of the
prohibition contained in the 1973 Constitution. Respondent Commissioner's Order granting Assemblyman
Fernandez leave to intervene in the SEC Case was reversed and set aside.
 Phil Judges Assoc. v. Prado
G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993

FACTS:
This is a petition to declare the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 7354. The main target of this
petition is Section 35 of RA 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation.

SEC. 35. Repealing Clause. – All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and
regulation or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified
accordingly. All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided
for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, republic acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087, and 5059.
The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977
and that of the Vice-President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or
unauthorized use thereof.

These measures withdraw the franking privilege (free mail) from the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land
Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.

The first objection is based on Art. VI, Sec. 26(1) of the Constitution, which provides that “Every bill
passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” RA
7345 is entitled “An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, functions and
Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith”. It
is the submission of the petitioners that Sec. 35 of RA 7345 which withdrew the franking privilege from the
Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.

The second objection was that the second paragraph of the repealing clause was not included in
the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or of House Bill No. 4200. It appeared only in the Conference
Committee Report, its addition violates Article VI Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, which provides that:

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members
three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately after, and the yeas and
nays entered in the Journal.

The petitioners invoked Sec. 74 of the Rules of HOR, requiring that amendment to any bill when
the House or Senate shall have differences may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.
They stressed that Section 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between both Houses and so the
second paragraph could not have been validly added as an amendment.

ISSUE: W/N RA 7345 is unconstitutional on the ground that it did not pass the required readings in both
Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the
members before its passage Article VI Sec. 26 (2).

HELD:
YES. While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences
between the Senate and the HOR, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is
described thus:

A confe committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the
precise differences bet the two houses. Even where the confe committee is not by rule limited in its
jurisdiction, legislative custom severly limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be
inserted into the confe bill. But occasionally a confe committee produces unexpected results
beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on confe
 committee jurisdiction. This is the symptomatic of the authoritarian power of confe committee.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of
the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. The Court declines to look into the petitioners’
charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became RA 7354
and that the copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both
the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted in accordance with
Article VI Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution.
 Bondoc v. Pineda
G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991

FACTS:
In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP
were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was
proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which
is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the
House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a
decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted
with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc, the winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing
him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of
Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party.
On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the
Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the
nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

ISSUE: W/N the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein,
may change that party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached
by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein

HELD

NO. The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an
independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan
consideration.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with
complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which
they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion
of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a
“conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of
the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave
abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against
Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates
Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional
election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure
under the Constitution. Therefore,membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause,
such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability,
resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party
or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party
disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.
 Arnault v. Nazareno
G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950

FACTS
The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as
Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was the
apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of
the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to
Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine
who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government.

Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was one of
the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the petitioner
repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of Php440,000.00,
which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.

Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of the
Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a petition
for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.

ISSUES

1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name
of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?

HELD

[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]

1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to
reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.

Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is
an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely
or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which
is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that
mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is
not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.

[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by
the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate
Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special Committee,
among other things, to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal,
and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal
is pertinent to that determination — it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The contention is
not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to
any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body to show
that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is
required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
 If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative
inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process
may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.

2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond
its period of legislative session.

We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end
of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very
reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its
constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are
performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing investigations
or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry
with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the
legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that
the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.

But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing
body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress . . . There is no limit
as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be
exerted as in the present case.

3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination.

Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the
[P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, we find no basis
upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. There is no
conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:

Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At
least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him as he is not the sole judge
of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the
circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of the
witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer
to a question may criminate or not. . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to show that he has
violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against
self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation.
The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an
imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.

It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case
whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved from answering merely on
his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide that
question.
 Belgica v. Hon. Exec. Sec. Ochoa
G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 & 209251, November 19, 2013

FACTS
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel
is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent
several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance
Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations
Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects”
(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship
grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft
projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for
soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may
request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is
approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential
pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this
has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of
PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle
blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system
had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork
barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that
government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit
was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy
et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme
Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.

HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it
violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The
executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of.
Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that,
after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF
funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle
of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel,
then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only
recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the
people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That
being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was
delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of
the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF
money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to
appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged
in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate
the power to the individual member of Congress.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA
which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact
that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his
PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the
appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting
which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives, what’s
happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it
as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national officer)
meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the
Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system but
worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.

II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.

The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
“No money shall be paid out of Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and
PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD
1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related
ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance
energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated
to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
 Tio v. Videogram
G.R. No. L-75697, June 18, 1987

FACTS
Valentin Tio is a videogram establishment operator adversely affected by Presidential Decree No.
1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board".

P.D. No. 1987 provides for the levy of a tax over each cassette sold (Sec. 134) and a 30% tax on
the gross receipts of a videogram establishment, payable to the local government (Sec. 10). The rationale
for this decree is set forth in its preambulatory/whereas clauses to wit:

1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others,
videotapes, discs, cassettes ... have greatly prejudiced the operations of moviehouses and theaters, and
have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop
in the collection of [taxes] thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in
government revenues;

2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals,
sales and disposition of videograms, and such earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving
the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year;

3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the
movie industry, ...;

5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of videogram establishments will not only alleviate the dire
financial condition of the movie industry ..., but also provide an additional source of revenue for the
Government, and at the same time rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms;

6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram features constitutes a clear
and present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of the youth [READ: PORN], and impairs the
mandate of the Constitution for the State to support the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character and promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being;

8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people [AGAIN,
READ: PORN] and betraying the national economic recovery program, bold emergency measures must be
adopted with dispatch; (emphasis supplied and certain passages omitted)

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the imposition of the 30% tax is a rider and the same is not germane to the subject matter
of the law.
2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of power and authority; and
HELD:

1. No, the tax is not a rider and is germane to the purpose and subject of the law.

The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general
purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that
the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and
are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject and title.

Reading section 10 of P.D. No. 1987 closely, one can see that the foregoing provision is allied and germane
to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the law, which is the
regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax
provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is
simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree.

Aside from revenue collection, tax laws may also be enacted for the purpose of regulating an activity. At
the same time, the videogram industry is also an untapped source of revenue which the government may
validly tax. All of this is evident from preambulatory clauses nos. 2, 5, 6 and 8, quoted in part above.

The levy of the 30% tax is also for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for
regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of
intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an
objective of the law to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

2. No. There was no undue delegation of law making authority.

Petitioner was concerned that Section 11 of P.D. No. 1987 stating that the videogram board (Board) has
authority to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a
fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement
functions for the Board" is an undue delegation of legislative power.

This is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its
execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done;
to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of
the Board to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned
being "subject to the direction and control of the Board."

The petition was DISMISSED.

 Bengzon v. Drilon
G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992

FACTS
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were
“repealed” during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain
retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions. Congress
felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement benefits among government officials.
However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law
should not give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking
the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644)
because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Tañada v.
Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never
repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for
1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the
allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included
therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different brances of the government; among such
obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the
retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed
vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the
constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive
Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is
constitutional.
HELD
NO. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in
accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the
Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her
predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional since the power of the
president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part
of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item.

NOTES: Pocket Veto Not Allowed

Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called pocket-veto power, i.e.,
disapproval of a bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the President to communicate his veto of any bill
represented to him within 30 days after the receipt thereof automatically causes the bill to become a law.
This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935 Constitution of releasing veto messages long
after he should have acted on the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as to what new laws are in force.
When is it allowed?
 The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which grants the President
power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. The veto in such case
shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
 Guingona v. Carague
G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991

FACTS
Petitioners are Senators of the Republic of the Philippines who brought this case to raise the
question of constitutionality of the said automatic appropriation for debt service which is authorized by P.D.
No. 81, entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred
Sixty(4860), as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget
Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967,
entitled "An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on
Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For
The Purpose. The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation with P86.8 Billion
for debt service. Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of
then President Marcos became functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986. And upon the
expiration of the one-man legislature in the person of President Marcos, the legislative power was restored
to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the Constitution was ratified by the people.

Therefore, a new legislation by the Congress providing for automatic appropriation should lie, but
Congress up to the present, has not approved any such law and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic
appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, it cannot been
forced. Whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then a law must be passed by Congress to
authorize said automatic appropriation. Petitioners state said decrees violate Section 29(l)of Article VI of
the Constitution which provides as follows

Sec. 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.

ISSUE: W/N the Automatic Appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget violates Sec. 29(1) Art. VI of
the Constitution and therefore unconstitutional

HELD:
No. Because there is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular
form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made,
except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned
presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly(as
by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws
by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms.

The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177
and P.D. No.1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise
amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to implement the same

There can be no question as to the patriotism and good motive of petitioners in filing this petition.
Unfortunately, the petition must fail on the constitutional and legal issues raised. As to whether or not the
country should honor its international debt, more especially the enormous amount that had been incurred
by the past administration, which appears to be the ultimate objective of the petition, is not an issue that is
presented or proposed to be addressed by the Court. Indeed, it is more of a political decision for Congress
and the Executive to determine in the exercise of their wisdom and sound discretion.
 EXECUTIVE CASES

Estrada v. Desierto
G.R. Nos. 146710-15&146738, March 2, 2001
FACTS
The case basically revolves around the series of events that happened prior and subsequent to the
event we know as EDSA II. During the 1998 elections, Joseph E. Estrada and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
were elected as president and vice-president respectively. The downfall of the Estrada administration began
when former Gov. Luis Chavit Singson went to the media and released his exposé that petitioner was part
of the Jueteng scandal as having received large sums of money. After this expose, a lot of different groups
and many personalities had asked for the resignation of the petitioner. Some of which are the Catholic
Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), Sen. Nene Pimentel, Archbishop of Manila, Jaime Cardinal
Sin, For. Pres. Fidel Ramos, and For. Pres. Corazon Aquino who asked petitioner to make the “supreme
self-sacrifice”. Respondent also resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services
and also asked petitioner for his resignation. 4 senior economic advisers of the petitioner resigned and then
Speaker Manny Villar, together with 47 representatives, defected from Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.

By November, an impeachment case was to be held as Speaker Manny Villar had transmitted the
Articles of Impeachment to the senate. On November 20, the 21 senators took oath as judges to the
impeachment trial with SC CJ Hilario Davide, Jr., presiding. The impeachment trial was one for the ages. It
was a battle royal of well known lawyers. But then came the fateful day, when by the vote of 11-10, the
judges came to a decision to not open the second envelop allegedly containing evidence showing that the
petitioner had a secret bank account under the name “Jose Velarde” containing P3.3 billion. The not
opening of the 2nd envelop resulted to the people going to the streets and the public prosecutors
withdrawing from the trial. On January 19, AFP Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes marched to EDSA shrine and
declared “on behalf of your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to
announce that we are withdrawing our support to this government.” PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo
Lacson together with some Cabinet members made the same announcement.
June 20 was the day of surrender. At around 12:20 AM, negotiations started for the peaceful
transition of power. But at around 12 noon, respondent took oath as the 14 th president of the Philippines.
At 2:30 PM, petitioner and his family left Malacanang. He issued the following Press Statement:
“20 January 2001

STATEMENT FROM

PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and
serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be
a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!

(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”

It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:

“Sir:

By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.

(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”

On January 22, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC.
The said resolution confirmed the authority given by the 12 SC justices to the CJ during the oath taking that
happened on January 20. Soon, other countries accepted the respondent as the new president of the
Philippines. The House then passed Resolution No. 175 “expressing the full support of the House of
Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Philippines.” It also approved Resolution No. 176 “expressing the support of the House of Representatives
to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of
the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her administration as a partner
in the attainment of the nation’s goals under the Constitution.”
On February 6, respondent recommended Teofisto Guingona to be the vice president. On February
7, the Senate adopted Resolution 82 which confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona. On the same
day, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and has
been terminated. Several cases were filed against the petitioner which are as follows: (1) OMB Case No.
0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB
Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for
plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of
Conduct for government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines
Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious
misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for
malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc., (5) OMB Case No. 0-
00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery,
violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B.
Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate
the charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with
the following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus
and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the
aforementioned complaints against him.

Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No.
146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754,
1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the
term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted.” Thru another counsel, petitioner, on
February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be
the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.” Acting on GR Nos.
146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the respondents “to comment thereon within
a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001.” On February 13, the Court ordered the
consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents’ comments “on
or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15.”
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press
statement for “Gag Order” on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738,
the Court resolved:
“(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office
of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged
resolution;

(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being cited
for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while
they are still pending decision by the Court, and

(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from
resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office against petitioner Joseph E.
Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman
may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing
held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic.”
ISSUES:

I Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.

II Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President
on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution
of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is
immune from criminal prosecution.
IV Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
DECISION

I No. The case is legal not political.

II No. He is not a president on leave.

III No. The impeachment proceedings was already aborted. As a non-sitting president, he is not entitled to
immunity from criminal prosecution
IV There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner
by the respondent Ombudsman.
HELD
I. Whether or not the case involves a political question

Respondents contend that the cases at bar pose a political question. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo became
a President through the People power revolution. Her legitimacy as president was also accepted by other
nations. Thus, they conclude that the following shall serve as political thicket which the Court cannot enter.

The Court rules otherwise. A political question has been defined by our Court as “those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure.”
Respondents allege that the legality of the Arroyo administration should be treated similarly with the
Aquino administration. Respondents propose that the situation of the Arroyo and Aquino administrations
are similar. However, the Court finds otherwise. The Court has made substantial distinctions which are the
following:

Aquino Arroyo

Government was a result of a successful revolution Government was a result of a peaceful revolution

In the Freedom constitution, it was stated that the Arroyo took the oath of the 1987 Constitution. She is
Aquino government was instilled directly by the discharging the authority of the president under the
people in defiance of the 1973 Constitution as 1987 constitution.
amended.

It is a well settled rule that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people
power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. But
this would not apply as the Court finds substantial difference between the 2 EDSA Revolutions. It would
show that there are differences between the 2 governments set up by EDSA I and II. This was further
explained by the Court by comparing the 2 EDSA Revolutions.

EDSA I EDSA II

Extra-constitutional. Hence, “Xxx IN DEFIANCE OF Intra-Constitutional. Hence, the oath of the

THE 1973 CONSTITUTION, AS AMENDED”—cannot respondent as President includes the protection and
be subject of judicial review upholding of the 1987 Constitution.—resignation of
the President makes it subject to judicial review

exercise of the people power of exercise of people power of freedom of speech

revolutionwhich overthrew the whole government and freedom of assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances which only
affected the office of the President

Political question Legal Question

In this issue, the Court holds that the issue is legal and not political.
II. Whether or not petitioner resigned as President
 Resignation is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to
resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. There is no required form of
resignation. It can be expressed, implied, oral or written. It is true that respondent never wrote a letter of
resignation before he left Malacanang on June 20, 2001. In this issue, the Court would use the totality test
or the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue.

Using this test, the Court rules that the petitioner had resigned. The Court knows the amount of stress
that the petitioner had suffered. With just a blink of an eye, he lost the support of the legislative when then
Manny Villar and other Representatives had defected. AFP Chief of Staff General Angelo Reyes had
already gone to EDSA. PNP Chief Director General Panfilo Lacson and other cabinet secretaries had
withdrawn as well. By looking into the Angara diaries, it was pointed out that the petitioner had suggested
a snap election at May on which he would not be a candidate. Proposing a snap election in which he is not
a candidate means that he had intent to resign. When the proposal for a dignified exit or resignation was
proposed, petitioner did not disagree but listened closely. This is proof that petitioner had reconciled
himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace
period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.

The negotiations that had happened were about a peaceful transfer of power. It was already implied
that petitioner would resign. The negotiations concentrated on the following: (1) the transition period of five
days after the petitioner’s resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family, and
(3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner. Also taken from the
Angara diaries, The President says. “Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang
masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don’t want any more of
this – it’s too painful. I’m tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.) I just want to clear my
name, then I will go.” The quoted statement of the petitioner was a clear evidence that he has resigned.

The second round of negotiations were about the consolidating of the clauses which were proposed by
both sides. The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It
will be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was
again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be
undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period.

When everything was already signed by the side of the petitioner and ready to be faxed by Angara, the
negotiator for the respondent, Angelo Reyes, called to Angara saying that the SC would allow respondent
to have her oath taking. Before petitioner left Malacanang, he made a last statement.

By making such statement, petitioner impliedly affirms the following: (1) he acknowledged the oath-
taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of
inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3)
he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring
to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk
from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference
is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he
called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did
not give up the presidency.

Petitioner however argues that he only took a temporary leave of absence. This is evidenced by a letter
which reads as follows:
“Sir

By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada”

The Court was surprised that the petitioner did not use this letter during the week long crisis. It
would be very easy for him to say before he left Malacanang that he was temporarily unable to govern,
thus, he is leaving Malacanang. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot
negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner
clearly showing his resignation from the presidency, then the resignation must prevail as a later act. If,
however, it was prepared after the press release, still, it commands scant legal significance.

Petitioner also argues that he could not resign. His legal basis is RA 3019 which states:

“Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.”

During the amendments, another section was inserted which states that:

During the period of amendments, the following provision was inserted as section 15:

“Sec. 15. Termination of office — No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under the
Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.

The separation or cessation of a public official from office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this
Act for an offense committed during his incumbency.”

The original senate bill was rejected because of the 2nd paragraph of section 15. Nonetheless,
another similar bill was passed. Section 15 then became section 13. There is another reason why
petitioner’s contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show that when petitioner
resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos.
0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the
respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the
reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases
cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA
No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or
prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting
President.

Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under
section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. The Court holds otherwise. The impeachment proceeding
may be arguable. However, even if the impeachment proceeding is administrative, it cannot be considered
pending because the process had already broke down. There was also a withdrawal by the prosecutors to
partake in the impeachment case. In fact, the proceeding was postponed indefinitely. In fact, there was no
impeachment case pending when he resigned.
III. Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President

This issue arose from the January 20 letter which was addressed to then Speaker Fuentebella and
then Senate President Pimentel. Petitioner’s contention is that he is a president on leave and that the
respondent is an acting president. This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner’s stance that he is
a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.

An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

“SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmit to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of
the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties
of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to
the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the
issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session within twelve
days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately,
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as
President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office."

After studying in-depth the series of events that happened after petitioner left Malacanang, it is very
clear that the inability of the petitioner as president is not temporary. The question is whether this Court
has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise
the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines.
The Court says that they cannot, for such is an example of a political question, in which the matter has
solely been left to the legislative,
IV. Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. If yes, what is the extent of
the immunity

Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent
Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings
against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil. The
“immunity” the petitioner points to is the principle of non-liability.

The principle of non-liability simply states that a chief executive may not be personally mulcted in civil
damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his official duties. He is liable
when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he cannot be said to have exercise
discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected
from personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without
authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining
whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, he is entitled to protection in determining the question
of his authority. If he decides wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his authority was one
over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he is not protected if
the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination.
 The Court rejects the petitioner’s argument that before he could be prosecuted, he should be first
convicted of impeachment proceedings. The impeachment proceeding was already aborted because of the
walking out of the prosecutors. This was then formalized by a Senate resolution (Resolution #83) which
declared the proceeding functus officio. According to the debates in the Constitutional Convention, when
an impeachment proceeding have become moot due to the resignation of the President, proper civil and
criminal cases may be filed against him.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting
President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder
which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts
and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity
is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. As for civil immunity, it means immunity
from civil damages only covers “official acts”.
 Quintos-Deles v. COA
GR No. 83216, September 4, 1989

FACTS
The petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant
to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. Due to the opposition
of some congressmen-members of the Commission on Appointments, who insisted that sectoral
representatives must first be confirmed by the respondent Commission before they could take their oaths
and/or assume office as members of the House of Representatives, Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr.
suspended the oathtaking of the four sectoral representatives which was scheduled at the Session Hall of
Congress after the Order of Business.

In view of this development, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. transmitted on April 25,
1988, a letter dated April 11, 1988 of the President addressed to the Commission on Appointments
submitting for confirmation the appointments of the four sectoral representatives.

Meanwhile, petitioner in a letter dated April 22, 1988 addressed to Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr.
(Annex V) appealed to the House of Representatives alleging, among others, that since “no attempt was
made to subject the sectoral representatives ** already sitting to the confirmation process, there is no
necessity for such confirmation and subjection thereto of the present batch would certainly be
discriminatory.”

On May 10, 1988, petitioner Deles received an invitation from the Commission on Appointments
for the deliberation of her appointment as sectoral representative for women. Petitioner sent a reply dated
May 11, 1988 explaining her position and questioning the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments
over the appointment of sectoral representatives.

In the May 12, 1988 meeting of the Committee of the Constitutional Commissions and Offices of
the Commission on Appointments, chaired by Sen. Edgardo J. Angara, the Committee ruled against the
position of petitioner Deles.

ISSUE: W/N the Constitution require the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments?

HELD
The petition is dismissed. The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in
character. Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be
filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is
undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the “other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,” referred to in the first sentence of
Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
(Sarmiento v. Mison, supra).

Petitioner’s appointment was furthermore made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 which
gives the President ”the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary
or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.” The records show that petitioner’s
appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to April 17,
1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to
her.

Implicit in the invocation of paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII as authority for the appointment of
petitioner is, the recognition by the President as appointing authority, that petitioner’s appointment requires
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. As a matter of fact, the President had expressly
submitted petitioner’s appointment for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Considering that
Congress had adjourned without respondent Commission on Appointments having acted on petitioner’s
appointment, said appointment/nomination had become moot and academic pursuant to Section 23 of the
Rules of respondent Commission and “unless resubmitted shall not again be considered by the
Commission.”
 Ang-Angco v. Castillo
G.R. No. L-17169, November 30, 1963

FACTS
On October 8, 1956, Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc. wrote a letter to the
Secretary of Commerce and Industry requesting for special permit to withdraw 1,188 units of Pepsi-cola
concentrates from the customs house which were imported without any dollar allocation or remittance of
foreign exchange and were not covered by any Central Bank release certificate.

Failing to secure the necessary authority from the Central Bank on October 13, 1956, the counsel
of the Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc., approached Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-
Angco in an attempt to secure from him the immediate release of the concentrates. Seeing that the
importation did not carry any release certificate from the Central Bank, Mr. Ang-Angco advised the counsel
to try to secure the necessary release certificate from the No-Dollar Import Office that had jurisdiction over
the case.

Mr. Aquiles J. Lopez, from the No-Dollar Import Office, wrote a letter addressed to Mr. Ang-Angco,
stating that his office had no objection to the release of the 1,188 units of concentrates but that it could not
take action on the request as "the same is not within the jurisdiction of the No-Dollar Import Office within
the contemplation of R.A. No. 1410."

Pepsi-Cola Co. counsel showed to Mr. Ang-Angco the letter from Mr. Lopez. But upon perusing it,
Mr. Ang-Angco still hesitated to grant the release. He suggested instead amending the letter in order to
remove the ambiguity appearing therein, but Mr. Lopez refused to amend the letter stating that the same
was neither a permit nor a release.

Mr. Ang-Angco contacted Secretary of Finance Hernandez via telephone and read to him the letter,
to which the Secretary verbally expressed his approval of the release on the basis of said certificate.
Collector Ang-Angco, though still in doubt as to the propriety of the suggested action, finally authorized the
release of the concentrates upon payment of the corresponding duties, customs charges, fees and taxes.

Upon knowing the release of the concentrates, Commissioner of Customs Manuel P. Manahan
immediately ordered their seizure but only a negligible portion thereof remained in the warehouse. And he
filed an administrative complaint against Collector of Customs Ang-Angco charging him of grave neglect of
duty and observed a conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the customs service. On the strength of this
complaint, President Ramon Magsaysay constituted an investigating committee to investigate Ang-Angco,
resulting to the latter’s suspension. But on April 1, 1957, Collector Ang-Angco was reinstated to his office
by Secretary Hernandez. The decision, however, on the administrative case against him remained
pending until the death of President Magsaysay.

After around three years from the termination of the investigation during which period Ang-Angco
had already been discharging the duties of his office, Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo, by authority
of President Garcia, rendered a decision on the case on February 12, 1960 finding Ang-Angco "guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service", and considering him resigned effective from the date
of notice, with prejudice to reinstatement in the Bureau of Customs.

ISSUE: W/N the President has the power to make direct action on the case of petitioner even if he belongs
to the classified service in spite of the provision now in the Civil Service Act of 1959.
HELD:
The action taken by respondent executive Secretary, even with the authority of the President in
taking direct action on the administrative case, petitioner, without submitting the same to the Commission
of Civil Service is contrary to law and should be set aside.

The following are the reasons:

1. Under sec 16 of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who has
original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases of all officers and employees in the
classified service. The only limitation to this power is the decision of the Commissioner may be appealed
to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, in which case said Board shall decide the appeal within a period of
90 days after the same has been submitted for decision, whose decision in such cases shall be final. It is
therefore clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service act of 1959, the case of petitioner comes
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having been deprived of the
procedure and down therein in connection with the investigation and disposition of this case, it may be said
that he has been deprived of due process guaranteed by said law.

2. Let us now take up the power of control given to the President by the Constitution over all offices
and employees in the executive department which is not invoked by respondents as justification to override
the specific provision of the Civil Service Act. The power merely applies to the exercise of control over the
acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself of the act. It only means that the President
may set aside the judgment of action taken by the subordinate in the performance of duties.

3. Not the strongest argument against the theory of respondents is that it would entirely nullify and
set aside at naught the beneficent purpose of the whole Civil Service system as implanted in this jurisdiction
which is to give stability to the tenure of office of those who belong to the classified service, in derogation
of the provision of our Constitution which provides the “No officer or employee in the civil service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.” The power of control of the President may
extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive
department if they are presidential appointee or do not belong to the classified service for to them that
inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our constitutional which says; “The
Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers in the President alone in the courts or in
the heads of department” and with regards to these officers provided by law for a procedure for their removal
precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil Service Act of 159.
 Olanguer v. Military Commission
GR L-54558, 22 May 1987

FACTS:
On 24 December 1979, herein Petitioners – all, of which, are civilians, have been charged of the
crime of subversion – were arrested by the military and were subsequently detained at Camp Crame and
were then transferred to Camp Bagong Diwa. Sometime in 1980, the then Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces created the Respondent Military Commission No. 34 for the purposes of trying the said Petitioners
of their alleged crimes. Hastily, the said Respondent Commission sentenced the Petitioners to death.
Petitioners now come to the Supreme Court to challenge the said Military Commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not the actions of the military are Constitutional?

HELD:
It must be noted that in 1981, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2045, thereby officially
lifting Martial Law. Furthermore, between 1981 and 1986, the Petitioners were given provisional liberty
thereby rendering their Petitions for Habeas Corpus moot and academic.

It has been held in a long line of cases that Military Commissions/Tribunals have no jurisdiction to
try civilians for alleged offenses when Civil Courts are open and functioning. Such being the case here, the
respondent Military Commission’s actions of trying the Petitioners and rendering sentence is null and void.

And assuming that the same does have jurisdiction, the fact that the trial(s) were conducted hastily
– i.e., the Petitioners were never actually given a chance to defend themselves or even present their own
evidences – due process was actually denied to the Petitioners; hence, their sentence should be treated
as unconstitutional.
 Llamas v. Orbos
G.R. No. 99031 October 15, 1991

FACTS
Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants
filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo
III was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed
office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned
hence he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.
The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases. They say that
the qualifying phrase “after conviction by final judgment” applies solely to criminal cases, and no other law
allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been “convicted in an administrative
case, allegedly because the word “conviction” refers only to criminal cases.

ISSUE: W/N the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative
cases.

HELD:
Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered under criminal or
administrative cases., if the law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The Constitution does not
distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole
exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in
criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the
coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Cases of impeachment are automatically excluded
inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses. They do not clearly see any valid and
convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is the
court’s considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or
Legislative branches of the government.

In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere
substantial evidence to support a decision.