PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, G.R. No.

185723
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* JJ.

Promulgated:
EDWIN MEJIA,
Accused-Appellant. August 4, 2009
x---------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is the Decision[1] dated 14 July
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02533, entitled People of the Philippines
v. Edwin Mejia, affirming, with modification, the Decision[2] rendered by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch 57 in Criminal Cases No. SCC-4080-4081,
finding accused-appellant Edwin Mejia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness.
On 2 March 2003, private complainants (AAAs)[3] womanhood was allegedly violated
by a man cohabiting with her mother (BBB) as common-law-spouse. BBB was already living
separately from AAAs father at the time the crime were committed at BBBs and accused-
appellants residence. This dastardly act led to AAAs pregnancy.

Out of fear and shame, it took some time before AAA had the courage to report the
incident to her relatives.

On 9 October 2003, after appropriate proceedings, the Office of the Provincial

Prosecutor of Pangasinan filed, with the RTC of San Carlos City in Pangasinan, two separate
informations for Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as Criminal
Cases No. SCC-4080 and No. SCC-4081. The informations charging accused-appellant Edwin
Mejia read:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. SCC-4080

That on or about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of March 2, 2003, in

Barangay XXX, XXX City, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, intimidation or violence,
and with lewd designs, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
has (sic) carnal knowledge with his step-daughter AAA, against her will and
consent.

Contrary to Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.[4]

CRIMINAL CASE NO. SCC-4081

 That on or about 8:00 oclock in the morning of March 2, 2003, in Barangay
XXX, XXX City, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, by means of force, intimidation or violence, and
with lewd design, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, has
(sic) carnal knowledge with his step-daughter AAA, against her will and consent.

Contrary to Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.[5]

Both criminal cases were raffled to Branch 57, presided by Judge Anthony Sison, and
thereafter consolidated and jointly tried. On arraignment, the Informations were read to
accused-appellant in a dialect known to, and understood by, him; and with the assistance
of his counsel, accused-appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to both charges.[6]

Pre-trial was conducted on 23 April 2004 but only the identities of the parties to the
case were admitted therein.[7] Thereafter, trial on the merits commenced.

Two witnesses testified. Private complainant AAA testified for the prosecution. Accused-
appellant Edwin Mejia testified for the defense.

AAA, 18 years old, single and a resident of Barangay XXX, XXX City in Pangasinan,
testified that on 2 March 2003, she, who was less than 18 years old at that time, was fetched
by her mother BBB from her grandmothers house where she lives. She was to take care of her
two- month-old brother at BBBs house in Barangay XXX, XXX City, Pangasinan. Accused-
appellant was BBBs live-in partner, who resided in the same house as BBB. BBB left
for Dagupan City, where she sold vegetables at the market.

While AAA was babysitting her brother, accused-appellant, who was armed with a
bolo, forcibly held her, laid her on the living room floor (sala) and with the use of threats,
undressed her and removed her panty. He then removed his short pants and brief and
placed himself on top of AAA. Appellant inserted his penis into AAAs vagina, and as he did,
she felt pain. Satisfying his sexual desire after about three minutes of inserting his penis inside
AAAs vagina, accused-appellant removed it from AAAs vagina and dressed up. Accused-
appellant threatened to kill AAA and her mother should she leave the house and/or report
the incident. Because she was afraid of the threat, AAA stayed inside the bedroom for
several hours.

At 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, accused-appellant went inside the
bedroom where AAA was babysitting her brother. He pulled her hair and placed himself on
top of her, but failed to insert his penis into her private part. Accused-appellant warned her
not to tell anyone about the incident. AAA went back to her grandparents house in XXX.

AAA did not inform her grandparents about the abominable act accused-appellant
committed upon her person out of fear due to his threats. However, she told her aunt with
whom she lived in XXX about her pregnancy, for she could no longer hide the change in her
physical appearance. After telling her aunt, private complainant reported the incident to
the police station, where she executed her sworn statement. AAA also underwent medical
examination.

On cross-examination, AAA stated that BBB and accused-appellant started living as

husband and wife in XXX, XXX City, Pangasinan when she was 16 years old. Her father (FFF)
and her mother BBB had been living separately. Private complainant disclosed that she was
under the care of her maternal grandparents and did not live with her mother BBB and
accused-appellant.

Upon AAAs arrival at the house of BBB and accused-appellant, accused-appellant

was out of town harvesting mangoes. Accused-appellant arrived after the harvest was
done. She was taking some time to rest after doing household chores, and after the children
of BBB with accused-appellant had already left for school. AAA said that when she arrived
at the house of her mother, accused-appellant was still talking to Noel Soriano who just lived
nearby.

The defense presented accused-appellant Edwin Mejia. Accused-appellant declared that

at around 8:00 oclock in the morning of 2 March 2003, he was not in their home in
XXX. Accused-appellant insisted he was harvesting mango fruits in Barangay Casantiagoan
in Manaoag, Pangasinan, from 1 March 2003 to 3 March 2003. He claimed it was impossible
for him to have raped AAA, because he was in Manaoag, Pangasinan from 1 March 2003 at
around 5:00 oclock in the morning, with a certain Bong Estrada, and returned home only
on 3 March 2003 at around 6:00 oclock in the evening. He said he did not live with AAA, as
the latter stayed in the house of his brother-in-law in XXX town.

Accused-appellant explained that AAA was the daughter of his live-in partner/common-
law-wife BBB by her husband. When AAA was only 10 years old, accused-appellant and BBB
started to cohabit. He had five children with BBB, and they resided in XXX, XXX City,
Pangasinan. Accused-appellant described his relationship with AAA as cold and aloof,
primarily due to the fact that AAA hated him for hurting her mother because of his vicious
lifestyle. He said that he had a good relationship with BBB despite the fact that her family
and AAA disliked him.

Accused-appellant claimed the rape charges AAA filed against him were fabricated
because he was in Manaoag, Pangasinan, harvesting mangoes at the time of the alleged
incident. He, however, said that the distance from Manaoag, Pangasinan to XXX City,
Pangasinan could be traveled for more or less one hour, using the same elf truck they used
going to Manaoag and back to XXX City.

On 18 September 2006, the trial court[8] found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of (a) Rape in Criminal Case No. SCC-4081; and (b) Acts of
Lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. SCC-4080, ruling in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Edwin Mejia, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of Rape as charged under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code in Criminal Case No. SCC-4081, and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused is directed to pay the
victim P50,000.00 as indemnity.
 However, as to Criminal Case No. SCC-4080, it is settled that each charge of
rape is a separate and distinct crime and each must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Mere laying on top of the alleged victim even if naked does
not constitute rape. The prosecution therefore failed to prove the essential
elements of rape, but the Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the lesser offense of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum to 3 years of prision
correctional, as maximum.

The court a quo gave more credence to the testimony of private complainant AAA, who
charged accused-appellant with committing the bestial act resulting in her pregnancy. The
trial court applied the principle that an affirmative testimony carries more weight than a
mere denial. Accused-appellants denial was found to be unsubstantiated and merely self-
serving, vis--vis the positive declaration of AAA and the frank manner in which she recounted
her ordeal. In fact, the defense of alibi put up by accused-appellant was
uncorroborated. Finally, the element of hate was not given much weight by the trial court. It
stated that, assuming this element was present, it did not detract from AAAs credibility.

The trial court appreciated the qualifying circumstance of minority and relationship, so that
under Article 266-B of Republic Act No. 8353, the penalty would have been death. With the
suspension of the death penalty due to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, the RTC
imposed reclusion perpetua.

Insisting on his innocence and invoking the twin defenses of denial and alibi, accused-
appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a notice of appeal.

Thus, on 14 July 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed accused-appellants guilt in the two
cases, but modified the decision of the court a quo by disregarding the qualifying
circumstance of minority and awarding moral damages, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Crim Case No. 6295 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, to wit:

(1) In Criminal Case No. SCC-4081, appellant Edwin Mejia is

hereby found guilty of simple rape and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant is further ORDERED to
indemnify AAA in the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity
and P50,000 as moral damages.

(2) In Criminal Case No. SCC-4080, appellant Edwin Mejia is guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum to three (3) years of prision
correctional, as maximum.[9]

The Court of Appeals was not persuaded by accused-appellants contention that hatred
caused AAA to concoct rape charges against him. This attempt to discredit AAA failed. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the hate element was too petty a cause for the victims family to
fabricate allegations of rape. Motive is not necessary when the identity of the wrongdoer is
positively identified by the victim herself. In giving full credit to AAAs testimony, the appellate
court affirmed the dictum that the assessment of trial courts is generally viewed as correct
and entitled to great weight.

The Court of Appeals opposed the trial courts appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of
minority of the victim in view of the informations failure to allege such circumstance and the
prosecutions failure to adduce proof as to the age of AAA at the time the alleged rape took
place. The qualifying circumstance of minority was not sufficiently established by
independent proof during trial. Thus, the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship were not appreciated by the Court of Appeals.

Hence, this appeal before this Court.

On 4 February 2009, the Court required the parties to simultaneously submit their
respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired.[10] Both defense and prosecution
manifested that they would adopt their briefs filed before the Court of Appeals in order to
avoid repetition of the arguments and to expedite the resolution of the instant case.[11]The
case was thereafter deemed submitted for decision.

Asking for his acquittal, accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE QUALIFYING

CIRCUMSTANCE OF MINORITY OF THE VICTIM ALTHOUGH THE INFORMATION
DOES NOT ALLEGE SUCH CIRCUMSTANCE AND THAT THE PROSECUTION
INTRODUCED NO PROOF AS TO THE AGE OF THE VICTIM AT THE TIME THE ALLEGED
RAPE INCIDENT HAPPENED.

The defense argues that it was impossible for accused-appellant to have raped AAA, for two
reasons. First, he and AAA did not reside at the same place. Second, at the time the alleged
rape incident took place, accused-appellant was harvesting mangoes in Casantiagoan,
Pangasinan. Accused-appellant attempts to discredit AAA by showing that AAA was
actuated by ill motives. Accused-appellant asserts that AAA had a very strong motive
against him, elucidating that AAA and BBBs family hated him because he hurt BBB. The
defense also questions the trial courts appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of minority
when the information failed to allege such circumstance and the prosecution did not
present proof pertaining to the age of the victim at the time the alleged rape took place.
On the side of the prosecution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) supports accused-
appellants conviction. However, it agrees that accused-appellant should only be convicted
of Simple Rape in Criminal Case No. SCC-4081, because the qualifying circumstance of
minority was neither alleged in the information nor proved in the trial.

The appeal fails.

The Informations charge accused-appellant with the crime of Rape, defined and penalized
under the provisions of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, viz:

ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation.

The prosecution must be able to establish the following essential elements under Article 266-
A(1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely: (a) that the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and (b) that the same was committed by using force and
intimidation.

Accused-appellant anchors his claim of innocence on two defenses, denial and alibi. At the
same time, accused-appellant impugns the credibility of AAA.

In resolving rape cases, this Court is guided by the following principles: (a) an accusation for
rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but even more difficult for the accused,
though innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only two
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense;
and (d) the evaluation of the trial court judges regarding the credibility of witnesses deserves
utmost respect on the ground that they are in the best position to observe the demeanor,
act, conduct, and attitude of the witnesses in court while testifying.[12]

In light of these principles and considering the gravity of the offense charged and the
severity of the penalty that may be imposed, this Court has meticulously evaluated the entire
records and transcript of stenographic notes, and find no reason to deviate from the
appellate courts findings.

AAAs testimony, quoted hereunder, indubitably shows that accused-appellant had carnal
knowledge of her by using force and intimidation, thus:

Pros. Taminaya

Q. Do you know accused Edwin Mejia?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why do you know Edwin Mejia?

A. He is my stepfather, sir.

Q, Is he in the Court room now?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you kindly point to him?

Interpreter

Witness pointed to a man wearing blue green t-shirt and he respondent that he
is Edwin Mejia when he was asked of his name.

Pros. Taminaya

Q. Some time on March 2, 2003 at 8:00 oclock in the morning, where were you?

A. I was at the house of my mother, sir.

Q. Where is the house of your mother located?

A. In XXX, XXX, Pangasinan, sir.

Q. Why were you there in the house of your mother?

A. I was asked to take care of my younger brother, sir.

Q. What is the name of your brother?

A. CCC, sir.

Q. How old is CCC you are taking cared of?

A. More than two (2) months, sir.

Q. While you were taking care of your younger brother in the morning of March
2, 2003 at 8:00 oclock in the morning in the house of your mother, was
there any unusual incident that happened?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What is that unusual incident?

A. He threatened me with a bolo, sir. (Inangatan to ak na barang)

Q. Who threatened you with a bolo?

A. Edwin, sir.

Q. After he threatened you with a bolo, what did he do to you?

A. He laid me down, sir.

Q. What part of the house were you laid down?

A. In the sala, sir.

Q. Where was your mother?

A. She was selling, sir.

Q. After he forced you down, what did Edwin Mejia do?

A. He undressed me and removed my panty, sir.

Q. After Edwin Mejia removed your dress and your panty, what did he do next?

A. He removed his short pants and brief and he went on top of me, sir.

Q. When he was on top of you, what did he do?

A. That I will never go down and went out or else he will kill me, sir.

Q. While on top, what happened to you?

A. Painful, sir.

Q. What is painful to you?

A. My vagina, sir.

Q. Why is your vagina painful?

A. Very painful, sir.

Q. Why, what did you feel to (sic) your vagina that caused the pain?

A. He forcefully inserted his penis on (sic) my vagina sir.

Q. How long did he enter his penis into your vagina.

A. He inserted it very well, sir.

Q. How long?

A. About three (3) minutes, sir.

Q. What did he do while his penis was inside your vagina for 3 minutes?

A. After that he removed it, sir.

Q. When he removed his penis, what did he tell you?

A. That I will not go down from the house because he will kill me and he will kill
my mother sir.

xxxx

Q. At around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same date, March 2, 2003 while
you were with your brother CCC, was there any unusual incident that
happened to you again?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. What is that unusual incident?

A. He pulled my hair, sir.

Q. Who pulled your hair?

A. Edwin Mejia, sir.

xxxx

Q. After pulling your hair, what did Edwin Mejia do?

A. He laid me down and then he raped me, sir.

Q. After laiding (sic) you down, what did Edwin Mejia do?

A. He removed my dress and my panty, sir.

Q. After Edwin Mejia removed your dress and your panty, what did he do next?

A. He went on top of me again, sir.

Q. Was he able to insert again his penis into your vagina?

A. Not anymore, sir.

Q. After that what transpired next?

A. He told me not to report, sir.

Q. Were you able to wait for your mother that afternoon of March 2, 2003?

A. No, sir.

Q. Where did you go?

A. In our house, sir.

Q. Where is your house located?

A. In XXX, Pangasinan.

Q. Whose house is that?

A. My grandparents, sir.

Q. When you reached your grandparents house that afternoon, did you tell to
(sic) your grandparents what happened to you?

A. No, sir.

Q. Why did you not tell your grandparents of what happened to you?

A. Because he threatened me with a bolo, sir.

Q. How about to your mother, were you able to tell the incident to your mother?
 A. Yes, sir.

Q. When did you tell your mother what happened to you?

A. When I was already pregnant, sir.[13]

Indeed, at the heart of almost all rape cases is the issue of credibility of witnesses, where
conviction or acquittal of the accused may depend entirely on the credibility of the victims
testimony, as only the participants therein can testify to its occurrence. By the nature of rape,
the only evidence that oftentimes is available is the victim's own declaration. The rule is clear
that the lone testimony of the victim in the crime of rape, if credible, is sufficient to sustain a
conviction.

In challenging the credibility of AAAs accusations against him, accused-appellant points out
the confusion in her testimony as to the exact time of the alleged rape to show that AAA
was concocting the charges. He claims that AAA was moved by hatred, as accused-
appellant often hurt AAAs mother BBB.

However, time and again, this Court has emphasized that the manner of assigning values to
declarations of witnesses on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by
the trial judge who has the unique and unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and
assess their credibility. In essence, when the question arises as to which of the conflicting
versions of the prosecution and the defense is worthy of belief, the assessment of the trial
court is generally given the highest degree of respect, if not finality. The assessment made by
the trial court is even more enhanced when the Court of Appeals affirms the same, as in this
case.

Moreover, although AAAs testimony was allegedly marred by confusion as to the time of the
rape, the supposed inconsistency refers to a minor detail, which cannot affect the credibility
of the testimony as a whole.

On accused-appellants claim -- that he could not have raped AAA since 2 March 2003 was
a Sunday; thus, his five children were home -- is of no merit, as lust is no respecter of time and
place. This Court has repeatedly held that rape can be committed even in places where
people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, and even inside a
house where there are other occupants or where other members of the family are also
sleeping. Thus, it is an accepted rule in criminal law that rape may be committed even when
the rapist and the victim are not alone. The fact is, rape may even be committed in the
same room while the rapists spouse is asleep, or in a small room where other family members
also sleep.[14]

Accused-appellant relies on his averment that he was harvesting mangoes in Casantiagoan,

Pangasinan when the incidents occurred. For alibi to succeed as a defense, the accused
must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the
time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at
the scene of the crime.[15] No other principle in criminal law jurisprudence is more settled
than that alibi is the frailest of all defenses as it is prone to fabrication.

The defense failed to prove the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the
crime. As testified to by accused-appellant, the distance from Casantiagoan, Pangasinan to
the house of BBB in XXX town, which was the scene of the crime, can be traversed by
ordinary commute in a span of one hour.[16] It was thus not physically impossible for him to
have been at the locus criminis.

Accused-appellants defense of denial is inherently weak. Jurisprudence has established that

the defense of denial assumes significance only when the prosecutions evidence is such that
it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Mere denial, unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is negative, self-serving evidence, which cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight than the testimony of the complaining witness who testified on affirmative
matters. While accused-appellant claimed to be in the company of a group of men during
those times, the defense could not present even a single corroborative testimony. Appellants
denial and alibi cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of AAA, more so when the
records lack any suggestion that AAAs testimony should be seen in a suspicious light.

In all, the totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution proves beyond reasonable
doubt that accused-appellant is guilty of Rape in Criminal Case No. SCC-4081.

Simple rape is punished under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code by the single
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code mandates
that the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
(1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim;

Although the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were appreciated by the
trial court, the Court of Appeals correctly disregarded them. These qualifying circumstances
cannot be considered in fixing the penalty because minority, though proved, was not
alleged in the information. As regards relationship, the same was alleged and proved.
Pursuant, however, to Section 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, in order to fall within
subparagraph 1 of said provision, both circumstances of minority and relationship must be
alleged in the information and proved during trial. In People v. Tabanggay,[17] we held:

Jurisprudence dictates that when the law specifies certain circumstances that
will qualify an offense and thus attach to it a greater degree of penalty, such
circumstances must be both alleged and proven in order to justify the imposition
of the graver penalty. Recent rulings of the Court relative to the rape of minors
invariably state that in order to justify the imposition of death, there must be
independent evidence proving the age of the victim, other than the testimonies
of prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by the accused. A duly
 certified certificate of live birth accurately showing the complainant's age, or
some other official document or record such as a school record, has been
recognized as competent evidence.

In the instant case, we find insufficient the bare testimony of private

complainants and their mother as to their ages as well as their kinship to the
appellant. x x x [We] cannot agree with the solicitor general that appellant's
admission of his relationship with his victims would suffice. Elementary is the
doctrine that the prosecution bears the burden of proving all the elements of a
crime, including the qualifying circumstances. In sum, the death penalty cannot
be imposed upon appellant.[18]

The twin circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender
must concur to qualify the crime of rape.[19] In the instant case, only relationship was duly
alleged and proved.

As amended, and effective 1 December 2000, Secs. 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure now provide that aggravating as well as qualifying circumstances
must be alleged in the information and proven during trial; otherwise they cannot be
considered against the accused. Proof of the age of the victim cannot consist merely of
testimony. Neither can a stipulation of the parties with respect to the victims age be
considered sufficient proof of minority.[20] Thus, the same cannot be used to impose the
higher penalty of capital punishment on the accused-appellant.

Anent the award of damages, civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the
fact of rape, while moral damages are awarded upon such finding without need of further
proof, because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling
the victim to such award.[21] The Court of Appeals correctly awarded (a) P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and (b) P50,000.00 as moral damages to the victim, pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence.[22] Exemplary damages are not awarded in light of the absence of proven
aggravating circumstances.

With respect to Criminal Case No. SCC-4080, we are in full agreement with the trial court and
Court of Appeals in downgrading the crime from rape to acts of lasciviousness inasmuch as
carnal knowledge was not established. The mere act of lying on top of the alleged victim,
even if naked, does not constitute rape.

Instead, the Court finds accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Acts of
Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. The felony of acts of
lasciviousness, a crime included in rape, is defined and penalized by Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, thus:

ART. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. - Any person who shall commit any act of
lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.

Its elements are as follows:

 1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness.

2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:

a. By using force or intimidation; or

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age.

3. That the offended party is another person of either sex.[23]

The Court finds accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser offense of
acts of lasciviousness with the presence of the foregoing elements, specifically: (1) the acts
of lasciviousness or lewdness and (2) the fact that these were done by using force or
intimidation.

The penalty for the felony of acts of lasciviousness is prision correccional in its full
range. Reducing the penalty by one degree to determine the minimum of the indeterminate
penalty, such penalty is arresto mayor, which has a range of one (1) month and one (1) day
to six (6) months. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full
range of arresto mayor. Absent any modifying circumstances attendant to the crime, the
maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision
correccional. Accordingly, accused-appellant is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of
six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three years of prision correccional, as maximum
in Criminal Case No. SCC-4080. Moreover, the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages is
awarded to the victim.[24]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals finding

accused-appellant Edwin Mejia, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple
Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal
Case No. SCC-4080, the amount of P30,000 is awarded to the victim as moral damages. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175013,June 1, 2007
Beltran vs People

Facts:These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and certiorari to enjoin
petitioners’ prosecution for Rebellion and to set aside the rulings of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC Makati) on the investigation
and prosecution of petitioners’ cases.Petitioner in G.R. No. 175013, Crispin B. Beltran (Beltran),
and petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-76, are members of the House of Representatives
representing various party-list groups. Petitioners all face charges for Rebellion under Article
134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code in two criminal cases pending with
the RTC Makati.
Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran
of the crime for which he was arrested. On that evening, Beltran was subjected to an inquest
at the Quezon City Hall of Justice for Inciting to Sedition under Article 142 of the Revised
Penal Code based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24
February 2006, on the occasion of the20th anniversary of the EDSA Revolution. The inquest
was based on the joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers who claimed to have been
present at the rally.
The authorities brought back Beltran to Camp Crame where he was subjected to a
second inquest, this time for Rebellion. The letters referred to the DOJ for appropriate action
the results of the CIDG’s investigation implicating Beltran, the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-
76, San Juan, and several others as “leaders and promoters” of an alleged foiled plot to
overthrow the Arroyo government. The plot was supposed to be carried out jointly by
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the
MakabayangKawalngPilipinas (MKP), which have formed a “tactical alliance.”
The DOJ panel of prosecutors issued a Resolution finding probable cause to indict
Beltran and San Juan as “leaders/promoters” of Rebellion. The Information alleged that
Beltran, San Juan, and other individuals “conspiring and confederating with each other, x xx,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously form a tactical alliance between the
CPP/NPA, renamed as PartidongKomunistangPilipinas (PKP) and its armed regular members
as KatipunanngAnakng Bayan (KAB) with the MakabayangKawalngPilipinas (MKP) and
thereby rise publicly and take up arms against the duly constituted government.
In his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General claims that Beltran’s inquest for
Rebellion was valid and that the RTC Makati correctly found probable cause to try Beltran
for such felony.

Issue: Whether the inquest proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion was valid and (b)
whether there is probable cause to indict Beltran for Rebellion.

Held: The Inquest Proceeding againstBeltran for Rebellion is Void.Inquest proceedings are
proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant.
The joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officersstates that the officers arrested Beltran,
without a warrant,for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor
could only have conducted – as he did conduct – an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no
other. Consequently, when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second
inquest proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority rendering the second
inquest void. None of Beltran’s arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the
crime of Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that
Beltran had just committed Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he
had committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they
saw and heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006.
 If the arrest was not properly effected, the inquest officer should proceed under
Section 9 of Circular No. 61 which provides:
Where Arrest Not Properly Effected.— Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest
was not made in accordance with the Rules, he shall:
a) recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;
b) note down the disposition on the referral document;
c) prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action taken;
and
d) forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the City or
Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.

For the failure of Beltran’s panel of inquest prosecutors to comply with Section 7, Rule
112 in relation to Section 5, Rule 113 and DOJ Circular No. 61, we declare Beltran’s inquest
void.Beltran would have been entitled to a preliminary investigation had he not asked the
trial court to make a judicial determination of probable cause, which effectively took the
place of such proceeding.

There is No Probable Cause to Indict Beltran for Rebellion. Probable cause is the “existence
of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on
the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted.

The elements of Rebellion are:

1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government;
and

2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either –

(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws:

(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers and prerogatives

Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action
done in furtherance of a political end.

We have gone over these documents and find merit in Beltran’s contention that the same
are insufficient to show probable cause to indict him for Rebellion. Theallegations in these
affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for taking part in an armed public
uprising against the government. What these documents prove, at best, is that Beltran was in
Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years earlier, he was present
during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific
acts of promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of 27
February 2006. None of the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of a rebellion. Beltran’s
alleged presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not automatically make him a leader of
a rebellion.Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not
acknowledge, mere membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion.29[29] As for the
alleged funding of the CPP’s military equipment from Beltran’s congressional funds,
Cachuela’s affidavit merely contained a general conclusion without any specific act
showing such funding. Such a general conclusion does not establish probable cause.
In his Comment to Beltran’s petition, the Solicitor General points to Fuentes’ affidavit,
dated 25 February 2006,] as basis for the finding of probable cause against Beltran as
Fuentes provided details in his statement regarding meetings Beltran and the other
petitioners attended in 2005 and 2006 in which plans to overthrow violently the Arroyo
government were allegedly discussed, among others. The claim is untenable. Fuentes’
affidavit was not part of the attachments the CIDG referred to the DOJ on 27 February
2006.Thus, the panel of inquest prosecutors did not have Fuentes’ affidavit in their possession
when they conducted the Rebellion inquest against Beltran on that day. Such belated
submission, a tacit admission of the dearth of evidence against Beltran during the inquest,
does not improve the prosecution’s case. Assuming them to be true, what the allegations in
Fuentes’ affidavit make out is a case for Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, punishable under
Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, not Rebellion under Article 134. Attendance in
meetings to discuss, among others, plans to bring down a government is a mere preparatory
step to commit the acts constituting Rebellion under Article 134.Thus, the RTC Makati erred
when it nevertheless found probable cause to try Beltran for Rebellion based on the
evidence before it.
To repeat, none of the affidavits alleges that Beltran is promoting, maintaining, or
heading a Rebellion. The Information in Criminal Case No. 06-452 itself does not make such
allegation. Thus, even assuming that the Information validly charges Beltran for taking part in
a Rebellion, he is entitled to bail as a matter of right since there is no allegation in the
Information that he is a leader or promoter of the Rebellion.However, the Information in fact
merely charges Beltran for “conspiring and confederating” with others in forming a “tactical
alliance” to commit rebellion. As worded, the Information does not charge Beltran with
Rebellion but with Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, a bailable offense
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMINGO SALAZAR y SEROMA alias
INGGO, MONCHITO GOTANGUGAN y SEVILLA, alias MONCHING and JOHN
DOE, accused, DOMINGO SALAZAR y SEROMA alias INGGO and MONCHITO
GOTANGUGAN y SEVILLA alias MONCHING, accused-appellants.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Although homicide (a crime against persons) is independently a graver offense

than robbery (a crime against property), it is treated in the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide as a mere incident committed by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery. Unless the prosecution convincingly proves that the main purpose of the culprit(s)
was the asportation of personal property and that the death was merely incidental to such
asportation, there can be no conviction for this special complex crime.

Statement of the Case

This principle is stressed by the Court as it rules on this appeal from the Judgment[1] dated
April 1, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104[2] which, acting as a
special criminal court, convicted Appellants Domingo Salazar y Seroma alias Inggo and
Monchito Gotangugan y Sevilla alias Monching of robbery with homicide.
In an Information dated July 31, 1989, Asst. Quezon City Prosecutor Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo
accused Appellants Salazar and Gotangugan, together with one John Doe, of robbery with
homicide committed as follows:[3]

That on or about the 10th day of March 1989, in Quezon City, Metro-Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and by means of violence upon person, rob
one CRISPIN GATMEN Y CEYNAS of his service firearm, a Squires Bingham Cal. 38 Revolver
with Serial No. 1096012 valued at P6,000.00, Philippine Currency, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party thereof in the aforementioned amount; and that by
reason of or on the occasion of the said robbery, said accused with intent to kill and without
any justifiable cause, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, and
assault the person of said CRISPIN GATMEN Y CEYNAS, by stabbing the latter, hitting him on
the different parts of his body by the use of bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim in such amount as may be
awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code.

Upon arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty. After trial proceeded in due course,
the court a quo rendered the assailed Judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:[4]

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding both accused, Domingo Salazar y

Seroma and Monchito Gotangugan y Sevilla, guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
as charged in the information. They are both sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, to pay the heirs of the deceased damages in the amount of P30,000.00, plus the
sum of P6,500.00 representing the value of the revolver taken by both accused, plus all the
accessory penalties provided for by law, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution
 The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Pfc. Jose Antonio of the Quezon City
Police, Eyewitnesses Vicente Miranda, Jr. and Pedro Soriano, Dr. Dario L. Gajardo of the
PC/INP Crime Laboratory and Ben Felipe Dangza, Consultant/Manager of PUMA Security
Agency. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the People, summarized the facts as viewed by
the prosecution:[5]

On March 10, 1989, at or about 3:30 (a.m.), Vicente Miranda, Jr. and his friend Nestor Arriola
were standing in the corner of Road 1 and Visayas Avenue, Quezon City, about 12 meters
from Lindas Supermarket (TSN, October 31, 1989, pp. 3 and 21). At about the same time,
Pedro Soriano, who was himself waiting for a ride, was standing in front of the Kambingan
Restaurant along Visayas Avenue and beside Lindas Supermarket (TSN, November 6, 1989, p.
2-3). Moments later, they saw appellants Domingo Salazar and Monchito Gotangugan
together with an unidentified companion approach the security guard of Lindas
Supermarket (TSN, October 31, 1989, pp. 3-4, 27).

Salazar, Gotangugan and their companion talked to the security guard, who was later
identified as Crispin Gatmen. Thereafter, Miranda saw Salazar pull out a 9-10 inches long
dagger from his pocket, and pass the same to Gotangugan (Ibid., pp. 5, 15, 22). Armed with
the dagger, Gotangugan suddenly started stabbing Gatmen (Ibid., p. 5, 15, 16).

At that precise moment, Pedro Soriano, who was only about 10 to 15 meters from Lindas
Supermarket heard moans coming from the guardhouse in front of Lindas Supermarket. He
turned his head towards the place where the moans were coming from and saw Gatmen
inside the guardhouse being repeatedly stabbed by Gotangugan (TSN, November 6, 1989,
pp. 2-6, 15-16).

Both Miranda and Soriano were able to witness and identify the malefactors because the
place where the incident happened was well-lighted (TSN, October 31, 1989, p. 22;
November 6, 1989, pp. 4-5).

While Gotangugan was stabbing Gatmen, Salazar stood close to Gotangugan, while their
unidentified companion acted as a lookout (TSN, October 31, 1989, pp. 8, 15; November 6,
1989, pp. 16).

Out of fear, Miranda and Arriola ran towards Tandang Sora. While running, however, they
saw Salazar and Gotangugan get the revolver of Gatmen (TSN, October 31, 1989, p. 7-
8). Soriano, on the other hand, left slowly but saw Salazar get the gun of Gatmen (TSN,
November 6, 1989, p. 6-7).

After getting the gun, Salazar, Gotangugan, and their unidentified companion left the scene
of the crime (TSN, October 31, 1989, p. 8; November 6, 1989, p. 7).

Gatmen died as a consequence of the following stab wounds, to wit:

(1) Hacked wound, frontal extending to the right pre-auricular region, measuring 10
by 1 cm, 8 cm from the anterior midline, fracturing the frontal bone.
(2) Stab wound, right zygomatic region, measuring 3 by 0.7 cm, 10 cm from the
anterior midline, directed posteriorwards and medialwards, fracturing the right
zygomatic bone.
(3) Incised wound, chin, measuring 1.2 by 0.3 cm, 2 cm right of the anterior midline.
(4) Stab wound, neck measuring 5 by 1.2 cm, crossing the anterior midline, 4 cm to
the right and 1 cm to the posteriorwards and medialwards, lacerating the trachea,
larynx and esophagus.
(5) Stab wound, right clavicular region, measuring 8 by 2 cm, 7 cm from the anterior
midline, 3 cm deep, directed posteriorwards and medialwards, fracturing the right
clavicle.
 (6) Stab wound, interclavicular region, measuring 3 by 0.1 cm, 6 cm from the anterior
midline.
(7) Linear abrasion, left mammary region, measuring 3 by 0.1 cm, 6 cm from the
anterior midline.
(8) Lacerated wound, palmar aspect of the left hand, measuring 5 by 2 cm, 3 cm
lateral to its anterior midline.
(9) Lacerated wound, palmar aspect of the right hand, measuring 4 by 2 cm, along
its anterior midline.
(10) Lacerated wound, middle phalange of the left small finger, measuring 1 by 0.1
cm.
(11) Stab wound, proximal phalange of the left index finger, measuring 2.2 by 1 cm.
(12) Incised wound, middle phalange of the right middle finger, measuring 1 by 0.5
cm.
(Exhibit E)

Evidence for the Defense

Appellants, testifying for themselves, set up the defense of alibi. The court a quo
summarized their testimonies as follows:[6]

DOMINGO SALAZAR, 30 years old, and residing at c/o Bureau of Animal Industry, Visayas
Avenue, Quezon City, testified that he had been in that place for ten (10) years and that
during the early morning of July 27, 1989, he was at their house sleeping, when all of a
sudden he was awakened because two persons kicked him and with guns pointed at him,
he was ordered to stand up. The two persons searched his things inside the house and asked
him where he hid his gun. Then, they dragged him out of his house. Outside the house, he
was kicked, boxed and hit with the butt of the gun. There were about five (5) people who
went to his house, all armed. He denied any participation in the killing of the deceased
because according to him, he was at his house sleeping. He slept at 7:00 (p.m. on) March 9
and woke up at dawn, March 10. He was with his wife Juanita Salazar, and his father-in-
law. They were sleeping side by side. He did not see Vicente Miranda and Pedro Soriano
before he was arrested on July 27, 1989.However, he admitted having seen Miranda and
Soriano at the police headquarters at Sikatuna, peeping at their cell. He often saw them at
City Hall with policemen accompanying newly arrested persons.

MONCHITO GOTANGUGAN, 23 years old, married, vendor, and with residence at Visayas
Avenue, Quezon City testified that he was not at the scene of the crime when the said
incident took place and that on March 10, 1989, he was at Lucena City. On July 27, 1989, he
was at the house of his sister located at Baex Compound, Visayas Avenue, Quezon City,
arriving in that place during the first week of May 1989. In the morning of July 27, 1989,
policemen forcibly entered his house and dragged him outside, ransacking his belongings
and bringing him at Sikatuna Police Headquarters. He was accused of being a Sparrow,
hold-upper and akyat bahay, and ordered to bring out firearms, but they did not find
anything. They mauled him at Sikatuna headquarters. While still at their house, he was kicked
and hit with the butt of the armalite. At the Sikatuna headquarters, he was never informed
by the police that he participated in the killing of the security guard in front of Lindas
Supermarket in the morning. He had never seen the witnesses presented by the prosecution,
however, he saw them at the City hall together with policemen and other detainees.

Ruling of the Trial Court

 The trial court brushed aside the alibi interposed by appellants, branding it as an
inherently weak defense. It gave full credence to the accounts of the eyewitnesses for the
prosecution as no evidence was adduced to refute them or to show why said eyewitnesses
would testify falsely against appellants. Quite the contrary, the prosecution evidence (was)
clear and convincing. The bare allegation of the defense that they were assets and
informants of the apprehending policemen was disbelieved. Thus, it rendered the
aforementioned six-page Judgment of conviction.
Hence, this appeal direct to this Court, the penalty being reclusin perpetua.

Assignment of Errors

In their Brief,[7] appellants attack the prosecution evidence for its lack of probative value
to outweigh their alibi and to sustain their conviction. They allege that the eyewitnesses
testimonies suffer from material inconsistencies and contradictions that cast serious doubt on
their credibility. Specifically, the following errors were imputed to the court a quo:[8]

The lower court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Vicente Miranda and Pedro Soriano since a more conscientious scrutiny of their
testimonies will show that they are highly incredible and consistently contradicting and
improbable.

II

The lower court erred in convicting both the accused-appellants since the evidence
presented by the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the offense
charged.

III

The lower court erred in refusing and failing to find that the herein accused-appellants were
arrested without warrant and therefore all evidence obtained after such illegal arrest are
inadmissible.

IV

The lower court committed serious error amounting to grave abuse of discretion in finding
that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Vicente Miranda and Pedro Soriano were
not refuted because the defense interposed by the accused is alibi.

These alleged errors will be discussed by the Court under the general heading Credibility
of Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence. In addition, the Court will tackle, motu proprio, the
issue of whether appellants may be held liable for the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, in the light of the proven facts.

The Courts Ruling

The Court finds appellants guilty of two separate felonies; namely, homicide and theft,
but not of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

Credibility of Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence

 As in most criminal cases, appellants contend that the court a quo erred in bestowing
credence on the testimony of prosecution witnesses. Appellants assail the credibility of the
eyewitnesses by pointing out several inconsistencies in their testimonies which render them
highly improbable and consistently impossible.

Two Different Persons Produced the Dagger and Stabbed the Victim per Mirandas Testimony

We disagree with appellants contention that, during the direct examination, Prosecution
Witness Miranda wobbled particularly on who between the appellants stabbed the
victim. The defense segregated Mirandas testimony, quoting and highlighting separate
portions thereof to show alleged inconsistencies. According to the defense, Miranda was
thus not credible as he was not clear as to who between the two appellants actually pulled
out the dagger and stabbed the victim. But when questioned specifically on this point, the
witness clarified the sequence of events from the act of pulling out the dagger to the actual
stabbing. Said the witness:[9]
Q. You said one of the three men pulled out a bladed instrument. Will you tell the
Honorable Court how far were you from these three persons who were then in
these conversation with the security guard?
A. From the witness stand up to that corner, sir.
FISCAL BELTRAN:
About a distance of 12 meters. I am proposing that the distance pointed to by
the witness is about 12 meters.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL BELTRAN:
Q. You said that one of the three persons pulled out a bladed instrument. What did
you do after pulling out this bladed instrument?
A. I saw him, sir, stab the guard.
Q. The same person who pulled out this bladed instrument was the same one who
stabbed the security guard?
A. No, sir. He handed the bladed instrument to the other person, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Were you able to see the face of this person whom you said pulled out this bladed
instrument?
A. Yes, sir.
Nor are we persuaded by appellants contention that the witness sworn statement to the
police shows that the one who pulled out the dagger was the same person who stabbed
the victim. The pertinent portion of his statement reads:[10]
06.TAnong kinalaman mo sa pangyayaring yon, kung mayroon?
SMangyari po, ay napadaan ho ako noon, kasama ko yong mga kaibigan ko, sa
may harap ng Lindas Grocery sa may kanto ng Road 1, at Visayas
Avenue. Noong mga oras na yon (3:30AM) ay nakita ko na yong guardya na
nakabantay doon sa may grocery ay parang may sinita na tatlong lalaki, tapos
mamaya-maya, yong isang lalaki ay tinapik niya sa puwit yong kasama at bigla
na lamang bumunot ng dagger at inundayan ng saksak yong guwardya, mga
tatlong sunud-sunod, tapos atras ng atras naman yong gwardya hanggang
napasandal doon sa may guard house at doon siya natumba tapos hinablot
niya yong baril ng gwardya tapos nag-takbohan na sila patungo sa squatteros
(sic) area sa may likoran ng Agriculture building, yong BAEX ho.
 07.TBale ilan ka-tao ang sumaksak sa guardia, noong makita mo?
SYong isa lang na maliit, na medyo kalbo, at yong isa naman medyo pa-pilay-pilay
ay siya tumapik sa kalbo na parang nag-uutos na saksakin yong guardya, yong
isa naman ay doon sa may pinto ng Lindas Grocery na tinitingnan naman niya
yong kandadado (sic) ng pinto.
While there may have been some vagueness in the answer to Question 06, the
clarification in the succeeding statement, i.e., the reply to Question 07, sufficiently explains
the witness story. It must be remembered that ex parte affidavits are generally considered
incomplete and inaccurate and will not prevail over the witness statements on the
stand.[11] That the defense labels Mirandas answers as inconsistencies appears to this Court
to be merely a strained interpretation of the witness testimony.

The Number of Stabs Inflicted Is a Minor Matter

Appellants make a mountain out of Mirandas admission on cross-examination that he

was not sure how many times Gotangugan stabbed the victim vis-a-vis his earlier statement
that one of appellants stabbed the victim thrice. There is really no inconsistency here. And
even if we grant that there is, the alleged conflict pertains to an insignificant detail that is not
material to the question of who killed the deceased. The general rule is that inconsistencies
and contradictions in minor and trivial matters do not impair a witness credibility. [12] The
ambivalence of a witness on the exact number of stabs inflicted on the victim does not
detract from the obvious fact that the victim was killed by Gotangugan, as clearly and
positively testified to by Miranda.Indeed, in a startling event like a killing, it is difficult for a
witness to keep tab of the exact number of strokes the killer made. It is enough that the
witness gives a fair estimate. The important thing is that the stabbing took place, the victim
died and the witness identified the culprit(s).

Distance Did Not Necessarily Hinder Perception

The contention that Miranda did not really see the culprits faces deserves scant
consideration. The distance of the witness from the stabbing incident was only 12
meters. That the crime happened before dawn (about 3:30 a.m.) is immaterial because the
place was lighted.[13] The witness remark that he was far from the situs of the crime merely
meant that he was not near enough to hear the culprits whispered conversation, but he was
near enough to see their faces and their felonious deed.[14]
Appellants denigrate the witness story that he ran closer to the locus criminis while
witnessing the stabbing. They claim that the natural tendency would be to run farther
away. However, under the circumstances, the witness did not really intend to come closer to
the scene of the crime. What he did was to go to the area of Tandang Sora where there was
a public market and where, expectably, there would be people even at such an early
hour. The area towards the city hall, on the other hand, was unlit and deserted, as the
government buildings there were still closed. Besides, since the witness was on his way to his
house in Teachers Village, he had to go to Tandang Sora, at that time, to get a ride. Hence,
the witness reaction was not unnatural.In fact, it was most prudent under the circumstances.

No Two Versions of the Event in Sorianos Testimony

The defense contends that the other eyewitness, Soriano, did not actually see the
stabbing incident, much less the person who stabbed the victim. Appellants claim that
Soriano presented two versions of the incident. According to one version given during direct
examination, the witness allegedly stated that the security guard was seated outside the
guardhouse and that one of the accused urinated behind him. Thereafter, the latter
stabbed the victim.[15] In the other version given during cross-examination, the victim was
allegedly inside the guardhouse when one of the culprits stabbed the victim.[16]
We disagree. The guardhouse was actually an outpost,[17] a structure open on all
sides. The guard was sitting under its roof and his assailants were standing outside the
roof. One of them was behind him and relieving himself. In this light, it is easy to understand
the absence of discrepancy in the witness testimony on this point.

Appellant Gotangugan Stabbed the Victim

Appellants claim that the witness was uncertain as to who actually stabbed the
victim. While it is true that initially he made a mistake in pinpointing the culprits in the
courtroom, this was the result only of his lack of familiarity with appellants names. However,
despite his initial confusion, his identification of the culprit who delivered the fatal stab
wound was categorical. This is clearly shown in the transcripts of the trial:[18]
Q. Earlier, you pointed to two persons inside the courtroom as having participated in
the stabbing of Crispin Gatmen, the first one gave his name as Monchito
Gotangugan, will you tell the Honorable Court what was the special participation
of Monchito Gotangugan in the stabbing?
A. The gun was handed over to him.
COURT:
Gun?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
FISCAL BELTRAN:
Q. How about the other person, this Domingo Salazar, what did he do?
A. He was the one who stabbed the victim.
Q. Who stabbed the victim?
A. The bald one, sir.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a person by the name of Monchito Gotangugan.
ATTY. OSORIO:
Your Honor, may I reiterate the witness to speak louder.
FISCAL BELTRAN:
Q Alright. You pointed to Monchito Gotangugan as the one who stabbed Crispin
Gatmen. How about the other person you pointed to, what did he do?
A. After the bald one stabbed the victim, sir, the big one took the gun from the
security guard.
Indeed, the foregoing testimony demonstrates that while the witness was confused as to
the name of the culprit, he was certain about his identity.

Eyewitnesses Accounts Are Consistent with Each Other

The defense claims that the testimonies of the two eyewitnesses materially contradicted
each other in two ways. First, Miranda allegedly said that the security guard was standing
when he was stabbed while Soriano stated that he was sitting down. Second, Miranda
testified that one of the culprits produced the dagger and the other stabbed the victim with
it. Soriano, on the other hand, said that only one person produced the dagger and
thereafter stabbed the victim.
We have examined the Appellants Brief and the records of this case and we have found
no factual basis for the strained inferences of the defense. From Mirandas sworn statement,
the defense deduced that the security guard was standing outside the outpost. But this
deduction is not supported by said sworn statement or by the witness testimony in
court. Miranda never said that the victim was standing up or was outside the guardhouse
when he was stabbed.
Both witnesses agreed that the person who stabbed the victim was Gotangugan. Both
eyewitnesses corroborated each other in identifying Salazar as the one who drew the
dagger from his jacket and then handed it to Gotangugan. With the dagger, Gotangugan
stabbed the security guard. The insistence of the defense on this supposed contradiction
simply has no basis.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that the assessment of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses and their stories is well-nigh conclusive on appeal, provided it is not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence.[19] In this case, the defense has tried but failed to establish any material
inconsistency or contradiction which would justify a departure from this rule.
Compared with the evidence submitted by the prosecution, appellants denial and alibi
cannot possibly be given more probative weight than the clear and positive identification
provided by no less than two credible eyewitnesses.[20]
Granting arguendo that appellants were illegally arrested, such arrest did not invest
these eyewitness accounts with constitutional infirmity as fruits of the poisonous
tree. Considering that their conviction could be secured on the strength of the testimonial
evidence given in open court which are not inadmissible in evidence, the court finds no
reason to further belabor the matter.

Elements of Robo con Homicidio

In prosecuting robbery with homicide cases, the government needs to prove the
following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or
intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is done
with animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide
(used in its generic sense) is committed.[21]
In this case, the prosecution has convincingly proven that (1) appellants asported a gun
with violence and intimidation against the victim; (2) the gun belonged to the deceased;
and (3) the security guard was killed. Animus lucrandi is presumed when there is proof
of asportation.[22] All of these facts are supported by the testimonies of competent
eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution.
There is, however, no showing that the death of the security guard occurred merely by
reason or on the occasion of the robbery. The prosecution was silent on
appellants primarycriminal intent. Did they intend to kill the security guard in order to steal
the gun? Or did they intend only to kill him, the taking of the gun being merely an
afterthought? The prosecution did not prove either of the two propositions, and the court a
quo failed to elaborate on this point. Thus, we cannot affirm appellants conviction of the
crime charged in the Information.
In several cases, the Court has already ruled that a conviction for robbery with homicide
requires certitude that the robbery was the main purpose and objective of the criminals and
that the killing was merely incidental, resulting merely by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery.[23] Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code specifically states:

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons--Penalties.--Any person

guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. the penalty or reclusin perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, x x x. (Underscoring supplied)

The Spanish version of Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code reads: 1.0--Con la pena
de reclusion perpetua a muerte, cuando con motivo o con ocasion del robo resultare
homicidio. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino explains that the use of the words con motivodel
robo permits of no interpretation other than that the intent of the actor must supply the
connection between the homicide and the robbery in order to constitute the complex
offense. If that intent comprehends the robbery, it is immaterial that the homicide may in
point of time immediately precede instead of follow the robbery. Where the original design
comprehends robbery, and homicide is perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of the
consummation of the former, the crime committed is the special complex offense, even if
homicide precedes the robbery by an appreciable interval of time. On the other hand, if the
original criminal design does not clearly comprehend robbery, but robbery follows the
homicide as an afterthought or as a minor incident of the homicide, the criminal acts should
be viewed as constitutive of two offenses and not of a single complex offense. Robbery with
homicide arises only when there is a direct relation, an intimate connection, between the
robbery and the killing, even if the killing is prior to, concurrent with, or subsequent to the
robbery.[24]
On the other hand, robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Code is distinguished
from the complex crime punished in Article 48, which contemplates a situation where one
offense is a necessary means to commit the other or where a single act results in two or more
offenses. The homicide in Article 294(1) is not necessary for the accomplishment of the
robbery.[25] However, it could be committed to avoid future identification of the robbers or as
a consequence or incident thereof.
Robo con homicidio is an indivisible offense, a special complex crime. The penalty for
robbery with homicide is more severe because the law sees, in this crime, that men placed
lucre above the value of human life, thus, justifying the imposition of a more severe penalty
than that for simple homicide or robbery. In view of said graver penalty, jurisprudence exacts
a stricter requirement before convicting the accused of this crime. Where the homicide is
not conclusively shown to have been committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, or
where the robbery was not proven, there can be no conviction for robo con homicidio.[26]
In the case under consideration, appellants primary intent remains an enigma. For this
reason, we cannot affirm appellants conviction for robbery with homicide. The fact that
appellants took the firearm after shooting the security guard did not prove that their primary
intent was to commit robbery. It shows that they committed an unlawful taking of property,
but it does not exclude the possibility that this was merely an afterthought. Any conclusion as
to their primary criminal intent based on the proven facts is speculative and without
adequate basis.
In view of the facts established and consistent with jurisprudence, the Court can convict
appellants only of the separate offenses of theft and homicide, which were both duly
proven.This Court is cognizant of the fact that the Information accused appellants of the
crime of robbery with homicide. Nonetheless, it is axiomatic that the nature and character of
the crime charged are determined not by the designation of the specific crime but by the
facts alleged in the Information. Thus, in People vs. Ponciano,[27] the Court through Mr.
Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. held:

x x x In the case at bar, the direct relation or intimate connection between the robbery and
the killing was not established.

We therefore, follow the rule laid down in People v. Manalang [170 SCRA 149,163,
February 9,1989],[28] to wit:

We already had several occasions to hold that if the original design was not to commit
robbery but that the idea of taking the personal property of another with intent to gain
came to the mind of the offender after the homicide only as an afterthought or as a minor
incident in the homicide, the criminal acts should be viewed as constituting two distinct
offenses and not as a single complex crime; the crimes would be either homicide or murder,
as the case may be, and theft. (People v. Atanacio, et al., No. L-11844, November 29, 1960,
110 Phil. 1032; People v. Elizaga, 86 Phil. 364 [1950]; People v. Glore, 87 Phil. 739 [1950])
(Underscoring supplied)

Thus, appellants should be held guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code and theft under Article 309 of the same Code. We also hold that treachery
aggravated the killing. The attack was sudden and without warning, affording the security
guard no chance to defend himself.[29] As it was not alleged in the Information, it cannot be
used to qualify the killing to murder. However, treachery can still be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance.[30]
While it was proven during the trial that the stolen pistol was worth P6,500.00,[31] the
Information placed the value at P6,000.00 only. However, the appellant did not object to the
higher valuation and is thus deemed to have waived his right to avail of the lower penalty
under paragraph 3 of Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, appellants may
be penalized for theft under Article 309 (2) of the said Code.[32]
It is scarcely necessary to point out that there was conspiracy between appellants,
because they clearly acted in concert and with a unified criminal design.[33] The eyewitness
accounts tell us that one of the assailants touched the other appellants behind to signal the
start of the attack against the security guard. Salazar then pulled out the dagger which
Gotangugan used to stab the victim.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Judgment is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(1) Appellants are hereby found GUILTY of the separate offense of
homicide and SENTENCED to the indeterminate sentence of ten years and one
day of prisin mayor, as minimum, to seventeen years, four months and one day
of reclusin temporal, as maximum.
(2) The indemnity ex delicto imposed by the trial court is INCREASED to fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) in line with prevailing jurisprudence.[34]
(3) Appellants are found also GUILTY of the separate offense of theft in accordance
with Article 309 (2) of the Revised Penal Code and SENTENCED to the
indeterminate penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to four years and two months and one day also of prision
correccional, as maximum.
(4) Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
CEFERINO A. SORIANO, petitioner, vs. HON. ADORACION C. ANGELES, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Caloocan City, Regional Trial Court, Branch CXXI, and RUEL
GARCIA, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 121, Caloocan City, on March 15, 1993 in Criminal Case No. C-40740 which acquitted
private respondent Ruel Garcia of direct assault.
The prosecutions evidence was as follows: Private respondent Ruel Garcia and his uncle,
Pedro Garcia, were members of the Caloocan police. Shortly after midnight on November 7,
1991, they barged into the barangay hall of Barangay 56, Zone 5 in Caloocan City, looking
for petitioner Ceferino A. Soriano, the barangay captain. Private respondent gave petitioner
fist blows on the face four times with his left hand, while he poked a gun at him with his right
hand, at the same time cursing him, Putang ina mo cabeza (You son of a bitch
chief). Although there were four barangay tanods (Manuel Montoya, Arturo del Rosario,
Ramiro Samson, and Francisco Raton) in the barangay hall, they could not come to the aid
of petitioner because they were held at bay by Pedro Garcia. The Garcias then left with their
companions who had been waiting outside the hall. Petitioner was treated for his injuries in
the hospital.
Private respondent denied petitioners allegations. He testified that he went to the
barangay hall in the evening of November 6, 1991 because his younger brother had been
reportedly arrested and beaten up by petitioner. (It appears that the younger Garcia was
involved in a brawl with Dennis Mones and a certain Ocampo. They were arrested and
taken to the barangay hall. One of the boys, who was apparently drunk, vomitted while their
names were recorded. Petitioner, therefore, ordered the three boys to be taken to the
Ospital ng Kalookan for a check-up.) As private respondent saw petitioner near the door of
the barangay hall, he asked for the whereabouts of his brother and the reason for the latters
arrest. Apparently thinking that private respondent was trying to intervene in the case he was
investigating, petitioner angrily told private respondent to lay off: Walang pulis pulis
dito (Your being a policeman doesnt pull strings here). When private respondent insisted on
going inside the barangay hall, petitioner blocked him and then pushed him on the
chest. Private respondent also pushed petitioner, causing him to fall on a pile of nightsticks
and injure himself. All the time, private respondent claimed he had his gun tucked at his
waist. Private respondents uncle, Pedro Garcia, then arrived and took him home.
In acquitting private respondent, respondent Judge Adoracion C. Angeles found it
incredible that petitioner did not resist or even say anything when private respondent
allegedly assaulted him and that none of the four barangay tanods who were near him
came to his aid. She thought that if petitioner had indeed been attacked, he would have
suffered more serious injuries than a contusion on the forehead, erythema on the chest, and
a lacerated wound on the lower lip. Respondent judge also excluded from the evidence the
testimonies of petitioner and barangay tanod Manuel Montoya on the ground that their
testimonies had not been formally offered in evidence as required by Rule 132, 34 to 35 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence.
Hence this petition for certiorari. Petitioner alleges that the decision is void because it was
not rendered by an impartial tribunal. He contends that respondent judge was hell-bent on
saving the private respondent from conviction and had pre-judged the case as shown by
the fact that (1) on August 26, 1992, before private respondents arraignment, she called the
parties and their counsels to her chambers and urged them to settle the case, and, when
petitioner refused, she did not set the case for hearing until after three weeks allegedly to
provide a cooling off period; (2) that at the initial trial on September 15 and 16, 1992,
respondent judge again called on the parties to settle the case. Petitioner alleges that, while
respondent judge stated in her order of September 15, 1992 cancelling the hearing on that
date that this was done to enable Atty. Maria Lelibet Sampaga to study the case as she had
been appointed as private respondents counsel only on that day, the same was actually a
pretext, the real reason being to give private respondent another opportunity to persuade
petitioner to settle the case. The records in fact show that Atty. Sampaga had been private
respondents counsel at the arraignment on August 26, 1992; (3) that respondent judge
excluded the testimonies of petitioner and his witness, Manuel Montoya, for failure of the
prosecution to offer formally the same when the transcript of stenographic notes shows this
was not so and that, at any rate, the defense waived the objection based on this ground by
cross-examining petitioner and Montoya; and (4) that respondent judge failed to find private
respondent guilty despite the testimonies of three eyewitnesses (barangay tanods Montoya,
del Rosario, and Samson). Petitioner therefore prays that a mistrial be declared and that the
case be ordered retried before another judge.
On the other hand, private respondent Ruel Garcia contends that, if at the outset,
petitioner doubted respondent judges impartiality, he should have sought her inhibition right
then and there; that it was not true respondent judge called the parties to her chambers on
August 26, 1992 as only the arraignment took place on that day; that at said arraignment, his
counsel, Atty. Emilio Bermas, was absent for which reason respondent judge designated
Atty. Maria Lelibet S. Sampaga to assist him; that the schedule of the trial (September 15, 16,
and 21, 1992) was not fixed by respondent judge but by the clerk in charge of the matter,
taking into account the schedule of the other cases assigned to the court; that it was only on
the first day of trial on September 15, 1992 that respondent judge first talked to the parties,
and, upon learning that both were public officers, thought it proper to ask them if they were
not willing to settle their dispute, and seeing the parties and their counsels to be receptive,
she invited them to her chambers; that as petitioner later appeared to have second
thoughts and, on the other hand, as Atty. Sampaga needed time to prepare for trial,
respondent judge postponed the trial to the next day, September 16, 1992; that on
September 16, 1992, respondent judge again called the parties to her chambers to see if
they had come to any agreement, but as she was told by petitioner that for him to withdraw
his complaint against the private respondent, he must have to transfer his residence first, thus
implying that he wished the case against private respondent to continue, respondent judge
proceeded with the trial that morning.
Private respondent contends that the instant petition does not have the consent and
conformity of the public prosecutor but was instead filed by the private prosecutor who does
not have the requisite legal personality to question the decision acquitting him.
Required to comment, the Solicitor General argues that this petition should be dismissed:

A perusal of the judgment of the trial court showed that the parties were heard conformably
to the norms of due process, evidence was presented by both parties and duly considered,
their arguments were studied, analyzed, and assessed, and judgment was rendered in which
findings of facts and conclusions of law were set forth. These conclusions of fact or law
cannot in any sense be characterized as outrageously wrong or manifestly mistaken or
whimsically or capriciously arrived at. The worst that may perhaps be said of them is that
they are fairly debatable and may even be possibly erroneous. But they cannot be declared
to have been made with grave abuse of discretion (Bustamante vs. NLRC, 195 SCRA
1991). Clearly, there was no mistrial in this case which would warrant the nullity of the assailed
judgment.[1]

The preliminary issue in this case is whether the petition should be dismissed outright
because it was filed without the intervention of the OSG as counsel for the prosecution.
This question is not a novel one. In the case of People v. Santiago,[2] this Court held:

The question as to whether or not U.P., as the private offended party, can file this special civil
action for certiorari questioning the validity of said decision of the trial court should be
answered in the affirmative.

It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainants role is limited to that of a witness for the
prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an
appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the
Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on
appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However,
the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of
the accused.

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be
filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the
private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of
the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the
respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the
action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name
of said complainant.[3]

The above ruling has been reiterated in De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals[4] and Perez v.
Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc.,[5] in which the legal personality of private complainant to file a
special civil action of certiorari questioning the dismissal by the trial court of a criminal case
has been upheld subject to the limitation that the accuseds right to double jeopardy is not
violated.[6] As explained by the Court in People v. Court of Appeals:[7] 7

A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due process is void, does not
exist in legal contemplation, and, thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal. However,
where the petition demonstrates mere errors in judgment not amounting to grave abuse of
discretion or deprivation of due process, the writ of certiorari cannot issue. A review of the
alleged errors of judgment cannot be made without trampling upon the right of the
accused against double jeopardy.[8]

In short, petitioner must establish that the judgment of acquittal resulted from a mistrial so as
not to place private respondent, as accused, in double jeopardy.
In only one case has the Court categorically declared a mistrial, and that is the case
of Galman v. Sandiganbayan.[9] Petitioner would have the Court draw parallelisms between
this case and Galman where the Court nullified the judgment of acquittal of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled People of the Philippines v.
General Luther Custodio, et al.
This cases is, however, a far cry from Galman. There, it was shown that evidence was
suppressed in order to justify the acquittal of the accused. This Court held that the secret
Malacaang conference at which the authoritarian President called together the Presiding
Justice of the Sandiganbayan [Manuel Pamaran] and Tanodbayan [Bernardo] Fernandez
and the entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan [Manuel] Herrera and told
them how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire
proceedings to assure the pre-determined ignominious final outcome are without parallel
and precedent in our annals and jurisprudence.[10]
In contrast, petitioner does not allege any such irregularity in the trial of private
respondent. He simply claims that respondent judges bias and partiality denied the
prosecution a fair and impartial trial. Why respondent judge was biased for the defense
petitioner does not say. It is noteworthy that petitioner does not even dispute private
respondents allegation that respondent judge was not personally acquainted with him until
she heard the criminal case against him.
It is pertinent at this point to cite certain principles laid down by the Court regarding the
disqualification of a judge for lack of the objectivity that due process requires. It is settled
that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties is not enough; there should
be evidence to prove the charge.[11] Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, especially
weighed against a judges sacred allegation under oath of office to administer justice
without respect to any person and do equal right to the poor and the rich.[12] There must be
a showing of bias and prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source resulting in an
opinion in the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation
in the case.[13]
The arguments which petitioner advances by way of proof of respondents judges
alleged bias are not persuasive.
Respondent judges efforts to have the parties arrive at an amicable settlement is not
evidence of partiality for private respondent. She could have been motivated by factors
other than a desire to clear private respondent of criminal liability, i.e., the clearing of her
court docket or, as pointed out by the OSG in its comment,[14] in setting a good example
considering that petitioner and private respondent were neighbors occupying public offices
charged with the maintenance of peace and order in the community.
As for the allegation that the trial was not held until after three weeks to give private
respondent more time to persuade petitioner to amicably settle the case, it has been shown
that it was not respondent judge but court personnel in charge of scheduling cases who
assigned the dates of trial taking into account the court calendar. The cancellation of the
September 15, 1992 hearing, on the other hand, was made to give private respondents
counsel, Atty. Maria Lelibet Sampaga, time to study the case and prepare for trial. Although
Atty. Sampaga had once appeared in behalf of private respondent, it was for the purpose
of assisting the latter at the arraignment because the regular counsel was absent. As new
counsel, Atty. Sampaga needed to study the case. A postponement to the next day,
September 16, 1992, was not an unreasonable request. Indeed, this did not involve resetting
the case since September 16, 1992 had been originally designated as one of the initial trial
dates.
Nor is there any showing that respondent judge decided the criminal case on grounds
other than its merits. A reading of her decision acquitting private respondent shows that the
same was made on the basis of her evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution and of
the defense. Because of the conflicting versions of the parties as to what really happened,
her decision was necessarily based on her appreciation of the credibility of the witnesses for
the prosecution and the defense.
True, petitioner is correct in his argument that respondent judge mistakenly excluded
from the evidence his testimony as well as that of prosecution witness Manuel Montoya on
the ground that the same had not been formally offered at the time they were called to the
witness stand. For the fact was that petitioner and Montoya had been cross-examined at
length by the defense and, therefore, the latter had waived objection to the failure of the
prosecution to make an offer of the evidence.[15] It has been held in Go v. Court of
Appeals,[16] however, that divergence of opinion between the trial judge and a partys
counsel as to the admissibility of evidence is not proof of bias or partiality. Besides, though
respondent judge stated in her decision that the testimonies of petitioner and Montoya
cannot be considered by this Court as constituting part of the evidence for the prosecution,
her decision shows that she actually considered the testimonies in piecing together the
prosecutions version of the events and in evaluating the evidence in the case. The
testimonies of petitioner and Montoya were after all referred to by the other witnesses for the
prosecution, namely, del Rosario and Samson. Thus respondent judges decision reads in
pertinent part:

The allegation of the private complainant that he neither resisted the punches of the
accused nor said anything to the latter is quite hard to believe. No rational man would allow
another to hurt him without offering any form of resistance, for he is instinctively concerned
[with] his self-preservation. It is more in consonance with human nature that when one is hurt,
especially if the feeling of innocence is within him, to immediately retaliate to an unjust act.

Another equally unbelievable allegation is that the four barangay tanods just stood and
watched their barangay captain while he was being mauled. There were four of them inside
the hall yet no one even dared to defend herein private complainant or stop herein
accused. If they could not do it for their barangay captain and inside their hall, how can
they be expected to protect the residents of their barangay outside their hall?

Furthermore, if herein private complainant was indeed mauled, he should have suffered a
lot more serious injuries than he alleged[ly] incurred. Considering their allegation that the
barangay tanods were guarded at the point of a gun by Pedro Garcia, herein accused thus
had all the time and opportunity to inflict on the private complainant as many serious injuries
as he could. But the results of the medical examination belie this point.

Well-settled is the rule that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and
not on the weakness of the defense (People vs. Dennis Mendoza, 203 SCRA 148, G.R. No.
85176, October 21, 1991). After a thorough examination of the pieces of evidence presented
by the prosecution, the latter failed to fulfill the test of moral certainty and establish such
degree of proof necessary to support conviction. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances
are capable of one or more explanations, one of which is consistent with innocence and the
other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty
and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The constitutional presumption of innocence
stands until overthrown by strong and convincing evidence, one of which will prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt (People vs. Gina Sahagun, 182 SCRA 91, G.R. No. 62024, February
12, 1990).

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are merely unfounded accusations insufficient
to gain conviction. In the case of People vs. Guinto, 184 SCRA 287, G.R. 88400, April 6, 1990,
the Supreme Court held: Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The accused is protected
by the constitutional presumption of innocence which the prosecution must overcome with
contrary proof beyond reasonable doubt. Even if the defense is weak, the case against the
accused must fail if the prosecution is even weaker. . . . If the prosecution has not sufficiently
established the guilt of the accused, he has a right to be acquitted and released even if he
presents naught a shred of evidence.[17]

That respondent judge believed the evidence of the defense more than that of the
prosecution does not indicate that she was biased. She must have simply found the defense
witnesses to be more credible.[18]
Indeed, no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its
alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. A writ of certiorari cannot be used to
correct a lower tribunals evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Thus, in People v.
Court of Appeals,[19] the Court dismissed a petition for certiorari filed by the prosecution from
a decision of the Court of Appeals reversing that of the trial court and acquitting the
accused of homicide and serious physical injuries on the ground that he acted in self-
defense. The Court held:

To show grave abuse of discretion, herein petitioner contends that Respondent Court of
Appeals committed manifest bias and partiality in rendering the assailed Decision. It claims
that Respondent Court ignored and discarded uncontroverted physical evidence which the
trial judge had relied upon. Furthermore, it allegedly erred in finding that he had base[d] his
decision on the testimony of witnesses whose demeanor he did not personally witness. In
addition, it supposedly harped on insignificant inconsistencies in the testimonies of some
prosecution witnesses, while unquestioningly accepting the private respondents claim of self-
defense.

Finally, the solicitor general maintains that the assailed Decision (1) failed to discuss the
effect of Maquilings escape from confinement during the pendency of the case; (2) shifted
the burden of proof on the prosecution to prove Maquilings guilt, although he admitted
killing the victim in self-defense; (3) ignored the physical evidence particularly the downward
trajectory of the bullets that had hit the two victims, thereby showing that private respondent
was still standing when he shot them; and the shotgun wound sustained by private
respondent, which disabled him and rendered him incapable of shooting the victims.
It is quite obvious from the foregoing allegations that petitioner imputed grave abuse of
discretion to Respondent Court because of the latters supposed misappreciation and
wrongful assessment of factual evidence. However, as earlier stressed, the present recourse
is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of
facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari; which
is extra ordinem beyond the ambit of appeal. Stated elsewise, factual matters cannot
normally be inquired into by the Supreme Court in a certiorari proceeding. This Court cannot
be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh
them again, in order to ascertain if the trial and the appellate courts were correct in
according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other.

The mere fact that a court erroneously decides a case does not necessarily deprive it of
jurisdiction. Thus, assuming arguendo that a court commits a mistake in its judgment, the
error does not vitiate the decision, considering that it has jurisdiction over the case.

An examination of the 65-page Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals shows no patent
and gross error amounting to grave abuse of discretion. Neither does it show an arbitrary or
despotic exercise of power arising from passion or hostility. . . .[20]

Finally, petitioners claim that respondent judge was biased is belied by his failure to move
for respondent judges inhibition. Petitioners claim that he did not do so because of his belief
and desire for said respondent judge to finally return to her normal sense of fairness is a
feeble excuse. His failure to file such motion stands as one more stark difference between
this case and Galman since the private prosecutors in the latter case lost no time in seeking
the disqualification of the members of the Sandiganbayan on grounds of manifest bias and
partiality for the defense.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.