Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; Two Distinct Concepts of Res Judicata.

—The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in

Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, comprehends two distinct concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by former judgment and
(2) conclusiveness of judgment. Under the first concept, res judicata absolutely bars any subsequent action when the following
requisites concur: (a) the former judgment or order was final; (b) it adjudged the pertinent issue or issues on their merits; (c) it
was rendered by a court that had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (d) between the first and the second
actions, there was identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.

Same; Same; Same; Where no identity of causes of action but only identity of issues exists, res judicata comes under the second
concept—i.e., under conclusiveness of judgment in which the rule bars the re-litigation of particular facts or issues involving the
same parties even if raised under different claims or causes of action.—Where no identity of causes of action but only identity of
issues exists, res judicata comes under the second concept—i.e., under conclusiveness of judgment. Under this concept, the rule
bars the re-litigation of particular facts or issues involving the same parties even if raised under different claims or causes of
action. Conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed
upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. The fact or question settled by final judgment or order
binds the parties to that action (and persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them
while the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or petition; the
conclusively settled fact or question furthermore cannot again be litigated in any future or other action between the same
parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same
or for a different cause of action. Thus, only the identities of parties and issues are required for the operation of the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment.
Same; Same; Same; While conclusiveness of judgment does not have the same barring effect as that of a bar by former judgment
that proscribes subsequent actions, the former nonetheless estops the parties from raising in a later case the issues or points
that were raised and controverted, and were determinative of the ruling in the earlier case.—While conclusiveness of judgment
does not have the same barring effect as that of a bar by former judgment that proscribes subsequent actions, the former
nonetheless estops the parties from raising in a later case the issues or points that were raised and controverted, and were
determinative of the ruling in the earlier case. In other words, the dictum laid down in the earlier final judgment or order
becomes conclusive and continues to be binding between the same parties, their privies and successors-in-interest, as long as
the facts on which that judgment was predicated continue to be the facts of the case or incident before the court in a later case;
the binding effect and enforceability of that earlier dictum can no longer be re-litigated in a later case since the issue has already
been resolved and finally laid to rest in the earlier case. Hacienda Bigaa, Inc. vs. Chavez, 618 SCRA 559, G.R. No. 174160<br/>
April 20, 2010
HACIENDA BIGAA, INC., G.R. No. 174160
Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
EPIFANIO V. CHAVEZ (deceased), substituted PEREZ, JJ.
by SANTIAGO V. CHAVEZ,
Respondent. -- - Promulgated:
April 20, 2010
This petition for review on certiorari[1] challenges the Court of Appeals (CA) decision of May 31, 2001 [2] and resolution of
August 2, 2006[3] in CA-G.R. SP No. 46176, affirming in toto the judgments of both the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calatagan
and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas dismissing the complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No. 129.
THE FACTS

We summarize below the factual antecedents of the present case based on the records before us.
petitioner Hacienda Bigaa, Inc. (Hacienda Bigaa) filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calatagan, Batangas a
complaint[4] for ejectment (forcible entry) and damages with application for writ of preliminary injunction against respondent
Epifanio V. Chavez (Chavez), docketed as Civil Case No. 129. The complaint alleged that Chavez, by force, strategy and/or stealth,
entered on April 29, 1996 the premises of Hacienda Bigaa's properties subsequently building a house on the property, and
occupying the lots without the prior consent and against the will of Hacienda Bigaa.

The records show that the lots were originally owned by Ayala y Cia[5] and/or Alfonso, Jacobo and Enrique Zobel, known
as Hacienda Calatagan. Ayala and/or the Zobels expanded TCT No. 722 The Ayalas and/or the Zobels later ordered the subdivision
of the hacienda, including these excess areas, and sold the subdivided lots to third parties. [6]

Among the buyers or transferees of the expanded and subdivided areas was Hacienda Bigaa which caused the issuance
of titles TCT Nos. 44695 and 56120 under its name covering the purchased subdivided areas. Thus, in his answer before the MTC
of Calatagan, then defendant (now respondent) Epifanio V. Chavez alleged that then plaintiff (now petitioner) Hacienda Bigaa is
the successor-in-interest of Ayala y Cia, Hacienda Calatagan, Alfonso Zobel, Jacobo Zobel and Enrique Zobel the original titular
owners of TCT No. 722.

Portions of the same lands foreshore lands were leased out by the Republic, through the Bureau of Fisheries, to
qualified applicants in whose favor fishpond permits were issued.
Suits were filed in various courts in Batangas for the recovery of the areas in excess of the area originally covered by TCT
No. 722, which suits ultimately reached the Supreme Court. In the Court's 1965 decisions in Dizon v. Rodriguez [7] (for quieting of
title) and Republic v. Ayala y Cia and/or Hacienda Calatagan, et al. [8] (for annulment of titles), the excess areas of TCT No. 722
were categorically declared as unregisterable lands of the public domain such that any title covering these excess areas are
necessarily null and void. In these cases, the Ayalas and the Zobels were found to be mere usurpers of public domain areas, and
all subdivision titles issued to them or their privies and covering these areas were invalidated; the wrongfully registered public
domain areas reverted to the Republic.
The Court effectively held that as owner of the excess lands, the Republic has the right to place its lessees and fishpond
permittees among them Zoila de Chavez, predecessor-in-interest of Chavez in possession. The Court invalidated TCT Nos. 3699
and 9262 for being among the other subdivision titles declared void and ordered reverted to public dominion.

To return to the forcible entry case, then defendant (now respondent) Chavez alleged in his answer before the MTC of
Calatagan that his mother, Zoila de Chavez (who died intestate on September 14, 1979) was a fishpond permittee/lessee
under Fishpond Permit Nos. F-4572-0 and F-24735 issued by the Bureau of Fisheries on April 21, 1959 and June 3, 1966,
respectively; that the areas covered by the permits are the same parcels of land which he presently occupies as Zoila's successor-
in-interest and which Hacienda Bigaa also claims.

Chavez likewise asserted that Hacienda Bigaa is the successor-in-interest of Ayala y Cia, Hacienda Calatagan, Alfonso
Zobel, Jacobo Zobel and Enrique Zobel who owned land illegally expanded the original
Chavez further argued that the suit is barred by prior judgment in two prior cases. Chavez asserts that the subject
matter and the issues involved in these cases are squarely similar and/or identical to the subject matter and issues involved in
the present forcible entry suit; the rulings in these two cases, therefore constitute res judicata with respect to the present case.

The MTC held a preliminary conference where the parties stipulated and identified the issues in the forcible entry
case, viz: (1) who between the parties has a better right of possession over the premises in question; (2) whether there is res
judicata; and (3) whether the parties are entitled to damages. [13] These are essentially the same basic issues that are before us in
the present petition.
The MTC, the RTC and the CAs Decision

The MTC rendered a decision[14] dismissing Hacienda Bigaa's complaint, holding that the disputed lots form part of the
areas illegally expanded and made to appear to be covered by TCT No. 722 of Hacienda Bigaa's predecessors-in-interest
(Ayala y Cia and/or the Zobels of Hacienda Calatagan); hence, the Hacienda's title are null and void. In so ruling, the MTC applied
this Court's pronouncements in the antecedent cases of Dizon v. Rodriguez,[15] Republic v. Ayala y Cia and/or Hacienda Calatagan,
Zobel, et al.,[16]and Republic v. De los Angeles.[17]

Clearly, the burden of proof lies on respondent Zobel and other transferees to show that his subdivision titles
are not among the unlawful expanded subdivision titles declared null and void by the said 1965
judgment. Respondent Zobel not only did not controvert the Republic's assertion that his titles are embraced
within the phrase other subdivision titles ordered canceled but failed to show that the subdivision titles in
his name cover lands within the original area covered by Ayala's TCT No. 722 (derived from OCT No. 20) and
not part of the beach, foreshore and territorial sea belonging and ordered reverted to public dominion in the
aforesaid 1965 judgment.[22] x x x

, the MTC declared that the Chavezes, as the Republics lessees/permittees, should have been in possession long ago.

The MTC finally ruled that the elements of res judicata are present. The forcible entry case before it shared an identity
of parties The MTC also found identity of subject matter because the forcible entry case shared with the previous cases the
same subject matter, As to identity of causes of action, the MTC held that although the previous cases were for unlawful
detainer and accion reinvindicatoria while the case before it was for forcible entry, an identity of issues existed because all these
cases involved conflicting claims of ownership, occupation and possession of the property which have long been settled by the
Supreme Court. It recognized that under the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, res judicata merely requires an identity of
issue, not an absolute identity of causes of action. [25]

On October 1, 1996, Hacienda Bigaa appealed the MTC's decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas[26] which
affirmed in toto the appealed decision.
 Hacienda Bigaa filed its petition for review [27] with the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review, totally
affirming the RTC and MTC decisions.[28]

THE PETITION

Hacienda Bigaa is now before us via a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to assail the CA ruling.

THE COURT'S RULING

We find the petition unmeritorious.

. We significantly note, too, that this issue involves a question of fact whose determination is improper in a Rule 45 proceeding
before this Court.

Thus, to our mind, the only real questions appropriate for resolution at this stage of the case are: (1) Do the TCTs of
Hacienda Bigaa have probative value in determining the issues of ownership and possession of the disputed lots? (2) Is Chavez as
successor-in-interest of government lessee or fishpond permittee Zoila de Chavez entitled to possession of these lots? In these
lights, the resolution of this case hinges on the question of better title who, between the petitioner and the respondent, has the
better right of possession of the disputed lots.

As a general rule in forcible entry cases, ownership or title is inconsequential; the primordial issue is possession de
facto and not possession de jure.

The issue of possession, as it relates with the ownership of the disputed

property, has been conclusively resolved in the antecedent cases.

These antecedent cases lay to rest the issues of ownership and of possession as an attribute thereof, which we both
ruled to be in favor of the Republic and its lessees or permittees.

The present case is a stark repetition of scenarios in these cases. . Considering that in this case the disputed lots are among
those litigated in the antecedent cases and the issues of ownership and possession are again in issue, the principle of res
judicata inevitably must be considered and applied, if warranted.

The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which in its relevant part reads:

Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court
of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

xxxx

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to
any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating
for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed
to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

This provision comprehends two distinct concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by former judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment.
Under the first concept, res judicata absolutely bars any subsequent action when the following requisites concur: (a) the former
judgment or order was final; (b) it adjudged the pertinent issue or issues on their merits; (c) it was rendered by a court that had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (d) between the first and the second actions, there was identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.[39]

Where no identity of causes of action but only identity of issues exists, res judicata comes under the second concept i.e.,
under conclusiveness of judgment. Under this concept, the rule bars the re-litigation of particular facts or issues involving the
same parties even if raised under different claims or causes of action.[40] Conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact
or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent
jurisdiction. The fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that action (and persons in privity with
them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them while the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed
by proper authority on a timely motion or petition; the conclusively settled fact or question furthermore cannot again be
litigated in any future or other action between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any
other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action. Thus, only the identities of parties
and issues are required for the operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.[41]
While conclusiveness of judgment does not have the same barring effect as that of a bar by former judgment that proscribes
subsequent actions, the former nonetheless estops the parties from raising in a later case the issues or points that were raised
and controverted, and were determinative of the ruling in the earlier case. [42] In other words, the dictum laid down in the earlier
final judgment or order becomes conclusive and continues to be binding between the same parties, their privies and successors-
in-interest, as long as the facts on which that judgment was predicated continue to be the facts of the case or incident before the
court in a later case; the binding effect and enforceability of that earlier dictum can no longer be re-litigated in a later case since
the issue has already been resolved and finally laid to rest in the earlier case. [43]

a. Identity of Parties

As already stated above, the parties to the present case are virtually the same as those in the antecedent
cases. Specifically in De los Angeles, the parties were Enrique Zobel, the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Hacienda Bigaa, and
Zoila de Chavez, the mother and predecessor-in-interest of Chavez.

b. Identity of Subject Matter

Hacienda Bigaa and Chavez are litigating the same properties subject of the antecedent cases inasmuch as they claim better right
of possession to parcels of land covered by subdivision titles derived from Hacienda Calatagan's TCT No. 722 and by government-
issued fishpond permits. Specifically in De los Angeles, the Zobels and Zoila de Chavez litigated the disputed lots covered by
subdivision titles in Zobels name and by fishpond permits the Republic issued in favor of de Chavez.

In ruling that the subject lots are the same lots litigated in the previously decided cases, the courts below based their findings
on De los Angeles that in turn was guided by our rulings in Dizon and Ayala y Cia. For emphasis, we reiterate our ruling in De los
Angeles: all areas the Ayalas and/or the Zobels made to appear to be covered by TCT No. 722 are owned by the Republic
because they form part of the public domain; specifically, portions of the navigable water or of the foreshores of the bay
converted into fishponds are parts of the public domain that cannot be sold by the Ayalas and/or the Zobels to third parties.
In his answer before the MTC, Chavez asserted that the areas covered by the fishpond permits of Zoila de Chavez are the same
parcels of land that he now occupies as Zoila's successor-in-interest. Given the rulings in the antecedent cases that Chavez
invoked, Hacienda Bigaa never bothered to object to or to rebut this allegation to show that the presently disputed lots are not
part of the expanded areas that, apart from the specifically described titles, Ayala y Cia described as other subdivision titles
covering unregisterable lands of the public domain that must revert to the Republic. [44] Hacienda Bigaa should have objected as
we held in De los Angeles that the onus is on Ayala and the Zobels Hacienda Bigaas predecessors-in-interest to show that their
titles do not cover the expanded areas whose titles were declared null and void.[45] We find no cogent reason to depart from
our past rulings in the antecedent cases, and from the ruling of the courts below in this case that the lots claimed by Hacienda
Bigaa are the same lots covered by our rulings in the antecedent cases.

c. Identity of Issues

This case and the antecedent cases all involve the issue of ownership or better right of possession. In Ayala y Cia, we
affirmed an RTC decision that decreed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(a) Declaring as null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9550 (or Exhibit 24) of the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Batangas and other subdivision titles issued in favor of Ayala y Cia and;or Hacienda de
Calatagan over the areas outside its private land covered by TCT No. 722, which, including the lots in T-9550
(lots 360, 362, 363 and 182) are hereby reverted to public dominion.[46] (Emphasis supplied, italics in the
original.)

Consequently, lots and their titles derived from the Ayalas and the Zobels TCT No. 722 not shown to be within the original
coverage of this title are conclusively public domain areas and their titles will be struck down as nullities.
Thus, De los Angeles[47] effectively annulled the subdivision titles disputed in the case for being among the other
subdivision titles declared void for covering public domain areas, and ordered their reversion to the Republic. De los
Angeles recognized, too, the right of the Republic's lessees and public fishpond permittees (among them Zoila de Chavez,
mother and predecessor-in-interest of Chavez) to possess the fishpond lots in question because they derive their right of
possession from the Republic the rightful owner of these lots.

We reject, based on these discussions, Hacienda Bigaa's position that there could be no res judicata in this case because
the present suit is for forcible entry while the antecedent cases adverted were based on different causes of action i.e., quieting of
title, annulment of titles and accion reinvindicatoria. For, res judicata, under the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, operates
even if no absolute identity of causes of action exists. Res judicata, in its conclusiveness of judgment concept, merely requires
identity of issues. We thus agree with the uniform view of the lower courts the MTC, RTC and the CA on the application of res
judicata to the present case.

In any event, Hacienda Bigaa can never have a better right of possession over the subject lots above that of the Republic
because the lots pertain to the public domain. All lands of the public domain are owned by the State the Republic. Thus, all
attributes of ownership, including the right to possess and use these lands, accrue to the Republic.Granting Hacienda Bigaa the
right to possess the subject premises would be equivalent to condoning an illegal act by allowing it to perpetuate an affront and
an offense against the State.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the present petition and AFFIRM the Court of Appeals decision and resolution. We accordingly DISMISS
WITH FINALITY the complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No. 129 before the Municipal Trial Court of Calatagan.

SO ORDERED.