Petitioner, vs. vs. Respondent.: Second Division

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 209387. January 11, 2016.]
ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ , petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES , respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN , J : p
Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done

without search warrants, are not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional
provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally understood so as to deny
reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public. HTcADC
For resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the Decision 2

dated September 28, 2012 and the Resolution 3 dated August 23, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals, Cebu City. 4 The Court of Appeals af rmed 5 the trial court's Judgment 6
finding petitioner Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
possessing unlicensed rearms under Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764 7
in relation to Section 261 8 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 9 during the 2007 election
period. 10
Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel. 1 1 He frequently
traveled, "coming back and forth taking a vessel." 12 At around 12:00 noon of May 11,
2007, Dela Cruz was at a pier of the Cebu Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo. 13 While
buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the oor with a porter. 14 It took him around
15 minutes to purchase a ticket. 15
Dela Cruz then proceeded to the entrance of the terminal and placed his bag on
the x-ray scanning machine for inspection. 16 The operator of the x-ray machine saw
firearms inside Dela Cruz's bag. 17
Cutie Pie Flores (Flores) was the x-ray machine operator-on-duty on May 11,
2007. 18 She saw the impression of what appeared to be three (3) rearms inside Dela
Cruz's bag. 19 Upon seeing the suspected rearms, she called the attention of port
personnel Archie Igot (Igot) who was the baggage inspector then. 20
Igot asked Dela Cruz whether he was the owner of the bag. 21 Dela Cruz
answered Igot in the af rmative and consented to Igot's manual inspection of the bag.
22
"Port Police Of cer Adolfo Abregana [(Of cer Abregana)] was on duty at the
terminal of the Cebu Domestic Port in Pier 1-G when his attention was called by . . .
Igot." 23 Igot told Of cer Abregana that there were rearms in a bag owned by a certain
person. 24 Igot then pointed to the person. 25 That person was later identi ed as Dela
Cruz. 26
Dela Cruz admitted that he was owner of the bag. 27 The bag was then inspected
and the following items were found inside: three (3) revolvers; NBI clearance; seaman's
book; other personal items; and four (4) live ammunitions placed inside the cylinder. 28
When asked whether he had the proper documents for the rearms, Dela Cruz
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answered in the negative. 29
Dela Cruz was then arrested and informed of his violation of a crime punishable
by law. 30 He was also informed of his constitutional rights. 31
In the Information dated November 19, 2003, Dela Cruz was charged with
violation of Republic Act No. 8294 for illegal possession of firearms: 32
Criminal Case No. CBU-80084
That on or about the 11th day of May 2007, at about 12:45 p.m. in the
City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, with the deliberate intent and without being authorized by law, did
then and there possess and carry outside his residence one (1) Cal. 38 Simith
[sic] & Wesson revolver without serial number; one (1) .22 Smith & Wesson
Magnum revolver without serial number; one (1) North American Black Widow
magnum revolver without serial number and four rounds of live ammunitions
for cal. 38 without rst securing the necessary license to possess and permit to
carry from the proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 33
Subsequently, another Information was led charging Dela Cruz with the violation
of Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881: 34
Criminal Case No. CBU 80085
That on or about the 11th day of May 2007, at about 12:45 in the
afternoon, which is within the election period for the May 14, 2007 National and
Local Elections, in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, did then and there
possess and carry outside his residence the following:
One (1) cal. .38 Simith [sic] & Wesson revolver without serial number; One (1)
cal. .22 Smith & Wesson Magnum revolver without serial number; One (1) North
American Black Widow magnum revolver without serial number and four (4)
rounds of live ammunitions for cal. 38.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 35 aScITE
Dela Cruz entered a plea of not guilty to both charges during arraignment. 36
After trial, Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City found Dela Cruz guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating the Gun Ban under Commission on Elections
Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 in Criminal
Case No. CBU 80085. 37 Dela Cruz was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one (1)
year with disqualification from holding public office and the right to suffrage. 38
According to the trial court, the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Dela Cruz committed illegal possession of rearms. 39 It proved
the following elements: "(a) the existence of the subject rearm and (b) the fact that the
accused who owned or possessed it does not have the license or permit to possess
the same." 40 The prosecution presented the rearms and live ammunitions found in
Dela Cruz's possession. 41 It also presented three (3) prosecution witnesses who
testi ed that the rearms were found inside Dela Cruz's bag. 42 The prosecution also
presented a Certi cation that Dela Cruz did not le any application for license to
possess a rearm, and he was not given authority to carry a rearm outside his
residence. 43
The trial court also held that the search conducted by the port authorities was
reasonable and, thus, valid: 44
Given the circumstances obtaining here, the court nds the search
conducted by the port authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of the
accused's constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the bag of the
accused revealed the rearms and ammunitions, accused is deemed to have
been caught in agrante delicto , justifying his arrest even without a warrant
under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The rearms
and ammunitions obtained in the course of such valid search are thus
admissible as evidence against [the] accused. 45
The trial court did not give credence to Dela Cruz's claim that the rearms were
"planted" inside his bag by the porter or anyone who could have accessed his bag while
he was buying a ticket. 46 According to the trial court, Dela Cruz's argument was "easy
to fabricate, but terribly dif cult to disprove." 47 Dela Cruz also did not show improper
motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to discredit their testimonies. 48
The trial court dismissed the case for violation of Republic Act No. 8294. 49 It
held that "Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of rearms,
provided that the person arrested committed 'no other crime.'" 50 Dela Cruz, who had
been charged with illegal possession of rearms, was also charged with violating the
Gun Ban under Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764. 51
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Consolidated Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE , the Court nds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 7764 in relation to Section 261
of BP Blg. 881 in Criminal Case No. CBU-80085, and hereby sentences him to
suffer an imprisonment for a period of one (1) year, and to suffer
disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right to suffrage.
While Criminal Case No. CBU-80084 for Violation of RA 8294 is hereby
DISMISSED. Accordingly, the cash bond posted by accused therein for his
provisional liberty is hereby ordered cancelled and released to said accused.
The subject rearms (Exhs. "H", "I" & "J"), and the live ammunitions (Exhs.
"K to K-2") shall, however, remain in custodia legis for proper disposition of the
appropriate government agency.
SO ORDERED. 52 (Emphasis in the original)
On appeal, the Court of Appeals af rmed the trial court's Judgment. 53 It held
that the defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses were moved by
improper motive; thus, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. 54 The acts
of government authorities were found to be regular. 55 HEITAD
The Court of Appeals did not nd Dela Cruz's defense of denial meritorious. 56
"Denial as a defense has been viewed upon with disfavor by the courts due to the ease
with which it can be concocted." 57 Dela Cruz did not present any evidence "to show
that he had authority to carry outside of residence rearms and ammunition during the
period of effectivity of the Gun Ban [during] election time." 58 The prosecution was able
to prove Dela Cruz's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The
assailed January 27, 2010 Consolidated Judgment of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 12 of Cebu City in Criminal Case CBU-59434 is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs on accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED. 59 (Emphasis in the original)
Dela Cruz led a Motion for Reconsideration, 60 which was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution dated August 23, 2013. 61
Dela Cruz led this Petition on November 4, 2013. 62 In the Resolution 63 dated
December 9, 2013, this court required respondent, through the Of ce of the Solicitor
General, to submit its Comment on the Petition. Respondent submitted its Comment 64
on March 6, 2014, which this court noted in the Resolution 65 dated March 19, 2014.
Dela Cruz claims that he was an on-the-job trainee for an inter-island vessel. 66 He
was "well[-]acquainted with [the] inspection scheme [at the] ports." 67 He would not
have risked placing prohibited items such as unlicensed rearms inside his luggage
knowing fully the consequences of such an action. 68
According to Dela Cruz, when he arrived at the port on May 11, 2007, he left his
luggage with a porter to buy a ticket. 69 "A considerable time of fteen minutes went by
before he could secure the ticket while his luggage was left sitting on the floor with only
the porter standing beside it." 70 He claims that someone must have placed the
unlicensed rearms inside his bag during the period he was away from it. 71 He was
surprised when his attention was called by the x-ray machine operator after the
firearms were detected. 72
Considering the circumstances, Dela Cruz argues that there was no voluntary
waiver against warrantless search: 73
In petitioner's case, it may well be said that, with the circumstances
attending the search of his luggage, he had no actual intention to relinquish his
right against warrantless searches. He knew in all honest belief that when his
luggage would pass through the routine x-ray examination, nothing
incriminating would be recovered. It was out of that innocent con dence that he
allowed the examination of his luggage. . . . [H]e believed that no
incriminating evidence w[ould] be found. He knew he did not place those
items. But what is strikingly unique about his situation is that a considerable
time interval lapsed, creating an opportunity for someone else to place inside
his luggage those incriminating items. 74 (Emphasis in the original)
Respondent argues that there was a valid waiver of Dela Cruz's right to
unreasonable search and seizure, thus warranting his conviction. 75 Dela Cruz was
"caught in agrante delicto carrying three (3) revolvers and four (4) live ammunitions
when his bag went through the x-ray machine in the Cebu Domestic Port on May 11,
2007, well within the election period." 76 The rearms were seized during a routine
baggage x-ray at the port of Cebu, a common seaport security procedure. 77
According to respondent, this case is similar to valid warrantless searches and
seizures conducted by airport personnel pursuant to routine airport security
procedures. 78
Records are also clear that Dela Cruz voluntarily waived his right to unreasonable
searches and seizure. 79 The trial court found that Dela Cruz voluntarily gave his
consent to the search. 80 ATICcS
Dela Cruz's claim that his bag was switched is also baseless. 81 The witnesses
categorically testi ed that Dela Cruz was "in possession of the bag before it went
through the x-ray machine, and he was also in possession of the same bag that
contained the firearms when he was apprehended." 82
Dela Cruz raised the lone issue of "whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
nding [him] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged despite the failure of
the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt[.]" 83
The issues for resolution in this case are:
First, whether petitioner Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz was in possession of the illegal
rearms within the meaning of the Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in
relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881;
Second, whether petitioner waived his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures; and
Lastly, assuming that there was no waiver, whether there was a valid search and
seizure in this case.
We deny the Petition.
I
The present criminal case was brought to this court under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The penalty imposed on petitioner by the trial court is material in determining the
mode of appeal to this court. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 must be
differentiated from appeals under Rule 124, Section 13 84 involving cases where the
lower court imposed on the accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment, or, previously, death. 85
In Mercado v. People: 86
Where the Court of Appeals nds that the imposable penalty in a criminal
case brought to it on appeal is at least reclusion perpetua, death or life
imprisonment, then it should impose such penalty, refrain from entering
judgment thereon, certify the case and elevate the entire records to this Court for
review. This will obviate the unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting shuttling
of criminal cases between this Court and the Court of Appeals, for by then this
Court will acquire jurisdiction over the case from the very inception and can,
without bothering the Court of Appeals which has fully completed the exercise
of its jurisdiction, do justice in the case.
On the other hand, where the Court of Appeals imposes a penalty less
than reclusion perpetua, a review of the case may be had only by petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 where only errors or questions of law may be
raised. 87 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
It is settled that in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law are
reviewed by this court. 88 The rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for review under Rule 45 is based on sound and practical policy considerations
stemming from the differing natures of a question of law and a question of fact:
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct
application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue
does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact
exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts
or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly
the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of speci c
surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the
whole, and the probability of the situation. 89TIADCc
Concomitantly, factual ndings of the lower courts as af rmed by the Court of

Appeals are binding on this court. 90
In contrast, an appeal in a criminal case "throws the whole case open for
review[.]" 91 The underlying principle is that errors in an appealed judgment, even if not
specifically assigned, may be corrected motu propio by the court if the consideration of
these errors is necessary to arrive at a just resolution of the case. 92 Nevertheless, "the
right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, it being merely a
statutory privilege which may be exercised only in the manner provided for by law[.]" 93
II
Petitioner argues that the rearms found in his bag were not his. Thus, he could
not be liable for possessing the contraband. Key to the resolution of this case is
whether petitioner possessed rearms without the necessary authorization from the
Commission on Elections. Petitioner was charged under special laws: Republic Act No.
8294 and Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
The law applicable is Section 2 (a) of Commission on Elections Resolution No.
7764, which provides:
SECTION 2. Prohibitions. — During the election period from January 14, 2007 it
shall be unlawful for:
a. Any person, including those possessing a permit to carry rearms
outside of residence or place of business, to bear, carry or transport
rearms or other deadly weapons in public places including any
building, street, park, private vehicle or public conveyance. For the
purpose rearm includes airgun, while deadly weapons include
hand grenades or other explosives, except pyrotechnics[.]
Section 261 (q) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 states:
Section 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election
offense:
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Carrying rearms outside residence or place of business. — Any person
who, although possessing a permit to carry rearms, carries any rearms
outside his residence or place of business during the election period, unless
authorized in writing by the Commission: Provided, That a motor vehicle, water
or air craft shall not be considered a residence or place of business or extension
hereof. (Par. (l), Id.)
This prohibition shall not apply to cashiers and disbursing of cers while in the
performance of their duties or to persons who by nature of their of cial duties,
profession, business or occupation habitually carry large sums of money or
valuables.
For a full understanding of the nature of the constitutional rights involved, we will
examine three (3) points of alleged intrusion into the right to privacy of petitioner: rst,
when petitioner gave his bag for x-ray scanning to port authorities; second, when the
baggage inspector opened petitioner's bag and called the Port Authority Police; and
third, when the police of cer opened the bag to search, retrieve, and seize the rearms
and ammunition.
III
The rst point of intrusion occurred when petitioner presented his bag for
inspection to port personnel — the x-ray machine operator and baggage inspector
manning the x-ray machine station. 94 With regard to searches and seizures, the
standard imposed on private persons is different from that imposed on state agents or
authorized government authorities. AIDSTE
I n People v. Marti , 95 the private forwarding and shipping company, following

standard operating procedure, opened packages sent by accused Andre Marti for
shipment to Zurich, Switzerland and detected a peculiar odor from the packages. 96
The representative from the company found dried marijuana leaves in the packages. 97
He reported the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation and brought the
samples to the Narcotics Section of the Bureau for laboratory examination. 98 Agents
from the National Bureau of Investigation subsequently took custody of the illegal
drugs. 99 Andre Marti was charged with and was found guilty of violating Republic Act
No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. 100
This court held that there was no unreasonable search or seizure. 101 The
evidence obtained against the accused was not procured by the state acting through
its police of cers or authorized government agencies. 102 The Bill of Rights does not
govern relationships between individuals; it cannot be invoked against the acts of
private individuals: 103
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must
generally be rst secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if
the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not
the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government. 104
Hence, by virtue of Marti, items seized pursuant to a reasonable search
conducted by private persons are not covered by the exclusionary rule. 105
To determine whether the intrusion by the port personnel in this case was
committed by private or public persons, we revisit the history and organizational
structure of the Philippine Ports Authority.
Port security measures are consistent with the country's aim to develop
transportation and trade in conjunction with national and economic growth. In 1974, the
Philippine Ports Authority was created for the reorganization of port administration and
operation functions. 106 The Philippine Ports Authority's Charter was later revised
through Presidential Decree No. 857. The Revised Charter provided that the Authority
may:
after consultation with relevant Government agencies, make rules or regulations
for the planning, development, construction, maintenance, control, supervision
and management of any Port or Port District and the services to be provided
therein, and for the maintenance of good order therein, and generally for
carrying out the process of this Decree. 107
The Philippine Ports Authority was subsequently given police authority through
Executive Order No. 513, 108 which provides:
Sec. 2. Section 6 is hereby amended by adding a new paragraph to read as
follows:
Section 6-c. Police Authority — The Authority shall have such
police authority within the ports administered by it as may be
necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain its
purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the
functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law enforcement
bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the
following:
a) To provide security to cargoes, port equipment, structure,
facilities, personnel and documents: Provided, however, That in
ports of entry, physical security to import and export cargoes shall
be exercised jointly with the Bureau of Customs;
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the
port, of persons and vehicles, as well as movement within the port
of watercraft;
c) To maintain peace and order inside the port, in coordination
with local police authorities;
d) To supervise private security agencies operating within the
port area; andAaCTcI
e) To enforce rules and regulations promulgated by the

Authority pursuant to law. (Emphasis supplied)
In 1992, the Cebu Port Authority was created to speci cally administer all ports
located in the Province of Cebu. 109 The Cebu Port Authority is a "public-bene t
corporation . . . under the supervision of the Department of Transportation and
Communications for purposes of policy coordination." 110 Control of the ports was
transferred to the Cebu Port Authority on January 1, 1996, when its operations of cially
began. 111
In 2004, the Of ce for Transportation Security was designated as the "single
authority responsible for the security of the transportation systems [in] the country[.]"
112 Its powers and functions included providing security measures for all
transportation systems in the country:
b. Exercise operational control and supervision over all units of law
enforcement agencies and agency personnel providing security services in the
transportation systems, except for motor vehicles in land transportation, jointly
with the heads of the bureaus or agencies to which the units or personnel
organically belong or are assigned;
c. Exercise responsibility for transportation security operations including,
but not limited to, security screening of passengers, baggage and cargoes, and
hiring, retention, training and testing of security screening personnel;
d. In coordination with the appropriate agencies and/or instrumentalities of
the government, formulate, develop, promulgate and implement comprehensive
security plans, policies, measures, strategies and programs to ably and
decisively deal with any threat to the security of transportation systems, and
continually review, assess and upgrade such security plans, policies, measures,
strategies and programs, to improve and enhance transportation security and
ensure the adequacy of these security measures;
e. Examine and audit the performance of transportation security personnel,
equipment and facilities, and, thereafter, establish, on a continuing basis,
performance standards for such personnel, equipment and facilities, including
for the training of personnel;
f. Prepare a security manual/master plan or programme which shall
prescribe the rules and regulations for the ef cient and safe operation of all
transportation systems, including standards for security screening procedures,
prior screening or pro ling of individuals for the issuance of security access
passes, and determination of levels of security clearances for personnel of the
OTS, the DOTC and its attached agencies, and other agencies of the
government;
g. Prescribe security and safety standards for all transportation systems in
accordance with existing laws, rules, regulations and international conventions;
h. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the DOTC, issue
Transportation Security Regulations/Rules and amend, rescind or revise such
regulations or rules as may be necessary for the security of the transportation
systems of the country[.] 113 (Emphasis supplied)
The Cebu Port Authority has adopted security measures imposed by the Of ce
for Transportation Security, including the National Security Programme for Sea
Transport and Maritime Infrastructure. 114
The Cebu Port Authority is clothed with authority by the state to oversee the
security of persons and vehicles within its ports. While there is a distinction between
port personnel and port police of cers in this case, considering that port personnel are
not necessarily law enforcers, both should be considered agents of government under
Article III of the Constitution. The actions of port personnel during routine security
checks at ports have the color of a state-related function. EcTCAD
I n People v. Malngan , 115 barangay tanod and the Barangay Chairman were
deemed as law enforcement of cers for purposes of applying Article III of the
Constitution. 116 In People v. Lauga , 117 this court held that a "bantay bayan," in relation
to the authority to conduct a custodial investigation under Article III, Section 12 118 of
the Constitution, "has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the
entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights[.]" 119
Thus, with port security personnel's functions having the color of state-related
functions and deemed agents of government, Marti is inapplicable in the present case.
Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port security measures are not unreasonable per
se. The security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin
to routine security procedures in airports.
I n People v. Suzuki , 120 the accused "entered the pre-departure area of the
Bacolod Airport Terminal." 121 He was "bound for Manila via ight No. 132 of the
Philippine Airlines and was carrying a small traveling bag and a box marked
'Bongbong's piaya.'" 122 The accused "proceeded to the 'walk-through metal detector,' a
machine which produces a red light and an alarm once it detects the presence of
metallic substance or object." 123 "Thereupon, the red light switched on and the alarm
sounded, signifying the presence of metallic substance either in his person or in the box
he was carrying." 124 When the accused was asked to open the content of the box, he
answered "open, open." 125 Several packs of dried marijuana fruiting tops were then
found inside the box. 126 Suzuki argued that the box was only given to him as
"pasalubong" by a certain Pinky, whom he had sexual relations with the night before. 127
He did not know the contents of the box. 128
This court in Suzuki found that the search conducted on the accused was a valid
exception to the prohibition against warrantless searches as it was pursuant to a
routine airport security procedure: 129
It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any
xed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. Given
the circumstances obtaining here, we nd the search conducted by the airport
authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of his constitutional rights.
Hence, when the search of the box of piaya revealed several marijuana fruiting
tops, appellant is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his
arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The packs of marijuana obtained in the course of such
valid search are thus admissible as evidence against appellant. 130 (Citations
omitted)
The reason behind it is that there is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy
when coming into airports or ports of travel:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner re ecting a lack
of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security
procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has
come increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to
board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage
as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these
procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are
conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such
searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the
safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with
airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often noti ed through airport public address
systems, signs and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search
and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject
to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not
apply to routine airport procedures. 131 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
This rationale was reiterated more recently in Sales v. People . 132 This court in
Sales upheld the validity of the search conducted as part of the routine security check
at the old Manila Domestic Airport — now Terminal 1 of the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport. 133 HSAcaE
Port authorities were acting within their duties and functions when it used x-ray
scanning machines for inspection of passengers' bags. 134 When the results of the x-
ray scan revealed the existence of rearms in the bag, the port authorities had probable
cause to conduct a search of petitioner's bag. Notably, petitioner did not contest the
results of the x-ray scan.
IV
Was the search rendered unreasonable at the second point of intrusion — when
the baggage inspector opened petitioner's bag and called the attention of the port
police officer?
We rule in the negative.
The port personnel's actions proceed from the authority and policy to ensure the
safety of travelers and vehicles within the port. At this point, petitioner already
submitted himself and his belongings to inspection by placing his bag in the x-ray
scanning machine.
The presentation of petitioner's bag for x-ray scanning was voluntary. Petitioner
had the choice of whether to present the bag or not. He had the option not to travel if he
did not want his bag scanned or inspected. X-ray machine scanning and actual
inspection upon showing of probable cause that a crime is being or has been
committed are part of reasonable security regulations to safeguard the passengers
passing through ports or terminals. Probable cause is:
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances suf ciently strong
in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is
guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and
circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by
law are in the place to be searched. 135
It is not too burdensome to be considered as an affront to an ordinary person's
right to travel if weighed against the safety of all passengers and the security in the
port facility.
As one philosopher said, the balance between authority and an individual's liberty
may be con ned within the harm that the individual may cause others. John Stuart Mill's
"harm principle" provides:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a suf cient warrant. He cannot
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so,
because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so
would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with
him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for
compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify
that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to
produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which
he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which
merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself,
over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. 136
Any perceived curtailment of liberty due to the presentation of person and
effects for port security measures is a permissible intrusion to privacy when measured
against the possible harm to society caused by lawless persons.
V
A third point of intrusion to petitioner's right to privacy occurred during
petitioner's submission to port security measures. This court should determine
whether the requirements for a valid waiver against unreasonable searches and
seizures were met.
After detection of the rearms through the x-ray scanning machine and
inspection by the baggage inspector, Of cer Abregana was called to inspect
petitioner's bag.
The Constitution safeguards a person's right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 137 A warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable. 138 However, this
court lays down the exceptions where warrantless searches are deemed legitimate: (1)
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure in "plain view"; (3) search of
a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and
frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. 139
In Caballes v. Court of Appeals: 140
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee
against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must
rst appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge,
either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 141
Petitioner anchors his case on the claim that he did not validly consent to the
search conducted by the port authorities. He argues that he did not have an actual
intention to relinquish his right against a warrantless search.
In cases involving the waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, events must be weighed in its entirety. The trial court's ndings show that
petitioner presented his bag for scanning in the x-ray machine. 142 When his bag went
through the x-ray machine and the rearms were detected, he voluntarily submitted his
bag for inspection to the port authorities:
Prosecutor Narido:
Q. What did he tell you?
A. I asked him if I can check his bag?
Q. What was his response?
A. He consented and cooperated. I checked the bag. 143
It was after the port personnel's inspection that Of cer Abregana's attention was
called and the bag was inspected anew with petitioner's consent. 144
"[A]ppellate courts accord the highest respect to the assessment of witnesses'
credibility by the trial court, because the latter was in a better position to observe their
demeanor and deportment on the witness stand." 145 We do not nd anything
erroneous as to the findings of fact of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
There was probable cause that petitioner was committing a crime leading to the
search of his personal effects. As the trial court found:
Given the circumstances obtaining here, the court nds the search
conducted by the port authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of the
accused's constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the bag of the
accused revealed the rearms and ammunitions, accused is deemed to have
been caught in agrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant
under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The rearms
and ammunitions obtained in the course of such valid search are thus
admissible as evidence against [the] accused. 146
Similar to the accused in People v. Kagui Malasugui 147 and People v. Omaweng
148 who permitted authorities to search their persons and premises without a warrant,
petitioner is now precluded from claiming an invalid warrantless search when he
voluntarily submitted to the search on his person. In addition, petitioner's consent to
the search at the domestic port was not given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances. 149 caITAC
This case should be differentiated from that of Aniag, Jr. v. Commission on

Elections, 150 which involved the search of a moving vehicle at a checkpoint. 151 In that
case, there was no implied acquiescence to the search since the checkpoint set up by
the police authorities was conducted without proper consultation, and it left motorists
without any choice except to subject themselves to the checkpoint:
It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the search
constitutes an implied waiver of petitioner's right to question the
reasonableness of the search of the vehicle and the seizure of the firearms.
While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of checkpoints, it
however stressed that "guidelines shall be made to ensure that no infringement
of civil and political rights results from the implementation of this authority,"
and that "the places and manner of setting up of checkpoints shall be
determined in consultation with the Committee on Firearms Ban and Security
Personnel created under Sec. 5, Resolution No. 2323." The facts show that PNP
installed the checkpoint at about ve o'clock in the afternoon of 13 January
1992. The search was made soon thereafter, or thirty minutes later. It was not
shown that news of impending checkpoints without necessarily giving their
locations, and the reason for the same have been announced in the media to
forewarn the citizens. Nor did the informal checkpoint that afternoon carry signs
informing the public of the purpose of its operation. As a result, motorists
passing that place did not have any inkling whatsoever about the reason behind
the instant exercise. With the authorities in control to stop and search passing
vehicles, the motorists did not have any choice but to submit to the PNP's
scrutiny. Otherwise, any attempt to turnabout albeit innocent would raise
suspicion and provide probable cause for the police to arrest the motorist and to
conduct an extensive search of his vehicle.
In the case of petitioner, only his driver was at the car at that time it was
stopped for inspection. As conceded by COMELEC, driver Arellano did not know
the purpose of the checkpoint. In the face of fourteen (14) armed policemen
conducting the operation, driver Arellano being alone and a mere employee of
petitioner could not have marshalled the strength and the courage to protest
against the extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the
"implied acquiescence," if there was any, could not be more than a mere passive
conformity on Arellano's part to the search, and "consent" given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty. 152 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
We also cannot subscribe to petitioner's argument that there was no valid
consent to the search because his consent was premised on his belief that there were
no prohibited items in his bag. The defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence
would be found does not automatically negate valid consent to the search when
incriminating items are found. His or her belief must be measured against the totality of
the circumstances. 153 Again, petitioner voluntarily submitted himself to port security
measures and, as he claimed during trial, he was familiar with the security measures
since he had been traveling back and forth through the sea port.
Consequently, we nd respondent's argument that the present petition falls
under a valid consented search and during routine port security procedures
meritorious. The search conducted on petitioner's bag is valid.
VI
The consented search conducted on petitioner's bag is different from a customs
search.
Customs searches, as exception to the requirement of a valid search warrant, are
allowed when "persons exercising police authority under the customs law . . . effect
search and seizure . . . in the enforcement of customs laws." 154 The Tariff and Customs
Code provides the authority for such warrantless search, as this court ruled in Papa, et
al. v. Mago, et al.: 155
The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the
Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect,
search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or
envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited
article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the
need of a search warrant in said cases. 156 (Citation omitted)
The ruling in Papa was echoed in Salvador v. People , 157 in that the state's policy
to combat smuggling must not lose to the dif culties posed by the debate on whether
the state has the duty to accord constitutional protection to dutiable articles on which
duty has not been paid, as with a person's papers and/or effects. 158 ICHDca
Hence, to be a valid customs search, the requirements are: (1) the person/s
conducting the search was/were exercising police authority under customs law; (2) the
search was for the enforcement of customs law; and (3) the place searched is not a
dwelling place or house. Here, the facts reveal that the search was part of routine port
security measures. The search was not conducted by persons authorized under
customs law. It was also not motivated by the provisions of the Tariff and Customs
Code or other customs laws. Although customs searches usually occur within ports or
terminals, it is important that the search must be for the enforcement of customs laws.
VII
In violations of the Gun Ban, the accused must be "in possession of a rearm . . .
outside of his residence within the period of the election gun ban imposed by the
COMELEC sans authority[.]" 159
I n Abenes v. Court of Appeals , 160 this court enumerated the elements for a
violation of the Gun Ban: "1) the person is bearing, carrying, or transporting rearms or
other deadly weapons; 2) such possession occurs during the election period; and, 3)
the weapon is carried in a public place." 161 This court also ruled that under the
Omnibus Election Code, the burden to show that he or she has a written authority to
possess a firearm is on the accused. 162
We nd that the prosecution was able to establish all the requisites for violation
of the Gun Ban. The rearms were found inside petitioner's bag. Petitioner did not
present any valid authorization to carry the rearms outside his residence during the
period designated by the Commission on Elections. He was carrying the rearms in the
Cebu Domestic Port, which was a public place.
However, petitioner raised the following circumstances in his defense: (1) that he
was a frequent traveler and was, thus, knowledgeable about the security measures at
the terminal; (2) that he left his bag with a porter for a certain amount of time; and (3)
that he voluntarily put his bag on the x-ray machine for voluntary inspection. All these
circumstances were left uncontested by the prosecution.
This court is now asked to determine whether these circumstances are suf cient
to raise reasonable doubt on petitioner's guilt.
When petitioner claimed that someone planted the illegal rearms in his bag, the
burden of evidence to prove this allegation shifted to him. The shift in the burden of
evidence does not equate to the reversal of the presumption of innocence. In People v.
Villanueva, 163 this court discussed the difference between burden of proof and burden
of evidence, and when the burden of evidence shifts to the accused:
Indeed, in criminal cases, the prosecution bears the onus to prove beyond
reasonable doubt not only the commission of the crime but likewise to
establish, with the same quantum of proof, the identity of the person or persons
responsible therefor. This burden of proof does not shift to the defense but
remains in the prosecution throughout the trial. However, when the prosecution
has succeeded in discharging the burden of proof by presenting evidence
suf cient to convince the court of the truth of the allegations in the information
or has established a prima facie case against the accused, the burden of
evidence shifts to the accused making it incumbent upon him to adduce
evidence in order to meet and nullify, if not to overthrow, that prima facie case .
164 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Petitioner failed to negate the prosecution's evidence that he had animus

possidendi or the intent to possess the illegal rearms. In People v. De Gracia , 165 this
court elucidated on the concept of animus possidendi and the importance of the intent
to commit an act prohibited by law as differentiated from criminal intent. 166 The
accused was charged with the quali ed offense of illegal possession of rearms in
furtherance of rebellion under Presidential Decree No. 1866 resulting from the coup
d'etat staged in 1989 by the Reform Armed Forces Movement — Soldiers of the Filipino
People. 167 This court held that the actions of the accused established his intent to
possess the illegal firearms:
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit
the crime is not necessary. It is suf cient that the offender has the intent to
perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and
intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have
consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and
that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the rst (intent to
commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to
perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and
consciously. TCAScE
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent

and intent to possess. While mere possession, without criminal intent, is
suf cient to convict a person for illegal possession of a rearm, it must still be
shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of
the accused. Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other
criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in
possessing the rearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the
accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed rearm. This is not
important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in
order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is suf cient
that the accused had no authority or license to possess a rearm, and that he
intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith
and without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession
or control of a rearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting
the possession of this kind of weapon, such as Presidential Decree No. 1866.
Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as long as the
animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed.
Coming now to the case before us, there is no doubt in our minds that
appellant De Gracia is indeed guilty of having intentionally possessed several
rearms, explosives and ammunition without the requisite license or authority
therefor. Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia categorically testi ed that he
was the rst one to enter the Eurocar Sales Of ce when the military operatives
raided the same, and he saw De Gracia standing in the room and holding the
several explosives marked in evidence as Exhibits D to D-4. At rst, appellant
denied any knowledge about the explosives. Then, he alternatively contended
that his act of guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano does
not constitute illegal possession thereof because there was no intent on his part
to possess the same, since he was merely employed as an errand boy of Col.
Matillano. His pretension of impersonal or indifferent material possession does
not and cannot inspire credence.
Animus possidendi is a state of mind which may be determined on a
case to case basis, taking into consideration the prior and coetaneous acts of
the accused and the surrounding circumstances. What exists in the realm of
thought is often disclosed in the range of action. It is not controverted that
appellant De Gracia is a former soldier, having served with the Philippine
Constabulary prior to his separation from the service for going on absence
without leave (AWOL). We do not hesitate, therefore, to believe and conclude
that he is familiar with and knowledgeable about the dynamites, "molotov"
bombs, and various kinds of ammunition which were confiscated by the military
from his possession. As a former soldier, it would be absurd for him not to know
anything about the dangerous uses and power of these weapons. A fortiori, he
cannot feign ignorance on the import of having in his possession such a large
quantity of explosives and ammunition. Furthermore, the place where the
explosives were found is not a military camp or office, nor one where such items
can ordinarily but lawfully be stored, as in a gun store, an arsenal or armory.
Even an ordinarily prudent man would be put on guard and be suspicious if he
nds articles of this nature in a place intended to carry out the business of
selling cars and which has nothing to do at all, directly or indirectly, with the
trade of firearms and ammunition. 168 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The disquisition in De Gracia on the distinction between criminal intent and intent
to possess, which is relevant to convictions for illegal possession of rearms, was
reiterated in Del Rosario v. People . 169 This court ruled that "[i]n the absence of animus
possidendi, the possessor of a firearm incurs no criminal liability." 170
In this case, petitioner failed to prove that his possession of the illegal rearms
seized from his bag was "temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession[.]" 171
As put by the trial court, petitioner's claim that anyone could have planted the rearms
in his bag while it was unattended is imsy. 172 There are dire consequences in
accepting this claim at face value, particularly that no one will be caught and convicted
of illegal possession of firearms. cTDaEH
Courts must also weigh the accused's claim against the totality of the evidence
presented by the prosecution. This includes determination of: (1) the motive of
whoever allegedly planted the illegal rearm(s); (2) whether there was opportunity to
plant the illegal rearm(s); and (3) reasonableness of the situation creating the
opportunity.
Petitioner merely claims that someone must have planted the rearms when he
left his bag with the porter. He did not identify who this person could have been and he
did not state any motive for this person to plant the rearms in his possession, even if
there was indeed an opportunity to plant the firearms.
However, this court is mindful that, owing to the nature of his work, petitioner
was a frequent traveler who is well-versed with port security measures. We cannot
accept that an average reasonable person aware of travel security measures would
leave his belongings with a stranger for a relatively long period of time. Also, records
show that petitioner had only one (1) bag. There was no evidence to show that a robust
young man like petitioner would have need of the porter's services. The defense did not
identify nor present this porter with whom petitioner left his bag.
VIII
The trial court was correct when it dismissed Criminal Case No. CBU-80084 for
violation of Republic Act No. 8294, otherwise known as illegal possession of rearms.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294 provides:
SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition
or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or
Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. — The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period and a ne of not less than Fifteen thousand
pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any
low powered rearm, such as rim re handgun, .380 or .32 and
other rearm of similar repower, part of rearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any rearm or ammunition: Provided, That no
other crime was committed. (Emphasis supplied)
Agote v. Judge Lorenzo 173 already settled the question of whether there can be
a "separate offense of illegal possession of rearms and ammunition if there is another
crime committed[.]" 174 In that case, the petitioner was charged with both illegal
possession of rearms and violation of the Gun Ban under Commission on Elections
Resolution No. 2826. 175 This court acquitted petitioner in the case for illegal
possession of rearms since he simultaneously violated the Gun Ban. 176 This court
also held that the unlicensed rearm need not be actually used in the course of
committing the other crime for the application of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294.
177
Similarly, Madrigal v. People 178 applied the ruling in Agote and held that Section
1 of Republic Act No. 8294 is express in its terms that a person may not be convicted
for illegal possession of firearms if another crime was committed. 179
IX
We note that the trial court imposed the penalty of imprisonment for a period of
one (1) year and to suffer disquali cation to hold public of ce and deprivation of the
right to suffrage. Under Section 264 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, persons found guilty
of an election offense "shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than one year
but not more than six years and shall not be subject to probation." 180 The
Indeterminate Sentence Law applies to offenses punished by both the Revised Penal
Code and special laws. 181 cSaATC

The penalty to be imposed is a matter of law that courts must follow. The trial
court should have provided minimum and maximum terms for petitioner's penalty of
imprisonment as required by the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 182 Accordingly, we
modify the penalty imposed by the trial court. Based on the facts, we deem it
reasonable that petitioner be penalized with imprisonment of one (1) year as minimum
to two (2) years as maximum. 183
X
The records are unclear whether petitioner is currently detained by the state or is
out on bail. Petitioner's detention is relevant in determining whether he has already
served more than the penalty imposed upon him by the trial court as modi ed by this
court, or whether he is quali ed to the credit of his preventive imprisonment with his
service of sentence.
Article 29 184 of the Revised Penal Code states:
ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of
imprisonment. — Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive
imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of
deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone
preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing
after being informed of the effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel to
abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except
in the following cases:
1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously
twice or more times of any crime; and
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their
sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance
of a counsel and shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four- fths
of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.
Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
deducted from thirty (30) years.
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period
equal to the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which
he may be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released
immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the
proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. Computation of preventive
imprisonment for purposes of immediate release under this paragraph shall be
the actual period of detention with good conduct time allowance: Provided,
however, That if the accused is absent without justi able cause at any stage of
the trial, the court may motu proprio order the rearrest of the accused: Provided,
nally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged
with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the
maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is lestierro [sic], he
shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.
In case credit of preventive imprisonment is due, petitioner must rst signify his
agreement to the conditions set forth in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. 185 If
petitioner has already served more than the penalty imposed upon him by the trial
court, then his immediate release from custody is in order unless detained for some
other lawful cause. 186
WHEREFORE , the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
September 8, 2012 and the Resolution dated August 23, 2013 in CA-GR CEB CR No.
01606 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS . Petitioner Erwin Libo-On Dela Cruz is
sentenced to imprisonment of one (1) year as minimum to two (2) years as maximum
in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The period of his preventive
imprisonment shall be credited in his favor if he has given his written conformity to
abide by the disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners in accordance with
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and if he is not out on bail. cHDAIS
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 8-21.
2. Id. at 56-63. The case was docketed as CA-GR CEB CR. No. 01606. The Decision was
penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando (Chair) and concurred in by
Associate Justices Gabriel T. Ingles and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles of the Special
Twentieth Division, Court of Appeals Cebu.
3. Id. at 68-69. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando and
concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo L. Delos Santos (Chair) and Gabriel T.
Ingles of the Special Former Special Twentieth Division, Court of Appeals Cebu.
4. Id. at 17, Petition.

5. Id. at 63, Court of Appeals Decision.
6. Id. at 23-31, Regional Trial Court's Consolidated Judgment. The Consolidated Judgment
was penned by Presiding Judge Estela Alma A. Singco of Branch 12 of the Regional
Trial Court, Cebu City.
7. Rules and Regulations on: (A) Bearing, Carrying or Transporting Firearms or Other Deadly
Weapons; (B) Security Personnel or Bodyguards; (C) Bearing Arms by any Member of
Security or Police Organization of Government Agencies and Other Similar
Organization (D) Organization or Maintenance of Reaction Forces during the Election
Period in connection with the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections.
8. Batas Blg. 881 (1985), sec. 261 (q) provides:
Section 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Carrying rearms outside residence or place of business. — Any person who,
although possessing a permit to carry rearms, carries any rearms outside his
residence or place of business during the election period, unless authorized in writing
by the Commission: Provided, That a motor vehicle, water or air craft shall not be
considered a residence or place of business or extension hereof. (Par. (l), Id.) This
prohibition shall not apply to cashiers and disbursing of cers while in the
performance of their duties or to persons who by nature of their of cial duties,
profession, business or occupation habitually carry large sums of money or
valuables.
9. Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines.
10. Rollo, p. 30, Regional Trial Court's Consolidated Judgment.
11. Id. at 12, Petition, and 27, Regional Trial Court's Consolidated Judgment; defense's version
of the facts as summarized by the trial court.
12. Id. at 27, Regional Trial Court's Consolidated Judgment.
13. Id. at 25 and 27, Regional Trial Court's Consolidated Judgment, and 58, Court of Appeals
Decision.
14. Id. at 27.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 26-27.
18. Id. at 26.

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 58, Court of Appeals Decision. In the trial court's Consolidated Judgment, the port
personnel was named "Archie" Igot. The Court of Appeals Decision refers to the port
personnel as "Arcie" Igot.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 58-59.
29. Id. at 11, Petition, and 59, Court of Appeals Decision.

31. Id.
32. Id. at 57.

33. Id.
34. Id. at 58.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 11, Petition, and 25, Regional Trial Court's Consolidated Judgment.
37. Id. at 30, Regional Trial Court's Consolidated Judgment, and 59-60, Court of Appeals
Decision.
38. Id. at 30, Regional Trial Court's Consolidated Judgment, and 60, Court of Appeals
Decision.
39. Id. at 27-28, Regional Trial Court's Consolidated Judgment.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 28.
42. Id. at 25-28.
43. Id. at 29.

44. Id. at 28.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 29.
47. Id.
48. Id.
50. Id. at 29, Regional Trial Court's Consolidated Judgment.
51. Id. at 30.

52. Id. at 30-31.

54. Id. at 60-61.
55. Id. at 61.
56. Id. at 62.

57. Id.
58. Id. at 62-63.

59. Id. at 63.
60. Id. at 64-67.
61. Id. at 69, Court of Appeals Resolution.

63. Id. at 72.

64. Id. at 83-95.
65. Id. at 97.

67. Id.
68. Id.

69. Id. at 15.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 15-16.
74. Id. at 16.

75. Id. at 88 and 90-91, Comment.
76. Id. at 88.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 89-90.
79. Id. at 90.
80. Id. at 92, citing the Regional Trial Court's Consolidated Judgment, p. 6.
81. Id. at 92.

82. Id. at 92-93.
84. RULES OF COURT, Rule 124, sec. 13, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC dated
September 28, 2004, provides:
Sec. 13. Certi cation or appeal of case to the Supreme Court . — (a) Whenever the Court of
Appeals nds that the penalty of death should be imposed, the court shall render
judgment but refrain from making an entry of judgment and forthwith certify the case
and elevate its entire record to the Supreme Court for review.
(b) Where the judgment also imposes a lesser penalty for offenses' committed on the same
occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more severe
offense for which the penalty of death is imposed, and the accused appeals, the
appeal shall be included in the case certified for review to the Supreme Court.
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such
penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal
filed with the Court of Appeals.
See People v. Rocha , 558 Phil. 521, 530-535 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division], for
a discussion on the difference between appeal for cases involving imposition of life
imprisonment and reclusion perpetua, and automatic review for cases involving
imposition of death penalty. See also People v. Mateo , 477 Phil. 752, 768-773 (2004)
[Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
85. See Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in
the Philippines".
86. 441 Phil. 216 (2002) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division]. The case was decided in 2002
before the amendment of the Rules in A.M. No. 00-5-3-SC dated September 28, 2004.

87. Id. at 222-223.
88. RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1 provides:

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or nal order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law,
may le with the Supreme Court a veri ed petition for review on certiorari. The
petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
See Tan v. People, 604 Phil. 68, 78 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
89. Ruiz v. People , 512 Phil. 127, 135 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division], citing
Republic v. Sandiganbayan , 425 Phil. 752, 765-766 (2002) [Per C.J. Davide, Jr., En
Banc].
90. See People v. Cardenas , G.R. No. 190342, March 21, 2012, 668 SCRA 827, 844-845 [Per J.
Sereno (now C.J.), Second Division].
91. People v. Galigao , 443 Phil. 246, 261 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc], citing
People v. Taño, 387 Phil. 465, 478 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc] and People v.
Castillo, 382 Phil. 499, 506 (2000) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
92. People v. Galigao , 443 Phil. 246, 261 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc], citing
People v. Pirame, 384 Phil. 286, 300 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
93. People v. Judge Laguio, Jr., 547 Phil. 296, 309 (2007) [Per J. Garcia, First Division].
95. 271 Phil. 51 (1991) [Per J. Bidin, Third Division].

96. Id. at 54-55.
97. Id. at 55.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 56.
101. Id. at 60.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 61.
104. Id. at 62.
105. Id. at 58. See Stonehill, et al. v. Diokno, et al. , 126 Phil. 738 (1967) [Per C.J. Concepcion,
En Banc]. In People v. Alicando, 321 Phil. 656, 690-691 (1995) [Per J. Puno, En Banc],
this court explained the doctrine of fruit of the poisonous tree as adopted in this
jurisdiction: "We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our
jurisdiction. We have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the 'fruit
of the poisonous tree,' a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the
celebrated case of Nardone v. United States . According to this rule, once the primary
source (the 'tree') is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or
derivative evidence (the 'fruit') derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise,
illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the
'fruit of the poisonous tree' is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The 'fruit of
the poisonous tree' is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it
is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally
obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the
originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. We
applied this exclusionary rule in the recent case of People vs. Salanga, et al., a
ponencia of Mr. Justice Regalado. Salanga was the appellant in the rape and killing
of a 15-year old barrio lass. He was, however, illegally arrested. Soldiers took him into
custody. They gave him a body search which yielded a lady's underwear. The
underwear was later identi ed as that of the victim. We acquitted Salanga. Among
other reasons, we ruled that 'the underwear allegedly taken from the appellant is
inadmissible in evidence, being a so-called fruit of the poisonous tree'".
106. See Pres. Decree No. 505 (1974), entitled Providing for the Reorganization of Port
Administration and Operation Functions in the Country, Creating the Philippine Port
Authority, Paving the Way for the Establishment of Individual, Autonomous
Port/Industrial Zone Authorities in the Different Port Districts, and for Other Purposes.
107. Pres. Decree No. 857 (1974), art. VIII, sec. 26 (a).
108. Exec. Order No. 513 (1978) is entitled Reorganizing the Philippine Ports Authority.
109. See Rep. Act No. 7621 (1992), entitled An Act Creating the Cebu Port Authority De ning
its Powers and Functions, Providing Appropriation therefor, and for Other Purposes.
110. Rep. Act No. 7621 (1992), sec. 3.
111. See Cebu Port Authority, Corporate Pro le, History <http://www.cpa.gov.ph/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=142&mId=110&mItemId=111> (visited
September 1, 2015).
112. See Exec. Order No. 311 (2004), entitled Designating the Of ce for Transportation
Security as the Single Authority Responsible for the Security of the Transportation
Systems of the Country, Expanding its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes.
See also Exec. Order No. 277 (2004).
113. Exec. Order No. 311 (2004), sec. 2.
114. See Cebu Port Authority Admin. Order No. 04 (2008)
<http://www.cpa.gov.ph/external/pdf/all_admin_order/2008/AO_04-2008.pdf>
(visited September 1, 2015).
115. 534 Phil. 404 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc]. This case applied the ruling in Marti
on the inapplicability of the Bill of Rights against private individuals. However, it
found that barangay tanod and the Barangay Chairman are law enforcement of cers
for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12 (1) and (3) of the Constitution.
116. Id. at 439.
117. 629 Phil. 522 (2010) [Per J. Perez, Second Division].
118. CONST., art. III, sec. 12 provides:

SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado,
or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as
well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices,
and their families.
119. People v. Lauga, 629 Phil. 522, 531 (2010) [Per J. Perez, Second Division].
120. G.R. No. 120670, October 23, 2003, 414 SCRA 43 [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].
121. Id. at 45.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 46.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 47.

128. Id.
129. Id. at 53.
130. Id. at 56-57.

131. Id. at 53-54.
132. G.R. No. 191023, February 6, 2013, 690 SCRA 141 [Per J. Villarama, Jr., First Division].
133. Id. at 145 and 152.

134. Police authority has been delegated to different government agencies and
instrumentalities through law. See TARIFF CODE, sec. 2203; Pres. Decree No. 1716-A
(1980), entitled Further Amending Presidential Decree No. 66 dated November 20,
1972, Creating the Export Processing Zone Authority, sec. 7; and Exec. Order No. 903
(1983), entitled Providing for a Revision of Executive Order No. 778 Creating the
Manila International Airport Authority, Transferring Existing Assets of the Manila
International Airport to the Authority, and Vesting the Authority with Power to
Administer and Operate the Manila International Airport. See also Salvador v. People ,
502 Phil. 60 (2005) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division]; Pacis v. Pamaran , 155
Phil. 17 (1974) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division]; Manikad, et al. v. Tanodbayan, et
al., 212 Phil. 669 (1984) [Per J. Escolin, En Banc]; and Manila International Airport
Authority v. Court of Appeals, 528 Phil. 181 (2006) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
135. People v. Mariacos , 635 Phil. 315, 329 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division], citing
People v. Aruta , 351 Phil. 868, 880 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third Division], citing in
turn People v. Encinada , 345 Phil. 301, 317 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third
Division].
136. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty <https://www.gutenberg.org/ les/34901/34901-h/34901-
h.htm> (visited September 1, 2015).
137. CONST., art. III, sec. 2 provides:
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or af rmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
138. See People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].
139. See People v. Cogaed , G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014, 731 SCRA 427, 440-441 [Per J.
Leonen, Third Division]. See also Villanueva v. People , G.R. No. 199042, November
17, 2014 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
le=/jurisprudence/2014/november2014/199042.pdf> 5 [Per C.J. Sereno, First
Division].
140. 424 Phil. 263 (2002) [Per J. Puno, First Division].

141. Id. at 289. See People v. Figueroa, 390 Phil. 561 (2000) [Per C.J. Davide, First Division].
142. Rollo, pp. 26-28, Regional Trial Court's Consolidated Judgment.
143. Id. at 28.

144. Id. at 25-27.
145. People v. Lacerna, 344 Phil. 100, 124 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

147. 63 Phil. 221 (1936) [Per J. Diaz, En Banc], citing I THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS 631 (8th ed.).
148. G.R. No. 99050, September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 462, 470-171 [Per J. Davide, Jr., Third
Division].
149. See Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 263, 289 (2002) [Per J. Puno, First Division].
150. G.R. No. 104961, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 424 [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].
151. Id. at 429.
152. Id. at 436-437.
153. See Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 263, 286 (2002) [Per J. Puno, First Division].
154. Papa, et al. v. Mago, et al., 130 Phil. 886, 902 (1968) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc].
155. 130 Phil. 886 (1968) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc].
156. Id. at 901-902.
157. 502 Phil. 60 (2005) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division].

158. Id. at 72.
159. See Escalante v. People , G.R. No. 192727, January 9, 2013, 688 SCRA 362, 373 [Per J.
Reyes, First Division].
160. 544 Phil. 614 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]. In this case, the accused
was convicted of violating the Gun Ban but was acquitted of violating Presidential
Decree No. 1866 (Id. at 634). This court held: "While the prosecution was able to
establish the fact that the subject rearm was seized by the police from the
possession of the petitioner, without the latter being able to present any license or
permit to possess the same, such fact alone is not conclusive proof that he was not
lawfully authorized to carry such rearm. In other words, such fact does not relieve
the prosecution from its duty to establish the lack of a license or permit to carry the
rearm by clear and convincing evidence, like a certi cation from the government
agency concerned" (Id. at 631).
161. Id. at 633. Abenes involved the Commission on Elections' imposed Gun Ban through Rep.
Act No. 7166 (1991), sec. 32, which is substantially the same with COMELEC
Resolution No. 7764 (2006), sec. 2, in relation to Batas Blg. 881 (1985), sec. 261.
162. Id. at 632.
163. 536 Phil. 998 (2006) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

164. Id. at 1003-1004.
165. G.R. Nos. 102009-10, July 6, 1994, 233 SCRA 716 [Per J. Regalado, Second Division].
166. Id. at 726-727.
167. Id. at 720-721.

168. Id. at 726-728.
169. Del Rosario v. People, 410 Phil. 642, 664 (2001) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
170. Id.
171. People v. De Gracia , G.R. Nos. 102009-10, July 6, 1994, 233 SCRA 716, 727 [Per J.
Regalado, Second Division].
173. 502 Phil. 318 (2005) [Per J. Garcia, En Banc].

174. Id. at 332.
175. Id. at 323-324.
176. Id. at 335.
177. Id. at 331-334.

178. 584 Phil. 241 (2008) [Per J. Corona, First Division].
179. Id. at 245.
180. Batas Blg. 881 (1985), sec. 264 provides:

SECTION 264. Penalties. — Any person found guilty of any election offense under this
Code shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than one year but not more
than six years and shall not be subject to probation. In addition, the guilty party shall
be sentenced to suffer disquali cation to hold public of ce and deprivation of the
right of suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be sentenced to deportation which shall
be enforced after the prison term has been served. Any political party found guilty
shall be sentenced to pay a ne of not less than ten thousand pesos, which shall be
imposed upon such party after criminal action has been instituted in which their
corresponding officials have been found guilty.
181. See Uriarte v. People , 540 Phil. 477, 501 (2006) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., First Division] and
People v. Simon , G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 234 SCRA 555, 579-581 [Per J.
Regalado, En Banc].
182. Act No. 4103 (1933), sec. 1, as amended by Act No. 4225 (1935), sec. 1, provides:
SEC. 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised
Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of
the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said
Code, and to a minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any
other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum xed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
See Escalante v. People , G.R. No. 192727, January 9, 2013, 688 SCRA 362, 374 [Per J.
Reyes, First Division].
183. In Abenes v. Court of Appeals , 544 Phil. 614, 634 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third
Division], this court imposed the indeterminate sentence of one (1) year of
imprisonment as minimum to two (2) years of imprisonment as maximum. In
Madrigal v. People , 584 Phil. 241, 245 (2008) [Per J. Corona, First Division], the
accused was "sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
one year as minimum to three years as maximum[.]"
184. As amended by Rep. Act No. 10592 (2012), sec. 1.

185. People v. Oloverio , G.R. No. 211159, March 28, 2015
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
le=/jurisprudence/2015/march2015/211159.pdf> 17-18 [Per J. Leonen, Second
Division].
186. Agote v. Judge Lorenzo, 502 Phil. 318, 335 (2005) [Per J. Garcia, En Banc].

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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 209387. January 11, 2016.]

ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ , petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done

For resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the Decision 2

Concomitantly, factual ndings of the lower courts as af rmed by the Court of

I n People v. Marti , 95 the private forwarding and shipping company, following

e) To enforce rules and regulations promulgated by the

This case should be differentiated from that of Aniag, Jr. v. Commission on

Petitioner failed to negate the prosecution's evidence that he had animus

In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent

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4. Id. at 17, Petition.

xxx xxx xxx

10. Rollo, p. 30, Regional Trial Court's Consolidated Judgment.

12. Id. at 27, Regional Trial Court's Consolidated Judgment.

17. Id. at 26-27.

18. Id. at 26.

29. Id. at 11, Petition, and 59, Court of Appeals Decision.

30. Id. at 59, Court of Appeals Decision.

32. Id. at 57.

34. Id. at 58.

42. Id. at 25-28.

43. Id. at 29.

50. Id. at 29, Regional Trial Court's Consolidated Judgment.

51. Id. at 30.

53. Id. at 63, Court of Appeals Decision.

55. Id. at 61.

56. Id. at 62.

58. Id. at 62-63.

60. Id. at 64-67.

61. Id. at 69, Court of Appeals Resolution.

63. Id. at 72.

65. Id. at 97.

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74. Id. at 16.

81. Id. at 92.

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88. RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1 provides:

95. 271 Phil. 51 (1991) [Per J. Bidin, Third Division].

118. CONST., art. III, sec. 12 provides:

127. Id. at 47.

130. Id. at 56-57.

133. Id. at 145 and 152.

140. 424 Phil. 263 (2002) [Per J. Puno, First Division].

143. Id. at 28.

146. Rollo, p. 28, Regional Trial Court's Consolidated Judgment.

157. 502 Phil. 60 (2005) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division].

163. 536 Phil. 998 (2006) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

167. Id. at 720-721.

173. 502 Phil. 318 (2005) [Per J. Garcia, En Banc].

177. Id. at 331-334.

180. Batas Blg. 881 (1985), sec. 264 provides:

184. As amended by Rep. Act No. 10592 (2012), sec. 1.

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