G.R. No. 187061. October 8, 2014. Celerina J. Santos, Petitioner, vs. Ricardo T. SANTOS, Respondent

11/1/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 737
G.R. No. 187061. October 8, 2014.*

CELERINA J. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. RICARDO T.
SANTOS, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgment;

Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial
Court’s (RTC’s) judgment, order, or resolution has become final,
and the “remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other
appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of
the petitioner.”—Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the
Regional Trial Court’s judgment, order, or resolution has become
final, and the “remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or
other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no
fault of the petitioner.” The grounds for annulment of judgment
are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. This court defined
extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi, 316 SCRA 523
(1999): For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it
has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent
acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where
the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated.
It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of
the trial which prevents a party from having a real contest, or from
presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of
the controversy.
Civil Law; Family Code; Declaration of Presumptive Death;
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse
for four(4) consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by
the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that
constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the
subsistence of another marriage.—The Family Code provides that
it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years,
coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the
absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a
second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage. The
Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger
of being terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or
she reappears.
* SECOND DIVISION.
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000166cea5600b34667970003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/17
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638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos vs. Santos
Same; Same; Same; Affidavit of Reappearance; The filing of

an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the
first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was
terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively
dead.—The Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse
with the remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage by mere
reappearance. The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an
admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage
to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was
declared absent or presumptively dead. Moreover, a close reading
of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the
subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to several
conditions: (1) the nonexistence of a judgment annulling the
previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in
the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent
marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of
reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent
marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of
reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined.
Same; Same; Same; When subsequent marriages are
contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a
presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that
the second marriage is legal.—When subsequent marriages are
contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a
presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that
the second marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail
over the continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse.
The second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid.
The burden of proof to show that the first marriage was not
properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the
second marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Mere reappearance will not terminate the
subsequent marriage even if the parties to the subsequent marriage
were notified if there was “no step taken to terminate the
subsequent marriage, either by filing an affidavit of reappearance
or by court action.”—This court recognized the conditional nature
of reappearance as a cause for terminating the subsequent
marriage in Social Security System v. Vda. de Bailon, 485 SCRA
376 (2006). This court noted that mere reappearance will not
terminate the subsequent marriage even if the parties to the
subsequent marriage were notified if there was “no step . . . taken

to terminate the subsequent
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Santos vs. Santos
marriage, either by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by

court action[.]” “Since the second marriage has been contracted
because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such
presumption continues inspite of the spouse’s physical
reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be
regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is
terminated as provided by law.”
Same; Same; Same; Conditions for a Bigamous Subsequent
Marriage to be Considered Valid.—A second marriage is bigamous
while the first subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent
marriage may be considered valid when the following are present:
1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years; 2)
The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead; 3) There must be a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse.
Same; Same; Same; Bigamous Marriages; Marriages
contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage
are generally considered bigamous and void.—A subsequent
marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a
court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a
well-founded belief that the spouse is already dead. The first
marriage will not be considered as validly terminated. Marriages
contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage
are generally considered bigamous and void. Only a subsequent
marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.
Same; Same; Same; A subsequent marriage may also be
terminated by filing “an action in court to prove the reappearance
of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or
termination of the subsequent marriage.”—The provision on
reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the
termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the
spouse who was declared presumptively dead from availing other
remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact, recognized that a
subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing “an action
in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a
declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent

marriage.”
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Santos vs. Santos
Same; Same; Same; Legitimate Children; Since an

undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family
Code is valid until terminated, the “children of such marriage
shall be considered legitimate, and the property relations of the
spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid
marriages.”—Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under
Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the
“children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the
property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the
same as in valid marriages.” If it is terminated by mere
reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived
before the termination shall still be considered legitimate.
Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense
against prosecution for bigamy. It is true that in most cases, an
action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may
nullify the effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in
relation to the status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a
respondent for bigamy.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Cariño & Mabalot for petitioner.
Gil D. Genorga, Jr. for respondent.
LEONEN, J.:

The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action
to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not
the proper remedy when the person declared presumptively
dead has never been absent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by
Celerina J. Santos, assailing the Court of Appeals’
resolutions dated November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for the
annulment of the trial court’s judgment declaring her
presumptively dead.
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Santos vs. Santos
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac

City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina)
presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo
T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of
absence or presumptive death for the purpose of
remarriage on June 15, 2007.1 Ricardo remarried on
September 17, 2008.2

In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive
death, Ricardo alleged that he and Celerina rented an
apartment somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila, after
they had gotten married on June 18, 1980.3 After a year,
they moved to Tarlac City. They were engaged in the buy
and sell business.4

Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper.5 As
a result, Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as a
domestic helper in Hong Kong.6 Ricardo initially refused
but because of Celerina’s insistence, he allowed her to work
abroad.7 She allegedly applied in an employment agency in
Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She left Tarlac two
months after and was never heard from again.8

Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate
Celerina.9 He went to Celerina’s parents in Cubao, Quezon
City, but they, too, did not know their daughter’s
whereabouts.10 He also inquired about her from other
relatives and friends, but no one gave him any
information.11
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 23, 27-29, 35-36.

2 Id., at p. 62.
3 Id., at p. 27.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id., at p. 28.
10 Id., at pp. 27-28.
11 Id., at p. 28.
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Santos vs. Santos
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the

date of his Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left.
He believed that she had passed away.12
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo’s
petition only sometime in October 2008 when she could no
longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief, or other appropriate remedies.13
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for
annulment of judgment14 before the Court of Appeals on
the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She
argued that she was deprived her day in court when
Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence,
misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of
Tarlac City.15 According to Celerina, her true residence was
in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon
City.16 This residence had been her and Ricardo’s conjugal
dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008.17 As a
result of Ricardo’s misrepresentation, she was deprived of
any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition
declaring her presumptively dead.18

Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac.19 She
also never left and worked as a domestic helper abroad.20
Neither did she go to an employment agency in February
1995.21 She also claimed that it was not true that she had
been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never
left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City.22 It was he who
_______________
12 Id.
13 Id., at p. 18.
14 Id., at pp. 37-45.
15 Id., at p. 40.
16 Id., at pp. 40, 42.
17 Id.
18 Id., at pp. 40-41.
19 Id., at p. 42.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id., at p. 43.
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Santos vs. Santos
left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with

another woman.23 Celerina referred to a joint affidavit
executed by their children to support her contention that
Ricardo made false allegations in his petition.24

Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over Ricardo’s petition because it had never
been published in a newspaper.25 She added that the Office
of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor’s
Office were not furnished copies of Ricardo’s petition.26

The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated
November 28, 2008, dismissing Celerina’s petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of
remedy.27 According to the Court of Appeals, the proper
remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil
registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with
Article 42 of the Family Code.28

Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court
of Appeals’ resolution dated November 28, 2008.29 The
Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration in
the resolution dated March 5, 2009.30

Hence, this petition was filed.
The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals
erred in dismissing Celerina’s petition for annulment of
judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently
obtained judgment declaring presumptive death.
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance
under Article 42 of the Family Code is appropriate only
when the spouse is actually absent and the spouse seeking
the dec-
_______________
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id., at p. 41.
26 Id.
27 Id., at p. 23.
28 Id., at pp. 23-24.

29 Id., at p. 25.
30 Id.
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Santos vs. Santos
laration of presumptive death actually has a well-founded

belief of the spouse’s death.31 She added that it would be
inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if she did
not disappear in the first place.32 She insisted that an
action for annulment of judgment is proper when the
declaration of presumptive death is obtained
fraudulently.33
Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of
reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code would
not be a sufficient remedy because it would not nullify the
legal effects of the judgment declaring her presumptive
death.34
In Ricardo’s comment,35 he argued that a petition for
annulment of judgment is not the proper remedy because it
cannot be availed when there are other remedies available.
Celerina could always file an affidavit of reappearance to
terminate the subsequent marriage. Ricardo iterated the
Court of Appeals’ ruling that the remedy afforded to
Celerina under Article 42 of the Family Code is the
appropriate remedy.
The petition is meritorious.
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the
Regional Trial Court’s judgment, order, or resolution has
become final, and the “remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.”36
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.37 This court defined extrinsic
fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi:38
_______________
31 Id., at p. 16.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id., at pp. 16-17.
35 Id., at pp. 57-67.
36 Rules of Court, Rule 47, Sec. 1.

38 Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi, 374 Phil. 879; 316 SCRA 523 (1999)
[Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
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Santos vs. Santos
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has

to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts
pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the
acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated. It is
extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the
trial which prevents a party from having a real contest, or from
presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of
the controversy.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of

judgment that there was fraud when Ricardo deliberately
made false allegations in the court with respect to her
residence.40 Ricardo also falsely claimed that she was
absent for 12 years. There was also no publication of the
notice of hearing of Ricardo’s petition in a newspaper of
general circulation.41 Celerina claimed that because of
these, she was deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose
Ricardo’s petition to declare her presumptively dead.42

Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo’s
petition for declaration of presumptive death were false.43
Celerina further claimed that the court did not acquire
jurisdiction because the Office of the Solicitor General and
the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office were not given copies of
Ricardo’s petition.44

These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Celerina alleged in her petition with the Court
of Appeals sufficient ground/s for annulment of judgment.
_______________
39 Id., at p. 890.
40 Rollo, pp. 39-40.
41 Id., at p. 39.
42 Id., at pp. 40-41.
43 Id., at pp. 41-43.
44 Id., at p. 41.
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Santos vs. Santos
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment45

on November 17, 2008. This was less than two years from
the July 27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively
dead and about a month from her discovery of the decision
in October 2008. The petition was, therefore, filed within
the four-year period allowed by law in case of extrinsic
fraud, and before the action is barred by laches, which is
the period allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction.46
There was also no other sufficient remedy available to
Celerina at the time of her discovery of the fraud
perpetrated on her.
The choice of remedy is important because remedies
carry with them certain admissions, presumptions, and
conditions.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence
of a spouse for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-
founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse
is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second
marriage during the subsistence of another marriage.47
_______________
45 Id., at pp. 37-45.

47 Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence
of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration
of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there
is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of
the absent spouse.
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Santos vs. Santos
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage

is in danger of being terminated by the presumptively dead
spouse when he or she reappears. Thus:
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the

preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the
recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse,
unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses
of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of
reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is
disputed. (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, the Family Code provides the

presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of terminating
the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an
admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her
marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or
she was declared absent or presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals
that the termination of the subsequent marriage by
reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the
nonexistence of a judgment annulling the previous
marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the
civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and
circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of
reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either
be undisputed or judicially determined.
The existence of these conditions means that
reappearance does not always immediately cause the
subsequent marriage’s termination. Reappearance of the
absent or presumptively
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Santos vs. Santos
dead spouse will cause the termination of the subsequent

marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the
Family Code are present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist

despite the absent or presumptively dead spouse’s
reappearance (1) if the first marriage has already been
annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn
statement of the reappearance is not recorded in the civil
registry of the subsequent spouses’ residence; (3) if there is
no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of
reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and
no judgment is yet rendered confirming, such fact of
reappearance.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a
judicial declaration of presumptive death, a presumption
arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the
second marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail
over the continuance of the marital relations with the first
spouse.48 The second marriage, as with all marriages, is
presumed valid.49 The burden of proof to show that the first
marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person
assailing the validity of the second marriage.50
This court recognized the conditional nature of
reappearance as a cause for terminating the subsequent
marriage in Social Security System v. Vda. de Bailon.51
This court noted52 that mere reappearance will not
terminate the subsequent marriage even if the parties to
the subsequent marriage were notified if there was “no step
. . . taken to terminate the sub-
_______________
48 See also A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines: Commentaries

and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, p. 282 (2004).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 520 Phil. 249; 485 SCRA 376 (2006) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, Third
Division].
52 The applicable law in Social Security System v. Vda. de Bailon was
the Civil Code, although there was a short discussion on the relevant
Family Code provisions.
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Santos vs. Santos
sequent marriage, either by [filing an] affidavit [of

reappearance] or by court action[.]”53 “Since the second
marriage has been contracted because of a presumption
that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues
inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction

of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an
absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as
provided by law.”54
The choice of the proper remedy is also important for
purposes of determining the status of the second marriage
and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed
that the other spouse was absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists.
However, a bigamous subsequent marriage may be
considered valid when the following are present:
1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead;
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the
absent spouse.55
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it

was contracted after a court declaration of presumptive
death,
_______________
53 Id., at p. 264; p. 391.

54 Id., citing A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines: Commentaries
and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, pp. 285-286 (1999); See also A. Tolentino, Civil
Code of the Philippines: Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, pp. 285-
286 (2004).
55 Family Code, Art. 41. (A declaration of presumptive death must be
based on good faith and on a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is
already dead.)
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Santos vs. Santos
lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief56 that the

spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be
considered as validly terminated. Marriages contracted
prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are
generally considered bigamous and void.57 Only a
subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected
by law.
Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent

marriage in bad faith is also not immune from an action to
declare his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous.
The prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of
another marriage still applies.58
If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when
he filed his petition to declare her presumptively dead and
when he contracted the subsequent marriage, such
marriage would be considered void for being bigamous
under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. This is because the
circumstances lack the element of “well-founded belief”
under Article 41 of the Family Code, which is essential for
the exception to the rule against bigamous marriages to
apply.59
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a
remedy to effect the termination of the subsequent
marriage does not preclude the spouse who was declared
presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing
in law. This court had, in fact, recognized that a
subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing “an
action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee
and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the
subsequent marriage.”60
_______________
58 Family Code, Arts. 35(4) and 41; Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 349.
56 Id.
57 Id.
59 Supra note 48 at p. 283.
60 Supra note 51 at p. 264; p. 391, citing A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines: Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, p. 282 (1999); See
also A. A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines: Commentaries and
Jurisprudence Vol. I, p. 284 (2004).
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Santos vs. Santos
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also

seeks not merely the termination of the subsequent
marriage but also the nullification of its effects. She
contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy
because it will only terminate the subsequent marriage but
not nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive
death and the subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent

marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until
terminated, the “children of such marriage shall be
considered legitimate, and the property relations of the
spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid
marriages.”61 If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the
children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the
termination shall still be considered legitimate.62
Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a
defense against prosecution for bigamy.63
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the
nullity of the subsequent marriage may nullify the effects
of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the
status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a
respondent for bigamy.
However, “a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or
wife.”64
_______________
61 A. A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines: Commentaries and

Jurisprudence, Vol. I, p. 284 (2004).
62 Family Code, Art. 43
The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its
termination shall be considered legitimate, and their custody and support
in case of dispute shall be decided by the court in a proper proceeding. . .
63 Manuel v. People, 512 Phil. 818, 833-835, 836-837; 476 SCRA 461,
477 (2005) (Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
64 See A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (March 4, 2003)
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Santos vs. Santos
This means that even if Celerina is a real party-in-interest

who stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an
action to nullify the second marriage,65 this remedy is not
available to her.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the
subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the
declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent
marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would
not suffice. Celerina’s choice to file an action for annulment
of judgment will, therefore, lie.
_______________
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE

NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE
MARRIAGES
....
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.
(a) Who may file.—A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n)
....
See also Ablaza v. Republic, G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010, 628
SCRA 27, 34 [Per J. Bersamin, Third Division] wherein this court
explained that:
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family
Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule
that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings
commenced after March 15, 2003. (Emphasis in the original)
The subsequent marriage in this case took place in 2008.
65 In Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 568, 577; 514 SCRA
607, 614 (2007) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Third Division], this court ruled
that a real party-in-interest may file an action to nullify a marriage.
653
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Santos vs. Santos
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court

of Appeals for determination of the existence of extrinsic
fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage,
and the merits of the petition.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza and

Perlas-Bernabe,** JJ., concur.
Case remanded to Court of Appeals.
Notes.—The finality of the judicial declaration of the

nullity of previous marriage of the accused cannot be made
to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage. (Teves vs.
People, 656 SCRA 307 [2011])
Under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in
a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death may file a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals on the ground that, in rendering judgment
thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. (Republic vs. Granada,

672 SCRA 432 [2012])
——o0o——
_______________
* * Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1829 dated

October 8, 2014.
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G.R. No. 187061. October 8, 2014. Celerina J. Santos, Petitioner, vs. Ricardo T. SANTOS, Respondent

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G.R. No. 187061. October 8, 2014. Celerina J. Santos, Petitioner, vs. Ricardo T. SANTOS, Respondent

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11/1/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 737

G.R. No. 187061. October 8, 2014.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgment;

638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Santos vs. Santos

Same; Same; Same; Affidavit of Reappearance; The filing of

subsequent marriage were notified if there was “no step . . . taken

VOL. 737, OCTOBER 8, 2014 639

Santos vs. Santos

marriage, either by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by

declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent

640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Santos vs. Santos

Same; Same; Same; Legitimate Children; Since an

PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the

VOL. 737, OCTOBER 8, 2014 641

On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac

1 Rollo, pp. 23, 27-29, 35-36.

642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the

VOL. 737, OCTOBER 8, 2014 643

left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with

28 Id., at pp. 23-24.

644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

laration of presumptive death actually has a well-founded

37 Rules of Court, Rule 47, Sec. 2.

VOL. 737, OCTOBER 8, 2014 645

For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has

Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of

646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment45

45 Id., at pp. 37-45.

VOL. 737, OCTOBER 8, 2014 647

The Family Code also provides that the second marriage

Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the

In other words, the Family Code provides the

648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

dead spouse will cause the termination of the subsequent

Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist

48 See also A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines: Commentaries

VOL. 737, OCTOBER 8, 2014 649

sequent marriage, either by [filing an] affidavit [of

inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction

A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it

53 Id., at p. 264; p. 391.

650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief56 that the

Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent

VOL. 737, OCTOBER 8, 2014 651

Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also

Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent

61 A. A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines: Commentaries and

652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

This means that even if Celerina is a real party-in-interest

RE: PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE

VOL. 737, OCTOBER 8, 2014 653

WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court

Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza and

Case remanded to Court of Appeals.