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    Art. 448. Arangote vs. Sps. Maglunob (Digest)

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    Master Gan
    The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner was not a possessor in good faith and not entitled to rights under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. When respondents challenged petitioner's title by bringing a complaint in 1993, petitioner's good faith ceased at that moment. Additionally, petitioner cannot be considered a builder in good faith because they were aware that the only proof of the property owner's ownership was a tax declaration, which is not proof of ownership. Payment of taxes is merely an indication of possession, not ownership.

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    Art. 448. Arangote vs. Sps. Maglunob (Digest)

    Uploaded by

    Master Gan
    214 views2 pages
    The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner was not a possessor in good faith and not entitled to rights under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. When respondents challenged petitioner's title by bringing a complaint in 1993, petitioner's good faith ceased at that moment. Additionally, petitioner cannot be considered a builder in good faith because they were aware that the only proof of the property owner's ownership was a tax declaration, which is not proof of ownership. Payment of taxes is merely an indication of possession, not ownership.

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    Arangote vs.Sps. Maglunob

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    Art. 448. Arangote vs. Sps. Maglunob (Digest). Docx

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    The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner was not a possessor in good faith and not entitled to rights under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. When respondents challenged petitioner's title by bringing a complaint in 1993, petitioner's good faith ceased at that moment. Additionally, petitioner cannot be considered a builder in good faith because they were aware that the only proof of the property owner's ownership was a tax declaration, which is not proof of ownership. Payment of taxes is merely an indication of possession, not ownership.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    214 views2 pages

    Art. 448. Arangote vs. Sps. Maglunob (Digest)

    Uploaded by

    Master Gan
    The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner was not a possessor in good faith and not entitled to rights under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. When respondents challenged petitioner's title by bringing a complaint in 1993, petitioner's good faith ceased at that moment. Additionally, petitioner cannot be considered a builder in good faith because they were aware that the only proof of the property owner's ownership was a tax declaration, which is not proof of ownership. Payment of taxes is merely an indication of possession, not ownership.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    of 2

    Arangote vs. Sps.

    Maglunob
    G.R. No. 178906 February 18, 2009
    CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

    By: Nalla, Glene

    Facts: Elvira T. Arangote, herein petitioner, is the registered owner of the subject property, as evidenced
    by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. CLOA-1748. Respondents Martin (Martin II) and Romeo are
    first cousins and the grandnephews of Esperanza Maglunob-Dailisan (Esperanza), from whom petitioner
    acquired the subject property.
    Petitioner filed an action against the respondents for Quieting of Title, Declaration of Ownership
    and Possession, Damages with Preliminary Injunction, and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
    before the MCTC. In this complaint, it was alleged that on 24 June 1985, Esperanza executed a Last Will
    and Testament bequeathing the subject property to petitioner and her husband, but it was never probated.
    On 9 June 1986, Esperanza executed another document, an Affidavit, in which she renounced,
    relinquished, waived and quitclaimed all her rights, share, interest and participation whatsoever in the
    subject property in favor of petitioner and her husband. Hence Tax Declaration No. 16218 in the name of
    Esperanza was cancelled and Tax Declaration No. 16666 (1987) was issued in the name of the petitioner
    and her husband. In 1989, petitioner and her husband constructed a house on the subject property. On 26
    March 1993, OCT No. CLOA-1748 was issued by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform
    (DAR) in the name of petitioner. However, respondents, together with some hired persons, entered the
    subject property on 3 June 1994 and built a hollow block wall behind and in front of petitioner’s house,
    which effectively blocked the entrance to its main door. Hence, in a civil action, respondents averred that
    they co-owned the subject property with Esperanza. Esperanza and her siblings, Tomas and Inocencia,
    inherited the subject property, in equal shares, from their father Martin Maglunob (Martin I). When
    Tomas and Inocencia passed away, their shares passed on by inheritance to respondents Martin II and
    Romeo, respectively. Hence, the subject property was co-owned by Esperanza, respondent Martin II, and
    respondent Romeo, each holding a one-third pro-indiviso share therein. Thus, Esperanza could not validly
    waive her rights and interest over the entire subject property in favor of the petitioner.
    The MCTC decided declaring petitioner as the true and lawful owners of the subject property.
    However, the RTC reversed the MCTC Decision and adjudged respondents, as well as the other heirs of
    Martin Maglunob, as the lawful owners and possessors of the entire subject property. The Court of
    Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision. Hence this petition for review by the petitioner arguing, among
    others as petitioner’s last-ditch effort, that she is a possessor in good faith and, thus, entitled to the rights
    provided for under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.

    Issue: WON Petitioner is a possessor in good faith, thus, entitled to the rights under Art. 448.

    Ruling: NO. This claim is untenable. The Civil Code describes a possessor in good faith as follows:
    Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
    acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
    He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.
    Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.
    Art. 1127. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he
    received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.
    Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessor by
    extraneous evidence or by a suit for recovery of the property by the true owner. Every possessor in good
    faith becomes a possessor in bad faith from the moment he becomes aware that what he believed to be
    true is not so.
    In the present case, when respondents came to know that an OCT over the subject property was
    issued and registered in petitioner’s name on 26 March 1993, respondents immediately brought a
    Complaint, challenging the title of petitioner to the subject property on the basis that said property
    constitutes the inheritance of respondent, together with their grandaunt Esperanza. So Esperanza had no
    authority to relinquish the entire subject property to petitioner. From that moment, the good faith of the
    petitioner had ceased.
    Petitioner cannot be entitled to the rights under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, because
    the rights mentioned therein are applicable only to builders in good faith and not to possessors in good
    faith. Moreover, the petitioner cannot be considered a builder in good faith of the house on the subject
    property. In the context that such term is used in particular reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code, a
    builder in good faith is one who, not being the owner of the land, builds on that land, believing himself to
    be its owner and unaware of any defect in his title or mode of acquisition.
    In this case, the subject property waived and quitclaimed by Esperanza to the petitioner and her
    husband in the Affidavit was only covered by a tax declaration in the name of Esperanza. Petitioner did
    not even bother to look into the origin of the subject property and to probe into the right of Esperanza to
    relinquish the same. Thus, when petitioner and her husband built a house thereon in 1989 they cannot be
    considered to have acted in good faith as they were fully aware that when Esperanza executed an
    Affidavit relinquishing in their favor the subject property the only proof of Esperanza’s ownership over
    the same was a mere tax declaration. This fact or circumstance alone was enough to put the petitioner and
    her husband under inquiry. Settled is the rule that a tax declaration does not prove ownership. It is merely
    an indicium of a claim of ownership. Payment of taxes is not proof of ownership; it is, at best, an
    indicium of possession in the concept of ownership. Neither tax receipts nor a declaration of ownership
    for taxation purposes is evidence of ownership or of a right to possess realty when not supported by other
    effective proofs.

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