ED/GEMR/MRT/2017/C1/8

Country case study prepared for the 2017/8 Global Education Monitoring Report

Accountability in education: Meeting our commitments

Accountability in the Education Sector:

The Case of Ghana
This paper was commissioned by the Global Education Monitoring Report as background information
to assist in drafting the 2017/8 GEM Report, Accountability in education: Meeting our commitments.
It has not been edited by the team. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the
author(s) and should not be attributed to the Global Education Monitoring Report or to UNESCO. The
papers can be cited with the following reference: “Paper commissioned for the 2017/8 Global
Education Monitoring Report, Accountability in education: Meeting our commitments”. For further
information, please contact [email protected].

Kwame Akyeampong 2017

1. Accountability: indigenous notion in the local context 1

Accountability is not a concept alien to indigenous Ghanaian systems of governance. For example, the Akan
notion of accountability and representation, enjoins the represented to hold those who represent them to
account. It is also interpreted to mean; answering for one’s actions and taking responsibility for mistakes, or
showing responsibility by explaining how one managed resources. From this perspective, it is the responsibility
of those who govern to render an account to the governed, but also for the governed to demand accountability
from their leadership through “mechanisms to control their leaders and ensure that the course of government
conforms to the wishes of the people” (Ajei 2001, p 35). Ghana’s 1992 constitution clearly states that, the people
of Ghana declare and affirm their commitment to, inter alia; (1) probity and accountability, (2) the principles that
all powers of government spring from the sovereign will of the people. Based on the 1992 constitution,
governments have sought to give meaning to these commitments by decentralising basic services, including
education. It is expected that through decentralisation local communities will demand improved services
ensuring that other stakeholders and providers of education become more accountable to those they provide
services to. Some recent evidence suggests that Ghanaians, though interested in discussing issues that affect
them, nevertheless majority never contact an official at a government agency (89%), their Member of Parliament
(86%), a political party official (85%) and their local government councillor (68%) about important problems or
to give them their views (Armah-Attoh et. al., 2014). It suggests that institutions and structures are not enough
for Ghanaians to engage. In the same way, decentralisation of public services does not guarantee that citizens
will demand and receive improved services. In relation to education decentralisation, the evidence discussed in
this paper shows that it has generally not led to improvements in quality education for disadvantaged groups
due to a combination of weak accountability structures, processes, capacity and resources.

2. Introduction and Country Profile

Ghana, gained independence in 1957, and immediately embarked on ambitious plans to expand education access
for all through the local government structures. The Education Act of 1961 (Act 87) envisaged that basic
education would be a local enterprise carried out at the local level by the local authorities acting on behalf of
central Government. The Act indicated that “it shall be the duty of the local education authority for every area
so far as its functions extend to contribute towards the spiritual, moral and physical development of the
community by securing that efficient education throughout the primary and middle stages shall be available to
meet the needs of the population of its area”. The objective was to enhance accountability and efficiency. From
the 1970s to 1990s, further attempts were made to devolve education service delivery entirely to the district
level to enhance accountability (Ahwoi et al., 2015). More recently, Ghana’s Education Strategic Plan (ESP 2010-
2020) has stressed the importance of future education decision-making and implementation as the responsibility
of local government, and given local communities oversight of education through School Management
Committees (SMCs) in basic education institutions and Boards of Governors (BoGs) in the second cycle
institutions.

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Written by Kwame Akyeampong, Centre for International Education, School of Education and Social Work, University of
Sussex, UK

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In terms of achieving accountable governance in education, Ghana’s ESP (2010-2020), proposed the following as
benefits:

 Schools, with oversight from locally-appointed SMCs and BoGs will develop School Performance
Improvement Programmes (SPIPS) that address their specific institutional needs. Financial resources
provided out from capitation grants supplied by Districts but managed and accounted for by SMCs and
BoGs
 Districts given the familiarity with local conditions, would be best placed to arrange equitable and
effective distribution of teachers, especially to disadvantaged areas
 Financial budgeting, tracking and expenditure will be more manageable, effective, relevant and locally
accountable under devolution
 Issues related to quality of teaching learning and pedagogical materials will be more responsive to
knowledge of local conditions and proximity to schools
 Accountability will be driven upwards through the system, rather than imposed from above from a single
accountant-general e.g. Schools will account to Districts who will account to Ministry of Education (MOE)
and the Ministry of Finance (MOF)
 (Ministry of Education 2013, Education Strategic Plan Chapter 4.1)

The ESP describes essentially, how accountability in the education sector through decentralised governance will
ultimately provide equitable quality education. It proposes that this will be achieved by: first, increasing the
proportion of allocated funds to the school level through districts, thus ensuring that appropriate school facilities,
staff and teaching and learning materials are available to improve learning; second, improving behaviours of
teachers – to be achieved through increasing attendance, decreasing negative behaviours, and improving
pedagogy and teaching skills, improving the quality of relationships between teachers and students, to improve
the quality of teaching and student learning outcomes. However, the upwards driven accountability has placed
more emphasis on compliance with regulations and adherence to professional norms e.g. schools, teachers
adhering to standards, than for example, on effective community participation in schools through School
Management Committees (SMCs), BoGs (Board of Governance) and Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) to ensure
that schools and districts are held accountable for the quality of education provided in local communities. The
in-depth analysis of community representation in schools (see section 4) discusses the challenges local
communities in Ghana face in pursuing active participation in school governance. It draws attention to how local
communities are sometimes denied accountability in the management of education at the district level.

2.1 Decentralisation and Accountability

Ghana's decentralization policy aims to give "voice" to local citizens through structures that ensure their active
participation in decision-making processes. Accountability is therefore to be achieved through regular
engagement between elected local government representatives and citizens. In the context of education
decentralisation, this means locating critical decision-making of education matters at the district and school level.
Decentralisation has been used by Ghanaian policy makers as the “major driving force in strengthening efficiency
and accountability of resources and results, … to make basic education generally more accountable to local level
authorities and allow self-regulation mechanisms through communities at grass roots to improve the quality of
education service delivery (Government of Ghana, 2000:35). But, districts and school communities have not been
effective holding education service providers to account, especially in rural communities (World Bank 2004).
Also, through decentralisation, resources from central government, recruitment, and policy implementation are
expected to be managed by the District Education Directorate (DED) which is accountable to the regional
education directorate and district assembly. Schools are accountable to districts on pupil performance. But this
accountability chain does not necessarily translate to effective action. In many instances, although District
Education Directors may be criticised by the assembly or District Chief Executive (DCE) whenever basic schools’
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results are poor, this has not resulted in changing substantially the educational plight of basic school pupils
(Debrah 2009). Rather, accountability is often about providing answers to queries about performance, and less
about resourcing and empowering schools, teachers and local communities to take action that will lead to
meaningful and lasting change. Emphasis is placed on accountability through administrative mechanisms whilst
community-accountability and empowerment initiatives which arguably are more likely to improve the quality
of education receive less attention (Essuman & Akyeampong 2010).

3. Actors and Accountability

Generally, “accountability exists when the performance of tasks or functions by an individual or institution are
subject to the oversight of another individual or institution … For example, if a school or district is accountable
to a community, then if the school fails to provide adequate textbooks, ensure that teachers are present during
the school day, or support pupil progress toward numeracy and literacy attainment then the community should
have the power to force schools to address these deficiencies” (Darvas & Balwanz 2014). Thus, it is the ability of
key actors to force action for improved services that determines whether accountability will be effective.

At the apex of the education system in Ghana is the Ministry of Education and the Ghana Education Service
responsible for policy formulation and implementation respectively. At the next level, is the regional and district
directorates of education with oversight over schools and educational institutions. Below this level are schools,
where teachers and Headteachers are responsible for teaching and the management of schools. Finally, school
communities are represented on School Management Committees (SMCs,) Board of Governors (BoGs) and
Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) to support schools in the delivery of quality education. International
organisations and the Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) community sit outside this governance structure,
but play an important role in shaping education policy, advocating for equitable education policy and practices.

The Ministry of Education organises accountability meetings through a National Education Sector Annual Review
(NESAR). NESAR is used as a forum to discuss the successes and failings of programme priorities of the Ministry.
The Ministry also publishes every year the Education Sector Performance Report (ESPR) which highlights planned
activities and their targets, and notes which have been achieved fully or partially. The ESPR provides space for
stakeholders to review progress and challenges. However, Darvas & Balwanz (2014) point out that ‘there does
not appear to be a system of accountability for addressing performance challenges against key priorities” as laid
out in the ESPR, and that the complicated nature of budget activities makes accounting for missed targets and
uncompleted activities nearly impossible. Darvas and Balwanz (2014) also point out that the public and media
are often more interested in ‘visible’ education issues (e.g. construction of secondary schools, free school
uniforms) compared to “less visible activities such as teacher professional development or providing remedial
learning support to children” (p 136)

What are the different roles played by these institutional actors, and how do these roles impact on accountability
in the Ghanaian education sector?

3.1 The Ministry of Education

The Ministry of Education has overall responsibility for education sector policy, planning and monitoring. Major
policy initiatives in basic education are initiated and driven by the Ministry of Education. For example, the
Ministry of Education, with financial and technical support from the World Bank, introduced major education
reforms in 1987 (World Bank 2004). The 1987 education reforms focused on improving efficiency and
effectiveness in education service delivery, and relied heavily on the World Bank to provide the needed finances
to implement the reforms (Little 2010, World Bank 2004). In 1995, the Ministry of Education initiated a new

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education policy agenda: The Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) policy. FCUBE provided the
framework for donor support to education and laid out institutional arrangements and other measures to
support the nascent decentralisation programme, including increased community participation in school
management (World Bank 2004). By relying on donor funds for the 1987 and FCUBE reforms, the Ministry
indirectly became accountable to external bodies such as the World Bank in driving its policies. An evaluation of
the 1987 education reforms suggest that effective implementation was problematic, largely because of the lack
of deep consultation and support at local level. For example, whereas the World Bank was engaged with the
Ministry to lay out reform strategies and conditions for financial assistance (World Bank 2004), “teachers felt
they had been consulted insufficiently prior to the implementation of the 1987 reforms” (Little 2010, p 20). Thus,
the two most significant education policy reforms spearheaded by the Ministry of Education became less
accountable to teachers and school communities. Strong financial assistance from donors such as the World
Bank, DFID and European Union had skewed accountability towards external partners. But, the World Bank’s
own assessment of its role in the 1987 reforms is that, the reforms were driven by national interests through
education commissions in the 1970s which recommended changes to the structure of education. All it did, was
to provide financial and technical assistance for equitable access to basic education (World Bank 2004).

Thus, the Ministry of Education’s role in policy formulation and implementation in the 1980s and 1990s was
strongly associated with donor assistance and conditionality’s that made them more accountable to powerful
international organisations such as the World Bank. In contrast, from the 2000s the Ministry’s policy formulation
process was influenced less by donor requirements and financial assistance. In 2002, the Ministry of Education
produced new policy recommendations to address low GERS of 38.7% at pre-school, 82.3% at primary, 63.3% at
the junior secondary stage and 17% at senior secondary level (Government of Ghana 2002). The Ministry pushed
for district assemblies to use the district assembly common funds to provide facilities to improve access. In
assessing the Ministry of Education’s role in policy formulation in the 2002 education reforms, Little (2010)
argues that the ‘gatekeepers who controlled access to policy formulation were the President and those
appointed by him’ (p 30). Similarly, Pedley and Taylor (2009) point out that presidential associates and advisers
‘had more influence than officials, consultants, and donor agency staff working in or with the Ministry of
Education” in shaping the content and direction of the reforms (p 25).

The reality is that, the policy formulation process in Ghana is not strongly aligned to local demands, but instead
has served the agendas and interests of donors and powerful elites at national and local community level (Dunne
et al., 2007; Allan 2004). Thus, local communities have had little say in the policy formulation process and
consequently have limited power to hold education providers accountable on policies that affect their schools.

3.2 Role of the International Community

The World Bank, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) have at various points in Ghana’s education development process played
important roles in influencing education policy and implementation. In the World Bank’s own assessment of its
involvement in the 1987 reforms, it pointed out that: “While the reforms were government-driven, the Bank did
have some influence on the shape of the program. For example, the government was persuaded to restrict
vocational training at JSS level to an introduction to tools. But there were other areas where the Bank was the
one to give ground. For example, the Bank went ahead and supported senior secondary schools in a more full-
fledged program that proved a costly failure, with $18 million wasted on workshop equipment that were not
used” (p 34). Even the Ministry of Education’s Education Strategic Plan (ESP), 2003-2015 was framed in the
language of EFA and the MDGs (Little 2010). The ESP provides fully-costed annual operational plans that was
used to apply for additional resources under “the EFA Fast Track Initiative (FTI), and for sector budget support
from donors particularly DFID and the World Bank (Pedley and Taylor 2009:19).

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Ghana made significant gains in improving educational access with the support it received from the international
donor community. In less than 15 years, enrolment in basic education has already doubled, from about 3.5
million pupils enrolled in 1999/2000 to nearly 7 million pupils in 2010/11 (Darvas & Balwanz 2014). But this
improvement has not been equitable. Analysis of education performance in Ghana suggests that, despite policies
to eliminate fees, supported by the donor community, the costs of education remain a serious barrier to access
especially among disadvantaged groups at the basic education level (Akyeampong et al., 2012; Akaguri 2011;
Rolleston 2009). Quality has not improved as much as access, and Darvas and Balwanz (2014) point out that
“inefficiencies at the school level, led by teacher absenteeism … account for the loss of more than 50 percent of
available instructional time in many primary schools” (p. 67).

Consequently, although the international donor community has contributed financial resources and supported
policy formulations to improve basic education in Ghana, this has not translated into improved learning
outcomes for all, partly because of weak fiscal and centralised accountability. Tikly (1996) has argued that
financial management should be shifted to schools where resources can be used to improve quality and
enrolment, and that this will enhance accountability of resources to improve education. Although Ghana
introduced capitation grants to give schools greater autonomy over financial management to improve
educational access and quality at the local level, irregular and late access to the grant has crippled the effort of
schools, especially in poor districts (Akyeampong 2011). This has meant that it is difficult to hold Headteachers
and schools accountable for poor quality learning outcomes.

3.3 Role of School Community

At the district and school level, circuit supervisors and head-teachers can play important management and
accountability roles. However, several factors, including lack of resources and insufficient professional
development hinder successful fulfilment of this job responsibility. The limited authority and training of circuit
supervisors and head-teachers mean that they are often not seen as figures of authority at the school (Darvas &
Balwanz 2014). Educational decentralisation policy in Ghana envisioned SMCs and PTAs as bodies that monitor
and support schools to deliver quality education at local level. However, particularly in rural areas, they have not
been as effective as urban areas mainly because of weak capacity and lack of resources (Darvas & Balwanz 2014).
School Report Cards, School Performance Improvement Plans (SPIPs) and School Performance Assessment
Meetings (SPAMs) have been introduced to ensure productive engagement of local communities in monitoring
and evaluating the performance of schools, but their impact has been mixed (Darvas & Balwanz 2014). The
traditional role of circuit supervisors which is to check teachers’ lessons plans, teacher and pupil attendance
records etc., has not been effective as well. Circuit supervisors who visit schools rarely go beyond checking
teacher attendance and pupil enrolment (Fobih et al., 1999; World Bank 2004). As happens in many developing
countries, supervision rarely inculcate a sense of accountability in teachers (Steyn & Squelch 1994; Ahmed &
Nath 2005).

3.4 Fiscal accountability

An area of accountability that has been weak is the public finance of and expenditure on education. Basically, in
Ghana, education financing is fragmented among several sources and among an even larger number of flows of
funds. This makes monitoring challenging, but also this leaves basic schools with no say over the resources
needed to deliver quality education. Resources generally flow from the centre and is characterised by the
complexity of education finance sources which complicate efforts to improve accountability. Furthermore, the
fragmented and decentralized nature of education finance and management compromises national-level
accountability efforts (Darvas & Balwanz 2014). Most effective “accountability” exercises in Ghana have
originated from outside of the mainstream education sector—led by civil society organizations or development
partner efforts to track public funding of education. At the district level, accountability for service delivery is
further compromised by the limited authority of and resources available to basic schools and districts. Besides,
most municipal district assemblies do not have full autonomy when it comes to expenditure decisions on

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remuneration (salaries and allowances), investment budget (classroom, school buildings, teachers’ houses, etc.)
and textbooks provision (Steffensen 2006).

3.5 Teacher Accountability

Teachers’ recruitment and deployment in Ghana is centralised. Upon successful graduation from teacher
training, teachers are directly posted to schools and thus do not feel accountable to districts and schools where
they have been posted to teach (Hedges 2002). Decentralised teacher management can enable districts and
schools to introduce practices or incentives to improve teacher performance (Bennell & Akyeampong 2006).
However, in a study of teachers’ role in improving educational access in Ghana, Alhassan & Adzahlie-Mensah
(2010) found that generally teacher management and accountability was weak. The study found that:

a) Most Headteachers were not aware that teachers were not teaching the prescribed number of lessons
for a day. They believed that the primary causes of drop outs were community attitudes to education
and not teacher practices
b) Teachers and Headteachers often reported late to school and there was no system in place to monitor
and improve their attendance
c) In some schools, teachers’ teaching methods were not effective and with poor head teacher supervision
of classroom practice, there was little chance to identify weaknesses and improve teaching practices

Teacher absenteeism is a problem in the Ghanaian basic education system (Abadzi 2007). Abadzi found that in
Ghana, “out of 197 school days, teachers were, on average, absent for 43 days and delayed for 40 days” (Abadzi
2007, p. 99). At the basic school level, Headteachers often lack the capacity and autonomy to address this
problem, partly because they have no role in the hiring of teachers. Poor rural communities fear that if they
demand higher accountable standards for teachers, many would simply quit teaching in their communities.
Teachers in their view were not directly accountable to them (Essuman & Akyeampong 2010).

In a school survey conducted by Akyeampong and Asante (2006), head-teachers were asked about the general
behaviour of their staff. Whilst rural school heads seem generally happy with the behaviour of their teachers,
urban heads complained that teachers were increasingly becoming rude and difficult to manage. The school
survey also showed that dismissals rarely occur. Most primary head-teachers, as one union official pointed out,
“lack the authority that goes with being a head,” and therefore are unable to initiate disciplinary measures
against teachers.

In a study on delivery and performance management at the district level, using teacher attendance as an
indicator, researchers found that differences could be explained through reference to the nature of power,
politics and both formal and informal institutional arrangements at multiple levels of governance in Ghana (ESID
2016). The study, however concluded that it was possible for the problem to be addressed through:

“the constellation of power at district level (that) had helped to shape the capacity of district-level
technocrats and school-level bodies such as PTAs to promote teacher accountability, and that a strong
alliance forged, not only between the key political and bureaucratic actors involved in governing
education at district level, … but also between these actors and the teacher unions had helped to enforce
accountable measures at all levels. This had enabled the district education director a free hand to enforce
sanctions on teachers through embargo of salaries, incentivised teachers by providing accommodation,
and initiated community monitoring and reporting on absentee teachers” (ESID 2016).”

This highlights the possibility of improving teacher accountability through a coalition of effort which empowers
districts to enforce teacher management regulations and incentivise teachers to improve their behaviour.

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School Report Cards have been introduced in Ghana with district-level software which allows schools and districts
to better monitor schools’ progress in aspects including teacher attendance. A preliminary analysis of data from
41 districts in the first term of 2012/13 found teacher attendance to be around 80% on average. Research into
the quality of education in the three northern regions undertook observations at 54 schools in six districts, and
found several reasons given by Headteachers for teacher absenteeism. These included teacher sickness,
attending social issues, delayed salary, lack of decent accommodation etc. Besides lack of enforced disciplinary
procedures by the District Education offices, little onsite supervision by circuit supervisors, contributed to a lack
of commitment from teachers (Ministry of Education 2013)

4. In-depth analysis of an issue

Local community involvement in school management
Parental involvement in education, particularly in school governance, is a means of making schools more
accountable to the society which funds them. Education decentralisation policy in Ghana has promoted the idea
that local communities would be at the centre of the drive to improve the quality of education. The assumption
is that; parents would demand better services and generally hold education providers accountable for the quality
of education they provide. Under education decentralisation, PTAs and SMCs were part and parcel of the school
community, with equal responsibility as teachers and Headteachers for improving schools.

In the review of the literature on community participation in schools Dunne et. al., (2007) summarised the
arguments in favour and concerns with community participation in practice (figure 1)

Figure 1: Issues Surrounding Community Participation in Schooling

Arguments in favour of community Concerns about community participation in

participation practice
Mobilisation of additional resources for Participation often limited to financial or
schooling (through cost-sharing) material conditions
Increased ownership (e.g. through resource Accountability of schools often more upwards
allocation and decision-making) to local government than out to communities
Increased accountability of schools Decrease in state responsibility but often not a
Increased efficiency in schools concomitant relinquishing of power
Increased responsiveness of schools to local Costs a burden on communities, especially the
needs poorest
Increased choice in schooling Uncertain sustainability of community
Better pupil attendance (through increased participation
parental involvement) and achievement Greater likelihood of the school/teachers being
Greater teacher professionalism pressured by local politics
Improved educational quality (through Unequal access to participation on formal
increased accountability and extra resources) school bodies
Improved democratisation and school cohesion Lack of clarity of remit or ‘real authority’ for
within the community participatory bodies
Acquisition of new skills in the community Inequitable participation in schooling
through participation in school Teachers may feel threatened by greater
management/governance community/parental involvement
Means of implementing educational Lack of community skills for meaningful
decentralisation participation

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 Participation often uni-directional from
communities to schools according to the
school’s demands
Source: Dunne, Akyeampong, Humphreys (2007:29-30)

Much of what the literature points out in favour of community participation and concerns with its practice applies
in the Ghana context. The World Bank’s (2004) impact evaluation of education reforms in Ghana included the
role of community participation in school management. It concluded that there is considerable variation in the
extent to which PTAs have provided support to schools, and that the support is closely related to the community’s
economic well-being, and that on average, more affluent schools in urban areas receive 10 times as much in PTA
contributions as schools in less affluent areas. Also, although School Performance Assessment Meetings (SPAM)
were introduced to enhance accountability at the school level, only 6 percent of households had someone attend
a SPAM at their child’s school (World Bank 2004 p. 16-18). Although local communities’ welcome participation
in the provision of basic education, what they do not welcome are situations where responsibilities are assigned
to them without consideration of their capabilities (Baku & Agyeman 1997). Essuman and Akyeampong’s (2010)
study of community participation in poor rural contexts, showed that it is often the local elite and relatively more
educated members of the community, who become the new brokers of decision-making and, through their
actions, close the spaces for representation and participation by community members in the affairs of schools.
They also found that the extent of community participation depended on the principle of reciprocity of roles
between the community and schools. Teachers felt more accountable to the traditional hierarchical educational
authority, and not to the community, partly because they were not recruited by schools or the district.

The Ghana evidence suggests that the degrees of engagement by the local community in the affairs of schools
depends on the resources and capacity available, both of which are in short supply in rural communities. Thus,
the ability to hold schools accountable for the service they provide is reduced. In a study, which explored
community participation in district education strategic planning and implementation in Northern Ghana, Takyi
et al., (2014) found that “community level stakeholders mentioned district level stakeholders, specifically DEO’s
fear of accountability as the major challenge to community participation … they felt the DEO did not involve them
in planning the District Education Strategic Plan (DESP) because it did not want to be accountable to them. Also,
DEOs were often reluctant to take the appropriate action after SMCs and PTAS reported teachers who were not
performing. This lack of action from the DEOs had led to a general tepid attitude of community level stakeholders
towards the district education strategic plan process (p 46).

The expectation that, the establishment of SMCs and PTAs, would improve opportunities for local communities
to hold schools accountable for the quality of education service they provide, has not materialised in the Ghana
context, especially when one looks at poor rural communities. For example, many of these communities do not
control resources with which to hire teachers, and therefore, lack a sense of empowerment to demand teacher
accountability. Besides, local communities feel that their concerns or input into local policy processes are ignored
or not valued. This dampens their commitment to demand accountability, as Takyi et al., (2014) found in their
study of Northern Ghana. In Ghana, community participation has been a top-down imposition and rarely a
response to demands from communities for greater involvement (Dunne et al., 2007). It is this imposition that
appears to have stifled genuine community engagement with schools to improve the quality of education they
provide. Generally, there is heavy tokenism when it comes to community participation in schooling –
communities, especially in rural areas, are not involved with real decision-making. Although, they appear to be
given voice through the SMC/PTA system, they have little or no power to demand change as they neither set nor
control the local education agenda.

Capitation grants were introduced in 2005 after the government abolished school fees. The grants are a yearly
allocation per student per school meant to provide transparent funding of classroom activities towards

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improvement of quality education. PTAs and SMCs are required to be involved in planning, managing and
monitoring capitation grants. Some evidence suggest that many PTAs and SMCs are not performing this
important function as expected. For example, a study of 10 schools in Ghana found that “many members of both
PTAs and SMCs were not aware of their powers and/or unable to effectively execute them. This led to continued
substantial abuses in funding allocations and textbook supplies not reaching the schools and depriving the
intended beneficiaries, the students, of important resources to obtain their rightful education” (PTF 2011). To
address this problem, ‘Action for Rural Education (ARE)’ - a Ghanaian Civil Society Organisation, engaged
important stakeholders (teachers, students, parents and local education officials) to monitor textbook
distribution and form committees to actively participate in the budgeting and planning processes. This resulted
in curbing the corruption associated with utilisation of capitation grants in the 10 schools. The key success
strategy was “to build a critical understanding of all dimensions of the capitation grant system as well as the
textbook tracking processes among all SMCs” (PTF 2011, p 2). In effect, this was about legitimising and
empowering SMCs and PTAs to monitor delivery of quality education. What this shows is that, with better
understanding of their roles and capacity building, SMCs and PTAs can become agents of change

5. Policy Recommendations

Accountability in the Ghanaian education sector can best be described as bureaucratic. Ghana has sought to
improve accountability through decentralisation policy. Decentralisation without real powers, resources and
capacity at the local level to support schools and hold them to account can make little difference to school
improvement policy and practice. From the analysis of the Ghana situation, the following recommendations can
be made to improve accountability in the sector.

To achieve real accountability in the education sector, decision-makers must have powers to enforce
recommendations that emerge from information about system performance. This will mean that decision-
makers at all levels of the education system must have the resources and capacity to take appropriate action.
Resource allocation to district and school level must be simplified and more transparent so that the use of
resources can be clearly linked to education performance to facilitate the accountability process.
Decentralisation is not the panacea to weak accountability in the education sector. It must be accompanied by
improvements in capacity and resource allocation. Greater devolution of decision-making powers in the areas
of resource and teacher management has the potential to enhance accountability.
Decentralisation policy must also shift the emphasis away from accountability through administrative
mechanisms to community-accountability and empowerment initiatives to improve the quality of education.

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6. References

Abadzi, Helen. 2007. Absenteeism and Beyond: Instructional Time Loss and Consequences.
Washington, DC: World Bank.

Ahmed, A. U. & Nath, S. (2005) Education Watch Report 2003/2004. Quality with Equity: The Primary Education

Agenda. Dhaka, Bangladesh: Campaign for Popular Education (CAMPE)

Ahwoi K., Djangmah J.S. Badu Akosa, A., Deku K., & Appiah E., (2015) Sector Fiscal Decentralisation of Health and
Education Financing (SFDHEF). Ministry of Finance, Accra: Ghana

Ajei M., (2001) Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Good Governance in Ghana: The Traditional Akan Socio-
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Akaguri L., (2011) Quality Low-Fee Private Schools for the Rural Poor: Perception or Reality? Evidence from
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Akyeampong K (2011) (Re)Assessing the Impact of School Capitation Grants on Educational Access in Ghana.
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Akyeampong K & Asante K (2006) Teacher Motivation and Incentives – a profile of Ghana. University of Sussex,
Centre for International Education, UK

Alhassan S., & Adzahlie-Mensah V., (2010) Teachers and Access to Schooling in Ghana. CREATE Pathways to
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