Barnett Lidsky, Lyrissa, Nobodys Fools - The Rational Audience As First Amendment Ideal

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Nobody's Fools: The Rational Audience as First

Amendment Ideal
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky
University of Florida Levin College of Law, [email protected]
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NOBODY'S FOOLS: THE RATIONAL
AUDIENCE AS FIRST AMENDMENT
IDEAL
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky*
The premise of the First Amendment is that the American

people are neither sheep nor fools .... Given the premises of de-
mocracy, there is no such thing as too much speech.'
Assumptions about audiences shape the outcomes of First

Amendment cases. Yet the Supreme Court rarely specifies what its
assumptions about audiences are, much less attempts to justify them.
Drawing on literary theory, this Article identifies and defends two
critical assumptions that emerge from First Amendment cases involv-
ing so-called core speech. The first is that audiences are capable of
rationally assessing the truth, quality, and credibility of core speech.
The second is that more speech is generally preferable to less. These
assumptions, which I refer to collectively as the rational audience
model, lie at the heart of the marketplace of ideas metaphor, which
has long been a target of criticism among First Amendment scholars.
Now, however, cognitive psychology and behavioraleconomics pro-
vide empirical evidence that the assumptions of the rationalaudience
model are demonstrably false in some commonplace settings. This
Article nonetheless contends that behavioral economics has not yet
made the case for jettisoning the rationalaudience model in the realm
of core speech. As the Supreme Court has recognized, a legal test that
looks at the actual effects of speech would be cumbersome and expen-
sive to apply, and would therefore chill speech, but there are even
more compelling reasons to adhere to a test focused on the reasonable
interpretationof core speech. The rationalaudience model constrains
paternalistic speech regulation, thereby safeguarding individual au-
* Stephen C. O'Connell Chair and Professor of Law, Fredric G. Levin College of Law. The
author wishes to thank Daniel C. Friedel, Kevin Combest, and Ben (Ziggy) Williamson for invaluable
research assistance, and Bill Page and David Anderson for comments and encouragement at critical
junctures. Many thanks to Jeffrey Harrison, Elizabeth Lear, Mark Fenster, Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr.,
and Elizabeth Rowe for laboring through earlier drafts and making great suggestions for improve-
ment.
1. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93,258-59 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
HeinOnline -- 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 799 2010

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2010
tonomy and the foundations of democratic self-governance. More-

over, the rational audience model prevents public discoursefrom be-
ing reduced to the level of the least educated or least sophisticatedau-
dience member. The model calls on citizens to raise their cognitive
capacities to meet the demands of public discourse, and it serves as a
check on the government's increasinglypowerful ability to drown out
other speakers in that discourse. This Article concludes that the ra-
tional audience model representsa flawed but worthy ideal.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ......................................................................................... 800

II. The Rational Audience in First Amendment Jurisprudence ......... 805
A. Literary Theory and the Implied Audience Construct ............. 805
B. Characteristics of the Implied Audience of Core Speech ........ 809
1. The Rational Audience Assumption ................................... 811
2. More-Is-Better, or Against Paternalism ............................. 816
C. The Implied Audience of Non-Core Speech: A Case Study ...819
III. Predictable Irrationality and Other Critiques .................................. 825
A. The Traditional Critique: Market Dysfunction ......................... 826
B. Cognitive Psychology and the Human Dysfunction
C ritiqu e .......................................................................................... 828
C. Is More Intervention in the Marketplace of Ideas
Justified ? ................................................... . . .. .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . . .. . .. .833
IV. Justifications for Clinging to a Flawed Ideal .................................... 835
A . Procedural Concerns .................................................................... 835
B. First Am endm ent Values ............................................................. 838
1. Democracy and Autonomy .................................................. 838
2. Preventing the Dumbing Down of Public Discourse ......... 841
3. Anti-Paternalism as an Antidote to Agenda Setting ......... 844
V. C onclusion ............................................................................................ 849
I. INTRODUCTION
A skilled speaker tailors her message to her audience. Except in

rare instances, however, she does so based on experiential rather than
empirical data.2 As it turns out, the Supreme Court of the United States
2. Although audience research is uncommon in First Amendment cases, it is an important

source of evidence in some legal contexts, such as trademark confusion litigation. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23 cmt. c (1995) ("Consumer surveys can be helpful in establish-
ing whether confusion is likely.... [A] survey that reasonably reflects the state of mind of prospective
purchasers as they encounter the designations in the marketplace is admissible evidence of the likeli-
hood of confusion."). It is also common in a number of social contexts, such as advertising and jury
consulting. See Spike Cramphorn, What Advertising Testing Might Have Been, If We Had Only
Known, 44 1. ADVERTISING REs. 170, 175 (2004) ("Partly because of this perceived importance of
awareness, focus groups became, and continue to be, a common means of consensus checking reac-
tions to creative ideas."); Rachel Hartje, Comment, A Jury of Your Peers?:How Jury Consulting May
Actually Help Trial Lawyers Resolve ConstitutionalLimitations Imposed on the Selection of Juries, 41

No. 3] NOBODY'S FOOLS
also tends to rely on assumptions rather than evidence in determining

how audiences decode so-called core speech-a contested category that
receives maximum First Amendment protection.' The Court rarely arti-
culates its assumptions about the presumed audience of core speech, but
its assumptions shape the outcomes of First Amendment cases. After all,
a naive and credulous audience might interpret speech one way and a
savvy and sophisticated audience another. Education, cultural back-
ground, and countless other characteristics may also influence the way
any given audience member interprets speech.4 Yet in the vast majority
of First Amendment cases, the Court presumes to judge how audiences
interpret speech without so much as a nod to these difficulties.' Instead,
the Court defaults to a set of normative assumptions which, taken to-
gether, reflects an idealized vision of the audience of core speech. The
first of these assumptions is that audiences are capable of rationally as-
sessing the truth, quality, and credibility of core speech. 6 The second is
that more speech is generally preferable to less.7
CAL. W. L. REV. 479, 493-94 (2005) ("Jury consultants predominantly rely upon the use of opinion
polls to construct a profile of the type of person that will be most receptive to a client's
case.... [D]emographic data is compiled and jury consultants look for specific correlations between
desirable traits .... ").
3. The Court has never given a precise definition of core speech, but it is clear that it includes
political speech at a minimum, and may encompass historical, literary, scientific, and even artistic
speech as well. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) ("[E]xpression on
public issues 'has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values."'
(quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,467 (1980))); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,101-402 (1940)
(asserting that free speech entails "the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public
concern," enabling citizens to "cope with the exigencies of [their] period"). Perhaps the most useful
definition is that core speech is anything that is not intermediate or low-value speech. See David A.
Strauss, Freedom of Speech and the Common-Law Constitution, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE
SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 33, 37 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (noting that
the "default category," for First Amendment purposes, is "high-value speech"). "Speakers need not
establish that their speech is political, or artistic, or scientific, or otherwise high value; they need only
establish that it is not in one of the low-value categories." Id. For further explanation, see Lyrissa
Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1537, 1581-89 (2007).
4. In fact, these characteristics vary so much from person to person that it makes little sense to
speak of any particular speech or text as if it had a single interpretation. For discussion of how as-
sumptions about hypothetical or "implied" readers influence the interpretation of literary texts, see
infra Part II. For discussion of how judges' assumptions about readers shape the interpretation of
whether a statement is defamatory in a tort context, see Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation,Reputa-
tion, and the Myth of Community, 71 WASH. L. REv. 1, 36-49 (1996).
5. The Court has at times acknowledged that vulnerable audience members may be without
judicial recourse against speech protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Org. for a Better Austin
v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (stating that "so long as the means are peaceful," speech cannot be
brought down to the level of the most vulnerable audience member). But cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726, 748-51 (1978) (allowing channeling of indecent broadcast programming). For more dis-
cussion, see infra Part II.
6. See, e.g., Org.for a Better Austin, 402 U.S. at 418 ("It is elementary, of course, that in a case
of this kind the courts do not concern themselves with the truth or validity of the publication.").
7. Although these assumptions can be decoupled, this Article will refer to them jointly as the
rational audience assumption.

First Amendment scholarship has criticized the doctrinal influence

of the rational audience ideal for some time, 8 but a new challenge is
mounting from a different quarter. Empirical work in the fields of cogni-
tive psychology and behavioral economics suggests that both the rational
audience and the more-is-better assumptions may be demonstrably false
in some commonplace settings. Behavioral economics began as a criti-
que of the rationality assumption of classical economics, namely, that
people rationally determine and maximize self-interest.' This critique of
rationality has penetrated deep into scholarly discourse' ° and is making
inroads into popular discourse as well. In fact, New York Times column-
ist David Brooks described the U.S. financial crisis that began in 2008 as
"a coming-out party for behavioral economists."" Behavioral economics
explains the financial crisis better than classical economics because it re-
cognizes that "markets are not perfectly efficient, people are not always
good guardians of their own self-interest and there might be limited cir-
cumstances when government could usefully slant the decision-making
architecture' 2 to encourage better policy decisions.
The behavioral economic critique of rational decision making argu-
ably applies as readily to speech markets as to economic ones.1 3 In the
face of this critique, the Supreme Court's continued adherence to the ra-
tional audience model in the realm of core speech deserves serious ex-
amination and analysis. This Article is directed to that goal.
The Court's own explanation has been limited. Only two Justices
have directly addressed the constitutional preference for standards based
on a rational audience rather than a real one. In FEC v. Wisconsin Right
to Life, Inc., 4 Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, explained
8. This scholarship often criticizes the influence of the marketplace of ideas metaphor in First
Amendment scholarship. See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth,
1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 5; see also discussion infra Part III.A. The marketplace metaphor neatly encapsu-
lates the assumptions of the rational audience ideal, and it remains the dominant metaphor of First
Amendment jurisprudence. I have chosen to refer to the rational audience ideal, in addition to the
more common marketplace metaphor, because this terminology brings out the often hidden or over-
looked assumptions of the marketplace metaphor.
9. See discussion infra Part III.B. I have chosen to use the term behavioral economics here.
The body of scholarship that attempts to apply the insights of cognitive psychology is often referred to
as "behavioral analysis" or "behavioral economics." The scholarly literature of "behavioral law and
economics" is particularly rich. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS 1, 1 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). The common thread in all of this scholarship is an at-
tempt to understand and model how humans make decisions.
10. See discussion of this critique in Part III.B, infra.
11. David Brooks, The BehavioralRevolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27,2008, at A31.
12. Id.
13. Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications,and the Fallacy of
the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649,651 (2006).
14. In FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449,457-58 (2007), Wisconsin Right to Life
(WRTL) asserted that it wished to run ads from its general treasury funds criticizing the stance of Wis-
consin Senators on the filibustering of judicial nominees. These ads did not urge Wisconsin voters to
elect or defeat the Senators; nonetheless, the ads met the definition of "electioneering communica-
tions" under section 203 of the BCRA (Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002), therefore making
it a federal crime to air them within thirty days of a federal primary or sixty days of a general election.

that the First Amendment requires the line between protected and un-
protected political speech to be drawn based on the reasonable interpre-
tation of such speech rather than "the actual effect speech will have... on
a particularsegment of the target audience."5 Justice Roberts' primary
argument for ignoring the actual effect of speech on real audiences is a
practical one. An actual-effect test would "typically lead to a burden-
some, expert-driven inquiry, with an indeterminate result. Litigation on
such a standard.., will unquestionably chill a substantial amount of po-
litical speech. ' 16 In other words, the cumbersome and expensive process
of gathering evidence about audience effects will chill political speech to
an unacceptable degree. But this rationale rests on the unexplained as-
sumption that the hypothetical risk of chilling speech outweighs the ben-
efits of examining the real effects of speech. Standing alone, expediency
is an insufficient explanation for why First Amendment jurisprudence
should continue to indulge the rational audience assumption and the
more-is-better assumption. Moreover, it does not explain why the Court
allows for the possibility that vulnerable audience members may need
protection from their own poor judgment in the realm of commercial17
Id. at 460. WRTL sought declaratory and injunctive relief in district court, alleging that the applica-
tion of the "electioneering communications" provisions to their ads violated the First Amendment. Id.
Five Supreme Court Justices-Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts-ultimately
held that the application of the "electioneering communications" provisions to WRTL's ads violated
the First Amendment, though they could not agree on a single rationale for this holding. Id. at 457,
481 (principal opinion supported by two votes); id. at 482-83 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 504 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Three of the five Justices who upheld the as-
applied challenges would have simply overturned the Court's prior holding in McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93 (2003), with regard to the facial constitutionality of the electioneering communications provi-
sions. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, contended that the Court should reject
McConnell because it "sets us the unsavory task of separating issue-speech from election-speech with
no clear criterion." Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 484 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). Justice Scalia, while not exactly praising Buckley's "magic words" test for separating
issue ads from express advocacy, observed that "[i]f a permissible test short of the magic-words test
existed, Buckley would surely have adopted it." Id. at 495. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito,
however, would have decided the case on a narrower ground. Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the
BCRA's provisions could be constitutionally applied to ads that constitute "express advocacy" and ads
that are the "functional equivalent" of express advocacy. Id. at 482 (principal opinion supported by
two votes). However, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, "[A] court should find that an ad is the functional
equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than
as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate." Id. at 469. Applying this test, he determined
that the WRTL's ads were not the functional equivalent of express advocacy because they dealt with a
genuine issue-the filibuster of judicial nominees-and they "d[id] not mention an election, candidacy,
political party, or challenger; and they d[id] not take a position on a candidate's character, qualifica-
tions, or fitness for office." Id. at 470.
15. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 469-70 (principal opinion supported by two votes) (emphasis
added). Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito would have adopted a test requiring a court to protect
the campaign speech at issue only if "no reasonable interpretation" of it would place it within the un-
protected category of "express advocacy" under BCRA section 203. Id. at 470. Justices Scalia, Ken-
nedy, and Thomas believed that even this test failed to draw a bright enough line to protect core polit-
ical speech. See id. at 492, 499 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
16. Id. at 469 (principal opinion supported by two votes).
17. See discussion infra Part II.B.

and other non-core speech,18 but not in the realm of core speech. This
Article therefore explores more fully the justifications for continuing to
presume that audiences of core speech are rational in the face of growing
evidence to the contrary.
First, though, the stage must be set. Part II draws on literary theory
to illuminate the process by which the Court constructs an implied au-
dience in First Amendment cases. In the realm of core speech, this im-
plied audience is composed of rational and skeptical citizens who are ca-
pable, when left to their own devices, of sorting through masses of
information to discover truth.19 Thus, governmental intervention in the
speech marketplace is almost always unjustified. In the realm of com-
mercial and other non-core speech, however, the Court sometimes
(though not consistently) applies a credulous consumer model of the im-
plied audience. 20 This alternate model, which posits that many audience
members are naive and easily misled, provides justification for paterna-
listic governmental intervention in the realm of commercial speech. Part
II thus demonstrates that assumptions about audiences shape outcomes
of First Amendment cases but leaves unanswered which set of assump-
tions courts ought to adopt.
Part III addresses scholarship that calls for more paternalistic inter-
ventions in the speech marketplace, giving prominence to the still largely
implicit critique posed by cognitive psychology and behavioral econom-
ics. 21 This new vein of criticism suggests that the marketplace of ideas is
flawed because humans are flawed: they are not rational information
processors, and more information often leads to worse decisions instead
of better ones. Yet the implications of this evidence for First Amend-
ment doctrine are unclear. Government actors are not immune from the
constraints on rationality affecting their fellow citizens. And even if in-
dividuals are only rational in fits and starts, the evidence is not at all clear
that this irrationality infects aggregate decision making.
More importantly, Part IV contends that clinging to an admittedly
flawed ideal of audience rationality is better than the alternative. As the
18. For example, the Court's electoral speech jurisprudence is, to put it generously, inconsistent
in this assumption about the ability of the voting public to make rational decisions when presented
with masses of highly biased information. An excellent article by Daniel Ortiz traces competing mod-
els of political decision making that underlie campaign speech decisions. See generally Daniel R. Or-
tiz, The Engaged and the Inert: Theorizing Political Personality Under the First Amendment, 81 VA. L.
REV. 1 (1995). Under one model, the Court treats the citizen as a "civic smarty" who "make[s] highly
informed political choices." Id. at 4. Under the other, the Court treats the citizen as a "civic slob"
who is "passive and uninformed." Id.; see also Daniel R. Ortiz, The Paradox of Mass Democracy, in
RETHINKING THE VOTE: THE POLITICS AND PROSPECTS OF AMERICAN ELECTION REFORM 210, 211
(Ann N. Crigler et al. eds., 2004).
19. See discussion infra Part ll.B.
20. See discussion infra Part II.C.
21. Although there is a large and growing body of literature on behavioral economics and cogni-
tive psychology, only two scholars seem to have applied this literature in the First Amendment con-
text. See Bambauer, supra note 13, at 651; Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics,Bi-
ases, and Institutions in the First Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2003).

Court has noted, concerns of judicial economy support the rationality as-
sumption.22 But rationality is also important as an aspirational norm.
First Amendment doctrine encourages us to develop our capacities to
engage in the level of public discourse democratic theory demands.23
Failure to apply a rational audience standard would reduce public dis-
course to the level of the least sophisticated audience, while punishing
speakers who are unable to predict what that level is. Perhaps more sig-
nificantly, both the rationality assumption and the more-is-better as-
sumption serve as a check on government's increasingly powerful at-
tempts to use its agenda-setting power to manipulate public discourse.
Finally, a State that indulges an irrationality assumption, or even a
bounded rationality assumption, fails to respect the autonomy of its citi-
zens, an autonomy upon which a self-governing democracy depends.
II. THE RATIONAL AUDIENCE IN FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

A. Literary Theory and the Implied Audience Construct
Every First Amendment decision involves a text to be decoded. In
decoding the disputed texts in First Amendment cases, the Court justifies
its interpretations not by reference to the Justices' subjective decodings
but by implicit reference to the decodings of a hypothetical reasonable or
rational audience.24 As this Article demonstrates, this process of inter-
pretation is typically hidden beneath the surface of First Amendment
opinions. The goal, therefore, is to unearth the process by which courts
construct audiences of disputed texts and to show that this process not
only helps legitimize outcomes but also advances the fundamental pur-
poses of the First Amendment.
Although legal theory has been obsessed with courts' processes of
interpretation as a general matter, it has done little to illuminate the
process by which courts impute interpretation of a disputed text to a
body of reasonable observers.2 An entire vein of literary criticism, how-
ever, has devoted itself to uncovering the role readers play in creating
the meaning of a text.26 This vein of criticism, often called reader-
22. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007) (Roberts, C.J. & Alito, J.,
dictum).
23. As opposed to consumers, for example. Although this argument will be explained more fully
in Part IV, infra, suffice to say that if citizens are incapable of rational decision making through partic-
ipation in public discourse, they are equally incapable of self-governance, the hallmark of democracy.
24. See supra notes 6, 14-16 and accompanying text.
25. I have attempted previously to illuminate how common law doctrines in defamation cases
allow judges to construct the implied audience of allegedly defamatory speech. See Lidsky, supra note
4, at 16-17.
26. Important works in the area include STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THis CLASS?: THE
AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980); WOLFGANG ISER, THE ACT OF READING: A
THEORY OF AESTHETIC RESPONSE (Wolfgang Iser & David Henry Wilson trans., Johns Hopkins Un-
iv. Press 1978) (1976) [hereinafter ISER, THE ACT OF READING]; WOLFGANG ISER, THE IMPLIED
READER: PA-ITERNS OF COMMUNICATION IN PROSE FICTION FROM BUNYAN TO BECKEIT (Wolfgang

response criticism or reception theory, has a variety of adherents united

by a central insight: namely, "the meaning of the text consists of our ex-
perience of what the text does to us as we read it."2 This Article does
not purport to fully mine this rich vein of criticism, but instead gleans a
few critical insights that have ready application to First Amendment ju-
risprudence.
Perhaps the central insight is simply a heightened awareness of the
role of the audience (or individual audience members) in fixing the
meaning of a First Amendment text. Different audience members bring
different experiences and backgrounds to the text and will therefore in-
terpret the same text quite differently. Focusing on the role of readers,
observers, or listeners of texts provides a new prism through which to
view seminal cases on freedom of expression 8
Reader-response criticism also offers other insights relevant to the
interpretation of First Amendment texts. Reader-response criticism po-
sits a special status for the literary critic. In order to interpret a text
"correctly," the critic must develop insights into how other readers will
interact with a given text and must predict how these readers will decode
Iser & David Henry Wilson trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1974) (1972) [hereinafter ISER, THE
IMPLIED READER]; HANS ROBERT JAUSS, TOWARD AN AESTHETIC OF RECEPTION (Timothy Bahti
trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1982) (1970). For two good summaries of reader-response criticism as a
whole, see TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 47-78 (2d ed. 1996) and LoIs
TYSON, CRITICAL THEORY TODAY: A USER-FRIENDLY GUIDE 153-96 (1999). For application of the
insights of reader-response theory to the question of what is fair use in copyright law, see generally
Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 445 (2008).
27. TYSON, supra note 26, at 162; see also EAGLETON, supra note 26, at 64-65 ("Literary texts do
not exist on bookshelves: they are processes of signification materialized only in the practice of read-
ing. For literature to happen, the reader is quite as vital as the author."); ISER, THE IMPLIED READER,
supranote 26, at xiii ("The reader discovers the meaning of the text .... TYSON, supra note 26, at
");
157 ("[A] written text is... an event that occurs within the reader, whose response is of primary im-
portance in creating the text.").
28. A similar test is used in First Amendment Establishment Clause cases. In Establishment
Clause cases, the Supreme Court makes quite explicit its reliance on the "reasonable observer" as the
benchmark by which the Court decides if a person would perceive a statute as a state endorsement of
religion. In Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985), Justice O'Connor's concurrence focused on
"whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of
the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement." See also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S.
639, 655 (2002) (applying an adult community member to the reasonable objective observer standard);
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (applying the reasonable observer test to
determine if there was a perception of government promotion of religion but specifying that the rele-
vant observer is a high school student). In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1,
36 (2004), Justice O'Connor described the reasonable observer in the context of the use of the phrase
"under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance:
For centuries, we have marked important occasions or pronouncements with references to God
and invocations of divine assistance.... The reasonable observer..., fully aware of our national
history and the origins of such practices, would not perceive these acknowledgments as signifying
a government endorsement of any specific religion, or even of religion over nonreligion.
For criticism of the test, see Susan Hanley Kosse, A Missed Opportunity to Abandon the Reasonable
Observer Framework in Sacred Text Cases: McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky and Van Orden
v. Perry, 4 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 139,141-42 (2006).

the text.29 And yet reader-response critics do not attempt to take surveys
about how readers decode texts. Rather, they posit an idealized reader30
who is educated and conversant with stylistic and literary conventions.
The critic then tries to see the text through the eyes of its "implied read-
er," in the words of Wolfgang Iser, 31 in order to make the "correct" or
"best" meaning of the text emerge.32 In First Amendment decisions,
courts play the role of critics, stepping into the shoes of implied reason-
able readers in order to fix the meaning of the disputed text.
A final insight of reader-response criticism is simply that although
there may be a best interpretation of a text, there is no universal inter-
pretation of a text. Meaning is not fixed by the author's intent or the text
itself; rather, meaning is an interactive process, a continuing dialogue be-
tween text and reader, a dialogue that changes over time. 33 Nonetheless,
in courts if not in the classrooms of literature professors, the disputed
text must be definitively decoded so that a final judgment can be ren-
dered. Although different readers will decode texts differently, courts
must settle upon a meaning; that meaning, in turn, determines whether
the speaker, author, publisher, or broadcaster receives the shelter of the
First Amendment. 4
These insights have ready application to actual cases. Consider, for
example, the famous case of Cohen v. California. 35 Cohen involved an
apparently simple text in the form of a jacket bearing the words "Fuck
the Draft." 6 Is "Fuck the Draft," when inscribed on a jacket worn in the
hallways of a courthouse, a heart-felt protest against the mandatory con-
scription of young men to serve in Vietnam?3 7 Or is the text on and of
the jacket a puerile epithet with little, if any, communicative value? In
order to decide the case, the Supreme Court was forced to decide which
29. Jane P. Tompkins, Introduction to Reader-Response Criticism, in READER-RESPONSE

CRITICISM: FROM FORMALISM TO POST-STRUCTURALISM ix, xi (Jane P. Tompkins ed., 1980); Jane P.
Tompkins, The Reader in History: The Changing Shape of Literary Response, in READER-RESPONSE
CRITICISM, supra, at 201,205-06.
30. Stanley E. Fish, Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics, in READER-RESPONSE
CRITICISM, supra note 29, at 70, 87; Gerald Prince, Introduction to the Study of the Narratee, in
READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM, supra note 29, at 7, 9.
31. Iser defines "implied reader" as "incorporat[ing] both the prestructuring of the potential
meaning by the text, and the reader's actualization of this potential through the reading process."
ISER, THE IMPLIED READER, supra note 26, at xii.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 174-75.
34. In determining the public's interpretation of a religious symbol as government sponsored,
the court
d[id] not ask whether there is any person who could find an endorsement of religion, whether
some people may be offended by the display, or whether some reasonable person might think
Grand Rapids endorses religion. Instead, we ask whether the reasonable observer would con-
clude that Grand Rapids endorses religion by allowing Chabad House's display.
Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1544 (6th Cir.
1992).
35. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
36. Id. at 16.
37. Id.

interpretation of Cohen's famous jacket was the "correct" interpreta-

tion." In 1968, some audience members may have experienced the words
on the jacket as "meaningless" epithets whose only purpose was to of-
fend community sensibilities; other audience members may have seen
them as a strident political commentary on the most important issue of
Cohen's day. Forty years later, an audience may construct an entirely
different meaning. Students who read about the famous jacket are likely
to be well acquainted with the "F-word" but less well acquainted with the
Vietnam War. Thus, for them, the sentiment on Cohen's jacket may be
just another way of saying "I don't like the draft."
The Court in Cohen never directly acknowledged this interpretive
difficulty, but the resolution of it determined the outcome of the case. A
lower court had upheld Cohen's thirty-day sentence for disturbing the
peace based on the presumed effect his speech would have on his au-
dience.39 Specifically, the lower court held that the State correctly pre-
dicted that the jacket "might cause others to rise up to commit a violent
act against the person of [Cohen] or attempt to forceably [sic] remove his
' 40
jacket. The predicted response of these others gave the State the au-
thority to jail Cohen for disturbing the peace.
The Court predicted a very different reception of the jacket. The
Court explicitly denoted the viewers of the jacket as reasonable people.41
The Court -or at least the six-Justice majority 42- hypothesized that "[n]o
individual actually or likely to be present could reasonably have regarded
the words on appellant's jacket as a direct personal insult. ' 43 The Court
refused to accept the State's argument that the jacket would incite indi-
viduals or groups to violence, though it cited little to support this conclu-
sion.' The Court gave no justification for the assumption that the au-
dience was composed of reasonable people. Nor did the Court provide a
convincing explanation why reasonable people would not respond force-
fully to Cohen's jacket, beyond observing that no one "was in fact vio-
lently aroused" by the jacket, 45 which arguably was a product of luck ra-
ther than the nature of the provocation.
Nonetheless, the Court made clear that its construction of the au-
dience of Cohen's speech trumped the State's. The Court accused the
State of attempting to censor speech based on the predicted reaction of
38. Id. at 21-22.

39. Id. at 16-17.
40. People v. Cohen, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503,506 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (emphasis added).
41. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
42. The three dissenting Justices first determined that Cohen's behavior "was mainly conduct
and little speech," and then determined that it was "well within the sphere of Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,"the Supreme Court's seminal fighting words case. Id. at 27 (Blackmun, J., Burger, C.J., &
Black, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 20 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
44. Id. Of course, the State need not wait until violence occurs before regulating speech that
constitutes incitement.
45. Id.

"a hypothetical coterie of the violent and lawless."' The State was not
entitled to assume the worst about its citizens.4 7 Even if the State feared
a breach of the peace, it could not censor speech absent "evidence that
substantial numbers of citizens are standing ready to strike out physically
at whoever may assault their sensibilities with execrations like that ut-
tered by Cohen." ' This, of course, created a procedural imbalance that
favors free speech; the State must provided strong evidence that its pre-
dictions of audience reactions are not speculative, but the Court is free to
speculate at will. More to the point, the Court's speculation provided the
definitive decoding of Cohen's jacket. The Court determined that rea-
sonable viewers would interpret the jacket as asserting an "evident posi-
tion on the inutility or immorality of the draft,"'49 and that, in turn, meant
that the State could not criminalize his speech.'
As Cohen illustrates, First Amendment jurisprudence accords
courts the role of disinterested critics of the disputed texts of First
Amendment cases. The Court (and by extension lower courts) claims
superior authority vis-A-vis the legislative and executive branches in pre-
dicting the effects of speech. It may be that the courts are granted this
authority due to some institutional superiority,51 but there is no indica-
tion that courts are superior to the other branches of government in pre-
dicting the responses of audiences to speech. Indeed, courts appear to
project an idealized construct of readers, listeners, and viewers into First
Amendment cases with little regard for the "facts on the ground." 2 Even
if empirical research were practical, the construct allows courts to claim
to be speaking for a broader audience than just themselves when they in-
terpret disputed speech. Moreover, as this Article ultimately shows, the
characteristics imputed to this idealized audience aid judges in advancing
the broader ideals of the First Amendment. First, however, it is impor-
tant to develop a more well-rounded portrait of the implied audience of
First Amendment speech.
B. Characteristicsof the Implied Audience of Core Speech

Although there is no settled definition of core speech-speech that
garners the lion's share of First Amendment protection-it includes at a
46. Id. at 23.

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 18.
50. Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Black in dissent, avoided the
problem of audience response by concluding, with very little explanation, that "Cohen's absurd and
immature antic, in my view, was mainly conduct and little speech." Id. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing).
51. As Professor John Jeffries has written, "The institution of the judiciary is peculiarly well
suited-in personnel, training, ideology, and institutional structure-to implement the ideals of the
First Amendment." John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking PriorRestraint,92 YALE L.J. 409, 427 (1983).
52. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.

minimum political speech 3 and speech dealing with issues of public con-
cern. 4 This speech lies at the core of the First Amendment because po-
litical speech in a democracy is essential to democratic self-governance;
without this information, citizens cannot play their assigned roles in
choosing and instructing their representatives and in participating in the
formation of public policy. Yet core speech also includes speech that
enables citizens to develop their critical faculties and understand the ex-
igencies of their eras, such as literary, artistic, historical, and scientific
speech. Built into the very concept of core speech, then, is the idea that
it appeals to its audience in their capacities as citizens first and foremost,
rather than appealing purely to economic, sexual, or other forms of self-
interest. The assumptions courts make about the audiences of core
speech, therefore, mirror the assumptions courts make about citizens.
In envisioning the implied audience of core speech, courts might as-
sume that audience members are na've and credulous, lacking the educa-
tion or sophistication necessary to critically assess the messages they re-
ceive. The modern trend for core speech, however, has been to assume
that audiences are savvy and sophisticated, capable of sorting through
masses of information to discover truth, however provisional or con-
tested. Indeed, these assumptions underpin two articles of faith in mod-
ern First Amendment theory: (1) audiences are capable of rationally eva-
luating the truth, quality, credibility, and usefulness of core speech
53. Some would include only political speech in the definition of core speech. See, e.g., Robert
H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 29 (1971) (defining
"the core of the first amendment" as "speech that is explicitly political").
54. See discussion supra note 3. The Court's distinction between core and non-core speech owes
a debt to the work of Alexander Meiklejohn, who defined the core of the First Amendment to include
speech of "governing importance." Justice Black's concurrence in the seminal case of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, for example, cited Meiklejohn for the notion that "[a]n unconditional right to
say what one pleases about public affairs is... the minimum guarantee of the First Amendment."
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297 (1964) (Black, J., concurring). Although initially it ap-
peared that Meiklejohn's theory would protect only political speech, he later broadened his theory to
include literary, historical, and scientific speech, based on the notion that these types of speech fos-
tered the development of our capacities as citizens to make informed public decisions. ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 26-28, 76-84,
144-47 (1948). The lines between core and non-core speech can be blurred at the margin, and it is
sometimes easier to define core speech by what it is not. Commercial speech, for example, is not core
speech; it does not sufficiently advance public discussion on issues of governing importance. But
commercial speech receives significant First Amendment protection because it provides important
information to citizens in their roles as consumers. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 & n.6 (1980). Fighting words are not core speech; they do not advance
public discussion and are designated as "low-value speech" because of their tendency to bypass cogni-
tive processes and produce immediate violence. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942). Defining core First Amendment speech creates troublesome issues at the margins, but it is
clear, at a minimum, that core speech includes discussions of political, literary, artistic, historical, cul-
tural, and social concerns. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 208 ("The Amendment has a 'central
meaning'-a core of protection of speech without which democracy cannot function, without which, in
Madison's phrase, 'the censorial power' would be in the Government over the people and not 'in the
people over the Government."'); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988).

without the aid of government intervention; and (2) more speech is bet-
ter than less.
1. The RationalAudience Assumption

Democratic theory demands faith in the rationality of citizens, and
several members of the founding generation, steeped in the ideals of the
Enlightenment, publicly professed this faith.5 In his inaugural address of
1801, Thomas Jefferson boldly proclaimed: "If there be any among us
who would wish to dissolve this Union or to change its republican form,
let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error
'5 6
of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.
Reason, so the argument goes, will drive out "error[s] of opinion" 7
from
public discourse, forming the basis for enlightened public policy.
This is not to say that the Founders were starry-eyed idealists. As
one historian has written, the Founding Fathers adopted the Constitution
of 1787 to curtail "excessive democracy. 5 8 They realized they were em-
barking on an experiment, and several expressed doubt about the extent
55. From the Federalist No. 1:

[Ilt seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to
decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing
good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for
their political constitutions on accident and force.
THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). This does not mean
that revolutionary leaders were naive about self-interest. Indeed, concern about the tendency of state
legislatures to pander to the parochial concerns of their citizens spurred the adoption of the Constitu-
tion in 1787. As Madison noted in The Federalist No. 51, "A dependence on the people is, no doubt,
the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary
precautions." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also
SUSAN JACOBY, FREETHINKERS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN SECULARISM 13 (2004) (noting the "es-
sential rationalism" of the Founders).
56. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in THE ESSENTIAL JEFFERSON 56
(Jean M. Yarbrough ed., 2006). Jefferson's remarks presumably relate to the controversy over the
Sedition Act of 1798 that the Federalist Party had enacted in an attempt to deny Jefferson and his Re-
publican Party victory in the election of 1800. The Act made it a crime to print any false, scandalous,
and malicious writings about the federal government, the Congress, or the president. Sedition Act of
1798, 1 Stat. 596, 596-97. The Act expired by its own terms in 1801. Id. at 597. Although enforcement
of the Act virtually silenced Republican newspapers, Jefferson won the election and the Act was never
renewed. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION
Acr OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 63--67 (2004). The Court, however, did not declare that the
punishment of seditious libel violated the First Amendment until 1964. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at
276 ("These views reflect a broad consensus that the Act, because of the restraint it imposed upon crit-
icism of government and public officials, was inconsistent with the First Amendment.").
57. See Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, in THE ESSENTIAL JEFFERSON, supra note
56, at 56.
58. WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 5 (2007)
(citing numerous sources); see also RICHARD K. MATTHEWS, IF MEN WERE ANGELS: JAMES MADISON
AND THE HEARTLESS EMPIRE OF REASON (1995); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT:
AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996). Some Americans during this period believed
that government should be made more democratic, others that it should be more republican. As Dr.
Holton notes, some Americans criticized the state governments prior to 1787 for a "glut" of democra-
cy and others for "a shortage of democracy." See HOLTON, supra, at 163. Some citizens even "em-
braced the slogan 'VOX POPULI VOX DEI'-'the voice of the people is the voice of God."' Id. at 164.
This was a response, in part, to the limits on the franchise. See id. at 163-64.

to which citizens could set aside self-interest to favor rational public poli-
cy. 9 Indeed, the constitutional system they designed contains measures
designed to prevent state legislatures from embracing irrational populist
measures:
Though the Founders espoused a'democratic theory rooted in ra-
tionalism, it was not until the twentieth century that courts began to fa-
shion a modern, libertarian First Amendment around the notion of the
rationality of citizen audiences. The clear and present danger doctrine
became the building block of this modern First Amendment, but its be-
ginnings were not auspicious. The test debuted in Schenck v. United
States, which involved a felony conviction under the Espionage Act of
1917 for distributing pamphlets critical of World War I to men who had
been drafted.6 The Court framed the issue as whether the speaker's
words "create[d] a clear and present danger"62 of "bring[ing] about the
substantive evils that Congress had a right to prevent."63 Yet in applica-
tion, the Court focused on the "tendency" of the defendant's pamphlet to
interfere with the draft without demanding proof of actual interference.'
The focus on the "tendency" of the speech suggested that it could be
suppressed if someone somewhere might respond badly to it. Thus, the
maiden voyage of the clear and present danger test served to suppress
rather than defend radical speech.65
From this inauspicious beginning the clear and present danger test
eventually became a bulwark protecting dissident speech. As is well
known, 66 Justice Holmes, under prompting by Judge Hand and other li-
bertarian thinkers,67 recalibrated the clear and present danger test. The
new, protective version of the test emerged in Justice Holmes' dissent in
Abrams v. United States.68 There, the government prosecuted five Rus-
sian immigrants under the Espionage Act for distributing pamphlets crit-
ical of U.S. involvement in World War 1.69 Though a majority of the
59. See id. at 165.

60. For example, the Constitution omitted the rights of citizens to instruct and recall Congress-
men. HOLTON, supra note 58, at 199. The Constitution also made each Congressman answerable to a
much larger group of constituents than was the case in the state assemblies. See id. at 200-05. The end
result was that the constitutional convention "managed to construct a new national government that
was considerably less democratic than even the most conservative of the state constitutions." Id. at
211. The Bill of Rights, in turn, counteracted the antidemocratic elements of the Constitution of 1787.
Id. at 256-58.
61. 249 U.S. 47,52 (1919).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 52-53.
66. See David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1205, 1317 (1983) (discussing the series of Justices Holmes' and Brandeis' dissents that were the
basis for the modem incitement test).
67. See G. Edward White, Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech Jurisprudence:
The Human Dimension, 80 CAL. L. REv. 391,407-12 (1992).
68. 250 U.S. 616, 628,630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 616-17 (majority opinion).

No. 31 NOBODY'S FOOLS
Court upheld the conviction of the defendants in Abrams, Justice

Holmes argued that the First Amendment forbade suppression of their
speech unless it presented an imminent threat of "immediate" harm:
"Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the
correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any exception to the
[First Amendment]. ' 70
Justice Holmes' justly famous dissent in Abrams, which was joined
by Justice Brandeis, reflected a belief that "humans are inherently ra-
tional beings."'" Given enough time to reflect, an audience will reject
''evil counsels" such as those advocated by the speakers Justice Holmes
described as "poor and puny anonymities" in Abrams.72 The First
Amendment protected the speech of these defendants because the gov-
ernment had failed to offer proof that their speech had hindered the war
effort or that they intended it to do so. 71 Justice Holmes' opinion rests on
faith in rational deliberation as an antidote to violence. Citizens will not
leap to action merely because radical speakers, like the socialists in Ab-
7
rams, urge them to do so. 1
Justice Brandeis takes Justice Holmes' themes even further in his
lyrical concurring opinion in Whitney v. California,75 described by Profes-
sor Vincent Blasi as "arguably the most important essay ever written, on
or off the bench, on the meaning of the first amendment. ' 76 Justice
Brandeis applied the clear and present danger test to evaluate the consti-
tutionality of the conviction of an avowed communist under California's
Criminal Syndicalism Act. 77 Justice Brandeis wrote that the conviction
violated the First Amendment because the State failed to show "either
that immediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or
that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was
then contemplated. '78 Justice Brandeis made clear that such violence
70. Id. at 630-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

71. G. Edward White, The Canonization of Holmes and Brandeis: Epistemology and Judicial
Reputations,70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 576, 579 n.11 (1995).
72. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 629-30 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 628-29.
74. Justice Holmes' own faith was less than whole-hearted. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The only difference between the expression of an opi-
nion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence
may set fire to reason.").
75. 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Justice Holmes believed that whether
reason would ultimately prevail or not, the principle of free expression prohibited government from
attempting to dictate the beliefs of citizens. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("If in
the long run the beliefs expressed in a proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the do-
minant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their
chance and have their way."). For a critique of this idea, see Bork, supra note 53, at 21 (arguing that
such speech may be suppressed because it undermines democracy).
76. Vincent Blasi, The FirstAmendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in
Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653,668 (1988).
77. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 378 (Brandeis, J., concurring). The basis of the prosecution was that the
party platform of the Communist Labor Party, of which Alicia Whitney was a founding member, ad-
vocated "revolutionary class struggle." Id. at 363 (majority opinion).
78. Id. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring).

should rarely occur, due to the "expected" rationality of audiences.7 9

Our system of government, Justice Brandeis wrote, depends on "confi-
dence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the
processes of popular government."" When such reasoning prevails,
no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present,
unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it
may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there
be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to
avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be ap-
plied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can
justify repression. 1
Brandeis echoes many of the themes articulated by Justice Holmes
in Abrams. Government intervention, or "enforced silence," hinders ra-
ther than advances rational public discourse." Open discourse allows the
implied audience of citizens to decide for themselves where truth and fal-
sity lie. 83 Only when the opportunity for rational discourse is cut off by
emergency circumstances may the government intervene.8 Ordinarily,
however, citizens will reject "falsehoods and fallacies" because public
discussion provides the "processes of education" necessary to refute
them.8 Justice Brandeis later explains that a tenet of democracy is that
"deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary." 6 This tenet, how-
ever, can only prevail if citizens, in their role as audience, actively engage
the "political duty" to participate in public discourse and refute what
they believe to be "noxious doctrine." At its core, Justice Brandeis'
opinion envisions a body of informed citizens engaging in a rational ex-
ercise in self-governance.
79. See id.

80. Id. at 377.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 377; see also id. at 375-76 ("Believing in the power of reason as applied through public
discussion, [the Framers] eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its worst form.");
Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character: From Milton to Brandeis to the Present, in
ETERNALLY VIGILANT, supra note 3, at 61, 78 ("[Justice Brandeis concluded] that we simply have to
believe in the power of reason in order to preserve a system of government in which the coercive pow-
er of the state does not swamp the individual. If we abandon the faith that reason matters, we are left
with a society governed exclusively by force.").
83. See Blasi, supra note 82, at 92.
84. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
85. As I have explained previously, Justice Brandeis' theory of the First Amendment depends
for its operation on the rule of law in a vibrant civil society-what Bernard Lewis has described as
"part of society, between the family and the state, in which the mainsprings of association, initiative,
and action are voluntary, determined by opinion or interest, or other personal choice." Lyrissa Bar-
nett Lidsky, Brandenburg and the United States' War on Incitement Abroad: Defending a Double Stan-
dard, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1009, 1024 n.102 (2002) (quoting BERNARD LEWIS, WHAT WENT
WRONG?: WESTERN IMPACr AND MIDDLE EASTERN RESPONSE 110 (2002)); see also Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) ("Civil liberties... imply the existence of an organized society
maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained
abuses.").
86. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
87. Id.

Justices Holmes and Brandeis provided the building blocks, 88 but

any number of First Amendment doctrines rely on a model of the au-
dience as rational, skeptical, and capable of sorting through masses of in-
formation to find truth. The fighting words doctrine assumes that only in
rare instances will an individual listener have a "non-cognitive" reaction
to speech and impulsively do violence to the speaker.8 9 The incitement
doctrine, in turn, is the "crowd response" counterpart of the fighting
words doctrine. 9' Rational individuals will not respond violently to
"mere advocacy" of unlawful action; 91 they respond only when "advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation ...is directed to inciting or produc-
ing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such ac-
tion.''92 The incitement doctrine, in both theory and application, assumes
that citizens will rarely respond with violence to the impassioned rhetoric
of a radical speaker. 93
Even doctrines designed to ensure that government does not nar-
row the range of views open to its citizens presume that the citizenry is
basically rational. The stringent First Amendment limitations on prose-
cutions for seditious libel 94 promote public discourse that is "uninhibited,
robust, and wide open" based on the theory that citizens can sort through
conflicting claims to discern the truth about "public men" and public
measures. Indeed, libel law clings to this theory even while acknowl-
edging that public discourse will "include vehement, caustic, and some-
times unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials" as
well as "half-truths," "misinformation," "exaggeration," "vilification,"
and false statements of facts. 96 The First Amendment's prohibition on
content-based discrimination rests, in part, on the assumption that the
State must not narrow the range of information open to its citizens; they,
and only they, are charged with rationally winnowing the unmediated
flow of information they receive.'
88. Bork, supra note 53, at 23 (observing that free speech law today "grows out of" the dissent-
ing (or concurring) opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis).
89. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (defining fighting words as those
"likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace"); see
also RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR. ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES AND THEORY 93 (2008)
("The fighting-words decisions... involve[] a determination of whether words are abusive or so akin
to an assault that they are likely to cause a violent response.").
90. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 408 (1989) (stating that First Amendment jurisprudence does not presume "an audience that
takes serious offense at particular expression is necessarily likely to disturb the peace").
91. See Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 448-49.
92. Id.at 447.
93. Brandenburg, for example, involved a Ku Klux Klan member urging other members, some
armed, to "[b]ury the niggers." Id. at 445-46, 446 n.1. The Court found the circumstances of the
speech, however, evidenced the audience would not respond with violence. Id. at 448-49.
94. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78 (1964) (requiring knowledge of falsity and reckless
disregard on the speaker's part).
95. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,268,270 (1964).
96. Id. at 270-71,273.
97. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,417-19 (1989).

Audience rationalism receives its main instantiation in the domi-

nant metaphor in First Amendment jurisprudence-the marketplace of
ideas. 8 Justice Holmes injected the metaphor into First Amendment ju-
risprudence when he endorsed the "free trade in ideas" in Abrams v.
United States.' Justice Holmes endorsed the metaphor as a sound foun-
dation of public policy, asserting that "the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out." 10° Yet it is not clear that the skeptical Justice Holmes fully en-
dorsed the sentiment underlying his own ringing rhetoric, for he imme-
diately declared that the
10 1
marketplace of ideas "is an experiment, as all
life is an experiment.'
The constitutional experiment with free trade in ideas depends fun-
damentally on the rationalism of the "consumers" in the marketplace.
Only rational consumers can sort through undifferentiated masses of in-
formation to discern what is valuable, to pluck the wheat from the chaff.
Indeed, the marketplace metaphor even contains a model of the reason-
ing process of these consumers. Competition implies action and reaction,
and consumers must actively compare and contrast competing ideas, al-
lowing "full and free discussion" to "expose[] the false."' 1 When the
market is permitted to function freely, the aggregate decisions of rational
consumers of information will ultimately drive the purveyors of worth-
less goods from the market. This process is essential for the formation of
sound public policy.
2. More-Is-Better,or Against Paternalism

There is no necessary relation between the assumption that au-
diences are rational and the assumption that they are better off with
98. The Court has repeatedly relied on the marketplace metaphor. For a recent example, see
New York State Boardof Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008) (unanimous) ("The First
Amendment creates an open marketplace where ideas, most especially political ideas, may compete
without government interference. It does not call on the federal courts to manage the market by pre-
venting too many buyers from settling upon a single product." (citation omitted)). As Professor Stan-
ley Ingber has noted, "Content-based restrictions leave the public with an incomplete, and perhaps
inaccurate, perception of the social and political universe. Thus, these restrictions can undermine the
search for truth and distort the process by which citizens make critical decisions." Stanley Ingber, The
First Amendment in Modem Garb: Retaining System Legitimacy, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 187, 191
(1987) (book review).
99. 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. Id. Compare Justice Holmes' assertion with Justice Brandeis' contention that the Framers
"believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth...." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring).
102. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting). "When ideas
compete in the market for acceptance, full and free discussion exposes the false and they gain few ad-
herents. Full and free discussion even of ideas we hate encourages the testing of our own prejudices
and preconceptions." Id.

more information rather than less. Even rational actors might make bet-
ter decisions when they are not overwhelmed by unlimited options.
Nonetheless, First Amendment decisions have consistently tied the two
assumptions together, and nowhere is this more evident than in the mar-
ketplace metaphor itself.
The marketplace metaphor justifies the assumption that more is
better on several bases, only one of which is that more information might
aid decision making. The marketplace of ideas ostensibly leads to the
emergence of Truth."3 The best decisions, of course, are based on truth,
and the search for truth is fostered by "the dissemination of news from as
many different sources, and with as many different facets and colors as is
possible."' 1 The more competitors who jockey for dominance in the
marketplace of ideas, the better the ideas that will ultimately triumph,
though of course this assumes that those judging the quality of ideas are
rational information consumers.
That said, the primary justification for the assumption that more-is-
better is not that it leads to better democratic decision making. 105 Con-
sider Judge Hand's oft-quoted 1° assertion that "right conclusions are
more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through
any kind of authoritative selection."1°7 It is not that right conclusions will
always emerge from discourse that includes a "multitude of tongues."
Rather, a diverse discourse is preferable to a discourse whose parameters
are dictated by the State. l 0s
103. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

104. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (Hand, J.); see also
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) ("Th[e First] Amendment rests on the assump-
tion that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is es-
sential to the welfare of the public ... ").
105. "A legitimate government must assure the right of each individual to participate in and in-
fluence governmental decision-making, not because decisions so reached are best, but because only
decisions so derived deserve obedience. This perspective of free expression is closely aligned with
democratic theory." Ingber, supra note 98, at 220.
106. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978); Columbia Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 191-92 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S.
589,603 (1967); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964).
107. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. at 372; THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR.,
REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 176 (1994) (describing the case as articulating the prin-
ciple of "no censorship" and that "individuals are fully capable of choosing what they would hear,
read, or believe").
108. See Richard A. Posner, The Speech Market and the Legacy of Schenck, in ETERNALLY
VIGILANT, supra note 3, at 121, 142 (observing that government regulators are no more able than or-
dinary consumers to "sort out truth from falsity" in the marketplace of ideas, and that the speech mar-
ket is "particularly vulnerable to heavy-handed regulation"). If a diverse discourse were the only goal,
the Supreme Court would routinely uphold government regulation to enhance the diversity of dis-
course. Compare Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (striking a govern-
ment regulation that required diverse viewpoints in newspapers), with Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969) (upholding a law requiring radio stations to allow individuals a right to re-
spond to attacks). Moreover, the Supreme Court would also routinely uphold government-mandated
disclosure requirements in all speech contexts, since such requirements increase the stock of informa-
tion available in the marketplace. Compare McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357

This preference dictates a laissez-faire approach to regulation of the

marketplace of ideas. Without the constraint of the First Amendment,
the temptation of governments to suppress the speech of critics would
simply be too great, as the experience of speech suppression in authorita-
rian regimes attests. Moreover, the history of speech regulation is rep-
lete with examples of the suppression of truth and enshrinement of er-
ror.1" Professor Frederick Schauer explains:
Freedom of speech is based in large part on a distrust of the ability
of government to make the necessary distinctions, a distrust of go-
vernmental determinations of truth and falsity, an appreciation of
the fallibility of political leaders, and a somewhat deeper distrust of
governmental power in a more general sense.n°
The distrust of government that permeates free speech theory applies
even when the government attempts to restrict core speech "with the
purest of motives.""'
Anti-paternalism permeates First Amendment doctrines governing
core speech."' Paternalistic speech regulations attempt to restrict the
free flow of information because citizens might misunderstand or misuse
the information.113 Such regulations are fundamentally at odds with our
national commitment to democratic self-governance. Moreover, gov-
ernment denigrates the autonomy of citizens" ' when it limits the stock of
(1995) (striking government-mandated disclosure for author of anonymous political pamphlets), with
Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 485 (1987) (upholding mandatory disclosure for foreign "political prop-
aganda" films).
109. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 81-86 (1982) (giving
numerous examples, including the persecution of Galileo).
110. Id. at 86.
111. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 791 (1988).
112. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n.31 (1978) ("The First
Amendment rejects the 'highly paternalistic' approach of statutes ...which restrict what the people
may hear."); Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principlein the FirstAmendment, 37 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 579, 582-83 (2004) (noting the dominance of the antipaternalism principle in First Amendment
jurisprudence); Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amend-
ment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 557-58 (1991) ("[T]raditional First Amendment jurispru-
dence ... assumes that people are ordinarily the best judges of their own interests."); Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 212 (1983) ("The
Court has long embraced an 'antipaternalistic' understanding of the first amendment.").
113. Professor Dale Carpenter defines paternalism in the First Amendment context as regulation
of speech "justified by the government's belief that speaking or receiving the information in the speech is
not in citizens' own best interests." Carpenter, supra note 112, at 582-83. Philosopher Joel Feinberg
has written: "[Paternalism] suggests the view that the state stands to its citizens as a parent.., stands
to his children .... 3 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAw 4
(1986).
114. "When men govern themselves, it is they-and no one else-who must pass judgment upon
unwisdom and unfairness and danger. And that means that unwise ideas must have a hearing as well
as wise ones...." MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 54, at 27. In the context of commercial speech, see Vir-
ginia State Board of Pharmacyv. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,756-57 (1976)
("Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, as is the case here,
the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.... If there is a
right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising ....
").In Lamont v. Postmaster
General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965), the Court upheld the First Amendment rights of citizens to receive
political publications sent from abroad. More recently, in Kleindienst v. Mandel,408 U.S. 753, 762-63

information from which they may draw to decide their collective fates."'
Respect for autonomy thus demands that the State adopt a vision of the
core-speech audience that sees them as capable of sorting through the in-
formation that bombards them in the marketplace to discern what is use-
ful and what is true. This vision wavers, however, when it comes to other
speech contexts, as the following Section reveals.
C. The Implied Audience of Non-Core Speech: A Case Study

Paternalism was once a perfectly legitimate basis on which to regu-
late commercial speech." 6 Indeed, practically anything was a perfectly
legitimate basis on which to regulate commercial speech" 7 prior to its
elevation to constitutionally protected status in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy in 1976." s Before that, a legitimate argument for regulating
commercial speech was that advertising manipulates credulous consum-
ers into buying more of a product than they need.119 Another legitimate
argument was that advertising confuses consumers about their best inter-
ests by making them subject to the siren song of the lowest price, regard-
less of quality. 20
(1972), the Court acknowledged a First Amendment right to "receive information and ideas." And in
Procunierv. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408 (1974), in examining the constitutionality of a restriction on
prisoners' mail, the Court stated, "Both parties to the correspondence have an interest ... and censor-
ship of the communication between them necessarily impinges on the interest of each."
115. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
573 (1995) ("[T]he fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment [is] that a speaker has
the autonomy to choose the content of his own message."). Speaker autonomy underpins many First
Amendment doctrines. For example, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256
(1974), the Court upheld the right of a newspaper to exercise editorial discretion in determining the
newspaper's contents. Even in the broadcast context, the government may interfere with speaker au-
tonomy only because, in a medium that requires government allocation to be viable, "the right[s] of
the viewers and listeners" are "paramount." Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
116. The Court's electoral speech cases also provide a good example of how it veers back and
forth between assumptions about the intelligence and sophistication of the audience of campaign-
related speech and information. For more, see the excellent discussion by Raleigh Hannah Levine,
The (Un)Informed Electorate: Insights Into the Supreme Court's Electoral Speech Cases, 54 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 225 (2003).
117. In Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52. 54 (1942), the Court held that the First Amendment
does not protect "purely commercial advertising." For additional discussion, see Alex Kozinski &
Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-Historyof CommercialSpeech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747 (1993).
118. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)
(holding that the First Amendment protects commercial speech).
119. Since 1976, states have attempted, mostly unsuccessfully, to use a "demand reduction" argu-
ment to justify bans on advertising in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350, 355, 376 (1977) (ban on lawyer advertising); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
689, 700 (1977) (ban on contraceptive advertising); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85, 92-94 (1977) (ban on "For Sale" signs). Even after 1976, the Court upheld a ban on casino
advertising despite the "reduction of demand for casino gambling." Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tour-
ism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986). For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes
121-28.
120. The State made, and the Court rejected, this argument made in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
433 U.S. 350, 373-74, 384 (1977). The Court refused to find that price advertising by attorneys was
inherently misleading. Id. at 372. Instead, the Court believed the absence of attorney advertisements

The revolution in commercial speech jurisprudence came when the

Supreme Court substituted a savvier implied audience for the credulous
consumers it had previously envisioned. Suddenly, in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy, the Court demanded that states treat the receivers
of commercial speech as rational actors, capable of parsing the biased
claims of advertisers to make "private economic decisions" that are "in-
telligent and well informed." ' l The Court rejected the State's argument
that banning price advertising of pharmaceuticals would protect consum-
ers from irrationally choosing cheaper pharmaceuticals at the expense of
higher-quality pharmacy services.2 2 The Court roundly condemned the
State's attempt to "protect" its citizens by keeping them in "ignor-
ance,"123 noting that the ban was based on "the reactions it is assumed
people will have to the free flow of drug price information. 12 4 In a 1977
case, the Court even embraced the notion that "more speech" is typically
an appropriate remedy for any harms that may flow from commercial
speech.'25 Even so, the Court applied not strict but intermediate scrutiny
to restrictions on commercial speech. 26 Under the so-called Central
Hudson test, restrictions of truthful and non-misleading commercial
speech would only be upheld if the State established a substantial gov-
ernment interest, directly advanced by the restrictions, which were "not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.' ' 2 7 Henceforth,
the Court would not allow states to protect their citizens from them-
selves, except in a few isolated cases.' 28
As it turns out, the implied audience construct is an excellent ve-
hicle for parsing commercial speech jurisprudence, since the shift from a
credulous consumer model to a savvy shopper model largely explains the
Court's increasing protection of commercial speech.1 29 The aim here,
would leave many consumers poorly equipped to seek legal services. Id. at 370. The Court described
advertising as a boon to "informed and reliable decisionmaking." Id. at 364.
121. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 765.
122. Id. at 769-70.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 769.
125. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingsboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (quoting Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
126. Id. at 95-97.
127. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). The test
for intermediate scrutiny is often called the Central Hudson test, after the case which established it.
See id. Commercial speech is considered less valuable than core political speech, and greater regula-
tion is permitted because commercial speech is more "durable" and hardy and more verifiable than
core speech. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 & n.24.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 429 (1993) (prohibitions on lottery
advertising); Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 342 (1986) (restrictions on
casino advertising).
129. Indeed, as Professor Mitchell Berman has noted, "constitutional protection for commercial
speech remains mostly predicated on ... listener interests." Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial Speech
and the UnconstitutionalConditionsDoctrine: A Second Look at "The Greater Includes the Lesser," 55
VAND. L. REV. 693, 724 (2002); see also Robert Post, The ConstitutionalStatus of Commercial Speech,
48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 14 (2000) ("Commercial speech doctrine.., is sharply audience oriented.").

however, is merely to illustrate the phenomenon by comparing two cases,

one that adopts a credulous consumer model (and has since been over-3°
ruled sub silentio) and another that adopts the savvy shopper model.
This illustration demonstrates that the choice of implied audience is not
inevitable but is instead deeply value-laden, a point which also has appli-
cation in core speech cases.
With that limited objective in mind, compare Posadas de Puerto Ri-
co Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico 31 with 44 Liquormart,Inc. v.
Rhode Island."2 Both cases involve "vice" advertising; specifically, ad-
vertising of casino gambling and alcoholic beverages, respectively.'33 Po-
sadas demonstrates that even after the Court put commercial speech un-
der the mantle of the First Amendment, application of a credulous
consumer model allowed a paternalistic rationale for regulation to suc-
ceed. Posadas involved a ban on truthful and non-misleading advertise-
ment of legal casino gambling to Puerto Rico citizens. 134
The basis for the ban was that advertising would "increase the de-
mand for the product advertised."'35 In other words, the government of
Puerto Rico believed it knew better than its own citizens where their best
interests lay; it felt compelled to protect its citizens from mindlessly suc-
cumbing to advertisements and increasing consumption of an activity
that would be "bad" for them. Puerto Rico contended that casino gam-
bling by its residents threatened their "health, safety and welfare" by
contributing to "the disruption of moral and cultural patterns, the in-
crease in local crime, the fostering of prostitution, the development of
corruption, and the infiltration of organized crime."'36 Interestingly,
however, the government's fears about the negative secondary effects of
gambling did not apply when it came to tourists; indeed, the government
wanted tourists to mindlessly succumb to casino advertisements, and its
restrictions applied only to advertising aimed at residents.137
In upholding the Puerto Rico advertising restrictions, the Court
found that Puerto Rico had a "substantial" interest in decreasing gam-
bling by residents, thereby protecting their "health, safety, and wel-
fare." 38 One might reasonably have asked why Puerto Rico legalized
gambling if it cared so much about the health, safety, and welfare of its
Thus, commercial speech doctrine may be a particularly appropriate realm for application of a con-
struct that focuses on assumptions about audiences latent in the text of judicial opinions.
130. It is more troublesome when the government forces ignorance on its citizens by withholding
information than when it forces knowledge on them through disclosure requirements. Mandatory dis-
closure does not compromise autonomy in the same way as withholding information.
131. 478 U.S. at 328.
132. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
133. 44 Liquormart,Inc., 517 U.S. at 514; Posadasde P.R. Assocs., 478 U.S. at 332.
134. Posadasde P.R. Assocs., 478 U.S. at 332-33.
135. Id. at 342.
136. Id. at 341 (citation omitted).
137. Id. at 332.
138. Id. at 341.

citizens, but the Court glossed over this obvious point.'39 The Court, hav-
ing found a substantial governmental interest, also found that Puerto Ri- '4
co's chosen statute directly advanced it. Puerto Rico was "reasonable"'
in assuming that shielding citizens from targeted advertising would de-41
crease their demand for casino gambling, inevitably benefitting them.'
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, the Court held that Puerto Ri-
co satisfied the last hurdle of intermediate scrutiny: its restrictions were
"no more extensive than necessary" to decrease citizen demand. 42 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court expressed little faith in the market-
place of ideas as a solution to the State's problem. The Court left it "up
to the legislature to decide whether or not such a 'counterspeech' policy
would be as effective in reducing the demand for casino gambling as a re-
striction on advertising.' 41 3 In other words, the State gets to decide
whether its citizens should be trusted to apply their rational faculties to
the issue and decide their own best interests, even when presented with
truthful "information"'" from conflicting viewpoints.
Posadas turns standard First Amendment assumptions on their
heads. The restrictions in Posadasbanned truthful speech to an audience
of Puerto Rican residents based on the assumption that they would be
seduced into "overconsuming" casino gambling. 145 The restrictions as-
sumed, and the Court accepted, that Puerto Ricans as a whole, and not4
merely a small subset of them, would misapprehend their own interests.
The Court allowed the State to manipulate its consumers by limiting
their stock of information about gambling, and did so, ironically, in the
name of protecting them from manipulation by casino advertisers. Posa-
139. Indeed, the Court later accepted the argument that since Puerto Rico could have banned
casino gambling (but chose not to do so), it could take the "lesser" step of banning advertisements
promoting casino gambling. Id. at 345-46.
140. Id. at 342.
141. Id. at 341-42.
142. Id. at 343.
143. Id. at 344. In addition, the Court concluded that because Puerto Rico could prohibit gam-
bling altogether, it could certainly take the lesser step of prohibiting advertisements for gambling. Id.
at 346 ("[I]t is precisely because the government could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of the
underlying conduct that it is permissible for the government to take the less intrusive step of allowing
the conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions on advertising.").
144. Some scholars have pointed out that much advertising is not truly "informational" and does
not contribute to rational decision making. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The
First Amendment in an Age of Paratroopers,68 TEx. L. REv. 1087, 1100-03 (1990). But arguably a
rational consumer can disaggregate the informational and non-informational components of an adver-
tisement and make his own determination of value. In the realm of core speech, the First Amendment
fully protects some works whose value is not purely or even predominantly informational, but protec-
tion of core speech is justified by an interest in fostering individual self-fulfillment that is not present
in the realm of commercial speech. Cf Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Bos-
ton, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (noting that forms of art like music and songs are protected by the
First Amendment).
145. See Posadasde P.R. Assocs., 478 U.S. at 344.
146. See id.

das rejects not just the rational consumer assumption,147 but also the as-
sumption "that some accurate information is better than no information
at all."'" Posadas, in fact, assumes that citizens would be better off if
they did not know that casino gambling existed.1 49 The implied audience
in Posadas is a group of unsophisticated and credulous consumers in
need of paternalistic intervention.
It is hard to reconcile this model of the implied audience with the
one more commonly applied in core speech cases, and in fact the Court
has never tried. Yet the modern trend, even in commercial speech cases,
is to give more credit to the targets of commercial speech. Indicative of
this trend is 44 Liquormart,Inc. v. Rhode Island,5 " which held unconsti-
tutional a ban on advertising retail prices of alcoholic beverages, 1 '
though the Justices had trouble agreeing on a single rationale for the
holding. A majority of Justices believed that the ban on price advertising
failed the Central Hudson test,152 although at least four Justices suggested
that intermediate scrutiny was insufficiently protective of the speech in-
terests involved in the case.'53 The State's reason for the ban on price ad-
vertising was to inhibit alcohol consumption among its citizens.15 4 Al-
147. There was a five member majority. Justice Brennan was joined in his dissent by Justices
Marshall and Blackmun. Id. at 348 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens dissented separately in
an opinion joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. Id. at 359 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980)). The dissenters likewise contended that "[t]he First Amendment
presupposes that 'people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed,
and ... the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication, rather than to close
them."' Id. (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
770 (1976)).
149. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I would hold that Puerto Rico may not suppress the disse-
mination of truthful information about entirely lawful activity merely to keep its residents ignorant.");
see also Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the ConstitutionalStatus of
Social Institutions,147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 858 (1999) ("In... Posadas .... the reason for keeping the
information from potential consumers was not based on a concern about such information coming
from any seller, but simply on a desire to keep such information from the audience as a general mat-
ter.").
150. 517 U.S. 484 (1996). In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 478 (1995), the Court
held, 9-0, that a ban on truthful advertising of alcohol content on beer labels violated the First
Amendment. The Court rejected the notion that a different constitutional standard should apply to
"vice" advertising than to other forms of commercial speech. Id. at 489-90.
151. 44 Liquormart,Inc., 517 U.S. at 489.
152. Id. at 508 (principal opinion supported by four votes); see also id. at 517-18 (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and in the judgment) (expressing disapproval of the Central Hudson test as "hav[ing]
nothing more than policy intuition to support it," but agreeing that it "would prohibit the challenged
regulation"); id. at 523 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) ("I do not join the prin-
cipal opinion's application of the Central Hudson balancing test because I do not believe that such a
test should be applied to a restriction of 'commercial' speech, at least when, as here, the asserted inter-
est is one that is to be achieved through keeping would-be recipients of the speech in the dark."); id. at
528-29 (O'Connor, J., with whom Rehnquist, C.J., Souter and Breyer, JJ., join, concurring in the
judgment) (concluding that the ban failed Central Hudson).
153. See id. at 501 (principal opinion supported by three votes) (arguing that bans on commercial
speech "for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process" deserved more "rigor-
ous" First Amendment review); id. at 523 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (ar-
guing that a stricter standard than intermediate scrutiny should apply).
154. See id. at 492-94 (majority opinion).

though this counted as a "substantial" state interest,155 the Court barred

the State from accomplishing it by depriving its citizens of truthful infor-
mation. The State contended that a ban on advertising would help keep
alcohol prices high, thus limiting consumption.'56 The principal opinion
found, however, that a ban on price advertising would not "directly ad-
vance[]" the State's goal because there was no evidence indicating that
an advertising ban would have "significantly reduce[d]" consumption. 57
More to the point, the State had other weapons in its regulatory arsenal,
such as taxation of alcoholic beverages, that would not target speech.15
Thus, a complete ban on price advertising was "more extensive than ne-
cessary" to achieve the State's goal.'59
A dominant theme of the opinions in 44 Liquormart is the First
Amendment's abhorrence of paternalistic regulation, even when applied
to commercial speech. The principal opinion chided Rhode Island for
attempting to regulate based "solely on the offensive assumption that the
public will respond 'irrationally' to the truth.""' In other words, the
State was constitutionally required to assume that the audience, when
confronted with alcohol price advertising, would not begin mindlessly
guzzling up the cheapest alcohol possible.16 Even in the realm of com-
mercial speech, "[t]he First Amendment directs us to be especially skep-
tical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the gov-
ernment perceives to be their own good.116 2 Echoing the sentiments
expressed in the principal opinion, Justice Thomas, concurring in the
judgment, went even further, asserting that any regulation of commercial
speech intended to keep consumers ignorant was per se unconstitution-
1 63
al.
With 44 Liquormart, the Court imposed a construction of the im-
plied audience in the realm of commercial speech that was consistent
with the construction it uses in the realm of core speech. Commercial
speech jurisprudence, however, provides suggestive evidence about how
155. Id. at 528-29 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that all parties agree the
State's interest was substantial and that the ban directly advanced it, but holding that the ban nonethe-
less was unconstitutional because it was more extensive than necessary).
156. Id. at 494 (majority opinion).
157. See id. at 504-05 (principal opinion supported by four votes) (emphasis omitted).
158. Id. at 507.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 503 (principal opinion supported by three votes). One can also read in the opinion a
respect for the processes of democratic self governance. An increase in taxes on alcoholic beverages
will make citizens aware of the State's temperance policy in a way that a ban on price advertising of
alcoholic beverages will not.
161. Id. at 507-08 (principal opinion supported by four votes).
162. Id. at 503 (principal opinion supported by three votes). Though Justice Thomas did not sign
on to this portion of the principal opinion, he agreed with its sentiments. See id. at 518 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (contending that restrictions on speech are "per se illegitimate" when based on an asserted
interest "to keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the
marketplace"). Thus, at least four Justices explicitly disavowed paternalism as a basis for regulating
commercial speech.
163. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).

core speech jurisprudence might look different without the reigning as-
sumptions of rationalism and anti-paternalism.
III. PREDICTABLE IRRATIONALITY AND OTHER CRITIQUES
First Amendment jurisprudence assumes, for most purposes, that

the implied audience of core speech is comprised of rational information
processors. But what if this assumption is demonstrably false? Or what
if even rational actors make better decisions with less, rather than more,
information? Traditional First Amendment scholarship has leveled two
criticisms at the rationality assumption underlying the marketplace of
ideas paradigm, one based in market dysfunction and the other in human
dysfunction. 16' The first is that even if citizens are mostly rational, the
minimum conditions for a functioning marketplace of ideas are not
met.165 In other words, because the marketplace of ideas does not truly
provide information from a diversity of sources, citizens cannot use the
marketplace to make rational decisions. The second criticism is that the
rationality assumption is simply wrong, because evidence indicates that
citizens are not rational. 166 This second vein of criticism has been bols-
tered by a growing body of scholarship incorporating the insights of cog-
nitive psychology. Cognitive psychology has already challenged the ra-
tional actor assumption of classical economics,167 and it is poised to
challenge the rationality assumption of First Amendment law. 168 In this
Section, however, I hope to show that criticisms of the rationality as-
sumption do not fundamentally undermine the reasons for applying it.
164. Stanley Ingber summarizes these criticisms succinctly as follows:

[R]eal world conditions... interfere with the effective operation of the marketplace of ideas: so-
phisticated and expensive communication technology, monopoly control of the media, access li-
mitations suffered by disfavored or impoverished groups, techniques of behavior manipulation,
irrational responses to propaganda, and the arguable nonexistence of objective truth, all conflict
with marketplace ideals.
Ingber, supra note 8, at 5.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 15.
167. Judge Posner describes the rationality assumption in traditional economics as follows: "The
task of economics, so defined, is to explore the implications of assuming that man is a rational max-
imizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions-what we shall call his 'self-interest.' ... Behavior is rational
when it conforms to the model of rational choice, whatever the state of mind of the chooser."
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (6th ed. 2003) (internal citation omitted); see
also RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS xiii (1991) ("[A]lU economic models of con-
sumer choice are based on rational behavior...."). Drawing insights from cognitive psychology, be-
havioral economics questions the rationality assumption and seeks to demonstrate how humans depart
from what rationality would dictate in predictable ways. See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1.
168. See generally Bambauer, supra note 13, at 651; Horwitz, supra note 21, at 4-5.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW (Vol. 2010
A. The TraditionalCritique:Market Dysfunction

According to critics, the marketplace of ideas cannot function be-
cause a few powerful voices drown out all others.1 9 The resulting lack of
diversity in public discourse deprives citizen of the information they need
to make rational decisions and denies them their right to participate in
policy formation.
Some First Amendment scholars have questioned the marketplace
metaphor because of the dramatic gap between the ideal versus the real
speech marketplace. Owen Fiss is a leading exponent of the market dys-
function critique. 7 ° Like other market dysfunction critics, Fiss builds his
critique on the assertion that the marketplace of ideas has changed since
the First Amendment was ratified. 71 In 1791, public debate was rich with
the voices of citizens from across the political and economic (though not
racial or gender) spectrum, but "[t]oday public debate is dominated by
the television networks and a number of large newspapers and maga-
zines.' ' 72 According to Fiss, the concentration of the mass media distorts
the marketplace of ideas because corporate owners of the mass media
place maximizing profit above serving the public interest. 73 One distor-
tion is the exclusion of certain types of views-namely, in the words 1of74
Charles Fried, those that are "unpopular, unfamiliar, and ill-funded.'
Another distortion is the exclusion of certain types of speakers-the
poor, the poorly educated, women, and minorities.17 As a result, the
market does not serve the needs and interests of citizens, and the electo-
rate as a whole is deprived of the information required for meaningful
self-governance.
The market dysfunction critique compels Fiss and others like him to
an obvious prescriptive solution, namely benign government intervention
to ensure a diverse and fully participatory marketplace of ideas. 76 Fiss
169. Ingber argues that

monopolitistic practices, economies of scale, and an unequal distribution of resources have made
it difficult for new ventures to enter the business of mass communications. Because these factors
limit entry to the economically advantaged, voices, which might have been heard in the time of
the town meeting and pamphleteer, today may be effectively quelled.
Ingber, supranote 98, at 188-89.
170. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, State Activism and State Censorship,100 YALE L.J. 2087 (1991).
171. For criticism of the historical argument, see L.A. Powe, Jr., Scholarship and Markets, 56
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 172, 182-84 (1987).
172. Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARv. L. REv. 781,787 (1987).
173. See id.; see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Into the Woods: Broadcasters,Bureaucrats,and
Children's Television Programming,45 DUKE L.J. 1193, 1211-12 (1996) (observing that "[a] broadcas-
ter's paramount objective is the creation and maintenance of an audience possessed of certain demo-
graphic characteristics" and contending that "commercial speech doctrine provides a more analytically
sound basis for justifying government regulation of broadcasters").
174. Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence:A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L.
REv. 225, 250 (1992).
175. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
AND LAw 163--96 (1987).
176. See, e.g., Ingber, supranote 8, at 5 ("Scholarly critics of the marketplace model argue that the
model itself suggests a vital need for government regulation of the market.").

contends that government should "act as the much-needed countervail-

ing power, to counteract the skew of public debate attributable to the
market and thus preserve the essential conditions of democracy." 177 It is
important to note that the argument for state intervention does not nec-
essarily assume that the electorate is irrational. Rather, it assumes that
the government must guarantee that citizens receive the necessary inputs
of rational decision making, which are not now available in the market-
place of ideas. 178 At its heart, the market dysfunction argument views the
implied audience as a helpless captive of powerful media forces, unable
or unwilling to free itself to seek information from other outlets. It also
calls for powerful though ostensibly benign state intervention in the field
of free expression. Regardless of the descriptive merits of the market
dysfunction critique, its normative agenda to improve the market has had
little traction outside the context of broadcasting,'17 and even there its in-
fluence appears to be waning. 10
177. See Fiss, supra note 172, at 788.

178. It is worth noting that government paternalism directed to increasing the stock of informa-
tion available to citizens is less troubling than government paternalism restricting the stock of informa-
tion. Even so, both involve the government choosing for its citizens which information is worthy of
their attention, and the government already does this through its agenda-setting role. See discussion
infra Part IV.B.3.
179. In the era before government regulation of broadcasting, "[c]ompeting stations broad-
cast[ed] at the same frequency in the same geographic location," leading to signal interference, and
ultimately to chaos. MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW 76 (7th ed. 2005). As a result,
broadcasters sought, and got, federal regulation of the airwaves. JEREMY HARRIS LIPSCHULTZ, FREE
EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET: SOCIAL AND LEGAL BOUNDARIES 60 (2000) ("Regula-
tion was demanded by existing broadcasters, who wanted to protect their stake in a new industry and
did not want new players to interfere with and squelch less powerful signals."). Congress passed the
Radio Act of 1927 and then a few years later the Communications Act of 1934. Id. at 61. Both Acts
assigned the federal government an active role in allocating the airwaves to serve public ends. Specifi-
cally, the Communications Act of 1934 commanded the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
to issue and deny licenses to broadcasters as dictated by "public interest, convenience, or necessity."
Id. Pursuant to this authority, the FCC has over the years employed various measures to ensure that a
diversity of views is broadcast to the public. One of these measures is the now-defunct fairness doc-
trine, which required broadcasters to present both sides of controversial issues. Id. at 67. As part of
the doctrine, the FCC required any broadcast licensee whose programming contained a "personal at-
tack" on the character or integrity of a person or group to provide them "a reasonable opportunity to
respond over the licensee's facilities." Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1969). The
Court upheld the constitutionality of the FCC's "personal attack" rule in Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v.
FCC,and in the process signed off on the notion that the marketplace of ideas might sometimes need
a boost from government. Id. at 390. In Red Lion, the Court justified government intervention to
promote a diversity of views on the unique characteristics of the broadcast medium, particularly the
"scarcity of radio frequencies." Id. Broadcasters accede to certain conditions when they accept a li-
cense to use the airwaves and "[tihere is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Govern-
ment from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or
fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of his communi-
ty." Id. at 389. According to the Court, the rights of broadcasters as speakers are trumped by the
rights of "viewers and listeners" to receive information; to hold otherwise would allow broadcasters to
use their government-granted license to "monopoliz[e]" the marketplace of ideas. Id. at 390. The
Court goes to great pains explaining that its holding is a response to a structural distortion in the mar-
ketplace of ideas caused by spectrum scarcity. This, and only this, can justify direct government inter-
vention, even when motivated by a desire to enhance diversity in public discourse. See id.
180. The FCC has argued that the scarcity doctrine no longer justifies the unique application of
the First Amendment to broadcast regulations designed to enhance diversity. Syracuse Peace Council,

B. Cognitive Psychology and the Human Dysfunction Critique

A more foundational criticism of the marketplace ideal is that its
faith in human reason is misplaced. Even if the marketplace functions
perfectly, truth cannot emerge if human beings are too lazy to seek it or
if they willfully cling to irrational beliefs."' A sampling of recent surveys
suggests the extent to which the citizenry is uninformed and, even worse,
misinformed about current events. A July 2008 survey revealed that fif-
ty-nine percent of Americans reported knowing little or nothing about
either of the presidential contenders' policy positions,'n though an earlier
survey indicated that eighty-four percent of Americans knew that Oprah
Winfrey was campaigning for Barack Obama.'1 A March 2008 survey
indicated that only twenty-eight percent of Americans were aware of the
approximate number of casualties in the war in Iraq.' 4 Though Ameri-
cans' dearth of awareness of political events might be explained away by
the concept of "rational ignorance," ' 5 the extent of irrational ignorance
is alarming. In place of facts, many Americans substitute fictions about
politics and everything else: twelve percent of Americans surveyed in
2008 believed that Barack Obama was Muslim, despite extensive media
coverage refuting this misperception.?8 Worse, according to a survey re-
2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5058 (1987) ("[T]he dramatic transformation in the telecommunications marketplace
provides a basis for the [Supreme] Court to reconsider its application of diminished First Amendment
protection to the electronic media."); see also Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d
501, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (rejecting the scarcity rationale). The Supreme Court has declined to extend
the broadcast paradigm to other media. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868-70 (1997) (declining to
apply the Red Lion paradigm to the Internet because it is not characterized by scarcity and has not
been historically subject to regulation"); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994) (de-
clining to extend Red Lion to cable television); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258
(1974) (holding unconstitutional a statute granting political candidates the right to reply to attack on
their records in newspapers). For a good survey of the Court's jurisprudence in this area, read Chris-
topher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91
GEO. L.J. 245 (2003).
181. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
REv. 964, 965-66 (1978); Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1644-47 (1967); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications,89 COLUM. L. REV.
119, 135 (1989).
182. Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Candidates' Policy Positions Still Not Widely
Known, PEwRESEARCHCENTERPUBLICATIONS, July 16, 2008, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/899/
candidates-policy-positions-still-not-widely-known.
183. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE UPDATE:
AWARENESS OF IRAQ WAR FATALITIES PLUMMETS 2 (2008), http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/401.
pdf.
184. Id. Many Americans are ignorant of basic political information. A 2004 study, for example,
revealed that only thirty-one percent of Americans knew that William Rehnquist was Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court (though eighty-six percent knew that Dick Cheney was Vice President). Stephen
Earl Bennett, Political Ignorance Revisited, PUBLIC OPINION PROS, Dec. 2005, http://www.
publicationopinionpros.norc.org/features/2005/dec/bennett.asp.
185. See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 928 (2006) (citing "[a]
vast body of empirical studies demonstrat[ing] citizens' lack of political knowledge," but observing
that public choice theory explains why "the public's ignorance is rational").
186. Michael Dimock, Belief that Obama Is Muslim Is Durable,Bipartisan-ButMost Likely to
Sway Democratic Votes, PEWRESEARCHCENTERPUBLICATIONS, July 15, 2008, http://pewresearch.org/
pubsI898/belief-that-obama-is-muslim-is-bipartisan-but-most-likey-t-sway-democrats.

ported in the New York Times, "Americans are as likely to believe in fly-
ing saucers as in evolution."' 1 7 And eighteen percent of Americans be-
lieve the sun orbits the earth. 18
Cognitive psychology provides a new window on these lamentable
statistics and, in the process, raises questions about the ideal of rationali-
ty and whether most citizens would be better off even if the marketplace
ideal became a reality. "Cognitive psychology is concerned with internal
processes, mental limitations, and the way in which the processes are
shaped by the limitations."' 189 One of the basic insights of cognitive psy-
chology is that human decision making is not perfectly rational. 19 This
insight, which is also the basis for behavioral economics,19' is incorpo-
rated in a concept known as "bounded rationality."'" According to Her-
bert Simon, "boundedly rational agents experience limits in formulating
and solving complex problems and in processing (receiving, storing, re-
trieving, transmitting) information.' '193 Individuals become boundedly
rational when complex decision-making environments tax their cognitive
faculties. In the face of complexity, individuals typically employ heuris-
tics-i.e., "mental shortcuts"' 94-to aid their decision making, but these
heuristics can cause decision making to depart from what strict rationali-
ty would dictate. Though my aim here is not to delve deeply into the rich
literature of cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, a couple of
examples of how heuristics might impede fully rational decision making
187. Nicholas D. Kristof, 'With a Few More Brains... ,'N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2008, at WK14.
188. Sam Wang & Sandra Aamodt, Your Brain Lies to You, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,2008, at A19.
189. Daniel Kahneman et al., Preface to JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES xi, xii (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). In addition to cognitive biases, emotion can also
cloud humans' abilities to make rational decisions. For further discussion, see Jeremy A. Blumenthal,
Emotional Paternalism,35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2007) (discussing the ways in which emotions
distort decision making).
190. For these purposes, a decision is rational if it (1) "is based on the decision maker's current
assets," monetary as well as psychological; (2) "is based on the possible consequences of the choice";
(3) calculates the likelihood of uncertain consequences "according to the basic rules of probability
theory"; and (4) is chosen with regard for the "constraints" of probable outcomes and the "values or
satisfactions associated" with those outcomes. REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL
CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 18
(2001). Based on this definition, research in psychology shows that not only do people often make
"patently irrational" decisions, they are "irrational in systematic ways-ways related to their automatic
or 'bounded' thinking habits." Id. at 22.
191. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Happiness, Efficiency, and the Promise of DecisionalEquity: From
Outcome to Process, 36 PEPp. L. REv. 935, 937 (2009) ("[Clonventional economics is based on beha-
vioral assumptions that have over the last twenty-five years come under increasing scrutiny. Principal
among these assumptions is that people are rational and motivated by self-interest alone.").
192. See Herbert A. Simon, Introductory Comment, in ECONOMICS, BOUNDED RATIONALITY
AND THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION 3,3-7 (Herbert A. Simon et al. eds., 1992).
193. Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach, 87
AM. J. SOC. 548, 553 (1981) (citing HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL
198-99 (1957)).
194. See BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE Is LESS 57 (2004); see also
HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 190, at 95 ("People rely on cognitive strategies that 'work' most of the
time; are cognitively economical; and are robust in the sense that they are durable in the face of in-
complete information, changing situations, and momentary distraction. But most of these strategies
also produce signature errors and biases .... ").

may help the reader understand the emerging challenge to the market-
place of ideas.
One example is the framing effect: research reveals that how a ques-
tion is framed fundamentally affects peoples' answers. In a well-known
experiment, Nobel Prize winners Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
asked research subjects to fill out questionnaires about how to handle a
disease outbreak.195 Subjects were asked to imagine that 600 people
would contract a life-threatening illness for which there are two possible
treatments. They were then told: "If Program A is adopted, 200 people
will be saved.... If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that
600 people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be
saved. ' 196 In this scenario, seventy-two percent of respondents chose
Program A, preferring saving 200 lives for certain to the risk of saving no
one. 19 Kahneman and Tversky then refrained the question and told res-
pondents: "If Program C is adopted 400 people will die.... If program D
is adopted there is [a] 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and [a] 2/3
probability that 600 people will die." 198 This question presented respon-
dents with exactly the same choice as before, but this time seventy-eight
percent chose treatment D. 99 When asked who they would save, respon-
dents made one choice; when asked who they would let die, respondents
made another. The disparity in results is explained by risk aversion and
the different ways humans perceive losses and gains.2m The first scenario
focuses on the saving of 200 people as a sure gain; the second focuses on
the death of 400 as a sure loss. The results are the same, but respon-
dents' perception of risk changes when the options are described diffe-
rently.
Framing highlights the extent to which human decision making de-
parts from the ideal of rationality. In Kahneman and Tversky's study,
195. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Framing]. This example is
used by HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 190, at 303; SCHWARTZ, supra note 194, at 64-65; and Bambau-
er, supra note 13, at 682. See also Barbara McNeil et al., On the Elicitation of Preferencesfor Alterna-
tive Therapies,306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1259, 1259 (1982) (demonstrating that people respond different-
ly to treatments when presented in terms of survival rates versus mortality rates, even where the
outcomes of the treatments are exactly the same). For more on the framing effect, see David A. Ar-
mor & Shelley E. Taylor, When PredictionsFail: The Dilemma of UnrealisticOptimism, in HEURISTICS
AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 334, 334-35 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds.,
2002), or Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 341, 343
(1984).
196. Tversky & Kahneman, Framing,supra note 195, at 453.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. ("Inconsistent responses to [the] problems ... arise from the conjunction of a framing
effect with contradictory attitudes toward risks involving gains and losses."). Tversky and Kahneman
refused to label the "preference reversals" seen in the differing responses to the two scenarios as "nec-
essarily irrational." Id. at 458. Instead, "[l]ike other intellectual limitations, discussed.., under the
heading of 'bounded rationality,' the practice of acting on the most readily available frame can some-
times be justified by reference to the mental effort required to explore alternative frames and avoid
potential inconsistencies." Id.

individuals appeared to have a difficult time transcending the "frame" to

get at the true choice presented by the hypothetical scenario. Their
choices reflected intuition rather than reason, making it hard to avoid the
conclusion that the choices were irrational. Even worse, this form of ir-
rationality resists being "cured" by more education or greater know-
ledge. 20 1 Susceptibility to the framing effect makes both sophisticated
and unsophisticated audiences susceptible to "manipulation. ' '2°, Though
skillful use of framing is a staple of courtroom advocacy, and, arguably,
of all persuasive speaking, unscrupulous use of framing is the hallmark of
the propagandist and demagogue. At a minimum, research on framing
undermines the assumptions of First Amendment jurisprudence that citi-
zens are rational processors of information.
This assumption is further undermined by research demonstrating
that humans systematically err in filtering available information to
choose which is relevant and which is not. One example of a systematic
reasoning error is the availability heuristic, a logical fallacy that has di-
rect relevance to public discourse and public policy decisions. 20 3 The
availability heuristic means that individuals are likely to believe some-
thing if it is repeated often enough, thus making it the "evidence" that is
most "available" to their consciousness when making decisions.2 4 The
availability heuristic also makes people more likely to call to mind events
that are vivid or emotionally charged, and thus more likely to accept
these events as relevant to their decision making.205 The availability heu-
ristic explains, for example, why people perceive flying as more risky
than driving. The availability heuristic may even lead to an availability
cascade, in which not just individuals but groups are more likely to be-
lieve a statement or a vivid anecdote that is frequently repeated in public
201. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 783 n.26 (2001)
(listing sources supporting the assertion that experts are subject to framing and other cognitive biases).
Tversky and Kahneman note that "[t]he reliance on heuristics and the prevalence of biases are not
restricted to laymen. Experienced researchers are also prone to the same biases-when they think
intuitively." Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristicsand Biases,
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 189, at 3,18.
202. Bambauer, supra note 13, at 683.
203. Another fallacy in this regard that may have relevance for public policy decisions is the op-
timism bias that leads humans to consistently view their own odds of avoiding an unpleasant outcome
as better than they actually are. Armor & Taylor, supra note 195, at 336. Another fallacy of relevance
to public discourse is the herd mentality, in which individuals may go along with what they believe to
be the majority consensus. This fallacy helps explain stock market bubbles and crashes. See ROBERT
J. SILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 148-55 (2000) (discussing overconfidence in market beha-
viors); see also David Hirshleifer & Siew Hong Teoh, Thought and Behavior Contagion in Capital
Markets, in HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL MARKETS: DYNAMICS AND EVOLUTION 1, 1-46 (Thorsten
Hens & Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hopp6 eds., 2009). Crime may even increase crime in response to high
prosecution rates. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv.
349, 354 (1997) ("[Tlhe perception that one's peers will or will not disapprove exerts a much stronger
influence than does the threat of a formal sanction on whether a person decides to engage in a range
of common offenses .... ").
204. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 201, at 11-14.
205. Id.

discourse. 20 The availability heuristic explains why politicians commonly

use vivid anecdotes rather than dry statistics in discussing public policy
issues. It also allows politicians to manipulate public discourse, and ulti-
mately public policy formation. Taken together, the evidence regarding
cognitive biases threatens one of the foundational assumptions of the
marketplace of ideas; namely, that humans are rational actors, capable of
sifting through available information, sorting the wheat from the chaff,
and ultimately reaching truth.
More alarming is evidence that more information does not always
lead to better decision making, even for experts."' In fact, as Cass Sun-
stein and Richard Thaler have written, the argument "that more is neces-
sarily better.., is quite implausible in many contexts."' Research re-
veals that increased information may lead to decision paralysis. A 2000
study involving jams - yes, the kind made from fruit - showed that shop-
pers presented with the ability to sample twenty-four varieties ended up
buying jam only three percent of the time. 2°9 In contrast, shoppers pre-
sented with only six varieties of jam ended up buying jam thirty percent
of the time. 210 A more recent study found that employees were less likely
to participate in a 401(k) plan as the options of funds in which to invest
2
11
increased.
Not only does additional information lead to decision paralysis, it
may also change the underlying decision, even if the additional informa-
tion is irrelevant.2 11 One study, for example, found that the outcome of a
mock jury trial changed when the "jurors" were presented with three
possible verdicts as opposed to two, even though the additional options
were irrelevant. 213 In another study, when participants were asked to
choose between a "low-end" camera and a "mid-level" camera, about fif-
206. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L.
REv. 683, 728 (1999).
207. Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Se-
curities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 456-57 (2003) ("Studies show that by trying to evaluate
more information, individuals who are accountable often overinterpret information, focus too much
on less relevant information while ignoring key (or 'diagnostic') information, and pay too much atten-
tion to conflicting information in anticipation of criticism from the party they are accountable to.").
208. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, LibertarianPaternalismIs Not an Oxymoron, 70 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1159, 1196 (2003); see also GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACrICE OF
AUTONOMY 62, 80 (1988); SCHWARTZ, supra note 194, at 3. This also means that people are easily
manipulated by propaganda.
209. Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too
Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 995,996-97 (2000).
210. Id. at 997.
211. Sheena Iyengar et al., How Much Choice Is Too Much?: Contributions to 401(k) Retirement
Plans 9 (Pension Research Council, Working Paper No. 2003-10). Even experienced professionals fall
prey to decision paralysis when faced with numerous options. See Bambauer, supra note 13, at 683.
212. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 194, at 1-8. Increased information-in the form of exposure to
both sides of an issue-may even lead to increased polarization of attitudes. For additional discussion,
see Lee Sigelman & Carol K. Sigelman, Judgments of the Carter-Reagan Debate: The Eyes of the Be-
holders,48 PUB. OPINION Q. 624,624 (1984).
213. Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependencein Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287,
290-91 (1996).

ty percent chose each one. 214 But when participants were asked to choose
between three cameras-low-end, mid-level, and high-end-seventy-two
percent chose the mid-level camera.215 In these contexts, more informa-
tion obviously affected decisions but did not make them more rational.
That said, it is certainly not always the case that more information leads
to worse decisions. "[I]ncreased quantities of irrelevant information"
impede decision making, but "increased amounts of relevant informa-
tion" improve it.2 6 The trick, of course, is sorting the relevant from the
irrelevant, a task which the marketplace metaphor leaves to the people
themselves, at least in the realm of core speech.
C. Is More Intervention in the Marketplace of Ideas Justified?

As the discussion above suggests, an emerging body of evidence
suggests that defects in human reasoning are complex and pervasive, and
that humans often lack the ability meaningfully to process information
"from a multitude of tongues," particularly when trying to formulate pol-
icies for the future. Indeed, Professor Derek Bambauer, one of the few
scholars to apply cognitive psychology to First Amendment law, has ar-
gued that such evidence demonstrates the descriptive failure of the mar-
ketplace metaphor; he goes further (much further) by concluding that
this descriptive failure justifies jettisoning the marketplace metaphor as
"a framework for decisions about regulating communications," clearing
the way for government to play a21stronger
7
role in channeling information
into and out of the public sphere.
Although Bambauer's work is useful and engaging, he overplays his
hand to the extent he rejects, seemingly altogether, the marketplace me-
taphor's foundational assumption of human rationality.21 People are
sometimes irrational in quite predictable ways, but they are not always,
or even predominantly, irrational. People use cognitive heuristics be-
cause they generally work, and pointing to instances where they do not
work does not undermine this fundamental principle. On average, heu-
ristics help people make "good enough" decisions, and they reduce deci-
214. Id. at 288 (citing Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast
and Extremeness Aversion, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 281,290 (1992)).
215. Id.
216. Charles A. O'Reilly, III, Individuals and Information Overload in Organizations:Is More
NecessarilyBetter?, 23 ACAD. MGMT. J. 684,685 (1980); see also id. at 692 (confirming these findings).
When information is limited, a menu of countless options increases the costs of decisions without
increasing the likelihood of accuracy. But when choosers are highly informed, the availability of
numerous options decreases the likelihood of error and does not greatly increase decision costs,
simply because informed choosers can more easily navigate the menu of options.
Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 208, at 1197-98.
217. Bambauer, supra note 13, at 696. As I shall contend in the next section, ideals have uses
even if they are never fully realized. See infra Part IV.B.7.
218. Like Bambauer, Paul Horwitz suggests that behavioral analysis may "sweep aside some of
the prevailing metaphors of First Amendment theory." Horwitz, supra note 21, at 8-9.

sion-making costs in the face of complexity and uncertainty. 219 This helps
explain, in part, why "democracy seems to be working pretty well" de-
spite citizens' "widespread ignorance" of many basic political facts.120 As
political scientists Richard Lau and David Redlawsk have noted, even if
American voters cannot always articulate reasoned positions on policy
issues, they may still be able to "vote[] 'correctly"' and "'in accordance
with what their fully informed preferences would be.' 2 1 In the political
realm, voters use traits such as a candidate's party affiliation or ideology
as proxies for the candidate's policy positions; 2 as a result, voting deci-
sions may end up being more rational than the relatively low levels of po-
litical knowledge amongst the citizenry would predict. While such cogni-
tive strategies are not always effective, there is no evidence that
irrationality so pervades voter decision making that we must give up on
democracy.
Moreover, it is by no means clear that one can generalize from evi-
dence that individuals are subject to cognitive biases in some settings to
the conclusion that decision making in society at large is fundamentally
flawed in a way that demands government action. There are clearly in-
stances in which aggregate decisions are more rational than individual 22 4
decisions 23 and in which the group "knows" more than the individual.
James Surowiecki wrote about this phenomenon in his book, The Wis-
dom of Crowds. Drawing on a number of studies of group decision mak-
ing, Surowiecki showed that "[i]f you ask a large enough group of di-
verse, independent people to make a prediction or estimate a probability,
and then average those estimates, the errors each of them makes in com-
ing up with an answer will cancel themselves out. ' 25 The result is that
groups of individuals acting independently of one another are very good
predictors of certain phenomena, such as whether a horse is likely to win
a race, 226 or whether a company is likely to prosper. 227 Indeed, this is why
financial markets as a whole tend to outperform all but a handful of indi-
vidual investors. 2 8 Though it is easy to point to examples of irrationality
in markets -particularly in the spring of 2010-the point is that irratio-
219. See id. at 13.

220. Richard R. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Advantages and Disadvantagesof Cognitive Heuristics
in PoliticalDecision Making, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 951, 951 (2001).
221. Id.
222. See id. at 952-53.
223. Id. at 952 ("Aggregate opinion can be much more stable and apparently 'rational' than indi-
vidual opinions, as long as error in individual opinions is assumed to be random." (citation omitted)).
The problem, of course, is that cognitive biases lead to non-random errors, and groups are sometimes
subject to "group think." See generally JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE
MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS,
ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS 3-22 (2004).
224. See generally SUROWIECKI, supra note 223, at 3-22.
225. Id. at 10.
226. Id. at 14.
227. Id. at 234-35.
228. Id.

nality is a deviation from the norm. On average, though certainly not

always, collective decision making by diverse groups reaches rational re-
sults.
Even if the assumptions underlying marketplace theory are false, it
does not necessarily follow that citizens would be better served by in-
creased filtering of information flowing into the marketplace of ideas.
Experts are often subject to the same cognitive biases as the rest of us,
and self-interest is just as likely to taint their decisions. 229 There is no
guarantee that experts would be better at filtering information to provide
the amount that is optimal for rational decision making. Moreover, as
demonstrated below, filtering is unlikely to be performed by completely
disinterested parties, and less than perfect decision making may be a rea-
sonable price to pay to preserve First Amendment, and indeed demo-
cratic, values.
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CLINGING TO A FLAWED IDEAL
Over the years, the assumptions underlying much of First Amend-

ment jurisprudence, including the rationality assumption and the more-
is-better assumption, have come under intense criticism. Now, a body of
scholarship lying outside the legal realm forms the basis of a new chal-
lenge to these assumptions. This creates a problem, not just for First
Amendment theory, but for law more generally: the rationality and
more-is-better assumptions are embedded in the marketplace metaphor
because they are embedded in democratic theory and legal doctrine.
What is needed are new, or simply comprehensively restated, justifica-
tions for clinging to what is clearly a flawed ideal.
A. ProceduralConcerns
Consider again the justification for adhering to the rationality ideal

proffered by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito in FEC v. Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc. 230 The Justices insisted that First Amendment protec-
tion hinges on a "reasonable interpretation" of the contested speech ra-
ther than its231 "actual effect ...on a particular segment of the target au-
229. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.

230. 551 U.S. 449 (2007). For a full discussion of the case's holding and the disagreements
amongst the Justices in the majority, see supra note 14. Of course the refusal to apply an actual-effect
test may result in the suppression of speech in some instances. In Gitlow v. New York, the Court af-
firmed a conviction for advocacy of criminal anarchy where the defendant published a Manifesto for
the Left Wing of the Socialist Party under the incitement principle. The Court found "no evidence of
any effect resulting from the publication and circulation of the Manifesto." Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 656 (1925). Yet, it reasoned "the immediate danger is none the less real and substantial, be-
cause the effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen." Id. at 669. The Court also wrote:
"A single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smoldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping
and destructive conflagration." Id.
231. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 469 (principal opinion supported by two votes). Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito would have adopted a test requiring a court to protect the campaign

dience. '' 32 A reasonable interpretation, of course, hinges on imagining

how a reasonable audience would decode the speech. Though the Justic-
es did not fully explain the justification for using an impliedly rational
audience as the benchmark for judging speech, they did contend that an
actual-effect test would "typically lead to a burdensome, expert-driven
inquiry, with an indeterminate result" and would "unquestionably chill a
33
'2
substantial amount of political speech.
Let's look at the justifications more fully. Certainly experts and
probably polling data would be needed in order to determine the actual
effect of contested speech, and both experts and polls prolong litigation
and drive up its costs. It is worth exploring further, however, whether an
actual-effect test would be feasible. In trademark law, courts are routine-
34
ly asked to rely on survey evidence to determine infringement claims3
The test for infringement is whether a defendant's use of the plaintiff's
trademark is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to de-
ceive. 235 The goal of this "likelihood of confusion" test is to determine
whether "an appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are
likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to the source of the
goods in question. ' 236 Courts concede that the likelihood of confusion
test is difficult to apply because it depends on "varying human reac-
tions. 2 37 They nevertheless gamely plug away at assessing the likelihood
of confusion based on a number of factors:
speech at issue only if "no reasonable interpretation" of it would place it within the unprotected cate-
gory of "express advocacy" under BCRA § 203. Id. at 469-70. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas
believed that even this test failed to draw a bright enough line to protect core political speech. Id. at
492 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
232. Id. at 469 (principal opinion supported by two votes) (emphasis added) (citing Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976) (per curiam)).
233. Id.
234. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23 cmt. c (1995) ("Consumer sur-
veys can be helpful in establishing whether confusion is likely."); see also, e.g., Sally Beauty Co. v.
Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 974 (10th Cir. 2002) ("[E]vidence [of actual confusion] may be intro-
duced through surveys, although their evidentiary value depends on the methodology and questions
asked."); CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng'g, Inc., 267 F.3d 660, 685 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[E]vidence of actual
confusion, if available, is entitled to substantial weight in the likelihood of confusion analysis .. ");
Rust Env't & Infrastructure, Inc. v. Teunissen, 131 F.3d 1210, 1218 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Actual confusion
can be shown by either direct evidence or by survey-evidence."); Michael J. Allen, The Role of Actual
Confusion Evidence in Trademark Infringement Litigation, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 267-68 (1993)
("[M]ost courts agree that actual confusion is one of the most important factors, if not the most impor-
tant factor, considered in determining the likelihood of confusion ... .
235. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006).
236. McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1979). Although the
Second Circuit references the ordinarily prudent purchaser, the very same opinion states that it is rele-
vant that purchasers may be "unknowledgeable" and "unsophisticated" and that the "purchasing pub-
lic must be credited with only a modicum of intelligence." Id. at 1138 (quoting Carnation Co. v. Cal.
Growers Wineries, 97 F.2d 80, 81 (C.C.P.A. 1938)). Similarly, courts have also noted that the test de-
pends on whether a person "with a not very definite or clear recollection as to the real trade-mark, is
likely to become confused or misled." Northam Warren Corp. v. Universal Cosmetic Co., 18 F.2d 774,
775 (7th Cir. 1927). Even so, the court need not apply the likelihood of confusion test "merely to pro-
tect the most gullible fringe of the consuming public." Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Bait. Football
Club Ltd., 34 F.3d 410,414 (7th Cir. 1994).
237. Colburn v. Puritan Mills, Inc., 108 F.2d 377, 378 (7th Cir. 1939).

the strength of [the prior owner's] mark, the degree of similarity be-
tween the two marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood
that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the
reciprocal of defendant's good faith in adopting its own mark, the
quality of defendant's product, and the sophistication of the buy-
38
ers.2
All this, and courts "may have to take still other variables into ac-
count. "239
In applying these factors, courts rely on their own assumptions
about how the presumed audience of purchasers would respond to the
competing trademarks, but they frequently bolster these assumptions
with the testimony of "professionals in marketing or applied statistics to
conduct surveys of consumers. ' 24 Nonetheless, this empirical evidence
does little to simplify the task of deciding whether consumers would be
likely to be confused. In the words of Judge Posner, "The battle of ex-
perts that ensues is frequently unedifying. ' '241 Not only does the "bat-
tle"-the fact that the experts are in complete disagreement as to their
"findings"-undermine judicial confidence, but judges typically are hard
pressed to assess the proffered data due to lack of expertise in statistics
or survey methodology.2 2 Moreover, the use of survey evidence raises
the question of how many members of the consuming public must be
likely to be confused to justify a finding of infringement. Is 7.6 percent
an "appreciable" number of confused purchasers, as one court was asked
to decide? 243 Considering these difficulties, both judges and scholars
have concluded that surveys regarding "actual confusion" amongst "real"
purchasers provide little benefit and add significant costs to infringement
cases. 244 If the state of affairs with regard to such evidence is unsatisfac-
tory in trademark law, there is certainly no reason for First Amendment
law to borrow it.24 This is especially true because trademark law does
not really worry about the chilling effect of expensive and protracted liti-
238. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). These factors are
called the Polaroidformula. See also PAUL GOLDSTEIN & R. ANTHONY REESE, COPYRIGHT, PATENT,
TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DoCrRINES: CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 364 (6th ed. 2008) (noting, however, that "[e]ach circuit has adopted its
own factors," though the tests tend to overlap).
239. PolaroidCorp., 287 F.2d at 495.
240. IndianapolisColts, Inc., 34 F.3d at 414.
241. Id. at 415.
242. See id. at 415-16 (noting a more fundamental problem common to consumer survey research;
namely, "that people are more careful when they are laying out their money than when they are ans-
wering questions").
243. See Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622,626 (8th Cir. 1987).
244. See Harvey S. Perlman, The Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition: A Work in
Progress,80 TRADEMARK REP. 461,472-73 (1990).
245. It is worth mentioning here that First Amendment jurisprudence dealing with religious free-
doms employs a reasonable observer test, which again rejects the use of empirical data about the real
audience. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682-83 (2005).

gation on trademark infringement.2 6 In First Amendment law, however,

the chilling effect of expensive2 47and protracted litigation on protected
speech is likely to be substantial.
B. FirstAmendment Values
Although courts have procedural justifications for relying on the
reasonable interpretation of core speech rather than its actual
interpretation, there are also compelling philosophical and pragmatic
justifications for doing so. The rational audience model constrains
paternalistic speech regulation, thereby protecting autonomy interests
and the foundations of democratic self-governance. 2" Moreover, the
rational audience model helps prevent the dumbing down of public
discourse by refusing to regulate based on the needs of the least educated
or least sophisticated audience members. Finally, the rational audience
model checks government abuse of its agenda-setting power to drown
out other speakers and dominate public discourse.249 In effect, this final
argument is an overlooked facet of the distrust of government strain in
First Amendment scholarship, and one that has added emphasis given
the current state of the mass media.
1. Democracy and Autonomy

The assumption that citizens are rational is deeply embedded in
democratic theory.5 0 In a liberal democracy such as ours, the govern-
ment derives both its power and its legitimacy from the "consent of the
governed,"251
' and the governed make their will known through a variety
of means, such as voting in elections and participating in public dis-
246. See Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L.
REV. 381,417 (2008).
247. See Susan M. Gilles, Taking FirstAmendment ProcedureSeriously: An Analysis of Process in
Libel Litigation, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1753, 1789 (1998) ("[lI]t is now clear that chill on speakers
comes.., from concern about the costs of litigation."); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe:
Defamation and Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 890-92 (2000) (discussing the chilling ef-
fect of protracted litigation on free speech).
248. Both autonomy and democratic self-governance are pillars of First Amendment theory,
though they are offered to justify the protection of expression generally, rather than the embrace of
rationalism and the preference for unrestricted entrance into the marketplace of ideas. See supra
notes 16, 105 and accompanying text.
249. See supraPart IV.B.2-3.
250. Doubtless this is part of the reason that contract law presumes that parties to a contract are
capable of making rational decisions about their own ends, that tort law assumes people generally are
capable of behaving reasonably, and that the rationality assumption pervades law generally. "Many
regulatory schemes, including the federal securities laws, assume that people, at least for the most part,
are rational. Consequently, people simply need more information to better evaluate their options and
make better decisions. If this is the case, more information is always better than less." Paredes, supra
note 207, at 435.
251. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also Owen M. Fiss, Free
Speech and Social Structure,71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1407 (1986) (discussing the process of "collective
self-determination").

course.52 Citizen participation in collective decision making enhances

both the legitimacy and the quality of the governing decisions ultimately
made. The ideal of democratic self-governance, however, makes no
sense unless one assumes that citizens will generally make rational choic-
es to govern the fate of the nation. If a majority of citizens make policy
choices based on lies, half-truths, or propaganda, sovereignty lies not
with the people but with the purveyors of disinformation. If this is the
case, democracy is both impossible and undesirable.
It is generally agreed that a core purpose of the First Amendment is
to foster the ideal of democratic self-governance. In fact, First Amend-3
ment doctrine has been consciously fashioned to reinforce this ideal.5
The First Amendment, as interpreted by courts, recognizes the important
role of the media in gathering information and presenting it to citizens
for their consideration .5 4 First Amendment doctrine also protects the
process of critical interaction' 5 by which citizens come to understand and
forge consensus on public issues, and it safeguards the means by which
they convey their understanding to their elected representatives.
This argument seems circular because it is. Liberal democracy and
freedom of expression are mutually reinforcing. The liberal democratic
ideal reflected in the U.S. Constitution imagines a rational citizenry, and
the First Amendment is part of the machinery to create that citizenry. If
citizens are incapable of exercising their rational faculties to participate
in public discourse, then they are equally incapable of rational self-
governance. To reject the possibility of a rational citizenry, therefore, is
to reject the democratic ideal. 256
252. Even where the Constitution imposes restraints on majoritarian decision making, deference
to majority will is the rule, not the exception. Yet deference to majority will make little sense if one
assumes that citizens are pervasively and ineluctably irrational.
253. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
254. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) ("[T]he Court's deci-
sions involving corporations in the business of communication or entertainment are based not only on
the role of the First Amendment in fostering individual self-expression but also on its role in affording
the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas."); Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,390 (1969).
255. As Robert Post has pointed out, First Amendment doctrine clears a space for "a process of
critical interaction." ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT 143 (1995). Participation in discourse arguably fosters citizens' abilities to make ra-
tional decisions, not through the intervention of an "enlightened elite." "Rather, the people educate
themselves" through the "exchange of opinions, refereed by the public." Bernard Manin, On Legiti-
macy and Political Deliberation,in 4 LIBERALISM: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN POLITICAL THEORY 247,
261 (G.W. Smith ed., 2002).
256. The anti-paternalism of First Amendment doctrine heightens the need for development of
critical faculties, making education a critical component of participation in public discourse. See
RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: A
COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH 14-15, 170 (2006) (discussing the im-
portance of education to democratic self-governance). This was a principle forwarded by Thomas Jef-
ferson in a letter to John Tyler in 1810, in which he contended that "no republic can maintain itself in
strength" without a program of "general education, to enable every man to judge for himself what will
secure or endanger his freedom." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Tyler (May 26, 1810), in 12
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 393 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1903).

Whether that ideal should be rejected is best left to political theor-

ists. Suffice to say that unless we want to fundamentally alter our system
of governance, it makes sense for us to aim for internal consistency. Yet
the necessity for embracing rationalism does not necessarily entail em-
bracing the notion that more information is better than less. Perhaps cit-
izens would make better information with a limited stock of information
selected to match their actual cognitive capabilities more closely. This
process of authoritative selection, after all, is how information is pre-
sented in the classroom. Even discussion is managed to make sure that,
ideally, all sides of an issue are presented. Why, then, has the Supreme
Court rejected this model for public discourse? One answer is that we do
not trust state actors to be in charge of the authoritative selection. The
choice of inputs into the marketplace of ideas would likely be self-
serving, designed to secure public approval for those in power. There
simply is no disinterested moderator of public discourse.
More critically, authoritative selection of the information to be in-
cluded in public discourse violates citizen autonomy. The need to re-
spect citizens as "autonomous agents" capable of self-determination' 7
undoubtedly comprises both an underpinning of the more-is-better as-
sumption as well as the rational audience assumption. To deny citizens
this autonomy is to deny them a fundamental aspect of citizenship. The
Court explained this relationship in Cohen v. California:
[The constitutional right of free expression] is designed and in-
tended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public
discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced
largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such
freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more
perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would com-
port with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which
our politicalsystem rests.258
This statement of principle emphasizes the linkage between demo-
cratic theory and autonomy. Democracy accords citizens the right to
choose their collective fates: that choice is meaningless if it is coerced or
manipulated.25 9 In fact, democratic decisions are simply illegitimate if
they violate this fundamental principle. ° Of course, autonomy is not
merely an instrumental justification but a deontological one as well.261
257. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-50 (1989).
258. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (emphasis added).
259. See BAKER, supra note 257, at 47-50 ("[T]he practices of democratic decision making or wel-
fare maximization [and utilitarianism] can often be understood as properly implementing equal re-
spect for persons as autonomous agents."); Mark G. Yudof, In Search of a Free Speech Principle,82
MICH. L. REv. 680, 695 (1984) (book review) ("[T]he dignity argument merges with the normative
argument from democracy.").
260. See BAKER, supranote 257, at 47-50.
261. See Laura A. Heymann, The Public's Domain in Trademark Law: A First Amendment
Theory of the Consumer, 43 GA. L. REv. 651, 660 (2009) (observing that a Kantian theory of autonomy
values choices because it "is personal to the individual," whereas a Millian theory "takes the conse-

Self-expression lies close to the core of personality, and government in-

trusions
2
may invade individual freedom in this realm more than in oth-
26
ers.
2. Preventingthe Dumbing Down of Public Discourse

Democracy and autonomy are important considerations in adopting
a model of the audience of First Amendment speech, but it is also impor-
tant to ask what effect the chosen model will have on public discourse.
The rational audience model elevates the level of public discourse in at
least two ways.
First, failure to assume that the audience of core speech is com-
posed of reasonable people would reduce public discourse to the level of
the least sophisticated audience. Speakers would be responsible for
transgressing the boundaries of public discourse unless they correctly
predicted the interpretation that might be placed on their speech by un-
sophisticated audience members. The Court's reasoning in Spence v.
Washington supports this proposition. 263 In Spence, the defendant was
convicted in state court of violating an "improper use" statute prohibit-
ing placing "figure, mark, picture, [or] design" on the United States
flag. 1 The defendant taped a peace sign on the flag and displayed it out-
side of his apartment to signify his opposition to the Cambodian invasion
and the shooting of students at Kent State University. 265 In deciding that
the flag defacement statute was unconstitutional as applied to Spence,
the Court reasoned that the defendant's "message was direct, likely to be
understood, and within the contours of the First Amendment. ' ' 266 The
Court thus implicitly recognized that Spence's intent need not be under-
stood by every audience member to receive First Amendment protec-
tion.
This principle is also illustrated by the line of Supreme Court cases
insulating speakers from tort liability for "non-factual" statements, such
as rhetorical hyperbole, parody, and the like-all of which could easily
be misinterpreted by unreasonable readers. 267 Consider Greenbelt Coop-
erative PublishingAss'n v. Bresler.261 In Bresler, a real estate developer
sued for defamation after a newspaper characterized his zoning negotia-
quentialist view that society should prefer autonomy because it leads to the overall well-being of socie-
ty").
262. Greenawalt, supra note 181, at 150-52. But cf. Yudof, supra note 259, at 695 (arguing that
people gain just as much dignity from economic factors as from expression of ideas).
263. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
264. Id. at 406-07.
265. Id. at 408.
266. Id. at 415.
267. For extensive discussion of the constitutional privilege for opinion, see generally Lidsky, su-
pra note 247.
268. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).

tions with the city council as "blackmail. 2 69 The Court held that the First
Amendment barred the developer's action, observing: "It is simply im-
possible to believe that a reader who reached the word 'blackmail' in ei-
ther article [published by the newspaper] would not have understood ex-
actly what was meant: it was Bresler's public and wholly legal negotiating
proposals that were being criticized." 70 Though the Court's interpreta-
tion clearly contemplated how the word blackmail would be read by a
reasonable reader, the Court found that "even the most careless reader"
would have interpreted the word as "no more than rhetorical hyperbole"
in the context in which it appeared. 7 1 Nevertheless, the Court clearly
endorsed the principle that speakers should not be held liable for "mis-
readings" of their speech by idiosyncratic or unsophisticated audience
members. Thus, the Court correctly described Bresler as playing a cen-
tral role in providing breathing space for freedom of expression.272 This
breathing space allows speakers latitude because they do not have to
concern themselves with unsophisticated audience members who will not
understand the nuances of their speech.
A second way that the rational audience model prevents the dumb-
ing down of public discourse is by acting as an exhortation to audience
members who do not reasonably decode the texts that comprise public
discourse. From this perspective, the reasonable audience model in First
Amendment law performs a function analogous to the reasonable person
in tort law. It sets a minimum standard of reasonableness to which all cit-
izens are expected to conform regardless (for the most part) of their ac-
tual capacity to do so. As the classic case of Vaughan v. Menloe 273 ex-
plains, the reasonable person standard guards against a collapse of
standards by refusing to allow negligence liability to become "co-
extensive with the judgment of each individual, which would be as varia-
ble as the length of the foot of each individual." 274 Just as the negligence
standard encourages citizens to come up to the standard of the reasona-
ble person if they do not already meet it, the effect of the rational au-
dience model is to call citizens to develop their capacities to participate
in rational discourse, and to exercise, as it were, their better natures.
Negligence law also points to another function of legal standards based
on the assumptions that people generally behave rationally. Although
the reasonable person standard seems unfair or unjust because it holds
individuals to cognitive standards which they cannot meet, it makes the
269. Id. at 7.
270. Id. at 14.
271. Id.
272. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990) (finding that existing doctrine, includ-
ing Bresler, gives breathing space to free expression "without the creation of an artificial dichotomy
between 'opinion' and fact").
273. (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.C.P.).
274. Id. at 493 (Tindal, C.J.).

negligence inquiry "tractable"275 for lawyers and juries. As Jeffrey Rach-

linski points out, behavioral economics has not yet provided a workable
alternative or even adequately justified the need for one: "[A]s the re-
search now stands, the influence of meta-cognitive biases on real beha-
vior and real negligence determinations is uncertain. In the real world,
other aspects of cognitive processes might allow people to muddle
through well enough."276 ' These same arguments apply to the rational
au-
dience standard in First Amendment doctrine.
To further highlight the "educational" function of the rational au-
dience standard, it is instructive to compare and contrast the model of
discourse it represents with the (ideal) model of discourse prevailing in
the law school classroom. In some ways, the ideal classroom discourse is
a poor analogy for the ideal political discourse. After all, classroom dis-
course is presided over by a dictator, albeit usually a benevolent one,
who has the power to squelch dissent and digression. Classroom dis-
course is similar to the ideal political discourse, however, in at least one
respect. The professor/dictator sets the level of discourse not at the level
of the least capable student, and not at the level of the most capable stu-
dent, but somewhere in between. The reasons for this approach are
practical and pedagogical. If the professor aims the class at the lowest
level, a sizeable majority of the class will be both bored and insulted. It
is by far better to aim for a level of discourse that communicates the most
information to the greatest number of students. Besides, this approach
sends the message to the least capable students that they must do addi-
tional work outside of class, perhaps much more additional work, to
come up to the level of understanding possessed by most of their class-
mates. The idea is to encourage them in these efforts, though of course a
small number may abandon them entirely.
Although the classroom setting illustrates the advantages of seeking
to guide discourse away from the level of the least savvy or sophisticated
audience, it also illustrates the danger of having the level of discourse
governed by a dictator. All of us are familiar with a professor who
abused the platform provided by his classroom in an attempt to indoctri-
nate students with his own political views. There are also classroom dic-
tators who orient discourse to gratify their own egos rather than to satisfy
the educational needs of students. And even the most benevolent dicta-
tor may mislead students because his or her own understanding is flawed
or unsound. Of course public discourse is infinitely more complicated
than classroom discourse, so it is dangerous to draw conclusions based on
the analogy. Nonetheless, the danger that a powerful speaker will domi-
275. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, MisunderstandingAbility, MisallocatingResponsibility, 68 BROOK. L.

REv. 1055, 1057, 1063-67 (2003) ("Because recent research suggests that people commonly overesti-
mate cognitive abilities, the application of the reasonable person test might undermine the deterrence
function and produce results wholly inconsistent with ordinary notions of justice and fairness.").
276. Id. at 1090-91.

nate discourse -either directly or indirectly-is worthy of further consid-

eration.
3. Anti-Paternalismas an Antidote to Agenda Setting

A third reason to apply the rational audience and more-is-better as-
sumptions stems from distrust of governmental intervention in the mar-
ketplace of ideas. Courts have been charged with policing the bounda-
ries of public discourse, and the rational audience assumption prevents
them from doing so in an unduly paternalistic manner. If courts were
free to indulge the assumption that the public is generally stupid and un-
informed, it would lead them to permit governmental intervention in the
marketplace in the name of serving the public good. The problem, of
course, is that the government must decide what forms of censorship
serve the public good, but its judgment of the public good is not only
marred by self-interest but also by the same cognitive flaws that affect
the rest of us. Moreover, given the already powerful agenda-setting role
of the government as speaker in the marketplace of ideas, indulging in an
irrational audience assumption would almost certainly eliminate an im-
portant check on government manipulation of public discourse.
A key goal of the First Amendment is to prevent the government
from silencing its critics, but the government often claims beneficent mo-
tives when policing public discourse. For example, the government may
justify suppression of speech on the grounds that it is necessary to protect
citizens from being misled."' As history reveals, however, beneficent
motives do not protect the government from exercising censorship
rooted in flawed reasoning. Perhaps the most infamous example is the
Roman Inquisition's persecution of Galileo Galilei, the "father of mod-
em science. '' 278 The Catholic Church first ordered Galileo not to defend
the idea that the earth revolves around the sun." 9 When he did so, the
Church put him on trial for heresy.2' His judges found him guilty,
banned his book, forced him to recant his views, and placed him on
house arrest for a number of years-all despite the fact that they were
wrong and he was right. 81l
The American experience also contains dispiriting examples that
confirm that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. Many of the
most embarrassing examples of speech suppression in American histo-
277. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)
("The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform
it ....").
278. See MANFRED WEIDHORN, THE PERSON OF THE MILLENNIUM: THE UNIQUE IMPACT OF
GALILEO ON WORLD HISTORY 155 (2005). See generally MAURICE A. FiNoccmARo, THE GALILEO
AFFAIR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Maurice A. Finocchiaro ed. & trans., 1989).
279. FINOCCHIARO,supra note 278, at 36-37.
280. Id. at 35-39.
281. Id. at 38-39.

ry-from the Sedition Act of 1798m until the present-have come in re-
sponse to perceived threats to national security. Public policy based on
fear, and particularly the government's fear of its own citizens, is particu-
larly likely to rely on cognitively flawed reasoning.3 The Red Scare cas-
es are but one example. The Russian Revolution sparked the first "Red
Scare" in the United States. This period of "antiradical hysteria,"' be-
ginning in 1917, led to the enactment of federal and state laws to sup-
press the speech of Communists, socialists, and anarchists. "[A]t least 27
states passed 'red flag' laws (laws barring the display of flags as a sign of
opposition to organized government), 16 states passed criminal syndical-
ism laws (laws prohibiting the advocacy of overthrow of the govern-
ment), and 12 states passed anarchy and sedition laws." 5 The result of
all this "Red Scare" legislation was over 1400 arrests and 300 convic-
tions.a 6 The Supreme Court acquiesced in the suppression of dissent,8 7
deferring to state determinations of the dangers presented by radical
speech and affirming convictions based on nothing more than abstract
advocacy of the overthrow of the government "at some date necessarily
' 8
far in the future." 8
Why do First Amendment principles often succumb to irrational
fears in time of war or when there are other perceived threats to securi-
ty? During such periods, citizens and their governments may place un-
due weight on vivid events that provoke a fear response. In hindsight, it
is hard to see how Americans thought an event akin to the Russian Rev-
olution could take place in America because the underlying social condi-
tions were so dramatically different in the two countries. But the "avail-
ability" heuristic 289 undoubtedly made the "evidence" more relevant to
policy makers trying to protect "the American way of life." Moreover,
the widespread discussion of the threat may have led to an availability
cascade, convincing a significant segment of the population that the
threat was widespread and imminent. The very same pattern has been
repeated over and over throughout history, which bespeaks the need for
doctrines to help shield against even the most benevolently motivated
282. Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596, 596-97; see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
276 (1964) ("Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has
carried the day in the court of history." (footnote omitted)).
283. See Horwitz, supra note 21, at 36-37.
284. MURRAY B. LEVIN, POLITICAL HYSTERIA IN AMERICA: THE DEMOCRATIC CAPACITY FOR
REPRESSION 29 (1971).
285. KROTOSZYNSKI ET AL., supra note 89, at 43-44; see also PATRICIA CAYO SEXTON, THE WAR
ON LABOR AND THE LEFT: UNDERSTANDING AMERICA'S UNIQUE CONSERVATISM 135 (1991).
286. KROTOSZYNSKI ET AL., supra note 89, at 44.
287. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 363, 372 (1927) (affirming criminal syndicalism con-
viction for organizing and being a member of the Communist Labor Party of America, which advo-
cated the "overthrow of capitalist rule").
288. Id. at 379 (Brandeis, J., concurring). The defendant in Whitney helped organize the Com-
munist Labor Party of California, whose constitution advocated overthrow of the government. Id. at
363 (majority opinion).
289. See supra Part nI.B.

government censorship. And even the strongest doctrines may be insuf-

ficient to resist the overwhelming emotional pull of censorship in times
of national crisis (or perceived crisis).
The cases above involved government assumptions about citizens'
irrational propensity for violence. But the government has also abused
its power by assuming that a portion of its citizens are ignorant or unedu-
cated. As an illustration of the abuses that can occur when the govern-
ment assumes the worst of its citizens, consider the sad, sorry history of
voter literacy tests. States began to adopt literacy tests as a prerequisite
to voter registration at the end of the nineteenth century.' Although os-
tensibly instituted to ensure that voters were qualified to exercise the
franchise intelligently, the purpose of literacy tests was to disenfranchise
black voters.2 1 Indeed, literacy tests were "[p]erhaps the most popular
method of constricting the electorate," 292 and states continued to use
them for this purpose until they were eliminated by the Voting Rights
Act of 1965.293
Literacy tests achieved their nefarious ends not only because blacks
were systematically denied educational opportunities, and thus had high-
er illiteracy rates than white Americans, 29 4 but also because white officials
administered the tests in a highly discriminatory fashion. The Supreme
Court tacitly encouraged this behavior. In 1898, the Court upheld a Mis-
sissippi law requiring citizens to prove, among other things, that they
could interpret a section of the Constitution.95 2 The Court acknowledged
that the Mississippi legislature intended the law as a tool to disenfran-
chise black voters but found that it was of no consequence since the law
affected equally "weak and vicious white men as well as weak and vicious
black men."296 From the Court's perspective, the weak and vicious were
simply not entitled to vote, and they left the determination of who was
290. BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING
EQUALITY 8 (1992) (noting that in the 1890s states used constitutional conventions to adopt means to
disenfranchise black voters). "Even as late as 1960, voter registration rates among whites in the South
were more than twice those of blacks.... " Id. at 1.
291. W. Sherman Rogers, The Black Quest for Economic Liberty: Legal, Historical and Related
Considerations,48 How. L.J. 1, 74 n.581 (2004) (noting the "desire to prevent blacks from voting" in
imposing literacy tests). States also used literacy tests to disenfranchise other groups of voters thought
to be incapable of voting intelligently, such as recent immigrants. For an extended discussion, see Le-
vine, supra note 116, at 239-40.
292. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY
IN THE UNITED STATES 142 (2000). The states also used residency requirements and poll taxes to con-
strict the franchise. See Levine, supra note 116, at 237.
293. See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, 314-19. The
nationwide ban originally was in place for five years. See id. at 315. In 1975, Congress made the ban
permanent. See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 102, 89 Stat. 400, 400
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (2006)).
294. Daniel S. Goldman, Note, The Modem-Day Literacy Test?: Felon Disenfranchisement and
Race Discrimination,57 STAN. L. REv. 611, 616 (2004). This disproportion was a natural result of the
systematic deprivation of educational opportunities to black Americans. Id. at 619.
295. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213,221,225 (1898).
296. Id. at 222.

weak and vicious to racist state officials. Even as late as 1959, the Court
could be sanguine in its assertion that the use of facially non-
discriminatory literacy tests was constitutional, accepting the premise
that "[t]he ability to read and write ...has some relation to standards de-
signed to promote intelligent use of the ballot. ''297 Again the Court con-
ceded that state officials might apply such tests in a racially discriminato-
ry fashion, 298 but the Court failed to understand that literacy tests -which
assume at the outset that many citizens are too dumb to vote-positively
invite state officials to act on their own prejudices about their fellow citi-
zens. This is not to say that a "rational voter" assumption would have
prevented the widespread disenfranchisement of black voters. But, it
would have deprived racist state officials of the cloak of legitimacy pro-
vided by the Court's acceptance of a paternalistic justification for admin-
istration of voter literacy tests.
There is good reason to be especially suspicious of the government
when it seeks to suppress information or choices it believes to be "bad"
for its citizens because the government already manipulates citizen prefe-
rences through its role in setting the agenda of political discourse in the
United States. The federal government is a "'major source of informa-
tion,""'299 and "information is a source of power."3 °° The government, par-
ticularly the executive branch, has a variety of tools and methods to get
its message out. Government officials can gather and release data sup-
porting a particular policy agenda. High government officials can hold
press conferences, confident in the knowledge that members of the mass
media will actually show up prepared to convey some version of the gov-
ernment's message. They can also grant exclusive interviews to get their
message out, with the implicit threat that the privilege of access will be
revoked if the coverage is not to their liking.30° Government leaders can
also shape discourse by refusing to provide information: by refusing to
hold press conferences, to discuss a policy choice beyond certain agreed
upon talking points, or to allow access to documents and news sites with-
in its control? °
The government also has at its disposal more ethically questionable
ways of manipulating public discourse. It is worthwhile to consider some
297. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959). However, the
Court has also recognized that such tests can be applied in a manner that violates a citizen's right to
equal protection of the laws. Id. at 53-54.
298. Id. at 53.
299. Lori Robertson, In Control, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Feb.-Mar. 2005, at 26, 28 (citation omit-
ted).
300. MALCOLM MITCHELL, PROPAGANDA, POLLS, AND PUBLIC OPINION: ARE THE PEOPLE
MANIPULATED? 46 (2d ed. 1977).
301. Robertson, supra note 299, at 30 (discussing the fact that New York Times reporters were
banned from then Vice President Dick Cheney's campaign plane as punishment for unfavorable cov-
erage).
302. See Ann Scott Tyson, Hundreds of Photos of Caskets Released-Pentagon Action Is in Re-
sponse to Lawsuit, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2005, at A10 (discussing the Bush administration's policy
banning photographs and videotapes of coffins at Dover Air Force Base).

of the highly publicized tactics of the George W. Bush administration for

getting its message out and undermining the credibility of its critics with-
out directly censoring them. With regard to its education policy, the ad-
ministration paid a journalist to tout its education policy and hired a pub-
lic relations firm to study "media perceptions of the Republican Party,"" 3 3
in violation of federal law forbidding dissemination of "covert propagan-
da" in the United States. °4 The Department of Education also issued
prepackaged video stories to television stations, which were "purposely
designed to be indistinguishable from news segments broadcast to the
public. ' 3° With regard to coverage of the Iraq War, the Bush administra-
tion's tactics were even more troubling. Certainly the Bush administra-
tion exaggerated the threat that Saddam Hussein had acquired weapons
of mass destruction,3 6 and it pushed the idea of a link between Hussein's
regime and Osama bin Laden even after this link was thoroughly discre-
dited. The administration also sought to undermine its critics through
strategic leaks to the press, 3°7 while at the same time threatening prosecu-
tion of journalists who published leaked information that was embarrass-
ing to the administration. In addition, the Pentagon gave briefings of its
"talking points" to retired military officers, who then made television
and radio appearances as disinterested military analysts. 30 8 The point is
not to catalog every abuse of the Bush administration, but merely to
show that the government's power to set the agenda of political discourse
is strong.
The main check on the governmental abuses of agenda-setting pow-
er is the "Fourth Estate"-that is, an independent press with the will and
resources to investigate government-provided information. °9 The me-
dia's performance in this area is decidedly mixed. Many have criticized
the media for being lapdogs rather than watchdogs during the run-up to
the Iraq War,31 ° though certainly there was impressive reporting during
303. Robert Pear, Buying of News by Bush's Aides Is Ruled Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2005, at
Al.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE: MILITARISM, SECRECY, AND THE END OF
THE REPUBLIC 229-30 (2004); PAUL RUTHERFORD, WEAPONS OF MASS PERSUASION: MARKETING
THE WAR AGAINST IRAQ 196 (2004).
307. See Murray Waas, Cheney "Authorized" Libby to Leak Classified Information, NAT'LJ., Feb.
9,2006, http://www.nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2006/0209njl.htm.
308. David Barstow, PentagonSuspends Briefings for Analysts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2008, at A15.
309. See Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631,634 (1975).
310. Five Years On: Media's Role in Iraq, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 19, 2008, at 8 ("The
press already stands accused of not doing enough before the war to probe the Bush administration's
arguments for the invasion, whether it was Saddam Hussein's alleged weapons or the prospects of im-
planting democracy in Iraq."); see also SCOTr MCCLELLAN, WHAT HAPPENED: INSIDE THE BUSH
WHITE HOUSE AND WASHINGTON'S CULTURE OF DECEPTION 125 (2008) (criticizing media for accept-
ing President Bush's propaganda without enough investigation); Sherry Ricchiardi, Whatever Hap-
pened to Iraq?: How the Media Lost Interest in a Long-Running War with No End in Sight, AM.
JOURNALISM REv. June-July 2008, at 20 (criticizing the lack of coverage after the initial phase of the
Iraq War). On the other hand, the Bush administration criticized the media for being unduly negative

the war on warrantless wiretaps, torture, and extraordinary rendition.'

And conflicting forces are at work on the ability of the media to serve as
checks on government manipulation. On one hand, the Internet means
that more eyes than ever are scrutinizing government actions. On the
other hand, the decline of newspapers undoubtedly cuts resources de-
voted to investigative journalism."'
If the media serves its checking function only sporadically, and the
government already has powerful tools to set the agenda of public dis-
course, certainly the First Amendment doctrine's refusal to allow the
government to directly regulate political discourse on paternalistic
grounds is justified. In essence, direct regulation on this basis would al-
low the government to "double dip": not only could the government at-
tempt to drown out other speakers (which the First Amendment does
not prohibit), but it could also censor its critics on the grounds that the
public would be "misled" by them. From this perspective, the rational
audience assumption serves as an additional check on the government's
ability to dominate public discourse.
V. CONCLUSION
The rational audience is an ideal and, like all ideals, is inevitably

flawed. There is no such thing as an audience; an audience is merely a
collection of individuals with their own different needs, interests, and ap-
titudes. And there certainly is no such thing as a rational audience,
though one can always hope that citizens are more often rational than
not. Behavioral economics helps illuminate areas in which human beings
tend to make cognitive mistakes, in which rationality predictably fails.
Behavioral economics may and probably should influence the way that
economic markets are regulated because it has great predictive power in
that realm. Indeed, behavioral economics might very well have predicted
and helped avoid or at least mitigate the current economic crisis.
It by no means follows, however, that the rationality ideal should be
discarded from First Amendment doctrine. A presumption of audience
irrationality would justify increased government regulation of the speech
marketplace, which presents far more dangers of mischief than increased
regulation of economic markets. Speech and expression are closely
linked to individual autonomy, and government constriction of core
speech -particularly political speech- threatens the entire basis of de-
in its coverage of the war in Iraq. See Michael O'Hanlon, Misplaced Blame, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 11,
2006, at A14.
311. See, e.g., Steve Fainaru, Cutting Costs, Bending Rules, and a Trail of Broken Lives: Ambush
in Iraq Last November Left Four Americans Missing and a String of Questions About the Firm They
Worked For, WASH. POST, July 29, 2007, at A01; Anthony Shadid, In Revival of Najaf Lessons for a
New Iraq: Shiite Clergy Build a Spiritual Capital,WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2003, at A01.
312. See, e.g., Tribune Will Cut Hundreds of Jobs as Businesses Weaken, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2008, at C9.

mocracy. If we the people are incapable of rationally choosing our col-

lective fates, then democracy is doomed to failure. On a more practical
level, the failure to apply a rational audience assumption would inevita-
bly lead to a dumbing down of public discourse, making speakers respon-
sible if they failed to predict the interpretation placed on their speech by
less sophisticated audience members. A standard based on rationalism
calls citizens to develop their capacities to engage in rational discourse,
to raise their cognitive capacities to the demands of that discourse. We
as citizens must risk information overload in order to ensure that we get
the information we need. The rational audience ideal reflects a justifia-
ble distrust of overtly paternalistic intervention by government in the
realm of speech and expression. In light of the government's already
powerful potential to drown out other speakers in the marketplace of
ideas, it is useful to preserve the rational audience assumption as an addi-
tional check on government's abuse of that power.
Defending rationalism at this point in the American experience
seems slightly quixotic. Recent events certainly cast doubt on the asser-
tion of First Amendment doctrine that "the American people are neither
sheep nor fools."3"3 But as John Updike has written, believing in "the
American political experiment"3 4 is
at bottom, a matter of trusting the citizens to know their own minds
and best interests.... And though the implementation will inevita-
bly be approximate and debatable, and though totalitarianism or
technocratic government can obtain some swift successes, in the
end, only a democracy 315
can enlist a people's energies on a sustained
and renewable basis.
It is this leap of faith in our collective capacities that has led First
Amendment doctrine to construct the ideal of the rational audience. It is
our duty as citizens to live up to it.
313. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 258 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
314. John Updike, All Things Considered: Testing the Limits of What I Know and What I Feel
(NPR radio broadcast Apr. 18, 2005), availableat http://thisibelieve.org/essay/14/ ("To guarantee the
individual maximum freedom within a social frame of minimal laws ensures-if not happiness-its
hopeful pursuit.").
315. Id.

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University of Florida Levin College of Law

UF Law Scholarship Repository

Nobody's Fools: The Rational Audience as First

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub

The premise of the First Amendment is that the American

Assumptions about audiences shape the outcomes of First

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tonomy and the foundations of democratic self-governance. More-

I. Introduction ......................................................................................... 800

A skilled speaker tailors her message to her audience. Except in

2. Although audience research is uncommon in First Amendment cases, it is an important

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also tends to rely on assumptions rather than evidence in determining

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First Amendment scholarship has criticized the doctrinal influence

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II. THE RATIONAL AUDIENCE IN FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

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response criticism or reception theory, has a variety of adherents united

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29. Jane P. Tompkins, Introduction to Reader-Response Criticism, in READER-RESPONSE

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interpretation of Cohen's famous jacket was the "correct" interpreta-

38. Id. at 21-22.

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B. Characteristicsof the Implied Audience of Core Speech

46. Id. at 23.

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1. The RationalAudience Assumption

55. From the Federalist No. 1:

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59. See id. at 165.

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Court upheld the conviction of the defendants in Abrams, Justice

70. Id. at 630-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

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should rarely occur, due to the "expected" rationality of audiences.7 9

79. See id.

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Justices Holmes and Brandeis provided the building blocks, 88 but

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Audience rationalism receives its main instantiation in the domi-

2. More-Is-Better,or Against Paternalism

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103. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

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This preference dictates a laissez-faire approach to regulation of the

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C. The Implied Audience of Non-Core Speech: A Case Study

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The revolution in commercial speech jurisprudence came when the

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however, is merely to illustrate the phenomenon by comparing two cases,

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