Harold Thiele [se |Luftwaffe Aerial Torpedo Aircraft and Operations in World War Two Harold Thiele HIKOKIAlso from Hikoki Publications MISSION 376 rd First published in 2004 by Hikoki Publications Limited Friars Gate Farm Mardens Hill Crowbordugh East Sussex TNG IXH England Email: infohikokiwarplanes.com Web: www hikokiwarplanes.com Production Management and Editorial: Chevron Publishing Limited Desig and ly Jacket de Profile artwork: Tim Bown ut: Colin Woodman Design Colin Woodman Design ISBN 1.902109, All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproxluced o¢ transmitted in any form or by any means electronic or mec nical, including photocopying, recording of by any information storage without permission from the Publisher in writing, All enquiries should be directed to the Publisher, © Text 2004:4 rold Thiele Spi Yellow T fires and 1 Mustangs Introduction Although airborne torpedo ope ions were relatively minor pared with the activities of other flying units, the Lujuwajfe’s torpedo units combined the elements of air and I strike power sea warfare into a Weapon of great poter and strategic marine significance. At first, before specialised torpedo units were established, the use of the airborne torpedo was merely another task added to the reconnaissance, mining, bombing and air-sea rescue duties ete, normally carried out by the Kastenfliegerverbdnde and the Seeflieger. Nevertheless, such sorties required a high degree of skill and a readiness on the part of the crews 0 make sacrifices, sometimes in the most adverse weather conditions, night or day, and frequently in the face of the enemy's increasing defences. Thus very high losses resulted from enemy action and also from the weaths ; technical failure and accidents. These ‘ions led only’rarely to spectacular successes and were ily haul acknowledged. Only brief details of the testing and development of the airborne torpedo has been included as itis felt that technical details have been well covered in other published works and do not need repeating here, Instead, the main section of this book attempts to examine the reported operations and successes in chronological order and compare them with Allied documents hough in many cases, cross-checking is ble because ofa complete lack of documentation impos: Tha ms do not stand up to comparison with loss lists should not surprise anyone who deals with the history of the war, since incorrect observations and reports were unavoidable and the result of the prevailing operational conditions. Thus, in all theatres of war, nd especially in the where encounters with the enemy were often brief but intense, the excitement of the moment combined with youthful exuberance often resulted in incorrect observations and, ll good faith, incorrect reports being submitted. Even in the most favourable circumstances, it is extriortinarily difficult to identify a ship according to size and type and even to accurately estimate its size, so that ship sizes and tonnage were invariably overestimated during the war. Add to this poor knowledge of the sea, faulty aircraft recognition and bad visibility, and it is hardly surprising that errors or duplication of ckiims occurred, especially when two or three different attackers selected the same target ‘One may also assume that, with a propagand: full swing and amid constant calls for an increase in ‘operations, there was a certain compulsion to succeed among, individuals, crews or even entire units, which m; well have contributed to the overestimation or the ‘exaggeration of individual success. One of the bestknown ‘examples of this is the reported sinking of the Ark Royal on 26 June 1939. ircraft carrier ied successes, the former RAF (On the theme of exagge Intell \ce officer Asher Lee tells. of a note schwaderkommodore Oberst Robert Fuchs put up on KG 268 notice board at StavangerSola in 1940, This note an agent of resistance worker and obtained by a Norwe sent to England, contained & sentence stating that,In future any member of the Staffel who reports the sinking or damaging of an enemy ship will immediately be court ‘martialled. Obviously, this was not to be taken seriously and morous reaction to earlier ‘was only intended as a grimly hi claims that had proved to be incorrect. Remarkably, some such exaggerated reports were, and often still are, accepted unreservedly and uncritically by those involved at the time and by postwar authors,and are still widely believed over 60, years after the events of the Second World War, While many of the warship and merchant vessel losses can be verified today, this is not always the case when warships were damaged, as opposed to being a total Loss Information on these occurrences is incomplete, so that the possibility exists that some warships damaged by airborne torpedoes might not be mentioned here. Other areas of uncertainty exist where a ship was lost for unknown reasons, where the precise cause could not be lished beyond doubt, or where ships were lost to various causes. In the case of the latter, it is possible that the cause of the loss may be described variously, or even contradictorily,in different docu nents, Furthermore, in the case of losses or damage to warships which occurred in the Mediterranean theatre of war, often no distinetion was made to show whether the cause was due to German or Italian action, This was especially so in the case of torpedo aircrafl, where vessels may have been under attack by machines from the Luftwaffe or the Re Similarly, human errors in writing, copying or printing nnot be entirely ruled out ja Aeronautica I, the For information, photographs and other mater author wishes to acknowledge the kind assistance of Ivan Arriez, Bundesarchiv (Koblenz), Steve Coates, Leo van Ginderen, Ma fred Griehl, Hans Werner Grosse, Martin Harlinghausen, Gerhard Himmelchen, Imperial War Museum (London), Werner Klimper, Volker Koos, Herbert Kuntz, Ulrich Laubis, Frau Lauck, Militirgeschichtliches Forschungsame (Freiburg), Cesar O'Donnell Torroba, Heinz J. Nowarra, Peter Petrick, Helmut Roosenboom, Rudi Schmidt, Fr nz Selinger, Giinther Ot, Juan Carlos Salgado, Friedemann Schell The author woukl always be grateful for any amendments, additions, constructive comments, or helpful suggestions, Harold Thiele Germany