Marcopper Mining vs.

Bumulo
Gr. No. G.R. No. 139548. December 22, 2000

Facts:
MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION registered its mining claims in
Pao, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) from 2 February 1982 to 12 October 1982. Private respondents
Alberto G. Bumolo, Benito Cachili, Conchita Bumolo, Rosario Camma, Patricio
Dumlao, et al, registered their mining claims in the same area from 28 July 1981 to
22 September 1988, which claims were subsequently converted into Mineral
Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA).

On 12 March 1982 petitioner entered into Option Agreements over the

mining claims with respondent Alberto G. Bumolo, for himself and as attorney-in-
fact of the other respondents on one hand; and with Rosario Camma on the other,
for herself and as attorney-in-fact of the rest. Under the Agreements, petitioner was
granted the exclusive and irrevocable right to explore the mining claims for three
(3) years with provision for extension

On 23 December 1982 and 26 March 1987 petitioner filed Prospecting

Permit Applications (PPA) with the Bureau of Forest Development, DENR, on the
alleged ground that a portion of the area covered by the mining claims was within
the Magat River Forest Reservation under Proc. 573 of 26 June 1969 and with the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) on account of alleged coverage of the
other portion within the Nueva Vizcaya-Quirino Civil Reservation under Proc.
1498 of 11 September 1975.

On 15 July 1991 DENR Regional Executive Director rejected petitioners

Prospecting Permit Application (PPA) on the ground that the Memorandum of 8
July 1991 endorsed by the Regional Technical Director for Mines revealed that the
area covered was outside government reservation; that the prospect claim was in
conflict with existing claims; and, that the area had been extensively explored in
the early 1980's.

On 15 August 1997 petitioner appealed to public respondent Mines

Adjudication Board (MAB), DENR, naming respondents Alberto G. Bumolo et al
as appellees. Petitioner maintained that subject area was within the Magat River
Forest Reservation. On 11 June 1998 the rejection of the PPA was affirmed
whereas the mining claims of respondents Alberto G. Bumolo et al. that had been
converted into a MPSA, subject to compliance with R.A. 7942 and DAO No. 96-
40, were given due course.

On 16 July 1998 petitioner moved for reconsideration. On 29 March 1999

private respondents Dalton Pacific Resources (Dalton) and Orophilippines
Ventures, Inc. (OVI) filed an Omnibus Motion for their joinder as parties on the
ground that on 17 July 1992 they had entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
with respondent Alberto G. Bumolo on his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of
Camma, et al. granting the companies exclusive and irrevocable right to explore
and operate the area subject of the mining claims. On 13 May 1999 respondent
MAB denied petitioners motion and formally joined respondents Dalton and OVI
with the original appellees as parties in the case.

Issue: Whether respondent MAB erred in finding that the area subject of the PPA
was outside the Magat River Forest Reservation.

Held:
Factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise in
matters entrusted to their jurisdictions are accorded by this Court not only respect
but finality if supported by substantial evidence.

In other words, the circumstance that the area covered by petitioner's PPA is
outside the Magat River Forest Reservation has been adequately established. MAB
even fortified the bases for the rejection of petitioner's PPA. As plotted by the
Lands Management Sector of DENR Region 2 contained in the sketch plan of 11
November 1996 and as shown in the Land Use map of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office of Dupax, Nueva Vizcaya, the area
covered under the PPA is indeed outside any government reservation.
OLYMPIC MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., vs. PLATINUM GROUP
METALS
G.R. No. 178188

Facts:
Olympic was granted "Mining Lease Contracts" by the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) covering mining areas
located in Palawan. With the passage of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995 (Mining Act), these mining lease contracts became the subject
of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) applications by Olympic.

Olympic entered into an Operating Agreement with Platinum, under which

Platinum was given the exclusive right to control, possess, manage/operate, and
conduct mining operations, and to market or dispose mining products found in
subject mining areas for a period of twenty-five years. In return, Platinum bound
itself to pay Olympic a royalty fee of 2½ of the gross revenues.

Olympic made various attempts to terminate the Operating Agreement and

to deprive Platinum of its rights and interests over the subject mining areas,
alleging that Platinum committed gross violations of the Operating Agreement.
Olympic filed administrative cases against Platinum with the intent to terminate
the Operating Agreement and to revoke Platinum’s Small Scale Mining Permits.

During the pendency of the case, Olympic transferred its MPSA applications
to Citinickel via a Deed of Assignment without notice to or the consent of
Platinum, which was approved by the Regional Director of Mines and Geosciences
Bureau.

Platinum filed a complaint for quieting of title, damages, breach of contract,

and specific performance against Olympic before the RTC of Puerto Princesa,
Palawan. Olympic filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the trial court was
without jurisdiction to rule on the issues raised in the complaint, as these involved
a mining dispute requiring the technical expertise of the Panel of Arbitrators
(POA)

ISSUE: Whether the RTC or the POA has jurisdiction over Platinum’s complaint
for quieting of title, breach of contract, damages and specific performance.

Held:
The complaint falls within the ambit of the RTCs original jurisdiction, to the
exclusion of all other judicial or quasi-judicial bodies.

To properly fall within the POAs jurisdiction under Section 77 (a) of the
Mining Law, the dispute must:
1. refer to an adverse claim, protest, or opposition to an application for a
mineral agreement; and
 2. be filed prior to the approval by the DENR Secretary of the mineral
agreement.

Under these terms, Section 77 (a) established a cut-off period (i.e., before
the approval of the mineral agreement) when the POAs jurisdiction may be
properly invoked, and this period had long lapsed insofar as the dispute between
Citinickel and Platinum is concerned, as Olympics mining lease contract and its
Operating Agreement with Platinum had already been approved by the
Government. Accordingly, invocation of the POAs jurisdiction under Section 77(a)
finds no application in this case.

Neither will POA be vested with jurisdiction through Section 77(b), as the
nature of the agreement between Olympic and Platinum is not the mineral
agreement contemplated under the law.
 PICOP Resources vs. Base Metal Mineral
G.R. No. 163509, December 6, 2006

Facts:
In 1987, the Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation
entered into a Mines Operating Agreement with Banahaw Mining and
Development Corporation whereby the latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for
the exploration, development, and eventual commercial operation of CMMCIs
eighteen (18) mining claims located in Agusan del Sur.

Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications

for Mining Lease Contracts over the mining claims with the Bureau of Mines. On
April 29, 1988, Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines Temporary Permit
authorizing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within its mining
claims. Upon its expiration, the temporary permit was subsequently renewed thrice
by the Bureau of Mines, the last being on June 28, 1991.

Since a portion of Banahaw Minings mining claims was located in petitioner

PICOPs logging concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner
PICOP entered into a Memorandum of Agreement, whereby, in mutual recognition
of each others right to the area concerned, petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw
Mining an access/right of way to its mining claims.

In 1991, Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to applications for

Mineral Production Sharing Agreements. While the MPSA were pending,
Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to sell/assign its rights and
interests over thirty-seven (37) mining claims in favor of private respondent Base
Metals Mineral Resources Corporation. The transfer included mining claims held
by Banahaw Mining in its own right as claim owner, as well as those covered by its
mining operating agreement with CMMCI.

Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner,

immediately approved the assignment made by Banahaw Mining in favor of
private respondent Base Metals, thereby recognizing private respondent Base
Metals as the new operator of its claims.

On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-
Sciences Bureau (MGB), Caraga Regional Office No. XIII an Adverse Claim
and/or Opposition to private respondent Base Metals application on the grounds
that to allow mining over a forest or forest reserve would allegedly be tantamount
to changing the classification of the land from forest to mineral land in violation of
Sec. 4, Art. XII of the Constitution and Sec. 1 of RA 3092 and its concession areas
are closed to mining operations as these are within the Agusan-Surigao-Davao
forest reserve established under Proclamation No. 369. The area is allegedly also
part of permanent forest established under Republic Act No. 3092 (RA 3092),and
overlaps the wilderness area where mining applications are expressly prohibited
under RA 7586.[ Hence, the area is closed to mining operations under Sec. 19(f) of
RA 7942.

Issue: Whether or not PICOP’s concession area is within the Agusan-Surigao-

Davao Forest Reserve established under Proclamation No. 369 and is closed to
mining application citing several paragraphs of Sec. 19 of RA 7942.

Held:
PICOPs contention must fail. Assuming that the area covered by Base
Metals MPSA is a government reservation, defined as proclaimed reserved lands
for specific purposes other than mineral reservations, such does not necessarily
preclude mining activities in the area. Sec. 15(b) of DAO 96-40 provides that
government reservations may be opened for mining applications upon prior written
clearance by the government agency having jurisdiction over such reservation.

Even granting that the area covered by the MPSA is part of the Agusan-
Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, such does not necessarily signify that the area is
absolutely closed to mining activities. Pursuant to PD 463 as amended by PD 1385,
one can acquire mining rights within forest reserves, such as the Agusan-Davao-
Surigao Forest Reserve, by initially applying for a permit to prospect with the
Bureau of Forest and Development and subsequently for a permit to explore with
the Bureau of Mines and Geosciences.

Moreover, Sec. 18 RA 7942 allows mining even in timberland or forestry

subject to existing rights and reservations.
 Pyro-Copper Mining Corp. vs. Mines Adjudication Board
G.R. No. 179674, July 28, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws
engaged in the business of mining. On 31 March 2000, petitioners Application for
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA), identified as APSA-SF-000089,
with the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR, Regional Office
No. 1, San Fernando City in La Union, for the exploration, development and
commercial utilization of certain pyrite ore and other mineral deposits in a
4,360.71-hectare land in Dasol, Pangasinan, was approved and MPSA No. 153-
2000-1 was issued in its favor.

On 12 September 2003, private respondent (MONTAGUE RESOURCES

PHILIPPINES CORPORATION) filed an Application for Exploration Permit with
MGB covering the same properties covered by and during the subsistence of
APSA-SF-000089 and MPSA No. 153-2000-1 of petitioner. In turn, petitioner filed
a Verified Protest/Opposition to the Application for Exploration Permit of the
private respondent. It was allegedly filed with the Panel of Arbitrators on 30
August 2005 and was received by the latter on 5 September 2005.

Prior, however, to petitioners filing of its Verified Protest/Opposition to the

private respondents Application for Exploration Permit, petitioners MPSA No.
153-2000-1 was cancelled per DENR Memorandum Order (DMO) No. 2005-03
issued by the DENR Secretary on 1 February 2005. Petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of DMO No. 2005-03, which the DENR Secretary denied in its
Decision dated 14 June 2005.

Issues:
1) Whether the issuance by the DENR Secretary of DMO No. 2005-03 on 1
February 2005 which cancelled MPSA No. 153-2000-1 of petitioner and the
issuance by MGB of EP No. 05-001 in favor of private respondent on 1
September 2005 rendered the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner moot
and academic.
2) Whether the Panel of Arbitrators has jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or
revoke EP No. 05-001 issued by MGB to private respondent.

Held:

1) Petitioner filed a Verified Protest/Opposition to the Application for

Exploration Permit of private respondent. When the application was
approved and the exploration permit issued to private respondent, petitioner
had nothing more to protest/oppose. More importantly, with the issuance by
MGB of EP No. 05-001 to private respondent, the remedy of petitioner is to
 seek the cancellation thereof, over which, as subsequently discussed herein,
the Panel of Arbitrators would have no jurisdiction. The Panel of Arbitrators
cannot simply consider or convert the Verified Protest/Opposition of
petitioner to the Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent as
a petition for the cancellation of EP No. 05-001. Since the Panel of
Arbitrators can no longer grant petitioner any actual substantial relief by
reason of the foregoing circumstances, then the Verified Protest/Opposition
of petitioner was appropriately dismissed for being moot and academic.

2) The authority to issue an Exploration Permit is vested in the MGB, then the
same necessarily includes the corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel
the same. Indisputably, the authority to deny, revoke, or cancel EP No. 05-
001 of private respondent is already lodged with the MGB, and not with the
Panel of Arbitrators.

The power of the POA to resolve any adverse claim, opposition, or protest
relative to mining rights under Section 77 (a) of RA 7942 is confined only to
adverse claims, conflicts, and oppositions relating to applications for the
grant of mineral rights. Clearly, POAs jurisdiction over disputes involving
rights to mining areas has nothing to do with the cancellation of existing
mineral agreements.
 SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY, INC., vs. HON. MINISTER OF
NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE J. LEIDO, JR. AND DIRECTOR OF
MINES JUANITO C. FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-49109, December 1, 1987

Facts:
Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc. is a mining corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It alleges that it is the holder of fifty
(50) valid mining claims situated in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, acquired
under the provisions of the Act of the U.S. Congress dated 1 July 1902 (Philippine
Bill of 1902).

On 14 October 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1214 was issued, requiring

holders of subsisting and valid patentable mining claims located under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 to file a mining lease application within
one (1) year from the approval of the Decree. Petitioner accordingly filed a mining
lease application, but "under protest," on 13 October 1978, with a reservation
annotated on the back of its application that it is not waiving its rights over its
mining claims until the validity of Presidential Decree No. 1214 shall have been
passed upon by this Court.

Petitioner avers that its fifty (50) mining claims had already been declared as
its own private and exclusive property in final judgments rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Norte in land registration proceedings initiated by third
persons.

The respondents allege that petitioner has no standing to file the instant
petition as it failed to fully exhaust administrative remedies. They cite the
pendency of petitioner's appeal, with the Office of the President, of the ruling of
the respondent Secretary of Natural Resources issued on 2 April 1977 in DNR
Case No. 4140, which upheld the decision of the Director of Mines finding that
forty four (44) out of petitioner's fifty (50) mining claims were void for lack of
valid "tie points" as required under the Philippine Bill of 1902, and that all the
mining claims had already been abandoned and cancelled, for petitioner's non-
compliance with the legal requirements of the same Phil. Bill of 1902 and
Executive Order No. 141.

Respondents further contend that, even assuming arguendo that petitioner's

mining claims were valid at the outset, if they are deemed abandoned and
cancelled due to non-compliance with the legal requirements for maintaining a
perfected mining claim, under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, 6
petitioner has no valid and subsisting claim which could be lost through the
implementation of Presidential Decree No. 1214, thus giving it no standing to
question the Decree.
 Petitioner, on the other hand, would rebut respondents' argument by
declaring that it already had a vested right over its mining claims even before
Presidential Decree No. 1214

Issue: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1214 is unconstitutional in that it

amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law.

Held:
Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not unconstitutional. It is a valid exercise of
the sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands of the public domain, of
which petitioner's mining claims still form a part, and over the patrimony of the
nation, of which mineral deposits are a valuable asset. It may be underscored, in
this connection, that the Decree does not cover all mining claims located under the
Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims over which their locators had failed to
obtain a patent. And even then, such locators may still avail of the renewable
twenty-five year (25) lease prescribed by Pres. Decree No. 463, the Mineral
Development Resources Decree of 1974.

Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the affected land or
the mining claim. It merely segregates the located land or area from the public
domain by barring other would-be locators from locating the same and
appropriating for themselves the minerals found therein. To rule otherwise would
imply that location is all that is needed to acquire and maintain rights over a
located mining claim.

The locator should faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements
for annual work and improvements in the located mining claim.
 Southeast Mindanao and Mining Corp. vs. BALITE Portal
[G.R. No. 135190. April 3, 2002]

FACTS:
From 1985 to 1991, thousands of people flocked to Diwalwal to stake their
respective claims. Peace and order deteriorated rapidly, with hundreds of people
perishing in mine accidents, man-made or otherwise, brought about by unregulated
mining activities. On 1991, the DENR Secretary issued DAO No. 66 declaring
729 hectares of Diwalwal area as non forest land open for small scale mining.
Subsequently, a petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 which was issued to
Marcopper Mining Corporation and the admission of MSPA proposal over
Diwalwal was filed before the DENR, docketed as RED Mines Case.

On 1994, while the RED case was pending, Marcopper assigned its EP No.
133 to South East Mindanao Corporation (SEM), which in turn applied for MPSA
over the land covered by the permit. The said application was then accepted and
registered by Mines and Geosciences Bureau. After publication of the application,
several mining operators and individuals including the respondent filed their
opposition. Subsequently, the Regional Panel Arbitrators took cognizance of the
RED mine case, which was consolidated with the oppositions. On April 1997,
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board passed a Resolution authorizing the issuance
of ore transport permit to small scale miners over Diwalwal where SEM alleged to
have a claim.

On May 1997, SEM filed a complaint for damages against DENR Secretary
alleging that the issuance of the OTPs allowed the extraction and hauling of gold
ore by small scale miners from SEM mining claim.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the assailed
memorandum order did not adopt the “direct state utilization scheme” in resolving
Diwalwal dispute.

HELD:
The direct state utilization scheme espoused in the challenged memorandum
is nothing but a legal shortcut, designed to divest petitioner of its vested right to the
gold rush area under its EP No. 133. The Court of Appeals ruling that the
challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt direct state utilization as a policy
in resolving the Diwalwal dispute is correct. The terms of the memorandum clearly
indicate that what was directed thereunder was merely a study of this option and
nothing else. Contrary to petitioners contention, it did not grant any
management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any
party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to
undertake studies to determine its feasibility. Consequently, the petition was
premature. The said memorandum order did not impose any obligation on the
claimants or fix any legal relation whatsoever between and among the parties to the
dispute. At this stage, petitioner can show no more than a mere apprehension that
the State, through the DENR, would directly take over the mines after studies point
to its viability. But until the DENR actually does so and petitioners fears turn into
reality, no valid objection can be entertained against MO 97-03 on grounds which
are purely speculative and anticipatory.

Incidentally, it must likewise be pointed out that under no circumstances

may petitioners rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute. As
correctly held by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision, EP No. 133
merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended,
modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so
since the exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural mineral
resources are matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits,
mining exploration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable
right within the purview of the non-impairment of contract and due process clauses
of the Constitution, since the State, under its all-encompassing police power, may
alter, modify or amend the same, in accordance with the demands of the general
welfare. Thus, the State may pursue the constitutional policy of full control and
supervision of the exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural
mineral resources, by either directly undertaking the same or by entering into
agreements with qualified entities. The DENR Secretary acted within his authority
when he ordered a study of the first option, which may be undertaken consistently
in accordance with the constitutional policy enunciated above. Obviously, the State
may not be precluded from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it is the
only plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold
rush. As implied earlier, the State need be guided only by the demands of public
interest in settling for this option, as well as its material and logistic feasibility.
 UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC. vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT
G.R. No. L-69997, September 30, 1987

Facts:
The petitioner filed a complaint for annulment and cancellation of patents
against the private respondents and prayed that all the free patent titles issued in
their favor be declared null and void.

The Director of Lands, who was impleaded as a formal defendant, filed his
answer alleging, among others, that the petitioner has no personality to institute the
cancellation proceedings inasmuch as the government is the grantor and not the
petitioner, and it should be the grantor who should institute the cancellation
proceedings.

On January 25, 1980, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint. It ruled that since the disputed properties form part of disposable land
of the public domain, the action for reversion should be instituted by the Solicitor
General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines and that, therefore, the
petitioner lacks personality to institute the annulment proceedings.

The petitioner appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. On April

5, 1984, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. It ruled that the
titles issued to the petitioner cover mineral lands which belong to the public
domain and that these cannot be the subject of private ownership. According to the
Court, under Section 101 of the Public Land Law, only the Solicitor General or the
officer acting in his stead has the authority to institute an action on behalf of the
Republic for the cancellation of the respondents' titles and for reversion of their
homesteads to the Government.

Issue:

a) Whether or not the appellate court committed an error of law when it ruled that
the lands in question belong to the public domain; and

b) Whether or not the appellate court erred in discussing the complaint on the
ground that the petitioner had no personality to institute the same.

Held:

a) The issuance of the lode patents on mineral claims by the President of the
Philippines in 1962 in favor of the petitioner granted to it only the right to extract
or utilize the minerals which may be found on or under the surface of the land. On
the other hand, the issuance of the free patents by the respondent Director of Lands
in 1979 in favor of the private respondents granted to them the ownership and the
right to use the land for agricultural purposes but excluding the ownership of, and
the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or under the
surface.

There is no basis in the records for the petitioner's stand that it acquired the
right to the mineral lands prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, thus,
making such acquisition outside its purview and scope. Although the original
certificates of titles of the petitioner were issued prior to the titles of the private
respondents, the former cannot prevail over the latter for the provisions of the
Constitution which governed at the time of their issuance prohibited the alienation
of mineral lands of the public domain.

b) The petitioner has no personality to institute the action below for annulment and
cancellation of patents. The mineral lands over which it has a right to extract
minerals remained part of the inalienable lands of the public domain and thus, only
the Solicitor General or the person acting in his stead can bring an action for
reversion.