LEGES POSTERIORES PRIORES CONTRARIAS ABROGANT

Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant — a later statute which is repugnant to an

earlier statute is deemed to have abrogated the earlier one on the same subject matter or where
the provisions of a later document are contrary to those of an earlier, the earliest must be
considered as repealed. The concept of this maxim is that the newer statute later abrogates a prior
statute only where “the two are manifestly inconsistent with and repugnant to each other. The
rationale for this form of construction is that the newer statute more accurately depicts the
current societal mood and a later expression of legislative will.

Sedgwick described leges posteriores, priores contrarias abrogant as follows "If two
inconsistent acts be passed at different times, the last is to be obeyed; and if obedience cannot be
observed without derogating from the first, it is the first which must give way."

On the other hand, Caleb Nelson, a professor of University of Virginia School of Law
states that leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant is “where words are clearly repugnant in
two laws, the later law takes place of the elder:

Illustrative Case 1:
Carabao, Inc. vs. Agricultural Productivity Commission
G.R No. L29304 September 30, 1970

FACTS: Carabao Inc., plaintiff, filed a case in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to recover the
sum of P238,500.00 representing the unpaid price of 300 units of fire extinguishers sold and
delivered by it to defendant Agricultural Productivity Commission. It served as a claim for the
payment of the sum which was presented to Auditor General. However, the latter had failed to
decide the claim within two (2) months from date of its presentation which should have been by
August 13, 1967 for it should had acquired the right under Act No. 3083 to file the original
action for collection in the lower court. On the other hand, Defendants moved for the dismissal
of the case principally on the ground of the lower court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. They rebutted that the settlement of money claims against the Government of the
Philippines has been placed under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Auditor General to
the exclusion of courts of first instance, while the Supreme Court is vested with appellate
jurisdiction over the Auditor General's decision involving claims of private persons or entities.
The lower court sustained defendants' dismissal motion and declared itself without jurisdiction to
hear the case. Plaintiff then filed a motion for reconsideration. Defendants contended that the
Auditor General had rendered his decision denying plaintiff's claim on the ground that the
alleged purchase order relied upon by plaintiff was null and void, since there was no obligating
instrument as required by law. The lower court having maintained its dismissal order, plaintiff
instituted the present appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Act 3083 is still in force not having been amended, repealed or declared
unconstitutional

HELD: The dismissal order must be affirmed. It is patent that the governing law under which
private parties may sue and seek settlement by the Philippine Government of their money claims
pursuant to Article XI, section 3 of the Philippine Constitution is Commonwealth Act No. 327.
Section 1 of said Act, pursuant to the Constitutional injunction, fixes the period of "sixty days
exclusive of Sundays and holidays after their presentation" within which Auditor General shall
act on and decide the same. Said section further provides that "If said accounts or claims need
reference to other persons, office or offices, or to the party interested, the period shall be counted
from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by him." Under section
2 of said Act, furthermore, the aggrieved private party may take an appeal, within thirty (30)
days from receipt of the Auditor General's adverse decision only to the Supreme Court, by filing
with the Court a petition for review thereof, as provided in Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of
Court. The corresponding provisions of Act 3083 which are utterly incompatible with those of
Commonwealth Act must therefore be deemed superseded and abrogated, under principle of
"leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant" — a later statute which is repugnant to an earlier
statute is deemed to have abrogated the earlier one on the same subject matter. Inaction by the
Auditor General for the sixty-day period now provided by Commonwealth Act 327 (exclusive of
Sundays and holidays) and of time consumed in referring the matter to other persons or officers
no longer entitles the claimant to file a direct suit in court, as he was formerly authorized under
Act 3083 in the event of the Auditor General's failure to decide within a flat period of two
months. Since the Constitution and Commonwealth Act 327 expressly enjoin the Auditor
General to act on and decide the claim within the fixed 60-day period, a claimant's remedy is to
institute mandamus proceedings to compel the rendition of a decision by the Auditor General in
the event of such inaction.

Section 4 of Act 3083 now discarded, "shall be governed by the same rules of procedure, both
original and appellate, as if the litigants were private parties" — since exclusive original
jurisdiction under Article XI of the Constitution and the implementing Act, Commonwealth Act
327 is vested in the Auditor General, and appellate jurisdiction is vested in the President in cases
of accountable officers, and in the Supreme Court in cases of private persons and entities upon
proper and timely petitions for review. The Court has so indicated in a number of cases that
claimants have to prosecute their money claims against the Government under Commonwealth
Act 327, stating that Act 3083 stands now merely as the general law waiving the State's
immunity from suit, subject to the general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that "no
execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of the
(Philippines),and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money
claims against the Government must be strictly observed. Therefore, plaintiff-appellant is
ordered to remove immediately the 300 units of fire extinguishers from the warehouse of
appellee Agricultural Productivity Commission.

Illustrative Case 2:
Manila Trading and Supply Company vs. Philippine Labor Union
G.R. No. L-47796 April 22, 1941

FACTS: There is a petition for the execution of the Court of Industrial Relations directing the
reinstatement of Felix Alcantara. The Court has given due course for the petition for a writ of
certiorari. It issued an order requiring petitioner to file a bond in an amount sufficient to cover
the back wages of Felix Alcantara during the pendency of his case. A motion to set aside this
order having been denied, petitioner took the instant appeal by certiorari.

As stated section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended by Commonwealth Act No.
559 “Enforcement of awards, orders, and decisions. — At the expiration of ten days from the
date of the award, order, or decision, in cases brought under the provisions of section four hereof,
judgment shall be entered in accordance therewith, unless during said ten days an aggrieved
party shall appeal therefrom to the Supreme Court of the Philippines by writ of certiorari as
hereinafter provided. The institution of such appeal shall not, however, stay execution of the
award, order, or decision sought to be reviewed, unless for special reasons the Court shall order
that execution be stayed, in which event the Court, in its discretion, may require the appellant to
deposit with the clerk of the court such amount of salaries or wages due the employees, laborers,
tenants, or farm-laborers concerned under the award, order, or decision appealed from or require
him to give bond in such form and of such amount as to insure compliance with the award, order,
or decision in case the same is affirmed.”
It is here contended that as enforcement or execution under section 14 above-quoted, refers to an
"award, order, or decision, in cases brought under the provisions of section four" of said Act. The
petitioners also contend that the Court of Industrial Relations is without power to decree
execution of its order under section 19 of the law. In the first place, the ultimate effect of
petitioner's theory is to concede to the Court of Industrial Relations the power to decide a case
under section 19 but deny it the power to execute its decision thereon. In the second place,
considering that the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations under section 19 is merely
incidental to the same jurisdiction it has previously acquired under section 4 of the law, it
follows that the power to execute its orders under section 19 is also the same power that it
possesses under section 4.

ISSUE: Whether or not appeal shall not stay the execution of the award, order or decision
appealed from

HELD: The order is affirmed. It is true that once an appeal has been perfected, the trial court
loses its jurisdiction over the case, where there is no express statutory provision to the contrary.
But section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 559,
expressly provides that the appeal shall not stay the execution of the award, order or decision
sought to be reviewed, unless, for special reason, the Court Industrial Relations shall order that
the execution be stayed. It is finally contended that the provisions of section Rule 44, of the new
Rule of Court, must prevail over the provisions of section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 559. Section, 7 of Rule 44 provides:

Effect of appeal. — The appeal shall stay the award, order or decision appealed from unless the
Supreme Court shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.

On the other hand, section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended by Commonwealth
Act No. 559, provides that the appeal shall not stay the execution of the award, order or decision
appealed from, unless the industrial court otherwise provides. The new Rules of Court were
approved in December, 1939, and made effective on July 1, 1940. Commonwealth Act No. 559
was approved and made effective on June 7, 1940, or six months after the Rules of Court were
approved and twenty-three days before said rules were made effective. When two Acts are
inconsistent, that which has been made effective in an earlier date. Statutes speak from the time
they take effect, and from that time they have posteriority. If passed to take effect at a future day,
they are to be construed, as a general rule, as if passed on that day and ordered to take immediate
effect. But, as between two acts, it has been held that one passed later and going into effect
earlier will prevail over one passed earlier and going into effect later. Thus an act passed April
16th and in force April 21st was held to prevail over an act passed April 9th and in effect July
4th of the same year. And an act going into effect immediately has been held to prevail over an
act passed before but going into effect later.". The question is one purely of legislative intent.
The Supreme Court, upon approving the Rules of Court in December, 1939, could not have
possibly intended to amend the procedural provisions contained in Commonwealth Act No. 559,
which was not yet then in existence, for it was approved six months later, that is, on June 7,
1940. Commonwealth Act No. 559 containing provisions which are repugnant to the Rules of
Court, may be presumed to have intended a repeal to the extent of the repugnance. Leges
posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.
NOVA CONSTITUTIO FUTURIS FORMAM IMPONERE DEBET NON PRAETERITIS

A new statute should affect the future, not the past.

It is a general rule in statutory construction that statutes are to be construed as having

only prospective operation, unless the intendment of the legislature to give them a retroactive
effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.

The reason for the general rule, as embodied in Article 4 of the New Civil Code which
states “laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.”, is that a law is a
rule established to guide actions with no binding effect until it is enacted; hence, it is said that the
law looks to the future only, and has no retroactive effect unless the legislature may have
formally given that effect to the law. Nova futuris formam imponere debet non praeterisis. A
new statute should affect the future, not the past.

They are construed as operating only in cases or on facts which come into existence after
the statutes were passed unless a retrospective effect be clearly intended. Perhaps no rule of
construction is more firmly established than this, that a retrospective operation is not to be given
to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of
procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the
enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either
interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only.

Illustrative Case:
FERMIN MANAPAT vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 110478

FACTS: For the resolution of the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. G.R. No. 110478 assails the May 27, 1993
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 10200-10212. G.R. No. 116176
questions the June 28, 1994 Decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. CV No. 27159. G.R.
NOS. 116491-503 assails the March 2, 1994 and the July 25, 1994 Resolutions of the CA also in
CA-G.R. CV Nos. 10200-10212. The three-decade saga of the parties herein has for its subject
parcels of land forming part of what was originally known as the Grace Park Subdivision in
Caloocan City and formerly owned by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM)
and/or the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).

Sometime in the 1960’s, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM) allowed a

number of individuals to occupy the Grace Park property on condition that they would vacate the
premises should the former push through with the plan to construct a school in the area. The
plan, however, did not materialize, thus, the occupants offered to purchase the portions they
occupied. Later, as they could not afford RCAM’s proposed price, the occupants, organizing
themselves as exclusive members of the Eulogio Rodriguez, Jr. Tenants Association, Inc.,
petitioned the Government for the acquisition of the said property, its subdivision into home lots,
and the resale of the subdivided lots to them at a low price, however the Government could not
buy the lot due to budget constraints. RCAM then decided to effect, on its own, the subdivision
of the property and the sale of the individual subdivided lots to the public. Significant turn of
events however happened in 1977 when the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1072, appropriating P1.2M out of the President’s Special
Operations Funds to cover the additional amount needed for the expropriation of Grace Park.
The National Housing Authority (NHA), PHHC’s successor, then filed several expropriation
proceedings over the already subdivided lots for the purpose of developing Grace Park under the
Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) and subdividing it into small lots for distribution and resale at
a low cost to the residents of the area. NHA, in its petition in G.R. Nos. 116491-503, primarily
contends that the CA erred when it issued its March 2, 1994 Resolution and modified the May
27, 1993 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 10200-10212 to the extent that it applied retroactively
Article VI, Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7279, thus exempting from expropriation the
300-sq m lots of respondents Loberanes, Quimque, Vega, Santos, Oracion and Mercado.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in giving R.A. No. 7279 retroactive effect.

RULING: The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in applying retroactively Article VI, Section
10 of Republic Act No. 7279 to the subject expropriation cases instituted back in 1977 by
petitioner-appellant NHA. Republic Act 7279 passed in 1992, almost two decades after the
expropriation cases against the property owners herein were instituted with the RTC in 1977,
should operate prospectively and, therefore, should not be given retroactive effect. Republic Act
7279 is a substantive and penal law with a penalty clause which cannot apply retroactively
especially to pending actions. Republic Act No. 7279 and PD 1072 are not in pari materia. The
retroactive application of Article VI, Section 10 of RA 7279 will affect vested rights of
petitioner-appellant NHA arising from its exercise of the power of eminent domain. Nova
constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis. A new statute should affect the future,
not the past. The law looks forward, not backward. Article 4 of the Civil Code even explicitly
declares, “laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.” In these
consolidated cases, the Court finds that the language of R.A. No. 7279 does not suggest that the
Legislature has intended its provisions to have any retroactive application. On the contrary,
Section 49 of the said law indicates that it “shall take effect upon its publication in at least two
(2) national newspapers of general circulation. “The law’s prospective application being clearly
stated, the Court cannot agree with the disposition of the appellate court that the subject lots not
exceeding 300 sq m are exempt from expropriation. The May 27, 1993 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON DEROGANT

This legal maxim means that “general things do not derogate from special things”. It is a
principle of statutory construction which posits that a general statutory provision does not repeal
a specific one; that if two provisions (of a statute) are in conflict, the more specific one shall
prevail over the more general one. The rule may apply to either of the two separate statutes, or to
the provisions within the same act.

Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which in
its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the particular
enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases
within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment.

Illustrative Case:
Commissioner of Customs vs. Hon. Court of Tax Appeals, Smith Bell & Co., Inc.
G.R. No. L-41861
March 23, 1987

FACTS: The Commissioner of Customs, the petitioner, elevated this case on certiorari for a
review of the decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals who reversed the decision of the
petitioner on grounds that the Customs Commissioner misapplied certain sections of the Tariff
and Customs Code in the assailed decision.

The statutory provisions involved in this case are Sections 1005, 2521, and 2523 of the Tariff
and Customs Code. Section 1005 lays down the indispensable requirement that every vessel
coming from a foreign part must have on board a complete manifest of all her cargo, further
stating therein the required contents of each manifest intended to be submitted to custom
authorities. On the other hand, Sections 2521 and 2523 provide for the corresponding penalties in
cases where Sec. 1005 is violated.

ISSUE: The main issue is on which between Secs. 2521 and 2523 of the Tariff and Customs
Code should be applied in case the weight of a cargo is inaccurately or incorrectly stated in the
manifest.

HELD: Sections 2521 and 2523 provide —

Sec. 2521 — Failure to Supply Requisite Manifests. If any vessel or aircraft enters or departs
from a port of entry without submitting the proper manifests to the customs authorities, or shall
enter or depart conveying unmanifested cargo other than as stated in the next preceding section
hereof, such vessel or aircraft shall be fined an amount not less than ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) but not exceeding thirty thousand (P30,000.00) pesos.

The same fine shall be imposed upon any arriving or departing vessel or aircraft if the master or
pilot in command shall fail to deliver or mail to the Commission on Audit a true copy of the
manifest of the incoming or outgoing cargo, as required by law. (As amended by P.D. No. 1258-
A)

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Sec. 2523 – Discrepancy Between Actual and Declared Weight of Manifested Article. — If the
gross weight of any article or package described in the manifest exceeds by more than twenty per
centrum the gross weight as declared in the manifest or bill of lading thereof, and the Collector
shall be of opinion that such discrepancy was due to the carelessness or incompetency of the
master or pilot in command, owner or employee of the vessel or aircraft, a fine of not more than
fifteen per centum of the value of the package or article in respect to which the deficiency exists,
may be imposed upon the importing vessel or aircraft.

If the weight of the cargo is in issue, the applicable provision of the Tariff and Customs Code is
Sec. 2523. A special and specific provision prevails over a general provision irrespective of their
relative position in the statute. Generalia specialibus non derogant. Where there is in the same
statute a particular enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense
would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and
the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are
not within the provisions of the particular enactment. It is a principle in statutory construction
that where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one specially
designed for said case must prevail over the other. The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SALUS POPULI EST SUPREMA LEX

Salus populi est suprema lex translates to “Let the good of the people be the supreme
law.”1 It finds its origin as early as 100 BC – 1AD in the book De Legibus written by Cicero the
renowned philosopher, politician, and lawyer. It was also used by eminent personalities in
politico-legal history such as John Locke and Francis Bacon. This concept serves as the
foundation of Philippine law including all the Constitutions we have had and their corresponding
amendments, representative of the needs of the people in times past. Simply put, this principle
places the welfare of the many above the welfare of the few. The will of the individual must
yield to the needs of the society, even if his life, liberty, or property is put in jeopardy. It follows
therefore, that no law and no officer of the people, elected or appointed, is above the will of the
people. Not even the constitution. Rather, it is a manifestation of the will of the people as
affirmed by Justice Malcom: “The written instrument enacted by the direct action of the
people…”

Illustrative Case:
Hon. Jejomar C. Binay and the Municipality of Makati
vs. Hon. Eufemio Domingo and the Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 92389
September 11, 1991

FACTS: The Burial Assistance Program (Resolution No. 60 – assisting those who only earn
less than P2,000/month of burial assistance in the amount of P500.00) made by Makati Mayor
Jejomar Binay, in the exercise of the police power granted to him by the municipal charter, was
referred to the Commission on Audit after the municipal secretary certified the disbursement of
four hundred thousand pesos for its implementation was disallowed by said commission of such
disbursements because there cannot be seen any perceptible connection or relation between the
objective sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of its
inhabitants.

ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of
police power under the general welfare clause.

HELD: Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power
under the general welfare clause. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent
attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the
maxims, “Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas” (use your property so as not to impair others) and
“Salus populi est suprema lex” (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). Its fundamental
purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is
the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of
powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic
and must be responsive to various social conditions. The care for the poor is generally
recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of
police power in the promotion of the common good.