Wrong Choice For ME
Wrong Choice For ME
Wrong Choice For ME
Table 1: 2017 Individual Tax Rate Schedule with Proposed Surtax
Single/Married
–
Rate
Head
of
Household
Married
–
Joint
Return
Separate
Return
5.8% Less than $21,050 Less than $31,550 Less than $42,100
$21,050
but
less
than
$31,550
but
less
than
$42,100
but
less
than
6.75%
$50,000
$75,000
$100,000
$50,000
but
less
than
$75,000
but
less
than
$100,000
but
less
than
7.15%
$200,000
$200,000
$200,000
10.15% $200,000 or more $200,000 or more $200,000 or more
In
analyzing
Question
2’s
impact
on
Maine’s
workforce,
economy,
and
schools,
this
report
focuses
on
two
important
aspects
of
the
proposal:
increasing
taxes
on
high-‐income
residents
and
increasing
state
funding
to
local
school
districts.
We
outline
the
likely
effects
of
a
substantial
income
tax
hike
on
out-‐migration
from
Maine
to
low-‐tax
states,
as
well
as
on
small
pass-‐through
businesses.
We
also
examine
how
tax
revenues
would
be
allocated
to
school
districts,
and
reveal
that
funds
would
mainly
flow
to
wealthy
communities.
The
economy
does
not
remain
in
its
current
state
when
governments
raise
or
lower
taxes.
Taxes
influence
behavior
and
set
into
action
a
series
of
events
that
change
economic
behavior.
Consider
the
work-‐leisure
calculus.
Taxpayers
divide
their
time
between
work
and
non-‐work,
which
we
call
“leisure.”
Lower
tax
rates
on
work
make
leisure
less
attractive
and
thus
encourage
taxpayers
to
work
more.
Higher
tax
rates
make
leisure
more
attractive
and
thus
induce
taxpayers
to
work
less.
By reducing investment in Maine’s
Consider
also
the
saving-‐consumption
calculus.
Taxpayers
must
decide
how
to
economy, Question 2 is expected to
allocate
their
after-‐tax
income
between
cost 4,050 private-sector jobs by 2021.
consumption
and
saving.
That
matters
to
the
economy
because
capital
spending
is
financed
from
saving,
and
capital
spending
increases
production
and
raises
the
demand
for
labor.
Lower
tax
rates
on
the
return
to
saving
induce
taxpayers
to
save
more,
thus
fueling
investment.
Higher
tax
rates
have
the
opposite
effect.
Clearly,
taxpayers
respond
to
incentives
and
disincentives
to
work
and
save
brought
about
by
tax
law
changes.
Lower
tax
rates
usually
reduce
government
revenues,
but
less
so
to
the
extent
that
they
encourage
work
and
saving.
Higher
tax
rates
usually
increase
revenues,
but
less
than
a
mechanical
computation
would
show,
because
they
also
discourage
work
and
saving.
Since
tax
cuts
raise
after-‐tax
profits,
they
induce
taxpayers
to
expand
investment
and,
in
so
doing,
wages
and
jobs.
As
a
result
of
raising
after-‐tax
wages,
tax
cuts
motivate
taxpayers
to
enter
the
labor
force
and
work
longer
hours.
This
is
the
result
of
the
reduction
of
disincentives
to
invest
and
work
that
are
inherent
to
any
tax
code.
Therefore,
it’s
important
not
to
assume
that
tax
revenues
move
in
proportion
to
tax
rate
increases
or
decreases.
Dynamic
behavioral
changes
must
be
accounted
for,
particularly
changes
in
the
willingness
of
taxpayers
to
invest
and
work
induced
by
tax
law
changes.
Indeed,
it
is
essential
to
estimate
these
behavioral
changes
in
order
to
assess
the
desirability,
from
the
public’s
point
of
view,
of
making
changes
in
tax
law.
Using
ME-‐STAMP,
a
comprehensive
economic
model
developed
by
the
Beacon
Hill
Institute
to
capture
the
principal
effects
of
tax
changes,
it
is
possible
to
calculate
the
degree
to
which
these
economic
mechanisms
will
affect
the
Maine
economy
in
the
context
of
Question
2.
The
analysis
assumes
that
the
measure
would
be
implemented
in
2017;
results
are
reported
for
both
2017
and
2021.
The
model’s
results
as
measured
against
the
‘baseline
economy’
of
no
tax
change.
Table
2
displays
the
simulation
results
for
Question
2.
Table
2:
The
Fiscal
and
Economic
Effects
of
the
Question
2
2017
2021
As
described
in
the
section
above,
the
income
tax
change
would
increase
the
tax
burden
on
savings
and
thus
capital
investments.
As
a
result,
both
local
and
out-‐of-‐state
businesses
would
find
investment
less
attractive
in
Maine.
The
ME-‐STAMP
model
estimates
that
investment
would
decrease
by
$11
million
in
2017,
and
$12
million
in
2021.
The
ME-‐STAMP
model
shows
that
the
surtax
would
have
moderate
dynamic
revenue
effects.
In
2017,
the
surtax
would
increase
personal
income
tax
revenues
by
$132
million
in
2017
and
$149
million
in
2021.
These
estimates
are
below
the
$157
million
calculated
by
the
Office
of
Fiscal
and
Program
Evaluation
and
promoted
by
the
“Stand
Up
For
Students”
campaign.
Moreover,
sales
and
other
tax
revenues
would
drop
by
$8
million
and
$3
million
respectively
in
2017
and
$9
million
and
$4
million
in
2021.
These
losses
would
result
from
the
drop
in
economic
activity
due
to
the
tax
changes.
The
losses
would
combine
with
the
personal
income
tax
revenue
gains
to
leave
the
state
with
$121
million
more
in
tax
revenue
in
2017
and
$136
million
in
2021.
As
a
result,
Maine
desperately
needs
to
adopt
pro-‐growth
policies
that
attract
young,
hard-‐working
families
from
across
the
country
and
around
the
globe.
Unfortunately,
Maine’s
current
high-‐tax
policies
contribute
to
“tax
flight”
into
low-‐tax
states.
Question
2
would
only
exacerbate
that
trend.
A
significant
number
of
studies
have
been
conducted
in
the
last
two
decades
to
evaluate
the
impact
of
tax
changes
on
migratory
patterns.
Almost
universally,
this
research
has
concluded
that
variations
in
income
tax
rates
are
associated
with
small
but
significant
effects
on
net
out-‐migration
from
a
state,
as
well
in
declines
in
in-‐migration.
Consider
these
examples:
To
be
sure,
income
tax
rates
are
not
the
only
factors
relevant
when
deciding
whether
to
relocate
across
state
lines.
Climate,
job
opportunities,
standard
of
living,
familial
considerations,
and
other
types
of
taxes
are
also
important.
Yet,
under
the
surtax
proposal,
popular
migration
destinations
for
Mainers—like
Florida—would
look
even
more
appealing.
Maine’s
high
tax
burden
already
makes
it
difficult
to
attract
doctors,
scientists,
engineers,
and
other
professionals.
Question
2
would
exacerbate
this
trend,
to
the
detriment
of
our
economy.
According
to
the
Bureau
of
Labor
Statistics,
24
occupations
in
Maine
earn,
on
average,
more
than
$100,000
per
year
(see
List
1).9
A
worker
in
one
of
these
professions,
whose
salary
is
combined
with
investment
income
and
a
spouse’s
wages,
could
easily
exceed
$200,000
in
annual
household
income.
Of
these
24
occupations,
the
Maine
Department
of
Labor
predicts
that
nine
(or
37.5%)
will
experience
rapid
employment
growth,
partly
driven
by
growing
demand.10
Faced
with
a
10.15
percent
top
income
tax
rate,
however,
some
professionals
may
be
deterred
from
working
in
Maine.
Consider,
for
instance,
that
physician
shortages
are
commonplace
in
Maine,
especially
in
rural
areas.
In
2010,
there
were
only
45.7
primary
care
physicians
(PCPs)
per
100,000
residents
of
Washington
County,
about
half
the
national
average.
Similar
shortages
exist
in
Oxford,
Sagahadoc,
and
Somerset
counties.11
Statewide,
Maine
had
nearly
30
percent
fewer
PCPs
than
the
national
average.
A
recent
study
found
that
Maine
will
need
120
additional
PCPs
by
2030
merely
to
maintain
the
status
quo,
much
less
begin
to
address
the
unmet
need
for
primary
care.12
The
lack
of
primary
care
providers
reduces
access
to
important
medical
care.
In
2014,
nearly
11
percent
of
adults
in
Maine
reported
not
seeing
a
doctor
in
the
past
12
months,13
while
more
than
12
percent
lacked
a
personal
physician.14
Question
2
will
deter
primary
care
physicians
and
other
high-‐income
professionals
from
considering
Maine
as
a
place
to
live
and
work,
threatening
Maine’s
ability
to
provide
medical
services
to
its
aging
population
and
further
exacerbating
our
demographic
challenges.
High-‐income
individuals
report
most
pass-‐through
business
income,
which
explains
why
a
large
majority
of
small
business
owners—as
high
as
69
percent,
according
to
a
2015
survey—don’t
support
raising
taxes
on
the
highest-‐earning
individuals.16
According
to
the
latest
IRS
data,
50
percent
of
pass-‐through
business
income
in
Maine
was
reported
on
returns
that
earned
more
than
$200,000.
As
a
result,
half
of
pass-‐through
business
income
in
Maine
is
currently
taxed
at
the
top
marginal
rate
of
7.15
percent,
and
would
be
subject
to
the
much
higher
rate
of
10.15
percent
if
Question
2
passes.
In
addition,
27
percent
of
Mainers
earning
more
than
$200,000
report
having
income
from
a
sole
proprietorship,
while
41
percent
derive
income
from
a
partnership
or
S-‐
corporation.
Passing
Question
2
would
amount
to
a
significant
tax
hike
on
the
types
of
small
businesses
that
generate
the
majority
of
Maine’s
private-‐sector
jobs;
this
is
a
clear
recipe
for
declines
in
employment
and
slow
business
growth
as
entrepreneurs
are
deterred
from
opening
businesses
in
Maine.
Using
the
most
recent
IRS
statistics,
it
is
possible
to
estimate
the
number
of
small
business
households
likely
to
be
impacted
by
Question
2.
Including
sole
proprietorships,
S-‐corporations,
and
partnerships,
the
measure
would
raise
taxes
on
11,450
pass-‐through
businesses,
totaling
$1.4
billion
in
adjusted
gross
income
(about
2.5
percent
of
state
GDP).
As
the
American
Legislative
Exchange
Council
has
noted,
“those
arguing
for
‘soaking
the
rich’
by…increasing
the
burden
on
the
top
[earners]…are
not
just
arguing
about
taxing
‘millionaires’—
they
want
to
tax
small
businesses.
These
small
businesses
are
major
drivers
of
job
growth
and
wage
growth.
Increasing
their
tax
burden
means
less
resources
for
expanding
production
facilities,
R&D
expenses
in
efforts
to
develop
new
products,
hiring
new
workers,
paying
more
generous
salaries
or
increasing
employee
benefits.”17
A
study
by
the
National
Bureau
of
Economic
Research
found
that
as
a
sole
proprietor’s
personal
income
tax
rate
goes
up,
the
rate
of
growth
of
his
business
declines.
The
trend
was
so
strong
that
the
authors
concluded
that
“a
decrease
in
the
marginal
tax
rate
levied
on
a
sole
proprietor
from
50
percent
to
33
percent
would
lead
to
an
increase
in
his
receipts
[a
measure
of
business
growth]
by
about
28
percent.”18
Effect
on
Public
Education
In
addition
to
the
effect
Question
2
would
have
on
economic
growth
and
migration
patterns
in
Maine,
voters
should
look
closely
at
the
way
the
Despite assurances from the initiative’s
measure
would
allocate
funds
to
local
supporters, there is little evidence that Question
school
districts.
Despite
assurances
2 would improve Maine’s public education
from
the
initiative’s
supporters,
there
is
system or provide property tax relief.
little
evidence
that
Question
2
would
improve
Maine’s
public
education
system
or
provide
property
tax
relief.
Funds
Could
Be
Reallocated
at
the
Whim
of
the
Legislature
While
Question
2’s
objective
is
to
supplement—and
not
replace
or
supplant—existing
state
contributions
to
local
school
districts,
there
is
no
mechanism
in
statute
to
prevent
legislators
from
reducing
baseline
education
appropriations
by
an
amount
equal
to
expected
revenues
from
the
tax,
thereby
keeping
education
funding
flat.
Despite
the
ballot
initiative’s
language,
which
states
that
the
“supplemental
funds
must
be
used
to
enable
the
State
to
meet
the
annual
target”
of
public
education
funding,
there
is
also
no
way
to
In
recent
years,
lawmakers
have
repeatedly
taken
funds
earmarked
for
a
specific
purpose
and
used
them
to
close
budget
gaps
and
support
other
programs.
For
instance,
while
a
portion
of
the
revenues
of
the
Oxford
Casino
are
supposed
to
go
to
the
Department
of
Education
to
finance
K-‐12
education,
these
funds—totaling
more
than
$10
million
over
2014
and
2015—have
repeatedly
been
transferred
back
to
the
General
Fund
to
help
balance
the
budget.
Similarly,
in
2013
legislators
transferred
more
than
$5
million
from
the
Fund
for
a
Healthy
Maine
(established
with
tobacco
settlement
money
to
combat
smoking
and
promote
public
health)
to
the
General
Fund.
There
is
no
assurance
that
legislators
will
not
pass
similar
measures
to
re-‐direct
Question
2
funds
away
from
K-‐
12
education.
The
data
show
significant
volatility;
a
sharp
decline
in
revenue
of
more
than
30%
would
have
occurred
following
the
2008
recession.
Other
states
that
rely
heavily
on
income
tax
revenues
from
top
earners
to
fund
public
services—such
as
New
Jersey—have
recently
had
to
wrestle
with
the
volatility
such
an
approach
introduces
into
their
tax
codes.
Although
supporters
assert
that
Question
2
would
provide
a
reliable,
long-‐term
funding
source
for
Maine’s
public
schools,
it
would
instead
increase
the
volatility
of
state
revenues.
Once
the
EPS
allocation
for
the
entire
state
has
been
computed,
it
is
funded
through
a
combination
of
state
and
local
revenues.
The
state
share
is
appropriated
by
the
Legislature,
while
the
local
required
contribution
is
collected
on
the
basis
of
an
established
property
tax
rate
designed
to
collect
the
balance
of
revenues
needed
to
fund
the
EPS.
Each
school
district’s
combination
of
state
and
local
funds
is
a
reflection
of
its
property
wealth
per
pupil;
property
poor
school
districts
receive
a
higher
percentage
of
state
funding
than
property
rich
districts,
regardless
of
the
level
of
household
income
within
the
communities.
Each
school
district’s
required
local
contribution
is
determined
by
applying
the
required
tax
rate
to
the
property
value
of
the
district
to
determine
the
local
share.
The
state
effectively
makes
up
the
balance
of
funding.
No
matter
how
property
rich
a
school
district
is,
however,
the
state
provides
a
minimum
level
of
funding,
called
a
“minimum
state
contribution”
This
minimum
is
computed
at
the
greater
of
five
percent
of
the
school
district’s
total
allocation
(state
and
local
share),
or
30%
of
its
special
education
adjustment.
One
important
aspect
of
Maine’s
EPS
funding
formula
is
that
only
property
taxes
are
used
as
a
measure
of
a
school
district’s
financial
capacity.
Communities
with
high
property
values
are
considered
able
to
shoulder
a
greater
share
of
their
school
budgets,
while
towns
with
low
property
values
receive
more
state
aid.
Unlike
some
states
that
blend
property
tax
data
with
income
and
sales
tax
records
to
calculate
the
local
share,
Maine
relies
exclusively
on
a
single
measure
which
is
an
unreliable
way
to
assess
an
area’s
economic
prosperity.
According
to
an
independent
review
of
Maine’s
EPS
formula,
“A
school
funding
model
that
does
not
take
income
into
account
in
determining
a
school
district’s
ability
to
fund
educational
services
is
more
likely
to
result
in
low-‐
income,
high
property
wealth
districts
being
treated
as
if
they
have
a
greater
tax
capacity
then
the
local
community
believes
it
can
afford.”23
In
other
words,
some
low-‐income,
property-‐rich
This
reality
has
a
profound
impact
on
how
Table
6:
Where
Would
Question
2
Question
2
funds
would
be
distributed
between
Funds
Go?
school
districts.
Question
2
would
allow
DOE
to
slightly
reduce
the
statewide
mill
rate
School
Districts
Additional
State
Aid
expectation,
which
would
inarguably
benefit
Under
Question
2
some
towns.
But
many
low-‐income
municipalities
with
relatively
high
property
values
would
still
be
Top
25
Highest
$69,606,242.87
considered
to
have
sufficient
local
resources
to
Receivers
fund
their
schools,
despite
high
unemployment
and
median
household
income
well
below
the
Next
25
Highest
$32,705,612.25
state
average.
Receivers
Consider
the
tiny
town
of
Upton,
located
in
Oxford
Rest
of
the
State
$27,883,835.16
County.
According
to
Department
of
Education
(196
Districts)
data,
in
2016
Upton’s
property
valuation
exceeded
$27
million.
At
a
mill
rate
of
8.23
(the
statewide
rate
set
by
DOE
in
2016),
Upton
could
generate
nearly
$225,000
in
local
property
taxes.
However,
the
EPS
formula
indicated
that
only
$47,339
was
needed
to
fund
Upton’s
education
system.
As
a
result,
the
state
contributed
virtually
nothing
to
Upton’s
public
schools
in
2016.
But
despite
its
property
tax
base,
Upton
is
a
community
facing
difficult
economic
conditions.
According
to
the
latest
Census
data,
the
median
household
income
in
Upton
is
$41,250,
significantly
lower
than
the
state
average
of
$48,804.
Nearly
one
third
of
Upton’s
residents
live
in
poverty,
compared
to
under
14
percent
statewide.
Upton—and
dozens
of
poor
rural
towns
across
Maine—needs
lower
property
taxes,
but
Question
2
will
provide
no
additional
state
aid
to
provide
local
tax
relief.
In
Question 2 would channel millions of dollars to fact,
most
towns
that
don’t
stand
wealthy communities like Cumberland and to
benefit
from
Question
2—
Yarmouth, while providing no additional funding numbering
approximately
130—
to struggling towns like Upton and Acton. have
median
household
incomes
below
the
state
average.
Towns
Expected
to
Receive
NO
Additional
State
Aid
Under
Question
2
Acton
Cyr
Lake
View
Orient
Stoneham
Allagash
Dallas
Lakeville
Osborn
Stonington
Arrowsic
Deblois
Lamoine
Otis
Surry
Bar
Harbor
Deer
Isle
Lincoln
Owls
Head
Swans
Island
Beaver
Cove
Denmark
Lincolnville
Oxbow
Sweden
Beddington
Dennistown
Long
Island
Penobscot
The
Forks
Blue
Hill
Embden
Lovell
Phippsburg
Tremont
Boothbay
Eustis
Lubec
Pleasant
Ridge
Trenton
Boothbay
Harbor
Frenchboro
Machiasport
Portage
Lake
Upton
Bowerbank
Friendship
Magalloway
Rangeley
Vinalhaven
Bremen
Frye
Island
Matinicus
Isle
Rangeley
Weld
Bristol
Georgetown
Meddybemps
Raymond
Wells
Brooklin
Glenwood
Monhegan
Rockport
Wesley
Brooksville
Gouldsboro
Moro
Rome
West
Bath
Byron
Grand
Lake
Stream
Moscow
Roque
Bluffs
West
Forks
Camden
Great
Pond
Mount
Chase
Roxbury
Westmanland
Caratunk
Greenville
Mount
Desert
Sandy
River
Weston
Carrabassett
Valley
Greenwood
Nashville
Sebago
Westport
Island
Carroll
Hanover
New
Limerick
Seboeis
Whiting
Castine
Harpswell
Newry
Sedgwick
Willimantic
Chebeague
Isle
Hersey
Nobleboro
Shirley
Winter
Harbor
Codyville
Isle
Au
Haut
North
Haven
Sorrento
Winterville
Cooper
Islesboro
Northfield
South
Bristol
York
Coplin
Jonesport
Northport
Southport
Cranberry
Isles
Kennebunkport
Ogunquit
Southwest
Harbor
Crawford
Kingsbury
Old
Orchard
Beach
St.
George
Before
making
a
decision
on
Question
2
at
the
ballot
box,
voters
should
carefully
consider
research
that
shows
the
link
between
education
spending
and
student
performance
is
not
definitive
as
supporters
suggest.
Over
the
last
decade,
researchers
have
found
that
among
other
variables,
the
relation
between
spending
and
student
performance
is
weak
and
that
other
factors
account
for
improved
performance.
Noted
education
economist
Eric
Hanushek
reviewed
163
studies
and
found
that
only
27
percent
of
the
studies
showed
a
positive
and
statistically
significant
relationship
between
expenditure
per
student
and
student
achievement.
On
the
other
hand,
seven
percent
of
the
studies
show
a
negative
and
statistically
significant
relationship
between
expenditure
per
student
and
student
achievement
and
66
percent
found
no
statistically
significant
relationship.
In
2010,
a
study
of
Maine’s
school
formula
failed
to
find
any
evidence
that
an
increase
in
state
funding
had
led
to
an
improvement
in
student
achievement.24
There
are
some
paths
toward
improvement
but
they
do
not
require
additional
sources.
Hanushek
suggests
that
education
spending
should
be
used
to
implement
the
policies
with
proven
efficacy,
such
as
replacing
teachers
who
fail
to
raise
test
scores
and
closing
schools
which
persistently
fail
to
produce
reasonable
student
achievement.
Instead
of
endangering
Maine’s
economic
prosperity
with
large
tax
hikes
on
small
business
owners,
advocates
for
a
strong
educational
system
should
focus
on
expanding
charter
schools,
creating
education
savings
accounts,
and
empowering
school
choice
so
that
Maine
children,
no
matter
where
they
live
or
the
income
of
their
parents,
have
access
to
a
high
quality
education.
collections/workforce-‐projections/Maine.pdf
13
http://kff.org/other/state-‐indicator/percent-‐of-‐adults-‐reporting-‐not-‐seeing-‐a-‐doctor-‐in-‐the-‐past-‐12-‐
months-‐because-‐of-‐cost-‐by-‐raceethnicity/
14
http://kff.org/other/state-‐indicator/percent-‐of-‐adults-‐reporting-‐not-‐having-‐a-‐personal-‐doctor/
15
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-‐book/what-‐are-‐flow-‐through-‐enterprises-‐and-‐how-‐are-‐they-‐
taxed
16
http://www.nsba.biz/wp-‐content/uploads/2015/04/2015-‐Taxation-‐Survey.pdf
17
https://www.alec.org/article/personal-‐income-‐tax-‐increases-‐hurts-‐small-‐businesses/
18
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10856.pdf
19
http://www.andersoneconomicgroup.com/Portals/0/AEG%20Tax%20Burden%20Study_2016_FINAL.pdf
20
http://taxfoundation.org/article/individual-‐tax-‐rates-‐impact-‐business-‐activity-‐due-‐high-‐number-‐pass-‐
throughs#_ftn7
21
http://www.forbes.com/best-‐states-‐for-‐business/list/2/#tab:overall
22
https://usm.maine.edu/sites/default/files/cepare/EPSCmmssnRprtF_1_9_2015Web.pdf
23
http://picusodden.com/wp-‐content/uploads/2013/09/maine-‐fiscal-‐capacity-‐july-‐2013.pdf
24
https://usm.maine.edu/sites/default/files/Center%20for%20Education%20Policy,%20Applied%20Researc
h,%20and%20Evaluation/ImpactofFundingFormulaStudentAchievement.pdf