SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-39430. December 3, 1990.]

FRANCISCO MANLAPAZ, DELFIN SANGCAP, DOMINGO

SANGCAP, PEDRO CUNANAN, FAUSTO DE LA PENA and
HONORATA DE LA PENA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. JUDGE LORENZO R. MOSQUEDA, HON. JUDGE
VIRGILIO CANIVEL, TEODORO RIVERA, PABLO RIVERA,
RENATO RIVERA and BONIFACIO RIVERA, respondents.

Albon, Serrano & Associates for petitioners.

Arsenio R. Reyes for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL

DETAINER; JUDGMENT; REQUIREMENT TO STAY IMMEDIATE EXECUTION. —
Under Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, to stay the immediate execution
of judgment in an ejectment proceeding it is required that the defendant-
appellant must (a) perfect his appeal, (b) file a supersedeas bond, and (c)
periodically deposit the rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal.
Failure to comply with said requirements is a ground for the outright execution of
the judgment upon petition of the prevailing party. (Romero vs. Pecson, etc., et
al., 83 Phil. 308 [1949]; Villaroman vs. Abaya, etc., et al., 91 Phil. 20 [1952])
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPERSEDEAS BOND; EFFECT OF FAILURE TO FILE. — It has been
repeatedly held that the requirement for the filing of a supersedeas bond is
mandatory and cannot be dispensed with by the courts. When the supersedeas
bond is not filed, the duty of the court to order the execution of the appealed
decision is ministerial and imperative and the execution of the judgment shall
then issue immediately, without prejudice to the appeal taking its course. In the
instant case, petitioners' failure to file a supersedeas bond necessary to stay
execution pending appeal made or rendered the original decision executory and
gave private respondents the right to immediate execution of the judgment
which the court is bound to grant and enforce.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL COURTS; RULE; RATIONALE. —
Firmly settled is the rule that a municipal court has jurisdiction over forcible
entry or unlawful detainer cases even if the ownership of the property is in
dispute. A resume of the basic legal principles in point would be apropos. In an
action for forcible entry and detainer, the main issue is one of priority of
possession. The legal right thereto is not essential to the possessor's cause of
action, for no one may take law into his own hands and forcibly eject another or
deprive him of his possession by stealth, even if his title thereto were
questionable or actually disputed in another case. If the plaintiff can prove prior
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 physical possession in himself, he may recover such possession even from the
owner, but on the other hand, if he cannot prove such prior physical possession,
he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the
owner of the property. An action for recovery of possession is totally distinct and
different from an action for recovery of title or ownership. In fact, a judgment
rendered in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question of
possession and not that of ownership. It does not in any way bind the title or
affect the ownership of the land or building. Section 7 of Rule 70 expressly states
that: "The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be
effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or
affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an
action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building, nor shall
it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same
parties upon a different cause of action not involving possession." We have held
that in giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the purpose
of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case
of controverted right, it requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one
or the other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent
jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just that the person
who has first acquired possession should remain in possession pending this
decision; and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a petty
warfare over the possession of the property which is the subject of dispute. To
permit this would be highly dangerous to individual security and disturbing to
social order. Therefore, where a person supposes himself to be the owner of a
piece of land and desires to vindicate his ownership against the party actually in
possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute an action to this end in a court
of competent jurisdiction; and he can not be permitted, by invading the property
and excluding the actual possessor to place upon the latter the burden of
instituting an action to try the property right. In no case may possession be
acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects
thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of
the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder
should refuse to deliver the thing. When a person is in possession of the land and
has maintained that possession for years, he cannot be forcibly dispossessed
thereof, even by the owner.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIOR REFERRAL TO THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
NOT REQUIRED IN THE ABSENCE OF TENANCY RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTIES.
— Prior referral of this case to the Department of Agrarian Reform under the
provisions of Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 316, in relation to Presidential
Decree No. 27, is not necessary. The said laws are not applicable to the case at
bar. There is here no allegation in the pleadings nor any showing in the records
that a tenancy relation exists between petitioners and private respondents. Both
groups are claiming a right of possession in the concept of an owner. The referral
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 316 apply only in cases wherein the parties
are landlords and tenants and not when they are applicants of a public land
claiming preferential right over it, as in this case.

DECISION

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 REGALADO, J : p

Through this special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with a prayer for
preliminary injunction, petitioners would have us reverse and set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals 1 which affirmed the order of the former Court of
First Instance of Pampanga, Branch VII, authorizing the immediate execution of
the judgment rendered by the former Municipal Court of Candaba, Pampanga in
Civil Case No. 425 for ejectment. Cdpr

On October 20, 1971, herein private respondents, as plaintiffs, filed an ejectment

case in the Municipal Court of Candaba, Pampanga against herein petitioners as
defendants, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 425, alleging that on or about
September 1, 1971 herein petitioners, thru force, intimidation and threats and
with the use of guns, forcibly ousted the private respondents from Lots 32, 36,
37, 38, 39, 40 and 41, Block 21 of Bahay Pare, Pampanga, which private
respondents had been occupying and cultivating peacefully, notoriously and
continually for more than ten (10) years.
Petitioners resisted the ejectment case alleging lack of jurisdiction due to the
pendency of Civil Case No. 79371 in the then Court of First Instance of Manila,
and denied all other material allegations in the complaint.
Thereafter, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts wherein they agreed
that:
1. The lots under litigation are Lots 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of Block
21 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Candaba, Pampanga;

2. The said lots belong to the Land Authority;

3. Both parties had filed their respective applications to purchase said lots
from the Government;

4. On May 20, 1968, the Land Authority rendered its decision dismissing
the applications of petitioners;

5. On appeal to the Office of the President, the decision of the Land

Authority was reversed and the awards in favor of private respondents
were cancelled;
6. Private respondents seasonably petitioned for judicial review and for
annulment of said decision of the Office of the President before the Court
of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 79371;
7. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 79371, the Land Authority
issued Orders of Award to petitioners on September 21, 1970;
8. The ejectment case was filed by private respondents during the
pendency of said Civil Case No. 79371 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila;

9. Private respondents have been regularly harvesting an average one

hundred (100) cavans per hectare from the land in dispute; and

10. On September 1, 1971, private respondents discovered petitioners'

intrusion over subject property; 2
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 On February 27, 1974, the Municipal Court of Candaba rendered judgment in
favor of private respondents, ordering petitioners to vacate the lots and restore
possession thereof to private respondents, and to pay as rentals twenty-five (25)
cavans per hectare for each year from May, 1971 until they shall have vacated
the controverted lots. 3
Petitioners duly appealed the said decision of the Court of First Instance of
Macabebe, Pampanga, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 73-70-M. During the
pendency of said appeal, a motion for execution pending appeal was filed by
private respondents for failure of petitioners to file a supersedeas bond. On April
2, 1974, the Court of First Instance of Candaba, Pampanga issued an order
granting the same. 4
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed
therein as CA-G.R. No. SP-02996, and obtained therefrom a writ of preliminary
injunction on a cash bond of P2,000.00. 5 However, on June 3, 1974, respondent
court rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads: LLjur

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, this Court is constrained to dismiss, as it now

dismisses, and denies certiorari; with costs, and preliminary injunction
issued by this Court on 30 April, 1974 is set aside.

IT IS SO ORDERED." 6

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which allegedly has not been
resolved by respondent court and by reason of which the respondent lower courts
issued a writ of execution, 7 hence the petition at bar. 8
We find petitioners' present recourse devoid of merit.
The writ of execution was properly issued pending appeal in the case. Respondent
judge had neither abused his discretion nor committed an error of judgment, but
merely complied with his ministerial duty under the Rules of Court when he
granted private respondents' motion for immediate execution of the judgments
in their favor for failure of petitioners to file a supersedeas bond.
Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides in part that:
"If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue
immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to
stay execution files a sufficient bond, approved by the justice of the
peace or municipal court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action
in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs
accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless,
during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court
the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as
found by the judgment of the justice of the peace or municipal court to
exist. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the court the
reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the
preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment, on or
before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. . . ."

Under this rule, to stay the immediate execution of judgment in an ejectment

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 proceeding it is required that the defendant-appellant must (a) perfect his appeal,
(b) file a supersedeas bond, and (c) periodically deposit the rentals falling due
during the pendency of the appeal. Failure to comply with said requirements is a
ground for the outright execution of the judgment upon petition of the prevailing
party. 9
It has been repeatedly held that the requirement for the filing of a supersedeas
bond is mandatory and cannot be dispensed with by the courts. When the
supersedeas bond is not filed, the duty of the court to order the execution of the
appealed decision is ministerial and imperative and the execution of the
judgment shall then issue immediately, 10 without prejudice to the appeal taking
its course. 11
In the instant case, petitioners' failure to file a supersedeas bond necessary to
stay execution pending appeal made or rendered the original decision executory
and gave private respondents the right to immediate execution of the judgment
which the court is bound to grant and enforce.
The claim of petitioners that the order of execution is contrary to the doctrine
laid down and reiterated in the cases of Rallon vs. Ruiz, Jr., et al., 12 Realiza vs.
Duarte, 13 and Hernandez, et al. vs. Clapis, et al. 14 is without merit.
Cdpr

The aforementioned cases stand on different factual settings, hence the common
dictum therein is not applicable in the case at bar. In those cases, the order of the
executive department, giving the defendant in the ejectment case preferential
right over the land in dispute, was already final and executory. The rights of the
defendants therein over the property that they claimed were already settled and
not contested by the adverse parties.
In the present case, the rights of petitioners over the land in controversy is
doubtful. The decision of the Office of the President giving petitioners
preferential rights to own the questioned lots, setting aside the decision of the
Land Authority awarding the same to private respondents, was questioned by the
latter before the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 79371. In fact,
on November 17, 1972, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, upon learning of the
pendency of said case, ordered the suspension of the processing of all papers
relative to the disputed lots and the holding in abeyance of further action on said
papers until Civil Case No. 79371 shall have been terminated. 15 In addition, on
August 10, 1977, private respondents submitted to the Court a copy of the
decision in Civil Case No. 79371 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated
April 28, 1977, declaring the letter decision of the Office of the President dated
October 4, 1968 and its letter order of February 27, 1970 as null and void, and
declaring private respondents Hernando, Teodoro, Pablo, Renato and Bonifacio, all
surnamed Rivera, as qualified applicants of the questioned lots. 16
Moreover, in the present case the decision is not yet final but became executory
by reason of the very act of herein petitioners in not filing a supersedeas bond
necessary to stay execution pending appeal as required by Section 8, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court. Herein petitioners could have prevented the execution of said
decision by simply complying with the rules but they opted not to do so, hence
they have only themselves to blame.
On the issue of jurisdiction, it is the contention of petitioners that the Municipal
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 Court of Candaba has no jurisdiction over the ejectment case for two reasons,
namely, (1) a civil case for annulment of the decision of the Office of the
President is still pending final determination in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, and (2) there was no compliance with Presidential Decree No. 316
requiring prior referral of the ejectment case to the Department of Agrarian
Reform.
We reject these pretensions.
Firmly settled is the rule that a municipal court has jurisdiction over forcible
entry or unlawful detainer cases even if the ownership of the property is in
disputed. 17 A resum of the basic legal principles in point would be apropos.
In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the main issue is one of priority of
possession. The legal right thereto is not essential to the possessor's cause of
action, for no one may take law into his own hands and forcibly eject another or
deprive him of his possession by stealth, even if his title thereto were
questionable or actually disputed in another case. 18 If the plaintiff can prove
prior physical possession in himself, he may recover such possession even from
the owner, but on the other hand, if he cannot prove such prior physical
possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he
should be the owner of the property. 19
An action for recovery of possession is totally distinct and different from an
action for recovery of title or ownership. In fact, a judgment rendered in a case
for recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question of possession and
not that of ownership. It does not in any way bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land or building. 20 Section 7 of Rule 70 expressly states that: cdll

"The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be

effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title
or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not
bar an action between the value parties respecting title to the land or
building, nor shall it be held conclusive of the fact therein found in a case
between the same parties upon a different cause of action not involving
possession."

We have held that in giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and
detainer the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual
possession; and in case of controverted right, it requires the parties to preserve
the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a
court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It is obviously
just that the person who has first acquired possession should remain in
possession pending this decision; and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile
to engage in a petty warfare over the possession of the property which is the
subject of dispute. To permit this would be highly dangerous to individual
security and disturbing to social order.
Therefore, where a person supposes himself to be the owner of a piece of land
and desires to indicate his ownership against the party actually in possession, it
is incumbent upon him to institute an action to this end in a court of competent
jurisdiction; and he can not be permitted, by invading the property and excluding
the actual possessor to place upon the latter the burden of instituting an action to
try the property right. 21 In no case may possession be acquired through force or
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 try the property right. In no case may possession be acquired through force or
intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes
that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must
invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the
thing. 22 When a person is in possession of the land and has maintained that
possession for years, he cannot be forcibly dispossessed thereof, even by the
owner. 23
Further, the authority given to the Bureau of Lands over the disposition of public
lands does not exclude the courts from their jurisdiction over possessory actions,
the public character of the land notwithstanding. The exercise by the courts of
such jurisdiction is not an interference with the alienation, disposition and control
of public lands. 24 The determination of the respective rights or rival claimants to
public lands is different from the determination of who has the actual possession
or occupation with a view to protecting the same and preventing disorder and
breaches of the peace. A judgment of the court ordering restitution of a parcel of
land to the actual occupant, who has been deprived thereof by another through
the use of force or another illegal manner, can never be prejudicial interference
with the disposition or alienation of public lands. On the contrary, if courts were
deprived of jurisdiction over the cases involving conflicts of possession, the threat
of judicial action against breaches of peace committed on public lands would be
eliminated, and a state of lawlessness would probably be produced between
applicants, occupants, or squatters, where force or might, not right or justice,
would rule. 25

It is, therefore, clear that the municipal court correctly assumed jurisdiction over
the case below as the complaint filed before it sufficiently avers that private
respondents seek to recover possession of the lots from petitioners. The
pendency of Civil Case No. 79371, wherein the question of ownership was
raised, is of no moment. Pending final adjudication of ownership, the municipal
court has jurisdiction to determine in the meantime the right of possession over
the land. 26
Prior referral of this case to the Department of Agrarian Reform under the
provisions of Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 316, in relation to Presidential
Decree No. 27, is not necessary. The said laws are not applicable to the case at
bar. There is here no allegation in the pleadings nor any showing in the records
that a tenancy relation exists between petitioners and private respondents. Both
groups are claiming a right of possession in the concept of an owner. The referral
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 316 apply only in cases wherein the parties
are landlords and tenants and not when they are applicants of a public land
claiming preferential right over it, as in this case.
As we ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al .: 27

". . . for the lands subject of the action to come under Operation Land
Transfer under Pres. Decree No. 27, there must first be a showing that
they are tenanted lands and for the action to come within the referral
provisions of Pres. Decree Nos. 316 and 946, it must first be established
that the action involves tenants. The aforecited decrees specifically speak
of 'tenant-farmer', 'sharecrop or lease tenancy', 'tenant', and 'tenant-
tiller'."
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 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the writs prayed for
are DENIED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on May 16,
1975 is hereby lifted. prcd

SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Penned by Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan, with Justices Luis B. Reyes and Efren I.
Plana concurring.
2. Rollo, 56-57.

3. Ibid., 67.
4. Ibid., 94-99.
5. Rollo, CA-G.R. No. SP-02996, 50.
6. Ibid., id., 130.
7. Rollo, 12.

8. Although the case in this Court had thereafter been submitted for decision, in its
resolution of May 16, 1990 the Court granted the motion of petitioners' new
counsel to file a memorandum in support of the petition. Petitioners'
memorandum was filed on June 28, 1990 and private respondents filed their
memorandum on September 8, 1990.
9. Romero vs. Pecson, etc., et al., 83 Phil. 308 (1949); Villaroman vs. Abaya, etc., et
al., 91 Phil. 20 (1952).

10. Yu Tiong Tay, et al. v. Barrios, etc., et al., 79 Phil. 597 (1947); De la Cruz, et al. vs.
Burgos, et al., 28 SCRA 977 (1969); Fuentes vs. Bautista, etc., et al., 53 SCRA
420 (1973).
11. Laurel, et al. vs. Abalos, etc., et al., 30 SCRA 281 (1969); Caparros vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 170 SCRA 758 (1989).
12. 28 SCRA 331 (1969).
13. 20 SCRA 1264 (1967).

14. 98 Phil. 684 (1956).

15. Rollo, CA-G.R. No. 02996, 83.
16. Rollo, 345-355.
17. Lopez vs. Santiago, etc., et al., 107 Phil. 668 (1960); De Gaerlan, et al. vs.
Martinez, etc., et al., 85 Phil. 375 (1950); De la Cruz, et al. vs. Burgos, et al., 28
SCRA 977 (1969).
18. De la Cruz, et al. vs. Burgos, et al., supra, and cases cited therein.

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 19. Masallo vs. Cesar, 39 Phil. 134 (1918); Prado vs. Calpo, et al., 10 SCRA 801
(1964).
20. Spouses Medina and Bernal vs. Valdellon, etc., et al., 63 SCRA 278 (1975).
21. Dizon vs. Concina, et al., 30 SCRA 897 (1969).

22. Art. 536, Civil Code.

23. Padin vs. Humphreys, et al., 19 Phil. 254 (1911).
24. National Development Company, et al. vs. Hervilla, 151 SCRA 520 (1987).
25. 3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 Ed., 273, as cited in Villaflor vs.
Reyes, et al., 22 SCRA 385 (1968); Guerrero vs. Amores, et al., 159 SCRA 374
(1988).
26. Santiago, etc. vs. Cruz, 54 Phil. 640 (1930).
27. 99 SCRA 722 (1980).

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