Fabre vs.

Court of Appeals

259 SCRA 426

G.R. No. 111127

July 26, 1996

Facts: Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a Mazda minibus. They used the bus
principally in connection with a bus service for school children which they operated in Manila. It was
driven by Porfirio Cabil.

On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged
with the petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La
Union and back in consideration of which private respondent paid petitioners the amount of P3,000.00.

The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at Carmen was
under repair, so that petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first trip to La
Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that
night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway. The road was slippery because it was
raining, causing the bus, which was running at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left
road shoulder. The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of
one Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of
impacts. The bus came to rest off the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its
front portion. Because of the mishap, several passengers were injured particularly Amyline Antonio.

Criminal complaint was filed against the driver and the spouses were also made jointly liable. Spouses
Fabre on the other hand contended that they are not liable since they are not a common carrier. The RTC
of Makati ruled in favor of the plaintiff and the defendants were ordered to pay jointly and severally to
the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether the spouses Fabre are common carriers?

Held: Petition was denied. Spouses Fabre are common carriers.

The Supreme Court held that this case actually involves a contract of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did
not have to be engaged in the business of public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on
common carriers to apply to them. As this Court has held: 10 Art. 1732, Common carriers are persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as
"a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise
offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier
offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who
offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that
Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.

Sunday, December 16, 2012

DE GUZMAN VS CA Case Digest

DE GUZMAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS

168 SCRA 612

Facts: Cendena was a junk dealer and was engaged in buying used bottles and scrap materials in
Pangasinan and brought these to Manila for resale. He used two 6-wheeler trucks. On the return trip to
Pangasinan, he would load his vehicles with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered to
Pangasinan. For that service, he charged freight lower than regular rates. General Milk Co. contacted
with him for the hauling of 750 cartons of milk. On the way to Pangasinan, one of the trucks was hijacked
by armed men who took with them the truck and its cargo and kidnapped the driver and his helper. Only
150 cartons of milk were delivered. The Milk Co. sued to claim the value of the lost merchandise based
on an alleged contract of carriage. Cendena denied that he was a common carrier and contended that he
could not be liable for the loss it was due to force majeure. The trial court ruled that he was a common
carrier. The CA reversed.

Issue: Whether or not Cendena is a common carrier?

Held: Yes, Cendena is properly characterized as a common carrier even though he merely backhauled
goods for other merchants, and even if it was done on a periodic basis rather than on a regular basis,
and even if his principal occupation was not the carriage of goods.

Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. It also avoids
making a distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation services on a regular or
scheduled basis and one offering service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does it
make a distinction between a carrier offering its services to the general public and one who offers
services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of population

National Development Company v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-49407; August 19, 1988

PARAS, J.:

In accordance with a memorandum agreement entered into between National Development Company
(NDC) and Maritime Company of the Philippines (MCP), NDC as the first preferred mortgagee of three
ocean going vessels including one with the name “Doña Nati” appointed MCP as its agent to manage and
operate said vessel for and in its behalf and account. The E. Philipp Corporation of New York loaded on
board the vessel “Doña Nati” at San Francisco, California, a total of 1,200 bales of American raw cotton
consigned to the order of Manila Banking Corporation, Manila and the People’s Bank and Trust Company
acting for and in behalf of the Pan Asiatic Commercial Company, Inc., which represents Riverside Mills
Corporation. Also loaded on the same vessel at Tokyo, Japan, were the cargo of Kyokuto Boekui, Kaisa,
Ltd., consigned to the order of Manila Banking Corporation consisting of 200 cartons of sodium lauryl
sulfate and 10 cases of aluminum foil. En route to Manila the vessel “Doña Nati” figured in a collision at
Ise Bay, Japan with a Japanese vessel “SS Yasushima Maru” as a result of which 550 bales of aforesaid
cargo of American raw cotton were lost and/or destroyed, of which 535 bales as damaged were landed
and sold on the authority of the General Average Surveyor for Yen 6,045,-500 and 15 bales were not
landed and deemed lost. The damaged and lost cargoes was worth P344,977.86 which amount, the
plaintiff as insurer, paid to the Riverside Mills Corporation as holder of the negotiable bills of lading duly
endorsed. Also considered totally lost were the aforesaid shipment of Kyokuto, Boekui, Kaisa Ltd.,
consigned to the order of Manila Banking Corporation, Manila, acting for Guilcon, Manila.

The total loss was P19,938.00 which the plaintiff as insurer paid to Guilcon as holder of the duly
endorsed bill of lading. Thus, the plaintiff had paid as insurer the total amount of P364,915.86 to the
consignees or their successors-in-interest, for the said lost or damaged cargoes. Hence, plaintiff filed this
complaint to recover said amount from the defendants-NDC and MCP as owner and ship agent
respectively, of the said “Doña Nati” vessel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) applies in instant case

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the law of the country to which the goods are to be transported
governs the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration. In the case
at bar, it has been established that the goods in question are transported from San Francisco, California
and Tokyo, Japan to the Philippines and that they were lost or damaged due to a collision which was
found to have been caused by the negligence or fault of both captains of the colliding vessels. Under the
above ruling, it is evident that the laws of the Philippines will apply, and it is immaterial that the collision
actually occurred in foreign waters, such as Ise Bay, Japan. ·Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, common
carriers from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported
by them according to all circumstances of each case. Accordingly, under Article 1735 of the same Code,
in all cases other than those mentioned in Article 1734 thereof, the common carrier shall be presumed
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary
diligence required by law.

Japan Airlines vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 118664)

Facts: Private respondents boarded a JAL flight in San Francisco, California bound for Manila. It included
an overnight stopover at Narita, Japan at JAL’s expense. Due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, private
respondents’ trip to Manila was cancelled. JAL rebooked all the Manila-bound passengers and paid for
the hotel expenses of their unexpected overnight stay. The flight of private respondents was again
cancelled due to NAIA’s indefinite closure. JAL informed the respondents that it would no longer defray
their hotel and accommodation expense during their stay in Narita. The respondents were forced to pay
for their accommodations and meal expenses for 5 days.

Issues:

Whether or not JAL has the obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal expenses even if the delay was
caused by force majeure

Whether or not the award of damages was proper

Held:

When a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of force majeure, the general rule is that he
cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. When JAL was prevented from resuming its
flight to Manila due to the effects of the eruption, whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and
meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred cannot be charged to JAL. The predicament of the
private respondents was not due to the fault or negligence of JAL. JAL had the duty to arrange the
respondents’ flight back to Manila. However, it failed to look after the comfort and convenience of its
passengers when it made the passengers arrange their flight back to Manila on their own and after
waiting in the airport for a whole day.
Yes, the award of nominal damages is proper. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of a
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized and not
for the purpose of indemnifying any loss suffered by him.

Herminio Mariano, Jr. petitioner, versus Ildefonso C. Callejas and Edgar De Borja, respondents

G.R. No. 166640 – July 31, 2009

Puno, C.J.:

Doctrine: While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the
safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it
does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.

It is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation company makes
it an insurer of the passenger's safety, but that its liability for personal injuries sustained by its
passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the degree of diligence that the law
requires.

Facts:

Petitioner Herminio Mariano, Jr. is the surviving spouse of Dr. Frelinda Mariano who was a
passenger of a Celyrosa Express bus bound for Tagaytay when she met her death. Respondent
Ildefonso C. Callejas is the registered owner of Celyrosa Express, while respondent Edgar de
Borja was the driver of the bus on which the deceased was a passenger.

On November 12, 1991, the Celyrosa Express bus, carrying Dr. Mariano as its passenger,
collided with an Isuzu truck with trailer. The passenger bus was bound for Tagaytay while the
trailer truck came from the opposite direction, bound for Manila. The trailer truck bumped the
passenger bus on its left middle portion. Due to the impact, the passenger bus fell on its right
side on the right shoulder of the highway and caused the death of Dr. Mariano and physical
injuries to four other passengers.

Petitioner filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage and damages against respondents.
Respondents denied liability for the death of Dr. Mariano. They claimed that the proximate
cause of the accident was the recklessness of the driver of the trailer truck which bumped their
bus while allegedly at a halt on the shoulder of the road in its rightful lane. Thus, respondent
Callejas filed a third-party complaint against Liong Chio Chang, the owner of the trailer truck.

The trial court found the respondents Callejas and De Borja together with Liong Chio Chang,
jointly and severally liable to pay the petitioner.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not Callejas and De Borja were negligent

Ruling:

No. Callejas and De Borja exercised utmost diligence in the discharge of their duty.

Celyrosa Express, a common carrier, has the express obligation to carry the passengers safely
as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances, and to observe extraordinary diligence in
the discharge of its duty. The death of the wife of the petitioner in the course of transporting her
to her destination gave rise to the presumption of negligence of the carrier. To overcome the
presumption, respondents have to show that they observed extraordinary diligence in the
discharge of their duty, or that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event.

While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe
transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does
not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.

Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation company
makes it an insurer of the passenger's safety, but that its liability for personal injuries sustained
by its passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the degree of diligence that the
law requires.

In the case at bar, petitioner cannot succeed in his contention that respondents failed to
overcome the presumption of negligence against them. The totality of evidence shows that the
death of petitioners spouse was caused by the reckless negligence of the driver of the Isuzu
trailer truck which lost its brakes and bumped the Celyrosa Express bus.

In fine, the evidence shows that before the collision, the passenger bus was cruising on its
rightful lane along the Aguinaldo Highway when the trailer truck coming from the opposite
direction, on full speed, suddenly swerved and encroached on its lane, and bumped the
passenger bus on its left middle portion. Respondent driver De Borja had every right to expect
that the trailer truck coming from the opposite direction would stay on its proper lane. He was
not expected to know that the trailer truck had lost its brakes. The swerving of the trailer truck
was abrupt and it was running on a fast speed as it was found 500 meters away from the point
of collision. Secondly, any doubt as to the culpability of the driver of the trailer truck ought to
vanish when he pleaded guilty to the charge of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple slight
physical injuries and damage to property in Criminal Case No. 2223-92, involving the same
incident.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 21, 2004 and the
Resolution dated January 7, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66891 are
AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 71929

NARVASA, J.

FACTS: Dr. Felipa Pablo, an associate professor in the University of the Philippines and a research
grantee of the Philippine Atomic Energy Agency, was invited to take part at a meeting of the Department
of Research and Isotopes in Italy in view of her specialized knowledge in “foreign substances in food and
the agriculture environment”. She would be the second speaker on the first day of the meeting. Dr. Pablo
booked passage on petitioner Alitalia. She arrived in Milan on the day before the meeting, but was told
that her luggage was delayed and was in a succeeding flight from Rome to Milan. The luggage included
her materials for the presentation. The succeeding flights did not carry her luggage. Desperate, she went
to Rome to try to locate the luggage herself, but to no avail. She returned to Manila without attending the
meeting. She demanded reparation for the damages. She rejected Alitalia ’s offer of free airline tickets and
commenced an action for damages. As it turned out, the luggage was actually forwarded to Ispra, but only
a day after the scheduled appearance. It was returned to her after 11 months. The trial court ruled in favor
of Dr. Pablo, and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES: W/N (1) the Warsaw Convention should be applied to limit Alitalia ’s liability; (2) Dr. Pablo is
entitled to nominal damages

RULING: (1) NEGATIVE.

Under the Warsaw Convention, an air carrier is made liable for damages for:
The death, wounding or other bodily injury of a passenger if the accident causing it took place on
board the aircraft or I the course of its operations of embarking or disembarking;
The destruction or loss of, or damage to, any registered luggage or goods, if the occurrence
causing it took place during the carriage by air; and
Delay in the transportation by air of passengers, luggage or goods.

The convention however denies to the carrier availment of the provisions which exclude or limit his
liability, if the damage is caused by his willful misconduct, or by such default on his part as is considered
to be equivalent to willful misconduct. The Convention does not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration
of the instances of an airline's liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. It should be
deemed a limit of liability only in those cases where the cause of the death or injury to person, or
destruction, loss or damage to property or delay in its transport is not attributable to or attended by any
willful misconduct, bad faith, recklessness, or otherwise improper conduct on the part of any official or
employee for which the carrier is responsible, and there is otherwise no special or extraordinary form of
resulting injury.

In the case at bar, no bad faith or otherwise improper conduct may be ascribed to the employees of
petitioner airline; and Dr. Pablo's luggage was eventually returned to her, belatedly, it is true, but without
appreciable damage. The fact is, nevertheless, that some species of injury was caused to Dr. Pablo
because petitioner ALITALIA misplaced her baggage and failed to deliver it to her at the time appointed -
a breach of its contract of carriage. Certainly, the compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo cannot
under the circumstances be restricted to that prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for delay in the
transport of baggage.

(2) POSITIVE.

She is not, of course, entitled to be compensated for loss or damage to her luggage. She is however
entitled to nominal damages which, as the law says, is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff,
which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff that for any loss suffered and this Court agrees that the respondent
Court of Appeals correctly set the amount thereof at PhP 40,000.00.

The Court also agrees that respondent Court of Appeals correctly awarded attorney ’s fees to Dr. Pablo
and the amount of PhP 5,000.00 set by it is reasonable in the premises. The law authorizes recovery of
attorney’s fees inter alia where, as here, the defendant ’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest or where the court deems it just and
equitable.

MAPA VS C-A (275-286)

Mapa purchased from TWA Trans World Airlines 2 airline tickets in Bankok Thailand, for Los Angeles- New York –
Boston St. Louis –Chicago, all of the USA. The domicile of the carrier TWA was Kansas City, Missouri USA, Where its
principal place of business was likewise located. The place of business of TWA where the contract was made was in
Bangkok Thailand. The place of destination was Chicago-USA. The MAPAS left Manila on board Pal for L-A, They left
checked in 7 pieces of luggage’s at TWA counter at JFK airport but failed to board the plane because they went to the
wrong gate. Hey were however allowed to take a later TWA plane to Boston which was delayed because of the
thunder storm. Upon arrival at boston they were only retrieved 3 out of 7 luggage’s which loss was immediately
reported to TWA with a total value of S 2,560 as constituting full satisfaction of their claim which the MAPAS accepted
as partial payment for the actual loss of their baggage’s. Thereafter MAPA filed a case against TWA in the Philippines
Similar to the case of Santos III , TWA move to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on section 28(1) warsaw
contending that the complaint should have been brought either in Bankok where the contract was entered into , or in
boston which was the place of destination or in Kansas City which was the carriers domicile and principla place of
business. MAPAS claimed that the WARSAW convention was not applicable because the contract was not an
Internationl Transportation as contemplated under the provision of the WARSAW convention the RTC as affirmed by
the C-A dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Is the Warsaw Convention applicable?

Held: Warsaw convention was not applicable because the contract does not involve an “INTERANTIONAL
TRANPORTATION” base on the two categories.

(1) that where the place of departure and the place of destination are situated within the territories of two High
Contracting Parties regardless of whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a transshipment; and

(2) that where the place of departure and the place of destination are within the territory of a single High Contracting
Party if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, mandate, or authority of another
power, even though the power is not a party of the Convention.

Whether the contracts were of international transportation is to be solely determined from the TWA
tickets issued to them in Bangkok, Thailand, which showed that their itinerary was Los Angeles-New
York-Boston-St. Louis-Chicago. Accordingly, since the place of departure (Los Angeles) and the
place of destination (Chicago) are both within the territory of one High Contracting Party, with no
agreed stopping place in a territory subject to the sovereignty, mandate, suzerainty or authority of
another Power, the contracts did not constitute 'international transportation' as defined by the
convention