Chapter 13: Protection

Operating System Concepts Essentials– 8th Edition Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011
 Chapter 13: Protection
„ Goals of Protection
„ Principles of Protection
„ Domain of Protection
„ Access Matrix
„ Implementation of Access Matrix
„ Access Control
„ Revocation of Access Rights
„ Capability-Based Systems
„ Language-Based Protection

Operating System Concepts Essentials – 8th Edition 13.2 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011
 Objectives
„ Discuss the goals and principles of protection in a modern computer system

„ Explain how protection domains combined with an access matrix are used to specify the resources a
process may access

„ Examine capability and language-based protection systems

Operating System Concepts Essentials – 8th Edition 13.3 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011
 Goals of Protection
„ In one protection model, computer consists of a collection of objects, hardware or software

„ Each object has a unique name and can be accessed through a well-defined set of operations

„ Protection problem - ensure that each object is accessed correctly and only by those processes that are
allowed to do so

Operating System Concepts Essentials – 8th Edition 13.4 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011
 Principles of Protection
„ Guiding principle – principle of least privilege
z Programs, users and systems should be given just enough privileges to perform their tasks
z Limits damage if entity has a bug, gets abused
z Can be static (during life of system, during life of process)
z Or dynamic (changed by process as needed) – domain switching, privilege escalation
z “Need to know” a similar concept regarding access to data

„ Must consider “grain” aspect

z Rough-grained privilege management easier, simpler, but least privilege now done in large chunks
 For example, traditional Unix processes either have abilities of the associated user, or of root
z Fine-grained management more complex, more overhead, but more protective
 File ACL lists, RBAC

„ Domain can be user, process, procedure

Operating System Concepts Essentials – 8th Edition 13.5 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011
 Domain Structure
„ Access-right = <object-name, rights-set>
where rights-set is a subset of all valid operations that can be performed on the object

„ Domain = set of access-rights

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 Domain Implementation (UNIX)
„ Domain = user-id

„ Domain switch accomplished via file system

 Each file has associated with it a domain bit (setuid bit)
 When file is executed and setuid = on, then user-id is set to owner of the file being executed
 When execution completes user-id is reset

„ Domain switch accomplished via passwords

z su command temporarily switches to another user’s domain when other domain’s password
provided

„ Domain switching via commands

z sudo command prefix executes specified command in another domain (if original domain has
privilege or password given)

Operating System Concepts Essentials – 8th Edition 13.7 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011
 Domain Implementation (MULTICS)

„ Let Di and Dj be any two domain rings

„ If j < I ⇒ Di ⊆ Dj

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 Multics Benefits and Limits
„ Ring / hierarchical structure provided more than the basic kernel / user or root / normal user design

„ Fairly complex -> more overhead

„ But does not allow strict need-to-know

z Object accessible in Dj but not in Di, then j must be < i
z But then every segment accessible in Di also accessible in Dj

Operating System Concepts Essentials – 8th Edition 13.9 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011
 Access Matrix
„ View protection as a matrix (access matrix)

„ Rows represent domains

„ Columns represent objects

„ Access(i, j) is the set of operations that a process executing in Domaini can invoke on Objectj

Operating System Concepts Essentials – 8th Edition 13.10 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011
 Access Matrix

Operating System Concepts Essentials – 8th Edition 13.11 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011
 Use of Access Matrix
„ If a process in Domain Di tries to do “op” on object Oj, then “op” must be in the access matrix

„ User who creates object can define access column for that object

„ Can be expanded to dynamic protection

z Operations to add, delete access rights
z Special access rights:
 owner of Oi
 copy op from Oi to Oj (denoted by “*”)
 control – Di can modify Dj access rights
 transfer – switch from domain Di to Dj

z Copy and Owner applicable to an object

z Control applicable to domain object

Operating System Concepts Essentials – 8th Edition 13.12 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011
 Use of Access Matrix (Cont.)
„ Access matrix design separates mechanism from policy
z Mechanism
 Operating system provides access-matrix + rules
 If ensures that the matrix is only manipulated by authorized agents and that rules are strictly
enforced
z Policy
 User dictates policy
 Who can access what object and in what mode

„ But doesn’t solve the general confinement problem

Operating System Concepts Essentials – 8th Edition 13.13 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011
 Access Matrix of Figure A
with Domains as Objects

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 Access Matrix with Copy Rights

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 Access Matrix With Owner Rights

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 Modified Access Matrix of Figure B

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 Implementation of Access Matrix
„ Generally, a sparse matrix
„ Option 1 – Global table
z Store ordered triples < domain, object, rights-set > in table
z A requested operation M on object Oj within domain Di -> search table for < Di, Oj, Rk >
 with M ‫ א‬Rk

z But table could be large -> won’t fit in main memory

z Difficult to group objects (consider an object that all domains can read)

„ Option 2 – Access lists for objects

z Each column implemented as an access list for one object
z Resulting per-object list consists of ordered pairs < domain, rights-set > defining all domains
with non-empty set of access rights for the object
z Easily extended to contain default set -> If M ‫ א‬default set, also allow access

Operating System Concepts Essentials – 8th Edition 13.18 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011
 „ Each column = Access-control list for one object
Defines who can perform what operation

Domain 1 = Read, Write

Domain 2 = Read
Domain 3 = Read

„ Each Row = Capability List (like a key)

For each domain, what operations allowed on what objects
Object F1 – Read
Object F4 – Read, Write, Execute
Object F5 – Read, Write, Delete, Copy

Operating System Concepts Essentials – 8th Edition 13.19 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011
 Implementation of Access Matrix (Cont.)
„ Option 3 – Capability list for domains
z Instead of object-based, list is domain based
z Capability list for domain is list of objects together with operations allows on them
z Object represented by its name or address, called a capability
z Execute operation M on object Oj, process requests operation and specifies capability as parameter
 Possession of capability means access is allowed
z Capability list associated with domain but never directly accessible by domain
 Rather, protected object, maintained by OS and accessed indirectly
 Like a “secure pointer”
 Idea can be extended up to applications

„ Option 4 – Lock-key
z Compromise between access lists and capability lists
z Each object has list of unique bit patterns, called locks
z Each domain as list of unique bit patterns called keys
z Process in a domain can only access object if domain has key that matches one of the locks

Operating System Concepts Essentials – 8th Edition 13.20 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011
 Comparison of Implementations
„ Many trade-offs to consider
z Global table is simple, but can be large
z Access lists correspond to needs of users
 Determining set of access rights for domain non-localized so difficult
 Every access to an object must be checked
– Many objects and access rights -> slow
z Capability lists useful for localizing information for a given process
 But revocation capabilities can be inefficient
z Lock-key effective and flexible, keys can be passed freely from domain to domain, easy revocation

„ Most systems use combination of access lists and capabilities

z First access to an object -> access list searched
 If allowed, capability created and attached to process
– Additional accesses need not be checked
 After last access, capability destroyed
 Consider file system with ACLs per file

Operating System Concepts Essentials – 8th Edition 13.21 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011
 Access Control
„ Protection can be applied to non-file resources

„ Solaris 10 provides role-based access control (RBAC) to implement least privilege

z Privilege is right to execute system call or use an option within a system call
z Can be assigned to processes
z Users assigned roles granting access to privileges and programs
 Enable role via password to gain its privileges
z Similar to access matrix

Operating System Concepts Essentials – 8th Edition 13.22 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011
 Role-based Access Control in Solaris 10

Operating System Concepts Essentials – 8th Edition 13.23 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011
 Revocation of Access Rights
„ Various options to remove the access right of a domain to an object
z Immediate vs. delayed
z Selective vs. general
z Partial vs. total
z Temporary vs. permanent
„ Access List – Delete access rights from access list
z Simple – search access list and remove entry
z Immediate, general or selective, total or partial, permanent or temporary
„ Capability List – Scheme required to locate capability in the system before capability can be revoked
z Reacquisition – periodic delete, with require and denial if revoked
z Back-pointers – set of pointers from each object to all capabilities of that object (Multics)
z Indirection – capability points to global table entry which points to object – delete entry from global
table, not selective (CAL)
z Keys – unique bits associated with capability, generated when capability created
 Master key associated with object, key matches master key for access
 Revocation – create new master key
 Policy decision of who can create and modify keys – object owner or others?

Operating System Concepts Essentials – 8th Edition 13.24 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011
 Capability-Based Systems
„ Hydra
z Fixed set of access rights known to and interpreted by the system
 i.e. read, write, or execute each memory segment
 User can declare other auxiliary rights and register those with protection system
 Accessing process must hold capability and know name of operation
 Rights amplification allowed by trustworthy procedures for a specific type
z Interpretation of user-defined rights performed solely by user's program; system provides access
protection for use of these rights
z Operations on objects defined procedurally – procedures are objects accessed indirectly by
capabilities
z Solves the problem of mutually suspicious subsystems
z Includes library of prewritten security routines
„ Cambridge CAP System
z Simpler but powerful
z Data capability - provides standard read, write, execute of individual storage segments
associated with object – implemented in microcode
z Software capability -interpretation left to the subsystem, through its protected procedures
 Only has access to its own subsystem
 Programmers must learn principles and techniques of protection

Operating System Concepts Essentials – 8th Edition 13.25 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011
 Language-Based Protection
„ Specification of protection in a programming language allows the high-level description of policies for the
allocation and use of resources

„ Language implementation can provide software for protection enforcement when automatic hardware-
supported checking is unavailable

„ Interpret protection specifications to generate calls on whatever protection system is provided by the
hardware and the operating system

Operating System Concepts Essentials – 8th Edition 13.26 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011
 Protection in Java 2
„ Protection is handled by the Java Virtual Machine (JVM)

„ A class is assigned a protection domain when it is loaded by the JVM

„ The protection domain indicates what operations the class can (and cannot) perform

„ If a library method is invoked that performs a privileged operation, the stack is inspected to ensure the
operation can be performed by the library

Operating System Concepts Essentials – 8th Edition 13.27 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011
 Stack Inspection

Operating System Concepts Essentials – 8th Edition 13.28 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011
 End of Chapter 13

Operating System Concepts Essentials– 8th Edition Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2011