Tan V CA PDF

2/10/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 175
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Tan vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 80479. July 28, 1989.
AGUSTINA LIQUETTE TAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS AND SPS. MARIANO SINGSON and
VISITACION SINGSON, respondents.
Civil Law; Obligations; Rescission; In the absence of a

contrary stipulation the power to rescind obligations must be
invoked judicially, it cannot be exercised solely on a party’s own
judgment that the other has committed a breach of the obligation.
—That the power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal
ones in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is
incumbent upon him is clear from a reading of the Civil Code
provisions. However, it is equally settled that, in the absence of a
stipulation to the contrary, this power must be invoked judicially;
it cannot be exercised solely on a party’s own judgment that the
other has committed a breach of the obligation. Where there is
nothing in the contract empowering the petitioner to rescind it
without resort to the courts, the petitioner’s action in unilaterally
terminating the contract in this case is unjustified.
Same; Same; Same; Alleged breach of the obligation by
private respondents not considered substantial enough to warrant
rescission of the contract.—The alleged breach of the obligation by
the private respondents, which consists in a mere delay for a few
days in clearing the title to the property, cannot be considered
substantial enough to warrant rescission of the contract.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
657
VOL. 175, JULY 28, 1989 657
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Rescission not permitted for a

slight or casual breach of the contract.—It is a settled principle of
law that rescission will not be permitted for a slight or casual
breach of the contract but only for such breaches as are so
substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties
in making the agreement.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A slight delay on the part of
the private respondents in the performance of their obligation not
sufficient ground for resolution of the agreement.—In this case, as
to the lot covered by TCT No. T-13826, it is true that as of June
25, 1984, the date set for the execution of the final deed of sale,
the mortgage lien in favor of DBP annotated in the title has not
yet been cancelled as it took DBP some time in processing the
papers relative thereto. However, just a few days after, or on July
12, 1984, the cancellation of the DBP mortgage was entered by
the Register of Deeds and duly noted on the title. Time not being
of the essence in the agreement, a slight delay on the part of the
private respondents in the performance of their obligation, is not
sufficient ground for the resolution of the agreement.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court

of Appeals. Reyes, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Noe Villanueva for petitioner.
Jose Beltran for private respondents.
CORTÉS, J.:
The instant petition for review raises the main issue of

whether the private respondents committed a substantial
breach of their obligation so as to warrant petitioner’s
exercise of her right to rescind the contract of sale under
Article 1191 of the Civil Code.
The antecedents of the instant controversy **
had been
summarized in the respondent court’s decision as follows:
xxx
The evidence shows that defendants-appellants spouses
(private respondents herein) are the owners of a house and lot
located at No. 34
_______________
** Penned by Justice Manuel T. Reyes and concurred in by Justices Oscar R.

Victoriano and Hector C. Fule.
658

Easter Road, Baguio City, and covered by T.C.T. No. T-13826,

which were then for sale. On June 14, 1984, plaintiff-appellee
together with her agent went to see said spouses at their
residence regarding the property. After appellants had shown
appellee around the house and had conversation about the
encumbrances and/or liens on the property, the parties finally
agreed on the price of P1,800,000.00, with appellee to advance
earnest money of P200,000.00 to enable appellants to secure the
cancellation of the mortgage and lien annotated on the title of the
property and the balance of the price to be paid by appellee on
June 21, 1984. Forthwith, appellee handed to appellants a check
for P200,000.00 and thereupon the parties signed a receipt (Exh.
A) in the following tenor:
xxx
In turn, appellants handed to appellee a xerox copy of the title
and other papers pertaining to the property as well as an
inventory of the furnishings of the house that are included in the
sale. There (3) days thereafter, i.e., on June 17, 1984, appellee
returned to appellants’ house together with her daughter Corazon
and one Ines, to ask for a reduction of the price to P1,750,000.00
and appellants spouses agreed, and so another receipt entitled
“Agreement” (Exh. B) was signed by the parties as follows:
xxx
The very same day that appellants received the earnest money
of P200,000.00, they started paying their mortgage loan with the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to clear up the title of
the subject property. On June 14, 1984, appellants paid the bank
P30,000.00 per receipt, Exhibit B; on June 18, 1984 another
P50,000.00 (Exh. 4-c); on June 29, 1984, P20,000.00 (Exh. 4-D);
and on July 5, 1984, P70,909.59 and another P19,886.60 (Exhs. 4-
F and 4-G) in full payment of the mortgage loan. On July 9, 1984,
the DBP executed a cancellation of mortgage, which was
registered with the Registry of Property of Baguio City in July 12,
1984. Appellants also paid all the taxes due and in appears on the
property. It likewise appears that appellants paid in full on July
17, 1984 the cost price of the 338 square meter lot which was
awarded to appellant Visitacion Singson per her townsite sale
application for said property. And the request of the City Sheriff
of Baguio City to lift the notice of levy in execution dated
February 2, 1978 in Civil Case No. Q-10202, Pio S. Acampado, et
al. v. Mariano D. Singson, et al., was duly annotated on the back
of TCT No. T-13826 on August 2, 1979.
On June 25, 1984, appellee accompanied by her daughter
Corazon and her lawyer, Atty. Vicente Quitoriano, went to Baguio
City to
659
VOL. 175, JULY 28, 1989 659

inquire about the status of the property and appellants told her
that the Development Bank of the Philippines was taking some
time processing their payments and preparing the deed of
cancellation of the mortgage. On that occasion, the parties agreed
on an extension of two (2) weeks for the execution of the deed of
sale. Here, the parties’ respective versions on the matter parted
ways. According to appellants, it was appellee who asked for the
extension because she was not yet ready to pay the balance of
P1,550,000.00. On the other hand, appellee said that it was
appellants who asked for it because the title of the property was
not yet cleared. The court below believed appellee because on said
date the Development Bank had not yet executed the deed of
cancellation of mortgage, and no title has yet been issued for the
driveway although already fully paid for.
Immediately, upon execution by the DBP of the deed of
cancellation of mortgage of July 9, 1984, appellants tried to
contact appellee and/or her daughter Corazon to come to Baguio
City for the formal execution of the deed of sale, but to no avail.
Instead, appellants received a telegram from Atty. Quitoriano
cancelling the sale and demanding the return of the P200,000.00
earnest money. Appellants countered with a letter of their lawyer,
Atty. Tiofisto Rodes, calling on appellee to perform her part of the
contract because “the title to the house and lot right now suffers
no imperfection or doubt. The levy on execution has long been
lifted, the mortgage indebtedness released, the portion of the
public land used as driveway has long been awarded and fully
paid for the City of Baguio. In short, the title can now be
transferred in your name upon execution of the contract of sale . .
. Your refusal will compel Us to sue for specific performance . . .”
Before appellants could make good their threat, appellee
“jumped the gun”, so to speak, upon them by filing in court on
August 27, 1984 the case for recovery of sum of money with
damages which is now this case on appeal before us.
In her complaint, appellee alleged that she gave appellants
spouses P200,000.00 upon their assurances that they could
transfer to her the house and lot she was buying from them free
from any liens and encumbrances, including the furnishings
thereof and the adjacent lot being used as driveway, on June 25,
1984, but that day had come and passed without appellants being
able to make good their promise, because she “discovered to her
shock and dismay that she had been dealt with in bad faith by
defendants” as the mortgage on the property was not released or
cancelled and the driveway was still public land and could not be
validly transferred to her as any disposition thereof would yet

require approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. Hence, the suit against appellants spouses for recovery
660

of the P200,000.00 earnest money which is, in essence and

concept, one for rescission with damages.
xxx
[CA Decision, pp. 1-6; Rollo, pp. 53-57.]
The Regional Trial Court which took cognizance of Civil

Case No. 3709-V filed by petitioner Agustina Liquette Tan
rendered a decision disposing of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff

and against defendants:
(1) Ordering the rescission of the contracts entered into by

and between plaintiff and the defendants, which are
embodied in Exhs. “A” or “1 and “B” or “2”;
(2) Ordering the defendants, spouses Mariano Singson and
Visitacion Singson to return to plaintiff the P200,000.00
earnest money given by her to defendants;
(3) Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff interest at the
rate of 12% per annum on the P200,000.00 from the filing
of the complaint until fully paid;
(4) Ordering the defendant (sic) to pay plaintiff moral
damages in the sum of P50,000.00;
(5) Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of
P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
(6) Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo. pp. 49-50.]
Private respondents interposed an appeal from said

decision alleging that the trial court erred
I. . . . in considering the consent of appellee to the

agreement was vitiated by fraud.
II. . . . in resolving in favor of the appellee the sole right of
rescission.
III. . . . in considering the adjacent lot as part of the sale
agreed upon by the parties.
IV. . . . in deciding the case in favor of the appellee and

awarding damages.
On August 24, 1987, the respondent Court of Appeals

promulgated a decision reversing that of the trial court, the
decretal portion of which reads as follows:
661
VOL. 175, JULY 28, 1989 661

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET

ASIDE and a new one is hereby entered ordering immediately
upon the finality of this judgment appellants spouses to execute
and sign an absolute deed of sale conveying to appellee free from
any lien or encumbrance the house and lot covered by T.C.T. No.
13826 of the Registry of Deeds of Baguio City together with the
furnishings and appliances listed in Exhibit C and the adjacent
lot used as driveway covered by the Order of Award, Exhibit E-3
and appellee to pay appellants spouses the sum of P1,550,000.00
plus interest at the legal rate from the finality of this judgment
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 61.]
Petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari

assailing the conclusion of the respondent Court of Appeals
that the private respondents had not committed a
substantial breach of their obligation and therefore, there
was no legal basis for the judgment ordering rescission of
the contract. Petitioners maintain that since private
respondents were not prepared to convey the title to the
subject property on the date agreed upon in view of the
various liens and encumbrances thereon, the former are
entitled to rescind the contract pursuant to Article 1191 of
the Civil Code which states:
Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in

reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with
what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the
rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in
either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen
fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be
just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third
persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance with articles
1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
After a thorough examination of the allegations contained

in the parties’ pleadings, the Court finds the instant
petition to be devoid of any merit.
That the power to rescind obligations is implied in
reciprocal ones in case one of the obligors should not
comply with what is
662

incumbent upon him is clear from a reading of the Civil

Code provisions. However, it is equally settled that, in the
absence of a stipulation to the contrary, this power must be
invoked judicially; it cannot be exercised solely on a party’s
own judgment that the other has committed a breach of the
obligation. Where there is nothing in the contract
empowering the petitioner to rescind it without resort to
the courts, the petitioner’s action in unilaterally
terminating the contract in this case is unjustified
[Philippine Amusement Enterprises, Inc. v. Natividad, G.R.
No. L-12876. September 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 284].
In this case, petitioner received on July 17, 1984
through her daughter Cora Tan Singson, a telegram from
private respondent Visitacion Singson advising the former
that the papers for the sale of the property are ready for
final execution. The parties likewise met on June 25, 1984,
the day agreed upon for the full payment of the purchase
price, and they agreed on a further extension of two weeks
for the execution of the deed of sale. Despite this
agreement, private respondents suddenly received a
telegram from Atty. Quitoriano, counsel for the petitioner,
unilaterally stopping the sale and demanding the return of
the earnest money paid by petitioner [Exhibit “9”, Original
Records, p. 99].
Petitioner, in rescinding the sale, claims that a
substantial breach of the obligation has been committed by
the private respondents as indicated by the following facts
proved to be existing as of the date agreed upon for the
consummation of the sale:
1. That no title has yet been issued by the Registry of

Deeds of the City of Baguio in the name of either of
the respondents in connection with the 338-square
meter lot where the driveway is located;
That the private respondents have not paid in full

2.
the total consideration for the said lot to the City of
Baguio because they were able to complete the
payment of the purchase price only on July 17, 1984
as found out by the respondent court in its decision
(Please see page 8 of the Court of Appeals’ decision,
Annex “B”);
3. That private respondents have not acquired the
“previous consent of the Secretary of Natural
Resources” for the said transfer to the petitioner as
required by the award;
4. That the restrictions indicated in the AWARD
makes what
663
VOL. 175, JULY 28, 1989 663

ever conveyance to be made by the awardee of the

lot within the prohibited period as null and void
and could cause the forfeiture of all the payments
already made as well as the improvements
introduced therein;
5. That there are still liens and encumbrances insofar
as TCT No. T-13826 consisting of a mortgage with
the DBP and a notice of Levy and Writ of
Execution. [Rollo, pp. 14-15.]
Alternatively, petitioner seeks annulment of the contract

on the ground of fraud since private respondents had
misrepresented to her that they could validly convey title to
the property subject of the contract which however is
encumbered with various existing liens.
1. The alleged breach of the obligation by the private

respondents, which consists in a mere delay for a
few days in clearing the title to the property, cannot
be considered substantial enough to warrant
rescission of the contract.
A thorough review of the records clearly indicates that

private respondents had substantially complied with their
undertaking of clearing the title to the property which has
a total land area of 886 square meters. It must be pointed
out that the subject lot consists of private land, with an
area of 548 square meters, covered by TCT No. T-13826
and of a portion of the public land which has been awarded

to the private respondents under Townsite Sales
Application No. 7-676-A. While TCT No. T-13826 was
subject to a mortgage in favor of DBP, private respondents,
upon receipt of the earnest money paid by petitioner,
utilized the same to settle its obligations with DBP thus
enabling them to secure a cancellation of the existing
mortgage, which was duly noted in the title to the property
[See Original Records, p. 94].
It is a settled principle of law that rescission will not be
permitted for a slight or casual breach of the contract but
only for such breaches as are so substantial and
fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in
making the agreement [Universal Food Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-29155, May 13, 1970, 33
SCRA 1; Philippine Amusement Enterprises, Inc. v.
Natividad, supra; Roque v. Lapuz, G.R. No. L-32811,
March 31, 1980, 96 SCRA 741]. A court, in determining
whether rescission is warranted, must exercise its
discretion judiciously
664

considering that the question of whether a breach of a

contract is substantial depends upon the attendant
circumstances [Corpus v. Alikpala, et al., G.R. Nos. L-
23720 and L-23707, January 17, 1968, 22 SCRA 104].
In this case, as to the lot covered by TCT No. T-13826, it
is true that as of June 25, 1984, the date set for the
execution of the final deed of sale, the mortgage lien in
favor of DBP annotated in the title has not yet been
cancelled as it took DBP some time in processing the
papers relative thereto. However, just a few days after, or
on July 12, 1984, the cancellation of the DBP mortgage was
entered by the Register of Deeds and duly noted on the
title. Time not being of the essence in the agreement, a
slight delay on the part of the private respondents in the
performance of their obligation, is not sufficient ground for
the resolution of the agreement [Biando and Espanto v.
Embestro and Bardaje, 105 Phil. 1164 (1959)], more so
when the delay was not totally attributable to them.
As to the notice of levy and execution annotated on TCT
No. T-13826, a request to lift the same had already been
filed with the Register of Deeds and duly noted on the title
[Original Records, p. 95]. The fact that said notice had not
yet been cancelled by the Register of Deeds as of June 25,

1984 cannot prejudice the sellers who must be deemed to
have substantially complied with their obligation. The rule
in this jurisdiction is that where the fulfillment of the
condition (in a conditional obligation) does not depend on
the will of the obligor, but on that of a third person, the
obligor’s part of the contract is complied with, if he does all
that is in his power and it then becomes incumbent upon
the other contracting party to comply with the terms of the
contract [Article 1182, Civil Code; Smith Bell and Co. v.
Sotelo Matti, 44 Phil. 874 (1922)].
On the other hand, private respondents’ interest in the
public land used as a driveway can likewise be conveyed to
petitioner although no title has yet been issued in the name
of Visitacion Singson. Such portion of the public land has
long been awarded to Singson in 1972 and payment of the
purchase price thereof has already been completed as of
July 17, 1984. The fact that the consent of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to the sale of the
property to petitioner has not yet been
665
VOL. 175, JULY 28, 1989 665

secured cannot be considered a substantial breach of

private respondents’ obligation under the contract of sale.
In Juanico and Barredo v. American Land Commercial
Co., Inc., et al. [97 Phil. 221 1955)], this Court had ruled
that the prior approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Recources is required only in cases of sale and
encumbrance of the public land during the pendency of the
application by the purchaser and before his compliance
with the requirements of the law. Thus:
...But such approval becomes unnecessary after the purchaser had

complied with all the requirements of the law, even if the patent
has not been actually issued, for in that case the rights of the
purchaser are already deemed vested, the issuance of the patent
being a mere ceremony. Thus, “the execution and delivery of the
patent after the right to it has become complete, are the mere
ministerial acts of the officers charged with that duty”. . . . And,
as it has been held, “One who has done everything which is
necessary in order to entitle him to receive a patent for public
land has, even before the patent is actually issued by the land
department, a complete acquitable estate in the land which he
can sell and convey, mortgage or lease. A fortiori a contract to
convey land made before the issuance of a patent but after final
proof has been made and the land paid for is not illegal”. . .
[At 227: Italics supplied.]
Here, since the land in question had already been awarded

to private respondents since 1972 and all the requirements
of the law for the purchase of public land were
subsequently complied with, private respondents, as
owners of said property, can properly convey title thereto to
petitioner.
Inasmuch as the private respondents are ready, willing
and able to comply with their obligation to deliver title to
the property subject of the sale and had already demanded
that petitioner pay the full amount of the purchase price,
the petitioner must be considered as having incurred in
delay. This conclusion is warranted by the clear provision
of Article 1169 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in

delay from the time the obligee judicially or extra-judicially
demands
666

from them the fulfillment of their obligation.

xxx
In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the
other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper
manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the moment one
of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the other begins.
It is basic that the breach of a contract gives the aggrieved

party under the law and even under general principles of
fairness, the right to rescind the contract or to ask for
specific performance [Nagarmull v. Binalbagan-Isabela
Sugar Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-22470, May 28, 1970, 33 SCRA
46.] Petitioner having failed to comply with her obligation
of paying the balance of the purchase price despite
demands by private respondents, private respondents were
clearly entitled to their counterclaim for specific
performance, as correctly adjudged by the respondent
court.
2. The claim that petitioner’s consent to the contract

was vitiated by fraud and, therefore, the contract in
question is voidable is patently unmeritorious. The
contract of sale is not voidable where no evidence

was shown that through insidious words or
machinations under Article 1338 of the Civil Code,
the seller had induced the buyer to enter into the
contract (Caram v. Laureta, Jr., G.R. No. L-28740,
February 24, 1981, 103 SCRA 7].
In this case, the evidence on record fully supports the

finding of the appellate court that private respondents did
not represent to petitioner that the house and lot they were
selling were free from liens and encumbrances. Rather,
they told her that the property was mortgaged to the DBP
which was why they asked her to advance P200,000.00 as
earnest money so that they could settle the mortgage
indebtedness and clear up the title [Rollo, p. 60]. The
testimony of petitioner herself shows that she was
furnished with xerox copies of the title, at the back of
which was a memorandum of the encumbrances of the
property [TSN, September 30, 1985, p. 4]. Further, it is
undisputed that at the time petitioner entered into the
agreement in question, she was accompanied by her
daughter Corazon and one Maria Lorenzo whom she could
have asked to explain the particulars of the transaction
that she could not understand
667
VOL. 175, JULY 28, 1989 667

[Rollo, p. 61].
One final point, the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals ordered execution by private respondents of the
absolute deed of sale conveying the subject property to
petitioner and payment by petitioner of the balance of the
purchase price immediately upon finality of such judgment.
However, under the third paragraph of Article 1191 of the
Civil Code, the Court is given a discretionary power to
allow a period within which a person in default may be
permitted to perfom his obligation [Kapisanan Banahaw v.
Dejarme and Alvero, 55 Phil. 339 (1930)]. Considering the
huge amount of money involved in this sale, the Court, in
the exercise of its sound discretion, hereby fixes a period of
ninety (90) days within which petitioner shall pay the
balance of the purchase price amounting to one million and
five hundred fifty thousand pesos (P1,550,000.00) plus
interest thereon at the legal rate from finality of this
judgment until fully paid. After such payment has been
made, the private respondents are ordered to sign and

execute the necessary absolute deed of sale in favor of
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals granting the counterclaim for specific
performance of herein private respondents is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the petitioner
is given a period of ninety (90) days within which to pay the
sum of one million and five hundred fifty thousand pesos
(P1,550,000.00) representing the balance of the purchase
price, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the
finality of this judgment until fully paid. The private
respondents are ordered to sign and execute the absolute
deed of sale after the petitioner has completed payment of
the purchase price and the interest thereon.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin,

JJ., concur.
Decision affirmed with modification.
Notes.—Vendor becomes entitled to rescission of sales

contract where vendee actually did not pay the price within
the
668

Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals
period agreed upon (Siy vs. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA

536).
An action for rescission of an agreement to bail out a
corporation which is essentially an action to recover control
of corporation’s management falls under SEC jurisdiction,
not the regular courts (DBP’s vs. Ilustre, 138 SCRA 11).
——o0o——
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2/10/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 175

656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

AGUSTINA LIQUETTE TAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

Civil Law; Obligations; Rescission; In the absence of a

VOL. 175, JULY 28, 1989 657

Tan vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; Same; Same; Rescission not permitted for a

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The instant petition for review raises the main issue of

** Penned by Justice Manuel T. Reyes and concurred in by Justices Oscar R.

658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Easter Road, Baguio City, and covered by T.C.T. No. T-13826,

VOL. 175, JULY 28, 1989 659

validly transferred to her as any disposition thereof would yet

660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

of the P200,000.00 earnest money which is, in essence and

The Regional Trial Court which took cognizance of Civil

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff

(1) Ordering the rescission of the contracts entered into by

SO ORDERED. [Rollo. pp. 49-50.]

Private respondents interposed an appeal from said

I. . . . in considering the consent of appellee to the

IV. . . . in deciding the case in favor of the appellee and

On August 24, 1987, the respondent Court of Appeals

VOL. 175, JULY 28, 1989 661

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET

Petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari

Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in

1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.

After a thorough examination of the allegations contained

662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

incumbent upon him is clear from a reading of the Civil

1. That no title has yet been issued by the Registry of

That the private respondents have not paid in full

VOL. 175, JULY 28, 1989 663

ever conveyance to be made by the awardee of the

Alternatively, petitioner seeks annulment of the contract

1. The alleged breach of the obligation by the private

A thorough review of the records clearly indicates that

and of a portion of the public land which has been awarded

664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

considering that the question of whether a breach of a

yet been cancelled by the Register of Deeds as of June 25,

VOL. 175, JULY 28, 1989 665

secured cannot be considered a substantial breach of

...But such approval becomes unnecessary after the purchaser had

Here, since the land in question had already been awarded

Art. 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in

666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

from them the fulfillment of their obligation.

It is basic that the breach of a contract gives the aggrieved

2. The claim that petitioner’s consent to the contract

contract of sale is not voidable where no evidence

In this case, the evidence on record fully supports the

VOL. 175, JULY 28, 1989 667

made, the private respondents are ordered to sign and

Fernan, (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin,

Decision affirmed with modification.