C.

STATE IMMUNITY
10. Municipality of San Fernando, La Union V Firme
FACTS:
The case was filed by petitioner, which is a municipal corporation existing under and in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
At about 7 o’clock in the morning of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred incolving a
passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel
and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several
passengers died and 4 others suffered physical injuries.
The private respondents instituted a complaint for damages against the Estate of Macario
Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the
aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of the dump truck,
Alfredo Bislig.
By virtue of a court order, the private respondents amended the complaint wherein the petitioner
and its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first time as defendants. Petitioner filed its
answer and raised affirmative defenses such as non- suability of the state. On October 10, 1979 the trial
court rendered a decision wherein the complaint is dismissed as to defendants Estate of Macario
Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. However, respondent judge issued another order
denying the motion for reconsideration order for having been filed out of time. Finally, the respondent
judge issued an order providing that if defendants municipality and Bislig further wish to pursue the
matter, such should be elevated to a higher court in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Petitioner maintains that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess jurisdiction in issuing the aforesaid orders and in rendering a decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and
failed to resolve the defense of non – suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to
dismiss.

Held:
NO. The Court is convinced that the respondent judge’s discretion in failing to resolve the issue of
non- suability did not amount to grave abuse of discretion. However, said judge acted in excess of his
jurisdiction when in his decision dated October 10, 1979 he held the municipality liable for the quasi-
delict committed by its regular employee.
Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on
the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded
by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign
immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable. Anent the
issue of whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or
propriety functions.
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that “he was on his way
to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando’s municipal streets. It
is held that “the construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time
of the accident are admittedly governmental activities.” We arrive at the conclusion that the municipality
cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the
discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger—tragic and deplorable though it
may be – imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.
Petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent court is hereby modified, absolving the
petitioner municipality of any liability in favor of private respondents.
Version 2
Issue:
Whether or not the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union is immune from suit.
Held:
YES. Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by
its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in
behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions.
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that “he was on
his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando’s
municipal streets. It is held that “the construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and
the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities.” We arrive at
the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular
employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death
of the passenger—tragic and deplorable though it may be – imposed on the municipality no duty
to pay monetary compensation.

11. People v. Hidalgo

On April 28, 2000, three sets of Information were filed against Roberto Hidalgo, his sixteen-year-old son
Don Juan Hidalgo, and Michael bombasi alias ‘kabayan' for three accounts of rape against thirteen-year-
old AAA, a house help of accused Roberto
In her testimony, AAA recalled that after putting Joshua (Roberto’s child) to sleep at around 8:00 in the
evening of January 30, 2000, she herself slept, however, she was awakened when Roberto and Bombasi
tied both of her hands at her back and had a handkerchief tied in her mouth. The accused took turns in
kissing, touching the victim’s body and inserting their penis to AAA’s vagina. Due to threats to her life, it
too/k almost one month for AAA to file case and submit herself to medical examination.
Don Juan was arrested while Roberto allegedly surrendered to PNP and Detection Group. Upon the
other hand, Bombasi remains at large.
The RTC of Tacloban City found the accused guilty as charge. It found the victim’s narration credible. It
also found present the special aggravating circumtances of the victim’s minority, conspiracy, use of force,
superior strength, night time, and ignominy. It also ruled that there was conspiracy among the accused in
taking turns in having carnal knowledge of the victim. On the other hand, a special mitigating
circumstance of minority was appreciated in favour of Don Juan
On appeal, CA affirmed with the modifications the ruling of the trial court. It ruled that there was
conspiracy among the accused but disregarded the qualifying circumstance that Roberto acted as AAA’s
guardian in the absence of sufficient proof. Also, the CA did not consider the other aggravating
circumstances of abuse of superior strength, night time and ignominy due to the fact that these were not
alleged in three sets of information filed against the accused. Only accused-appellant filed this appeal.

ISSUE/S:
a) W/N conspiracy was established and the accused are guilty of the crime of rape
HELD:
1. YES. The prosecution was able to prove that the three accused conspired with one another to
commit carnal knowledge of the victim through the use of force and threat. The court ruled that the
 acts of Roberto, Don Juan and Bombasi clearly showed unity of action to have carnal knowledge of
AAA (1) Both Roberto and Bombasi tied AAA's hands at her back, while a handkerchief was already
tied in her mouth; (2) Both men turned AAA around, touched her body and started to take her clothes
off; (3) Roberto succeeded in undressing AAA, went on top of her and placed his penis inside her
vagina; (4) After satisfying his lust, Roberto got off from AAA and Bombasi took his turn and inserted
his penis inside AAA's vagina; (5) After Bombasi, Don Juan went on top of AAA, kissed her
shoulders and lips and also inserted his penis inside AAA's vagina; (6) When they were satiated in
their sexual desires, the three accused untied the rope binding AAA and threatened to cut off her
tongue and kill her family in case she would tell them what happened. Unmistakably, these acts
demonstrated a concerted effort to rape AAA.

Since there was a conspiracy between Roberto, Don Juan and Bombasi, the act of one of them was
the act of all and the three of them are equally guilty of all the crimes of rape committed against AAA.

12. Municipality of Makati vs. ca

Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondent Admiral
Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc.

After hearing, the RTC fixed the appraised value of the property at P5,291,666.00, and ordered petitioner
to pay this amount minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was earlier released to private
respondent. It then issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of
funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be
garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without
the proper appropriation required under the law.

The RTC denied the motion. CA affirmed; hence, petitioner filed a petition for review before the SC.

Issue:

1. Are the funds of the Municipality of Makati exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution?

Held:

Yes. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution,
unless otherwise provided for by statute.

More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for
public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the
municipality.

Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and
exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are
exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an
ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC
decision, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner.
13.UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DIZON

Facts:
On the 30th of August of 1990, University of the Philippines (UP) through then president Jose V.
Abueva entered a General Construction Agreement with Stern Builders Corporation, respondent, for the
construction of the extension and renovation of the College of Arts and Science Building in UP Los Baños
(UPLB). Stern Builders submitted three progress billings for the work, but UP failed to pay all three and
only paid two, with the third billing disallowed by the Commission on Audit (COA). This prompted Stern
Builders to sue against UP for the unpaid billing. The Regional Trial Court went in favor to Stern Builders,
urging UP to file a petition, but was again dismissed due to late filing of the motion.
Eventually, the RTC granted Stern Builder’s amended motion for sheriff’s assistance, later telling
the sheriff to proceed to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to receive the check of UP’s
funds. UP then petitions to reverse the decision made by the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the funds of UP are subject to garnishment.
Held:
NO. Chartered and unincorporated institutions have no personality of their own and is clothed
with state immunity, and their funds are considered public. This means that said funds cannot be
subjected to garnishment because they are accrued for the institutions of the institutions handled by the
government and their objectives.
UP is vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. UP is
also a government instrumentality, and all the funds going into UP constitute a “special trust fund” that
aligns with its mission and purpose as a government instrumentality. The Constitution states that
monetary issues of government bodies are only subject to auditing by the Commission on Audit, and not
by any other court. The funds of UP are public in character and may only be spent in the attainment of
institutional objectives. Thus, the funds subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of
RTC’s writ of judgment or garnishment.
UP correctly submits that the garnishment of funds to satisfy the actual and moral damages,
including attorney’s fees of Stern Builders was not valid if the Congress had no special appropriation to
cover the liability. The Court of Appeals (CA) ignored the legal restriction that COA should have been the
one holding the suit, as UP is a government instrumentality.
Therefore, the Court grants the petition for review on certiorari, and reverses and sets aside the
decision of Court of Appeals for review and annuls the order for garnishment of funds.

14. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY VS ROXAS

Facts:
The NHA is charged, among others, with the development of the Dagat-dagatan Development Project
(project) situated in Navotas, Metro Manila. On December 4, 1985, Roxas applied for commercial lots in
the project, particularly Lot 9 and Lot 10 in Block 11, Area 3, Phase III A/B, with an area of 176 square
meters, for the use of his business of buying and selling gravel, sand and cement products. The NHA
approved his application, and issued on December 6, 1985 the order of payment respecting the lots. On
December 27, 1985, the NHA issued the notice of award for the lots in favor of Roxas, at
P1,500.00/square meter. On the basis of the order of payment and the notice of award, Roxas made his
downpayment of P79,200.00. A relocation/reblocking survey resulted in the renumbering of Lot 9 to Lot 5
and Lot 10 to Lot 6 (subject lots). He completed his payment for the subject lots on December 20, 1991.

In the meanwhile, the NHA conducted a final subdivision project survey, causing the increase in the area
of the subject lots from 176 to 320 square meters. The NHA informed Roxas about the increase in the
area of the subject lots, and approved the award of the additional area of 144 square meters to him at
P3,500.00/square meter. Although manifesting his interest in acquiring the additional area, he appealed
for the reduction of the price to Pl,500.00/square meter, pointing out that Lot 5 and Lot 6 were a
substitution unilaterally imposed by the NHA that resulted in the increase of 144 square meters based on
the technical description, and that although he desired to purchase the increased area, the purchase
must be in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in the order of payment and notice of
award issued to him. After the NHA rejected his appeal, he commenced in the RTC this action for specific
performance and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. He amended
the complaint to compel the NHA to comply with the terms and conditions of the order of payment and the
notice of award.
Issue:
WON the National Housing Authority is immune from suits
WON the main relief and the secondary relief can be directed to NHA and not to COA.
Ruling;
First of all, the mantle of the State's immunity from suit did not extend to the NHA despite its being a
government-owned and -controlled corporation. Under Section 6(i) of Presidential Decree No. 757, which
was its charter, the NHA could sue and be sued. As such, the NHA was not immune from the suit of
Roxas.

And, secondly, for purposes of the implementation of the writ of execution, it is necessary to distinguish
between, on the one hand, the main relief adjudicated in the judgment of July 15, 1994, which was the
decree of specific performance as to the right of Roxas to acquire the subject lots at Pl,500.00/square
meter as stated in the original agreement between the parties, and, on the other, the secondary relief for
the attorney's fees of P30,000.00 to be paid by the NHA to Roxas.
The NHA possessed the legal competence and authority to directly afford the main relief without Roxas
needing to first submit to the COA the contract to sell for review and approval. To maintain otherwise is to
unconstitutionally grant to the COA the power of judicial review in respect of the decision of a court of law.
However, settling or paying off the secondary relief for the attorney's fees of P30,000.00, being a
monetary obligation of the NHA, would not be in the usual course of the activities of the NHA under its
charter. That such relief was the consequence of the suit that granted the main relief did not matter.
Pursuant to Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, Roxas should first bring it to the COA prior to its
enforcement against the NHA.
There is no question that the NHA could sue or be sued, and thus could be held liable under the judgment
rendered against it. But the universal rule remains to be that the State, although it gives its consent to be
sued either by general or special law, may limit the claimant's action only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution. In other words, the power of the court ends when the
judgment is rendered because government funds and property may not be seized pursuant to writs of
execution or writs of garnishment to satisfy such judgments. The functions and public services of the
State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public fund from their legitimate
and specific objects, and as appropriated by law. The rule is based on obvious considerations of public
policy. Indeed, the disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as
required by law.
15. Republic v. NLRC (Third division) (2016)
Topic: State Immunity
Asset Privatization Trust was a government entity created under Proclamation No. 50 dated December 8,
1986 for the purpose of conserving, provisionally managing, and disposing of assets that have been
identified for privatization or disposition.
NACUSIP/BISUDECO Chapter is the exclusive bargaining agent for the rank-and-file employees of
Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation, a corporation engaged in milling and producing sugar.
Since the 1980s, Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation had been incurring heavy losses. It
obtained loans from Philippine Sugar Corporation and Philippine National Bank, secured by its assets and
properties. In 1987, Philippine National Bank ceded its rights and interests over Bicolandia Sugar
Development Corporation's loans to the government through Asset Privatization Trust.
On November 18, 1988, Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation, with the conformity of Asset
Privatization Trust, entered into a Supervision and Financing Agreement with Philippine Sugar
Corporation for the latter to operate and manage the mill until August 31, 1992. Due to Bicolandia Sugar
Development Corporation's continued failure to pay its loan obligations, Asset Privatization Trust filed a
Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's mortgaged
properties on March 26, 1990. There being no other qualified bidder, Asset Privatization Trust was issued
a certificate of sale upon payment of P1,725,063,044.00.
Sometime in 1992, the Asset Privatization Trust, pursuant to its mandate to dispose of government
properties for privatization, decided to sell the assets and properties of Bicolandia Sugar Development
Corporation. On September 1, 1992, it issued a Notice of Termination to Bicolandia Sugar Development
Corporation's employees, advising them that their services would be terminated within 30 days.
As a result, several members of the NACUSIP/BISUDECO Chapter filed a Complaint dated April 24, 1996
charging Asset Privatization Trust, Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation, Philippine Sugar
Corporation, and Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Incorporated-Peñafrancia Sugar Mill with
unfair labor practice, union busting, and claims for labor standard benefits.
Issue/s:
Whether Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's closure could be considered serious business
losses that would exempt petitioner from payment of separation benefits
Held:
Initially, petitioner was not liable for the Union's claims for labor standard benefits. Its acquisition of
Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's assets was not for the purpose of continuing its business. It
was to conserve the assets in order to prepare it for privatization. When Philippine National Bank ceded
its rights and interests over Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's loan to petitioner in 1987, it
merely transferred its rights and interests over Bicolandia's outstanding loan obligations. The transfer was
not for the purpose of continuing Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's business. Thus, petitioner
never became the substitute employer of Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's employees. It
would not have been liable for any money claim arising from an employer-employee relationship.
As Section 24 of Proclamation No. 50 states: The transfer of any asset of government directly to the
national government as mandated herein shall be for the purpose of disposition, liquidation and/or
privatization only, any import in the covering deed of assignment to the contrary notwithstanding. Such
transfer, therefore, shall not operate to revert such assets automatically to the general fund or the national
patrimony, and shall not require specific enabling legislation to authorize their subsequent disposition, but
shall remain as duly appropriated public properties earmarked for assignment, transfer or conveyance
under the signature of the Minister of Finance or his duly authorized representative, who is hereby
authorized for this purpose, to any disposition entity approved by the Committee pursuant to the
provisions of this Proclamation.
16. Sebastian Cosculluela VS The Honorable Court of Appeals (1988)
On March 8, 1976, the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo to expropriate 2 parcels of land in the municipality of Barotac, Iloilo owned by the petitioner
Sebastian Cosculluela and one Mita Lumampo, their land was expropriated for the construction of the
canal network of the Barotac Irrigation project. In Cosculluela petition, he assails the decision of the
appellate court as being violative of his right to just compensation and due process of law. He maintains
that these constitutional guarantees transcend all administrative and procedural laws and jurisprudence
for as between these said laws and constitutional rights of private citizens, the latter must prevail. As
admitted by the respondent Republic of the Philippines, the NIA (National Irrigation Administration) took
possession of the expropriated property in 1975 and for around ten (10) years already. It has been
servicing the farmers on both sides of the Barotac Viejo Irrigation Project in Iloilo province and has been
collecting fees by way of taxes at the expense of the petitioner (Cosculluela). On the other hand, the
petitioner (Cosculluela), who is already more than eighty (80) years old and sickly, is undergoing frequent
hospitalization, and is made to suffer further by the unconscionable delay in the payment of just
compensation based on a final and executory judgment. The respondent Republic on the other hand,
argues that while it has no intention of keeping the land and dishonoring the judgment, the manner by
which the same will have to be satisfied must not be inconsistent with prevailing jurisprudence, and that
is, that public funds such as those of the respondent NIA cannot be disbursed without the proper
appropriation.
Issue:
Whether or not the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking is a correct determination
of just compensation
Held:
Yes, just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of
the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered “just” for the property owner is made to suffer the
consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more
before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. The case illustrates the expanded
meaning of “public use” in the eminent domain clause. (Constitution, Article III, Section 9) The petitioner’s
(Cosculluela) land was not taken for the construction of a road, bridge, school, public buildings, or other
traditional projects of expropriation. When the National Housing Authority expropriates land to convert into
housing projects or the NIA (National Irrigation Administration) expropriates land to construct irrigation
system and sells water rights to farmers, it would be the height of abuse and ignominy for the agencies to
start earning from those properties while ignoring the final judgment ordering the payment of just
compensation to the former owners.

17. The Holy See (petitioner) vs. The Hon. Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. (respondents)
[238 SCRA 524 | G.R. No. 101949 | December 1, 1994 | Quiason, J.]

Facts:

Holy See, the petitioner, exercises sovereignty over Vatican City and is represented in the Philippines by
Papal Nuncio. Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., the private respondent, is a Domestic Corporation
engaged in real estate business.

Petition arose from the controversy over Lot 5-A, a parcel of land owned by Holy See, which was
contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D which was registered in the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lands were sold to Ronald Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos Jr., which serves as their
agent for the sale. Later, Licup would assign his rights to Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

The squatters refuse to vacate the premises, a dispute arose with the parties as to who is responsible for
evicting and clearing the land from squatters. Lot 5-A was then subsequently sold by Holy See to
Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).

A complaint was filed by Starbright against Holy See, Msgr. Cirilos, PRC and Tropicana. Holy See and
moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction based on state immunity from suit.
The trial court dismissed this, claiming that Holy See “shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into
the business contract in question.”

Issue:

Whether or not Holy See can invoke State Immunity.

Held:

Yes, Holy See can invoke State Immunity.

Under Section 2 Article II of the Constitution, generally accepted principles of International Law were
adopted. Two concepts of state immunity arise therein, state immunity arises from acts which are public in
nature or jure imperii, but no state immunity arises from acts which are commercial in nature. Also, in

Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention, grants immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of
the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of
the sreceiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purpose of the mission

Lot 5-A was a donation by the Archdiocese of Manila to Holy See, intended to construct the official place
of residence of Papal Nuncio, thus, the donation was not for a commercial purpose. Holy See sold the
land, with no commercial intention, but for the purpose of disposing the land, since the land was
impossible to use because of the squatters refusing to vacate the premises.

Department of Foreign Affairs officially certified that the Embassy of Holy See is a “duly accredited
diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the
rights, privileges, and immunities of a diplomatic mission in this country.”
Therefore, Holy See has state immunity and is immune from suit, since the land sold was not a
commercial act, but as an act of the constituent (governmental) function of Holy See. It is governmental in
character. The land was acquired by donation from the Archdiocese of Manila for the construction of the
official residence of Papal Nuncio, also a governmental purpose. Holy See sold the land for disposal
purposes, since the land is impossible to use because of squatters living in the land, thus not commercial
in nature. The transfer of property to Holy See and its disposal later on, are both acts which are both
constituent function in nature, which then supports the immunity of Holy See from suit.

The petition was granted and the complaints were dismissed accordingly.

18. Khosrow Minucher (petitioner) vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Arthur Scalzo (respondents)
[397 SCRA 244 | G.R. No. 142396 | February 11, 2003 | Vitug, J.]

Facts:

Khosrow Minucher, the petitioner, an Iranian National was allegedly charged for violation of Section 4 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, or known as “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972”. Arthur Scalzo, the private
respondent, a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration.

Minucher’s house was raided by narcotic agents, among them was Scalzo. Later, Minucher was acquitted
by the trial court for the charges. A civil case was filed by Minucher to the Regional Trial Court of Manila
for damages on the account of what he claimed to be trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by
Scalzo. Scalzo claimed that he is immune from suit, (diplomatic immunity) since he is a special agent of
US Drug Enforcement Administration, with this, he filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the
motion to dismiss. Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA). CA sustained the
diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordered the dismissal of the complaint against him. Minucher filed a
petition for review with Court, appealing the judgment of the CA. SC reversed the decision of CA and held
Scalzo liable for damages. On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the trial court and sustained the
defense of Scalzo, that he was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity.

Issue:

Whether or not Scalzo should be immune to suit because of diplomatic immunity.

Held:

Yes. Scalzo should be immune to suit because of diplomatic immunity.

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for the immunity of the members of diplomatic
missions, with a restrictive application. Only diplomatic agents are vested with a blanket of immunity from
civil and criminal suits. These agents are heads of missions or members of diplomatic staff, thus impliedly
withholding the same privileges from all others. To determine whether or not a diplomat is entitled to
immunity is to determine whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature.

In World Health Organization vs. Aquino, Department of Foreign Affairs gives the grants of immunity. The
privilege of immunity is “not an immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from
ensuing legal liability; it is rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial jusirisdiction.”

“State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state.” If the acts of the foreign government done by their
foreign agent gives rise to suit, although not necessary a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official
capacity, the suit could be barred by the immunity of a foreign state to suit without its consent. Suing a
representative of a state, sues the state itself. “A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be
cloaked with immunity from suit, as long as it is established that he is acting within the directives of the
sending state.

Official exchanges between agencies of the Philippines and US, certifications from the Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, and the participation of the Philippine
Narcotics Command in the buy-bust operation at the residence of Minucher given indication that the
Philippines gives consent to the activities of Scalzo as an agent of US Drug Enforcement. Scalzo was
tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities, and after ascertained the target inform the
local officers who would then be expected to give the arrest. In line with this, Scalzo cannot be said to
have acted beyond the scope of him official functions or duties. Therefore, Scalzo is entitled to the
defense of state immunity from suit.

The petition is denied. No costs.

19. ARIGO v SWIFT

FACTS: On Dec 2012, US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the USS
Guardian to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for
the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.
On Jan 17, 2013, 2:30AM, USS Guardian, ran aground on the northwest side of the Southern
Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs. No one was injured and no reports of leaking fuel oil.
On Jan 20, 2013, US 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift and US Ambassador to the
Philippines Henry Thomas, Jr expressed regret for the incident and assured the Foreign Affairs Secretary
that US will provide appropriate compensation for the damage to the reef caused by the ship. By Mar 30,
2013, US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of grounded ship from coral reef.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the nearing
provinces which violates their constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology. They alleged that
US respondents violated RA 10067 and assailed certain provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA) which they want to be nullified for being unconstitutional.
A petition for issuance of writ of Kalikasan was filed by the petitioners.
ISSUE: 1. WON SC has jurisdiction over the US respondents
2. WON there was a waiver of the immunity from the suit in the VFA.
RULING: 1. No, the principle of par in parem no habet imperium prohibits suits against the other states
because all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over another. It also applies to the
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. The rule is that if the judgement against such officials will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the State itself although it has not
been formally impleaded.
In this case, US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the
US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or
omission resulting in the grounding of the vessel was committed while they were performing official
military duties. Therefore, the principle of State Immunity bars the exercise of jurisdiction by the SC over
the persons of the respondents.
2. No, there was no waiver of such in the VFA. VFA is an agreement which defines treatment of
US troops and personnel visiting in the PH to promote the common security interests between the two
states. It provides for guidelines such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the US
and the PH government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, among others. It is the VFA which governs
disputes involving the US military ships and crew navigating PH waters in pursuance of the objective of
the agreement. Hence, the waiver therein pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil
actions such as the case in consideration.

In addition, SC cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the petition to order a review of the
VFA and nullify certain immunity provision thereof. VFA was duly concurred in by the PH Senate and has
been recognized as a treaty by the US. It is a valid and binding agreement and parties must therefore
abide by its terms and provisions. The petition under the Rules of Procedure for environmental cases is
not the proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of its provisions.
Finally, SC cannot grant damages which have resulted from violation of environmental laws but under RA
10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same
violation of an environmental law. The petition for issuance of the privilege of the writ of Kalikasan is
denied.

20. Liang vs. People

FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the
MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a
warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the
Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an “office of protocol” from the DFA
stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country.
Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without
notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which
was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to
enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, the
petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity
under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal case.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity from legal process with regard to
Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Gov’t.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative.
HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the
communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in
courts. The court needs to protect the right to due process not only of the accused but also of the
prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the
exception that the acts must be done in “official capacity”. Hence, slandering a person could not possibly
be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such
as defamation, in the name of official duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as this
case. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically
granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

Hence, SC denied the petition.

D. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES

1. Endencia V. David – Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances

FACTS:
Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor
Endencia’s and Justice Fernando Jugo’s (and other judges’) salary pursuant to Sec. 13 of Republic Act
No. 590 which states that “No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not
to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.”
The judges however argued that under the case of Perfecto vs Meer, judges are exempt from
taxation – this is also in observance of the doctrine of separation of powers, i.e., the executive, to which
the Internal Revenue reports, is separate from the judiciary; that under the Constitution, the judiciary is
independent and the salaries of judges may not be diminished by the other branches of government; that
taxing their salaries is already a diminution of their benefits/ salaries (Section 9, Article VIII, Constitution).
The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR, states that the decision in Perfecto vs Meer
was rendered ineffective when Congress enacted RA 590.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court declared Section 13 of RA 590 unconstitutional. The said provision is a
violation of the separation of powers. Only courts have the power to interpret laws. Congress makes laws
but courts interpret them. In Sec. 13 of RA 590, Congress is already encroaching upon the functions of
the courts when it inserted the phrase: “payment of which [tax] is hereby declared not to be a diminution
of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.”
Here, Congress is already saying that imposing taxes upon judges is not a diminution of their
salary. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase “which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office,” found in Section 9, Article VIII of the
Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part
thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well- defined and established province and jurisdiction of
the Judiciary.
 “The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act
declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A
legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere;
otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term.
The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statues is within the exclusive
province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not
legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional
prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially
when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation
already given in a case by the highest court of the land.
2. Ople v. Torres
Facts:
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On December 12, 1996 providing for a national
computerized identification system with the goal of providing convenient way to transact business with
basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities. Petitioner and Senator
Blas Ople filed a case seeking to declare the act unconstitutional, claiming that A.O. No. 308 is not a
mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue.
Issue:
a) W/N the issuance of the President of AO No. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the
legislative powers of the Congress.
Ruling:
Yes. A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order.
Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them."
The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested
this power in the Congress of the Philippines. While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the
President executes the laws. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification
Reference System. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a
law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially, it violates
the right to privacy. The act of promulgating AO no. 308 is an act of legislation rather than enforcement of
a law, thus, should be struck down as unconstitutional exercise of legislative power.
3. Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. director-general of neda
This case is consolidated with Consolidated with Bayan Muna vs Ermita
In 2005, Executive Order No. 420 was passed. This law sought to harmonize and streamline the country’s
id system. Kilusang Mayo Uno, Bayan Muna, and other concerned groups sought to enjoin the Director-
General from implementing the EO because they allege that the said EO is unconstitutional for it infringes
upon the right to privacy of the people and that the same is a usurpation of legislative power by the
president.
ISSUE: Whether EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by
the President (executive)
HELD: No. Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to “adopt a unified multi-purpose ID
system.” Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws are
required to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their IDs.
Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the uniform data collection and format. The President
may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive department
to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Sec 17, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides that
the “President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices.” The same Section
also mandates the President to “ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.” Certainly, under this
constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their
functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings,
efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public.
The President’s constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing
legislation. Of course, the President’s power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government
and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions.
Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also
authorized to issue voter’s ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system
because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of
government.
4. NIXON v. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Facts:
In 1974, tapes and recordings of President Nixon’s conversation with his aides and advisers
regarding the Watergate Scandal, which was a burglary to the Democratic National Committee by five
men at the Watergate office in Washington, D.C, were released to the public. The president of that time,
President Richard Nixon’s conversations with his aides and assistants were the subjects of these tape
recordings, which were later subpoenad. President Nixon claims his executive privilege and filed a motion
to quash the said subpoenad material. The court later issued an order for an in camera examination of
the materials, rejecting Nixon’s contentions that (a) the dispute between him and the Special Prosecutor
was nonjusticiable as “intra-exclusive conflict”; and (b) the judiciary lacked the authority to review the
president’s assertion of executive privilege.

Issue:
Whether or not the president has the privilege of immunity from judicial proceedings.

Held:
NO. The president has the executive privilege, in which the immunity from suit is given to him,
while the judiciary has the power to interpret or modify the law. The privilege to the executive must be in a
matter of necessity and these should be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. While President
Nixon is the president of the United States and is granted the executive privilege, what was done in the
Watergate Scandal was not done for necessity and it was necessary to inform the public of the issues
surrounding the president. Therefore, through executive privilege, no in camera material is revealed to the
public. However, President Nixon is to submit the recordings himself to the Supreme Court.

5. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA

Facts:
This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China
National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the
Fertilizer scam.
The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials
for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent
a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to
“afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they
may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation.” Senate refused the request.
On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated
that “all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec.
Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the
meeting since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and
Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court martial
for such attendance.
Issue:
Whether or not EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress

Ruling:
To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two different functions of
the Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and the power to conduct inquiry
during question hour.
The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987
Constitution, which reads: “The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of
the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall
be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three
days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may
cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.”
The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight
function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it had issued, the department heads’ appearance is merely requested.
The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the appearance of department
heads during question hour as it explicitly referred to Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in Article 6,
section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: “The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of
its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.”
The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation
is intended to affect or change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information, recourse must be had to others who do possess it. But even where the inquiry is in aid of
legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the
rubric of “executive privilege”. This is the power of the government to withhold information from the public,
the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized only to certain types of information of a sensitive
character. When Congress exercise its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one official may be exempted from this power -- the President.
Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is
broad. In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such
invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office
authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged.
The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive privilege
or that the matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the
recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the
lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. The letter assumes
that the invited official possesses information that is covered by the executive privilege. Certainly,
Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does
not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is
so.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not
asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely
invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent.
When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be
covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the
Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide the
President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for
a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the
Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the
official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his
appearance.
Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void. Section
1(a) is however valid.
6. ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 174689
October 22, 2007,
Topic: Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances.
Facts: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth
certificate in the RTC of Manila. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but
feels, thinks and acts as a female." His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" included undergoing
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. In 2001, he underwent sex
reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand.
Being engaged to be married to his American fiance, petitioner sought to have his name in his birth
certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female." The RTC
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner declaring that the petition was filed, not for an unlawful motive,
but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The Republic, thru the OSG, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which set aside the trial court
decision. The CA ruled that there is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of
birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery.
Petitioner claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407
to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and Republic Act No. 9048.
Issue/s:
Whether or not it is within the power of the court to change Silverio’s gender and name on the ground of
sex reassignment?
Ruling:
NO.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned
administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the
coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed
and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum,
the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial.
Hence, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner's first name was not
within that court's primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar
concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy
was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048.
It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila
where his birth certificate is kept.
7. Office of the Court Administrator vs Florencio Reyes and Rene De Guzman
Judge Sta. Romana presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court Branch 31 of Guimba, Nueva Ecija,
requested the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office (CLO) to conduct a drug test on Rene De
Guzman, the clerk of court, for his alleged irresponsibility and queer behavior at work. The results from
the drug test administered by CLO yielded positive results for marijuana and shabu. Thereafter, a
complaint of gross misconduct was filed against De Guzman, where it was alleged that Jusge Sta.
Romana would often have to remind him about the transmittal of records for appealed cases for more
than a dozen times as he was in charge of the preparation and transmission of the records on appeal, De
Guzman would just dismiss the subject in ridicule and with the empty assurance that the task is good as
finished, he did not transmit the records of PP vs Mangan. On September 17, 2007, the court required De
Guzman to comment on the charge of misconduct relative to the alleged use of prohibited drugs.
Notwithstanding, De Guzman failed to file his comment. On March 12, 2008, De Guzman complied with
the court’s directive claiming that he failed to comply because he lost his copy of the resolution. De
Guzman’s comment was then referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, to which the
OCA submitted a recommendation of De Guzman’s dismissal from the service.
Issue:
Whether De Guzman should be dismissed from service
Held:
Yes, De Guzman’s use of prohibited drugs has greatly affected his efficiency in the performance of his
functions. De Guzman did not refute the observation of his superior, Judge Sta. Romana, that as a
criminal docket court clerk, he (De Guzman) was totally inept and incompetent. Hence, to get across his
displeasure and dissatisfaction with his job performance, Judge Sta. Romana gave De Guzman an
unsatisfactory rating. Moreover, De Guzman’s efficiency as a custodian of court records is also totally
wanting. In the same vein, Reyes also put forth the absurd behavioral manifestations of De Guzman.
According to Reyes, Judge Sta. Romana would always remind De Guzman to prepare and transmit the
complete records of the appealed cases. However, De Guzman would only make empty assurances to
perform his task. Notwithstanding the reminders of his superiors, De Guzman would still fail to transmit
the records. Instead, he would report the next day and jubilantly declare that the problem has been solved
at last. In fine, we agree with the OCA that by his repeated and contumacious conduct of disrespecting
the Court’s directives, De Guzman is guilty of gross misconduct and has already forfeited his privilege of
being an employee of the Court. Likewise, we can no longer countenance his manifestations of queer
behavior, bordering on absurd, irrational and irresponsible, because it has greatly affected his job
performance and efficiency. By using prohibited drugs, and being a front-line representative of the
Judiciary, De Guzman has exposed to risk the very institution which he serves. It is only by weeding out
the likes of De Guzman from the ranks that we would be able to preserve the integrity of this institution.

8. Baguhan M. Mamiscal (complainant) vs. Clerk of Court Macalinog S. Adullah, Shari’a Circuit
Court, Marawi City (respondent)
[761 SCRA 39 | A.M. No. SCC-13-18-J | July 1, 2015 | Mendoza, J.]

Facts:

Baguan M. Mamiscal and his wife, Adelaidah Lomondot (Adelaidah) had a heated argument, prompting
Mamiscal to divorce his wife by repudiating her (talaq). Repudiation was in an agreement (kapasadan)
signed by both parties. Adelaidah left the congugal home. During the obligatory period of waiting (‘iddah),
Mamiscal decided to make peace with his wife, but Adelaidah filed the Certificate of Divorce (COD) with
the office of Macalinog S. Adullah for registration. The COD was not signed by Mamiscal, but it was
annotated in the certificate that it was executed in the presence of two witnesses and in accordance with
Islamic Law. Adullah issued the Certificate of Registration of Divorce, finalizing the same. A motion by
Mamiscal opposed the issuance stating that the kapasadan and the COD were invalid because he did not
prepare such, and there were no witnesses to its execution. Adullah denied the claims, and said that it
was his ministerial duty to receive the COD and the attached kapasadan. A complaint was filed by
Mamiscal to the Supreme Court against Adullah, charging him with partiality, violation of due process,
dishonesty, snd conduct unbecoming of a court employee.

Issue:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to impose administrative sanction against Adullah.

Held:

No, Shari’a Circuit Court which, under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim
Code) enjoys exclusive original jurisdiction to resolve disputes relating to divorce.

The civil registrar is the person charged by law for the recording of vital events and other documents
affecting the civil status of persons. Article 185 of the Muslim Code provides the neglect of duty of
registrars or circuit registrar that fails to perform properly his duties in accordance to this Code shall be
penalized in accordance to Section 18 of Act 3753, which states that “any local registrar who fails to
properly perform his duties in accordance with the provisions of this Act and of the regulations issued
hereunder shall be punished for the first offense, by an administrative fine in a sum equal to his salary for
not less than fifteen days nor more than three months, and for a second or repeated offense, by removal
from service.”

Based on the forgoing, SC Court has no jurisdiction to impose the proper disciplinary action against
registrars. Mamiscal seeks to hold Adullah liable for registering and issuing the CRD in respect to
Adullah’s duties as a Circuit Registrar of Muslim divorces. The test of jurisdiction is the nature of the
offense and not the personality of the offender. Complaint charges against Adullah for “conduct
unbecoming of a court employee” is of no moment. A rule states that “what controls is not the designation
of the offense but the actual facts recited in the complaint.” In conclusion, unless the jurisdiction has been
conferred by some legislative act no court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it.

The petition is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice. The complaint of Mamiscal against
Adullah is referred to the Office of the Mayor, Marawi City and the Civil Service Commission for
appropriate action.

9. Osmeña, Jr. vs. Pendatun, et al

Facts:
Sergio Osmeña, Jr., made a privilege speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”. There, Osmeña, Jr.
claimed to have been hearing of ugly reports that the government has been selling “free things”
at premium prices. He also claimed that even pardons are for sale regardless of the gravity of the
case. The Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59, consisting of fifteen members to
investigate the truth of the charges against the President of the Philippines made by Osmeña, Jr.,
stated that these charges, if made maliciously or recklessly and without basis in truth, would constitute
a serious assault upon the dignity of the presidential office and would expose it to contempt and
disrepute.
The Supreme Court decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents Pendatun and others
to answer.
The Special Committee continued to perform its task. After giving Congressman Osmeña, Jr. a chance
to defend himself, found him guilty of serious disorderly behavior and acting on such report, the House
approved on the same day House Resolution No. 175, declaring Osmeña, Jr. guilty as recommended,
and suspending him from office for fifteen months.
Pendatun and others filed their answer where they challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain
the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension and then
invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session, the Committee had thereby ceased
to exist.
Issue/s:

1. Can the Court discipline Osmeña, Jr. given that he is a member of the Congress?
2. Can Osmeña, Jr.be suspended for 15 months?

Held:

1. No. As decided in an earlier case (Angara vs. Electoral Commission) by the Supreme Court,
it shall be observed that each department had exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere as guaranteed by the theory of separation of
powers. On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive
constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña, Jr. may be disciplined, the House is the
judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has
conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual
circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and
white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed
the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would
thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer
upon a coordinate branch of the Government. Therefore, the Congress shall discipline
Osmeña, Jr. and not the Court.

2. No. In Alejandrino precedent, the Court held that the Senate had no power to adopt the
resolution suspending a Senator from office because suspension for 12 months amounts to
removal, and the Jones Law gave the Senate no power to remove an appointive member, like
Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided that "each house may punish its
members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel
an elective member. In the case at bar, Osmeña, Jr. is being suspended of 15 months by
House Resolution No. 175, longer than the suspension given to Senator Alejandrino and
should therefore be protected by the Jones Law as well. Therefore, Osmeña, Jr. cannot be
suspended for 15 months.
10. ARROYO v DE VENECIA

FACTS: RA 8240, a law amending the provisions of the tax codes on “sin taxes” imposed on manufacture
and sale of beer and cigarettes, originated from the House of Representatives (House) and approved on
the third reading. It was approved by the Senate on the third reading as well but with amendments hence
a bicameral committee was formed; to reconcile the disagreeing provisions from the House and Senate.
During the delivery of the committee chairman’s speech, Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of
quorum which was denied upon showing of quorum after a roll call. Arroyo raised a question at the same
time that the Speaker were asking for objections. Thereafter, the speaker approved the same upon
absence of objections. The bill was then ratified and was signed into law by then-President Ramos.
Members of the House filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of
RA 8240 alleging that it was passed in violation of the House rules mandated by the Constitution
therefore a violation of the Constitution itself.
De Venecia and petitioners argue that the court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the
rules of the House for it will be against the principle of separation of powers.
ISSUE: 1. WON RA 8240 is in violation of the constitutional requirements in the enactment of a law
2. WON the Court had the power to look into the internal proceedings of a House
RULING: 1. No. Rules are hardly permanent, they are subject to revocation, modification, or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern
with their observance. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. Subject
to the qualification that where the construction to be given a rule affects persons other than the members
of Congress, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved.
In the case at hand, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court.
2. No, Courts cannot declare an act of legislature void on account of merely noncompliance with
rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a
branch of the government has “gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction” so as to call for the
exercise of the powers of the judiciary in Art 8, Sec 5 of the Constitution.
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this court to
either sat aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks that the House has disregarded ists
own rules of procedure or allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial
forum when petitioners can find their remedy in the department itself – seek repeal or amendment of RA
8240 or an enactment of a new law. Therefore, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed.

E. DELEGATION OF POWERS

1. Araneta vs. Dinglasan

FACTS:
Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive Order 62 which regulates rentals for
houses and lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan was the judge hearing the case.
Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred
that EO 62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671 which he claimed ceased to exist,
hence, the EO has no legal basis.
Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a
shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit
issued to him.
L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from ’49-‘50] pursuant
to EO 225.
L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was appropriating funds to hold the national
elections.
They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as an act declaring a state of total emergency as a result of
war involving the philippines and authorizing the president to promulgate rules and regulations to meet
such emergency or simply the Emergency Powers Act, is already inoperative and that all EOs issued
pursuant to said CA had likewise ceased.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force or effect.
HELD:
Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to the president, became inoperative ex proprio
vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192,
225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead
of the first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to
the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may “consider
general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate.” Such acts were to be good
only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, “unless
sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly.” Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation
must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or
upon early repeal.
2. Rodriguez V. Gella – Delegation of Powers
FACTS:
Eulogio Rodriguez et al. seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first
appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside
the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts,
earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. They sought to have Vicente Gella, then National
Treasurer, be enjoined from releasing funds pursuant to said EOs. These EOs were pursuant to
Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior to Araneta V. Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727
intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his
perception that war is still subsisting as a fact. Note also that CA 671 was already declared inoperative by
the Supreme Court in the same case of Araneta V. Dinglasan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Orders 545 and 546 are valid.
HELD:
NO. This court had already passed upon the status of Commonwealth Act No. 671, “declaring a
state of total emergency as a result of war involving the Philippines and authorizing the President to
promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency.” As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the
constitutional provision, it has to be assumed that the National Assembly intended it to be only for a
limited period. It is concluded that the powers delegated to the President had been withdrawn as to
matters already legislated upon by the Congress or on which the latter had demonstrated its readiness or
ability to act.
As similarly decided in the Araneta V. Dinglasan case, the EOs’ issued in pursuant to CA 671
shall be rendered ineffective. The president, in returning to the Congress his signature Bill No. 727, did
not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war which CA 671 has
been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be the merit for the emergency
he feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the
repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend
otherwise. For “while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall
them except by two- third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers
than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law.” Act No. 671 may be
likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the
sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be
forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agent
created under the Act is coupled with interest.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order Nos. 545 and 546 are hereby declared NULL and VOID.

3. SOUTHERN CROSS V. CEMENT MANUFACURERS

Facts:

Republic Act No. 8800, the Safeguard Measures Act (SMA), which was one of the laws enacted by
Congress soon after the Philippines ratified the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.The SMA provides the structure and mechanics for the
imposition of emergency measures, including tariffs, to protect domestic industries and producers from
increased imports which inflict or could inflict serious injury on them.

Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross) is a domestic corporation engaged in
the business of cement manufacturing, production, importation and exportation. Its principal stockholders
are Taiheiyo Cement Corporation and Tokuyama Corporation, purportedly the largest cement
manufacturers in Japan.

Private respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation (Philcemcor) is an association of

domestic cement manufacturers. It has eighteen (18) members,per Record. While Philcemcor heralds
itself to be an association of domestic cement manufacturers, it appears that considerable equity
holdings, if not controlling interests in at least twelve (12) of its member-corporations, were acquired by
the three largest cement manufacturers in the world, namely Financiere Lafarge S.A. of France, Cemex
S.A. de C.V. of Mexico, and Holcim Ltd. of Switzerland (formerly Holderbank Financiere Glaris, Ltd., then
Holderfin B.V.).

the DTIs disagreement with the conclusions of the Tariff Commission, but at the same time, ultimately
denying Philcemcors application for safeguard measures on the ground that the he was bound to do so in
light of the Tariff Commissions negative findings.

Philcemcor challenged this Decision of the DTI Secretary by filing with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus[11] seeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as well as the Tariff
Commissions Report. The Court of Appeals Twelfth Division, in a Decision[13] penned by Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Elvi John Asuncion,[14] partially granted Philcemcors petition.

On 23 June 2003, Southern Cross filed the present petition, arguing that the Court of Appeals has no
jurisdiction over Philcemcors petition, as the proper remedy is a petition for review with the CTA
conformably with the SMA, and; that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission on the existence or
non-existence of conditions warranting the imposition of general safeguard measures are binding upon
the DTI Secretary.

Despite the fact that the Court of Appeals Decision had not yet become final, its binding force was cited
by the DTI Secretary when he issued a new Decision on 25 June 2003, wherein he ruled that that in light
of the appellate courts Decision, there was no longer any legal impediment to his deciding Philcemcors
application for definitive safeguard measures.

The Court of Appeals had held that based on the foregoing premises, petitioner’s prayer to set aside the
findings of the Tariff Commission in its assailed Report dated March 13, 2002 is DENIED. On the other
hand, the assailed April 5, 2002 Decision of the Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry is
hereby SET ASIDE. Consequently, the case is REMANDED to the public respondent Secretary of
Department of Trade and Industry for a final decision in accordance with RA 8800 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations. Hence, the appeal.

Yet on 25 June 2003, the DTI Secretary issued a new Decision, ruling this time that that in light of the
appellate courts Decision there was no longer any legal impediment to his deciding Philcemcors
application for definitive safeguard measures. He made a determination that, contrary to the findings of
the Tariff Commission, the local cement industry had suffered serious injury as a result of the import
surges. Accordingly, he imposed a definitive safeguard measure on the importation of gray Portland
cement, in the form of a definitive safeguard duty in the amount of P20.60/40 kg. bag for three years on
imported gray Portland Cement. Hence, the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the decision of DTI Secretary, to impose safeguard measures is valid.

Held:

NO, due to the nature of this case, the Court found that the DTI should follow the regulations prescribed
by SMA. The Court held that he assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is DECLARED NULL AND
VOID and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the DTI Secretary dated 25 June 2003 is also DECLARED NULL
AND VOID and SET ASIDE. No Costs.

4. Philippine Airlines vs Civil Aeronautics Board

Facts: Philippine Airlines seeks to prohibit Civil Aeronautics Board from exercising jurisdiction over private
respondents Application for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, and to
annul and set aside a temporary operating permit issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board in favor of
GrandAir, allowing the same to engage in scheduled domestic air transportation services, particularly the
Manila-Cebu, Manila-Davao, and converse routes.PAL contested the grant issued by CAB to GrandAir as
the latter does not possess a legislative franchise authorizing it toengage in air transportation service
within the Philippines or elsewhere. Such franchise is, allegedly, a requisite for the issuance of a
Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity by the respondent Board, as mandated under Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution.

GrandAir, on the other hand, posits that a legislative franchise is no longer a requirement for the issuance
of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity or a Temporary Operating Permit, following the
Courts pronouncements in the case of Albano vs. ReyesGrandAir applied for a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity with CAB, which the Chief Hearing Officer of the CAB issued a Notice of
Hearing setting the application for initial hearing.

Petitioner, itself the holder of a legislative franchise to operate air transport services, filed an Opposition
to the application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity because, accordingly, CAB has
no jurisdiction to hear the petitioners application until GrandAir has first obtained a franchise to operate
from Congress. Chief Hearing Officer of CAB issued an Order denying petitioners Opposition. The Board
promulgated Resolution No. 119b92h approving the issuance of a Temporary Operating Permit in favor of
Grand Airfor a period of three months, which was later, extended to six months.

Issue: Whether the respondent has the power to issue a temporary operating permit
Held: The Civil Aeronautics Board has jurisdiction over GrandAir’s Application for a Temporary Operating
Permit. The Board is expressly authorized by Republic Act No. 776 to issue a temporary operating permit
or Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, and nothing contained in the said law negates the
power to issue said permit before the completion of the applicants evidence and that of the opposite
thereto on the main petition. The CABts authority togrant a temporary permit Lupon its own initiativeL
strongly suggests the power to exercise said authority, even before the presentation of said evidence has
begun. Even if a legislative franchise is prerequisite to the issuance of a Permit, the absence of the same
does not affect the jurisdiction of the Board to hear the application, but tolls only upon the ultimate
issuance of the requested permit.
5. PHILIPPINES INTERISLAND SHIPPING ASSOCIATION VS CA

Facts:
It came to pass that a response from a clamor of harbour pilots for an increase in pilotage rates was given
by the then President Marcos through the issuance of an E.O No. 1088.

“PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES FOR PILOTAGE SERVICES RENDERED TO
FOREIGN AND COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PORTS. The executive order
increased substantially the rates of the existing pilotage fees previously fixed by the PPA.” During that
time the President was exercising legislative power and was authorized.

However, PPA was reluctant to enforce the same arguing that it was issued hastily and it was just an
Administrative Order whereby PPA has the power to revised EO 1088 which it did so by issuing A.O. No.
43-86, which fixed lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely left the fees to be paid for pilotage to
the agreement of the parties to a contract..

Issue:
WON E.O. No. 1088 is an Administrative Order and by virtue of which PPA has the power to
modify the same.

Ruling:
EO 1088 is a law.

The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power.

There is no basis for petitioners' argument that rate fixing is merely an exercise of administrative power,
that if President Marcos had power to revise the rates previously fixed by the PPA through the issuance
of E.O. No. 1088, the PPA could in turn revise those fixed by the President, as the PPA actually did in
A.O. No. 43-86, which fixed lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely left the fees to be paid for
pilotage to the agreement of the parties to a contract. The orders previously issued by the PPA were in
the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in the exercise of delegated power. As such these
could only be amended or revised by law, as the President did by E.O. No. 1088. It is not an answer to
say that E.O. No. 1088 should not be considered a statute because that would imply the withdrawal of
power from the PPA. What determines whether an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its
form but its nature. Here, as we have already said, the power to fix the rates of charges for services,
including pilotage service, has always been regarded as legislative in character.

6. YAZAKI TORRES MAHUFACTURING, INC. v COURT OF APPEALS

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

Facts:
The Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) is the government agency tasked with the
administration of the PAG-IBIG Fund created under P.D. No. 1530, which was signed into law on June
11, 1978. The fund’s purpose is for housing purposes sourced by members’ voluntary contributions. P.D.
No. 1530 was later amended with P.D. No. 1752, providing that membership in the Fund must be
mandatory for all gainfully-employed Filipinos. The Fund extends to all members and employers of Social
Security System (SSS) and Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), but for earners of less than
Php 4,000 in a month can join voluntarily. The board of HDMF provided a waiver which is to be followed
by its members.
Yazaki Torres Manufacturing Inc., petitioner, a corporation under Philippine laws, applied for and
was granted a waiver by HDMF and found that Yazaki Torres Manufacturing’s retirement plan for their
employees much superior to the Fund’s and decided to amend the rules of the fund’s waiver. After the
lapse of their waver, Yazaki applied for a renewal, with grounds of “superior retirement plan,” but was
disapproved saying that HDMF’s retirement plan is not more superior than of Yazaki’s and told the latter
to register its employees to HDMF instead. Petitioner filed its motion, claiming that HDMF has no power to
repeal laws.

Issue:
Whether or not HDMF has the power to amend rules and regulations.

Held:
NO. It is the power of the Executive branch of government is to execute and enforce, the
Legislative branch to enact, amend, and revise laws, and the Judiciary’s power to interpret them. These
three branches, although equal in the government, cannot interfere with the other’s power nor are allowed
to assume the other’s function, as it is considered impermissible. However, the legislature cannot foresee
the nature of every problem it seeks to address, thus having it customarily delegated to the executive
department, known as administrative agencies. HDMF is an administrative agency, and while it holds no
legislative power, it is given the power to create rules and regulations and is charged with its
implementation. The rules and regulations in the waiver of HDMF are necessary to proper exercise its
authority. Therefore, the petition is dismissed in favour of HDMF with costs against Yazaki Torres
Manufacturing, Inc.

7. PHILIPPINES INTERISLAND SHIPPING ASSOCIATION VS CA

Facts:
It came to pass that a response from a clamor of harbour pilots for an increase in pilotage rates was given
by the then President Marcos through the issuance of an E.O No. 1088.

“PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES FOR PILOTAGE SERVICES RENDERED TO
FOREIGN AND COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PORTS. The executive order
increased substantially the rates of the existing pilotage fees previously fixed by the PPA.” During that
time the President was exercising legislative power and was authorized.

However, PPA was reluctant to enforce the same arguing that it was issued hastily and it was just an
Administrative Order whereby PPA has the power to revised EO 1088 which it did so by issuing A.O. No.
43-86, which fixed lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely left the fees to be paid for pilotage to
the agreement of the parties to a contract..

Issue:
WON E.O. No. 1088 is an Administrative Order and by virtue of which PPA has the power to
modify the same.

Ruling:
EO 1088 is a law.

The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power.

There is no basis for petitioners' argument that rate fixing is merely an exercise of administrative power,
that if President Marcos had power to revise the rates previously fixed by the PPA through the issuance
of E.O. No. 1088, the PPA could in turn revise those fixed by the President, as the PPA actually did in
A.O. No. 43-86, which fixed lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely left the fees to be paid for
pilotage to the agreement of the parties to a contract. The orders previously issued by the PPA were in
the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in the exercise of delegated power. As such these
could only be amended or revised by law, as the President did by E.O. No. 1088. It is not an answer to
say that E.O. No. 1088 should not be considered a statute because that would imply the withdrawal of
power from the PPA. What determines whether an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its
form but its nature. Here, as we have already said, the power to fix the rates of charges for services,
including pilotage service, has always been regarded as legislative in character.

8. Municipality of San Narciso Quezon VS Hon. Atonio V. Mendez, SR.

On August 20, 1959 the Municipality of San Narciso Quezon was created by segregating from the
municipality of San Andres Quezon pursuant to Executive Order No. 353 issued by President Carlos P.
Garcia. Executive Order No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President and coursed
through the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon, in its
Resolution No. 8 of 24 of May 24, 1959 By virtue of Executive Order No. 174 issued the Pres. Diosdado
Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon was later officially recognized to have gained
the status of a fifth class municipality beginning July 1, 1963 by operation of Section 2 of Republic Act No.
1515. The executive order added that “the conversion of this municipality district a municipality as
proposed by House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of Representatives.
On June 5, 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon filed a petition for quo warranto with the
Reginal Trial Court, Branch 62 in Gumaca Quezon, against the official of the Municipality of San Andres.
The petition sought declaration of nullity of EO No. 353 and prayed that the respondent local official of the
Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of
their respective offices. The petitioning municipality contended that EO No. 353, a presidential act, was a
clear usurpation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers, furthermore arguing that the
officials of the Municipality of San Andres, Quezon had no right to exercise the duties and functions of
their respective offices that rightfully belonged to the corresponding officials of the Municipality of San
Narciso.
The respondent (Municipality of San Andres, Quezon) asked for the dismissal of the petition, by way of
affirmative and special defenses, that since it was at the instance of the petitioner municipality
(Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon) that the issuance of EO No. 353, the Municipality of San Narciso,
Quezon should be deemed estopped from questioning the creation of the new municipality because the
Municipality of San Andreas had been in existence since 1959, its corporate personality could no longer
be assailed. On November 27, 1991, the Municipality of San Andres files anew a motion to dismiss
alleging that the case had become moot and academic with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect in January 1, 1991, which
provides that municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this code shall continue to exist and
operate as such.
Issue:
Won the alleged unconstitutionality of the creation of the municipality of San Andres has been cured by
the enactment of R.A. No. 7160 or otherwise known as01 the Local Government Code of 1991.
Held:
Petitioner challenged the legality of the creation of San Andres only after almost 30years after its creation
where in the meantime it existed as a duly created local government unit. The Local Government Code
provides that municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and
operate as such. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts
done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are
validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.
9. Sultan Osop B. Camid (petitioner) vs. The Office of the President, Department of the Interior and
Local Government, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Department of Finance, Department
of Budget and Management, Commission on Audit, and the Congress of the Philippines (House of
Representatives and the Senate (respondent)
[448 SCRA 711 | G.R. No. 161414 | January 17, 2005 | Tinga, J.]

Facts:

Sultan Osop B. Camid, the petitioner, represents himself as a resident of Andong, as a private citizen and
a taxpayer.

This is a petition for Certiorari arguing for the existence of Municipality of Andong in Lanao Del Sur.This
decision has noted the earlier decision of Pelaez where the Executive Orders (EO) of the former
President Macapagal Arroyo creating 33 Municipalities of Lanao Del Sur were considered null and void
due to undue delegation of legislative powers. Among those annulled EOs was EO No. 107, which
pertains to the creation of Andong.

Camid states that the Municipality of Andong has evolved into a full blown municipality since there is a
complete set of officials appointed to handle essential tasks and services, it has its own high school,
Bureau of Post DECS office etc. and 17 barangays with a chairman). Andong is also being recognized by
agencies and private groups and also the CENRO and DENR Certification of land area and population of
Andong.

In the Certification of DILG there is an enumeration of existing municipalities including 18 of the 33

municipalities invalidated in the Pelaez Case, in relation with this, Camid finds this as an abuse of
discretion and unequal treatment for Andong.

Issue:

Whether or not the Municipality of Andong be recognized as a de facto municipal corporation.

Held:

No, Municipality of Andong is not a de facto municipal corporation.

Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and
exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without
interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription.

Camid does not show factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its
corporation of its corporate powers as well as acquiescence by the other instrumentalities of the state like
charters or the legislature’s action.

The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

10. SEMA vs COMELEC

11. BINAMIRA V GARRUCHO JR

FACTS: On April 7, 1986, Ramon Binamira was designated as General Manager (GM) of the Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA) through a memorandum addressed to him by the Minister of Tourism.
On April 10, 1986, Pres. Aquino approved the PTA Board of Directors (PTA BODs) which
included Binamira as Vice-chairman in his capacity as General Manager.
 On January 2, 1990, Garrucho, as the new Secretary of Tourism, demanded Binamira’s
resignation. On Jan 4, Pres. Aquino, in a memorandum, designated Garrucho as the General Manager
and stated that the designation of Binamira as GM made by the Minister of Tourism is invalid.
Binamira seeks for reinstatement of his office claiming to have been removed without just cause
in violation of his security of tenure.
ISSUE: WON Binamira was removed without just cause and WON the acts of the Minister of Tourism are
acts of the President as well
RULING: No, Binamira was merely designated by the Minister of Tourism. Sec 23-A of PD 564 provides
that a GM must be appointed by the President only and not by the Minister thereby automatically making
the designation invalid.
In addition, designation provides implication that he shall hold office only in a temporary capacity
which may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. Binamira’s claim of security of tenure must
perforce fall to the ground. He never acquired a valid title to the office as GM and therefore has no right to
be reinstated.
There is a presumption that the acts of the Department Heads are acts of the President when
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business unless it is not disapproved or reprobated
by the President. In the present case, Pres. Aquino’s approval of the PTA BODs wherein Binamira was
included as the vice-chairman is merely provisional as it was recalled by the President herself in a
memorandum designating Garrucho as the GM wherein the previous designation made by the Minister
was invalid.

 Appointment v Designation:
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation,
the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure
because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law
of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is
designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the
Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the
Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially
executive while designation is legislative in nature.
12. Llamas vs. Orbos
FACTS:
Private respondent Mariano Un Ocampo III is the incumbent governor of Tarlac Province and petitioner
Rodolfo D. Llamas together with some other complainants (Tarlac Board Members) filed an administrative
case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty.
He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his incumbent vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In
not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he
can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.
The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases. They say that
the qualifying phrase “after conviction by final judgment” applies solely to criminal cases, and no other law
allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been “convicted in an administrative
case, allegedly because the word “conviction” refers only to criminal cases.

ISSUE:
WON the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases.
HELD:
Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered under criminal or administrative
cases. If the law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish
between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of
impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it
would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of
Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Cases of impeachment are automatically excluded in as much
as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
The do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive
clemency in administrative cases. It is the court’s considered view that if the President can grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more
reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than
criminal offenses.
The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial
or Legislative branches of the government.
In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond reasonable
doubt. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial
evidence to support a decision.

13. NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC DAMA) V. National Power Corporation
(Delegation of Powers)

FACTS:
On June 8, 2001, Republic Act 9136 or the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA
Law) was approved and signed by President Macapagal – Arroyo. It provides a framework for the
restructuring of the electric power industry, specifically (1) the privatization of the assets of NPC, (2) the
transition to the desired competitive structure, and (3) the definition of the responsibilities of the various
government agencies an private entities. Thus, under such law, a new National Power Board of Directors
(NPB) was constituted.
On February 27, 2002, in pursuant of the EPIRA Law, the Energy Restructuring Steering
Committee (Restructuring Committee) was created by the Secretary of the Department of Energy to enact
the first and second provisions stated above.
On November 18, 2002, the Restructuring Committee proposed a guideline to the NPB which
was modified and passed by the latter through Resolutions No. 2002 – 124 and No. 2002 – 125. Said
Resolutions provided that (1) all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated on January 31, 2003 and (2)
the NPC personnel shall be entitled to separation of benefits.
Contending that the assailed NPB Resolutions are void and without force and effect, herein
petitioners, in their individual and representative capacities, filed the present Petition for Injunction to
restrain respondents from implementing NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125.
In assailing the validity of NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, petitioners maintain
that said Resolutions were not passed and issued by a majority of the members of the duly constituted
Board of Directors since only three of its members, as provided under Section 486 of the EPIRA Law,
were present. The other four members who were present at the meeting and signed the Resolutions were
not the secretaries of their respective departments but were merely representatives or designated
alternates of the officials who were named under the EPIRA Law to sit as members of the NPB.
Petitioners claim that the acts of these representatives are violative of the well-settled principle that
"delegated power cannot be further delegated." Thus, petitioners conclude that the questioned
Resolutions have been illegally issued as it were not issued by a duly constituted board since no quorum
existed because only three of the nine members, as provided under Section 48 of the EPIRA Law, were
present and qualified to sit and vote.

ISSUE:
Whether or not NPB Resolutions No. 2002- 124 and No. 2002- 125 were properly enacted.
HELD:
NO. In enumerating under Section 48 those who shall compose the National Power Board of
Directors, the legislature has vested upon these persons the power to exercise their judgment and
discretion in running the affairs of the NPC. Discretion may be defined as "the act or the liberty to decide
according to the principles of justice and one's ideas of what is right and proper under the circumstances,
without willfulness or favor.8 Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right
conferred upon them by law of acting officially in certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their
own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others.9 It is to be
presumed that in naming the respective department heads as members of the board of directors, the
legislature chose these secretaries of the various executive departments on the basis of their personal
qualifications and acumen which made them eligible to occupy their present positions as department
heads. Thus, the department secretaries cannot delegate their duties as members of the NPB, much less
their power to vote and approve board resolutions, because it is their personal judgment that must be
exercised in the fulfillment of such responsibility.
There are also exemptions to the general rule. It was also held in the case Binamira v. Garucho
that: “An officer to whom discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being that
he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and
unless given the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his
duties to another.”
In the case of American Tobacco Company v. Director of Patents: “A delegate may exercise his
authority through persons he appoints to assist him in his functions.. only when the judgment and
discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law.. so long as it is the legally
authorized official who makes the final decision through the use of his own personal judgment.”
In the case at bar, however, it is the representatives of the secretaries of the different executive
departments and not the secretaries themselves who exercised judgment in passing assailed Resolution.
WHEREFORE, National Power Board Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are hereby
declared VOID and WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT. The Petition for INJUNCTION is hereby GRANTED.
14. People vs Dacuycuy
Facts:
On April 4, 1975, private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilio M. Zanoria,
public school officials from Leyte were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte for violating
Republic Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers). The respondents pleaded not guilty
and petitioned for certeriori and prohibition with preliminary injuction before the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, Branch VII alleging that:
a. The Municipal Court of Hindang has no jurisdiction over the case due to the correctional nature of the
penalty of imprisonment (as state in Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 4670) prescribed for the offense
b. Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is unconstitutional because, (1) the term of imprisonment is unfixed and
may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration
of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the
legislative department of the Government.
On March 30, 1976, the petition was transferred to Branch IV where the respondent Judge, Judge
Dacuycuy ruled that R.A. No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside of the
jurisdiction of municipal and city courts.
Issue:
a) W/N Repbulic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional.
b) W/N Whether or not the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
Yes, Republic Act No. 4760 is unconstitutional. Section 32 violates the constitutional prohibition against
undue delegation of legislative power by vesting in the court the responsibility of imposing a duration on
the punishment of imprisonment, as if the courts were the legislative department of the government.
Yes, the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act. No. 296, as amended by
Republic Act No. 3828, considers crimes punishable by fine of not more than Php 3,000.00 fall under the
original jurisdiction of municipal courts.