BARTELSON, Jens - War in International Thought

War in International Thought
As scholars and citizens, we are predisposed to think of war as a profoundly

destructive activity that ideally should be abolished altogether. Yet before
the twentieth century, war was widely understood as a productive force in
human affairs that should be harnessed for the purposes of creating peace
and order. Analyzing how the concept of war has been used in different
contexts from the seventeenth to the late nineteenth century, Jens Bartelson
addresses this transition by inquiring into the underlying and often
unspoken assumptions about the nature of war, and how these have
shaped our understanding of the modern political world and the role of
war within it. He explores its functions in the process of state making and in
the creation of the modern international system to bring the argument up to
date to the present day, where war is now on the center stage of world
politics.
jens bartelson is Professor of Political Science at Lund University. He is

the author of Visions of World Community (Cambridge, 2009), The
Critique of the State (Cambridge, 2001), A Genealogy of Sovereignty
(Cambridge, 1995), as well as of articles in leading journals in
international relations, international law, political theory, and sociology.
War in International
Thought
jens bartelson
Lund University, Sweden
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www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108419352
DOI: 10.1017/9781108297707
© Jens Bartelson 2018
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To Caspian
Contents
Preface and Acknowledgments page ix

1 Toward a Historical Ontology of War 1
2 The State of War 33
3 Fortifying the State 88
4 Wars of Law, Laws of War 129
Conclusion: The Return of the Repressed? 180
Bibliography 202
Index 233
vii
Preface and Acknowledgments
I am certainly not the first to write a book on war in international

thought. Yet most of what has been written that tries to capture the
meaning of war remains forgetful of the fact that war also is that which
makes the modern world meaningful by virtue of having been
consistently invoked in its making. Hence this book tries not only to
make sense of war in international thought but also to explore the role
of war in the shaping of that very body of thought from the early
modern period onward.
The topic of war has a curious propensity to generate cognitive
arousal even among pacifists, something that I discovered during the
many conversations I had with colleagues and friends in the process of
writing this book. This process started and ended at the Swedish
Defence University, where Jan Willem Honig graciously commented
on a draft chapter many years ago. Several years later, I returned to the
same place with a more finished product that Kjell Engelbrekt and Jan
Ångström then dissected with great acumen. In the meantime, Judith
Butler and Wendy Brown had invited me to a seminar at Berkeley, an
immensely rewarding experience that provided me with fresh feedback
during a critical phase of writing. Something similar happened later in
Cambridge, where Duncan Bell and Ayşe Zarakol had invited me for a
talk. The response I received was intellectually overwhelming and
compelled me to rethink parts of the argument in light of sharp
interventions by John Dunn and many others. Another great source
of positive influence has been my colleagues within the research
program Time, Memory, and Representation. Generously funded by
the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation and gracefully led by my
friend Hans Ruin, this program gathered together some of the brightest
scholars in the humanities in Sweden for a period of six years. I am very
grateful for the funding received and for the constructive engagement
of the participants with my work during these years. Many colleagues
in Lund and elsewhere have also provided inspiration and helpful
ix
x Preface and Acknowledgments
suggestions over the years either by reading parts of the book or by

responding to oral presentations: Matilda Arvidsson, Andreas Behnke,
Chris Bickerton, Leila Brännström, Agustín Goenaga, Markus
Gunneflo, Alexander von Hagen-Jamar, Peter Haldén, Martin Hall,
Caroline Jonsäter, Sara Kalm, Oliver Kessler, Johannes Lindvall,
Debbie Lisle, Tom Lundborg, Gregor Noll, Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen,
Nisha Shah, Jayne Svennungsson, Jan Teorell, Sven Tägil, Rob Walker,
Pål Wrange, Dan Öberg, and Eva Österberg have all made thoughtful
contributions to my work. Still other colleagues went far beyond the call
of duty. Nick Onuf read most chapters with his usual enthusiasm and
provided me with invaluable suggestions for improvement. Casper
Sylvest read the entire manuscript with great attention to the many
missing parts of the story. In the end, Pia Lonnakko was kind enough
to compile a bibliography out of what had become a heap of
disorganized notes. I am also grateful to my wife, Mia, who for several
years patiently suffered the consequences of having a husband obsessed
with war. My deepest gratitude goes to John Haslam at Cambridge
University Press for his unwavering support of my work for more
than twenty years. Lastly, I am grateful to Oxford University Press
for granting me permission to republish parts of Chapters 1, 2, and 3
that were published in “Blasts from the Past: War and Fracture in
the International System,” International Political Sociology 10, No. 4
(2016): 252–368.
1 Toward a Historical Ontology
of War
Introduction
This is a book about the meaning of war in international thought
from the early seventeenth to the late nineteenth century. Such a
topic lends itself to many approaches, with many possible results.
One rather conventional way to approach this topic would be to
investigate how the concept of war has been used by different
authors in different historical contexts and for what kinds of ideo-
logical and political purposes. From such an inquiry we would hope-
fully be able to make inferences about the changing functions of the
concept of war across time and space and from these perhaps distill
more general insights about the meaning of war in international
thought.
My approach is different, however. Instead of inquiring into how
the concept of war has been used by different authors across multi-
ple historical contexts, this book inquires into how the underlying
and unspoken assumptions about the nature of war have shaped
our understanding of the modern political world and the role of
war within it. As such, this book is not so much a conceptual
history of war as it is an analysis of the historical ontology of
war – of the world that war made. Although conceptual history
and historical ontology reflect a similar ambition to better under-
stand the present in terms of the past, they raise different questions
and focus on different objects of inquiry. Whereas a conceptual
history of war would remain content to describe how different
authors have used the concept of war in different contexts to
accomplish different things, a historical ontology of war cuts dee-
per than that by focusing on what different conceptions of war
have presupposed in order to be used by interlocutors in a mean-
ingful and coherent way, as well as on what the usages of this
concept in turn have done to the range of phenomena it purports to
1
2 Toward a Historical Ontology of War
describe and render meaningful.1 This book tries to uncover these

presuppositions, how they have shaped the meaning of war in
international thought, as well as how those meanings in turn have
shaped the way we understand the nature of war.
But is the concept of war really amenable to historical inquiry at
all? Judging from the ways in which war is understood in the social
sciences today, the answer seems to be no. To many philosophers
and political scientists, war itself is a timeless and immutable cate-
gory, albeit one with a great variety of instantiations. As Coker has
recently argued, “we tend to believe that, unlike the character of war
which is indefinable because it is always changing, the nature of war
can be defined because it does not . . . war has a nature which is
eternal but which at the same time takes a finite form.” From this it
would follow that “the nature of war is not transformed through
history, its nature is made manifest in time, but time does not sub-
stantially affect the eternal; the character of war is the actualization
of its nature.”2 Since the quest for the essence of war has been going
on at least since Clausewitz, the denial of its historicity is quite
common among modern scholars of military thought and strategy.
For example, as Gat has stated, “[W]hile the forms of war may
change with time, its spirit, or essence, remains unchanged.”3 As
we shall notice later in this chapter, among those who have studied
the causes of war, their practices of definition point in a similar
direction. Even though the precise definition of this concept has
been and still is much contested – such as the nature of the belliger-
ents and the number of causalities required for any given outburst of
violence to qualify as war proper – there is a general agreement to the
effect that at least some definition is necessary for all further
1
For this contrast, compare Ian Hacking, Historical Ontology (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2002), 1–26; Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the
Semantics of Historical Time (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); Reinhart
Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing
Concepts (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).
2
Christopher Coker, Barbarous Philosophers: Reflections on the Nature of War
from Heraclitus to Heisenberg (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010),
12–13.
3
Azar Gat, Military Thought in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford
University Press. 1992), 67. For the quest for the essence of war, see Beatrice
Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 100ff.
Introduction 3
theoretical and empirical inquiry into the phenomenon of war and

its causes.
On this view, studying the historical ontology of war would be a
rather pointless exercise because such an inquiry would only lead us
back to and affirm those meanings that were at its starting point.
We can certainly write histories of war and warfare, but only by
virtue of the fact that the concept of war is unchanging enough to
allow such histories to be written in the first place and distinguished
from histories of other things in the second. This points to an
important fact that I will elaborate on in the Chapter 2. One reason
why war seems to lack a history of its own is the fact that it has
been allowed to structure historical narratives of the emergence and
consolidation of the modern state and the international system; war
seems to lack a history of its own simply because it has long been a
condition of possible history, especially when it comes to telling
stories of how individual states once emerged out of a dark past of
civil or international strife.
Yet I suspect that there is another and more important reason
why the historicity of war has been downplayed or denied by so
much modern scholarship. To say that the meaning of war is
historically contingent could be taken to imply that war is a social
construct, and to say that war is a social construct could by some be
taken to imply that the human suffering it brings is somehow less
real. Yet I think these objections rest on a misunderstanding of the
upshot of conceptual history in general and perhaps that of histor-
ical ontology in particular. A historical inquiry into the ontological
presuppositions of war does not imply that human experiences of
war are unreal: rather, it is a matter of showing how these experi-
ences became real in the first place and how some of these presup-
positions still condition experiences and expectations of war in the
present day. It is a matter of bringing war back within the scope of
human volition and responsibility.4
Although many other political concepts have been subjected to
detailed historical analysis during the past decades, war has not yet
received much systematic treatment by historians of political thought,
4
For suggestions in this direction, see Jan-Werner Müller, “On Conceptual
History,” in Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (eds.), Rethinking Modern
European Intellectual History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 74–93.
and the few exceptions in this regard still leave much to be desired in
terms of their empirical scope. While an otherwise impressive article in
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe deals with the history of this concept
within a German-speaking context only, a recent book by Armitage
focuses exclusively on the concept of civil war and how civil wars have
shaped historical and political experience from Roman to modern
times.5 By contrast, this book takes the notion of international war as
the starting point of inquiry and then traces its genealogy backward in
time across a series of historical contexts and intellectual fields over
roughly three centuries. By focusing on international rather than civil
war, this book aims to explain how the modern concept of interna-
tional war came into being, how war came to be understood as a
contest between two or more identifiable actors of which sovereign
states became the paradigmatic case, and how recent and profound
challenges to this conception of international war have contributed to
changes in the ways in which wars are waged in the contemporary
world.
Yet the fact that the concept of international war has not received
any systematic treatment by historians of political thought does not
mean that there is no scholarship of potential value to such inquiry,
once we come to terms with some of its presentist tendencies. For
example, and as noted earlier, while historians of military thought
have contributed immensely to the historical understanding of war,
many of them have assumed that war has some kind of timeless
meaning or essence and have thereby failed to note the many
changes that the concept of war in fact has undergone in the
wider context of political and legal thought.6 And although recent
efforts to align the traditional concerns of military history with
those of the cultural turn in the human sciences have produced
fresh and valuable insights into the specific contexts in which
ways of thinking about war have evolved, it has not made any
direct contribution to a conceptual history of war, let alone to its
5
Wilhelm Janssen, “Krieg,” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches
Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, vol. III (Stuttgart: Klett-
Cotta, 1982): 567–615; David Armitage, Civil Wars: A History in Ideas (New
York: Knopf, 2017).
6
See, for example, Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the
Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Azar
Gat, War in Human Civilization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006);
Heuser, Evolution of Strategy, passim.
Introduction 5
historical ontology.7 Furthermore, although the changing legal and

moral justifications of war have attracted much attention from
historians of political thought, even otherwise historically sensitive
accounts of the rights of war and peace seem to assume that the
meaning of war has remained relatively stable over time and
across different contexts, perhaps in order to facilitate comparison
between different authors from different traditions.8 Finally, while recent
efforts have been made by sociologists to study the role of war in social
thought from the early modern period onward, their account is pri-
marily geared toward understanding its role in modern social theory
rather than with the meanings and functions attributed to war within
international thought.9
In this book, I try to amend this situation by inquiring into the
changes that the understanding of war has undergone from the
early seventeenth to the late nineteenth century. This focus is moti-
vated by my conviction that this period marks a series of important
changes in the understanding of war, changes that have profoundly
influenced our view of the modern state and the role of war in the
modern international system. Yet the story I will tell is slightly at
odds with two views widespread among historians of international
law. According the first of these, the history of international war is
a history of how warfare among European states gradually became
subjected to legal restraints from the early modern period onward.
As Schmitt famously argued, the decisive step from medieval to
modern international law lies in the separation of questions of
just cause grounded in moral arguments from the idea of the legal
equality of belligerents.10 This paved the way for the subsequent
creation of a legal framework that effectively limited the use of
force among European states. In a similar vein, Neff has described
how the meaning of war changed from the Middle Ages to the early
modern period. Although consistently used to refer to conflict
7
Jeremy Black, War and the Cultural Turn (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), esp.
1–43.
8
See, for example, Richard Tuck, Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and
International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999).
9
Hans Joas and Wolfgang Knöbl, War in Social Thought: Hobbes to the Present
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).
10
Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus
Publicum Europaeum (New York: Telos Press, 2006), 110.
between distinct political communities rather than between domes-

tic authorities and their internal opponents, war has mainly been
conceived as an instrument of justice in the Western legal tradition.
In his account, war as means of law enforcement was eventually
replaced by an understanding of war as a contest between sovereign
equals, which was then opened to regulation through a gradual
codification of the principles of balance of power in international
law from the seventeenth century onward.11
Second, it has been maintained that these restraints on war were
made possible by a European expansion and the appropriation of
land on other continents. Beyond the lines of demarcation that
separated the European system from the rest of the world, no such
legal restraints were considered valid or applicable. As Schmitt
argued, beyond these lines was a zone “in which, for want of any
legal limits to war, only the law of the stronger applied . . . this
freedom meant that the line set aside an area where force could be
used freely and ruthlessly . . . everything that occurred beyond the
line remained outside the legal, moral and political values recog-
nized on this side of the line.”12 As he went on to explain, “the
designation of a zone of ruthless conflict was a logical consequence
of the fact that there was neither a recognized principle nor a com-
mon arbitrational authority to govern the division and allocation of
lands.” But, simultaneously, “a rationalization, humanization, and
legalization – a bracketing – of war was achieved against this back-
ground of global lines.”13 Hence the increased regulation of warfare
between European states during the early modern period was pre-
mised on the unleashing of unprecedented violence against non-
European peoples and a much less restrictive use of force between
imperial powers competing for territory on foreign shores.
Somewhat curiously, similar views are today common among post-
colonial theorists of international law, who argue that the outward
projection of violence was justified with reference to ideologies that
11
Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Stephen C. Neff, Justice among Nations
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 148–78.
12
Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of The Earth, 93–4. For an interesting commentary,
see Martti Koskenniemi, “International Law as Political Theology: How to
Read Nomos der Erde?,” Constellations 11 (2004): 492–511.
13
Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, 100.
Introduction 7
assumed non-European peoples to be stuck in an uncivilized and

stateless condition, therefore being fair game for conquest and colo-
nization by European powers.14 Although the rise and spread of
such ideologies have received considerable attention by historians
during the past decades, this has not led to any sustained attempt
to study the functions of war and violence in creating and uphold-
ing the distinction between civilized and uncivilized peoples that
lies at the heart of these ideologies.15
In this book, I shall contest the above-mentioned views on both
historical and philosophical grounds. First, as I will maintain, there
was never any clean break between war as punishment of evildoers
or law enforcement, on the one hand, and war as an armed contest
between moral and legal equals, on the other. In fact, the idea that
war was a way of punishing wrongdoers and enforcing the law
remained important precisely in order to produce the kind of legal
equality between states that since then has become a foundational
assumption of modern international law. The integrity and cohe-
sion of the nascent international system in Europe required its
internal enemies to be punished or even eliminated, and this, in
turn, motivated recourse to forms of violence that were ruled out in
the intercourse between sovereigns. Yet, simultaneously, the notion
of war as law enforcement presupposes that there already is an
14
See, for example, Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Brett
Bowden, “The Colonial Origins of International Law: European Expansion and
the Classical Standard of Civilization,” Journal of the History of International
Law 7, no. 1 (2005): 1–23; Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society,
Grotius, Colonialism, and Order in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002); Anne Orford, International Law and Its Others
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
15
See, for example, Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire
in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500–c. 1850 (New Haven: Yale University
Press; 1995); Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in
Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1999); David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to
Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2005); Duncan Bell (ed.), Victorian Visions of
Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century
Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). For an
excellent overview, see Duncan S. A. Bell, “Empire and International Relations
in Victorian Political Thought,” The History Journal 49 (2006): 281–98.
established jurisdiction within which law enforcement is possible

and thus that there has been a successful claim to a political
authority of a corresponding scope. As I intend to show, for much
of the early modern period, irregular warfare was the preferred
means of carving such jurisdictions out and backing such authority
claims up.
Second, although wars waged against non-European peoples
were often justified on grounds different from those waged among
European states – such as ideas of a Christian empire – they were
not legitimized with reference to ideologies premised on the super-
iority of the Europeans, or at least not initially. Rather, it seems to
have been the other way around. The dissemination of ideas of
natural hostility and enmity coincided in time with the proliferation
of cultural prejudices inside Europe, which were often convenient
pretexts for waging war among European states. Assumptions of
natural hostility and enmity had been first introduced in order to
legitimize secular political authority in Europe and only later were
projected onto non-European peoples, and then only after many of
them had been conquered and subjected to colonial rule. The main
source of the many prejudices at play in this process of political
exorcism was rather the dark past of barbarism that had been
invented to legitimize the transition from a stateless past to what
in the minds of Protestant elites now was in the process of becom-
ing secular states. It was not until the late nineteenth century that
these undesirable traits were projected outward to justify the indis-
criminate use of force against non-European peoples, a process
greatly facilitated by the uptake of doctrines of evolution and
natural selection across different intellectual fields. Yet all the pre-
ceding raises the more basic question of how such assumptions of
natural hostility found their way into the foundations of early
modern political thought in the first place. As we shall see, answer-
ing this question compels us to revisit views of war that have long
been marginalized or even forgotten by students of international
thought.
My main reason for undertaking this inquiry into the historical
ontology of war is the intellectual confusion that surrounds this
concept in the present day. Much of this confusion is the result of
recent debates about the changing role of war in a globalized world.
The first of these debates started almost immediately after the end
Introduction 9
of the Cold War, when some authors optimistically predicted the

declining relevance of international war as an instrument of state
policy and started to focus on those low-intensity conflicts in the
Third World that appeared to bring many already fragile states to
the brink of collapse.16 As Hassner remarked, although still possi-
ble, international war “has already lost its justification, or its mean-
ing, and it may become less and less frequent and less and less
central for political life.”17 Since the study of international rela-
tions had long been preoccupied with international war and its
many causes, the declining incidence of international wars brought
a shift in focus to the proliferation of domestic conflicts that soon
followed.18 Since then, it has become common to study violent
conflicts without presupposing the existence of a specific kind of
actor or any definite level of hostilities between them because both
of these requirements are deemed contingent on the context at hand
rather than on stipulative definitions.19 Consequently, many scho-
lars agreed that the modern concept of war has lost much of its
analytical purchase in a world in which sovereign states no longer
are the main belligerents and in which the distinction between
international and domestic conflicts has ceased to make much
empirical sense. And what had ceased to make empirical sense
had already ceased to make legal sense. As Greenwood had pointed
out, “it is doubtful . . . whether it is still meaningful to talk of war
[as] a legal concept or institution at all. If no direct legal conse-
quences flow from the creation of a state of war, the state of war
16
John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New
York: Basic Books, 1990); Martin Van Creveld, Transformation of War (New
York: Free Press, 1991).
17
Pierre Hassner, “Beyond the Three Traditions: The Philosophy of War and
Peace in Historical Perspective,” International Affairs 70, no. 4 (1994): 737–56,
at 754.
18
See, among others, Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); James D. Fearon, and David
D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science
Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90.
19
See, among others, Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a
Global Era (Oxford: Polity, 1999); Christopher Coker, The Future of War: The
Re-enchantment of War in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004);
Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, Risk Society at War (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006). For a critique of the newness of “new” forms of war, see
Stathis Kalyvas, “New and Old Civil Wars,” World Politics 54, no. 1 (2001):
99–118.
has become an empty shell which international law has already

discarded in all but name.”20 Responding to this predicament,
students of armed conflict faced a hard choice between stretching
the meaning of the modern concept of war to fit new circumstances
or to abandon this concept altogether in favor of concepts that
carry fewer commitments as to the identity of the belligerents and
the level of hostilities required for any outburst of violence to
qualify as war proper. Yet, as a result of the blurring of the dis-
tinction between international and civil wars, the once seemingly
solid distinction between peace and war also began to crumble.
From having referred to two states of affairs incapable of coexisting
within the same portion of time and space, war and peace now
occupy extreme points of a continuum with many shades of gray in
between.21
Hence those distinctions that made the concept of war analytically
useful have been blurred, if not altogether dissolved, by contemporary
efforts to come to terms with changing practices of warfare, making
analysts opt for concepts such as “violent conflict” in the hope of
avoiding the ambiguities and theoretical difficulties that ensue when
the meaning of war is stretched too far. But quite regardless of our
choice of terminology, the same underlying problem will reappear in
new guises because understanding violent conflict presupposes some
prior account of the belligerents and their identity. Since even the most
minimalistic definition of war or violent conflict presupposes that it
takes at least two to tango, this requires that the belligerents are
identifiable if not to the analyst, so at least to each other. And such
identification of belligerents presupposes that they are distinct and
bounded and that there is some determinate locus of political authority
that can account for their inner cohesion and capacity to act. But if such
a locus cannot be pinpointed with sufficient precision, then the actors
involved cannot be properly identified either. And if actors cannot be
properly identified, it is hard to make sense of any outburst of violence
between them in conventional terms because there is no one there to
20
Christopher Greenwood, “The Concept of War in Modern International Law,”
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 36, no. 2 (1987): 283–306, at
305.
21
For a sophisticated statement of this view, see Jairus Victor Grove, “Becoming
War: Ecology, Ethics, and the Globalization of Violence,” Ph.D. dissertation,
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, 2011.
Introduction 11
whom we can attribute motives, causal powers, or moral responsibil-

ity. Hence, in the absence of a determinate locus of political authority
and firm boundaries between belligerent entities, not only does the
distinction between international and civil war collapse, but so does
our ability to explain the incidence of war with reference to the interests
and identities of actors.22 Since the distinction between war and peace
is contingent on the presence of political authority within actors and
the existence of boundaries between them, this distinction becomes
equally difficult to uphold whenever these requirements are not
fulfilled.23
What goes for the terms of explanation goes for the terms of justifi-
cation. The next debate was less concerned with ontological issues and
more with legal and moral justifications of war and their ideological
implications. Many of the wars that have been waged during the last
decades have been justified with reference to the threats to the interna-
tional system posed by failed states and terrorist groups, which made
the former legitimate targets of military interventions and the latter fair
game for exceptional measures and the extralegal use of force.24 But in
order for us to be able to pass moral or legal judgments on the use of
force, some things must be known in advance and taken for granted. As
Butler has pointed out, however contingent their form and content,
definitions of war are never innocent semantic exercises. From defini-
tions of war follow normative principles, and from those principles
follow rules that make it possible to promote or restrict the violent
22
See Stathis Kalyvas, “The Ontology of ‘Political Violence’: Action and Identity
in Civil Wars,” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 3 (2003): 475–94.
23
See Jens Bartelson, “Double Binds: Sovereignty and the Just War Tradition,” in
Hent Kalmo and Quentin Skinner (eds.), Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past,
Present, and Future of a Contested Concept (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010), 81–95.
24
Ayşe Zarakol, “What Makes Terrorism Modern? Terrorism, Legitimacy, and
the International System,” Review of International Studies 37, no. 5 (2011):
2311–36; Frédéric Mégret, “From ‘Savages’ to ‘Unlawful Combatants’: A
Postcolonial Look at International Humanitarian Law’s Other,” in Anne
Orford (ed.), International Law and Its Others (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), 265–317; Oliver Kessler and Wouter G. Werner,
“Extrajudicial Killing as Risk Management,” Security Dialogue 39, nos. 2–3
(2008): 289–308; Wouter G. Werner, “From Justus Hostis to Rogue State: The
Concept of the Enemy in International Legal Thinking,” International Journal
for the Semiotics of Law 17, no. 2 (2004): 155–68.
practices thus defined: our moral and legal responses to war are always
already conditioned by practices of definition and classification.25
From the debate that ensued, it seems clear that some of the new
ways of conceptualizing violent conflict that had evolved after the
end of the Cold War actually went some way toward justifying global
or imperial wars simply by nullifying many of the restrictions that were
coeval with the modern distinction between civil and international
wars. And since these wars were justified with reference to universal
values and rights, they either implied claims to boundless political
authority or presupposed the imminent possibility of a community of
all humankind.26
Taken together, these contemporary reconceptualizations of
war have brought a change away from the modern notion of
war as a contest between moral and legal equals back to signify-
ing a contest of unequal parties that by definition cannot be just
on both sides. This could be taken to indicate that the modern
meaning of the concept of war has been dissolved in favor of a
swift return to older conceptions of war as law enforcement or as
the punishment of evildoers.27 In a dystopian version of this
argument, even the element of law enforcement and punishment
is gone from contemporary warfare. What we are facing is noth-
ing but a return to premodern and primitive forms of warfare
between actors of different kinds, unhampered by any moral or
legal constraints.28
25
Judith Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? (London: Verso, 2009),
1–32. Also Etienne Balibar, “What’s in a War? (Politics as War, War as
Politics),” Ratio Juris 21, no. 3 (2008): 365–86.
26
See, for example, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and
Democracy in the End of Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004); Rens Van
Munster, “The War on Terrorism: When the Exception Becomes the Rule,”
International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 17, no. 2 (2004): 141–53; Hauke
Brunkhorst, “The Right to War: Hegemonic Geopolitics or Civic
Constitutionalism?,” Constellations 11, no. 4 (2004): 512–26; Vivienne Jabri,
“War, Security and the Liberal State,” Security Dialogue 37, no. 1 (2006):
47–64.
27
Carl Schmitt, “The Turn to the Discriminating Concept of War” [1937], in Carl
Schmitt (ed.), Writings on War, trans. Timothy Nunan (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 2011), 30–74.
28
Loretta Napoleoni, The Islamist Phoenix (New York: Seven Stories Press,
2014).
Ontogenetic War 13
Ontogenetic War
Reflecting the traumatic experiences of two world wars, we have become
accustomed to thinking of war as profoundly destructive of political
order and therefore morally undesirable. From this conviction has fol-
lowed a long and arduous search for the causes of war in the hope of
preventing future wars. As Andrew Carnegie stated in his letter to the
trustees of what was to become the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, the purpose was “to hasten the abolition of interna-
tional war, the foulest blot upon our civilization. Although we no longer
eat our fellowmen, nor torture prisoners, nor sack cities killing their
inhabitants, we still kill each other in war like barbarians.”29 The horrors
of the First World War seemed to confirm this view and contributed
greatly to push the public attitude toward war in a more pacifist direction.
War became seen as something to be abolished, avoided, or at least limited
in the interest of minimizing human suffering.30 Even if the impact of
interwar idealism may have been exaggerated by historians of interna-
tional relations, it seems clear that the first efforts to establish interna-
tional relations as an autonomous scholarly field were guided by a
widespread desire to abolish war.31 Alfred Zimmern, who became the
first professor of international relations in 1919, advocated the creation of
a global commonwealth of nations to this end. War will be preventable
only “when the world has a common will, and has created a common
government to express and enforce that will.”32 Similar sensibilities ani-
mated the study of international relations in the United States, which to a
29
Andrew Carnegie, “Letter to the Trustees,” December 14, 1910, spelling
modified. For the context in which this letter was written, see David S. Patterson,
“Andrew Carnegie’s Quest for World Peace,” Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Society (1970): 371–83.
30
See, for example, John Mueller, “Changing Attitudes towards War: The Impact
of the First World War,” British Journal of Political Science 21, no. 1 (1991): 1–
28.
31
See Lucian M. Ashworth, “Where Are the Idealists in Interwar International
Relations?,” Review of International Studies 32, no. 2 (2006): 291–308; Casper
Sylvest, “Interwar Internationalism, the British Labour Party, and the
Historiography of International Relations,” International Studies Quarterly 48,
no. 2 (2004): 409–32; Andreas Osiander, “Rereading Early Twentieth-Century
IR Theory: Idealism Revisited,” International Studies Quarterly 42, no. 3
(1998): 409–32.
32
See Alfred Zimmern, “German Culture and the British Commonwealth,” in
Nationality and Government with Other War-Time Essays (London: Chatto &
Windus, 1918), 1–31, at 22. For a critical analysis of his ideas, see Jeanne
large extent was devoted to understanding the causes of war with the aim
of minimizing the likelihood of future war.33 This ambition was certainly
not confined to liberal idealists. As Morgenthau stated in his Politics
among Nations (1948), “the abolition of war is obviously the fundamen-
tal problem confronting international thought.”34 The invention and use
of nuclear weapons had further reinforced the awareness of the destruc-
tive character of war to the point of institutionalizing that awareness in
the doctrine of nuclear deterrence after the Second World War. As
Brodie then argued, “[t]hus far, the chief purpose of our military
establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose
must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.”35
And as he added a few years later, “[o]ur problem is now to develop
the habit of living with the atomic bomb, and the very incomprehen-
sibility of the potential catastrophe inherent in it may well make that
task easier.”36 Living with the prospect of nuclear disaster indeed
changed the meaning of life itself. As Morgenthau later was to
remark, “[t]he significance of the possibility of nuclear death is that
it radically affects the meaning of death, of immortality, of life itself
. . . [i]t destroys the meaning of immortality by making both society
and history impossible. It destroys the meaning of life by throwing
life back upon itself.”37 Thus the atomic age made nuclear deterrence
the great equalizer of nations and the great stabilizer of the interna-
tional system. Since then, very few people have been prepared to
argue that war is morally desirable, and even fewer are likely to
celebrate the virtues of war in fostering individual character or patriotic
Morefield, Covenants without Swords: Liberal Idealism and the Spirit of

Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
33
See, for example, Brian C. Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A
Disciplinary History of International Relations (Albany, NY: SUNY Press,
1998), 157–65; Brian C. Schmidt, “On the History and Historiography of
International Relations,” in Walter Calsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons
(eds.), Handbook of International Relations (London: SAGE, 2002), 3–22.
34
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace
(New York: Knopf, 1985), 47.
35
Bernard Brodie (ed.), The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order
(New York: Harcourt, 1946), 76; see also Bernard Brodie, “The Development of
Nuclear Strategy,” International Security 2 no. 4 (1978): 65–83.
36
Bernard Brodie, “The Atom Bomb as Policy Maker,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 4, no. 12 (1948): 277–383, at 383.
37
Hans J. Morgenthau, “Public Affairs: Death in the Nuclear Age,” Commentary
32, no. 3 (1961): 233.
Ontogenetic War 15
sentiment. Since there is a broad agreement to the effect that war is

destructive of human life and therefore morally undesirable, the only
remaining task of an ethics of war is to specify under what conditions
the use of force nevertheless might be permissible for the purpose of self-
defense or to avert greater evils such as genocide or existential threats to
humankind as a whole.38
But, as Michael Howard has argued, before the Enlightenment and
its invention of peace and progress, war “was recognized as an intrinsic
part of the social and political order.”39 The increased awareness of the
destructiveness of war has sometimes been portrayed as an escape from
an old world in which war was a natural part of the human condition
into a new world in which war is at least in principle within human
control thanks to the advancement of the social sciences in general and
academic international relations in particular.40 But this widespread
belief in the destructiveness of war has been allowed to overshadow the
existence of another way of viewing war that may help us understand
why war came to be seen as a natural part of the human condition in the
first place. This is the belief that war is a productive force in human
affairs that ought to be harnessed for the right political purposes, such
as the creation of order and peace. This belief and its performative
consequences constitute the main focus of the coming chapters of this
book. Yet the almost exclusive focus on this view of war should not be
taken to imply that this view is exhaustive or even representative of the
many ideas about war that we find in the history of international
thought. The great variety and richness of the tradition of reflecting
on war in international thought cannot be neatly subsumed under a
38
See, for example, Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument
with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977); Michael Howard
(ed.), Restraints on War: Studies in the Limitation of Armed Conflict (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1979); Larry May (ed.), War: Essays in Political
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Jeff McMahan,
Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). For a penetrating
critique of such attempts, see Nicholas Rengger, Just War and International
Order: The Uncivil Condition in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2013).
39
Michael Howard, The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International
Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 10.
40
Stanley Hoffmann, “An American Social Science: International Relations,”
Daedalus 106, no. 3 (1977): 41–60.
single conception of war, however abstractly defined.41 Instead, my

focus on the notion of war as a productive force in human affairs is
motivated by its important but neglected role in the shaping of the
modern political world and the role of war within this world: for want
of a better term, I will henceforth refer to this view of war as ontoge-
netic war.
On this view, war does not require the identities of the belligerents to
be known in advance but instead assumes that the belligerents are
beaten into shape in the course of battle. Rather than standing in
need of any explanation and justification, war is a mysterious and
impersonal force that itself can be invoked to explain and justify
political processes and their outcomes. The upshot of ontogenetic
war is not that it takes two to tango but that it takes a tango to make
two: war does not occur as a result of prior enmity between actors
whose identities and interests are given and known but is that which
produces identities and interests as well as the patterns of enmity and
friendship within which actors become embedded by fighting. Thus
understood, war is a primordial force that imposes structure on a world
that otherwise would too chaotic to be accessible to understanding and
hence also beyond the reach of human intervention. Making war is
therefore also making sense: war is not only a means of imposing order
onto chaos but also a way of imposing meaning onto an otherwise
enigmatic political world. This implies that if war is a mysterious force
beyond human control, the best we can hope for is to be able to tame its
flames for more noble human ends and thus bestow some meaning on
the suffering war invariably brings.
Should we subscribe to the view that the political world is war all
they way down, we are likely to accept that politics is a continuation of
war with other means rather than the other way around. Thus ontoge-
netic war implies that war is necessary precursor to the creation of
political order but also that war is an important source of change in the
political world. Indeed, before any recognizably modern notion of
41
An ambitious attempt to classify conceptions of war in the Western tradition is
Anatol Rapoport, “Introduction,” in Carl von Clausewitz, On War
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), 11–80. For the long legacy of
internationalist thought critical of war, see Francis Harry Hinsley, Power and
the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between
States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967).
Ontogenetic War 17
sociopolitical change had emerged – which it arguably did only with the
French Revolution – war and other forms of organized violence were
consistently invoked to explain major changes and upheavals within as
well as between political communities, to the point of being regarded as
the cause of transformation in the political world. And if we believe
that war is the ultimate source of order and change in the political
world, we will be inclined to maintain that war is justified in order to
create the preconditions of political order whenever there is too much
discord and suffering on the ground or whenever the authority neces-
sary to uphold those preconditions is weak or absent.
Since this view of war makes little sense to a modern mind that
recognizes no mysterious forces at the origin of things, those in search
of philosophical support have often turned to Heraclitus. As he had it,
“war [polemos] is father of all, king of all, and some he shows as gods
while some as human beings, some he makes slaves, others free.”42 Yet
many modern commentators have cautioned us not to interpret this
fragment too literally.43 As Heidegger remarked, “the polemos named
here is a conflict that prevailed prior to everything divine and human,
not a war in the human sense.”44 Hence the way in which Heraclitus
uses the term polemos rather points to a cosmological principle of
differentiation “that first caused the realm of being to separate into
opposites, it first gave rise to position, order and rank.”45 When seen in
the wider context of his cosmology, polemos signifies the mechanism
through which the world is differentiated into recognizable beings
placed in ontological opposition to each other.46 As Heidegger goes
on to explain, “the struggle meant here is the original struggle, for it
gives rise to the contenders as such; it is not a mere assault on something
already there.”47
42
Charles H. Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: A New Arrangement and
Translation of the Fragments with Literary and Philosophical Commentary
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), fragment B, 53, 67.
43
See, for example, ibid., 204–10; Geoffrey Stephen Kirk, “Natural Change in
Heraclitus,” Mind 60, no. 237 (1951): 35–42.
44
Martin Heidegger, “On the Grammar and Etymology of the Word ‘Being,’” in
Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Mannheim (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1959), 62.
45
Ibid.
46
See Claudia Baracchi, “The Πόλεμος that Gathers All: Heraclitus on War,”
Research in Phenomenology 45, no. 2 (2015): 267–87.
47
Heidegger, “On the Grammar and Etymology of the Word ‘Being,’” 62.
Although we hear a distant echo of Heraclitus in Aristotle when

he discusses the nature of friendship and enmity, the concept of
polemos was given a more literal twist by the great historians of
antiquity.48 For instance, although hardly representative of the
Greek understanding of war, Thucydides clearly alludes to the
productive force of war when he describes the rise of the Hellenic
world from what originally was but a disjointed set of commu-
nities. The scattered Greek cities “were before the Trojan War
prevented by their want of strength and the absence of mutual
intercourse from displaying any collective action.”49 And although
the Romans recognized highly ritualized constraints on the legiti-
mate use of force – as embodied in the ius fetiale – these were
gradually overruled in the pursuit of imperial expansion and mili-
tary glory so that without war, empire would not have been possi-
ble, and without empire, war would not have been necessary.50
Hence, when Polybius recounted the causes of Roman expansion
and the sources of imperial greatness, it was obvious to him that
this was the result of military conquests and the successful projec-
tion of invincibility.51 As Livy later described the birth of Rome in a
similar spirit, “if any nation ought to be allowed to claim a sacred
origin and point back to a divine paternity that nation is Rome. For
such is her renown in war that when she chooses to represent Mars
as her own and her founder’s father, the nations of the world accept
the statement with the same equanimity with which they accept her
dominion.”52 Finally, although such conceptions were conspicu-
ously absent from medieval doctrines of just war when applied to
Christian princes, war appears to have been a potent source of
48
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), VIII:i.1155b, 144.
49
Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (London: J. M. Dent, 1910), I.i.
50
See P. A. Brunt, “Laus Imperii,” in P. D. A. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker (eds.),
Imperialism in the Ancient World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1978), 160–92; John Rich and Graham Shipley (eds.), War and Society in the
Roman World (London: Routledge, 1993).
51
Polybius, Histories, vol. I, trans. W. R. Paton (Cambridge, MA: LOEB Classical
Library, 2010). For commentaries on the role of war in the Histories, see Donald
Walter Baronowski, Polybius and Roman Imperialism (London: Bloomsbury,
2013); James Davidson, “The Gaze in Polybius’ Histories,” Journal of Roman
Studies 81 (1991): 10–24.
52
Titus Livy, History of Rome, vol. I, trans. Rev. Canon Roberts (New York: E.P.
Dutton, 1912), preface, 7–8.
Ontogenetic War 19
Christian cohesion whenever its fury was directed outward, against

the infidel.53 As Mastnak has argued, although the Crusades may
have been born out of a genuine desire for peace, they also served
the ultimate purpose of galvanizing Christendom. “[I]n its inten-
tions and mythic self-perception, the crusade was an expression of
the Christian unity that it was also creating.”54
The purpose of this book in not to dig into the ancient foundations or
medieval manifestations of this view of war but to tell the story of its
revival in early modern Europe and how the outcomes of this revival
continued to resonate throughout much of the modern period. This
revival came as a consequence of sustained efforts to put political
authority on secular foundations after the wars of religion and coin-
cided neatly with the rediscovery of Roman sources from which
notions useful to this end could be extracted. So when political author-
ity no longer could be legitimized with reference to a divine will or a
preordained cosmic order, Mars was invited back as the royal purveyor
of political order, and his lingering presence was to remain crucial to
secular statecraft well into the Enlightenment and beyond.55
Studying the return of this view makes it possible to freshly assess the
transition from war as law enforcement to wars as an armed contest
between legal equals. While this was never a clean break, the return of
ontogenetic war helps us to understand what really was at stake in this
transition. War as law enforcement made sense only as long as there
was a law there to enforce, and some claim to jurisdiction and some
political authority to back that latter claim up. Without any shared
universalistic normative framework to lend prima facie legitimacy to
such aspirations, the remaining way to create the preconditions of law
enforcement in this sense was by means of prior expansion into what
was essentially a legal void. By the same token, war as a contest
53
James Muldoon, Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels: The Church and the Non-
Christian World 1250–1550 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1979); Julia
Costa Lopez, “Beyond Eurocentrism and Orientalism: Revisiting the Othering
of Jews and Muslims through Medieval Canon Law,” Review of International
Studies 42, no. 3 (2016): 450–70.
54
Tomaz Mastnak, Crusading Peace: Christendom, the Muslim World, and
Western Political Order (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 95.
55
See Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d’état and Its
Place in Modern History, trans. Douglas Scott (New Haven: Yale University
Press 1962); Hans Delbrück, The Dawn of Modern Warfare, trans. Walter
Renfroe (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990).
between legal equals makes sense only on condition that the belliger-
ents in question are identifiable independently of the hostilities between
them, which means that they must be at peace with themselves. In the
absence of any traditional sources of legitimacy left undisturbed by the
Reformation and the wars of religion, the only remaining way to create
domestic order and peace out of the remnants of Christian unity was by
means of war.
The experiences of the two world wars paved the way for a forgetful-
ness concerning this troublesome part of the European past. Since
ontogenetic war is hard to reconcile with the pacifist self-images and
values of modern liberal and democratic societies, its historical impor-
tance in the formative phases of these societies has been conveniently
downplayed, if not forgotten. To cope with its consequences as they
were felt in trenches and concentration camps, its role in the shaping of
the modern world had to be denied. In this particular case, Nietzsche
was right when he insisted that a “poet could say that God has placed
forgetfulness as a doorkeeper on the threshold of the temple of human
dignity.”56 Something similar goes for the reception of this view within
the social sciences. While we all are familiar with the famous dictum
according to which “war made the state, and the state made war,” the
fact that similar ideas about the constitutive powers of war indeed
inspired the very process of state making has largely escaped atten-
tion.57 On those relatively rare occasions when this view has attracted
attention, it has been equated with different versions of militarism, but
without subjecting its assumptions or long historical pedigree to any
systematic inquiry.58 But does this forgetfulness imply that its legacy
has been entirely lost to us? As some students of collective memory like
to maintain, “[n]ations can repress with psychological impunity, their
56
Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. Carol Diethe
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 124. For accounts of the role
of memory and forgetting in international politics, see Duncan Bell (ed.),
Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship between
Past and Present (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Jan-Werner Müller
(ed.), Memory and Power in Post-War Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge
57
Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” in
Charles Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 42.
58
See, for example, Karma Nabulsi, Traditions of War: Occupation, Resistance,
and the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 80–127.
Ontogenetic War 21
collective memories can be changed without a returned of the

repressed.”59 By contrast, I would like to argue that we are witnessing
the return of the repressed insofar as a fair share of contemporary
warfare is legitimized with reference precisely to its ontogenetic capa-
cities. Rather than being contests between legal equals or a way of
enforcing the law on the weak by the strong, many wars today are best
understood as attempts to impose particularistic visions of political
order in spaces and places where such order is deemed absent or weak
due to prior conflicts.
Although the concept is largely absent from the study of interna-
tional relations, Ruggie touches on the notion of ontogenetic war when
he argues that during the early modern period, the wars of religion were
constitutive wars in the sense that the nature and identity of the belli-
gerents were not present beforehand but rather emerged gradually
precisely as the consequence of these wars.60 Perhaps symptomatically,
this notion of war has recently been revived by critical theorists in
search of a fresh approach to the study of war. As Jabri has argued,
“[e]ven in its most instrumental articulation, therefore, violence has a
constitutive manifestation and is hence seen as being formative of the
subject.”61 Other critics have more specifically targeted the ontogenetic
dimensions of modern liberal warfare. For example, as Dillon has
remarked, “war . . . has been directly instrumental in making the poli-
tical subjects of states and civil societies alike the very subjects that they
are . . . War forms and transforms governmental institutions and prac-
tices as it does political rationalities and civic cultures.”62 In a similar
vein, Evans takes the ontogenetic capacities of war as a starting point
for a critique of contemporary liberal ways of war: “Liberal wars are
intimately bound to the active production of political subjectivities.
59
Claudio Fogu and Wulf Kansteiner, “The Politics of Memory and the Poetics of
History,” in Richard Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner, and Claudio Fogu (eds.),
The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2006), 284–310, at 289.
60
John Gerard Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in
International Relations,” International Organization 47, no. 1 (1993): 139–74,
at 162.
61
Vivienne Jabri, War and the Transformation of Global Politics (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 12.
62
Michael J. Dillon, “Introduction: From Liberal Conscience to Liberal Rule,” in
Michael J. Dillon and Julian Reid, The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life
Live (London: Routledge, 2009), 1–13, at 8–9
Security discourses have always had a particular affinity with political

authenticity, which sets out who we are as people and defines what we
are to become.”63 Finally, in what appears to be the most succinct
statement to date, Barkawi and Brighton have argued that “war is a
generative force like no other. It is of fundamental significance for
politics, society and culture . . . War, the threat of war and the prepara-
tion for war mark the origins, transformation and end of polities.”64 As
they go on to elaborate, the “transformative effect, the capacity to
rework the reality of social and political existence, is . . . the objective
of waging war.”65 To them, the most basic element of war is fighting
broadly conceived, which produces consequences far beyond its
immediate and contingent manifestations that should be made part of
a renewed study of war. In terms of the present manifestations of this
view, I think Massumi is right to point out that the current doctrines of
preemptive war presupposes that war has the power to transform
political reality in profound ways that extend far beyond its immediate
effects.66
Yet, in contrast to the above-mentioned critics, I do not think that
this view of war should be taken at face value and used as a starting
point for a critical study of war but that it should be carefully con-
textualized and historicized with the aim of loosening its grip on our
political imagination. Rather than passing moral judgment on ontoge-
netic war and its many manifestations, I would like to suggest that a
historical inquiry into this notion of war should attend to its performa-
tive consequences in order to better understand how we got into the
present predicament that critical theorists so lament. In my effort to
explore the performative consequences of the notion of ontogenetic
war, I shall attend to its looping effects, a concept that takes some
63
Brad Evans, “The Liberal War Thesis: Introducing the Ten Key Principles of
Twenty-First-Century Biopolitical Warfare,” South Atlantic Quarterly 110, no.
3 (2011): 747–56, at 753.
64
Tarak Barkawi and Shane Brighton, “Powers of War: Fighting, Knowledge, and
Critique,” International Political Sociology 5, no. 2 (2011): 126–43, at 126. For
an interesting comment on the limitations of this view, see Astrid H. M. Nordin
and Dan Öberg, “Targeting the Ontology of War: From Clausewitz to
Baudrillard,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 43, no. 2 (2015):
392–410.
65
Barkawi and Brighton, “Powers of War,” 136.
66
Brian Massumi, Ontopower: War, Powers, and the State of Perception
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015), 1–19.
Ontogenetic War 23
tweaking to become useful in this context. The idea of looping effects

was originally introduced to capture how the grouping together of
people on the basis of some of their characteristics affects their self-
descriptions and the range of actions they can perform, as well as how
they will reconstruct their past and envision their future. When people
of a kind start thinking and acting differently as consequence of
having been lumped together and labeled in a certain way, this trans-
forms the grounds on which they initially were lumped together,
which, in turn, produces new modes of knowing that feed into further
change of the historical past and future possibilities available to
them.67
But to what extent is the notion of looping effects applicable to
concepts that subsume kinds of phenomena rather than kinds of
people? Since war is neither a natural nor a human kind, the notion
of looping effects seems not immediately suited to make sense of its
performative consequences over time. But granted that the concept
of war is used to refer to a class of phenomena, it is reasonable to
assume that the ways in which this concept is used will affect which
phenomena can thus be subsumed by telling us what war is and what
war does and what war is not and what war does not. War is thus
what we make of it through our creative tampering with the linguis-
tic conventions that govern the use of its concept. As Hacking
reminds us elsewhere, “human acts come into being hand in hand
with our invention of the ways to name them.”68 And as Winch once
pointed out, “to give an account of the meaning of a word is to
describe how it is used; and to describe how it is used is to describe
the social intercourse into which it enters.”69 Since the concept of
war has been and still is used to denote instances of organized
violence, its looping effects are confined to the ways in which war
thereby is rendered distinct from other kinds of violence and the
range of actions that can be legitimized by means of this concept by
the actors involved, since, as Goodman once cleverly stated about
the limits of what a standard constructivist account can hope to
67
Ian Hacking, “The Looping Effects of Human Kinds,” in Dan Sperber, David
Premack, and Ann James Premack (eds.), Causal Cognition: A Multi-
Disciplinary Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 351–94, esp. 366–70.
68
Hacking, Historical Ontology, 113.
69
Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy
(London: Routledge, 1958), 114–15.
achieve, “we are confined to ways of describing whatever is

described.”70
But what about the notion of ontogenetic war? Taking this view
seriously means ascribing certain predetermined looping effects to
war – such as the capacity to produce political order out of its negations
or absences – while remaining oblivious to what such attributions do to
the phenomenon of war itself. So, although I believe that we should
refrain from attributing ontogenetic capacities to anything but our-
selves, I also believe that we should recognize that the belief that some
things have ontogenetic capacities might itself be ontogenetic, but not
necessarily of what these beliefs are believed to be ontogenetic of.
Hence what matters to the present inquiry is not whether war is really
constitutive of political order or not, but the extent to which this belief
has been constitutive of the meaning of war in international thought.
Hence, taking ontogenetic attributions seriously means analyzing how
they have given rise to and reinforced the belief that war is a necessary
antidote to violence and disorder and how they have made war look as
an inescapable part of the human condition and a natural fact of
political life.
To substantiate this argument, I shall try to show how notions of
ontogenetic war have been consistently invoked in order to explain and
legitimize the existence of the modern state and the international
system by demarcating them from what went before in time and what
was outside in space, as well as by underpinning those legal frame-
works intended to regulate the intercourse of states as well as their
relations to the many others on the outside. Many of those things
whose existence has been explained with reference to the productive
force of war were later invoked to understand and legitimize the use of
force, leading to a productive circularity in our understanding of what
war possibly can mean. The limits and boundaries of the modern state
and the international system have defined the conditions under which
war is intelligible with reference only to those things that it is believed
to have constituted in the past. If war is intelligible only with reference
to these identities and boundaries, this means that if and when these
identities and boundaries are challenged – as they arguably have been
during the past decades – the modern concept of war will lose much of
its coherence and analytical purchase, and the long-repressed view of
70
Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978), 3.
Ontogenetic War 25
war as a productive force in human affairs is likely to resurface and to

inform attempts to impose political order in times and places where it is
believed to be absent, weak, or contested.
But how do we go about such an inquiry, given that the topic is
vast and the evidence scattered across many different intellectual
fields? Since my focus is on the historical ontology of war and its
looping effects across historical contexts over a long period of time, I
think some suggestions recently made by Armitage might be useful.
Whereas contextualist historians have tended to focus on the use of
political concepts within temporally quite limited contexts,
Armitage has suggested that the scope of inquiry should be broa-
dened to include comparisons across different historical contexts.
What he has aptly termed “transtemporal history” consciously
“links discrete contexts, moments and periods while maintaining
the synchronic specificity of those contexts.”71 Furthermore, the
writing of such a transtemporal history must proceed by means of
what he calls serial contextualism. Doing this takes the “reconstruc-
tion of a sequence of distinct contexts in which identifiable agents
strategically deployed existing languages to effect identifiable goals
such as legitimation and de-legitimation.”72 Following these recom-
mendations, I will focus on how war has been invoked by different
actors for the purpose of legitimizing various aspects of the modern
political order and how these strategies played themselves out within
different intellectual fields both across time as well as across differ-
ent national contexts. Yet, when doing this, I shall attend more to
the presuppositions underlying different speech acts rather than to
the rhetorical upshot of those speech acts. And given that the ambi-
tion of this book is to recover a specific conception of war rather
than to provide a fair and full account of the entire range of con-
ceptions of war that was available during the early modern and
modern periods, I will pay less attention to those views of war
that were developed in opposition to the productive view of war
71
David Armitage, “What’s the Big Idea? Intellectual History and the Longue
Durée,” History of European Ideas 38, no. 4 (2012): 493–507, at 498; David
Armitage, Jo Guldi, and Jérôme Baudry, “Le Retour de la Longue Durée: une
perspective Anglo-Américaine,” Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales 70, no. 2
(2015): 289–318.
72
Armitage, “What’s the Big Idea?,” 498.
but that have animated political and legal resistance to power

politics ever since.73
The notion of ontogenetic war is in no way confined to distinct
national contexts but traveled widely across them, as well as across
different intellectual fields. Although the productive view of war is
closely associated with the rise of nationalism, this view was intrinsi-
cally international, in the sense that its dissemination took place with-
out the slightest regard for then-emerging territorial boundaries, as
well as in the sense that it brought vague assumptions about the
existence of an international system within which war was inevitable
into being.74 This has led me to believe that Wight simply was wrong
when he lamented the absence of “a tradition of speculation about
relations between states” or when he identified this tradition with “the
kind of rumination about human destiny to which we give the unsa-
tisfactory name of philosophy of history.”75 As I will demonstrate,
there is indeed an extensive but neglected literature about war that
extends far beyond the scattered remarks made by political philoso-
phers or that was embodied in the classics of international law and the
philosophy of history. When we venture beyond the established canon
of legal and political thought, we will rediscover works that have long
been forgotten by historians of international thought but that were
widely disseminated among the political and military elites of the day
and were read and appreciated as viable guides to political action by
members of the same elites. Broadening the scope of inquiry to include
narratives produced by courtiers and royal historians, memoires writ-
ten by generals and diplomats, reports submitted by cartographers and
military engineers, pieces of advice offered by ministers and strategists,
and the commentaries provided by lawyers and philosophers, this will
indicate that to the extent that there was something meriting the label
of international theory during the early modern period, this was essen-
tially a theory about war and its productive force. Reconstructing the
assumptions of this theory makes it possible to reinterpret canonical
73
I have attempted this elsewhere; see Jens Bartelson, Visions of World
Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
74
For an interesting overview of the study of international thought, see David
Armitage, “The International Turn in Intellectual History,” in Darrin M.
McMahon and Samuel Moyn (eds.), Rethinking Modern European Intellectual
History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 232–52.
75
Martin Wight, “Why Is There No International Theory?,” International
Relations 2, no. 1 (1960): 35–48, at 35 and 48.
Understanding War 27
texts in political and legal thought by showing how their scant accounts
of war and warfare both informed and found ample support in writings
from other intellectual fields and genres from the same periods but that
have attracted less attention than have the great names of legal theory.
So, although there is an element of comparison to my analysis, I will
focus mainly on similarities across different fields and genres, some-
times downplaying their differences for the sake of maintaining a clear
focus on shared conceptualizations of war and their presuppositions
and implications.
Understanding War
But what can a historical ontology of war offer in terms of a better
understanding of the phenomenon of war? Although this book does
not directly address the causes of war, my account still has some
important implications for our attempts to explain and understand
the phenomenon of war itself. Since one upshot is to show how the
meaning attributed to war is contingent on prior conceptualizations, it
would be tempting to argue that war is but a looping effect of these
conceptualizations. When war is invoked to explain and legitimize the
existence of certain other things, this is bound to affect the conditions
under which war itself can be understood and justified. For example, as
long as we stay with conventional definitions of war as organized
violence, justifications of war will remain essential to the very enter-
prise of war. If such justifications are understood as speech acts whose
point is to command the approval of a given audience, justifications are
indeed necessary to turn what otherwise might be but random out-
bursts of violence into an organized form and thus to war proper. And
as long as we are willing to admit that justifications provided for a given
action also can be a cause of that action under certain conditions, it
would follow that an inquiry into the conditions under which war can
be justified in different situations is a necessary precursor to an under-
standing of those among its possible causes that spring directly from
human action.76
Before elaborating this further, we should note that we are very
unlikely to find in the sociopolitical world anything that has not already
76
See Donald Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” Journal of Philosophy
60, no. 23 (1963): 685–700.
been put into it by ourselves or our predecessors. To treat war as a

timeless concept or a transhistorical problem is therefore bound to lead
attempts to understand war astray. This tendency is no more evident
than in the efforts to reconstruct past thinking about war in order to
better explain its causes in the present. A good example of this is the
modern classic, Man, the State and War (1954), in which Waltz starts
out by arguing that Collingwood was wrong when he “suggested that
the best way of understanding the writings of philosophers is to seek
out the questions they were attempting to answer” and instead pro-
poses that “the best way to examine the problems of international
political theory is to pose a central question and identify the answers
that can be given to it.”77 By understanding war as a transhistorical
problem, Waltz not only sacrifices the prohibition against anachronism
on the altar of positivist explanation, but by ruling out that war might
have meant very different things to different people in different times
and places, he thereby precludes the possibility of a contextual expla-
nation of the phenomenon of war. When Waltz proceeds further to
make the variety of existing explanations of war manageable by classi-
fying them, locating the causes of war within human nature, within the
domestic makeup of states, or within the anarchic international system,
he disregards the fact that this typology would have made little or no
sense to most of the authors whose works he consulted in search for the
most edifying examples. By doing so, Waltz also fails to note that some
of these authors indeed were responsible for creating these categories
and filling them with the kind of content that made their explanations
stick and that they often did so with reference to the productive forces
of war.
Another no less sophisticated example of this tendency to recon-
struct past thinking about war from the vantage point of present
concerns is found in Ways of War and Peace (1997) by Doyle. He
opens this study by suggesting that theorists of war from Thucydides
onward “are modern in a recognizable sense” because each begins with
“the modern predicament – masterless men in modern society – and
tries to speak across history to all who share it.”78 Faced with the
uncertain outcomes of global change, Doyle then advises us to revisit
77
Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1959), 12.
78
Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 10.
Understanding War 29
these classics in search for better explanations and prescriptions to

guide us into the future. Grouping these together under the headings
of realism, liberalism, and socialism, respectively, he proposes that
these theories can offer competing but complementary guidance to
the tricky moral issues underlying decisions about war and peace
since “within this shared realization of anarchy, identities differ
according to different assumptions about the content of interests and
the meaning of institutions.”79 Yet this line of inquiry also presupposes
that war is a transhistorical problem by virtue of possessing some
timeless meaning and that theories grappling with war can be compart-
mentalized according to their assumptions about identities and inter-
ests. Pace Doyle, I argue that notions of ontogenetic war have been an
integral part of all these worldviews and that this puts a limit on the
amount of guidance they are able to offer us in the present.
Although a historical ontology of war cannot provide any good
explanation of why there is war, it can supplement existing explana-
tions by describing how the attributions of causes became possible in
the first place. Take international anarchy. As Waltz famously argued
with a little help from Rousseau, “wars occur because there is nothing
to prevent them.”80 The task of historical ontology is not to contest the
validity of this conclusion but to analyze how it acquired verisimilitude
over time. Doing this is a matter of inquiring into its historical pre-
conditions by describing the various functions attributed to war when
explaining the genesis of the modern state and the transition from a
stateless past to the modern international system. Exploring the loop-
ing effects of the notion of ontogenetic war helps us to understand how
war became the evil twin of sovereignty and why political realism
broadly conceived came to provide the best field guide to state conduct
within the international system. Or take the notion that some states are
more belligerent than others due to their domestic makeup. Although a
historical ontology of war does not purport to explain why some states
are more belligerent than others, it can help us to understand how the
historical attribution of warlike qualities to some states have condi-
tioned their internal makeup and shaped their interaction over time.
Finally, take the view that war ultimately springs from the dark side of
human nature. Again, historical ontology would have to remain agnos-
tic on this score and instead point to the fact that human hostility has
79 80
Ibid., 24. Waltz, Man, the State, and War, 232.
been consistently invoked as the ultimate cause of war long enough to

have become a self-fulfilling prophecy. But if the causes war in fact are
nothing but cumulated looping effects of the belief that war is consti-
tutive of something other than itself, my suggestion would be to aban-
don the quest for the causes of war in favor of a systematic inquiry into
how different conceptions of war have shaped the range of actions and
justifications available to actors in different contexts.
Given the failure to make good historical sense of past thinking
about war documented earlier, a return to the practices of intellectual
history would perhaps help us to avoid anachronistic reasoning of the
worst kind, but it would not automatically help us to make any better
sense of war itself.81 Doing this would require us to pursue a contextu-
alist line of inquiry one step further by studying not only how war was
conceptualized in the past but also how the different meanings of war
have affected the range of actions that possibly could be justified with
reference to this concept. A transtemporal view would allow us to make
inferences about how the range of available justifications has changed
as a consequence of underlying changes in the meaning of war. The
abandonment of the productive view of war after the end of the Second
World War is a case in point, as is its sudden return after the end of the
Cold War. Attending to the range of justifications will tell us who is
entitled to wage war, for what reasons, and under what circumstances
and under what conditions the relevant audiences are likely to accept
some justifications while rejecting others: Although a historical ontol-
ogy of war can never explain why there is war, it is a precursor to
understanding why individual wars occur.
Plan of the Book

The rest of this book is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I describe
how war came to be understood as a transhistorical and ontogenetic
state of affairs by early modern historians and how this notion trans-
muted into a recognizably modern notion of international anarchy. By
focusing on the function of war in early modern and modern historical
writing, I argue that this concept informs historical narratives of states
and their emergence by dividing historical time into a stateless past and
81
Robin G. Collingwood, An Autobiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1939).
Plan of the Book 31
a statist present so that an international state of war is made to appear

the natural correlate of state making. I end this chapter by describing
what happens to the state of war when grafted onto theories of evolu-
tion and natural selection in early sociology, arguing that this goes
some way to explain why the notion of ontogenetic war was so thor-
oughly discredited and repressed after the end of the two world wars. In
Chapter 3, I explore some of the functions attributed to war in the
creation of territories and the demarcation of boundaries between
states in Europe, as well as between the European system of states
and its non-European and stateless outside. Contesting the constructi-
vist consensus on this issue, I argue that the process of territorial
demarcation and unification was informed by and legitimized with
reference to an ever-present possibility of war and domestic turmoil. I
end by describing how these violent geographic imaginaries later
blended with theories of natural selection and issued a generous license
for imperial expansion and geopolitical competition during the late
nineteenth century. In Chapter 4, I explore the functions attributed to
human hostility and violence in some of the classics of international
law, arguing that the attempt to restrict the use of force by means of law
presupposes the prior existence of hostility among men and the con-
comitant possibility of discriminating between regular and irregular
forms of violence. The propensity for irregular violence was initially
projected backward in time onto a barbarous past in order to justify the
use of force against threats to the legal order, such as pirates and
brigands, thereby allowing for the legal regulation of violence between
sovereigns. I end by arguing that when blended with doctrines of legal
evolution, this notion of natural hostility was projected outward in
space in order to legitimize the use of force against non-European
peoples on the grounds that these peoples were predisposed to irregular
forms of violence. In the concluding chapter, I discuss the recent return
of the notion of ontogenetic war and its consequences for our under-
standing of allegedly new forms of war and warfare in world politics,
arguing that its influence has been most strongly felt in the shifting
legitimizations of military intervention after the end of the Cold War
but that it then has been disseminated in the international system.
Discussing the role of state weakness and failure in these legitimiza-
tions, I show how notions of ontogenetic war have informed recent
justifications of humanitarian intervention and nation-building and
how this has provoked similar responses from those who dispute the
legitimacy of these policies and the ambitions they reflect. I end by

pointing out that since some critics of war themselves subscribe to
notions of ontogenetic war, they cannot hope to provide contemporary
attempts to restrain the use of force with any solid moral or legal
foundation. This raises important questions about limits of critical
inquiry in international thought, questions that I briefly address toward
the end.
2 The State of War
Introduction
According to a contested commonplace of historical sociology, “War
made the state, and the state made war.”1 On this view, the state is the
outcome of violent competition between groups in society. As Weber
famously argued, “having established the monopoly of physical vio-
lence as a means of rule within a territory,” the state can then freely
deploy its capacity for organized violence against other states.2 By the
same token, according to what has long been a common and no less
contested view within academic international relations, relations
between states are best characterized as a state of war. On this view,
wars between states occur because there is no political authority in the
international system there to prevent them from breaking out.3
1
Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” in Charles
Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1975), 3–83, at 42; Charles Tilly, “War Making and
State Making as Organized Crime,” in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer,
and Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), 169–87; Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European
States AD 990–1990 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); Thomas Ertman, Birth of
the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Anthony Giddens, The
Nation-State and Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). For a
critical discussion, see Steven Gunn, “War and the Emergence of the State:
Western Europe, 1350–1600,” in Frank Tallett and D. J. B. Trim (eds.),
European Warfare 1350–1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010),
50–73.
2
Max Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” in Peter Lassman and
Ronald Spiers (eds.), Max Weber: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), 309–69, at 316.
3
See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical
Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Kenneth N. Waltz,
Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979). For an
ambitious restatement, see R. Harrison Wagner, War and the State: The Theory
of International Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007).
33
34 The State of War
As Suganami has summarized the bottom line of those views, “if the
practice of sovereignty is a sufficient condition of the possibility of
arbitrary violence . . . it follows . . . that the possibility of arbitrary
violence is a necessary condition of the practice of sovereignty.”4 And,
as I argued earlier, there is indeed a double bind between sovereign
authority and the use of force insofar as claims to political authority
have been legitimized with reference to the violence that would ensue in
its absence, while the use of force has consistently been justified with
reference to sovereign authority.5 But how did this double bind between
the state and war come into being, and how did it become a crucial
presupposition of historical sociology and academic international rela-
tions? These are the questions that will guide this chapter. As I shall
argue, the double bind between war and the state is a result of a tendency
within European historiography to explain the emergence of the state
and the international system with reference to a state of war. From the
beginning of the seventeenth to the end of the nineteenth century, the
concept of war – however defined and understood – was used to define
the temporal limits of states and the international realm by demarcating
them from what allegedly existed before. Although the meanings
ascribed to war varied considerably during this period, and although
historical consciousness underwent substantial mutations during the
same period, the attribution of ontogenetic functions to war represents
a striking continuity that stretches from early modern historians of states
to late nineteenth-century sociology. By focusing on the accounts of state
formation that were widely disseminated and read by contemporary
political elites in Europe, I will show how the double bind between
war and the state was forged historically and how it informed and
legitimized practices of state formation during this period. This means
that when the mantra that war made the state and the state made war is
repeated today, it might be the case that its apparent validity is nothing
more than a result of its looping effects, since many of those who were
involved in the making of states did so with cruder versions of this
mantra firmly in mind.
4
Hidemi Suganami, “Understanding Sovereignty through Kelsen/Schmitt,”
Review of International Studies 33, no. 3 (2007): 511–30, at 529.
5
Jens Bartelson, “Double Binds: Sovereignty and the Just War Tradition,” in Hent
Kalmo and Quentin Skinner (eds.), Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present
and Future of a Contested Concept (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010), 81–95.
Introduction 35
The intellectual obsession with war during this period is puzzling

because it has frequently been portrayed as period of pacification and
domestication. As Foucault pointed out, almost at the same time when
the institutions of war were concentrated in the hands of the state and
private warfare was abolished in favor of war between states, we wit-
nessed the emergence of a historical and political discourse according to
which society is constituted by conflicts; “we are therefore at war with
one another; a battlefront runs through the whole of society, continu-
ously and permanently, and it is this battlefront that puts us all on one
side or the other.”6 While I am in broad agreement with Foucault that
such imaginaries of war emerged simultaneously with the rise of the state
in Europe, I would like to expand on his account in two ways. First, I
think that we should pay more attention to the meaning and function of
war in these imaginaries. Since Foucault implies that war has meant more
or less the same across different contexts, he presupposes what has to be
explained, namely, how this particular conception of war emerged and
how it came to structure historical consciousness. Doing this, I would like
to suggest that such violent imaginaries were much more pervasive than
indicated by his account. To Foucault, the paradigmatic expression of
such violent conflict is the clash of races, so “the conflictual relationship
that that exists between the two groups that constitute the social body
and shapes the state is in fact one of war, of permanent warfare. The State
is nothing more than the way that the war between the two groups
continues to be waged in apparently peaceful forms.”7 But rather than
being restricted to the struggle between races within societies, however, I
would like to suggest that such imaginaries involved a much wider range
of collective subjects and were invoked to account for their identities.
Finally, whereas Foucault’s account is built on a rather sharp contrast
between notions of struggle and war, on the one hand, and legalistic
conceptions of sovereignty, on the other, I would like to argue that war
finds its ultimate warrant in the quest for sovereignty and that this quest
was frequently justified with reference to the violence that would ensue in
the absence of supreme authority within the social body.
Second, I think that Foucault neglects a crucial aspect of the function of
war in early modern political and historical writing. When he tries to show
how the state emerges out of a continuous struggle between groups,
6
Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended (New York: Picador, 2003), 51.
7
Ibid., 88.
36 The State of War
Foucault takes the existence of temporally demarcated societies for

granted. Yet, as I will suggest below, the concept of war was crucial in
providing states and societies with their temporal limits. Early modern
accounts of war and the state are not primarily or exclusively concerned
with the legitimacy of particular forms of government but more often
invoke a state of war in order to constitute the temporal limits of individual
states in relation to their past. What is at stake in early modern histories of
the state is to explain a how a given state came into being as a result of
warfare, as a consequence of battles and conquests; how its population
gradually evolved into a people as a result of invasions, expulsions, and
subjugations; and how the state came into itself as a result of rebellions,
usurpations, and revolutions against a feudal or barbarous past. Thus, if
war indeed can be said to have made the state, this is because warfare
already was understood as being necessary to the constitution of states in
historical time, in relation to their own troubled past as well as to that of
their neighbors. Thus, expanding on the accounts by Fasolt and Davis, I
argue that notions of war and warfare have been integral to the very
practices of periodization that made it possible to distinguish between
states and premodern forms of political association and use that distinction
to arrange different forms of political association in sequences ranging
from the primitive to the more advanced and civilized. In other words,
this is partly a story of how the “Middle Ages” was assembled out of
myths of a violent past.8
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, I
describe how emergent conceptions of war and history during the late
sixteenth century paved the way for the rise of new forms of historical
writing that took particular states as their primary objects of inquiry.
I then provide a few examples of how the relationship between war
and the state was understood in some widely read treatises from the
seventeenth century. In the next section, I describe how themes from
these narratives found their way into Enlightenment histories of
progress and civilization and how war came to be understood as
the not-so-gentle civilizer of nations in the process. In the final sec-
tion, I describe how these narratives blended with theories of evolu-
tion and natural selection and gave rise to theories of race struggle so
8
See Constantin Fasolt, The Limits of History (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2004); Kathleen Davis, Periodization and Sovereignty: How Ideas of
Feudalism and Secularization Govern the Politics of Time (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
War and the Immemorial 37
dear to early social theory and sociology but so fatal to the modern
world.
War and the Immemorial

Although we have grown accustomed to thinking of the state as the
outcome of warfare, there is nothing new about this idea. Rather, as I
argue in this section, such notions emerged in the early seventeenth
century when new conceptions of war and new ways of understanding
the past blended into new modes of historical writing that became pre-
occupied with the formation of particular political communities. From
this point onward, reference to an ontogenetic and transhistorical state of
war becomes the most common explanation for the emergence of parti-
cular states, as well as for the formation of an international arena char-
acterized by intense rivalries between states.
Let us start with the concept of war. According to a widespread view,
before war became a prerogative of sovereigns, no two parties could be
equally justified in their resort to violence because the justness of one’s
cause implied the necessary injustice of that of the adversary. In the
medieval “just war” tradition, war was widely conceptualized as an act
of law enforcement between morally unequal parties through which
legitimate authorities could impose law on their subjects and punish
evildoers for their transgressions of these laws.9 This implied that no
sharp distinction between war and peace could be drawn, whether in
theory or in practice. Since war was understood as an action under-
taken by some legitimate authority with the aim of enforcing the law, it
could well coexist with peaceful and orderly conduct among those not
targeted for correction. Yet this unilateral conception of war gradually
gave way to a bilateral one, according to which both belligerents could
be equally justified in their resort to force. Drawing on Ulpian, civic
humanists revived the Roman conception according to which war
could be equally just on both sides. A first step in this direction had
been taken by Fulgosius, who in his In primam Pandectarum partem
Commentaria (c. 1400) argued that in the absence of any superior legal
authority that could decide on the justness of their cause, belligerents
9
See Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 7–82; James Turner Johnson,
Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981).
38 The State of War
had an equal right to fight precisely by virtue of being independent of

any legal or moral authority.10 On this view, war becomes less a matter
of law enforcement and more akin to a duel between moral equals stuck
in a condition devoid of objective right, a state of war.
The gradual acceptance of this view had profound implications for the
grounds on which war could be fought and justified. In the absence of any
shared and authoritative source of legal judgment, war becomes the final
arbiter of conflict and hence also justifiable on grounds that it serves the
causes of the political community, or at least parts thereof. So from the
legal equality of belligerents follows the possibility of harnessing war for
ends other than law enforcement and punishment, and although the
nature of those ends could vary significantly, this shift implied that war
could be used as a means to realize them. As Machiavelli states in the
Preface to his Arte Della Guerra (1519–20), “For all the arts that are
ordered in city for the sake of the common good of men, all the orders
made there for living in fear of the laws of God, would be in vain if their
defenses were not prepared.”11 The common good could be defined in
terms of protection against external enemies and the preservation of
domestic order but could also easily be stretched to include imperial
aggrandizement and military glory.12
Since then, we have grown accustomed to regard war as a preroga-
tive of sovereigns stuck in a condition devoid of common authority. In
the absence of such authority, war becomes a natural condition of
politics involving all parties in a constant test of strength believed to
be the final arbiter of the moral and legal legitimacy of their claims.
With no other method for resolving disputes at hand, “war was
accepted as integral to the conduct of relationships between polities;
all polities faced a struggle to maintain their relative position in what
10
See Ryan Greenwood, “War and Sovereignty in Medieval Roman Law,” Law
and History Review 32, no. 1 (2014): 31–63; Gregory M. Reichberg, “Just War
and Regular War: Competing Paradigms,” in David Rodin and Henry Shue
(eds.), Just and Unjust Warriors: Moral Equality on the Battlefield (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008), 193–213.
11
Niccolò Machiavelli, The Art of War, trans. Christopher Lynch (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2003), 4.
12
See Maurizio Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State: The Acquisition and
Transformation of the Language of Politics 1250–1600 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992); Mikael Hörnqvist, “Machiavelli’s Three
Desires: Florentine Republicans on Liberty, Empire, and Justice,” in Sankar
Muthu (ed.), Empire and Modern Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012), 7–29.
was a cut-throat environment.”13 As we shall see in this section, to

conceptualize war as a default condition of political life implied that it
was perceived to be beyond the full control of individual rulers and
their policies but also that it could be harnessed for the purposes of
making and preserving states. In the words of one eminent military
historian, prior to the modern period, “war created policy rather than
continued it.”14 Against this backdrop, it would hardly make sense to
posit any distinction between civil and international wars, since war-
fare was widely believed to be the very means by which a distinction
between the domestic and international realms could be drawn in
practice.
So although it would be equally anachronistic to speak of a recog-
nizably modern concept of the state at this point in time, I think it is
possible to argue that such a conception emerges as a consequence of
sustained efforts to harness the impersonal forces of war for the pur-
poses of statecraft. If war has the power to pass verdicts on the actions
of rulers, it has also the power to make or break states. As the Habsburg
general Montecuccoli summarized his vast experiences of war in his
Mémoires (1703), “Battles give Crowns and take them away, resolves
disputes between Sovereigns without appeal, conclude the war and
render the conqueror immortal.”15 And as he went on to elaborate
the implications of a state of war among European states, “no State can
be at peace, ward off attacks, defend its Laws, its Religion without
Arms . . . its majesty will not be respected without them, neither among
its subjects, nor among Foreigners.”16 If warfare indeed is a default
condition of politics, the task of rulers is to harness its productive
potentials for the singular purpose of creating and maintaining their
states. Thus, in a widely read treatise titled Tesoro Politico (1589),
Comino Ventura could persuasively argue that the foundation of the
“machine of the state” lies in the systematic use of force both as an
instrument of internal domination and to protect the state from foreign
violence. Since wars are likely to occur anyway, or so Ventura believed,
13
Frank Tallett and D. J. B. Trim, “‘Then was then and now is now’: an overview
of change and continuity in late-medieval and early modern warfare,” in Frank
Tallett and D. J. B. Trim (eds.), European Warfare 1350–1750 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1–26, at 22.
14
George Clark, War and Society in the 17th Century (Cambridge: Cambridge
15
Raimundo Montecuccoli, Mémoires (Paris: Muzier, 1712), 183.
16
Ibid., 76.
40 The State of War
it is a matter of prudence on behalf of the ruler to avoid the occurrence

of internal rebellions and foreign war at the same time. To maintain a
relative state of peace within their states, rulers have to face a peculiar
tradeoff: while mobilizing resources for the conduct of foreign war
easily leads to grievances at home that might issue in domestic rebel-
lion, failing to mobilize against external enemies might subject the state
to defeat and ruin at the hands of foreigners.17 Consequently, it was
possible to argue that foreign wars sometimes were necessary to detract
attention from domestic problems. As Courtilz de Sandras argued, it is
a maxim of statecraft to always have some foreign war going on in
order to avoid internal strife and to keep up the martial spirit among
subjects.18
By the same token, while it would seem no less anachronistic to speak
of nationalism in a modern sense during the early modern period, the
constant possibility of war was frequently invoked in the construction of
rudimentary notions of national identity, which then were fed into con-
temporary justifications of war. As Hirschi has recently pointed out,
while the symbolic legacy of the Roman Empire was still very much
alive and widely shared among European elites, the obvious mismatch
between the imperial ideal of a single hegemonic power and the actual rise
of territorial states gave rise not only to a quest for supremacy among
them but also to attempts to reappropriate this symbolic legacy in order
to justify claims to supremacy with reference to superior national char-
acters.19 As Hirschi goes on to explain, “in a world of nations, one needs
to have an idea of how other nations see themselves in order to char-
acterize oneself.”20 Thus early modern varieties of nationalism emerged
in the context of rivaling claims to uniqueness and grandeur, each capi-
talizing on the same Roman legacy and each being formed in opposition
to the other. Accordingly, as Ventura observed, “not only are the customs
of Nations different, but often also opposed.”21
Finally, while it would be historically inaccurate to speak of an inter-
national system during this period, efforts to achieve domestic order with
17
Comino Ventura, Trésor Politique (Paris: Nicolas de Fossé, 1608), 1–23.
18
Gatien Courtilz de Sandras, Nouveaux Interets des Princes de L’Europe
(Cologne: Pierre Marteau, 1686), 158–9.
19
Caspar Hirschi, The Origins of Nationalism: An Alternative History from
Ancient Rome to Early Modern Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2012), 34–49.
20
Ibid., 39. 21 Ventura, Trésor Politique, 13.
violent means eventually resulted in the emergence of something akin to

an international arena. Although lacking many of the characteristics we
have come to associate with a modern international system or interna-
tional society, this arena emerged as a consequence of territorial contests
and relentless efforts at expansion. Whereas Renaissance warfare had
been a local or regional affair at most, the geographic scope of early
modern warfare expanded, as did the number of parties involved and the
range of their strategic ambitions. As de Vries has shown, what was
peculiar to early modern warfare was that the security of states increas-
ingly depended on their ability to formulate strategies that spanned vast
geographic areas and long periods of time and to implement those visions
by projecting military power across equally vast stretches of time and
space.22
Hence, when insights from the geographic and cartographic revolu-
tions of the sixteenth century began to penetrate military and strategic
thinking, it resulted in popular geopolitical guidebooks such as the
Relazioni Universali (1591–8) by Giovanni Botero and Les Estats,
Empires, Royaumes et Principautes du Monde (1625) by Pierre d’Avity.
The geographic scope of these books extended far beyond the European
continent into hitherto underexplored parts of the world. But whereas
Botero is focused primarily on the Christian world and its relations with
outside actors, d’Avity sets out to compare every known polity, from the
great powers and the tiniest principalities in Europe to the most distant
kingdoms of the Orient, providing thick, if often fanciful, descriptions of
their geography, climate, customs, wealth, government, military capabil-
ity, and religion, all in order to assess their relative power and to pass
judgment on their foreign policies.23
In the next section, I attempt to provide some nuance to the transition
from war as a method of law enforcement to idea of war as productive
22
Kelly de Vries, “Warfare and the International System,” in Frank Tallett and
D. J. B. Trim (eds.), European Warfare 1350–1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge
23
Giovanni Botero, Relazioni Universali (Venice: Appresso Giorgio Angelieri,
1599); Pierre D’Avity, Les Estats, Empires, Royaumes et Principautes du
Monde (Paris: Pierre Chevalier, 1625). For analyses of Botero, see John M.
Headley, “Geography and Empire in the Late Renaissance: Botero’s
Assignment, Western Universalism, and the Civilizing Process,” Renaissance
Quarterly 53, no. 4 (2000): 1119–55; Joan-Pau Rubiés, “Oriental Despotism
and European Orientalism: Botero to Montesquieu,” Journal of Early Modern
History 9, nos. 1–2 (2005): 109–80.
42 The State of War
force in human affairs. As I argue, war – both as a state of things and as a

mode of intercourse – was widely believed to be constitutive of states,
nations, and the international arena. Appeals to a state of war and war as
an activity were crucial to the framing of states as independent actors, to
the concomitant construction of nations as distinct and unique, and to the
creation of an international arena in which states could perform and
interact. Much of this depended on practices of historical rewriting,
through which a boundless state of war could be projected backward in
time to explain how individual states had first emerged and entered the
international arena by virtue of their ability to overcome internal and
external threats to their existence. What was buried in the past was
therefore also very much present in the present, as well as conversely.
Yet this backward projection of a state of war would hardly have been
possible without some prior changes in historical consciousness. Roughly
at the same time as the concept of war was being redefined along these
lines, European historiography underwent a corresponding transition
that greatly facilitated the backward projection of the state of war. As
Pocock has famously shown, the medieval concern with universal and
timeless preconditions of political community was then superseded by a
new focus on particular communities and their ability to withstand the
corrosive influence of time and change.24 Whereas the great Renaissance
histories of Machiavelli and Guicciardini had assumed that historical
events would recur in cycles, much early modern historical scholarship
was informed by a quest for unbroken historical continuities that could
be used to support or debunk particular claims to political authority.
Because such claims were often justified with reference to purportedly
timeless and immutable principles of reason and nature, those who
wanted to defend their privileges and liberties against incursions by
royal authority had to argue that since these latter were founded in
ancient customs and fundamental laws of the realm, no ruler could ever
legitimately amend or revoke them. Those who wanted to resist absolutist
claims of authority often sought support in historical narratives in order
to demonstrate that some precious political and legal institutions indeed
antedated the rise of sovereign authority and were rooted in immemorial
customs that no king could ever alter. In France, this change took place in
24
J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and
the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1975), 3–80.
the context of religious warfare, with Huguenot writers asserting ancient

rights and liberties with reference to the age-old institutions of popular
sovereignty.25 In England, authors such as Coke asserted the legal primacy
of common law and the power of parliament against royal sovereignty
and the arbitrary exercise of power through a recourse to historical
tradition, a notion that later provided the ideological basis for a violent
overthrow of the monarchy.26
The treatment law in these historical accounts was often paradoxical.
On the one hand, the appeal to custom could be taken to entail that law is
in constant change, as a consequence of the need to adapt customs to ever-
changing circumstances. On the other hand, references to custom could be
taken to imply that fundamental laws were unchanging and had remained
the same since time immemorial. In either case, however, these laws were
thought to be beyond the scope of sovereign intervention and thereby also
thought to constitute effective bridles on its exercise.27 Much of this
scholarship emerged in opposition to other tendencies in early modern
political and legal thought. In contrast to theories of sovereignty that
sought to justify sovereign authority in abstract and contractual terms,
legal histories were written with the more or less explicit intention to
support or debunk particular claims to authority but had little, if anything,
to say about the sources of sovereignty and its legitimacy in general
terms.28 Furthermore, in contrast to attempts to deduce universal princi-
ples of political order from Stoic notions of human reason and sociability,
these histories explain the formation of states in terms of violent conflicts
about the content of their fundamental laws, often in opposition to the
timeless categories of natural law.29
25
Michael Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical
Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); Donald R. Kelley,
Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship: Language, Law, and History in
the French Renaissance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).
26
See J. G. A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of
English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987), 30–55; Harold J. Berman, “The Origins of Historical
Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale,” Yale Law Journal 103, no. 7 (1994): 1651–
738, esp. 1686–94.
27
Pocock, Ancient Constitution, 36.
28
Harro Höpfl and Martyn P. Thompson, “The History of Contract as a Motif in
Political Thought,” American Historical Review 84, no. 4 (1979): 919–44.
29
Martyn P. Thompson, “The History of Fundamental Law in Political Thought
from the French Wars of Religion to the American Revolution,” American
Historical Review 91, no. 5 (1986): 1103–28.
44 The State of War
If appeals to unbroken historical continuities were a source of poli-

tical legitimacy, claims to absolute sovereignty were nothing but
attempts to usurp the rights and liberties that had existed since time
immemorial. As Pocock has summarized the efforts to trace the origin
of fundamental laws and constitutions back into a distant past in order
to endow them with immunity from royal interference, “the concept of
the immemorial encouraged the fabrication of myths about immensely
remote times, and the fact that the appeal to early national history took
the form of partisan controversy between sovereign and constitution
enhanced this tendency.”30 Following this appeal to the immemorial,
“laws must be either absolutely immemorial or subject to an absolute
sovereign.”31
Since this kind of historiography projected the concerns of the present
back onto a distant and mythic past in search for legitimacy, it thereby
presupposed that national traditions of constitutional and political devel-
opment were distinct and continuous. This entailed that any disruptions
those traditions had undergone could be twisted into evidence of prior
usurpations and thus be used to contest the legitimacy of royal authority in
the present. Wars of conquest were paradigmatic instances of such dis-
ruptions, and their consequences for constitutional continuity and the
legitimacy of royal authority were hotly contested during the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. In England, the Norman Conquest was a recur-
ring source of political and legal discord in which the rights of the people
and parliament were pitted against those of the king. While Coke held that
common law antedated the arrival of the Normans, he also maintained
that the institutions introduced by them formed part of law by virtue of
having been confirmed by William the Conqueror. This was later vehe-
mently disputed by the Levellers, to whom the very idea of common law
was but an offspring of the Conquest and hence nothing but a usurpation
of the ancient liberties of the Anglo-Saxon peoples.32 In France, the
conquest of Gaul by the Franks performed a similar function in political
historiography. To Huguenot historians, the invasion by the Franks was
in effect a war of liberation from the legacy of Roman absolutism, which
helped restore continuity to France and produced a sense of national
30
Pocock, Ancient Constitution, 19. 31 Ibid., 52.
32
R. B. Seaberg, “The Norman Conquest and the Common Law: The Levellers
and the Argument from Continuity,” The Historical Journal 24, no. 4 (1981):
791–806.
From the State of War to the State 45
identity.33 For example, to Boulainvilliers, although the Frankish conquest

of Gaul signified liberation from the Roman yoke, it also marked a happy
resurrection of the aristocratic values of a German warrior culture.34
Yet, in all these examples, violent conflict is systematically invoked
to contest the monopolization of political authority in the hands of a
single sovereign, as well as to account for the constitution of cohesive
societies that could raise more legitimate claims to authority by virtue
of the historical continuity of their customs and traditions. But, as such,
these accounts remain firmly focused on what had taken place within
societies rather than with how those societies had come into being in
the first place and how they had been demarcated in relation to their
own tumultuous past as well as to their neighbors. In short, while the
preceding accounts indicate the rise of a new historical consciousness
that takes armed struggle as the organizing principle of historical
writing in order to debunk royal claims to sovereignty, they had little
to say about the temporal origins and limits of states and their relations
to other states.
From the State of War to the State

During the later part of the seventeenth century, the quest for the
immemorial issues in a new form of historiography that is supportive
of royal sovereignty and statehood. Reflecting the concerns of secular
statecraft, some historians now begin to narrate histories of individual
states in terms of an imagined or desired congruence between sover-
eigns, nations, and territories into what we retrospectively have come
to consider modern states. What is at stake in this kind of historiogra-
phy is not the question of whether particular authority claims raised by
kings, nobles, and popular assemblies are legitimate or not, but to what
extent states – despite their sometimes profound internal divisions and
questionable historical continuity – can be said to exist independently
of their rulers and ruled and, by implication, whether they are able to act
autonomously in an emergent international arena and attain legal per-
sonality in the eyes of international lawyers.35 The task at hand was thus
33
Zachary Sayre Schiffman, “An Anatomy of the Historical Revolution in
Renaissance France,” Renaissance Quarterly 42, no. 3 (1989): 507–33.
34
See Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 144–65.
35
See, for example, Ben Holland, The Moral Person of the State: Pufendorf,
Sovereignty and Composite Polities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
46 The State of War
to reconstruct the past of individual states in such a way that temporal

discontinuities and moments of internal discord could be rearranged into
a progressive sequences taking us from its primitive and violent origins in
the past into its full unity and splendor in the present. As such, these
historians were in the process of creating new practices of periodization,
insofar as they had to reconstruct the past of states in ways that made that
past clearly distinguishable from the present.
But in order to write histories of such dubious entities as states,
nations, and their territories, these entities must be taken to exist in
the first place, albeit in some rudimentary or embryonic form. During
the early modern period, such entities were very much works in
progress, calling for rigorous definitions and careful distinction
from other forms of political association.36 Hence, in the kind of
historiography we will consider shortly, states are demarcated from a
distant past when the conditions of their existence were more uncer-
tain – when they lacked a locus of sovereign authority, fixed popula-
tions, and territorial boundaries – in order to make credible that even
despite all these apparent historical discontinuities and the recurrent
threats to their temporal continuity represented by conquests and
usurpations, each individual state remains essentially the same across
time precisely by virtue of the constant contestation of its sovereignty
and its territorial integrity and the shifting composition of its popu-
lation. To this end, it seemed necessary to assume that states had been
constituted through a constant rivalry between primordial groups
stuck in a state of war since time immemorial.
In contrast to the histories of law and government discussed in the
preceding section, these histories of states could capitalize on themes
and concepts salient in contemporary natural law and universal history
without much contradiction being felt between them. Assumptions
about social antagonism, human sociability, and stages of human
development that had been used to justify the existence of sovereign
authority in theories of natural law could now be used to reconstruct
2017); Jens Bartelson, “Sovereignty and the Personality of the State,” in Robert
Schuett and Peter M. R. Stirk (eds.), The Concept of the State in International
Relations: Philosophy, Sovereignty, and Cosmopolitanism (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 81–107; Quentin Skinner, “A Genealogy of
the Modern State,” in Proceedings of the British Academy 162 (2009): 325–70.
36
For this point, see Annabel S. Brett, Changes of State: Nature and the Limits of
the City in Early Modern Natural Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2011).
the historical trajectory of actually existing states, provided that they

were reinterpreted as empirical assumptions and then allowed to
structure the available historical evidence accordingly. What counted
as admissible historical evidence was, in turn, somewhat circularly
determined by pointing to the extent to which it could be used to
corroborate these conjectural accounts or not. Rather than being
written in opposition to the abstract justifications of sovereignty
provided by Grotius or Hobbes, much of this historiography can be
understood as a means to substantiate these justifications with
“empirical” evidence. The appeal to reason and nature that was
used during this period to back claims to sovereignty was thereby
supplemented with historical narratives that purported to show that
the violent origin of states was not merely a fiction invented to
demonstrate the necessity of sovereign authority but also had a very
real basis in the prehistory of each state. By implication, to question
the legitimacy of sovereign authority was tantamount to inviting that
prehistory right back into the present, with all the violence and dis-
order this would bring.
Yet what had antedated the formation of states, and what would
most likely return in their absence, was not a simple bellum omni
contra omnes with individuals fighting each other out of fear or
pride. Since there was no historical evidence to support the idea that
individuals had ever coexisted in such a sordid condition, the starting
point was that men had banded together into primordial groups glued
together by kinship and paternal authority and that these groups then
had entered into bellicose relations for reasons of passion and expe-
diency. Because kinship was thought to be the basis of these groups, the
preoccupation with race in the archaic sense of this term came naturally
to many early modern historians. So roughly at the same point in time
when Boulainvilliers turned to history to defend aristocratic privilege
against royal claims to sovereignty, the latter claims had already found
ample support in a new kind of historiography that portrayed royal
sovereignty and state formation as the natural outcomes of wars fought
successfully against the enemies of the state, a category to which those
parts of the nobility that Boulainvilliers so valiantly defended certainly
counted. Hence there was no longer any need to invoke mythological-
lawgivers such as a Solon or a Lycurgus to account for the origin of
individual states. When the immemorial had been equated with a general
state of war, there were no ancient customs or fundamental laws left
48 The State of War
uncontaminated by brute force to which those who wanted to dispute

royal claims could appeal. History was war all the way down.
The theoretical principles governing this kind of historical writing were
derived from what I earlier termed the analysis of interests.37 Integral to
this analysis was the idea that the politics is, or at least ought to be,
governed by strict considerations of self-interest rather than being moti-
vated by religious zeal or blind passion.38 As Rohan argued in his De
l’interest des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté (1643), “princes command
the people and interest commands princes,” and since “knowledge of this
interest is as much elevated above that of the actions of princes, as they are
above the peoples,” then identifying and sticking to rational interest
become imperative to the survival and flourishing of princes and their
states.39 The aim of this analysis was to infer maxims from the past that
could be used to benchmark state conduct in the present. Since the inter-
ests of a given state were thought to include its security, reputation, and
wealth, and since these were believed to vary according to the geopolitical
situation and form of government of each state, knowledge of these
factors was believed to be an important requirement for rational action
in domestic and foreign politics during the early modern period.40
Thus the rather loose precepts of “Reason of State” found in Botero
and Ventura now morphed into what was to become the foundational
principle of state historiography during the modern period, namely, that
political actors were and always had been primarily motivated by their
self-interest. Given that the principle of self-interest itself was supposed to
be valid across time and space, it furnished not only a viable guide to the
37
Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995), 154–85.
38
See, for example, J. A. W. Gunn, “‘Interest Will Not Lie’: A Seventeenth-
Century Political Maxim,” Journal of the History of Ideas 29, no. 4 (1968):
551–64; J. A. W. Gunn, Politics and the Public Interest in the Seventeenth
Century (London: Routledge, 1969); William Farr Church, Richelieu and
Reason of State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972); Albert O.
Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism
before Its Triumph (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977).
39
Henri Duc de Rohan, De l’Interest des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté (Paris:
Augustin Courbé, 1643), 1. Rohan’s text was widely imitated during the
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, yet sometimes with value added. See,
for example, Anon., Interests et Maximes des Princes et des États Souverains
(Cologne, 1666); Jean Rousset, Les Interets Presens des Puissances de l’Europe
(La Haye, 1734).
40
Ryan Walter, “The Analysis of Interest and the History of Economic Thought,”
Parergon 28, no. 2 (2011): 129–47.
conduct of states in the present but also provided a recipe for histor-
ical writing insofar as the past of states could be reconstructed as the
outcome of prior clashes between self-interested actors. The analysis
of interest thereby made it possible to narrate the history of each state
as a process of individuation propelled by perpetual conflicts of
interest and shifting patterns of friendship and enmity. But since the
notion of self-interest only can claim to have explanatory power in a
world populated by other equally self-interested parties, it also
brought a change in the criteria for what counted as valid historical
knowledge. Since self-interested actors presumably speak and act
according to their interest, their words and actions must be inter-
preted accordingly. What actors say about themselves cannot be
taken at face value but must be seen as clever attempts to promote
and conceal their claims to power, and what actors say about others
are no less clever attempts to delegitimize their claims to power. Thus
the analysis of interests furnishes the seed values of what later was to
be known as source criticism, since it allows the historian to evaluate
statements as inherently partisan and thus base his or her own claims
to historical truth on a juxtaposition or triangulation of such state-
ments. Yet claims to an unbiased historical truth were by no means
innocent, not only because they served to legitimize claims to power
but also because they helped naturalize the state of war as a produc-
tive and inescapable condition of political life.
If the earliest examples of this mode of historical writing still owed
much to the exemplary historiography of the Renaissance, it grew more
sophisticated as the analysis of interest was brought to bear on avail-
able historical records and sources and allowed them to be organized in
accordance with its principles. In this process, the initial preoccupation
with the history of particular states gradually gives way to more of a
comparative perspective, with a growing focus on the relations
between states rather than on their inner characteristics. While most
of these comparative histories were devoted to the major players on the
European scene and their relations, some of them purported to cover
polities outside the European context as well.41
41
For a similar perspective on the role of historiography in the formation of states
and the international system, see Richard Devetak, “Historiographical
Foundations of Modern International Thought: Histories of the European
States-System from Florence to Göttingen,” History of European Ideas 41, no. 1
(2015): 62–77.
50 The State of War
Perhaps the foremost and most systematic exponent of this mode of

historical writing is Samuel von Pufendorf. While he is widely known
for his contributions to natural law and the law of nations, his histor-
ical works have received less scholarly attention. Written during his
appointment as a court historian in Stockholm, they were translated
into numerous languages and widely read as viable guides to European
great power politics well into the eighteenth century.42 True to the
methodological principles described earlier, von Pufendorf felt no con-
tradiction between his ambition to write in a style at once impersonal
and impartial in order to uncover the truth from authentic sources
while simultaneously purporting to interpret and express the motives
of the states whose history he wrote.
As von Pufendorf writes in the Preface of his Einleitung zu der Historie
der vornehmsten Reiche und Staaten, so itziger Zeit in Europa sich
befinden (1682), “he who has no Relish for History, is very unlikely to
make any great Progress in the Way of Knowledge.”43 He then criticizes
the contemporary focus on ancient history in favor of the “considerable
Advantage it is to understand the Modern History as well as of our
Native Country, as of its neighbouring Nations.”44 In order to provide
the reader with valid historical knowledge of the past of each individual
state and its relations with other states, von Pufendorf sets out to describe
the “good and bad qualifications of each Nation . . . [and] what concerns
the Nature, Strength and Weakness of each Country, and its form of
Government.”45 To this end, he introduces a distinction between the
imaginary and the real interests of states. Whereas the former “consists
in such things as cannot be performed without disquieting and being
injurious to a great many other states,” real interests are further subdi-
vided into perpetual and temporary ones. While the former “depends
chiefly on the Situation and Constitution of the Country, and the natural
42
For a general background, see Leonard Krieger, “History and Law in the
Seventeenth Century: Pufendorf,” Journal of the History of Ideas 21, no. 2
(1960): 198–210; Pärtel Piirimäe, “Politics and History: An Unholy Alliance?
Samuel Pufendorf as Official Historiographer,” in M. Engelbrecht, U. Hanssen-
Decker, and D. Höffker (eds.), Rund um die Meere des Nordens. Festschrift für
Hain Rebas (Heyde: Boyens Buchverlag, 2008), 237–52. On von Pufendorf’s
influence on the Swedish court, see R. M. Hatton, Charles XII of Sweden
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968), 50, 111.
43
Samuel von Pufendorf, Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms
and States in Europe (London: Peele, 1719), preface, ii.
44
Ibid., ii–iii. 45 Ibid., iv.
Inclinations of the People,” the latter is determined by the “Condition,

Strengths and Weakness of the neighbouring Nations.”46 Drawing on
existing histories of European states, von Pufendorf sees no reason to
correct them but rather wants to take them as indicative of the perceptions
these states entertain of their own past and present. That these histories are
biased and are based on all sorts of myths is of less concern to him, as long
as these biases and myths can be taken as expressions of their distinct
identities and interests. Since he regards these narratives to be indicative of
claims to dynastic and territorial sovereignty, it does not really matter to
him whether they are based or ascertainable historical facts or not, as long
as they can be made intelligible with reference to a general state of war
between seemingly cohesive and self-interested actors.
But if states are, or at least should be, governed by the maxims of real
interests in their relations with each other, how did individual states
come into being, and how did they manage to consolidate themselves
into independent actors and legal persons? To the same extent that the
precepts of secular statecraft are reflected in the relations of states,
states have invariably been constituted through violent conflict
between primordial groups. Thus, as if to empirically substantiate the
speculative account of the origin of civil societies we find in the first
pages of De jure naturae et gentium (1672), the real reason why
mankind left behind paternal forms of government after the Deluge is
that “among the Neighbouring Families, sometimes Quarrels used to
arise, which being often decided by Force, drew along with them very
great Inconveniences . . . And to guard off such Injuries, the Neighbours
that lived so near as to be able to assist one another in case of Necessity,
did enter into a society to defend themselves against their common
Enemies.”47 But this state of war did not end with the constitution of
societies but was now instead manifested in the relations between these,
eventually culminating in the consolidation of distinct and bounded
states. To von Pufendorf, as to many of his contemporaries, one of the
main propellants of state formation is foreign invasion, which compels
otherwise rivaling groups to unite against the intruders. Thus we learn
that Spain “was in ancient times divided into a great many States,
independent of one another . . . But this multiplicity or partition
exposed this otherwise Warlike Nation to the Inroads of Foreign
Enemies.”48 Likewise, England was originally divided into “a great
46 47 48
Ibid., v. Ibid., 2. Ibid., 25.
52 The State of War
many petty States,” which “exposed them to the danger of being over-
come by their Foreign Enemies.”49 And although the Gauls initially
had conquered both Italy and Greece, “this potent People, ignorant of
their own Strength and Power, were in no capacity to exert it suffi-
ciently against other Nations, because they were not then under
the Government of one Prince, but divided into a great many petty
States, which were always at variance with one another. This contrib-
uted much to facilitate the Conquest of the Romans over them.”50
After the Frankish invasion, it was evident that “the Race of the ancient
Gauls was not quite extinguished, but that both Nations were by
degrees united into one, though with this difference, that the Frankish
families made up the Body of the Nation.”51
But a state could also originate as a result of expulsion or coloniza-
tion in the distant past. As we learn from the posthumous compilation
entitled, The Compleat History of Sweden from Its Origin to This Time
(1702), although little is known of the ancient origins of this kingdom,
“it is probable that the first Inhabitants for a long time retained the free
State of Paternal Authority.”52 After having noted that “we are equally
in the dark of the exploits of their ancient Kings, since what we know of
them is only taken from old Ballads and fabulous Legends,”53 von
Pufendorf embarks on a critical discussion of two earlier and well-
known accounts of Scandinavian history written by Johannes Magnus
and Johannes Messenius, respectively.54 According to Magnus,
Denmark had been created when King Erik had “sent all the useless
and dissolute sort of People into the Isles of Denmark, and gave them
Judges who were subject to the Empire of the Goths.”55 This view had
later been disputed by Messenius, who had been responsible for orga-
nizing the royal archives that von Pufendorf used as the basis for his
own account. According to Messenius, Magnus had merely been inter-
ested in deprecating the Danes, when in fact “these colonies were only
planted in order to ease the Country which was over-stocked with
49
Ibid., 84. 50 Ibid., 148. 51 Ibid., 149.
52
Samuel von Pufendorf, The Compleat History of Sweden from Its Origin to This
Time (London: Wild, 1702), 3.
53
Ibid.
54
The source subject to contestation by both these authors is Gesta Danorum by
Saxo Grammaticus. See Kurt Johannesson, Saxo Grammaticus. Komposition
och världsbild i Gesta Danorum (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International,
1978).
55
von Pufendorf, History, 5.
Inhabitants . . . and . . . there were a great many Worthy and Brave

Persons concerned in such Expeditions.”56 But regardless of whether
the Danish nation is made up of wicked men once expelled from Gothic
soil or founded by praiseworthy men colonizing what then had been
but a terra nullius, Denmark and the Danes nevertheless owed their
existence to the most ancient and noble kingdom of Scandinavia and
were therefore stuck in a position of perpetual inferiority vis-à-vis that
kingdom. The reader should not be surprised to find that the relations
between Denmark and Sweden had since been marked by nothing but
mutual suspicion, deceit, and treachery.57
This provides the starting point for a long narrative leading toward the
liberation of Sweden from the Danish yoke, culminating in its role as the
vanguard of Protestant liberty against the imperial ambitions pursued by
Ferdinand II. Indeed, the main reason why Sweden entered the Thirty
Years War was that the “Emperor had formed a design to ruine the
Protestants and make himself absolute Soveraign of Germany: This
done, he meant to make himself Master of the Northern Kingdoms,
which were necessary for establishing the Universal Monarchy over
Europe, that he aspires after.”58 But in order to achieve the goals of this
war of liberation, it was absolutely necessary that “the Protestants should
act in Concert, and joyn their Forces together; for that otherwise, the
peace would no sooner be concluded, but the Imperialists would resume
their old Game, and ruine the Confederates one after another.”59 Hence,
in this account, it is the Thirty Years War that compels Protestant states
to consolidate and unite against a common enemy.
This account represents a first version of the idea that the Peace of
Westphalia constitutes a point of transition from the world of empire to
a world of states. But, in contrast to the modern version of this idea,
Westphalia does not mark the emergence of a system of territorially
bounded and mutually recognizing sovereign states but represents the
end result of a war of independence and liberation from imperial
authority pursued by a rather loose coalition of disparate actors.60
To von Pufendorf, what made the world of states was not so much
the Peace of Westphalia but the war that preceded that peace. So
56
Ibid. 57 Ibid., 88ff, 168ff. 58 Ibid., 437–8. 59 Ibid., 462.
60
For a discussion, see Derek Croxton, “The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the
Origins of Sovereignty,” International History Review 21, no. 3 (1999): 569–
91; Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the
Westphalian Myth,” International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001): 251–87.
54 The State of War
however glorious, this peace cannot but result in new wars, since states
are now stuck in a state of war among themselves, much as a conse-
quence of their violent prehistory and the outward projection of that
violent past that followed naturally on their quest for independence. As
von Pufendorf tells us, soon after his coronation, Charles Gustavus
“was indispensably obliged to prepare himself and take up Arms, not
only least the Courages of so many Brave officers would droop by too
much ease, and that way obscure the Lustre and Glory of the Swedish
Nation; but because the Fire of War, which was kindled between the
Poles and Muscovites, was come even to the Frontiers of Sweden.”61
Thus the unity of nations gave way to a proliferation of internal
divisions, invasions, and conquests, yet rivalries between groups as
well as with foreign foes pushed forward a consolidation of state
power in the hands of successive sovereigns, ending with an outward
projection of violent impulses onto the emergent international arena.
So to the nadir of empire corresponds the genesis of that arena where
the interests of states are bound to clash. But the Protestant myth of
Westphalia also gave rise to the first attempts to write what later came
to be known as diplomatic history. Rather than tracing the history of
particular states backward in time in order to assert their uniqueness
and glory in the present, works in this genre take Westphalia to be a
formative moment in history and then recount the history of the states
that owed their independence to the preceding war. One of the first
efforts in this direction was made by the Dutch diplomat Abraham de
Wicquefort, whose L’Ambassadeur et ses Fonctions (1682) had
quickly become the standard manual of contemporary diplomatic
practice. Wicquefort later turned out to be a skilled and prolific writer
of diplomatic history. As we learn from his Histoire de Provinces-Unies
des Pais-Bas (1704), it was the treaty of Münster that led to the “perfect
establishment” of the Dutch republic. Whereas von Pufendorf had
struggled to make sense of a distant past in terms consonant with the
precepts of secular statecraft, Wicquefort faces the easier task of mak-
ing sense of contemporary great power politics in the same terms. Yet,
admittedly, “it is a very delicate matter to write of the affairs of those
who are living through and handling them, and following their execu-
tion with Justice and Truth, through so much as their interests differ
61
von Pufendorf, History, 560.
and their passions are directly opposed.”62 To this end, he purports to

advance nothing that cannot be verified from archives, registers, and
memoirs and whose truth can be ascertained by readers who them-
selves were witnesses of the events to be recounted. In his account, the
Thirty Years War was indeed constitutive of some states, since prior to
the Peace of Westphalia, one cannot speak of the United Provinces as a
state proper because “there was no other Sovereignty in this state than
that which resided in the provinces of which it was composed.”63 Thus
it becomes possible to speak of the United Provinces as a single state as
a consequence of the conquests of territories from the Spaniards.
France, and England, being “jealous of the formidable power of the
King of Spain and the House of Austria,” thereby facilitated the birth of
the United Provinces, which was first to discover the weakness of
Spain.64 Noting that the king of Spain “can be properly called the
veritable enemy of this State,” Wicquefort proceeds to describe the
liberation of the Dutch from the Spanish yoke, from the onset of
the Dutch revolt to what he optimistically believes to be its conclusion
at Münster.65 What transpires from his account is the contention that
these wars had shaped the United Provinces as an independent actor on
the international stage and made it able to entertain diplomatic rela-
tions with other European states on formally equal terms.
Yet the mode of historical writing exemplified in this account raises a
series of important questions. How could the state of war be projected
back onto time immemorial and structure historical narratives, and
how was it possible to assume that European countries – at least in
some embryonic form – had been present since the dawn of history?
This is puzzling given that early modern historical consciousness was
still largely under the spell of universal history, according to which
humanity traversed a series of preordained historical stages contained
in a providential plan.66 Since the precepts of secular statecraft were
regarded as immoral and destructive, those Protestant historians who
used them to structure their historical narratives were facing an away
game. In order to understand why such statist historiography won the
day, we must pay attention to the rhetorical functions performed by these
62
Abraham de Wicquefort, Histoire de Provinces-Unies des Pais-Bas (La Haye:
Johnson 1719), 2.
63
Wicquefort, Histoire, 6, 16 64 Ibid., 26. 65 Ibid., 44; 45–59.
66
See for example, Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, Discours sur l”Histoire Universelle
(Paris: S. Mabre-Cramoisy, 1681).
56 The State of War
historical accounts. First, and most obviously, projecting a state of war

onto the immemorial served to establish continuities between past and
present that were used to legitimize power politics in the present, precisely
against those who disputed such conduct on moral grounds. By establish-
ing continuities between past and present, it was possible to argue that
since the state of war was a transhistorical condition beyond the scope of
human volition, it necessitated recourse to political practices that other-
wise would have been considered profoundly destructive of the political
order.
Second, I think it is equally obvious that the assumption that states
had been present in some embryonic form since time immemorial
served not only to reinforce claims to sovereignty by their rulers but
also to sustain the early forms of nationalism that had accompanied the
rise of ontogenetic war. This is no more evident than in the attribution
of national characters during this period. As I argued in the preceding
section, ideas of nationhood could be traced back to the reappropria-
tion of Roman ideals of empire and patriotism. Drawing on this rich
symbolic legacy, many writers were busy constructing accounts of
national identities in support of sovereignty claims raised by individual
rulers. Frequently fanned by the flames of war, these accounts were
used to galvanize compatriots into action and to stigmatize foreigners
into enemies so that each story of nationhood developed in opposition
to other similar stories until a system of self-reinforcing stereotypes and
prejudices had taken hold of European elites and thoroughly tainted
their perceptions of their neighbors.
The creation of such national identities is very present in the early
modern histories discussed earlier. Here d’Avity and Pufendorf stand
out as the most creative and dynamic exponents, and the fact that their
accounts are separated by more than half a century allows for some
interesting comparisons. As an important step in assessing the strengths
and weaknesses of European states, d’Avity provides elaborate descrip-
tions of the customs and manners of their inhabitants. While he draws
heavily on Roman authorities such as Strabo, Pliny, and Tacitus when
describing the past, his way of characterizing present customs provides
us with nice glimpses into seventeenth-century proto-nationalism at
work. Thus we learn that although the English were originally barbar-
ous, they have gradually become more polite and civilized, now being
capable of arts and science and displaying courtesy and hospitality to
strangers.67 Yet their original barbarism remains alive and well among
the lower classes, since “with the exception of those well born and
nourished, the nature of all others is extremely fierce, and their way of
living intolerable to anyone with sentiment and courage.”68 Hence the
occasional visitor to England should be forewarned that “the leftovers
of this nation are indeed born into thievery.”69
Likewise, the Spaniards are “of a warm and dry nature, and of a
brown color” and “surpass almost all the rest of mankind in their
superstition.”70 They receive foreigners with little courtesy and “keep
their solemnity with a feigned sincerity, which makes them detested by
all other nations.”71 Their haughtiness aside, the Spaniards are also
constantly conniving and “love tricks and lies in all matters,” including
those of faith: “they pretend great reverence of the Church and things
sacred, and some of them hold that their professed piety . . . have [sic]
rendered the Heavens favorable, and has made God give them a new
world through conquest.”72 By contrast, and unsurprisingly, the
French excel at bonhomie. The French, being “good and straightfor-
ward,” and while threatened by the malicious designs of their neigh-
bors in the South, these plots are to no avail because the French were
literally born in war and their nobility the most valiant and gentle.73
Similarly, each chapter of Pufendorf’s History ends with a brief
sketch of the peculiarities of each nation, making it valuable as a
catalogue of early modern stereotypes. But underneath the surface of
prejudice is an analysis of the virtues and vices that help explain why
some states have been successful and others have failed to survive and
prosper. Among the former, the French and the Swedes stand out for
their valor and military prowess. The French nation “has been always
warlike . . . they were very brave at the first Onset; but after their first
Fury was a little cooled, their Courage used to slacken, if they met with
stout and brave Resistance.”74 We also learn that the French are “also
brisk, forward, of a merry Constitution: as to their outward appearance
in their Apparel and Behaviour, they are generally very comely.”75 The
Swedes, despite having descended from barbarians, also embody Roman
valor; “they were ever reputed very Warlike; they always had the char-
acter of a People that are not Afraid of their Skin, or annoyed by the smell
67
D’Avity, Les Estats, Empires, Royaumes et Principautes du Monde, 6.
68
Ibid., 7. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid. 146. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid., 147.
73
Ibid., 90–1. 74 von Pufendorf, Introduction, 210. 75 Ibid., 211.
58 The State of War
of Gunpowder.” But Pufendorf is quick to add some qualifications,

noting that since even if they are “very well versed in the Art of
Dissimulation, they remain ‘extremely jealous and distrustful’ . . . as
well as ‘very invidous,’ insomuch that one Swede does not commonly
love to see another thrive.”76 The Spaniards receive an unfavorable
treatment by Pufendorf. Thus we learn of the Spaniards that although
they “are very fit for War . . . their sober way of living, and spare Bodies,
qualify them to bear Hunger and Thirst . . . they maintain their Gravity by
highflown Words and proud Behaviour.” Furthermore, “they are seldom
fit for any Trade or Business where hard Labour is required.” And “Their
Pride, Covetousness, and rigorous Proceedings make them hateful to all
that are under their Command.”77
These accounts are indicative of how political competition among
early modern states was reinforced by an appeal to national character-
istics, how the notion of a primordial state of war found additional
nourishment in the attribution of warlike characteristics, and how the
distribution of virtues and vices among these peoples reflected an emer-
gent stratification between the Protestant North and the Catholic South.
While the nations of the North are governed by rational interest, those in
the South remain prey to passions and superstition. And while the former
are described as diligent and trustworthy, the latter are inclined to be
proud and dishonest in their dealings.
But these nations are also internally stratified. While the nobility is
distinguished by its valor, gentleness, and hospitality, the lower strata
still bear the stigma of barbarism that originally had characterized each
nation before the struggle between races had propelled the process of
state formation forward and given rise to virtuous elites. Thus these
authors are characteristically ambivalent about the nature of barbarism
and its relation to the state. On the one hand, barbarism is present at
the foundation of each state since time immemorial and thus remains
an indispensable force behind its formation. On the other hand, as soon
as the state has been formed and warfare has become the privilege of a
warrior class, what remains of barbarism becomes a threat that must be
either expelled from the social body or harnessed for the purposes of
foreign war. To d’Avity, since the violent energies of the lower classes
represent a threat to the cohesion of society, their members must be
subjugated, disciplined, and punished. Only in that way can other
76 77
von Pufendorf, History, 610, 612. von Pufendorf, Introduction, 59, 60.
From Barbarism to Civilization 59
nations aspire to the perfection already attained by the French. To

Pufendorf, “the boors” constitute a whimsical and dangerous force
that a ruler may neglect only at his own peril. But when properly tamed,
however, the boors can become useful; as evidenced by the military
reforms of Gustavus Adolphus, their enlistment and training can be a
source of great military success.
From Barbarism to Civilization

When we enter the eighteenth century, it is widely accepted as axio-
matic that war had made the state. What had begun as a series of
historical conjectures intended to legitimize sovereign authority now
found support in a rich historiography that portrayed the formation of
states and their intercourse as the inevitable result of a state of war that
had been present since time immemorial. For example, to Hume,
government found its origin in war: “[I]t is probable, that the first
ascendant of one man over multitudes begun during a state of war;
where the superiority of courage and of genius discovers itself most
visibly, where unanimity and concert are most requisite, and where the
pernicious effects of disorder are most sensibly felt.”78 And as Smith
contended, “the first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the
society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies,
can be performed only by means of a military force.”79
But whereas philosophers and historians of the seventeenth century
had been focused on war as an instrument of secular statecraft, their
Enlightenment successors were more concerned with its undesirable
fallout. Many authors during this period lamented that war perpetuated
despotic governments at home and imperial rule abroad but simulta-
neously regarded an international state of war as an inevitable outcome
of domestic pacification. To Rousseau, it was obvious that the formation
of states merely had pushed the state of war outward so that “bodies
politic, remaining thus in a state of nature among themselves, presently
experienced the inconveniences which had obliged individuals to forsake
it; for this state became still more fatal to these great bodies than it had
been to the individuals of whom they were composed. Hence arose
78
David Hume, “On the Origin of Government,” in Essays (Indianapolis, IN:
Liberty Fund, 1987), I.V, 6.
79
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
[1776], ed. Edwin Cannan (London: Methuen & Co., 1904), II.V.1.0.
60 The State of War
national wars, battles, murders, and reprisals, which shock nature and
outrage reason.”80
To accept that war had made states made it hard to deny that states
also made war and hence also that the abolition of warfare within states
had turned the state of war into a permanent condition of humankind,
which was irreversibly divided into distinct and bounded communities,
each claiming sovereignty over its territory and population. As Rousseau
went on to argue, “the state of war is the natural relation of one Power to
another . . . Who then are those between whom war takes place and who
alone can truly be called enemies? I answer that they are public persons.
And what is a ‘public person’? I answer that it is that moral creation called
a Sovereign, which owes its existence to a social compact and all the
decisions of which go by the name of ‘laws.’”81
According to Howard, many Enlightenment authors regarded war
“not as part of the natural order or a necessary instrument of state
power, but as a foolish anachronism, perpetuated only by those who
enjoyed or profited from it.”82 But although many Enlightenment
authors certainly were critical of contemporary practices of war and
empire, they were also struggling to come to terms with the role of
war and the prospects of popular sovereignty.83 Catering to the latter
concerns, they sometimes invoked war as an important cause of human
progress and civilization and, by implication, as the not-so-gentle
civilizer of nations. Thus Enlightenment historians and philosophers
were inclined to argue two things. First, given the widely shared
assumption that human history could be subdivided into distinct stages
ranging from the primitive to the more advanced, they argued that since
the art of war had been crucial to the progress of the human species,
civilized states enjoyed a military advantage over less civilized ones.
80
Rousseau, “Discourse on the Origin of Inequality,” in Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
The Social Contract and Discourses, trans. G. D. H. Cole (London: Dent, 1990),
100. For an analysis of Rousseau’s view of war that remains valuable, see
Stanley Hoffmann, “Rousseau on War and Peace,” in Stanley Hoffmann, The
State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics (New
York: Praeger, 1965), 54–87.
81
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “L’État de Guerre,” in Jean Jacques Rousseau, The
Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau, vol. I, ed. C. E. Vaughan
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1915), 293–307, at 301.
82
Michael Howard, The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International
Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 26.
83
See Richard Whatmore, Against War and Empire: Geneva, Britain and France
in the Eighteenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012).
Second, since many Enlightenment historians were critical of imperial

practices of war on the grounds that they hampered political progress
and corrupted commercial advances, it was not uncommon to argue
that popular sovereignty was desirable for strategic rather than moral
or ideological reasons, insofar as it could be expected to give republics a
distinctive edge in an international system characterized by fierce poli-
tical and economic competition between great powers.
Yet these arguments assumed that nations were sufficiently cohe-
sive to maintain the conditions of popular sovereignty in order to
augment their external power. While the early modern authors dis-
cussed earlier had construed nations in support of claims to sover-
eign authority, these nations were hardly conceived as acting
subjects in their own right but multitudes held together by common
characteristics. To speak of nations as actors took some rather
profound changes in the meaning of this concept and its range of
applicability. From having been used to refer to groups divided
along kinship lines, the concept of nation was now being used to
refer to entire populations under the presumption that prior conflicts
between these groups had been resolved or at least mitigated to such
an extent that nations now could be conceived as collective
subjects.84
The second source of change concerns the appeals to popular sover-
eignty that made their way into treatises in legal and political theory
from the mid-eighteenth century onward. If nations constitute collec-
tive subjects, and if they enjoy legal independence within an interna-
tional system devoid of supreme authority, it was a short step to argue
that they also were entitled to govern themselves internally. Hence
arose the connection between claims to external sovereignty, on the
one hand, and pleas to self-determination, on the other.85 In the present
context, however, a new understanding of how this connection was
forged allows us to question a common understanding of the relation-
ship between nationalism and popular sovereignty. According to this
understanding, nationalism and nations arose in close conjunction
with the quest for popular sovereignty and democratic legitimacy that
84
Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 215–38.
85
See David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence: A Global History
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); David Armitage,
Foundations of Modern International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge
62 The State of War
ensued from the American and French revolutions. As Greenfeld

argued some time ago, “[n]ationalism was the form in which democ-
racy appeared in the world, contained in the idea of the nation as a
butterfly in a cocoon.”86 And as Hunt has pointed out, “the displace-
ment of the ruler by the nation required the building of a citizenry in
which individuals . . . identified with each other as part of a nation.”87
But although this was undoubtedly true in many cases, this should not
detract attention from the fact early versions of popular sovereignty
were justified with reference to the increase in social cohesion and state
power that popular participation in politics was expected to bring. The
first recognizably modern pleas for popular sovereignty are therefore
perhaps better understood as responses to problems of security and war
rather than as harbingers of revolutions to come.
To grasp this peculiar connection between war and popular sover-
eignty, let us briefly revisit the notions of an international system that
started to emerge in the literature during this period. Many contem-
porary authors struggled to make sense of what they perceived to be a
radical break with the foreign policies of the seventeenth century.
Whereas war had been seen as a tool for consolidating state sover-
eignty and boosting the power and prestige of monarchs, it was now
increasingly taken to be a consequence of economic and geopolitical
competition between states that resulted from mercantile ideology and
practices.88 As Hume commented on the trade rivalries between the great
powers, “nothing is more usual, among states which have made some
advances in commerce, than to look on the progress of their neighbours
with a suspicious eye, to consider all trading states as their rivals, and to
suppose that it is impossible for any of them to flourish, but at their
expence.”89 Mercantile practices made earlier maxims of statecraft
86
Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1992), 10. For other accounts that emphasize this
connection, see Christopher A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World 1780–
1914 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 199–243; Bernhard Yack, “Popular
Sovereignty and Nationalism,” Political Theory 29 no. 4 (2001): 517–36.
87
Lynn Hunt, “The French Revolution in Global Context,” in David Armitage
and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (eds.), The Age of Revolutions in a Global Context,
c. 1760–1840 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 20–36, at 35.
88
See Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-
State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2005), 1–159.
89
David Hume, “Jealousy of Trade” [1742], in Essays (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty
Fund, 1987), II.VI, 1.
appear outdated because they had been derived from the attributes of
individual states rather than from their relative power position in the
system of states that now was believed to be emerging and whose modus
operandi was thought to be outside the control of individual statesmen.
As Mably argued, what determine the interests and conduct of states are
no longer their inner attributes but their relative power in the interna-
tional political system. To him, and now irrespective of their different
customs and laws, the great powers of Europe can be subdivided into two
broad categories – dominant and rival ones – while all lesser powers will
have to conduct their foreign policies with an eye to the balance of power
between the great powers.90
In this new system, it was imperative to maintain the balance of power
in order to prevent any state from achieving dominance, thereby preser-
ving the independence of individual states while upholding a modicum of
international order and peace. While the international system was a
potent source of discord in its own right due to its anarchic character,
it was also widely perceived to be a means to preserve the independence
of states and the liberties of peoples. As Gibbon remarked in his Decline
and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776–8), in sharp contrast to the Roman
Empire, “the division of Europe into a number of independent states,
connected, however, with each other, by the general resemblance of
religion, language, and manners, is productive of the most beneficial
consequences to the liberty of mankind.”91 As historical narratives of
states now were restructured, the Protestant myth of Westphalia was
superseded by narratives that located the origin of the international
system even further back in time but that again gave preeminence to
the constitutive force of war when explaining the genesis of states and
nations in Europe.92
For example, as we learn from Voltaire in his Siècle de Louis XIV
(1751), the progress from barbarism to civilization had been propelled by
the gradual perfection of arts and manners that started with the Greeks
and culminated during the reign of Louis XIV. But even well before his
90
Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, Des Principes des Négociations, pour servir
d’introduction au Droit Publique de l’europé, fondé sur les traités (La Haye,
1757), 31–2.
91
Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. 1 (New York:
Modern Library, n.d.), 72–3.
92
For an overview of such themes in Enlightenment historiography, see Bruce
Buchan, “Enlightened Histories: Civilization, War and the Scottish
Enlightenment,” European Legacy 10, no. 2 (2005): 177–92.
64 The State of War
reign, Europe “might be considered as a great republic divided into

several states” whose intercourse was characterized by “the prudent
policy of preserving, as far as they are able, an equal balance of power
among themselves.”93 Voltaire then describes the preconditions for the
cultural and scientific refinement attained during the reign of Louis. As it
turns out, his greatest feat was to consolidate the French state and to
abolish factionalism, discord, and superstition that had long stifled pro-
gress. Since “politics and arms seem unhappily to be the two professions
most natural to man, who must always be either negotiating or fighting,”
the measurement of true greatness was the ability to master both.94 Thus,
at the height of his reign, “Louis increased his dominions even in peace,
and always kept himself in readiness for war, fortifying the frontier
towns, augmenting the number of his troops, keeping them well disci-
plined, and frequently reviewing them in person.”95 And as a result of his
endeavors, the French “state became one regular whole, every line of
which terminated in the centre.”96 This made it possible to turn a nation
hitherto divided and turbulent into “a peaceable people, who were
dangerous only to the enemy.”97
Another example of this new periodization is found in Robertson’s
History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V (1769). Whereas both
Voltaire and Hume had emphasized the importance of balance of
power in maintaining the European system of states, Robertson was
more concerned with how and why the latter had emerged.98 As he
states in the Preface, since modern history begins with the advent of
secular statecraft, this makes it imperative to confine “study of history
in detail chiefly to that period in which the several states of Europe
having become intimately connected, the operations of one power are
so felt by all as to influence their councils, and to regulate their mea-
sures.”99 Tracing the origin of the modern international system to the
93
Voltaire, The Age of Louis XIV [1751], vol. 12, in The Works of Voltaire: A
Contemporary Version (New York: E.R. Dumont, 1901), 13. For a valuable
account of the historiographic context, see J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and
Religion, vol. II: Narratives of Civil Government (Cambridge: Cambridge
94
Voltaire, The Age of Louis XIV, 30. 95 Ibid., 115. 96 Ibid., 256.
97
Ibid., 257.
98
For a comparison, see Frederick G. Whelan, “Robertson, Hume, and the
Balance of Power,” Hume Studies 21, no. 2 (1995): 315–32.
99
William Robertson, The History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V, with a
View of the Progress of Society in Europe, from the Subversion of the Roman
reign of Charles V, this system emerges largely as an unintended con-

sequence of his policies of conquest and counter-reformation, and
especially through the resistance these policies provoked among the
French. As Robertson continues, “it was during his administration that
the powers of Europe were formed into one great political system, in
which each took a station, wherein it has since remained with less
variation than could have been expected after the shocks occasioned
by so many internal revolutions, and so many foreign wars.”100 The
cornerstone of this system was the balance of power, and the moment
of its inception was the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559. At this
point, the belligerents had been compelled by recent historical develop-
ments to acknowledge that “no prince was so much superior to the rest in
power, as to render his efforts irresistible, and his conquests easy . . . the
advantages possessed by one state were counterbalanced by circum-
stances favourable to others and this prevented any from attaining such
superiority as might have been fatal to all.”101 But the reign of Charles
had further consequences insofar as it had forced European states to
consolidate in order to counteract his ambitions so that “the different
kingdoms of Europe acquired internal vigour; that they discerned the
resources of which they were possessed; that they came both to feel their
own strength, and to know how to render it formidable to others.”102
True to the practices Enlightenment historiography, Robertson projects
contemporary concerns onto the past and allows them to organize a
narrative in which war, together with scientific and moral progress,
become the driving force behind the consolidation of states in Europe
and the formation of “one great political system, in which each took a
station, wherein it hath remained since that time with less variation than
could have been expected after the events of two active centuries.”103
While allowing for differences of culture and religion, there was not
among European states “that wide diversity of character and of genius
which, in almost every period of history, hath exalted the Europeans
above the inhabitants of the other quarters of the globe, and seems to
have destined the one to rule, and the other to obey.”104
Empire to the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century, vol. I [1769] (London:

Routledge, 1857), vii. For the historiographic context, see Pocock, Barbarism
and Religion, vol. II, 83–96.
100
Robertson, The History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V, vol. I, viii.
101
Robertson, The History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V, vol. II, 470.
102
Ibid., 471. 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid., 470.
66 The State of War
But before this great system could be projected backward in time, it had
first to become a social fact in its own right, and this is where the
prerevolutionary pleas for popular sovereignty start to make sense.
Important clues to this development can be found in the republican
tradition and its understanding of the relationship between popular
sovereignty and warfare. As Nabulsi has summarized the core assump-
tions of this tradition, “if freedom is to be understood as independence . . .
then one needs to find the means to avoid becoming dependent not only
on tyrants who arise (by means of faction) from within but also from
without (by way of conquest).”105 This is why the strategic defenses of
popular sovereignty articulated by Mably and d’Argenson become so
important. Both authors seek to revive tenets of classical republicanism in
French foreign policy in the decades before the Revolution not because
they wanted to overthrow the monarchy but rather because they wanted
to augment the relative power of France in relation to its competitors
during a period of relative decline. To Mably, diplomatic ties between
states is the outcome of a natural tendency among humans to form
alliances: “like humans when united into a society . . . have formed a
defensive league against violence, it is natural that less powerful peoples
unite themselves once more to oppose who would abuse their superiority
of power.”106 Invoking familiar republican themes and virtues, Mably
argues that to preserve the independence of the state from foreign powers,
it is necessary to preserve the liberty of the citizens from arbitrary exer-
cises of power. Republican governments are best equipped in this regard
because they stand internally united and can thus better withstand foreign
pressure. They are therefore in a good position to maintain peaceful
relations with other states but also to deal most forcibly with states that
wish to expand their influence at the expense of others.107 So whereas
Mably sometimes has been credited with having reconceptualized the
French nation in terms more democratic and inclusive than some of his
contemporaries, I think it is important to recall that his vindication of
105
Karma Nabulsi, Traditions of War: Occupation, Resistance, and the Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 177–240, at 238–9; cf. Nicholas
Greenwood Onuf, The Republican Legacy in International Thought
106
Mably, Principes, 2. 107 Ibid., 151–70.
republican virtues and institutions was to some extent motivated by

concerns with external security and internal legitimacy.108
Another example of how the connection between popular sover-
eignty and national interest could be conceptualized is found in
Considérations sur le Gouvernement Ancient et Présent de la France
(1764–5), by Marquis d’Argenson, who had briefly served as foreign
minister under Louis XV.109 In a world characterized by swift and
unforeseen reversals of fortune among states, good government must
maximize both the strength of the state and the happiness of the people
at the same time. Yet these objectives often turn out to be difficult to
reconcile in practice because a strong state calls for a rule that is likely
to deprive the people of their happiness and infringe on their liberty,
whereas promoting the latter risks undermining the strength of the
state and thereby rendering it more vulnerable to external enemies.
D’Argenson seeks to handle this tradeoff by an appeal to a very peculiar
form of popular sovereignty: “I hope to show through this examina-
tion, that popular administration can be exercised under sovereign
authority, without diminishing but rather increasing public power,
and that this is a source of people’s happiness.”110 Since direct rule
by the people will necessarily degenerate into mob rule and eventually
result in anarchy, true democracy is only possible when deputies are
elected by the people and thereby constitute a public power in its own
right.111 Since the state is composed of many particular and often
conflicting interests, the sovereign must know when to hamper their
expression and when to give them free reign for the sake of the general
good. To that end, different parts of the people must be allowed to
gather together to discuss and act with a certain degree of indepen-
dence.112 And “if the public interest is listened to and allowed to act
without confusion, it will produce a movement towards continuity and
renewal that will further increase and perfect it.”113 Again, popular
sovereignty is justified not with reference to the civic virtues it is
108
Compare François Furet and Mona Ozouf, “Deux Légitimations Historiques
de la Société Française au XVIIIe Siècle: Mably et Boulainvilliers,” in Annales.
Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations (1979): 438–50.
109
René Louis de Voyer de Paulmy D’Argenson, Considérations sur le
Gouvernement Ancient et Présent de la France (Amsterdam: Reys, 1765). For
an interesting analysis, see Péter Balázs, “Philosophie et Histoire dans l’œuvre
du marquis d’Argenson,” Dix-Huitième Siècle 1 (2010): 561–79.
110
D’Argenson, Considérations, 2. 111 Ibid., 7–8. 112 Ibid., 28.
113
Ibid., 34.
68 The State of War
supposed to foster but as a means to increase the legitimacy of royal

authority and the power of the state as a whole. Thus the importance of
this early version of illiberal democracy lies in its ability to preserve
rather than to subvert monarchical institutions. This being so, popular
sovereignty makes it possible to reconcile conflicting interests for the
common good and align those interests with those of the sovereign,
thereby creating the kind of national unity that is best equipped to
withstand foreign threats and revolutionary upheaval at home. This
reconceptualization of republican ideas not only antedated the famous
reconceptualization of the nation undertaken by Sieyès but was
informed by political imperatives very distinct from those that ani-
mated the works of Rousseau and Diderot.
The idea that war is productive of national cohesion found ample
support in more erudite works of the same period. While some
Enlightenment authors saw war as detrimental to human happiness
and conducive only of despotism and imperialism, others regarded war
as the main driver of progress in human affairs and tried to explain the
genesis of sociopolitical order in terms of perpetual conflict. Thus
Ferguson, in his Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), starts
out from the assumption that “mankind not only find in their condition
the sources of variance and dissension; they appear to have in their
minds the seeds of animosity, and to embrace the occasions of mutual
opposition, with alacrity and pleasure.”114 At earlier stages of human
development, this violent predisposition manifested itself in perpetual
struggles among rude nations, yet without “the rivalship of nations,
and the practice of war, civil society itself could scarcely have found an
object or a form.”115 Thus a comparison of the prehistory of the
114
Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (London: Millar &
Cadell, 1767), 30. For some recent interpretations, see Lisa Hill, “Eighteenth-
Century Anticipations of the Sociology of Conflict: The Case of Adam
Ferguson,” Journal of the History of Ideas 62, no. 2 (2001): 281–99; Craig
Smith, “‘We Have Mingled Politeness with the Use of the Sword’: Nature and
Civilisation in Adam Ferguson’s Philosophy of War,” The European Legacy
19, no. 1 (2014): 1–15; Bruce Buchan, “Civilisation, Sovereignty and War: The
Scottish Enlightenment and International Relations,” International Relations
20, no. 2 (2006): 175–92; Hans Joas and Wolfgang Knöbl, War in Social
Thought: Hobbes to the Present (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2013), 31–7; Iain McDaniel, Adam Ferguson in the Scottish Enlightenment:
The Roman Past and Europe’s Future (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2013).
115
Ferguson, Essay, 35.
Greeks, the Romans, and the contemporary condition of the native

tribes of America reveal that “in every rude state, the great business is
war; and that in barbarous times, mankind, being generally divided
into small parties, are engaged in almost perpetual hostilities. This
circumstance gives the military leader a continued ascendant in his
country, and inclines every people, during warlike ages, to monarchical
government.”116 From this, Ferguson was able to infer that “such
therefore appears to have been the commencement of history with all
nations, and in such circumstances are we to look for the original
character of mankind.”117 Yet, however belligerent and ferocious,
rude and barbarian nations must “always yield to the superior arts,
and the more discipline of more civilized nations.”118 So when nations
evolve into a more civilized stage, they not only become less belligerent
but also more skilled in the art of war and thus better equipped to
subjugate their more rude enemies. And while rude nations are “for the
most part separated by jealousy and animosity; yet when pressed by wars
and formidable enemies, they sometimes unite in greater bodies”119 and
have thereby been forced to embark on the road toward a more civilized
and polite stage. Hence “the enjoyment of peace, and the prospect of
being able to exchange one commodity for another, turns, by degrees the
hunter and warrior into a tradesman and a merchant.”120 At this point,
Ferguson reiterates a familiar point, since having escaped their original
rudeness and barbarism, “they require the exercise of foreign wars to
maintain domestic peace: when the enemy no longer appears from
abroad, they have leisure for private feuds, and employ that courage in
their dissensions at home.”121
But even if some civic virtues and military valor unfortunately had
been lost in the transition from barbarous to commercial and civilized
societies, an international state of war between such societies is never-
theless preferable to the boundless state of war between uncivilized
nations that had preceded it, since the civilizing process also extends
into the European system of states “we have improved on the laws of
war . . . we have mingled politeness with the use of the sword; we have
learned to make war under the stipulations of treatises and cartels . . .
This is, perhaps, the principal characteristic, on which, among modern
nations, we bestow the epithets of civilized or of polished.”122 Yet,
116 117 118 119

Ibid., 226. Ibid., 114. Ibid., 144. Ibid., 155.
120 121 122
Ibid., 277. Ibid., 157. Ibid., 306.
70 The State of War
however much subject to legal regulation and territorial compartmen-

talization, war will remain a productive force in human affairs because
it “furnishes mankind with a principal occupation of their restless
spirit” and “serves, by the variety of its events, to diversify their
fortunes. While it opens to one tribe or society, the way to eminence,
and leads to dominion, it brings another to subjection, and closes the
scene of their national efforts.”123 As Kalyvas and Katznelson have
concluded in their analysis of Ferguson’s work, “modernity generates
diversity that is always conflictual.”124 Hence the international state of
war can be understood as a consequence of the modernizing process,
since that process pushes the remnants of barbarism and hostility out-
ward, into the nowhere of the international system. Against the back-
drop of this understanding of war as the first mover of the civilizing
process, it made perfect sense not only to argue that republican forms of
government were better adapted to the more refined circumstances of
civilized nations but that they also gave such nations a distinctive
advantage compared with their less civilized opponents in times of war.
Similar themes recurred and were further elaborated by Smith in his
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776).
To him, it was evident that the capacity to wage war increased with the
level of civilization and that this gave civilized states an advantage over
uncivilized ones because “in modern times the poor and barbarous find
it difficult to defend themselves against the opulent and civilized.”125
Developing the capacity for warfare is thus absolutely crucial for the
modern state because “the art of war, however, as it is certainly the
noblest of all arts, so in the progress of improvement it necessarily
becomes one of the most complicated among them.”126 Since standing
armies enjoy a distinctive advantage over citizen militias, the former
must be “maintained by an opulent and civilized nation, so it can alone
defend such a nation against the invasion of a poor and barbarous
neighbour. It is only by means of a standing army, therefore, that the
civilization of any country can be perpetuated, or even preserved for
any considerable time.”127 And, by the same token, standing armies
represent the best means to impose civilization on other parts of the
123
Ibid., 316.
124
Andreas Kalyvas and Ira Katznelson, “Adam Ferguson Returns: Liberalism
through a Glass, Darkly,” Political Theory 26, no. 2 (1998): 173–97, at 191.
125
Smith, Wealth of Nations, II.V.1.43. 126 Ibid., II.V.1.13.
127
Ibid., II.V.1.38.
world because such armies “establish with an irresistible force, the law
of the sovereign through the remotest provinces of the empire, and
maintain some degree of regular government in countries which could
not otherwise admit of any.”128
It could of course also be argued that republics are more disposed to
peaceful conduct than are monarchical governments and that the inter-
national state of war eventually will give way to a state of international
peace, at least among the former. But although the belief that republics
are predisposed to peace long had been a salient theme in republican
thought, this belief was further reinforced by the expectation that pro-
gress and civilization would eventually make war redundant, and such
expectations were commonly voiced in the more optimistic strands of
Enlightenment political thought.129 Yet, as Kant famously argued in his
Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (1784),
“the unsocial sociability of men, that is, their tendency to come together
in society, coupled, however, with continual resistance which constantly
threatens to break this society up” will ultimately propel mankind toward
a state of peace.130 Having established commonwealths based on the rule
of law and the reciprocal freedom of their members, mankind is then
faced with the final challenge of overcoming discord in its external
relations. The same unsociability that once compelled mankind to form
states now manifests itself between states; “each must accordingly expect
from any other precisely the same evils which formerly oppressed indivi-
dual men and forced them into a law-governed civil state.”131 In response
to this predicament, though, “nature has thus again employed the
unsociableness of men, and even of the large societies and states which
human beings construct, as a means of arriving at a condition of calm and
security through their inevitable antagonism.”132 And “wars, tense and
unremitting military preparations, and the resultant distress which every
state must feel within itself, even in the midst of peace” are the mechan-
isms that could be expected to compel states to enter into a federation for
the purpose of securing a lasting peace among themselves.133
128
Ibid., II.V.1.39.
129
Sankar Muthu, Enlightenment against Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2003); Jens Bartelson, Visions of World Community
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 115–70.
130
Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” in Hans
Reiss (ed.), Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991), 41–53, at 44.
131
Kant, Idea, 47. 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid.
72 The State of War
Although both Ferguson and Kant saw war as an underlying source of

human progress and civilization, they also saw progress and civilization
as the main antidotes to the unrestricted use of force in international
politics. To Ferguson, the civilizing process would temper the bellicose
spirit of rude nations by compelling them to become civilized in the face
of international competition and the threat of ultimate annihilation. To
Kant, the innate unsocial sociability of men would compel them to enter
into a pacific federation and ultimately into a world community gov-
erned by cosmopolitan law. Both these arguments give rise to pragmatic
paradoxes, however, because they are vulnerable to the objection that if
war indeed is the driving force behind progress and civilization, then to
abolish war would be tantamount to removing the springs of progress
and civilization, thereby plunging mankind back into the primordial
state that allegedly had conditioned the emergence of states and civil
societies in the first place. Hence some antagonism needs to be cultivated
for constructive purposes rather than being abolished, lest the springs of
human development should be altogether lost.134 In a similar vein, it was
also possible to object that even if a lasting peace would be possible to
attain among republican states by forming a federation between them,
such a federation would just make other states band together in opposi-
tion, thereby reproducing the international state of war between more
powerful entities. As Hegel famously argued in his Grundlinien der
Philosophie des Rechts (1821), “even if a number of states join together
as a family, this league, in its individuality, must generate opposition and
create an enemy.”135 Once the idea of an international state of war had
taken hold, conservatives could always pour cold water on hopes for
transcendence or reform. Reform and resistance would be either futile or
134
See Michaele Ferguson, “Unsocial Sociability: Perpetual Antagonism in Kant’s
Political Thought,” in Elisabeth Ellis (ed.), Kant’s Political Theory:
Interpretations and Applications (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State
135
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans.
H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), § 324, 362. For
discussions of the wider ramifications of this passage, see Shlomo Avineri, “The
Problem of War in Hegel’s Thought,” Journal of the History of Ideas 22, no. 4
(1961): 463–74; Steven B. Smith, “Hegel’s Views on War, the State, and
International Relations,” American Political Science Review 77, no. 3 (1983):
624–32; Colin Tyler, “Hegel, War and the Tragedy of Imperialism,” History of
European Ideas 30, no. 4 (2004): 403–31.
counterproductive and would merely serve to reproduce the logic of

hostility and enmity that had brought the international state of war
into being. In the gloomiest of days, as much as such a state of war
spurred a quest for eternal peace, that quest must inevitably issue in
perpetual war.136 States and nations – now being thought of as congru-
ent – are stuck in an international system where every attempt to trans-
cend its underlying logic will only serve to transpose antagonism to ever
higher levels of aggregation while pushing war further beyond the pur-
view of human freedom and responsibility and further into the realm of
historical necessity.
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, a recognizably
modern notion of international anarchy had begun to inform the
now-proliferating historical writing about the intercourse of states.
Looking back on the formative phases of that system in what later
was to become a foundational text for the modern study of interna-
tional relations, Heeren started out by carefully delimiting his topic. A
study of the international system “must not be confounded with the
history of the separate states of which it is composed.” Rather, it is a
history of their relations as constituted by their internal freedom, “that
is, the stability and mutual independence of its members.”137 This
reciprocal freedom is what distinguishes the European system from
its opposite, “where an acknowledged preponderance of one of the
members exists.”138 But this focus on relations between states did not
mean that the internal makeup of states was unaffected by their inter-
action or vice versa. Even if his primary task was to furnish a sketch of
the changes that the European system had undergone since its forma-
tion, Heeren also wanted to show how the characters and modes of
action of the leading states had been shaped by their intercourse.139
Although the European system had reached a stage of maturity in
which “princes and nations do not exist to make war on each other,
136
See Andreas Behnke, “Eternal Peace, Perpetual War? A Critical Investigation
into Kant’s Conceptualisations of War,” Journal of International Relations
and Development 15, no. 2 (2012): 250–71.
137
Arnold Hermann Ludwig Heeren, Geschichte des Europäischen
Staatensystems und seiner Kolonien (1809/1819). I have used the following
translation: A Manual of the History of the Political System of Europe and Its
Colonies from Its Formation at the Close of the Fifteenth Century to Its
Reestablishment upon the Fall of Napoleon (London: Henry G. Bohn,
1834), 5.
138
Ibid., viii. 139 Ibid., ix.
74 The State of War
unless forced by necessity,” this had not always been the case.140 In
fact, much of what had happen in the European system before it had
reached that mature stage had happened as a result of wars motivated
by religion, succession, or territorial aggrandizement and the ability of
that system to resist quests for preponderance and to restore the bal-
ance of power. For example, of the consequences of the War of the
Austrian Succession, we learn that these “were important, not merely
to the separate states, who had been engaged in it; they were still more
so as regards the mutual relations between them.”141 As for the
American Revolutionary War, we are informed that “no other war
has led to such vast consequences as this in the history of mankind.”142
But the Seven Years’ War stands out in terms of its creative powers
because it “had called forth a spirit of activity which peace could not
allay.” Apart from its tangible effects on the balance of power, a principal
character of the activity now displayed “was the facility with which the
growing intelligence of the age enabled it to employ itself upon a variety
and multiplicity of objects unknown to it before; especially upon the
mutual relations of men and states, which now began to be known and
understood.”143 Accordingly, war was the source of that reflexivity
because the productive forces of war had not only brought the interna-
tional system into being but also had given rise to a certain awareness of
its existence that was to become the sine qua non of its maturity.
As Ranke was to remark on Heraclitus in Die Grossen Mächte (1833),
“out of the clash of opposing forces, in the crucial moments of danger –
collapse, resurgence, liberation – the most decisive new developments are
born . . . In their interaction and succession, in their life, in their decline
and rejuvenation . . . lies the secret of world history.”144 But this kind of
statist and bellicist historiography was soon challenged by the rise of
cultural history and its new practices of periodization. To historians such
as Burckhardt, it was the Renaissance revival of the ideals of antiquity
and the refinement of the arts that had provided a happy escape out of
barbarism and feudalism, not the incessant warfare between primordial
groups of people. With the invention of the Renaissance, a temporal
buffer zone was thus inserted between the dark past of barbarism and the
coming of modernity that made it possible to posit the state as a work of
140
Ibid., 477. 141 Ibid., 235. 142 Ibid., 284. 143 Ibid., 250.
144
Leopold von Ranke, “The Great Powers,” trans. Theodore von Laue, in
Theodore von Laue (ed.), Leopold Ranke: The Formative Years (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1950), 181–218, at 214 and 217.
Universal War 75
art rather than as an outcome of war.145 But given the undeniably statist
foundations of modern international relations, many of those who later
advocated a historical approach to its study would rather turn to Heeren
and Ranke for support.146
Universal War
Almost at the same time as statist history came under challenge from
cultural historians such as Burkhardt and Lamprecht, war became an
object of abstract philosophical inquiry, and its study gradually pushed in
a more nomothetic direction. To many early modern and Enlightenment
historians, war had been a productive force that could and should be
harnessed for the purposes of secular statecraft and perhaps even be
celebrated as a cause of human progress and civilization. But even if
war was widely understood as an impersonal and productive force by
these historians, it was rarely, if ever, considered separately from its
particular historical instantiations. Even if there was a tendency to use
the concept of war as if war had a life of its own, it was rarely conceived of
in abstract terms. War was an essential part of social and political life, but
only by virtue of its lack of an essence; war was capable of producing
substances only because it lacked a substance of its own.
This changed during the nineteenth century when war became the
subject of philosophical rather than merely politicohistorical analysis.
While Clausewitz’ definition of war as a “duel on a larger scale” echoes
a view of war well established already during the sixteenth century, he
is among first to insist that this is the universal and timeless meaning of
war, a meaning that transcends all its particular manifestations, and
that this meaning first needs to be grasped before we can hope to come
to terms with particular wars. As we learn from the opening pages of
Vom Kriege (1832), “war is an act of force, and there is no logical limit
to the application of that force. Each side, therefore, compels its oppo-
nent to follow suit; a reciprocal action is started which must lead, in
145
See Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy [1860]
(London: Phaidon Press, 1951), esp. 1–80; Donald R. Kelley, “The Old
Cultural History,” History of the Human Sciences 9, no. 3 (1996): 101–26.
146
Hedley Bull, “International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach,”
World Politics 18, no. 3 (1966): 361–77; Gordon A. Craig, “The Historian and
the Study of International Relations,” American Historical Review 88, no. 1
(1983): 1–11.
76 The State of War
theory, to extremes.”147 Yet, if the essence of war always remains the

same, the practices of war are open to endless modification because “if
wars between civilized nations are far less cruel and destructive than wars
between savages, the reason lies in the social conditions of the states
themselves and in their relationships to one another. These are the forces
that give rise to war; the same forces circumscribe and moderate it.”148
To Clausewitz, wars are the result of hostile feelings or hostile
intentions or both. Whereas the former motive is likely to predominate
among savage peoples and subside with civilization, the latter consti-
tutes a universal and transhistorical precondition of war. Yet “even the
most savage, almost instinctive, passion of hatred cannot be conceived
as existing without hostile intent; but hostile intentions are often unac-
companied by any sort of hostile feelings.”149 But the fact that civilized
states fight wars for different reasons and with different methods must
not lead us to conclude that the essence of war has changed or to hope
for its imminent abolishment because “it would be an obvious fallacy
to imagine war between civilized peoples as resulting merely from a
rational act on the part of their governments and to conceive of war as
gradually ridding itself of passion, so that in the end one would never
really need to use the physical impact of the fighting forces.”150 Thus,
although the actual conduct of war is contingent on shifting historical
and political circumstances, absolute war has a timeless and universal
essence that always will remain the same across time and space.151
Given their background understanding of war as a philosophical
category, it is revealing that both Marx and Engels, both of whom
struggled to make sense of contemporary wars in terms of the contra-
dictions of capitalism, nevertheless felt compelled to posit war as a
productive force in human affairs when explaining the ancient founda-
tions of class differences and the division of labor. To Marx, the
difficulties confronted by early forms of communal life stem from the
presence of other communities, so “war is therefore the great compre-
hensive task, the peat communal labour which is required either to
occupy the objective conditions of being there alive, or to protect and
perpetuate the occupation. Hence the commune consists of families
147
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 15.
148
Ibid., 14. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid.
151
For a good treatment of the conceptual underpinnings, see Raymond Aron,
Penser La Guerre, Clausewitz, vol. I (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), 108–48.
Universal War 77
organized in a warlike way.”152 And even when Engels tried to explain

the rise of social classes in purely economic terms, he conceded that
during antiquity, additional slave labor was “provided by war, and war
was as old as the simultaneous existence alongside each other of several
groups of communities.”153 This notion of war as a productive force in
human affairs was also reflected in Marx’s comments on the Indian
Revolt of 1857. Rather than being a mere mutiny, as many of his
contemporaries had it, this was indeed a national revolt that galvanized
the Indians into a community through their brave resistance to the
British. As such, the so-called revolt was more a war of independence
because now “Mussulmans and Hindoos, renouncing their mutual
antipathies, have combined against their common masters,” something
that “has coincided with a general disaffection exhibited against
English supremacy on the part of the great Asiatic nations.”154
This nascent universalistic conception of war continued to resonate
with military strategists until it found its way into early sociology toward
the end of the nineteenth century. This development was conditioned by –
and to some extent also conditioned – other and largely simultaneous
conceptual changes. The first of these concerned the concept of the nation,
which long had evolved in tandem with that of war. Whereas early
modern authors had used this concept to denote primordial groups
whose existence allegedly antedated the rise of states, and although
Sieyès had later bequeathed an understanding of the nation as an emergent
political unity under a common authority, late nineteenth-century writers
now redefined the nation in biological or cultural terms and then used this
concept to describe the violent race struggles they thought to be character-
istic of the modern international system.155
Second, and much as a consequence of the preceding, the meaning
of the concept of barbarism changes, and its range of applicability is
152
Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy
[1859], trans. S. W. Ryazanskaya (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), 246.
One of the best treatments remains W. B. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and
War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engles and Tolstoy (Cambridge: Cambridge
153
Friedrich Engels, Anti-Dühring [1894], trans. Emile Burns (New York:
International Publishers, 1966), 205.
154
Karl Marx, “The Revolt in the Indian Army,” New York Daily Tribune, July
15, 1857.
155
See Mike Hawkins, Social Darwinism in European and American Thought
1860–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 184–5.
78 The State of War
widened to encompass new peoples and societies. We have already

noted how early modern writers often invoked this notion to explain
the origins of the state. While they differed somewhat about the
temporal limits and defining characteristics of barbarism and the
barbarian, they were in broad agreement that barbarism represented
a historical stage without which the rise of the state would not have
been possible and which states and societies also had effectively
transcended in the process of becoming civilized. The barbarian
had embodied all the violent energies that found their paramount
expression in the primordial state of war until those energies were
tamed and converted into military valor once the state was in place.
Yet remnants of barbarism continued to pose an imagined threat to
political order from within as well as from without. The lower strata
of society were often described as barbarous and therefore danger-
ous, as were peoples on the fringes of the European system, such as
Swedes and Turks. During the later part of the nineteenth century,
however, peoples outside Europe were being identified as barbarous
on the basis of a blend of cultural and biological features, whereas
those Europeans previously saddled with such epithets were rede-
scribed in eugenicist terms as weak, degenerate, or simply morally
defective.
These conceptual changes have largely been attributed to the
impact of Darwinism on social and political thought during this
period.156 But perhaps this influence was more reciprocal in kind.
As Crook has argued, “Darwin transferred metaphors taken from
European military and imperial experience directly to nature.”157
But although Darwin accepted that a struggle for existence was
necessary to human development and that this struggle might well
have taken violent forms during the early stages of civilization, he
thought that it might ultimately engender sympathy and more peace-
ful forms of competition between civilized peoples.158 While some of his
156
See, for example, Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1992); Paul Crook, Darwinism, War and History: The
Debate over the Biology of War from the “Origin of Species” to the First World
War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 63–97; Casper Sylvest,
British Liberal Internationalism, 1880–1930: Making Progress? (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2009).
157
Crook, Darwinism, War and History, 15.
158
Ibid., 24–28; Hawkins, Social Darwinism, 33.
Universal War 79
followers – such as Spencer – interpreted the theory of evolution in largely

pacifist terms, others extended the assumption that conflict was a neces-
sary feature of natural selection to cover the sociopolitical realm as well,
until social Darwinism became “an omnipresent reality for the practi-
tioners of the social sciences during this period.”159 Early social scientists
were thus left with the choice of arguing either that social and cultural
evolution was dependent on, and therefore reducible to, the biological
characteristics of human beings or that social and political evolution
occurred through analogous processes of selection and adaption, mirror-
ing the mechanisms operative in nature, yet without being fully identical
with them.160 That nation and race were used interchangeably greatly
facilitated the spread of such analogies across domains. This, in turn,
made it easier to transfer naturalistic notions of struggle to the socio-
political realm and paved the way for the conclusion that nature and
culture were governed by the same underlying and immutable laws of
human existence.
While ideas of race and race struggle certainly antedated the work of
Darwin – notably those of Knox and Gobineau – such theorizing
received additional scientific legitimacy with the rather swift but also
very selective uptake of the Darwinian worldview described earlier.161
And although some Social Darwinists believed that competition
between nations gradually would assume more peaceful forms as they
became more civilized, others subscribed to the view that human pro-
gress is driven by ceaseless and violent competition between distinct
races.162 Since notions of race and nation blended biological and
cultural elements together, it became obvious to social scientists not
only that conflict between races was natural but also that such conflict
was indispensable to our understanding of society. As Le Bon claimed,
“without the conflict of individuals, races, and classes – in a word,
159
Hawkins, Social Darwinism, 13. 160 Ibid., 34–5.
161
See Robert Knox, Races of Men: A Fragment (Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard,
1850); Arthur de Gobineau, Essai sur l’Inegalité des Races Humaines (Paris:
Firmin Didot, 1853–5).
162
As Duncan Bell has shown, racial theories of international relations constitute
an important part of the prehistory of the democratic peace thesis; see Duncan
Bell, “Before the Democratic Peace: Racial Utopianism, Empire, and the
Abolition of War,” European Journal of International Relations 20, no. 3
(2014): 647–70.
80 The State of War
without universal conflict, man would never have emerged from sava-
gery, would never have attained to civilization.”163 This being so, “the
only process that Nature has been able to discover for the amelioration of
species is to bring into the world far more creatures that she is able to
nourish, and to establish between them a perpetual struggle in which only
the strongest and the best adapted can survive.”164 Yet to Le Bon, the
attainment of civilization offered no escape from the universal struggle of
races and nations that has animated history from the beginning. Thus Le
Bon maintained that “equally among the savage and the civilized man,
the state of war against his fellows is the natural state, and the struggle is
all the more cruel . . . when the people among whom it rages have attained
a higher degree of civilization.”165 The history of peoples, he continued,
“is in reality only a narrative of facts resulting from their efforts to surpass
their neighbours in military strength.”166 History therefore “tells us that
the nations have always been struggling, and that since the beginning of
the world the right of the strongest has always been the arbiter of their
destinies.”167 Those immutable laws governing history were equally valid
in the present because “international relations are to-day what they have
been since the beginning of the world, when different interests are in
question, or when it is merely a matter of a nation wishing to enlarge
itself. Right and justice have never played any part in relations of unequal
strength.”168
Similar views of universal war loomed large in the racial psychology of
Gumplowicz. To him, the state originates in the successful subjection of
weaker ethnic groups by stronger ones. Once accomplished, such subjec-
tion gives rise to a hierarchy between rulers and ruled, where the former
governs the latter by virtue of their mental and military superiority: “The
one party commands; the other labors and accommodates itself to super-
ior force. As every war must cease raging and the weaker party must give
up fruitless opposition, so nature helps to make the situation peaceful and
lasting. But peace and permanence are the elements of order, out of which
come habit, custom, rights.”169 Once consolidated, the state enters a
163
Gustave Le Bon, The Psychology of Socialism (New York: Macmillan, 1899),
323.
164
Ibid., 331.
165
Gustave Le Bon, L’Homme et les Sociétés: leurs orgines at leur histoire, vol. II
(Paris: Rotschild, 1881), 88.
166
Ibid., 95. 167 Le Bon, Psychology of Socialism, 326–7. 168 Ibid., 329.
169
Ludwig Gumplowicz, Outlines of Sociology [1885], trans. Frederick W. Moore
(Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1899), 121.
Universal War 81
perpetual struggle for survival with other nations because its “object is
always defence against attacks, increase of power and territory, that is,
conquest in one form or another.”170 The existence of universal struggle
implies that “even the least aggressive state will be drawn in spite of itself
into the stream of ‘history’; evolution cannot stop. As wants increase, the
state, which was called into being to satisfy them, is driven to further
conquests of territory and power.”171 As a result, international relations
become a constant struggle for power between races; “it is generally
recognized that states oppose each other like savage hordes; that they
follow the blind laws of nature; that no ethical law or moral obligation,
only the fear of the stronger holds them in check.”172 Yet war cannot
continue continuously, lest the ends for which it is undertaken should be
defeated. “Peace is as necessary as occasional war, for both are the result
of a natural law of strife; and so it was possible to establish states, since
otherwise the more powerful must have had to exterminate the
weaker.”173
Since history offers no escape out of endless struggle, even civilized
and powerful states must always face threats to their existence from
without as well as from within. With barbarism embodied in both the
lower races and the lower classes, Gumplowicz fears that these might
join forces in the destruction of civilization. As he goes on to explain:
[T]he fall of many a powerful civilized state under the assault of rather small
barbarian hordes could not be comprehended if it were not known that
domestic social enemies of the existing order let the secretly glimmering
hatred of the property and ruling classes burst into bright flame in the
moment of danger; and this alone is often sufficient to turn the toilsome
labor of centuries into dust and ashes.174
Given this logic of might and right, rise and decay, the only valid
moral precept on offer is that “to make war upon strangers and over-
power them is a virtue; to betray one’s fellow citizens is a crime.”175
Theories of race and race struggle were also central to early American
sociology.176 Two of its founding fathers subscribed to conceptions of
race similar to that of Gumplowicz and held that race struggle was
170
Ibid., 117. 171 Ibid., 125. 172 Ibid., 147. 173 Ibid., 126.
174
Ibid., 206. 175 Ibid., 210.
176
See Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, 51–84; Dorothy Ross,
The Origins of American Social Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992), 85–97.
82 The State of War
inevitable and desirable as a source of human progress and civilization.

Sumner – who was a card-carrying Social Darwinist – started his analysis
of war by contesting the then widespread assumption that warfare was
endemic among primitive peoples. From available anthropological evi-
dence he was able to infer that “we cannot postulate a warlike character
or a habit of fighting as a universal or even characteristic trait of primitive
man.”177 Instead, war only arises between more developed societies as a
result of a differentiation between insiders and outsiders. As Sumner
states, “the sentiment which prevails inside the ‘we-group,’ between its
members, is that of peace and cooperation; the sentiment which prevails
inside of a group towards all outsiders is that of hostility and war.”178
This differentiation between insiders and outsider is itself explained with
reference to competition for scarce resources. As Sumner goes on to
explain, “war arises from the competition of life, not from the struggle
for existence. In the struggle for existence a man is wrestling with nature
to extort from her the means of subsistence. It is when two men are
striving side by side in the struggle for existence, to extort from nature the
supplies they need, that they come into rivalry and a collision of interest
with each other takes place.”179 This struggle leads further to the forma-
tion of more or less cohesive groups stuck in competition for scarce
natural resources. “It is the competition of life, therefore, which makes
war, and that is why war always has existed and always will.”180
This violent competition for life also explains how and why states
emerged in history. The same conditions that made men hostile toward
outsiders also made them yield to domestic authority and to “submit to
discipline, obey law, cultivate peace, and create institutions inside.”181
As men fought wars, “they were acquiring discipline and cohesion; they
were learning cooperation, perseverance, fortitude, and patience.”
Thus, by necessitating concord on the inside in order to cope with
external competition, “war forms larger social units and produces
states.”182 And in order to survive the no less fierce competition in
the international system, the state must be a “true peace-group in which
there is sufficient concord and sympathy to overcome the antagonisms
of nationality, race, class etc., and in which are maintained institutions
adequate to adjust interests and control passions.”183 And since “no
177
William Graham Sumner, “War” [1903], in War and Other Essays (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1919), 3–40, at 7.
178
Ibid., 9. 179 Ibid. 180 Ibid., 10. 181 Ibid., 11. 182 Ibid., 15.
183
Ibid., 28.
Universal War 83
one has yet found any way in which two races, far apart in blood and
culture, can be amalgamated into one society with satisfaction to both,”
this entails that to maintain the cohesion necessary to ward off external
aggression, states must be racially and culturally homogeneous.184 In his
concluding remarks, Sumner addresses the question of whether universal
peace is possible. But given his ontology of race struggle, the notion of
universal peace is but an intellectual fallacy and ultimately a very danger-
ous doctrine. Peace can never embrace all of mankind, since whenever a
peace group grows bigger, “differences, discords, antagonisms, and war
begin inside of it on account of the divergence of interests.”185 By
assuming that the struggle for life is the ultimate driving force in nature,
Sumner could argue not only that war is a universal feature of human
history but also that war is constitutive of the modern state. By further
assuming that war is a perennial feature of the struggle for existence
among states, Sumner could conclude that war indeed is universal and
inescapable and also the main source of progress in human affairs.
Sumner thereby provided the historical conception of war found in
Ferguson and Kant with a scientific foundation consonant with the
Darwinist consensus of his day. By so doing, he also took important
steps toward elevating the state to the penultimate vehicle of universal
and racial war. And, by understanding race and nation as congruent, he
was able to assume that the struggle for existence that had animated the
premodern period and the international wars of his own present were
instantiations of the same underlying and immutable laws.
A similar line of argument was presented by the statistician and euge-
nicist Pearson in his attempt to put nationalism on a scientific footing.
Guided by the question of what part the nation plays in the universal
struggle for existence, he contended that the scientific view of the nation
requires that we regard it as “an organized whole, kept up to a high pitch
of internal efficiency by insuring that its numbers are substantially
recruited from the better stocks, and kept up to a high pitch of external
efficiency by contest, chiefly by way of war with inferior races, and with
equal races by the struggle for trade-routes and for the sources of raw
material and of food supply.”186 Thus the nation itself is constituted
through race struggle, and once nations become racially homogeneous,
184
Ibid., 35. 185 Ibid., 36.
186
Karl Pearson, National Life from the Standpoint of Science [1900] (London:
Adam & Charles Black, 1901), 43.
84 The State of War
this struggle will perpetuate itself as a conscious quest for dominance in

the international system, a struggle in which the white man ultimately
must prevail.
Although the other founding father of American sociology spent much
time debunking Social Darwinism for what he took to be its misguided
cosmological starting points, Ward was no less inclined to see universal
struggle as the constitutive force in the historical and social evolution of
mankind. To him, all social structures owe their existence to “some form
of struggle among the social forces whereby the centrifugal and destruc-
tive character of each force acting alone is neutralized and each is made to
contribute to the constructive work of society.”187 Whereas Sumner held
war to be a perennial feature of human history from its primitive past to
the present day, Ward regarded universal struggle as the condition of
possibility of the social realm and the key to its differentiation from mere
nature, this being so because human beings have first to subjugate or
domesticate other species in their quest for survival before they can enter
a state of war among themselves. Yet, having done so, a struggle between
human races will inevitably follow, since “each race looks upon all others
as utterly unlike itself, and usually there exists among different races the
most profound mutual contempt. Whenever two races are brought into
contact it usually means war.”188 Drawing heavily on the earlier works
by Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer, both of whom “have abundantly and
admirably proved that the genesis of society as we see it and know it has
been through the struggle of races,” Ward goes on to describe the
historical development that has led to the formation of states and the
subsequent transposition of universal struggle to the international
realm.189 The first step is the conquest and subjugation of one race by
another. After a conclusive victory, the conquering race needs the assis-
tance of the conquered race. “After a long trial of the stern policy of
repression the physically superior race tires of the strain and relaxes in the
direction of general law, of calling in the aid of the best elements of the
weaker race, and at length reaches the stage marked by the formation of a
state.”190 But the formation and consolidation of states does not end of
race struggle but rather marks its transposition to another level. As Ward
goes on to argue, “races, states, peoples, nations are always forming,
187
Lester F. Ward, Pure Sociology: A Treatise on the Origin and Spontaneous
Development of Society [1903] (New York: Macmillan, 1916), 193.
188
Ibid., 193. 189 Ibid., 203. 190 Ibid., 208.
Universal War 85
always aggressing, always clashing and clinching, and struggling for the
mastery, and the long, painful, wasteful, but always fruitful gestation
must be renewed and repeated again and again.”191 Like Sumner before
him, Ward could not see how this struggle between races ever could end
other than by the conclusive dominance of the superior race over all
others, unless all impetus behind human progress should be irretrievably
lost and barbarism should return with a vengeance. Propelled by the
natural hatred between races, “the movement must go on, and there
seems no place for it to stop until, just as man has gained dominion
over the animal world, so the highest type of man shall gain dominion
over all the lower types of man.”192
But what are we to make of these accounts of race struggle and its
role as a driver of historical progress? Many scholars have seen these
ideas and their subsequent dissemination as an important ideational
cause of the First World War. Especially when combined other noxious
ingredients, such as Realpolitik and ethnic nationalism, these theories
offered not only new ways of legitimizing imperialism and colonialism
abroad, but by portraying war among European states as inevitable
and sometimes even desirable, they also furnished a recipe for disaster.
Their preoccupation with race and race struggle also made these the-
ories complicit in policies of racial extermination.193 Yet, by focusing
more or less exclusively on the meaning and function of the concept of
race in those theories, existing scholarship has missed what I take to be
a more important point. This has to do with the primacy accorded to
struggle in their accounts of the genesis of political order. Even though
the authors discussed earlier took racial differences to be constitutive of
states and the international system, they accorded explanatory priority
to the concept of struggle over that of race. Races – whether conceived
in biological or cultural terms or in any conceivable blend thereof – are
not understood as preconstituted entities whose identities and bound-
aries are immutable but are themselves seen as outcomes of multiple
struggles in the past.
191
Ibid. 192 Ibid., 239.
193
See, for example, Richard Weikart, “Progress through Racial Extermination:
Social Darwinism, Eugenics, and Pacifism in Germany, 1860–1918,” German
Studies Review 26, no. 2 (2003): 273–94; Richard Weikart, From Darwin to
Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics, and Racism in Germany (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy:
Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge
86 The State of War
The mechanisms of racial differentiation invoked by Social Darwinists

presuppose that the struggle for existence is a cosmological principle
whose applicability extends to all living beings from the beginning of the
world. When tailored to fit certain political purposes, this obsession with
struggle resulted in a celebration of the productive forces of war, whose
looping effects were manifest in the many atrocities that were to follow
during the twentieth century. In its more extreme versions, this celebra-
tion of war also brought a profound suspicion of peace. As the German
general Bernhardi argued just before the onset of the First World War,
the aspiration to peace is “directly antagonistic to the great universal
laws that rule all life. War is a biological necessity of the first importance,
a regulative element in the life of mankind that cannot be dispensed with,
since without it an unhealthy development will follow, which excludes
every advancement of the race, and therefore all civilization.”194
In this chapter, we have seen how different conceptions of war have
been invoked in order to explain the genesis of the modern state and the
international system by contrasting them with a stateless past of barbar-
ism. Despite significant discontinuities in terms of historical conscious-
ness across different historical contexts, war – however defined – bestows
order to history to the extent that the temporal limits of statehood would
appear enigmatic in its absence. As I pointed out in Chapter 1, this is why
the concept of war seems to lack a history of its own, since war is a
condition of possible history, at least in the shape in which the past has
become known to us within Western historiography.
We have also noted that while the meaning of war changes almost
imperceptibly in response to ontological and epistemological muta-
tions underlying the practice of historical writing, the range of subjects
allegedly constituted through warfare varies considerably across time,
taking us from primordial kinship groups via states and nations to
races. Hence those who want to explain the occurrence of war with
reference to the characteristics of states or the international system
should be reminded that since these entities long have been believed
to be nothing but avatars of war, their explanations cannot be but fancy
restatements of already well-entrenched but long-forgotten looping
effects of the ontogenetic view of war. We have also seen how the
quest for temporal limits led many historians to posit a stateless past
194
Friedrich von Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, trans. Allen H. Powles
(New York: Longmans, Green, 1914), 18.
Universal War 87
from which states could emerge only by escaping the barbarism that
made them possible in the first place. Yet such escape was possible only
by projecting the most undesirable characteristics of that barbarous
past onto non-European peoples, now believed to be stuck with poli-
tical institutions and practices of a kind that the Europeans thought
they had left behind. To fully understand how this act of wholesale
political exorcism was accomplished, however, we have to inquire into
how the spatial limits of the modern state and the international system
were defined and defended with reference to the productive force of
war. That is the task of Chapter 3.
3 Fortifying the State
Introduction
Territoriality has long been a defining characteristic of the modern state
and the international system. As John Herz once pointed out, what
accounts for the coherence of the modern state is the fact of its physical
extension, “an expanse of territory encircled for its identification and
its defense by a ‘hard shell’ of fortifications.”1 And since the interna-
tional system is composed of such territorial states, it has also been
widely accepted that “every international order, down to our own day,
has been essentially territorial.”2 Hence, at least since Leibniz insisted
that sovereignty entails jurisdiction over a bounded portion of space,
territoriality has been what distinguishes the modern state and the
modern international order from what allegedly existed before, a feu-
dal order characterized by multiple authorities with overlapping jur-
isdictions ruling unbounded and heterogeneous political spaces.3 Being
an essential attribute of states, territory has also been regarded as a
potent source of discord in international politics. “War, whether inter-
state or guerilla, is a political process that has as its purpose the control
of territory to enable subsequent projections of power.”4 Since many
1
John H. Herz, “Rise and Demise of the Territorial State,” World Politics 9, no. 4
(1957): 473–93, at 474.
2
Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 161. For an analysis of this
assumption, see Alexander B. Murphy, “The Sovereign State System as Political-
Territorial Idea: Historical and Contemporary Considerations,” in Thomas J.
Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds.), State Sovereignty as Social Construct
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 81–120.
3
See, for example, Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Saskia Sassen, Territory,
Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2006), 25–73.
4
Colin Flint, “Introduction: Geography of War and Peace,” in Colin Flint (ed.),
The Geography of War and Peace: From Death Camps to Diplomats (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005), 1–15, at 6.
88
Introduction 89
wars have been caused by disputes over territory or aimed at territorial

conquest, the preservation of territorial integrity has long been a para-
mount concern of state security until it eventually became a sacrosanct
principle of modern international order.5 So even if we should agree
with those who today argue that political authority has become
increasingly deterritorialized and that territory therefore has lost
much of its former importance to international politics, the fact
remains that by most definitions state sovereignty denotes supreme
authority within a given territory.6
But how did territoriality become a defining characteristic of the
modern state and a perennial apple of discord in international politics?
This is puzzling, especially given that early modern theories of the state
rarely made any explicit references to the concept of territory nor
implied that political authority had to be spatially bounded to be
legitimate. As Brett has eloquently pointed out, “the drive to define
the city as a unity possessed of sovereign power, and to show how that
entity and that power can have been created by individual human
agents, militates against the definition of the state in terms of place or
even of territory.”7 Although Bodin maintained that sovereignty was
confined to a commonwealth composed of a multitude of households,
he did not assume that this multitude had to be spatially bounded.8
Furthermore, while Grotius held that imperium could be exercised over
places as well as peoples, the primary subjects of sovereign power were
the latter.9 And since Hobbes recognized no limits to the scope of
sovereignty, its territorial extension is at best implicit in his account.10
In sum, as Benton has pointed out, the conceptions of space implied by
early modern theories of the state were heterogeneous and elastic ones
5
See, for example, John Vasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993); Mark W. Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm:
International Boundaries and the Use of Force,” International Organization 55,
no. 2 (2001): 215–50; Monica Duffy Toft, “Territory and War,” Journal of
Peace Research 51, no. 2 (2014): 185–98.
6
See, for example, Ayelet Banai, Margaret Moore, David Miller, Cara Nine, and
Frank Dietrich, “Symposium ‘Theories of Territory beyond Westphalia’,”
International Theory 6, no. 1 (2014): 98–104.
7
Annabel S. Brett, Changes of State: Nature and the Limits of the City in Early
Modern Natural Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 212.
8
See Stuart Elden, The Birth of Territory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2013), 240.
9
Ibid., 259–68; Brett, Changes of State, 199, 210.
10
Elden, The Birth of Territory, 301; Brett, Changes of State, 212.
at best, and it was not until later that the concept of sovereignty came to
connote exclusive control over a bounded territory.11
In response to this puzzle, many scholars have tried to explain when
and how the connection between political authority and territory first
emerged. According to a pioneering effort by John Ruggie, the quin-
tessentially modern congruence between authority and territory was
made possible by the Renaissance invention of linear perspective and its
subsequent incorporation in political and legal thought. As Ruggie
argued, “what was true in the visual arts was equally true in politics:
political space came to be defined as it appeared from a single fixed
viewpoint. The concept of sovereignty, then, was merely the doctrinal
counterpart of the application of single-point perspectival forms to the
spatial organization of politics.”12 In what since has crystallized into a
constructivist consensus on this issue, many authors have affirmed the
historical contingency of modern conceptions of space and emphasized
the importance of geographic and cartographic practices in the shaping
of the modern state and the modern international system.13 As Branch
has claimed in what arguably is the most sophisticated statement of this
position to date, the invention of modern techniques of mapping was
necessary, if not sufficient, for the emergence and consolidation of the
modern state and the international system. The dissemination of carto-
graphic representations of linear and homogeneous space restructured
conceptions of political authority among actors, thereby legitimizing
territorial forms of rule at the expense of nonterritorial ones. Although
modern mapping techniques evolved independently of political
11
Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European
Empires, 1400–1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1–39,
279–99.
12
John Gerard Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in
International Relations,” International Organization 47, no. 1 (1993): 139–74,
at 159; Richard Ned Lebow, “Constitutive Causality: Imagined Spaces and
Political Practices,” Millennium 38, no. 2 (2009): 211–39. See also Samuel Y.
Edgerton, The Renaissance Rediscovery of Linear Perspective (New York: Basic
Books, 1975); John Agnew, “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical
Assumptions of International Relations Theory,” Review of International
Political Economy 1, no. 1 (1994): 53–80.
13
See, for example, Elden, The Birth of Territory; Jordan Branch, The
Cartographic State: Maps, Territory, and the Origins of Sovereignty
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Jeppe Strandsbjerg, Territory,
Globalization and International Relations: The Cartographic Reality of Space
(Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
Introduction 91
considerations, their implicit notions of homogeneous and demarcated

spaces were gradually translated into political practice, as indicated by
the increasing salience of references to territorial boundaries in peace
treaties from the early modern to the modern period.14
In another no less comprehensive account of the congruence
between political authority and territory, Elden argued that while
the treaties that concluded the Thirty Years War did not contain
any modern notion of territorially bounded sovereignty, they
nevertheless granted territorial rights to individual princes, and
subsequent attempts to spell out the implications of these rights
led Leibniz to argue that “sovereign is he who is master of a
territory.” Although this definition of sovereignty echoed medieval
conceptions of territorial jurisdiction and was articulated against
the backdrop of lingering claims to imperial authority, it was the
first time supreme authority was explicitly equated with territorial
control.15
Yet the question of how such conceptions of territorial author-
ity were translated into facts on the ground has rarely been
raised, and the few answers available portray this as a process
of rationalization through which cartographic representations
were translated more or less directly into actual territorial
demarcations. As Biggs has described this process, “as lands
were surveyed and mapped, they were reshaped into a territory:
a homogenous [sic] and uniform space, demarcated by linear
boundaries.”16 But, although both Biggs and Branch describe in
detail how mapping techniques were gradually harnessed for
political purposes and how they shaped perceptions of what con-
stituted legitimate political authority, they do not have much to
say about how this conversion was carried out in practice. Thus,
as Shah pointed out, there seems to be a missing link in much
recent constructivist scholarship on territoriality. While construc-
tivists help us to make sense of territorial sovereignty in the
abstract form, it appears in legal and political theories that they
have failed to account for how the physical substratum of the
14
Branch, Cartographic State, 1–67. 15 Elden, Birth of Territory, 318–21.
16
Michael Biggs, “Putting the State on the Map: Cartography, Territory, and
European State Formation,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 41, no.
2 (1999): 374–405, at 385.
state – the res of the respublica – came into being and became a
natural point of reference for these theories.17
To the same extent that cartography constituted the object of state
formation, though, state authorities constituted the object of cartogra-
phy by creating its referents through concrete practices of demarcation
and unification.18 Taking this suggestion seriously would imply that we
should not confine our inquiry to the changing representations of
territory on maps but that we ought to pay attention to how the
corresponding referents were created as well. Hence, in this chapter, I
focus on the process of conversion through which claims to sovereign
authority represented on maps were translated into facts on the ground
and how the outcome of this process became naturalized and taken for
granted by historical geographers. As I suggest, the conversion of
symbolic claims to territorial authority we find on early modern maps
into the kind of demarcated territory we have come to associate with
the modern state was to a large extent carried out and justified with
reference to the productive forces of war and warfare, forces that were
held capable of generating geographic facts on their own. This is
evident from the consistent appeals made by cartographers and geo-
graphers to the need to keep foreign enemies at bay and to the desire to
prevent unclear jurisdictions from causing domestic unrest.
Yet my argument must be distinguished from the view according to
which territoriality and boundaries originate in political violence. This
view has a long pedigree within social theory and is implicit in some
theories of state formation.19 As Lefebvre argued some time ago, state
sovereignty “implies a space against which violence, whether latent or
overt, is directed, a space established and constituted by violence.”20 By
the same token, Virilio has emphasized how the territoriality of the
modern state was shaped by the strategic imperatives of war from the
Middle Ages to the French Revolution.21 According to a recent version
17
Nisha Shah, “The Territorial Trap of the Territorial Trap: Global
Transformation and the Problem of the State’s Two Territories,” International
Political Sociology 6, no. 1 (2012): 57–76.
18
Biggs, “Putting the State on the Map,” 391.
19
See Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1985), 35–60.
20
Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space [1974] (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991),
280.
21
For the idea that human geography is conditioned by war, see Paul Virilio,
L’Insecurité du Territoire (Paris: Galilée, 1993); Paul Virilio, Speed and Politics
Introduction 93
of this view, while maps were certainly instrumental in the process of

state making insofar as they helped demarcate legitimate claims to
political authority from illegitimate ones, they also helped to “mask
the violence that brings the state into being and the interests that sustain
the ideological preponderance of the state system.”22 From this point
of view, the territoriality of the modern states owes its existence to
violent disputes over territory that only later resulted in stable demar-
cations. As Brenner and Elden have stated this point, “[t]erritory is
always being produced and reproduced by the actions of the former
and through political struggles over the latter.”23
But to say that territory was an object of struggle before it settled into
an organizing principle raises the question of how this connection
between territory and political violence emerged in the first place. My
intention in this chapter is not to contest or corroborate the above-
mentioned views but to describe how they became possible to entertain
and why they were able to acquire verisimilitude over time. To answer
these questions, I believe that we must attend to the productive forces
attributed to war in cartographic and geographic theory and practice.
Doing this should not mean, of course, that we commit ourselves to any
aspect of this view or that cartographic representations of political
space were themselves constitutive of territoriality. As I will argue,
much in the same way as the temporal limits of the state and the
international system were drawn with reference to a primordial state
of war, so the spatial boundaries of states as well as the less tangible
lines of demarcation separating the civilized world from its barbarous
outside were informed by violent imaginaries that emphasized the ever-
present possibility of warfare and domestic unrest as the main drivers
behind processes of territorial demarcation and unification. Such ima-
ginaries were further reinforced by cartographic representations of
space that rendered the outcome contingent on the successful use of
force. Hence the fact that we have come to understand the territoriality
of the state and the international system as an outcome of war and
(New York: Semiotext(e), 1986), 29–41; for an analysis, see Tim Luke and
Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “The Spatiality of War, Speed and Vision in the Work of
Paul Virilio,” in Mike Crang and Nigel Thrift (eds.), Thinking Space (London:
Routledge, 2000), 360–79.
22
Mark Neocleous, “Off the Map: On Violence and Cartography,” European
Journal of Social Theory 6, no. 4 (2003): 409–25, at 422.
23
Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden, “Henri Lefebvre on State, Space, Territory,”
International Political Sociology 3, no. 4 (2009): 353–77, at 367.
warfare testifies to the potent looping effects of such imaginaries in and

out of cartography, with profound consequences for the ways in which
we have come to understand the causes of war within the modern
international order.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I
will sketch some of the main features of the geographic and carto-
graphic revolutions and the reconceptualization of space that they
brought into being. I will then proceed to describe how the largely
symbolic claims to sovereignty embodied in early modern maps were
translated into actual claims to territorial authority. Doing this, I will
analyze how different conceptions of territoriality were disseminated
among political elites and gradually translated into facts on the ground,
arguing that violent geographic imaginaries acted as the main con-
veyors in this process. In the third section, I focus on the art of for-
tification and the quest for natural boundaries. Although I believe that
Virilio overstated this point when he argued that the modern state is but
the outcome of a long process of fortification, I think that it is helpful to
regard fortification as a shorthand for the process by which abstract
conceptions of territory were turned into facts on the ground, for the
simple reason that fortification was seen as a model by many of those
who were busy bringing this process of conversion about. In the final
section, I dwell on how the imagined congruence of political authority
and territory was naturalized and taken for granted as a consequence of
attempts to reconceptualize geography as a struggle between nations
and races.
Mapping the State

As I have described in some detail elsewhere, the geographic and
cartographic revolutions of the early modern period were conditioned
by changes in cosmological? outlook that took place during the late
sixteenth century.24 These changes made it possible to conceptualize
the world as a spherical object, a globe. This was a precondition for the
compartmentalization of that spherical object into distinct portions by
24
See Jens Bartelson, Visions of World Community (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009); Jens Bartelson, “The Social Construction of Globality,”
International Political Sociology 4, no. 3 (2010): 219–35.
Mapping the State 95
means of geometric methods, as well as for the subsequent subjection of

such portions to exclusive claims to sovereign authority by their
rulers.25 To this end, “the machine of discovery . . . not only produced
an immense perceptual challenge and epistemological problem but also
the realization of an almost totally accessible and inhabitable global
arena in which to contend with this problem.”26 On this emergent
global arena, the discipline of cosmography “could reign as an absolute
sovereign over the terraqueous globe . . . It manipulated at will the
natural frontiers of rivers and mountains; determined the future of
peoples by fixing their migrations and boundaries.”27 As Sloterdijk
summarized the ideological temptations brought by this development,
“as soon as the form of the sphere could be constructed in geometrical
abstraction and gazed upon in cosmological contemplation, there arose
forcefully the question of who should rule over the represented and
produced sphere.”28 Hence dreams of unbounded sovereignty “found
the beginnings of its realization in the map or sphere that was dedicated
to the monarch, framed by his arms and traversed by his ships, and that
opened up to his dreams of empire a space of intervention stretching to
the limits of the terraqueous globe.”29 Hence the appropriation of
space on a global scale was as much a source of knowledge as a source
of sovereignty by rising imperial powers.30 But while such
25
See Denis Cosgrove, Apollo’s Eye: A Cartographic Genealogy of the Earth in the
Western Imagination (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Denis
Cosgrove, “Globalism and Tolerance in Early Modern Geography,” Annals of
the Association of American Geographers 93, no. 4 (2003): 852–70.
26
John Headley, “The Sixteenth-Century Venetian Celebration of the Earth’s
Total Habitability: The Issue of the Fully Habitable World for Renaissance
Europe,” Journal of World History 8, no. 1: 1–27, at 24.
27
Frank Lestringant, Mapping the Renaissance World: The Geographical
Imagination in the Age of Discovery (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 3.
28
Peter Sloterdijk, “Geometry in the Colossal: The Project of Metaphysical
Globalization,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 27 (2009): 29–
40, at 33. For the full story, see Peter Sloterdijk, Globes, Spheres, vol. II:
Macrospherology (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2014).
29
Lestringant, Mapping the Renaissance World, 23. See also David Turnbull,
“Cartography and Science in Early Modern Europe: Mapping the Construction
of Knowledge Spaces,” Imago Mundi 48, no. 1 (1996): 5–24.
30
Jerry Brotton, Trading Territories: Mapping the Early Modern World (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 83; Brian J. Harley, “Silences and Secrecy:
The Hidden Agenda of Cartography in Early Modern Europe,” Imago Mundi
40, no. 1 (1988): 57–76; John Harley and Paul Laxton, The New Nature of
Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
representations of space inspired visions of empire and world commu-

nity, they were also harnessed for the purpose of buttressing particular-
istic claims to territorial sovereignty.31 As Branch has aptly described
this, “a mutually constitutive relationship exists between representations
of political space, the ideas held by actors about the organization of
political authority, and actors’ authoritative political practices manifest-
ing those ideas.”32
To some extent, this was a result of claims to political authority
already being symbolically embodied in maps. As Jacob has pointed
out, “[m]aps reflect a desire for completeness, a dream of universality, a
yearning for power in which seeing from a point of view forbidden to
all others . . . is equivalent to possession.”33 Thus, before invading
Provence in 1536, Charles V had convinced himself that possessing a
map of this province was tantamount to possessing a title to the
province proper.34 But since we should be careful to attribute causal
powers to inanimate objects such as maps, contentions such as the
preceding raise questions about how abstract conceptions of space
represented on maps were translated into actual territoriality and
how they spurred quests for territorial control. Granted that maps
are nothing more and nothing less than instruments of power – albeit
arguably very potent ones – how can we understand the process
through which the authority claims they embody were realized?
Although I am sympathetic to those who argue that advances in
cartography and techniques of mapping played an important role in
the creation of modern states and the international system, I would like
to add that the role of cartography in this process ought to be under-
stood against the backdrop of contemporary beliefs about the produc-
tive nature of war and warfare. The territorialization of political
authority was not the result of a rationalization of space through the
agreed imposition of neat geometric demarcations but a process to a
31
See Marcelo Escolar, “Exploration, Cartography and the Modernization of
State Power,” International Social Science Journal 49, no. 151 (1997): 55–75.
32
Branch, Cartographic State, 69.
33
Christian Jacob, The Sovereign Map: Theoretical Approaches in Cartography
throughout History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 1.
34
Martin Du Bellay, Mémoires de messire Martin Du Bellay, in Choix de
chroniques et mémoires sur l’histoire de France, vol. 11, ed. J. A. C. Buchon
(Paris: A. Desrez, 1836), 582. Quoted in John Hale, “Warfare and Cartography,
ca. 1450 to ca. 1640,” in David Woodward (ed.), The History of Cartography,
vol. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 719–37, at 719.
large extent driven by perceptions of military necessity on behalf of

ruling elites in Europe, and many of these perceptions were, in turn,
informed by ontogenetic conceptions of war and warfare. Although
mapmaking at first evolved independently of such concerns and catered
to many different needs, historians of military thought have empha-
sized how later advances in cartography were prompted by military
necessity and how these advances, in turn, contributed to the evolution
of military strategy.35
As Foucault pointed out, territory was a strategic concept before it
became a geographic one. According to him, the traditional problem of
sovereignty was a matter of holding onto or conquering territory,
which gave rise to the questions that came to preoccupy geographers
and cartographers during the early modern period: how can territories
be demarcated, fixed, protected, or enlarged?36 Raising successful
claims to territorial authority and jurisdiction presupposed that ques-
tions such as these could be answered with sufficient precision and the
answers then effectively implemented. Thus, when Jomini famously
defined strategy as “the art of making war upon the map,” he was
thereby taking for granted what in fact was the result of a long process
through which the concerns of cartography and warfare had been
allowed to cross-fertilize so that the lines drawn on the map by means
of the pen also could be drawn on the ground by means of the sword.
Without the mapping of territory, no modern military strategy could
succeed, as well as conversely.37 In this section, I try to show how this
confluence of concerns took place during the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries and how this ushered in the territorial demarcations
that we have come to associate with the modern state and the interna-
tional system. Doing this, I focus mainly on developments in Britain
and France. Both these states were early adopters of new technologies
of surveying and mapmaking that had emerged during the cartographic
35
See, for example, Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the
Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 76–8.
36
Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège de
France 1977–1978 (New York: Picador, 2007), 64–5. For a useful commentary,
see Stuart Elden, “How Should We Do the History of Territory?,” Territory,
Politics, Governance 1, no. 1 (2013): 5–20.
37
Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War, ed. and trans. G. H. Mendell
and W. P. Craighill (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1862), 69.
revolution and were quick to harness them for political and military
purposes in ways that were widely emulated by other European
states.38 Although significant cartographic resources were developed
by Portugal and Spain, these were mainly devoted to the mapping of
their overseas possessions, even if detailed maps of the Iberian
Peninsula such as the Escorial Atlas were produced during the late
sixteenth century. Given that the land frontiers of Spain were compara-
tively short, its government faced no strong incentives to produce
domestic maps.39
While many early modern maps were produced for commercial and
artistic reasons, many European governments started to commission
maps and undertake major mapping projects during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. One of the most important functions of early
maps was to embody representations of royal power and to disseminate
these representations in order to legitimize royal claims to power. In
1579, Saxton produced his Atlas of the Counties of England and
Wales, its frontispiece embellished with a portrait of an enthroned
Elizabeth I. Similar developments soon followed in France, with
Bouguereau’s Le Théatre Francoys celebrating the rise of Henri de
Navarre to the throne in 1594 by depicting the lands under his con-
trol.40 During the reign of Louis XIV, the making and dissemination of
maps became important in order to legitimize royal authority and
territorial conquests to those on the receiving end, as indicated by the
appearance of Les Glorieuses Conquestes de Louis Le Grand by
Sébastien de Beaulieu in 1662.
But although the rise of cartography was closely connected to royal
claims to power, it was also driven by more practical considerations,
38
See Peter Barber, “England I: Pageantry, Defense, and Government – Maps at
Court to 1550,” in David Buisseret (ed.), Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps: The
Emergence of Cartography as a Tool of Government in Early Modern Europe
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 26–56; Peter Barber, “England II:
Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps, 1550–1625,” in Buisseret, Monarchs,
Ministers, and Maps, 57–98; David Buisseret, “Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps
in France before the Ascension of Louis XIV,” in Buisseret, Monarchs,
Ministers, and Maps, 99–123.
39
Geoffrey Parker, “Maps and Ministers: The Spanish Habsburgs,” in Buisseret,
Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps, 124–52.
40
Christine Petto, Mapping and Charting in Early Modern England and France:
Power, Patronage, and Production (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015), 4–
13.
and new methods of surveying and mapping were often invented in

direct response to pressing needs for taxation and administrative
reform.41 Reflecting such needs, surveys by means of triangulation
were made by Jacob van Deventer in the Duchy of Brabant and were
followed by similar efforts in other northern provinces of the Low
Countries during the mid-sixteenth century. Some of these maps were
later incorporated into the undisputed masterpiece of Renaissance
cartography, the Theatrum Orbis Terrarum (1570) by Abraham
Ortelius.42 One of the first land surveys that covered an entire realm
was undertaken in Sweden well before it had achieved great power
status.43 The Swedish Land Survey (Lantmäteriet) was established by a
royal decree in 1628 and given the task of surveying the entire kingdom
“not only to protect his land and realm against the enemy, but also to
use every opportunity and means to improve their condition.”44 While
the precise motives for undertaking this massive task have been dis-
puted by historians, it now seems clear that mapping the realm was
prompted by the Swedish aspirations to great power status at the
time.45
Similar projects followed elsewhere. When Colbert launched the first
geodetic survey of France in 1660, it was motivated by the need for
administrative reform and the desire to advance commerce. The latter
remained an important rationale for surveying and mapping well into
the next century, when Cassini de Thury justified his undertaking in the
following way: “as much as it is necessary for the sovereign to know the
41
Monique Pelletier, “Cartography and Power in France during the Seventeenth
and Eighteenth Centuries,” Cartographica: The International Journal for
Geographic Information and Geovisualization 35, nos. 3–4 (1998): 41–53.
42
Cornelis Koeman and Marco van Egmond, “Surveying and Official Mapping in
the Low Countries, 1500–ca. 1670,” in Woodward, The History of
Cartography, vol. 3, part II, 1246–94, esp. 1257ff.
43
See Elizabeth Baigent, “Swedish Cadastral Mapping 1628–1700: A Neglected
Legacy,” Geographical Journal 156, no. 1 (1990): 62–9; Roger J. P. Kain and
Elizabeth Baigent, The Cadastral Map in the Service of the State: A History of
Property Mapping (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
44
Kunglig Instruktion, April 4, 1628, quoted in Viktor Ekstrand (ed.), Samlingar i
Landtmäteri, första samlingen, instruktioner och bref, 1628–1699 (Stockholm:
Isaac Marcus, 1901), 1.
45
See Staffan Helmfrid, “De geometriska jordeböckerna –
‘skattläggningskartor,’” YMER 79 no. 3 (1959), 224–31; Baigent, “Swedish
Cadastral Mapping 1628–1700,” 64, 67.
country under his dominion well, it is useful to the subjects to know the
location of places where their interests can be furthered and commerce
conducted.”46
Although boundaries and administrative divisions were often deli-
neated on these maps, such boundaries rarely corresponded to the
actual jurisdictions of early modern states but rather reflected the
working methods of cartographers and their desire to impose a sense
of order on a world whose intelligibility had been all but lost during the
age of discoveries.47 Sometimes cartographers produced maps that
conveyed the impression of more territorial homogeneity and political
centralization than was actually the case, but which were deemed
suitable to further such ambitions.48 Whether produced for propagan-
distic or practical purposes, maps and atlases conditioned subsequent
claims to territorial authority by secular rulers in Europe and else-
where. So “while atlas structure was defining political territory ever
more precisely . . . it was also giving form to the political territoriality
and geopolitical appetites of particular nations.”49 In the case of France –
which might be taken as paradigmatic in this regard – there was a striking
lack of correspondence between the “natural” boundaries delineated by
cartographers and the actual extent of its governmental jurisdiction. As
Sahlins has remarked, “the stylized depiction of rivers and mountains
within a growing commercial cartography provided a language that lent
itself to the more general political project of building an idealized repre-
sentation of the state.”50 But, however inaccurate they were, such repre-
sentations of territory were not only essential to the conduct of foreign
policy but also were important in fostering a sense of identity by defining
populations with reference to their location. As we have seen, the
idea that the political authority ought to be exercised over a sufficiently
46
César-François Cassini de Thury, Description Géométrique de la France (Paris:
Desaint, 1783), 5.
47
For this theme, see Charles W. J. Withers, Placing the Enlightenment: Thinking
Geographically about the Age of Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2007), 87–110.
48
Josef W. Konvitz, “The Nation-State, Paris and Cartography in Eighteenth- and
Nineteenth-Century France,” Journal of Historical Geography 16, no. 1 (1990):
3–16.
49
James R. Akerman, “The Structuring of Political Territory in Early Printed
Atlases,” Imago Mundi 47, no. 1 (1995): 138–54, at 152.
50
Peter Sahlins, “Natural Frontiers Revisited: France’s Boundaries since the
Seventeenth Century,” American Historical Review 95, no. 5 (1990): 1423–51,
at 1428.
homogeneous population antedated the notion that its exercise should be

territorially bounded, yet cartography provided one important means for
aligning populations and territories under the same sovereign gaze. Given
imperatives such as these, early modern cartographic projects aimed at
establishing more precise boundaries in order to settle issues of jurisdic-
tion and loyalty in contested areas, such as in the frontier zones between
France and the Netherlands.51 As cartographic methods became more
precise and the resulting maps more accurate, not only did they become
more useful in settling territorial disputes but also in order to bring
territories and populations to coincide by turning territorial boundaries
into national boundaries.52 But this was not always without complica-
tions; since maps could be used to promote different interests depending
on the cartographic techniques used, they sometimes fueled territorial and
national disputes rather than contributed to their resolution.53
Simultaneously, the early modern period was marked by great
changes in the art of war in Europe. As armies grew in size and the
importance of artillery increased, the need for effective field command
increased in proportion. Since the art of command now consisted of
combining the strengths of the various branches of the army, this was a
matter of making optimal use of the terrain for defense as well as
attack.54 As Machiavelli advised a captain marching through foreign
territory, “the first thing [you] must do is to have the whole territory
described and pictured so that [you] know the places, the number, the
distances, the roads, the mountains, the rivers and marshes, and the
nature of them.”55 Thus, although some maps were widely dissemi-
nated to bolster royal claims to authority and foster a sense of national
identity, military maps were often surrounded by secrecy. In Portugal,
51
David Buisseret, “The Cartographic Definition of France’s Eastern Boundary in
the Early Seventeenth Century,” Imago Mundi 36, no. 1 (1984): 72–80.
52
See, for example, Daniel Nordman, “Des Limites d’État aux Frontières
Nationales,” in Pierre Nora (ed.), Les Lieux de Memoire, vol. II: La Nation
(Paris: Gallimard, 1997), 1125–46.
53
See, for example, Mary Pedley, “Map Wars: The Role of Maps in the Nova
Scotia/Acadia Boundary Disputes of 1750,” Imago Mundi 50, no. 1 (1998): 96–
104.
54
For the impact of the military revolution on cartography and mapping, see
David Buisseret, The Mapmakers’ Quest: Depicting New Worlds in Renaissance
Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 113–38.
55
Niccolò Machiavelli, The Art of War, trans. Christopher Lynch (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2003), 111.
the government kept all cartographic information under strict surveil-

lance and on several occasions ordered the destruction of all maps and
globes for reasons of national security.56 And when Charles IX of
France was presented with a map of his country by a cartographer, he
had it locked up “because maps are useful in war, enabling a foreign
enemy to lead an army without the aid of a guide who knows the
country across the terrain shown on the said maps, utilizing only a
quadrant.”57
With some hindsight, such suspiciousness seems unfounded and even
paranoid. Although geographic knowledge had long been deemed use-
ful to military planning, military concerns were initially of limited
importance to the evolution of cartography and the production of
maps. As Hale has shown, the knowledge required for successful
campaigns was not primarily transmitted through maps but rather
orally or in writing. Though commercial maps were widely available
from the late sixteenth century onward, they did not cater that well to
the needs of the field commander. Because such maps rarely contained
any strategically important information about the precise locations of
roads, river crossings, and mountain passes or the nature of the terrain,
military leaders rather relied on written or oral topographic accounts
when planning and conducting campaigns in foreign lands. Although
administrative maps contained potentially valuable information, they
were used in the settlement of legal disputes rather than being appro-
priated for military purposes. Well into the seventeenth century, “the
demand for multipurpose topographical information prevented the
evolution of a cartography primarily geared to the needs of war.”58
But this was soon to change in response to new methods of war. As
the preferred way of warfare changed from siege to battle, knowing the
terrain became more important to both attack and defense. This made
topographic surveying of paramount importance to success on the
battlefield. Already during the seventeenth century, French topo-
graphic mapping was had been entrusted to a corps of geographical
56
A. Teixeira da Mota, “Some Notes on the Organization of Hydrographical
Services in Portugal before the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century,” Imago
Mundi 28 (1976): 51–60.
57
Quoted in Geoffrey Parker, “Maps and Ministers: The Spanish Habsburgs,” in
Buisseret (ed.), Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps, 124–52, at 125.
58
John Hale, “Warfare and Cartography, ca. 1450 to ca. 1640,” in Woodward,
The History of Cartography, vol. 3, 719–37, at 735.
engineers whose work was seen as an important preparation for future

wars.59 In 1624, geographical engineers had begun to accompany
French forces into battle, and by the beginning of next century, geo-
graphical engineers were tasked with the undertaking of land surveys
and the design of fortifications. Since topographic mapping provided
information essential to the location of fortifications, topographic
mapping was understood as an integral part of defensive warfare.60
As such, the cartographic activities of military engineers during the
seventeenth century resulted in the mapping of large parts of France,
especially of the frontier regions.61
Similar developments took place in England. As the instructions to
the principal military engineer from the Board of Ordnance read in
1663, he was supposed to “take surveys of land . . . to have always by
him . . . Engineers useful in Fortifications and Sieges, to draw and design
the Situation of any Place in their due Prospects.”62 A decade later,
considerations of war and peace had become integral to the mapmak-
ing enterprise in England. As John Ogilby claimed in the dedicatory
epistle in his road atlas Britannia (1675), “[h]ere then I present your
sacred majesty with an important novelty, the scale of peace and war,
whereby . . . a true prospect of this your flourishing kingdom may be
taken, pregnant hints of security and interest gathered.”63 In order to
dissipate any remaining doubts about the usefulness of his masterpiece,
Ogilby advices the reader “not to press the infallible notions deducible
in order to the security against civil dissension and foreign invasion.”64
Such mundane motives would become even more salient as mapmaking
went from being a way of propagating claims to territorial authority to
59
Josef W. Konvitz, Cartography in France, 1660–1848: Science, Engineering,
and Statecraft (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 1–31.
60
Henri Marie Auguste Berthaut, Les Ingenieurs Geographes Militaires, 1624–
1831, vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimerie du Service Géographique, 1901), 1–10.
61
Buisseret, Mapmaker’s Quest, 131; Anne Godlewska, Geography Unbound:
French Geographic Science from Cassini to Humboldt (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1999).
62
Quoted in Carolyn Jane Anderson, “State Imperatives: Military Mapping in
Scotland, 1689–1770,” Scottish Geographical Journal 125, no. 1 (2009): 4–24,
at 7.
63
John Ogilby, Britannia or, an Illustration of the Kingdom of England and
Dominion of Wales (London: Ogilby, 1675), dedication to Charles II. For the
background of this work, see Petto, Mapping and Charting in Early Modern
England and France, 27–30.
64
Ogilby, Britannia, preface, folio 1.
an instrument for actively asserting and implementing such claims on

the ground.
During the following century, cartography underwent a phase of
intense militarization. This brought an emphasis on the natural fron-
tiers of each country as the proper locus of defense and attack, an
emphasis that was difficult to reconcile with the long-standing obses-
sion among cartographers with purely geometric methods of demarca-
tion. Since cartography had long been an offspring of cosmography, the
foundations of mapmaking were sought in the axioms of geometry.
And since surveying was based on measurement of distance through
triangulation, mapmaking presupposed that the physical environment
was static enough to be rendered intelligible via empirical observation.
Simultaneously, the map was a potent metaphor for all knowledge, and
the art of mapmaking was closely aligned with the interests and ideol-
ogies of ruling elites.65 Whereas commercial mapmaking had imposed
intelligibility on the world with little regard for the actual extent of
jurisdictions, the military preoccupation with geography was condi-
tioned by the need to determine the natural frontiers of each country in
order to protect it from attack or to use frontier regions as launching
pads for assaults on neighboring countries. Thus, in the 1740s, the
English army began to employ draftsmen to chart areas where cam-
paigns were planned, and in Prussia, Frederick the Great insisted that
the most detailed and accurate maps should be used because “knowl-
edge of a country is to a general is what a rifle is to an infantryman and
what the rules of arithmetic are to a geometrician.”66
Similar developments ensued in France. A Dépôt Général de la
Guerre et de la Géographie was established in 1743 and was charged
with the task of directing the strategic needs of military geography in
times of war. As Withers has remarked about this enterprise, “military
geography was a handmaiden to state politics.”67 Such efforts yielded
the first comprehensive manuals in military geography, such as Les
Principes de la Guerre de Montagnes (1775) by Pierre Bourcet. Having
started his career by conducting clandestine reconnaissance operations
in the Alps and having then planned the French invasion of Piedmont
during the War of the Austrian Succession, Bourcet devoted the first
65
Matthew H. Edney, “Mathematical Cosmography and the Social Ideology of
British Cartography, 1780–1820,” Imago Mundi 46, no. 1 (1994): 101–16.
66
Quoted in Buisseret, Mapmakers’ Quest, 118.
67
Withers, Placing the Enlightenment, 198.
chapters of his manual to the methods of topographic reconnaissance

and its importance to strategic planning. When undertaking reconnais-
sance missions in frontier areas, the first step is to acquire knowledge
about the limits separating the territories of different sovereigns from
each other.68 This was a matter of identifying the natural frontiers of
each country. Following a curious geographic doctrine, Bourcet pro-
posed that in order to localize the natural frontier in mountainous
areas, one needed to obtain information about the location of the
waterways separated by a given mountain range.69 Having thus deter-
mined the proper line of demarcation between two countries with
reference to what was termed les eaux pendants, the commander is
advised not to remain content consulting existing maps but to supple-
ment the information contained therein by scouting and taking careful
notes on the terrain, its relative accessibility, and the nature and sever-
ity of the various obstacles to be overcome by an advancing force.70
This method for determining natural frontiers in mountainous areas
was the result of peculiar looping effects because it had first been
introduced as a method for settling territorial disputes during peace
negotiations before it was turned into a tool of military planning by
Bourcet.71 As the century progressed, awareness of the importance of
surveying and mapmaking to military planning increased further. As
General Roy stated 1785, “accurate surveys of a country are univer-
sally admitted to be . . . the best means of forming judicious plans of
defence . . . Hence it happens, that if a country has not actually been
surveyed, or is but little known, a state of warfare generally produces
the first improvements in its geography.”72 In response to this predica-
ment, many European states charged military officers with conducting
68
Pierre de Bourcet, Principes de la Guerre de Montagnes (Paris: Imprimerie
Nationale, 1888), 7.
69
For a background, see Bernard Debarbieux, “La (M)montagne comme figure de
la frontière: réflexions à partir de quelques cas,” Le Globe. Revue Genevoise de
Géographie 137 (1997): 145–66.
70
Bourcet, Principes de la Guerre de Montagnes, 9–10.
71
See Georg Friedrich von Martens, Nouveaux Supplémens au Receuil de Traités
(Göttingen: Dietrich, 1839), 11; Traité de Paix entre La France et La Savoye
conclu à Utrecht le 11 April 1713 (Paris: Fournier, 1713); Traité entre le Roi et le
Roi de Sardaigne, conclu à Turin le 24 Mars 1760 (Paris: Imprimerie Royale,
1762).
72
An account of the measurement of a base on Hounslow Heath: Major-General
William Roy, read at the Royal Society, from April 21 to June 16, 1785
(London, 1785), 3. Quoted in Anderson, “State Imperatives,” 21.
systematic surveys and producing military maps of each country, to the

point of mapmaking becoming the very epitome of a military science.73
But the militarization of cartography was not confined to the European
continent. Many of the cartographic practices later employed in Europe
were first developed in a colonial context, reflecting a desire to facilitate
colonial management by creating homogeneous spaces.74 European
expansion had long spurred a demand for maps that could be used to
aid imperial expansion and settle territorial disputes between imperial
powers; this is one reason why Spain and Portugal devoted much of their
cartographic resources to their overseas possessions. And in North
America, the making of the United States was premised on the possibility
of creating a homogeneous and bounded political space that was amen-
able to republican forms of governance.75 The American Revolutionary
War added further impetus to its mapping. Since detailed and accurate
maps still were lacking, the belligerents were compelled to develop map-
making capabilities of their own in order to gain and maintain military
advantage.76
The expansion of British military activities in South Asia increased
the need for accurate maps, and by 1760, the first surveys of the Indian
subcontinent were undertaken. Robert Orme – historian of the East
India Company – made great efforts to communicate the military value
of maps and geographic knowledge in general and collected large
amounts of geographic information with the aim of facilitating future
military operations of the Company.77 As the awareness of the military
importance of cartography grew, James Rennell was appointed
Surveyor General of India. As we learn from the letter recommending
73
See Matthew H. Edney, “British Military Education, Mapmaking, and Military
‘Map-Mindedness’ in the Later Enlightenment,” The Cartographic Journal 31,
no. 1 (1994): 14–20; Sven Widmalm, “Accuracy, Rhetoric, and Technology:
The Paris-Greenwich Triangulation, 1784–88,” in Tore Frängsmyr and John L.
Heilbron (eds.), The Quantifying Spirit in the 18th Century (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1990), 179–206.
74
Branch, Cartographic State, 100–19.
75
Peter S. Onuf and Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World:
The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolutions, 1776–1814 (Madison, WI:
Madison House, 1993).
76
Buisseret, Mapmakers’ Quest, 120.
77
See Asoka SinhaRaja Tammita-Delgoda, “‘Nabob, Historian and Orientalist’:
The Life and Writings of Robert Orme (1728–1801),” doctoral dissertation,
King’s College, London, 1991, 263ff.
his appointment, “so much depends upon accurate surveys both in

military operations and in coming at a true knowledge of the value of
your possessions, that we have employed everybody on this service who
could be spared and were capable of it.”78 Based partly on maps
previously drawn by Orme, Rennell published the Bengal Atlas in
1780 and a General Map of All Hindostan in 1782, both of which
were to remain authoritative sources for some time.79 Later, when
prefacing an updated version of the latter work in 1788, he was pleased
to note that the war against the notorious Tipo Sultan had “produced
much new geographical matter, in various parts of the peninsula, by the
marches of the different armies, and their detachments.”80 But since the
Mogul empire now had been dismembered, its former provinces
divided between different princes and its traditional boundaries dis-
solved, locating boundaries with any precision was no easy task for
Rennell and his colleagues.81 This posed a peculiar problem in the
tumultuous south, where “north of the Cauvery . . . boundaries are
very ill defined, even by the governing powers themselves.”82 So, in
contrast to European states, most of which by now were territorially
bounded and unified, imperial possessions and colonial spaces dis-
played highly variegated geographies, often without any clear territor-
ial demarcations or jurisdictions.83
Toward the end of the eighteenth century, the mapping of the
European Continent had almost been completed. While large-scale
surveys and mapping projects were now perceived as necessary pre-
cursors to the unification of state territories and the demarcation of
national boundaries, they also informed the processes through which
the congruence of authority and community within bounded territories
gradually was realized. Consequently, maps and atlases produced
78
Letter to the Court of Directors, March 30, 1767, in The Journals of Major
James Rennell, First Surveyor-General of India, Written for the Information of
the Governors of Bengal during His Surveys of the Ganges and Brahmaputra
Rivers 1764 to 1767 (Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1910), 2.
79
Tammita-Delgoda, “Nabob, Historian and Orientalist,” 140; Matthew H.
Edney, Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India,
1765–1843 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
80
James Rennell, Memoir of a Map of Hindoostan or the Mogul Empire (London,
1788), iv.
81
Ibid., vi. 82 Ibid., 197.
83
See Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World
History, 1400–1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
during this period made consistent use of lines and colors to demarcate
states from each other. Thus the Atlas Universel (1757) by Robert de
Vaugondy and Europe Divided into Its Kingdoms (1772) by Robert
Sayer both depicted the European continent divided into its principal
states and their provinces and were followed by an outpouring of maps
and atlases reflecting the changing political divisions in Europe in the
aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna.84 These
changing political divisions were themselves fueled by advances in mili-
tary geography and cartography. Both Napoleon and Wellington had
gone to battle equipped with extensive map collections and their own
cartographic staff, sometimes with decisive consequences for their cam-
paigns. For example, after the battle of Buçaco in 1810, Wellington’s
troops could retreat to relative safety behind the Torres Vedras lines to
the north of Lisbon, lines of defense that could not have been conceived
and built without the detailed geographic knowledge that had been
obtained well in advance of the peninsular war.85
Fortifying the State

In the preceding section, we saw how symbolic claims to territorial
authority embodied in early modern maps were translated into a
recognizably modern notion of territoriality through practices of car-
tographic demarcation. The next and no less important steps in trans-
lating such representations of territoriality into facts on the ground
were taken by military engineers during roughly the same period.
Military engineers were less interested in the contours of a landscape
but all the more concerned with the possibility of exploiting its topo-
graphy for the purposes of military defense and attack. Hence, in this
section, I explore the connections between cartography and the art of
fortification, arguing that their common indebtedness to geometric
reasoning makes it possible to describe the process through which
cartographic representations were implemented on the ground as a
process of large-scale fortification. This does not imply that states
were turned into fortresses other than in a metaphorical sense but
that the fortress served as templates for territorial defense and domestic
84
Biggs, “Putting the State on the Map,” 398.
85
See Richard H. P. Smith, “Peninsular War Cartography: A New Look at the
Military Mapping of General Sir George Murray and the Quartermaster
General’s Department,” Imago Mundi 65, no. 2 (2013): 234–52.
Fortifying the State 109
pacification, in similar way as the panopticon was to serve as a para-

digm of surveillance.86 The fact that fortification and cartography were
indebted to the same epistemic framework and reflected similar con-
cerns with state security warranted a partial confluence of methods and
strategies. Both were based on geometric reasoning and on the assump-
tion that state security would best be served by the application of
scientific methods. Hence it was a widely shared belief that the con-
struction of fortresses should be governed by geometric principles and
that these should be adapted to the features of the terrain as rendered
on maps and conveyed through observation.87
The early modern fortifications had originally developed in response
to the use of gunpowder artillery in late fifteenth-century Italy. In their
standard shape, with a pentagonal bastion protruding from a curtain
wall, early modern fortifications betrayed strong influences from
Roman military architecture and then especially from the recently
rediscovered works of Vitruvius. Even if his defensive designs were
no longer that useful in the age of gunpowder, this nevertheless corro-
borated the Vitruvian principle according to which any defensive
countermeasures must be adapted to the offensive capabilities at
hand.88 Fortification was now an aspiring science of security whose
ambitions were seemingly unlimited by any walls, and military archi-
tecture began to exercise a detectable influence on city planning to the
point of turning towns into forts and forts into towns.89
Thus the pioneering military engineer, Errard Bar-le-Duc, felt it
necessary to inform his intended audience of aristocratic readers that
the art of fortification was based on “geometrical demonstrations that
give infallible assurance to everybody,” regardless of the fact that most
of what he had to say on this topic was grounded in practical military
experience rather than in anything resembling geometric proof.90 With
86
On the role of fortification in state making, see Charles S. Maier, Once Within
Borders: Territories of Power, Wealth and Belonging since 1500 (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 50–81.
87
Janis Langins, Conserving the Enlightenment: French Military Engineering from
Vauban to the Revolution (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 13–37.
88
Vitruve, Les Dix Livres d’Architecture [reprint of the 1673 trans. by Claude
Perrault] (Paris: Balland, 1979), vol. X: xvi, 336–40 (De Repugnatoriis Rebus).
89
See Horst de la Croix, “Military Architecture and the Radial City Plan in
Sixteenth Century Italy,” The Art Bulletin 42, no. 4 (1960): 263–90.
90
Jean Errard de Bar-le-Duc, La Fortification Démontree et Reduicte en Art
[1600] (Paris, 1619), dedication to the nobility.
the importance of fortification increasing in proportion to the power of

canons, attempts to put the art of fortification on a scientific footing
continued unabated during the seventeenth century.91 As White has
described this, “it is doubtful whether the ‘Cartesian’ mentality, which
assumed that mathematics is the key to reality, would have become
dominant if Europe had not been assiduously bankrupting itself by
building new military defenses in which assurance of safety was
achieved less by tangible masses of masonry than by abstract geome-
trical patterns of lines of fire.”92 Such attempts to harness geometric
knowledge for the purposes of security provide further clues to how the
imagined congruence between political authority and territory was
translated into facts on the ground. This was in effect a matter of
drawing lines on the ground that aligned territories thus demarcated
with their cartographic representations on maps rather than the other
way around. Hence, and pace Branch, this was less a matter of repla-
cing a series of discontinuous places with a singular and homogeneous
space than it was largely a matter of turning states into places in their
own right.93
While cartographic knowledge was considered necessary, it was not
sufficient to guide efforts at territorial unification and demarcation.
Geographic surveys often went hand in hand with statistical ones, reflect-
ing the Enlightenment belief that numerical registration was a necessary
precursor to domestic order and safety. Geography provided the basis of
what Petty and Davenant had termed “political arithmetic” – the art of
reasoning by figures on things relating to government – by delineating its
units of analysis in space so that different places could be subjected to
systematic comparison according to the size of their populations and their
relative wealth.94 This use of geography as a basis for statistics animated
the work of the great military engineer Vauban, whose work was to be
emulated by almost all European states during the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries. Although Vauban thought maps indispensable to military
91
See Christopher Duffy, The Fortress in the Age of Vauban and Frederick the
Great: 1660–1789, vol. 2 (London: Routledge Kegan & Paul, 1985).
92
Lynn White, “Jacopo Aconcio as an Engineer,” American Historical Review 72,
no. 2 (1967): 425–44, at 425. Quoted in Langins, Conserving the
Enlightenment, 45.
93
Branch, Cartographic State, 142–64.
94
Ted Mc Cormick, William Petty and the Ambitions of Political Arithmetic
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Withers, Placing the Enlightenment,
199–200.
planning and fortification, their lack of detailed information about differ-

ent places prompted him to undertake survey missions to towns and
frontier areas to gather additional information about their populations
and wealth.95 In his instructions for the conduct of such statistical surveys,
Vauban advised his colleague Caligny to first acquire a map on which to
mark the area to be surveyed with lines and colors. Caligny is then asked
to provide a detailed report on all the relevant characteristics of each area
in question, such as its topographic features, the presence of fortresses and
other military installations, the number of clergy and noblemen and their
possessions, the revenues to be extracted and the repairs to be made, the
number of acres and what is produced on them, the number of cattle and
poultry found in the area, the number of people in different age and status
groups, and so forth.96
Apart from commissioning such reports, Vauban himself undertook
several such missions, meticulously documenting the geographic and
topographic characteristics of border towns and their surroundings.97
In a detailed statistical analysis of Vézelay that was to become a template
for many subsequent surveys, Vauban provided an account of its tax
base, the customs of its inhabitants, their richness and poverty, and the
quality of the soil. All this information was then organized into tables
and analyzed, which resulted in recommendations on how to improve its
soils to alleviate a condition of chronic malnourishment among the
population.98 Remarkable feats such as these earned Vauban a reputa-
tion – perhaps a bit anachronistically – as the father of modern statistics
and a pioneer in political economy fully on a par with Turgot.99
95
Sebastién Prestre de Vauban, “Observations a Faire sur la Reconnaissance des
Places,” in Eugène-Auguste-Albert de Rochas d’Aiglun (ed.), Vauban. Sa famille
et ses écrits: ses “Oisivetés” et sa Correspondance, analyse et extraits, vol. 1
(Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1910), 240–1.
96
Vauban, “Lettre sur la Manière de Faire les Statistiques,” in d’Aiglun, Vauban,
590–5.
97
Vauban, “Relation du Voyage sur la Frontière Commence le 9 Avril 1698 et fini
le 12 Fevrier 1699,” in d’Aiglun, Vauban, 603–12.
98
Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, Description Géographique de l’Élection de
Vézelay, contenant ses revenus, sa qualité, les moeurs de ses habitants, leur
pauvreté et richesse, la fertilité du pays et ce que l’on pourrait y faire pour en
corriger la stérilité et procurer l’augmentation des peuples et l’accroissement des
bestiaux, Janvier 1696, Jean-Francois Pernot (ed.) (Paris: Association des amis
de la maison Vauban, 1986).
99
See, for example, Bernard Buyer de Fontenelle, Éloge de Monsieur le Maréchal
de Vauban, Histoire de l’Académie Royale des Sciences (Paris: Compagnie des
Sometimes these reports resulted in pieces of concrete advice to

Louis XIV. Much of this advice focused on what Vauban saw as
necessary measures to create a unified and demarcated territory.
His use of terminology in some of these reports indicates that he
saw territory as a dueling ground on which it was necessary to
impose order by creating infrastructure and developing economic
resources.100 As Vauban remarked in a letter to his superior,
Louvois, “[t]he King ought to think a little about squaring the
field. This confusion of friendly and enemy fortresses mixed
together does not please me at all. You are compelled to maintain
three for one; your people are tormented, your expenses greatly
stretched and your forces diminished.”101 In regions where there
were no natural frontiers, the vision of a unified territory resulted
in the construction of what Vauban termed a ceinture de fer con-
sisting in a double line of fortresses demarcating French territory
from those of its neighbors.102 Prompted by the porousness that
the Peace of Nijmegen (1678) had brought to the northwestern
frontier, this project was quickly initiated and completed toward
the end of the century. Vauban expressed his worries in a memor-
andum to Louis XIV: “the frontier toward the Low Countries lies
open and disordered as a consequence of the recent peace.” What
should be done to avert this threat is “to establish a new frontier
and fortify it so well that it closes the approaches into our country
to an enemy while giving us access to his.” This was to be done by
making the fortifications large enough “to contain not only the
munitions required for their own defense but also the supplies
needed if we invade enemy territory” and also by strengthening
the line of defense with canals “along whose banks entrenchments
could be dug in time of war . . . while at the same time the canals
would provide valuable assistance for the movement of goods, and
Libraires, 1752); Félix Cadet, Histoire de l’économie politique: les précurseurs

Boisguilbert, Vauban, Quesnay, Turgot (Paris: H. Gérard, 1869).
100
Langins, Conserving the Enlightenment, 70–1.
101
Vauban to Louvois, January 20, 1673, in d’Aiglun, Vauban, vol. II, 89; also
Gaston Zeller, L’organisation défensive des frontières du Nord et de l’Est au
XVIIe siècle: avec une carte hors texte (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1928), 60;
Sahlins, “Natural Frontiers Revisited,” 1434.
102
Sahlins, “Natural Frontiers Revisited,” 1434ff; Langins, Conserving the
Enlightenment, 65.
commerce.”103 In order to prevent the Spaniards from posing a

renewed threat from the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Strasbourg
should be captured and duly fortified. In another mémoir, Vauban
provides an assessment of the towns and frontier regions that could
be sacrificed in the interest of peace but without weakening the
state itself or its frontiers. These towns and their surroundings are
evaluated according to their strategic importance, the revenues that
can be extracted from their inhabitants in times of war, whether or
not they are easily defended, and whether or not they can offer
bridgeheads during offensive expeditions into neighboring coun-
tries. In towns that could be ceded without too much loss to the
crown, he recommended demolishing existing fortifications before
they could be handed over to the enemy.104
During the second half of the eighteenth century, when the process of
fortification almost had been brought to completion, the French gov-
ernment started to demarcate its territory with boundary stones and
entered into negotiations with its neighbors over the proper limits of its
realm in order to purge it of enclaves and to eliminate remaining objects
of dispute among frontier inhabitants.105 As Vauban had argued,
enclaves are good only for “causing quarrels and attracting disputes
that are only decided with the sword.”106 In sum, “[b]y fortifying
France’s coastal and inland borders and by adopting a strategy of
rapid, forward movement into the territory of a potential enemy,
France achieved a level of security for its cities which was altogether
unprecedented.”107 But these attempts to assert boundaries that were
thought to be natural or historically rightful also found expression in a
103
Sebastién Prestre de Vauban, Memorandum on the Places on the Flanders
Frontier which Must Be Fortified to Secure the Lands Owing Obedience to the
King (November 1678), in Eugène-Auguste-Albert de Rochas d’Aiglun,
Vauban. Sa famille et ses écrits: ses “Oisivetés” et sa Correspondance, analyse
et extraits (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1910), 189–92.
104
Vauban, “Places dont le Roi Pourrait se Défaire en Faveur d’un Traité de Paix
Sans Faire Tort a l’État ni Affaiblir sa Frontière,” in d’Aiglun, Vauban, vol. I,
192–207.
105
Sahlins, “Natural Frontiers Revisited,” 1438–40.
106
Vauban, “Projet de Paix assez Raisonable Pour que Tous les Intéressez a La
Guerre Présente, en deussent être contens, s’il avoit lieu et qu’il plut a Dieu d’y
donner sa benediction” (1706), in d’Aiglun, Vauban, vol. I, 496–532, at 510.
107
Konvitz, “The Nation-State, Paris and Cartography in Eighteenth- and
Nineteenth-Century France,” 11.
rather aggressive foreign policy. Although Vauban urged the king to

exercise restraint by not expanding his territory beyond the natural
frontiers of France, it turned out that properly establishing those “nat-
ural frontiers” nevertheless required swallowing a host of principalities
and bishoprics.108 By the time his successor, Cormontaigne, sketched a
brief history of the art of fortification, it was obvious to him that the
work of Vauban represented the culmination of a long development
that had begun when humans first had erected primitive obstacles to
ward off attacks by ferocious beasts. Those parts of France that did not
enjoy natural protection by mountains and oceans were now protected
by three lines of interconnected fortifications, with places of lesser
strategic importance on the outer line for the defense of the more
strategically important ones on the inner line.109
As Langins has summarized the role of the military engineering corps
in this process of territorial unification and demarcation, the fortifica-
tion of the French state “may have given them a distorted view of the
national space of the country, [and] it was also a view that saw that
space as becoming more coherent, more rational and more defensi-
ble.”110 And as we have seen, this process of territorial demarcation
was carried out and justified with reference to the threats – real or
imagined – of foreign invasion. But the imperative of external defense
was also closely aligned with the desire for internal order, sometimes to
the point of them being indistinguishable. The process of territorial
demarcation was accompanied by infrastructural projects aimed at
improving the internal circulation of people and commodities for the
benefit of a unified and homogeneous political and economic space.
The most ambitious of these projects – Le Canal du Midi – had been
commissioned by Colbert in the hope of making the surrounding
regions more governable and more profitable and was pursued relent-
lessly and ruthlessly by his contractor, Riquet, from 1661 to 1681.
Realizing an ancient Roman dream of connecting the Mediterranean
and the Atlantic through an extensive network of waterways, the canal
was intended to facilitate trade between regions with different com-
parative advantages in the interest of increasing national economic
108
Vauban, “Intérets Present des États de la Chrétienté,” in d’Aiglun, Vauban, vol.
I, 491–6.
109
Louis de Cormontaigne, Architecture Militaire, ou l’art de fortifier (La Haye:
Jean Neaulme & Adrien Moetjens, 1741), 1–8.
110
Langins, Conserving the Enligthenment, 69.
integration. But by the time Vauban was commissioned to inspect and

redesign it, the canal and its embankments had fallen into a state of
severe disrepair. To the obvious economic advantages that were
believed to ensue from its restoration, Vauban added some telling
remarks on its military potentials. Although considerations of its mili-
tary usefulness had figured preeminently in the original plans for the
canal, the design features from which the navy was supposed to benefit
had been abandoned because of technical difficulties.111 But as we learn
from his Mémoire sur le Canal du Languedoc (1691), a properly
redesigned canal “will be very convenient for the transport of muni-
tions, sealed and rigged according to need, promptly and safely from
one ocean to the other . . . to let galleys pass in less than ten to twelve
days with a good number of Men of War is a sure way of inciting terror
in the English, the Dutch and others.”112
When seen in the broader context of state formation, the demarca-
tion of territorial boundaries and the building of new infrastructure
were two complementary processes. As Mukerji has argued, the mak-
ing of the French state was not so much the result of centralization and
rationalization as it was the outcome of improvement in logistics
undertaken for both military and economic reasons. The lines of
defense erected by military engineers under the guidance of Vauban
and the many infrastructural projects initiated by Colbert and com-
pleted by civil engineers together reflect a coherent strategy designed to
protect the country from foreign invasions as well as from domestic
unrest, either by removing their underlying causes or by increasing the
capacity to nip outbursts of domestic dissent in the bud.113 Thus
Cartesian dreams of a calculable order were fulfilled insofar as the res
of the respublica was made identical with its res extensa, rather than
with any of its abundant representations in res cogitans.
Given the widespread emulation of this model of territorial demar-
cation, with its emphasis on fortification as a method of establishing
and protecting the natural frontiers of each state, it is not surprising
111
Chandra Mukerji, Impossible Engineering: Technology and Territoriality on
the Canal du Midi (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).
112
Vauban, Mémoire sur le Canal du Languedoc, in d’Aiglun, Vauban, 545–76, at
573.
113
Chandra Mukerji, “The Territorial State as a Figured World of Power:
Strategics, Logistics, and Impersonal Rule,” Sociological Theory 28, no. 4
(2010): 402–24.
that military science should accept this outcome as a brute fact and a
baseline for strategic thinking. Even if military science reflected the
Enlightenment preoccupation with geometric reasoning, it could not
dispense altogether with the notion of natural frontiers. It is even
possible to argue that the notion of natural frontiers became essential
to the art of war precisely because of its salience to the art of fortifica-
tion. As Lloyd argued in his Reflections on the General Principles of
War (1781), “[t]he march of armies cannot be calculated with any
degree of precision without the help of mathematics: because whatever
is not reduced to space and time, will in practice turn out very uncer-
tain.”114 And if the conduct of war indeed is a matter of mastering time
and space, it follows that “the most important object . . . to those who
aspire to the command of armies, is geography; not only that which
consists in a general knowledge of a country, but a local one: a man
must be thoroughly acquainted with the face of the country . . . and
particularly with those objects which are immediately connected with
military operations.”115 Lloyd then applies the principles of geography
to practical warfare by describing in detail the frontier lines of different
European states. Knowledge of these lines shall “enable the sovereign,
ministers, and generals to form their plans of war.”116 As a matter of
principle, “however extensive such a line may be, the points on which it
can be attacked are determined by the number and quality of the roads
that lead to it, and by the position and distance of the respective
capitals, and other strong places within a hundred miles of it.”117
Thus the “the absolute force of a frontier consists in natural obstacles,
which an enemy would find in approaching and attacking it.”118 But
apart from capitalizing on natural barriers to attack provided by
mountain ranges and rivers, “the relative force of a frontier line
depends on the distance of the capitals and fortresses, where the depots
are lodged, of those who attack and defend it.”119 Although advances
in surveying and cartography now allowed for a precise demarcation of
boundaries without any reference to the concept of natural frontiers,
114
Henry Lloyd, “Reflections on the General Principles of War; and on the
Composition and Characters of the Different Armies in Europe,” in
Continuation of the History of the Late War in Germany between the King of
Prussia and the Empress of Germany and Her Allies (London: Hooper, 1781),
xx.
115
Ibid., xxiv. 116 Ibid., 153. 117 Ibid., 151. 118 Ibid., 153.
119
Ibid., 154.
Geographies of Violence 117
military engineers remained convinced that states should stick to their

natural frontiers as defined by rivers and mountains because the latter
made it easier to organize attacks and mount defense.120
Geographies of Violence
In Chapter 2, we saw how the early modern historians held that each
state had a territorial extension that could vary over time as a conse-
quence of wars and invasions. In this chapter, we have seen how early
modern geographers and cartographers assumed that states enjoyed
temporal continuity within their mutable and often porous boundaries.
Early modern historiography and geography thereby provided the
basic coordinates for the creation of states and an international system
by making their temporal limits and spatial boundaries appear natural
as a consequence of being co-constitutive. But geography and carto-
graphy not only provided new methods of territorial demarcation and
unification but also furnished new ways of understanding mankind as a
whole. The discoveries had revealed new evidence of human diversity
that was hard to reconcile with received views of the unity of mankind,
and colonial encounters with peoples in remote corners of the earth
yielded additional information about different cultures, their customs,
and their habits. All these differences stood in need of scientific expla-
nation. While the causes of these differences were hotly contested in the
early human sciences, a first step toward understanding them was to
study the distribution of human difference across time and space.121
Doing this would bring a gradual convergence of history and geo-
graphy. Although history and geography had been closely aligned
during the early modern period, they were distinct branches of knowl-
edge with different epistemic foundations. Historical writing continued
to be informed by the precepts of renaissance humanism into the eight-
eenth century and beyond, and as we have seen, geography had been
heavily indebted to the ideals of geometric reasoning from its inception.
The earliest attempts to make sense of the distribution of human
differences in time and space were largely conjectural in character,
and although they did distinguish between different stages of human
development and often related these to variations in climate and
120
Sahlins, “Natural Frontiers Revisited,” 1442.
121
Withers, Placing the Enlightenment, 136–63.
habitat, it was not until Turgot that stadial theories of human devel-
opment were systematically aligned with the study of geography. The
task that Turgot had set for himself was to describe the “distribution of
peoples on the globe and the division into states.”122
The attempt to fuse geography and history together was to some
extent motivated by the need to reconcile the concept of the territorially
bounded state with the last wave of imperial expansion that had started
in 1870s. When the evolutionary perspective began to make its pre-
sence felt within almost all scientific fields during the latter half of the
nineteenth century, this offered an opportunity to bring history and
geography closer by arguing that both disciplines were concerned with
aspects of human evolution, albeit from different vantage points and
with various methods. Yet their shared preoccupation with the
mechanisms of evolution broadly conceived made it possible to fuse
geography and history into a single field of investigation and to argue
that this would yield a more comprehensive and coherent account of
human evolution that any of these disciplines could claim to convey in
isolation.123 Since Darwinism brought the concept of natural selection
to bear on both fields, this made it easier for historians and geographers
to cast earlier differences aside and join forces by claiming to share the
same scientific foundation and basic assumptions.124 But as we shall see
in this section, it also made it possible to explain territorial demarcation
and unification as outcomes of natural selection, this selection resulting
from an ongoing struggle between nations and races for space. Hence
the idea that war was a productive force in human affairs found new
support in what was widely regarded as the main scientific achievement
of the day and which made it possible to reconcile the territorially
bounded state with claims to imperial authority now being asserted
with renewed vigor.
122
Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, “Plan d’un Ouvrage sur la Géographie
Politique” [1751], in Gustave Schelle (ed.), Oeuvres de Turgot (Paris: Félix
Alcan, 1913), 255–74, at 255. For an analysis, see Michael Heffernan, “On
Geography and Progress: Turgot’s Plan d’un ouvrage sur la géographie
politique (1751) and the Origins of Modern Progressive Thought,” Political
Geography 13, no. 4 (1994): 328–43.
123
See Henry Clifford Darby and Michael Williams. The Relations of History and
Geography: Studies in England, France and the United States (Exeter:
University of Exeter Press, 2002).
124
See David R. Stoddart, “Darwin’s Impact on Geography,” Annals of the
Association of American Geographers 56, no. 4 (1966): 683–98.
One early example of Darwinian influence on geography was Die

Darwin’sche Theorie und das Migrationsgesetz der Organismen (1868)
by Moritz Wagner, in which he sought to explain the geographic distribu-
tion of living beings in terms of natural selection. Although the law
according to which the struggle for survival prompted migration was
applied mainly to plants and animals, its application to the development
of the human race “is certainly capable of much greater amplification than
is aimed at in this treatise.”125 And such amplification was certainly in the
coming. Within this nascent field that only decades later would transmute
into geopolitics proper, existing territorial boundaries were seen as the
result of struggles between different races over territory. The principles of
natural selection were invoked not only to explain the existence of
boundaries between states but also to justify the fine lines of demarcation
separating the civilized from the uncivilized parts of the world. Yet it was
an open question whether such boundaries were fixed or should be under-
stood as mutable. To those adhering to the former view, states should
stick to the boundaries bestowed upon them by a historical accident. To
those who subscribed to the latter view, it was obvious that states and
entire civilizations expanded and contracted according to the logic of
natural selection, so the stronger and most vigorous human communities
necessarily would conquer weaker ones.
As Bryce summarized the starting point for bringing geography
closer to the human sciences, “geography is as a meeting-point between
the sciences of Nature and the sciences of Man.”126 And he went on to
add, “it is in discovering the carrying effects produced on the growth of
man as a social and political, a wealth-acquiring and State-forming
creature, by the geographical surroundings in which he is placed, that
we find the meeting point of geography and history.”127 Thus the
configuration of the Earth’s surface will “determine the directions in
which races move, the spots in which civilization first develops . . . [and]
the frequency and ease with which communication takes place between
two races or political communities.”128 As Bryce further explains,
among the branches of geography with the most influence of the course
125
Moritz Wagner, The Darwinian Theory and the Law of the Migration of
Organisms, trans. James L. Laird (London: Edward Stanford, 1873), 5.
126
James Bryce, “The Relations of History and Geography,” Contemporary
Review 69 (1887): 426–43, at 426.
127
Bryce, “Relations of History and Geography,” 427. 128 Ibid., 427.
of history we find political and military geography, being concerned

with the “relations of the artificial boundaries of States to the natural
boundaries which Nature has tried to draw, and which have become of
later years more important by the consolidation of small States into
large ones.”129 For example, the history and national sentiments of
France and Spain are conditioned by the simple fact that they are
separated by the Pyrenees rather than by any notable racial differences
between them.130 But in an increasingly interconnected world, race
struggle will produce an inevitable outcome, that is, “when nearly all
its habitable parts have been surveyed, when the great races, the great
languages, the great religions, spreading swiftly over its surface, are
swallowing up the lesser.”131
To some extent this desire to make history and geography converge
was determined by the effort to establish geography as an autonomous
discipline at this point in time. As the young Mackinder argued, geo-
graphy proper ought to be separated from physical geography nar-
rowly defined because the latter had become unduly subsumed under
geology. Rather than merely describing the geographic features of a
given country, the main function of geography “is to trace the interac-
tion of man in society and so much of his environment as varies
locally.”132 Although he envisioned no close connection between the
disciplines of history and geography, he held that geographic features
were important in the development of civilizations, such as waterways
facilitating commerce and natural barriers protecting against foreign
invasions.133
To Freeman, the main task of historical geography was to under-
stand the causes and effects of boundaries between states. The first step
in this inquiry was “draw the map of the countries with which we are
concerned as it appeared after each of the different changes which they
have gone through, and then to point out the historical causes which
have led to the changes on the map.”134 An assumption commonly
made within this field was that the differentiation into distinct and
bounded communities in Europe and elsewhere had resulted from the
129
Ibid., 430. 130 Ibid., 438. 131 Ibid., 443.
132
Halford J. Mackinder, “On the Scope and Methods of Geography,”
Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, 3 (1887): 141–74, at 143.
133
Mackinder, “On the Scope and Methods of Geography,” 158–9.
134
Edward A. Freeman, A Historical Geography of Europe, vol. 1 (London:
Longmans, Green, 1881), 2–3.
gradual fission of primordial races and language groups into smaller

units. Although history certainly is shaped by national character, geo-
graphic position had something to do with forming the national char-
acter, and in all cases it has had an influence on it, by giving it a better or
a worse field for working and showing itself.”135 To Freeman, it was
obvious that “[w]hether we look at Europe now, or whether we look at
it at the earliest times of which we have any glimmerings, it is preemi-
nently an Aryan continent.”136 But the Aryan predominance was but
the result of a series of struggles through which they had established
themselves as masters by driving off or successfully assimilating infer-
ior racial elements. As he proceeded to argue, “Sicilian history is chiefly
made up of struggles for the mastery between Carthage and the Greek
cities. This was in truth a struggle between the Aryan and the Semitic
race.”137 But after having warded off such undesirable influences,
Europeans had to confront barbarism in a new and more potent guise
when Cyprus “shared the fate, not of Sicily but of Crete, and became
the solid prize of the Ottoman.”138 But at the time Freeman was
writing, the destiny of Europe seemed manifest, “having spread herself
beyond her geographical limits in the foundation of new European
states beyond the Ocean.”139
Although Freeman was among the first to develop what could be
described as a historical geography of race struggle, attempts in a
similar direction were made by military historians and geographers.
To Maguire, for example, it was important that citizens should have a
clear conception of the art of war and its relationship to geography
because “in battles the highest faculties of the race are exerted in their
most intense energy. The struggles of embattled men are perennially
interesting to all men, and the history of mankind is the history of
armies.”140 And as George argued in his curious effort to combine
military history and geography, “[h]istory is not intelligible without
geography. This is obviously true in the sense that the reader of history
must learn where are the frontiers of states, where wars were fought
out, whither colonies were dispatched.”141 From this George inferred a
135
Ibid., 11. 136 Ibid., 12. 137 Ibid., 48–9. 138 Ibid., 404.
139
Ibid., 569.
140
T. Miller Maguire, Outlines of Military Geography (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1899), 13.
141
Hereford B. George, The Relations of Geography and History (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1901), 1.
guiding principle of his entire work, namely, that “[a]ll external rela-
tions, hostile and peaceful, are based largely on geography.”142 This
assumption is particularly interesting in the present context because
George then presents an explanation of the relative fixity of bound-
aries. “As men grew less savage and more settled, and learned to live
within reach of one another without perpetual war, there would arise a
need for recognized boundaries between tribes, or between aggregates
of tribes that were making, the first steps towards a larger union.
Geographical facts doubtless in most cases determined these.”143
Thus, all seemingly natural frontiers had resulted from the prehistorical
movement of races because “[i]n process of time mankind settled down
to permanent occupation of territory; and then the mountains, which
had been obstacles dividing races, tended to become permanent fron-
tiers.”144 Whereas rivers first had provided the means for interconnec-
tion between different groups and races, they owe their importance as
frontiers to the modern art of war.145
As Maguire pointed out, “no frontier, however massive, or however
strengthened by nature and art, can prevent a luxurious, inert or
corrupt race from ruin.”146 But to George, the relationship between
race and geography was not that straightforward. Geographic and
racial boundaries do not necessarily coincide, and on those occasions
when they do not, “[g]eography may well despair of drawing any
frontier that will honestly satisfy ethnology, and must therefore let
politics settle the question.”147 In fact, race struggle is only likely to
occur where races live separated in sparsely populated areas, but as
soon as “tribes come to be in more or less close contact, instead of being
surrounded by large unpeopled lands, intermixture of race begins . . .
Thus in the modern world there is no such thing as a really pure race, at
any rate among civilized mankind.”148 Admittedly, as Dann argued
when the heydays of historical geography were drawing to a close, “[m]
ost of the cosmos of nations has been created out of the chaos of
barbarism or social revolution by fighting; and the landmarks of the
world’s annals are battles and treaties.”149 In the final analysis, civili-
zation was but an accidental offspring of barbarism and a happy end
142
Ibid., 1. 143 Ibid., 12–13. 144 Ibid., 21. 145 Ibid., 29, 31.
146
Maguire, Outlines of Military Geography, 178.
147
George, Relations of Geography and History, 32. 148 Ibid., 120.
149
Ernest W. Dann, Historical Geography on a Regional Basis, vol. II: Europe
(London: Dent, 1908), 10.
product of race struggles, events that now were believed to be things of

the past, at least in Europe.
As Benton has shown, whereas the European states system was
structured according to the principle of territorial sovereignty, the
methods of rule used by imperial powers outside Europe gave rise to
multilayered and variegated geographies composed of semiautono-
mous spaces where sovereignty was divided among local actors and
colonial powers.150 With the spatial limits of the European state being
settled in theory and practice, the contrasts between the European
system of states and its non-European and supposedly uncivilized out-
side became increasingly apparent to historical geographers. Some set
out to explain the absence of civilization and sovereign statehood out-
side Europe with reference to the geographic features of foreign lands
and the backwardness of their inhabitants. To Bryce, for example, it
was obvious that in northern and central Asia, “[Y]ou will see that the
highest European races would, if placed there, find it almost impossible
to develop a high type of civilization for want as well of fuel as of the
sources of commercial wealth.”151 To others, it was obvious that the
geographic lines of demarcation that separated Europe from its outside
coincided with the distinction between civilization and its others. As
Ramsay pointed out in the introduction to his magisterial Historical
Geography of Asia Minor (1890), “the peninsula of Asia Minor has
been from the beginning of history a battlefield between the East and
the West . . . the very character of the country has marked it out as a
battleground between the Oriental and the European spirit.”152 But
despite repeated efforts to bring civilization to this part of the world,
“[t]he Oriental element does not retreat, it is not driven back by open
war: it dies out on the coast by a slow yet sure decay.”153
The perhaps most influential attempt to transpose the study of
historical geography to the global level was made by Friedrich Ratzel
in his Völkerkunde (1885–8). Criticizing his contemporaries for their
narrow focus on European civilization, Ratzel saw it as “the duty of
ethnography to apply itself all the more faithfully to the neglected lower
strata of humanity.”154 In the ensuing study of all the known races of
150
Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty.
151
Bryce, “Relations of History and Geography,” 429.
152
W. M. Ramsay, The Historical Geography of Asia Minor (London: John
Murray, 1890), 23.
153
Ibid., 25.
the world, he argued, “[t]he geographical conception of their surround-

ings, and the historical consideration of their development, will thus go
hand in hand.”155 Applying the principles of natural selection to the
intercourse between different races across global space, Ratzel was
bound to conclude that “[t]he greater bulk, quicker growth, and super-
iority in all conquering arts, which mark the more highly civilized races,
give them . . . the advantage in this process, and we can speak of an
absorption of the lower by the higher even where the latter for the
present are not in the majority.”156 Ratzel then set out to explain why
non-European peoples had failed to become civilized and to create
anything resembling modern states and hence why they were con-
demned to foreign rule by their colonial masters. Unsurprisingly, this
failure was due to the violent disposition of the “natural races” because
“[m]ost of what we know of the history of natural races is the history of
their wars.”157 But in contrast to the Europeans who had entered civil
society and formed governments, barbarous peoples were stuck in a
perpetual state of war from which they could not escape by their own,
even if it “must be pointed out that among barbarians also there are
peaceful races and peace-loving rulers.”158 And should barbarous
peoples ever succeed in establishing political authority, their states
were bound to fail as a consequence of being territorially unbounded.
“Want of defined frontiers is in the essence of the formation of barbar-
ous states. The line is intentionally not drawn, but kept open as a clear
space of varying breadth.”159 To Ratzel, this lack of clearly defined
boundaries corresponded to another sharp line of demarcation
between the civilized and the uncivilized parts of the world because
“[t]he case in which sharp frontiers are soonest formed is where the two
fundamentally different modes of civilization and life, nomadism and
agriculture, come into contact.”160
This also made it possible to reconcile the concept of the territorially
bounded state with the realities of imperial expansion.161 Generalizing
these insights in his later works, Ratzel tried to explain how territorial
154
Friedrich Ratzel, The History of Mankind, vol. 1 [1885], trans. A. J. Butler
(London: Macmillan 1896), 3.
155
Ibid., 3. 156 Ibid., 12. 157 Ibid., 130. 158 Ibid. 131.
159
Ibid., 136. 160 Ibid., 137.
161
See Mark Bassin, “Imperialism and the Nation State in Friedrich Ratzel’s
Political Geography,” Progress in Human Geography 11, no. 4 (1987): 473–
95.
boundaries changed in response to the growth of states and the geo-

graphic expansion of civilizations. Such explanations formed the basis
of his notorious concept of Lebensraum, a concept that became the
cornerstone of various imperial ideologies during the early twentieth
century.162 In his Politische Geographie (1897), parts of which were
translated into English, Ratzel emphasized the territorial basis of all
politics, arguing that all politics is in essence a quest for space. One
cause of the progress of mankind, he maintained, was that “as more
states and larger states grow up, the nearer do they edge together, and
so much the more intimately must they act and react upon one another;
history, therefore, means mutual approach and compression.”163 But
since the space of the globe is finite, this means that only a few states can
expand and rise to great power status at a time and that European
civilization is compelled to expand on other continents in its quest for
more space. The quest for finite space led Ratzel to formulate a central
axiom of geopolitics: “Geographical space in general . . . is estimated
according to the power which must be expended for its conquest, and
this power, in turn, is measured in terms of this space, and will always
grow with the expansion of the same from age to age.”164 Since con-
ceptions of space condition the political possibilities of states in each
age, he argued, space is an independent political force rather than a
mere substratum of politics. Hence, “[t]he capacity for territorial con-
quest, which forms one element in ‘the qualities of a ruler,’ or in ‘talent
for organization,’ must meet a similar endowment in the people, if it is
to lead to an enduring extension of political area.”165 Since this applies
to every state and every people equally, geopolitical conflict is an
inescapable part of the human condition. “Just as the struggle for
existence in the plant and animal world always centers about a matter
of space, so the conflicts of nations are in great part only struggles for
162
See Woodruff D. Smith, “Friedrich Ratzel and the Origins of Lebensraum,”
German Studies Review 3, no. 1 (1980): 51–68; Matus Halas, “Searching for
the Perfect Footnote: Friedrich Ratzel and the Others at the Roots of
Lebensraum,” Geopolitics 19, no. 1 (2014): 1–18.
163
Friedrich Ratzel, “Studies in Political Areas I: The Political Territory in
Relation to Earth and Continent,” American Journal of Sociology 3, no. 3
(1897): 297–313, at 297.
164
Friedrich Ratzel, “Studies in Political Areas II: Intellectual, Political, and
Economic Effects of Large Areas,” American Journal of Sociology 3, no. 4
(1898): 449–63, at 449–50.
165
Ibid., 452.
territory.”166 When seen in the context of imperial expansion, it was

obvious to Ratzel that the encounter between European civilization
and non-European peoples not only was a clash between different
conceptions of space where those with the most expansive view were
likely to prevail but also that European expansion on other continents
would imply that territorial rivalries within Europe would become less
pronounced and that the foreign relations of European states therefore
would be greatly simplified and less bellicose.167
As a mature Mackinder summarized what the happy marriage
between history and geography had delivered in terms of scientific
insights, “we are for the first time in a position to attempt, with some
degree of completeness, a correlation between the larger geographical
and the larger historical generalizations.”168 Among these generaliza-
tions, it was now obvious that violent conflict had been responsible
both for bringing the world together and for dividing it into distinct
communities because “[t]he ideas which go to form a nation, as
opposed to a mere crowd of human animals, have usually been
accepted under the pressure of a common tribulation, and under a
common necessity of resistance to external force.”169 This meant that
“it was under the pressure of external barbarism that Europe achieved
its civilization.”170 Hence, in a world system structured by mutual
antagonism and perennial discord, the fate of nations and races was
decided by their relative power, and that power was “the product, one
the one hand, of geographical conditions, both economic and strategic,
and, on the other hand, of the relative number, virility, equipment, and
organization of the competing peoples.”171
So when we reach the beginning of the twentieth century, the ima-
gined congruence between authority and territory had been established
as a social fact and was taken to be an indisputable foundation of
modern political order. It was now obvious that states were defined
by their territorial extension and were demarcated by boundaries and
that territory long had constituted an apple of discord over which
numerous and constitutive wars had been fought. Consequently, it
was accepted as true that territoriality was a defining characteristic of
the international system and that the territorial extent of states was
166
Ibid., 458. 167 Ibid., 460–2.
168
Halford Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” The Geographical
Journal 23, no. 4 (1904): 421–44, at 422.
169
Ibid. 422–3. 170 Ibid., 423. 171 Ibid., 437.
grounded in the brute facts of geography rather than in acts of human

volition. Yet none of this was the result of a rationalization of space
through which claims to sovereign authority embodied in early modern
maps were projected onto the surface of the Earth and directly trans-
lated into political practice and embodied in legal agreements. The
process of conversion was much less uniform and much more complex,
involving the gradual militarization of cartography and weaponization
of maps in the hands of political elites. Translating the claims to
sovereignty represented on maps to actual facts on the ground such as
demarcated boundaries and unified territories took a concerted effort
of generations of surveyors and military engineers who supplemented
what they took to be insufficient cartographic and geographic informa-
tion with population statistics, blended it with considerations of strategy
and political prudence, and proceeded with large-scale fortifications and
infrastructural improvements to bring state territories in conformity
with the claims to sovereign authority that long had been represented
on maps. By and large, this process of conversion was sometimes moti-
vated by and very often justified with reference to the imperatives of state
security. Fears of foreign invasions, threats of domestic unrest, and the
desire to promote the wealth of populations were all consistently
invoked by those who sought to realize visions of territorial sovereignty.
With political authority firmly grounded and bounded, it was left to
historical geographers to trace the spatial trajectory of individual states
in time and, by implication, to naturalize the outcome of territorializa-
tion. Although historical geographers saw boundaries as contingent,
they took the overall congruence between political authority and terri-
tory largely for granted and accounted for the mutability of boundaries
and territories by invoking the productive force of race struggle and
natural selection. The actual territorial extent of individual states and
the nature of their boundaries were seen as outcomes of prior disputes
fueled by the quest for power in space as well as over space. What was
open to dispute, however, was the extent to which territorial bound-
aries reflected the natural circumstances of each state or whether they
were but temporary stopping points on an endless road of European
expansion. Although historical geographers did not dispute that
authority and territory ought to be congruent in principle, evolutionary
theory made it possible to argue that since boundaries were outcomes
of natural selection, they were bound to be mutable and to reflect the
relative vigorousness of races in their perpetual struggle for space. Thus
notions of natural selection made it possible to reconcile the concept of

the territorially bounded state with schemes of boundless imperial
expansion, thereby legitimizing European rule of foreign lands defined
by their lack of proper boundaries and unified territories. Yet all of this
stood in need of legal justification in order to get off the ground. It is to
these justifications that we now must turn.
4 Wars of Law, Laws of War
Introduction
In previous chapters we have seen how the temporal limits and spatial
boundaries of the modern state and the international system were
drawn by means of a consistent appeal to the productive force of war
in the emerging fields of historiography and geography from the early
modern period onward. International war was thereby constituted as a
natural correlate of the modern political order, and the meaningful use
of this concept came to presuppose the existence of bounded political
communities characterized by domestic peace and order. In this chap-
ter, I describe how attempts to regulate the use of force by means of law
have depended on similar, albeit slightly more subdued, assumptions
about the productive force of hostility and violence in human affairs.
To this end, I engage some canonical texts in international law from the
early seventeenth to the late nineteenth century.
The regulative force of international law presupposes that it can
transcend the contingencies of history and geography by virtue of its
universalistic aspirations. Yet, as I show, many attempts to justify the
existence of an international legal order and international legal norms
share many of the assumptions made by historians and geographers in
their endeavor to make sense of the sovereign state and the interna-
tional system. Notions of human hostility and war appear to be as
crucial to the explanation and justification of international legal order
as they were to understanding of the origins of the sovereign state and
the international system. As Carl Schmitt once remarked, “the history
of international law is a history of the concept of war.”1
Yet my argument must be distinguished from reductionist views of
international law. First, according to a quintessentially realist view,
1
Carl Schmitt, “The Turn to the Discriminating Concept of War” [1937], in Carl
Schmitt, Writings on War, trans. Timothy Nunan (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2011), 31.
129
international law is nothing but an expression of the will of the most

powerful states, its main function being to legitimize the use of force by
them.2 In contrast to its realist critics, however, I would like to main-
tain that the habit of harnessing legal principles for the purposes of
power politics did not originate in any sudden sacrifice of the autonomy
of international law on the altar of state power. Rather, I believe that
the embarrassing congruence between the concerns of international
law and those of secular statecraft is an unintended consequence of
sustained attempts to preserve the autonomy of the former in a world
gradually being structured according to the principles of the latter.
Thus – and pace Skinner – I will not treat the natural law tradition as
distinct from that of secular statecraft, but instead assume that these
traditions have in fact long been confluent.3
Second, according to its postcolonial critics, one main function of
international law has been to impose Western standards of civilization
on the rest of the world, excluding non-European peoples from mem-
bership in international society on the grounds that they lack the marks
of sovereignty and other essential characteristics of civilized nations.4
By contrast, I maintain that these tendencies did not arise from any
deep-seated cultural prejudices against non-European peoples but from
the inner logic of international law itself. While the exclusion of non-
European peoples from the pale of international law was often justified
with reference to cultural differences, that exclusion was a consequence
of attempts to come to terms with the primitive forms of violence and
hostility that already had been posited at the very foundation of inter-
national law. From the seventeenth to the early nineteenth century,
many international lawyers were simply not that concerned with what
took place outside European states. But by differentiating between
2
For a recent restatement of this view, see Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner,
“Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice
Perspective,” Journal of Legal Studies 31, no. 1 (2002): 115–39; Jack L.
Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford: Oxford
3
For this contention, see Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political
Thought, Vol. 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 172.
4
Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Brett Bowden, “The Colonial
Origins of International Law: European Expansion and the Classical Standard of
Civilization,” Journal of the History of International Law 7, no. 1 (2005): 1–23;
Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism, and Order
in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
Introduction 131
different kinds of hostility and violence – normalizing some while

rendering others pathologic – international lawyers made certain prac-
tices of exclusion indispensable to the coherence of international law
itself. By defining some forms of violence as natural parts of the human
condition and as normal features of state intercourse while identifying
other forms with those found in the dark past of European states,
international law thereby created the preconditions of its own identity
and disciplinary integrity.
Third, it is important to distinguish the present argument from
the view according to which law is altogether contingent on power
and violence. As we learn from Nietzsche’s Zur Genealogie der
Moral (1887), “states of legality can never be anything but excep-
tional states, as partial restrictions of the true will to life, which
seeks power and to whose overall purpose they subordinate them-
selves as individual measures, that is to say, as a means of creating
greater units of power.”5 In a similar vein, Schmitt later main-
tained that law cannot determine what goes on in the political
sphere because law is but the offspring a sovereign decision that
constitutes the political community on the basis of a distinction
between friends and enemies.6 During the twentieth century, this
kind of argument was twisted into a critique of the state and its
reliance on violence for its smooth functioning. As Benjamin
argued, if law indeed originates in violence, “it follows . . . that
all violence as a means, even in the most favorable case, is impli-
cated in the problematic nature of law itself.”7 And as he went on
to explain, “lawmaking is power making, and, to that extent an
immediate manifestation of violence.”8 Expanding on this account,
Derrida has argued that although law does not necessarily origi-
nate in raw power, the making and justification of law nevertheless
depend on “a performative and therefore interpretative violence
that in itself is neither just nor unjust.” Hence both the founding
authority and the law itself “are themselves a violence without
5
Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. Carol Diethe
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), II, § 11, 50.
6
Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political [1927] (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2008).
7
Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” in Walter Benjamin, Reflections:
Essays, Aphorisms, Anthropological Writings, ed. Peter Demetz (New York:
Schocken Books, 1978), 277–300, at 287.
8
Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 295.
ground.”9 A curious blend of these views has recently found favor

with those who take the violent origins of law to be indicative of
its utter lack of legitimacy and who therefore are inclined to
argue that we are stuck in a permanent state of exception and
lawlessness.10
These accounts assume that some kind of primordial violence lies at
the heart of all law because otherwise there would be nothing there for
law to regulate and nothing there that would prompt its emergence in
the first place. Yet, to my mind, what matters to the emergence of law is
not whether some actual violence was present in the beginning but
rather the curious fact that the possibility and necessity of violence are
imagined by law itself as a condition of itself. Thus there is an inescap-
able circularity in those accounts of law that both take violence to be
foundational and purport to present an antidote to its excesses or
otherwise undesirable manifestations. I therefore think that interna-
tional law and its history will start to make much more sense once we
are willing to realize that there is no “war” apart from that constructed
by lawyers in order to provide international law with its ultimate
justification. This implies that the reductionist accounts discussed ear-
lier – whether realist, postcolonial, or critical – perhaps should be seen
as late modern manifestations of a long tradition of thought that has
insisted on a symbiotic relationship between violence and law. Instead
of taking these accounts at face value and using them as field guides in
the present, I think they should best be read as examples of a form of
legal reasoning that was initiated long ago and thus fit into a more
encompassing account of the role of violent imaginaries in the consti-
tution of sociopolitical order.11
When it comes to making sense of the symbiotic relationship of war
and law, historians of international law are generally more helpful than
political philosophers. As Koskenniemi has argued, early modern
9
Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority,’” in
Drucilla Cornell, Michael Rosenfield, and David G. Carlson (eds.),
Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (London: Routledge, 1992), 3–67,
at 14–15.
10
Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2005); Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life
(Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).
11
See, for example, Ronald C. Jennings, “Sovereignty and Political Modernity: A
Genealogy of Agamben’s Critique of Sovereignty,” Anthropological Theory 11,
no. 1 (2011): 23–61.
Introduction 133
natural jurisprudence was not primarily concerned with restricting the

use of force by an appeal to a universal normative order but was more a
matter of harnessing it for the purposes of secular statecraft given the
limits posed by nascent conceptions of sovereignty.12 And, as Berman
has noted, “throughout its history, the contours of the legal construc-
tion of war have been contested, defended, transformed, and recon-
structed through myriad discursive and practical activities.”13 This
implies that the distinction between war and not-war is open to what
Berman has called “strategic instrumentalization,” that is, the deploy-
ment of this “distinction itself for partisan advantage – seeking to
achieve practical or discursive gains through shifting back and forth
between war and not-war.”14 Pursuing this argument further, Kennedy
has argued that war is best understood as a legal institution. Hence the
rules of war should not be viewed primarily as attempts to impose
limits on the use of force but rather as constitutive of that very institu-
tion. Since “the changing nature of warfare is also a function of chan-
ging ideas about law,” international law is not distinct from the
practices of war.15 Rather, conversely, “law now offers an institutional
and doctrinal space for transforming the boundaries of war into stra-
tegic assets, as well as a vernacular for legitimating and denouncing
what happens in war.”16 So, ultimately, “we make war in the shadow
of law, and law in the shadow of force.”17
Yet, as I propose, the symbiosis between law and war runs even
deeper than this, thanks to its long historical pedigree. While many
of the authors in the canon of international law subscribed to
12
Martti Koskenniemi, “International Law and Raison d’État: Rethinking the
Prehistory of International Law,” in Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin
Straumann (eds.), The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico
Gentili and the Justice of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 297–
339.
13
Nathaniel Berman, “Privileging Combat?: Contemporary Conflict and the Legal
Construction of War,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 43, no. 1
(2004): 1–71, at 6. See also Roger Normand and Chris af Jochnick, “The
Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War,” Harvard
International Law Journal 35, no. 1 (1994): 49–95.
14
Berman, “Privileging Combat?,” 7.
15
David Kennedy, Of Law and War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2006), 8. Also David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law and
Expertise Shape the Global Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
16
Kennedy, Of Law and War, 116. 17 Ibid., 165.
ontogenetic views of war similar to those detailed in the preceding

chapters, I believe that the preoccupation with war is indicative of
the extent to which international law has tried to legitimize itself by
appealing to what would likely happen if violence were left uncate-
gorized and hence also un-naturalized and unregulated. Thus we are
confronted with a double bind between law and the use of force than
runs parallel to the history of the relationship between war and the
sovereign state. War appears as the evil twin of both: as much as war
needs international law to exist as a meaningful category of thought
and action, international law needs war in order to maintain its
autonomy as a field of inquiry.
So, while Benjamin might have been right in insisting that military
violence is “primordial and paradigmatic of all violence used for nat-
ural ends” and hence that “there is in all such violence a lawmaking
character,”18 this equation would not be possible to uphold unless that
peculiar form of violence already had been defined and delimited by
means of legal concepts distinguishing it from its less instrumental and
more destructive forms. Conversely, while international lawyers might
be right in pointing out that these legal categories have been socially
constructed and constantly contested across time and space, they have
been able to make this point against the backdrop of a widespread
conviction that war has been around in a similar form long enough to
constitute a perennial problem to which commensurable solutions
could be proposed, compared, validated, or disqualified.
But war and law can only be made to appear co-constitutive to the
extent that international law presupposes that hostility and enmity
among political communities is a natural or at least a customary con-
dition while suggesting that this hostility and enmity also are amenable
to some regulation and perhaps even to eventual abolition in some
distant future. Hence we should also guard against the tendency to
project notions of international law back onto a past in which such
notions would have made little or no sense.19 So, rather than assuming
that international law in some recognizably modern form has been
present from the early modern period onward, it is imperative that
we should try to reconstruct its emergence and institutionalization in
18
Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 283.
19
On the perils of anachronism in the historiography of international law, see
David Kennedy, “Primitive Legal Scholarship,” Harvard Journal of
International Law 27, no. 1 (1986): 1–98.
Natural Law and Natural Hostility 135
terms of its imagined symbiotic relationship with war and how this
relationship has evolved in tandem with the constitution of the sover-
eign state and the modern international system.20
Catering to these desiderata, the rest of this chapter is organized as
follows. In the next section, I describe how theorists of natural law
made foundational assumptions about human hostility and how these
assumptions shaped their outlook on the law of nations. I then dwell
on those who made the first attempts to supplement the naturalist
framework with voluntary and positive law, arguing that this resulted
in a further naturalization and reification of war as a productive force
in human affairs. In the final section, I analyze the nineteenth-century
transition to legal positivism, arguing that this resulted in an outward
projection of the forms of hostility and violence that long had been
imagined at the very foundations of international law.
Natural Law and Natural Hostility

As Schmitt has famously argued, the decisive step from medieval to
modern international law lies in the separation of questions of just
cause grounded in moral arguments from the idea of legal equality
of belligerents.21 I have already described how this transition from
war as law enforcement to war as a duel between equals made it
possible to attribute ontogenetic capacities to war and to impose
temporal limits and spatial boundaries on those still nebulous enti-
ties that were in the process of becoming sovereign states. In this
and the following sections, I will analyze how this new understand-
ing of war affected attempts to regulate the intercourse of sovereign
states by means of law and how these efforts were premised on the
hostility and violence posited at the very foundation of that law.
But first let me add some complication to this transition. As Neff
has described the just-war tradition, it “was notably lacking in any
idea of moral equivalence, or equality of rights, between a just and
an unjust belligerent. The unjust side, by definition, had no right
whatever to use force against the just side, any more than a criminal
20
For recent attempts in this direction, see Olaf Asbach and Peter Schröder (eds.),
War, The State, and International Law in the Seventeenth Century (Farnham:
Ashgate, 2010).
21
Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus
Publicum Europaeum (New York: Telos Press, 2006), 110.
has a ‘right’ to use violence against a magistrate.”22 This view of

war as punishment by some rightful authority remained central to
the scholastic tradition well into the sixteenth century. As Vitoria
stated in his De Iure Belli (1539), “the sole and only just cause for
waging war is when harm has been inflicted,” adding that “not
every or any injury gives sufficient grounds for waging war.” This
being so, because a “prince cannot have greater authority over
foreigners than he has over his own subjects; but he may not
draw the sword against his own subjects unless they have done
some wrong; therefore he cannot do the same against foreigners
except in the same circumstances.”23 To Vitoria, the fact that
humanity was divided into distinct political communities did not
entail that war against foreigners was more easily justified than war
against inner enemies of each such community. Yet, as I shall try to
show, the transition from medieval doctrines of just war to the
modern understanding of war never was as smooth and straightfor-
ward as Schmitt and Neff would like us to believe because the very
ambition to regulate war between legal equals depended precisely
on the endurance of irregular forms of violence – real or imagined –
that could be invoked as the defining characteristic of those who
stood outside the law and whose lingering presence made legal
regulation of the use of force seem both necessary and desirable.
Since the task of this chapter is to inquire into how different concep-
tions of war and enmity have shaped international law from the seven-
teenth to the nineteenth century, a focus on the humanist tradition is a
natural starting point not only because of its preoccupation with war
but also because of its substantial influence on the subsequent devel-
opment of international law. Although legal scholasticism remained
important throughout the early modern period, it was mainly influen-
tial in the development of the private rights of dominium that were
crucial to commercial and imperial pursuits.24 Drawing on recently
rediscovered Roman sources, the humanist tradition was based on the
22
Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 62.
23
Francisco de Vitoria, “On the Law of War,” in Vitoria: Political Writings, ed.
Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), § 13–14, 303–4.
24
See Martti Koskenniemi, “Empire and International Law: The Real Spanish
Contribution,” University of Toronto Law Journal 61, no. 1 (2011): 1–36.
assumption that self-preservation is the most fundamental principle of

natural law. This principle was equally applicable to individuals and
political communities and especially so in the absence of a common
political or legal authority. As a result, most humanists felt little or no
contradiction between the precepts of secular statecraft and the prin-
ciples of natural law because safeguarding political communities from
external threats was seen as necessary to their independence and thus
also to the possibility of maintaining individual rights within them.25
Although early modern natural law theorists differed on the meaning
of sovereignty, they had inherited the assumption that only wars waged
by some legitimate authority are justifiable. And although their under-
standings of what constituted such legitimate authority did differ
markedly, this implied that political authority and the right to wage
war came to be defined in terms of each other right from the start. As a
consequence, war is at the foundation of political authority and law
because “the legitimacy of the state could now be understood as a
function of the logic driving its own formation, rather than in terms
of its historical appearance.”26 Early theorists of natural law therefore
typically start by presupposing that hostility and violence are natural or
at least customary features of the human condition, partly because
human beings are predisposed to violence and partly because there is
no common authority there to check those predispositions. They then
proceed to differentiate war proper from irregular forms of violence.
Whereas proper war is the prerogative of legitimate authorities, the
existence of irregular forms of violence is invoked to explain the
emergence of sovereignty and law with reference to the disorder and
violence that are likely to ensue in their absence. Such irregular forms of
violence can only be justifiably employed by legitimate authorities
25
See Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the
International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999), 16–50; also Ryan Greenwood, “War and Sovereignty in Medieval
Roman Law,” Law and History Review 32, no. 1 (2014): 31–63. The contrast
between the scholastic and humanist traditions should not be overstated,
however. See Randall Lesaffer, “The Classical Law of Nations (1500–1800),” in
Alexander Orakhelashvili (ed.), Research Handbook on the Theory and History
of International Law (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2011), 408–40; Diego Panizza,
“Political Theory and Jurisprudence in Gentili’s De Iure Belli: The Great Debate
between ‘Theological’ and ‘Humanist’ Perspectives from Vitoria to Grotius,”
International Law and Justice Working Papers 15/5 (2005).
26
David William Bates, States of War: Enlightenment Origins of the Political
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 51.
against actors who are deemed illegitimate precisely with reference to

their own propensity to resort to irregular forms of violence.
That war is nothing but a duel between moral equals stuck in a
condition devoid of common authority is a core assumption of
Gentili’s De Jure Belli (1588/1598), a book that proclaimed to be
nothing less than a first philosophy of war. As Gentili states in the
first chapter, “it does not appear to be the function either of the moral
or of the political philosopher to give an account of the laws which we
have in common with our enemies and with foreigners . . . This philo-
sophy of war belongs to that great community formed by the entire
world and the whole human race.”27 That great community of all
humankind is bound together by the law of nations, which is “that
which is in use among all the nations of men, which native reason has
established among all human beings, and which is equally observed by
all mankind.”28 Yet the presence of such a world community is not
itself sufficient to establish any binding norms that could restrain the
use of force because it does not have any corresponding authority to
enforce such norms.29
Gentili then sets out to define the concept of war and discuss its role
within this universal legal order. Proceeding from a definition accord-
ing to which “war is a just and public contest of arms,” Gentili stipu-
lates that “the arms on both sides should be public, for bellum, ‘war,’
derives its name from the fact there is a contest for victory between
equal parties, and for that reason it was first called duellum, a contest of
two . . . The term hostis was applied to a foreigner who had equal rights
with the Romans. In fact hostire means ‘to make equal’ . . . Therefore
hostis is a person with whom war is made and who is the equal of his
opponent.”30 Thus, in contrast to scholastics such as Vitoria, Gentili
emphasizes that war properly understood can only take place between
legal equals, and whatever violence that takes place between unequal
27
Alberico Gentili, De Jure Belli Libri Tres, trans. John C. Rolfe (Oxford:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1933), I.I.3. For a recent and
illuminating discussion, see Peter Schröder, “Taming the Fox and the Lion:
Some Aspects of the Sixteenth Century’s Debate on Inter-State Relations,” in
Asbach and Schröder, War, the State, and International Law, 83–102.
28
Gentili, De Jure Belli, I.I.8.
29
See Andreas Wagner, “Francisco de Vitoria and Alberico Gentili on the Legal
Character of the Global Commonwealth,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31,
no. 3 (2011): 565–82.
30
Gentili, De Jure Belli, I.II.12.
parties must take on a different form, such as brigandage, or as warfare

undertaken to punish those who threaten the integrity or existence of
the universal community of humankind.31
That justice could lie with both parties also meant that “war has
its origin in necessity; and this necessity arises because there cannot
be judicial processes between supreme sovereigns or free peoples
unless they themselves consent, since they acknowledge no judge or
superior. Consequently they are only supreme and they alone merit
the title of public, while all others are inferior and are rated as
private individuals . . . Therefore it was inevitable that the decision
between sovereigns should be made by arms.”32 So although Gentili
holds that war should be the resorted to only when all attempts at
arbitration have failed, he is adamant that war is a method of
dispute settlement, “for we are inquiring into the method of settling
a case, not into that of taking vengeance and inflicting punish-
ment.”33 From this definition of war as a contest between equals
that recognize no superior authority also follows that “private indi-
viduals, subject peoples, and petty sovereigns are never confronted
with the necessity of resorting to the arbitrament of Mars, since they
can obtain their legal rights before their superiors’ tribunal.”34 Thus
the key concepts of the laws of war are defined in terms of each
other: war is defined in terms of the formal equality of the belliger-
ents; equality is defined in terms of their mutual hostility, mutual
hostility, in turn, being a consequence of their refusal to recognize
any supreme authority and their refusal to recognize any supreme
authority being a corollary of their claims to sovereignty, claims to
sovereignty being but a consequence of the kind of primitive hostility
that otherwise would reign unobstructed within as well as between
political communities.
Now, equivocations like this could easily be taken to indicate that
Gentili foreshadowed a recognizably modern account of the relation-
ship between the sovereign state and war by making the latter the
exclusive prerogative of the former. Against this it could be objected
that Gentili had a rather vague notion of the meaning, locus, and
scope of sovereignty, thus making such inferences anachronistic and
31
For a similar argument, see Wouter G. Werner, “From Justus Hostis to Rogue
State the Concept of the Enemy in International Legal Thinking,” International
Journal for the Semiotics of Law 17, no. 2 (2004): 155–68.
32
Gentili, De Jure Belli, I.III.15. 33 Ibid., I.III.19. 34 Ibid., I.III.20.
unwarranted.35 But, by drawing extensively on the writings of

Bodin, the meaning he imputed to sovereignty seems sufficiently
precise for the task at hand, namely, to distinguish between those
who are subject to the laws of war and those who are not.36 Hence, as
Gentili goes on to explain with a little help from Cicero, “he is an
enemy who has a state, a senate, a treasury, united and harmonious
citizens, and some basis for a treaty of peace, should matters so shape
themselves.” Yet, although the term hostis implies equality, this term
is “sometimes extended to cover those that are not equal, namely, to
pirates, proscribed persons, and rebels; nevertheless, it cannot confer
the rights due to enemies . . . and the privileges of regular warfare.”37
War is thus a category applicable to formal equals only, whereas
those who are “the common enemies of all mankind . . . do not enjoy
the privileges of a law to which they are foes.”38 By virtue of not
being enemies in any proper sense, and hence not subject to the laws
of war, all nonsovereign malefactors are fair game for punishment at
the hands of legitimate sovereigns. So, although this is necessary in
order to carry out a clear-cut transition from a unilateral to a bilat-
eral conception of war, the former remains essential to the coherence
of the latter.
Even among actors of equal standing, we find a rather licentious
view of the right to wage war. The right to wage war derives from its
very nature. While Gentili disagrees with the view that hostility is a
natural condition of all men, he maintains that the distinction
between friend and enemy is made by custom. Yet custom is second
nature to us, firmly rooted in the unruly passions of men. Thus “it is
through the fault of the human race that dissensions arise, since
mankind is uneasy and untamed, and always engaged in a struggle
for freedom or glory or dominion.”39 No war is therefore ever nat-
ural, but wars can nevertheless arise out of natural causes. Self-
defense is a case in point because “this is the most generally accepted
of all rights. All laws and all codes allow the repelling of force by
35
See Benedict Kingsbury, “Confronting Difference: The Puzzling Durability of
Gentili’s Combination of Pragmatic Pluralism and Normative Judgment,”
American Journal of International Law 92, no. 1 (1998): 713–23, at 715.
36
See Peter Schröder, “Vitoria, Gentili, Bodin: Sovereignty and the Law of
Nations,” in Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann (eds.), The Roman
Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 163–86.
37
Gentili, De Jure Belli, I.IV.25. 38 Ibid., I.IV.23. 39 Ibid., I.XII.54.
force. There is one rule which endures forever, to maintain one’s

safety by any and every means.”40 Apart from self-defense in the
more narrow sense of preventive war, wars of expediency may be
also waged justly as long as they serve the broader aim of
self-preservation.41 This being so, “no one ought to wait to be struck,
unless he is a fool. One ought to provide not only against an offence
which is being committed, but also against one which may possibly be
committed.”42 Thus conceived, the right of self-defense entails an
obligation to resist those who attempt to aggrandize themselves at
the expense of others because it “is better to provide that men should
not acquire too great power, than to be obliged to seek a remedy later,
when they have already become too powerful.”43 As one perceptive
commentator has pointed out, Gentili thereby “decoupled the notion
of just war from the concept of punishment and described all just wars
as defensive in character.”44
Yet the definition of war implies that both belligerents are equally
likely to maintain that their cause is just and that there are few, if any,
reliable methods available to ascertain the validity of their respective
claims. Only in the rare cases where one party is “contending without
any adequate reason [is] . . . that party surely practising brigandage
and not waging war.”45 But those who do have adequate, if not
always valid, reasons for going to war have to be prepared that the
law that “grants the rights of war to both contestants makes what is
taken on each side the property of the captors, and regards the prison-
ers of both parties as slaves.”46 In a predicament devoid of superior
40
Ibid., I.XIII.59. On this point, see Gregory M. Reichberg, “Preventive War in
Classical Just War Theory,” Journal of the History of International Law 9, no. 1
(2007): 5–34.
41
Gentili, De Jure Belli, I.V.30.
42
Ibid., I.XIV.62. For a detailed account of how such permissive views of self-
defense played themselves out in practice, see Randall Lesaffer, “Defensive
Warfare, Prevention and Hegemony: The Justifications for the Franco-Spanish
War of 1635,” Parts I and II, Journal of the History of International Law 8, nos.
1 and 2 (2006): 91–123, 141–79.
43
Gentili, De Jure Belli, I.XIV.65.
44
Pärtel Piirimäe, “Alberico Gentili’s Doctrine of Defensive War and Its Impact on
Seventeenth-Century Normative Views,” in Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin
Straumann (eds.), The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico
Gentili and the Justice of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 187–
209.
45
Gentili, De Jure Belli, I.VI.31–2. 46 Ibid., I.VI.33.
moral or legal authority, religious differences can never be a just cause

of war “since the laws of religion do not properly exist between man
and man, therefore no man’s rights are violated by a difference in
religion, nor is it lawful to make war because of religion.”47 Yet the
very absence of religion constitutes a valid exception to this rule
because “we are not now speaking of those who, living rather like
beasts than like men, are wholly without religious belief; for I should
hold that such men, being the common foes of all mankind, as pirates
are, ought to be assailed in war and forced to adopt the usages of
humanity.”48 Likewise, while it may not always be necessary to wage
war against barbarians and infidels, their hostility is a valid reason for
going to war against them. “[W]e have war with the Turks because
they act as our enemies, plot against us, and threaten us. With the
greatest treachery they always seize our possessions, whenever they
can. Thus we constantly have a legitimate reason for war against the
Turks.”49 As Malcolm has pointed out, friendly relations with infidels
were ruled out by Gentili on a variety of grounds, some pragmatic and
others theological in character.50
By carefully constructing a chain of inferential connections between
his core concepts, and by using those concepts to determine the content
of the laws of war as well as the conditions of their applicability, Gentili
seems to be saying the following: while hostility may not be part of the
natural condition of humankind, the passions of men will inevitably
give rise to enmity as long as those passions remain untamed by
sovereign authority and law. Yet human hostility is also what makes
law possible and indeed necessary, insofar as it compels men to submit
to sovereign authority in the interest of self-preservation and to avoid
the random violence that would otherwise ensue in its absence.
Customary hostility is thus a great equalizer of political communities
coexisting in a condition devoid of supreme authority and that which
makes it possible to distinguish between war proper and war as law
enforcement. While war in the former sense is necessary for the law of
nations to emerge and solidify, war in the latter sense is necessary to
protect the law of nations from the evil acts of those who out of choice
47
Ibid., I.IX.41. 48 Ibid., I.IX.41. 49 Ibid., I.XII.56–7.
50
Noel Malcolm, “Alberico Gentili and the Ottomans,” in Benedict Kingsbury
and Benjamin Straumann (eds.), The Roman Foundations of the Law of
Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010), 127–45.
or disposition stand outside law altogether and therefore constitute

enemies of all humankind.
Similar connections between the concepts of war, law, and sover-
eignty run through the many pages of De Iure Belli ac Pacis Libri
Tres (1625) by Hugo Grotius. Although Grotius incorporated more
strands from the scholastic tradition than did Gentili and conse-
quently held more restrictive views on the use of force, he subscribed
to an ontogenetic view of war that is not very different from that of
his predecessor. He starts by noting that “all the Differences of those
who do not acknowledge one common Civil Right . . . relate either to
the Affairs of War, or Peace.”51 That civil right issues from civil
power that “is that which governs the State. The State is a compleat
Body of free Persons, associated together to enjoy peaceably their
Rights, and for their common Benefit.”52
In contrast to the medieval conception of war as an instrument of
law enforcement, Grotius stipulates that “war is the State or
Situation of those . . . who dispute by Force of Arms.”53 Noting
that bellum derives from duellum, this implies “a Difference between
two Persons, in the same Sense as we term Peace Unity (from Unitas)
for a contrary Reason.”54 Thus war and peace are defined as
mutually exclusive states of affairs that cannot coexist within the
same slice of time and space and whose distinctness is closely con-
nected to the presence of law and legitimate authority within the
state and their absence outside the state. While Grotius held that war
is a condition in which both individuals and states easily could find
themselves in the absence of overarching authority, the resort to
violent means is justified with reference to the right to self-preserva-
tion: “’tis the first Duty of every one to preserve himself in his natural
State, to seek after those Things which are agreeable to Nature, and
to avert those which are repugnant.”55 Furthermore, since “that it is
a Law of Nature, fixed in all living Creatures, to be desirous of Life;
and that we therefore look on them as our Enemies, who would
openly deprive us of it, it follows that ‘by the Law of Nature’ then,
which may also be called the Law of Nations, it is plain, that every
Kind of War is not to be condemned.”56
51
Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ed. Richard Tuck (Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund, 2005), I.I.133.
52
Grotius, Rights of War and Peace, I.I.162. 53 Ibid., I.I.134.
54
Ibid., I.I.135. 55 Ibid., I.II.180. 56 Ibid., I.II.188–9.
From these more general considerations of war as the ultimate tool

of justice and peace, Grotius proceeds to distinguish between differ-
ent forms of war and on what grounds they might be justified.
Leaving aside his definition of private war for the moment, Grotius
distinguishes between public wars that are solemn and those that are
not. The former, he informs us, is a war that is lawful in the sense
“that it be made on both Sides, by the Authority of those that have
the Sovereign Power in the State.”57 This being so, since by “War the
whole State is endangered, therefore it is provided, by the Laws of
almost all Nations, that it be undertaken only by the Order or with
the Approbation of the Sovereign.”58
The requirement that wars must be declared and waged by some
sovereign authority prompts Grotius to consider the meaning of
this latter term in some detail.59 Equating sovereignty with supreme
authority within a given polity, we learn that “the common Subject
of Supreme Power is the State; which I have before called a perfect
Society of Men.”60 Thus public wars occur “only between those
that acknowledge no common Judge” since in the absence of such
superior legal authority, the right of self-defense “arises directly
and immediately from the Care of our own Preservation, which
Nature recommends to every one, and not from the Injustice or
Crime of the Aggressor.”61 But, in contrast to Gentili, the right of
self-defense does not imply the right to take up arms in order to
curb the rising power of another state or on sheer suspicion of
aggressive intentions. As Grotius states, “to justify taking up
Arms in our own Defence, there ought to be a Necessity for so
doing, which there is not, unless we are sure, with a moral
Certainty, that he has not only Forces sufficient, but a full
Intention to injure us.”62 This and similar passages have been
interpreted as evidence that Grotius took a more restrictive view
on the use of force and that he thereby laid the foundations of a
distinct tradition of international thought that takes legal norms to
57
Ibid., I.III.250. 58 Ibid., I.III.251.
59
Although Grotius uses the term imperium to describe supreme authority, he
does so invoking distinctively Bodinian connotations of indivisibility; see Knud
Haakonssen, “Hugo Grotius and the History of Political Thought,” Political
Theory 13, no. 2 (1985): 239–65.
60
Grotius, Rights of War and Peace, I.III.259. 61 Ibid., II.I.416, 397.
62
Ibid., II.XXII.1102.
be valid and applicable beyond the boundaries of individual

states.63
But wars could also be fought lawfully by private actors, sometimes
on their own initiative and sometimes at the behest of their sovereigns.
Grotius starts his discussion of private war by noting that this is the
most ancient form of war, yet the “[l]iberty allowed before is now much
restrained.”64 Thus private war is now permissible only where legal
authority is absent and the road to formal justice closed, such as “in
Places not inhabited, as on the Seas, in a Wilderness, in desert Islands;
and any other Places where there is no Civil Government.”65 Given this
definition, whether a war is public or private depends on whether it is
waged by sovereign authorities or not.
As Keene has shown, although Grotius held sovereignty to be
indivisible in principle, he readily admitted that it was often divided
in practice. But even if Grotius did not exclude non-European peoples
from international law and considered them capable of entering into
and honoring legally binding agreements, the fact that their political
institutions did not fulfill the formal requirements of sovereignty
meant that they were fair game for different forms of interference.66
Yet none of this seems to have been motivated by any cultural pre-
judices on his behalf, however. Grotius had published a dissertation
on the origin of the American Indians that provided few, if any,
63
For some statements, see Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Grotian Tradition in
International Law,” British Yearbook of International Law 23 (1946): 1–53;
Hedley Bull, “The Importance of Grotius and International Relations,” in
Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts (eds.), Hugo Grotius and
International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992), 65–93; Martin
Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, ed. Gabriele Wight and
Brian Porter (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991); Benedict Kingsbury,
“Grotian Tradition of Theory and Practice: Grotius, Law, and Moral
Skepticism in the Thought of Hedley Bull,” Quinnipiac Law Review 17, no. 3
(1997): 3–33; Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann, “The State of
Nature and Commercial Sociability in Early Modern International Legal
Thought,” Grotiana 31, no. 1 (2010): 22–43. For critical discussions, see Jens
Bartelson, “Short Circuits: Society and Tradition in International Relations
Theory,” Review of International Studies 22, no. 4 (1996): 339–60; John T.
Parry, “What Is the Grotian Tradition in International Law?,” University of
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 35, no. 2 (2014): 299–377; Randall
Lesaffer, “The Grotian Tradition Revisited: Change and Continuity in the
History of International Law,” British Yearbook of International Law 73, no. 1
(2003): 103–39.
64
Grotius, Rights of War and Peace, I.III.240. 65 Ibid., I.III.241.
66
Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, 40–59.
reasons for their dispossession and subjugation, all while his natural-
ism predisposed him to regard them and other non-European peoples
as default members of the great community of humankind.67 Hence
he tells us that “the Indians of the orient are neither insane nor
irrational, but clever and sagacious, so that not even in this respect
can a pretext for their subjugation be found.”68 It rather seems that
the differential treatment of non-European peoples finds justification
in his distinction between public and private wars. This implies that
any act of hostility between fully sovereign states and those whose
sovereignty is weak, absent, or divided will automatically fail to meet
the criteria of public war and instead be subsumed under the more
nebulous and permissive category of private war. Grotius had thereby
created two distinct spheres of war, each with its own rules of engage-
ment. Among sovereign states, the use of force could be subjected to
restrictions according to the law of nations. On those parts of the
non-European world outside where there was no sovereignty and
hence no law worthy of the name, actors were constrained by the
principle of self-defense only.
To Grotius, the perennial presence of violence in human affairs is
not only what motivates his inquiry but also that which determines
its conceptual and logical structure. While war takes on a recog-
nizably modern meaning by being defined as a contest between
sovereign equals, what motivates this exercise in definition and
classification is the underlying assumption that war is always
already present in some primitive and unregulated form so that
defining the meaning of this concept is a necessary precursor to its
eventual regulation. While war in its crude, unregulated, and pri-
vate form antedated and conditioned the emergence of sovereign
authority and law in Europe, that kind of war is now found outside
Europe and thus beyond the scope of legal regulation.
While much intellectual effort has gone into contrasting the
Grotian view of international law with that of Hobbes, the fact
that Hobbes had little to say about interstate relations has greatly
complicated such comparisons and has probably also facilitated the
67
See Joan-Pau Rubiés, “Hugo Grotius’s Dissertation on the Origin of the
American Peoples and the Use of Comparative Methods,” Journal of the History
of Ideas 52, no. 2 (1991): 221–44.
68
Hugo Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, trans. Gwladys L.
Williams and W. H. Zeydel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), 220–2.
co-optation of his work by modern political realists.69 But, as Tuck

has argued, “Hobbes need not to be seen as differing from Grotius
over ethical matters, strictly understood, at all.”70 Although Hobbes
differed from Grotius in that he equated the state of nature with a
state of war and thus imputed little innate sociability to human
beings, both saw self-preservation as the most fundamental right of
both individuals and states and also equated international law with
the law of nature as applied to the latter.
In the present context, however, a more interesting difference
between Grotius and Hobbes lies in the fact that the latter much
more explicitly invokes hostility and enmity to explain how the
sovereign state and law are possible in the first place. This move is
made possible by Hobbes’s clear definition of war as a state of affairs
with a definite spatiotemporal extension rather than as an indefinite
sequence of violent actions. As Hobbes tells us in the Elements of Law
(1640), “[w]ar is nothing else but that time where the will and inten-
tion of contending by force is either by words or actions sufficiently
declared; and the time which is not war is Peace.”71 Parts of this
definition are reiterated in Leviathan (1651), but with the important
addition that war is now defined with reference to the absence of
supreme authority so that “during the time men live without a com-
mon power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is
called Warre . . . Warre consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of
fighting; but in a tract of time Wherein the will to contend by Battell is
sufficiently known.”72 What matters here is thus not the presence of
overt hostilities between the parties, but the fact that they happen to
coexist and interact in the absence of a common authority. That is,
even if they should fail to recognize that there is no one there to keep
them in awe or fail to interpret such an absence as a license to do
battle, they are nevertheless stuck in a state of war because war
69
See David Armitage, Foundations of Modern International Thought
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 59; David Boucher, “Hobbes’s
Contribution to International Thought, and the Contribution of International
Thought to Hobbes,” History of European Ideas 41, no. 1 (2015): 29–48.
70
Tuck, Rights of War and Peace, 135; Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 279–
348.
71
Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law Natural and Politic, ed. Maurice
Goldsmith (London: Frank Cass, 1969), 73.
72
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge University Press,
1991), I.XIII.88.
“consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition

thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.”73
But why must the absence of common authority necessarily lead to
war? In De Cive (1642), we learn that the state of nature is nothing but a
state of war because “it cannot be denied but that the natural state of men,
before they entered into society, was a mere war, but a war of all men
against all men.”74 This question has long puzzled political theorists and
scholars of international relations. If it cannot be shown that the state of
nature necessarily is also a state of war, it cannot be shown why men
should voluntarily submit to sovereign authority in the interest of self-
preservation, and if that cannot be shown, the Hobbesian justification of
sovereignty crumbles. Some authors have responded to this problem by
focusing on the dispositions that according to Hobbes may compel
human beings to violence. The dispositions invoked by him to this end –
competition, diffidence, and glory – have somewhat anachronistically
been taken to mean that background conditions such as a scarcity of
resources, a lack of security, and a desire for recognition, either alone or
taken together, are sufficient conditions of war.75 Others have argued that
the uncertainty about the intentions of others that comes naturally with
anarchy, coupled with the corresponding lack of a common moral voca-
bulary, is sufficient to explain why hostilities are likely to break out in the
absence of sovereign authority.76
While the preceding accounts have focused on the inferential connec-
tions between the concepts of war and sovereign authority, they have
failed to notice that Hobbes also takes the state of war to be productive of
sovereign authority and law in a more sociological and historical sense.77
This omission is hardly surprising given that much of what he has to say
73
Hobbes, Leviathan, I.XIII.88.
74
Thomas Hobbes, De Cive or the Citizen (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
1949), I.29.
75
See, for example, Arash Abizadeh, “Hobbes on the Causes of War: A
Disagreement Theory,” American Political Science Review 105, no. 2 (2011):
298–315; Jean Hampton, “Hobbes’s State of War,” Topoi 4, no. 1 (1985): 47–
60; Gregory S. Kavka, “Hobbes’s War of All Against All,” Ethics 93, no. 2
(1983): 291–310.
76
Richard Tuck, Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Jonathan
Havercroft, Captives of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2011).
77
For a recent analysis of the sociological dimensions of Hobbes’s thought, see
Hans Joas and Wolfgang Knöbl, War in Social Thought: Hobbes to the Present
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 16–21.
about the state of war could be taken to indicate that this is a purely
analytical concept: “there was never such a time, nor condition of
warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the
world.” Hence it is tempting to interpret the state of war as a
convenient fiction construed to provide sovereign authority with a
good, if not logically watertight, justification. Yet, later in the same
infamous paragraph, the state of war is exemplified with “Kings and
Persons of Soveraigne Authority,’ who by virtue of their indepen-
dence, find themselves “in the state and posture of Gladiators.”78
But this analogy merely raises the obvious question of how such an
international state of war ever could have emerged had not sovereign
states been present beforehand. But since the state of war is invoked
to explain why human beings are compelled by their fear of death to
relinquish their natural freedom and settle for relative security
within the state, such recourse to an international state of war fails
to provide the desired justification for the simple reason that it
presupposes precisely what it purports to explain.
But Hobbes was arguably less concerned with the actual foundation of
states and more with the threat that subversion posed to states was already
in existence. To avoid dissension and civil war, Hobbes proposed that the
sovereign should propagate an ideology designated to curb subversive
ideas and replace them with doctrines conducive to peace and order. He
states this point in De Cive: “It follows therefore that this one . . . to whom
the city hath committed the supreme power, have also this right; that he
both judge what opinions and doctrines re enemies unto peace, and also
that he forbid them to be taught.”79 This point is repeated in a more
condensed form in Leviathan, where Hobbes holds that it is annexed to
sovereignty “to be Judge of what Opinions and Doctrines are averse, and
what conducive to Peace.”80 Given the importance Hobbes attaches to
matters of doctrine and opinion in Leviathan and elsewhere, the answer to
the question of why he posited a state of war as the very foundation of his
own doctrine should perhaps be sought in the rhetorical functions that this
assumption performs rather than in its inferential connections – or lack
thereof – with other core assumptions.81 Although Hobbes was mainly
78
Hobbes, Leviathan, I.XIII.90. 79 Hobbes, De Cive, VI.76.
80
Hobbes, Leviathan, XVIII.124.
81
On the rhetorical aspects of his work, see David Johnston, The Rhetoric of
Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); Quentin Skinner, Reason and
concerned with the adverse effects of various religious doctrines, what he

said about religious beliefs could perhaps be extended to false beliefs in
general. As Malcolm has pointed out, while Hobbes recognized that
ancient kingdoms sometimes had been founded on myth, a state ought
ideally to rest on true beliefs about the nature and necessity of sovereignty
of the kind that Hobbes himself sought to establish.82 The fact that
Hobbes sought to justify sovereign authority with reference to the violence
and disorder that would ensue in its absence would thus entail that the
purposes of domestic peace would be best served if members of society
were well aware of the fearful consequences such an absence would bring.
But, as Waldron has cautioned us, this does not imply that Hobbes
tailored his view of the truth to the ends of the commonwealth, either
by saying that what is true is that which is conducive to peace and order
or by saying that what is true is that which serves the interests of the
sovereign.83 But even if Hobbes was opposed to backing sovereign
authority up with myths and falsehoods and also held that false doc-
trines were potent sources of civil discord, he hoped that his civil
science would bring truth and authority to converge and reinforce
each other. Hobbes thus recognized the need to legitimize the sovereign
state by harnessing all available resources of reason and eloquence to
this end. For this reason, he also invoked a state of war to explain how
states are formed and then projects this state onto the stateless past of
European societies, as well as onto the primitive peoples of the New
World. As Boucher has pointed out, Hobbes’s choice of examples
illustrates that he took hostility among groups of men rather than
among individuals to be the paradigmatic case of violent conflict and
that the kind of group he mostly had in mind was a family headed by a
patriarch.84 For example, in the Elements of Law, we are informed that
the state of hostility is what we know “by the experience of savage
nations that live at this day, and by the histories of our ancestors, the
old inhabitants of Germany and other now civil countries, where we
find the people few and short lived, and without the ornaments and
Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1996), 296–325.
82
Noel Malcolm, Reason of State, Propaganda, and the Thirty Years’ War: An
Unknown Translation by Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007),
121–2.
83
Jeremy Waldron, “Hobbes and the Principle of Publicity,” Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly 82, nos. 3–4 (2001): 447–74.
84
Boucher, “Hobbes’s Contribution to International Thought,” 12–13.
comforts of life, which by peace and society are usually invented and
procured.”85 So when Hobbes sets out to explain how states have been
formed out of a state of nature, he describes a process essentially driven
by war:
[I]t is sufficiently showed, in what manner, and by what degrees, many

natural persons, through desire of preserving themselves, and by mutual
fear, have grown together into a civil person, whom we have called a city.
But they who submit themselves to another for fear, either submit to him
whom they fear, so some other whom they confide in for protection. They act
according in the first manner who are vanquished in war, that they may not
be slain; they according to the second, who are not yet overcome, that they
may be not overcome.86
In ancient times, such a state of war was mitigated by custom, however,

so that those who were living by rapine “taking away the rest, to spare
life, and abstain from oxen fit for plough, and every instrument service-
able to husbandry,” since “lest by too much cruelty, they might be
suspected guilty of fear.”87 A similar explanation of the origin of the
state recurs in Leviathan, where we learn that the successful institution
of government depends on outside enemies, so “the Multitude suffi-
cient to confide in for our security, is not determined by any certain
number, but by comparison with the enemy we feare.”88 But when the
risk of war has faded and fear subsided, that is, “when either thy have
no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy, is by
another held for a friend, they must needs by the difference of their
interests dissolve, and fall again into a Warre amongst themselves.”89
To the same extent that states are formed out of war between rivaling
groups, a state will depend on the presence of external enemies for its
continuity and cohesion; hence “the state of cities among themselves is
natural and hostile.”90
But what was part of the past of European states was also to be
found outside the confines of the emergent European system. It is no
coincidence that libertas is represented by a Native American in the
frontispiece to De Cive. To Hobbes, practices of rapine and piracy
were as rampant among the savage peoples of the New World as they
once had been among the German tribes of antiquity. Here Hobbes
85
Hobbes, Elements of Law, XIV.73. 86 Hobbes, De Cive, V.68–9.
87
Ibid., V.64. 88 Hobbes, Leviathan, 118. 89 Ibid., 119.
90
Hobbes, De Cive, 150.
exemplifies the state of war with the natural condition of the

American Indians: “For the savage people in many places of
America, except the government of small Families, the concord
whereof dependenth on natural lust, have no government at all; and
live at this day in that brutish manner.”91 As a number of scholars
have pointed out, the contrast between a condition of natural liberty
and that of security produced by sovereign authority was reinforced
by letting this contrast coincide with a geographic divide between the
New World and the Old. The fictitious state of nature had its empiri-
cal counterpart in the savage anarchy thought to be characteristic of
the New World, whereas peoples in the Old World could enjoy the
fruits of civilization brought about by their voluntary subjection to
sovereign authority. Not only did this help Hobbes to substantiate the
assumption that the state of nature was a state of war, but it also made
it possible to locate savage peoples beyond the scope of international
law. His account of sovereign authority presupposed that such
authority was absent or weak in non-European societies and that
the savagery of primitive societies represented a condition that
European societies had long ago left behind thanks to the sovereign
state.92 While the Europeans had escaped that condition by subjecting
themselves to a common political authority, non-Europeans were
stuck in this state of affairs and with little hope of escaping it without
the aid of the Europeans. From this followed a right, if not a duty, on
behalf of Europeans to subject those peoples to sovereign authority,
and this well before anything like a modern standard of civilization
had been articulated.
By virtue of the same logic according to which European peoples had
successfully escaped the state of war by entering into the civil state, they
now found themselves in a condition of hostility not only toward each
other but also toward those who had not yet escaped the primordial
state of war. Hence the state of war cannot but duplicate itself because
overcoming this state at one level amounts to nothing but its
91
Hobbes, Leviathan, XIII.89.
92
See Tuck, Rights of War and Peace, 135–9; Beate Jahn, “IR and the State of
Nature: The Cultural Origins of a Ruling Ideology,” Review of International
Studies 25, no. 3 (1999): 411–34; Pat Moloney, “Hobbes, Savagery, and
International Anarchy,” American Political Science Review 105, no. 1 (2011):
189–204; Robert Lee Nichols, “Realizing the Social Contract: The Case of
Colonialism and Indigenous Peoples,” Contemporary Political Theory 4, no. 1
(2005): 42–62.
reproduction at another. To the same extent as European states had

been able to overcome internal discord and consolidate themselves, this
could only accentuate their superiority in relation to those peoples who
had not been able to enter into civil societies of their own and hence
justify their subjugation at the hand of the Europeans in exactly those
terms. Thus the state of war is not only productive of sovereignty and
law but also of the separation of European and non-European peoples
that later would make international law inapplicable outside the
society of sovereign states. Yet none of this was made possible by
cultural prejudices but rather followed from the attribution of ontoge-
netic capacities to the state of war.
At this point, it is worth noting that Locke – who shared the view that
the law of nations derived from the law of nature – drew different
conclusions when it came to the role of hostility and war in human
affairs. In his view, the law of nature does not entail that humans are
inflamed by hatred to such an extent that that they must be divided into
mutually hostile states. Rather, the division of mankind into distinct
communities was the result of positive agreements and the reciprocal
recognition of exclusive territorial rights between peoples.93 But, by
equating the law of nations with natural law as applied to sovereign
states, Hobbes also invited attempts to distinguish more firmly between
the ius gentium and the ius inter gentes. Whereas the former contained
elements of laws that were common to all peoples, the latter comprised
laws that regulated the intercourse between different peoples and
nothing else.94 Insisting on this distinction meant that the law of
nations could be divorced from natural law and be equated more
squarely with positive agreements between states. Thus Zouche, in
his Juris et Judiciis fecialis, sive Juris inter Gentes (1650), defined the
law between peoples as “the law which is recognized in the community
of different princes or peoples who hold sovereign power – that is to
say, the law which has been accepted among most nations by customs
in harmony with reason, and that upon which single nations agree with
one another, and which is observed by nations at peace and by those at
war.”95 Although Zouche had almost nothing to say about the
93
Armitage, Foundations of Modern International Thought, 75–89.
94
For this point, see ibid., 68.
95
Richard Zouche, An Exposition of Fecial Law and Procedure, or of Law
between Nations, and Questions Concerning the Same, trans. J. L. Brierly
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1911), I.I.1.
historical origins of war, except when he noted that “men, from a

depraved reason and corrupted customs, have become ill-affected one
towards another,” he – like Hobbes – equated the condition of peace
with the subjection to civil government. But he also added that peace
might well also obtain between states to the extent that they recognize
each other as friends and allies by virtue of having entered into various
contractual agreements.96 War, however, is that “condition of princes
or peoples who are at strife or contention with others” and “is that
which causes some to be regarded as unfriendly persons and others as
enemies.”97 Zouche goes on to argue that “those are unfriendly with
whom there is no friendship or legal intercourse, as aliens and adver-
saries. Aliens were called by the Greeks barbarians, and by the Romans
peregrini, and if injury or damage was done them they had no legal
remedy; so that, as regards some of the effects of war, they appeared to
be in the position of enemies.”98 Here Zouche makes the important, if
neglected, point that the state of war produces enmity among states
rather than the other way around.
War effectively turns those who otherwise would be but strangers
into enemies, and this stratification of the world into friends and
enemies constitutes the baseline for the rights of war and peace between
nations. Drawing on Livy, Zouche then divides enemies into two dis-
tinct categories. In the first were all those who pose a threat to the
sovereign state: “enemies proper are those whom it is lawful to offend
and destroy utterly,” for example “those who have taken up arms
against their prince or commonwealth with hostile intent” and “rebels
and deserters, who have revolted from the prince to whose government
they were subject. Robbers are those who go about in the manner of
enemies without the authority of a state, as brigands on land, and
pirates at sea.”99 Now echoing both Cicero and Gentili, the second
category consists of lawful enemies, which are those who have “a State,
Senate, Treasury, citizens consenting and agreeing, and some method
of making peace or war, if occasion requires.”100 Whereas Zouche is
relatively unbothered by the emergence of the sovereign state and its
relationship to various forms of violence, he is perhaps the first to argue
that war is productive of enmity rather than the other way around and
that such enmity between states is constitutive of the international
realm quite irrespective of whether states themselves are born out of
96 97 98 99 100
Ibid., I.I.3–4. Ibid., I.VI.37. Ibid. Ibid., I.VI.38. Ibid.
hostility or not. This is a point that would continue to resonate all the
way into modern political realism.
Whether states are born out of war or not has been a main sticking
point in the interpretations of von Pufendorf. As Hont has argued, von
Pufendorf was among the first to dispute the quintessentially Hobbesian
contention that the state had originated from a state of war.101
According to this interpretation, human intercourse in the state of nature
was tempered by the natural sociability of men, which first led them to
enter society in order to fulfill their most basic needs and only later
compelled them to voluntarily relinquish some of their liberty to sover-
eign authority in order to protect themselves from internal and external
enemies. This reading is not without textual support, since von
Pufendorf is adamant that a state of war of the kind described by
Hobbes never existed: “A common or universal War engaging all
Mankind at the same time, is an impossible Supposition; this being a
direct Consequence of the State of Beasts.”102 Hence the state of nature
is not a state of war because “those who live in a State of Nature both
may, and ought, and frequently do, consent to live Socially.”103 The
natural condition of men is therefore one of peace, being instituted by
“bare Nature, without the Intervention of any human Deed . . . and doth
not owe its first Introduction to the Agreement and Covenant of
Men.”104 In contrast to Hobbes, therefore, it would follow that states
simply cannot have emerged out of wars between small groups of people
subjected to some form of paternal government, since such wars would
presuppose that some rudimentary sovereign authority already had been
established within these groups:
[T]he notorious violence of many Persons, and their Desire of oppressing

others, might possibly give occasion to the Fathers or Families, living
independent and scattered up and down, to unite in political Bodies. It is
moreover evident, that most Empires, which have made a Noise and Figure in
the World, if not all in general, have owed their Growth and Progress to War.
And yet this is no reason why we should pitch upon War for the Original and
Fountain of Government. For at least, that Band of Men, which first
101
Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-
State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2005), 159–84.
102
Samuel von Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, trans. Basil Kennet
(London, 1749), I.I.viii.
103
Ibid., II.II.v. 104 Ibid., II.II.xi.
conspired to invade their Neighbours, voluntarily engaged in Subjection to a

common Leader. And as for those who were invaded, no lawful Sovereignty
could be established over them, till by giving their Covenant and Faith, they
had promised Obedience to the Conquerour.105
But once we start to uncover the meaning attributed to the concept of

sociability in this context, the contrast between Hobbes and von
Pufendorf wears thin. As one leading scholar has argued, to von
Pufendorf, sociability is not so much a natural human predisposition
as it is a legal and political institution.106 This view finds ample
support in what von Pufendorf had to say about the formation of
civil societies, both in De Iure Naturae et Gentium (1672) and in his
historical writings discussed in Chapter 2. In fact, much of what he
has to say about the history of European nations is consistent with his
views on the origins of civil society set forth in his magnum opus and
can even be read as an attempt to substantiate this view empirically.
As von Pufendorf describes the reasons why human beings enter civil
society, they “first embraced civil Society, not as led to it by the Biass
of Nature, but as driven by the Fear of greater Evils.” The greater evils
from which man must seek protection stem from his own depraved
nature “so that Nothing, besides the Fear of Punishment, could keep
the greater Number in any tolerable Order.” Since “Competition for
Riches, Honour, Command, or any Prerogative and Power above
others, inclines to Contention, Enmity, and War . . . civil Societies
are absolutely necessary to their Safety.”107 Thus the formation of
civil societies is only possible through their voluntary subjection to a
common authority because “the malicious Inclinations of Men, and
their ready Disposition to their Neighbour’s Hurt, cannot [in] any
way be more effectually kept under, than by setting before their Eyes
some present Danger.”108
Now, that present danger can come from within as well as from
without. In the final analysis, therefore, “the true and leading Cause
why the Fathers of Families would consent to resign up their natural
Liberty, and to form a Commonwealth, was thereby to guard them-
selves against those Injuries, which one man was in Danger of
105
Ibid., VII.II.v.
106
See Fiammetta Palladini, “Pufendorf Disciple of Hobbes: The Nature of Man
and the State of Nature – The Doctrine of Socialitas,” History of European
Ideas 34, no. 1 (2008): 26–60.
107
von Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, VII.I.iv. 108 Ibid., VII.II.i
sustaining from another.”109 And given his definition of war as a “[s]tate

of Men mutually engaged in offering and repelling Injuries,” it is hard to
see how his appeal to sociability could make any big difference between
his account of the emergence of the state and that of Hobbes.110 And once
communities have been formed in order to protect men from the wicked-
ness of others, the same condition inevitably recurs between states. As von
Pufendorf describes their mutual relations, “Civil Communities, even in
the times of profoundest Peace, do yet fortify their Towns, guard their
Frontiers with Troops, and fill their Granaries with warlike Stores; all
which would be an unnecessary Expence, did not they apprehend some
Danger from their Neighbours.”111 None of this is very far from the view
of Hobbes.
In this section, I have tried to show that early modern legal theorists
understood human hostility as a natural or at least a customary condi-
tion rooted in the violent predispositions of men. Although tempered in
varying degrees by human reason and sociability, overcoming this
hostility and its destructive consequences necessitated the creation of
civil government and law. To make sense of the genesis of government
and law, ius naturalists distinguished between forms of hostility and
violence that served to create or preserve sovereign authority and legal
order and forms that were believed to be destructive of that order. Such
distinctions were then used to structure conjectural accounts of the
origin of political authority and civil society, as well as ordering the
political world into distinct spheres of violence with different rules of
conduct. In as much as the law of nations derived its existence from
natural hostility and the fear of death, it was based on a systematic
suppression of forms of hostility and violence that were deemed incom-
patible with its existence, such as brigandage, rapine, and piracy. The
enemies of legal order responsible for such irregular forms of violence
were found in the conjectural prehistory of law, and although infidels
and Indians were sometimes saddled with such savagery, the differen-
tiation of the political world into distinct spheres of violence was not
primarily justified with reference to cultural differences. Underlying
universalistic assumptions made such differences legally irrelevant,
and the scant knowledge available about non-European peoples did
not provide solid enough justifications for their dispossession and
109 110 111

Ibid., VII.I.vii Ibid., I.I.viii. Ibid., VII.I.vii.
subjugation. Yet the very lines of demarcation that excluded non-

European peoples from the scope of international law were drawn
long before appeals to their apparent lack of civilization were made.
But those lines of demarcation were less a result of systematic preju-
dices against non-European peoples and more a reflection of the sym-
biotic connection between war and legitimate authority that had been
forged within the humanist tradition.
From Natural Law to the Modern Law of Nations

While most ius naturalists equated the law of nations with the laws of
nature being applied to states, it would be misleading to regard them as
founders of international law in any recognizably modern sense of this
term. Struggling to supersede the universalistic framework of their
scholastic predecessors, humanists had articulated conceptions of
sovereignty that became foundational to modern international law.
But to the same extent as natural lawyers had assumed that hostility
and a general state of war were productive of domestic order, their
modern successors assumed that an international state of war must
necessarily give rise to constraints on the use of force in order to
preserve a modicum of international order. From this followed a shared
ambition to distinguish sharply between legitimate and illegitimate
forms of violence and a corresponding quest to regulate and formalize
the former while stigmatizing the latter. While legitimate war now was
widely understood as a method of dispute settlement in the absence of
any superior authority, illegitimate war was understood as a threat to
the existence of international order and hence something that required
exceptional measures and an extraordinary use of force to protect that
order. Fire was to be fought by fire.
All of this presupposed that a firm line of demarcation could be
drawn between what was inside states and what was outside them
and what was inside the international system and what was outside
and thus foreign to it. Since the early ius naturalists had equated the law
of nations with the laws of nature, the savagery found outside the
international realm was not very different from the savagery found in
the prehistory of states: the demons the Europeans had invented to
justify the sovereign state had merely migrated outward as a conse-
quence of its success. Yet, in Le Droit des Gens (1758) by Emer de
Vattel, this order of things appears to have been reversed. Like
From Natural Law to the Modern Law of Nations 159
Montesquieu before him, Vattel does not assume that a state of nature
among individuals necessarily must be a state of war but nevertheless
held that the formation of states had produced an international state of
war. While the traces of hostility still found inside states were remnants
of a distant and more violent past, those traces could not lend legiti-
macy to the sovereign state. Instead, that legitimacy appears to derive
from the external sovereignty of the state, that is, from the international
realm in which states enjoy exclusive authority and independence.112
Thus, to Vattel, there is no longer any necessity to appeal to the
conjectural prehistory of the state to justify its existence in terms of
the violence and disorder that had antedated it and again would
reappear in its absence. The state is already there as a legal and
political fact and is instead justified with reference to its inner purpose
and the prospects of its perfection in the context of international
competition and cooperation. “Nations or states are bodies politic,
societies of men united together for the purpose of promoting their
mutual safety and advantage by the joint efforts of their combined
strength.”113 As such, “the state . . . remains absolutely free and
independent with respect to all other men, all other nations, as long
as it has not voluntarily submitted to them.”114 States, being exter-
nally sovereign by virtue of their independence from any superior
authority, are subject to the law of nations, which “is originally no
other than the law of nature applied to nations.”115 While sovereignty
entails rights of self-preservation and self-perfection, the first general
law of nations dictates that the natural society of all humankind
brings an obligation to assist other states in their endeavor at pre-
servation and perfection, but only on condition “that each nation
should be left in the peaceable enjoyment of that liberty which she
inherits from nature. The natural society of nations cannot subsist,
unless the natural rights of each be duly respected.”116 Such natural
liberty and independence implied that all states are equals when it
112
See Stéphane Beaulac, “Emer de Vattel and the Externalization of
Sovereignty,” Journal of the History of International Law 5, no. 2 (2003): 237–
92.
113
Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature,
Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three
Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury [1758/
1797], edited and with an introduction by Béla Kapossy and Richard
Whatmore (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008), prel. § 1, 67.
114
Ibid., prel. § 4, 68. 115 Ibid., prel. § 6, 68–9. 116 Ibid., prel. § 15, 74.
comes to their rights and obligations toward each other because

“[p]ower or weakness does not in this respect produce any difference.
A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a
sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom.”117
The fact that sovereign states can constitute a society of their own
by virtue of their formal equality implied that it was possible to speak
of an international system having been formed in Europe. “Europe
forms a political system, an integral body, closely connected by the
relations and different interests of the nations inhabiting this part of
the world. It is not, as formerly, a confused heap of detached pieces,
each of which thought herself very little concerned in the fate of the
others, and seldom regarded things which did not immediately con-
cern her.”118 As several commentators have pointed out, however, in
order to make sense of the emergent international system, and in
order to be able to offer useful precepts for political action within it,
Vattel adapted the principles of natural law to the demands of
“Reason of State” and then tried to strike a balance between the
universalism of the former and the particularism of the latter.119
This led him to emphasize balance of power as a source of liberty
and international order and to place his bets on diplomacy as the chief
instrument of maintaining it. So what ultimately held the European
system together was not any shared legal norms or moral values, but a
common interest in maintaining the liberty of individual states.
“Hence arose that famous scheme of the political balance, or the
equilibrium of power; by which is understood such a disposition of
things, as that no one potentate be able absolutely to predominate,
and prescribe laws to the others.”120 In order to preserve the balance
of power, states have a right to anticipate attacks from those who
might be suspected of entertaining designs of oppression and conquest
and are “justifiable in taking advantage of this happy opportunity to
weaken and reduce a power too contrary to the equilibrium, and
117
Ibid., prel. § 18, 75. 118 Ibid., III.III. § 47, 496.
119
See, for example, Tuck, Rights of War and Peace, 191–6; Isaac Nakhimovsky,
“Vattel’s Theory of the International Order: Commerce and the Balance of
Power in the Law of Nations,” History of European Ideas 33, no. 2 (2007):
157–73; Ian Hunter, “Vattel’s Law of Nations: Diplomatic Casuistry for the
Protestant Nation,” Grotiana 31, no. 1 (2010): 108–40; Richard Devetak,
“Law of Nations as Reason of State: Diplomacy and the Balance of Power in
Vattel’s Law of Nations,” Parergon 28, no. 2 (2011): 105–28.
120
Vattel, Law of Nations, III.III. § 47, 496.
From Natural Law to the Modern Law of Nations 161
dangerous to the common liberty.”121 Although Vattel produces a

number of examples of such mischievous designs, unsurprisingly, the
paradigm case was provided by the Ottoman Empire. “[W]hen the
Turks were successfully pursuing their victorious career, and rapidly
advancing to the zenith of power, all Christian nations ought . . . to
have considered them as enemies.”122
But what, more precisely, is the role of hostility and violence in this
theory? Although Vattel does not explain the emergence of sovereign
states and the international system with reference to human hostility
and warfare, he nevertheless implies that the existence and legitimacy
of both depend on their ability to contain and regulate more primitive
manifestations of violence. Inside states, the abolition of private war
between individuals marks the monopolization of power in the hands
of the sovereign to the effect that “[l]aws and the authority of the
magistrates having been substituted in the room of private war, the
conductor of a nation ought not to suffer individuals to attempt to do
themselves justice, when they can have recourse to the magistrates.”123
The only remaining instance of private war is the practice of dueling,
which “is a manifest disorder, repugnant to the ends of civil
society.”124 Until men have got rid of this “Gothic idea,” the only
antidote is “to make a total distinction between the offended and the
aggressor” and then to mercilessly punish the latter while acquitting the
former.125 Thus the right of punishment no longer belongs to private
individuals but only to the moral person of the state, “who has a right
to provide for its own safety, by punishing those that trespass against
it.”126
The same right applies in relations between states. Since “[o]ne of the
ends of political society is to defend itself with its combined strength
against all external insult or violence,” it follows that each state also
enjoys a fundamental right to self-preservation. “Every nation, as well
as every man, has therefore a right to prevent other nations from
obstructing her preservation, her perfection, and happiness . . . It is
this right to preserve herself from all injury that is called the right to
security.”127 As Vattel goes on to explain, the right to employ force for
the preservation of the state and the maintenance of its right is
121
Ibid., III.III. § 49, 498. 122 Ibid., II.I. § 16, 270.
123
Ibid., I.XIII. § 175, 194. 124 Ibid. 125 Ibid., I.XIII. § 176, 195.
126
Ibid., I.XIII. § 169, 190–1. 127 Ibid., I.XIV. § 177, 198, II.V. § 49, 288.
constitutive of proper government. This right to redress injuries by

means of force derives from the fact that there is no authority to settle
disputes among sovereign states. “Each nation in fact maintains that
she has justice on her side in every dispute that happens to arise: and it
does not belong to either of the parties interested, or to other nations, to
pronounce a judgment on the contested question.”128 As such, the right
to war “can belong only to the body of the nation, or to the sovereign,
her representative. It is doubtless one of those rights, without which
there can be no salutary government, and which are therefore called
rights of majesty . . . Thus the sovereign power alone is possessed of
authority to make war.”129
In order to fulfill the requirements of legitimate war, wars under-
taken by sovereign authorities must be preceded by a formal declara-
tion of war in the hope of settling differences without bloodshed. Wars
undertaken for motives other than those of self-preservation and the
maintenance of rights are condemned by Vattel on the grounds that
they threaten not only the existence of individual states but also the
existence and well-being of international society as a whole.
[T]hose who seem to delight in the ravages of war, who spread it on all sides,
without reasons or pretexts, and even without any other motive than their
own ferocity, are monsters, unworthy the name of men. They should be
considered as enemies to the human race, in the same manner as, in civil
society, professed assassins and incendiaries are guilty, not only towards the
particular victims of their nefarious deeds, but also towards the state, which
therefore proclaims them public enemies. All nations have a right to join in a
confederacy for the purpose of punishing and even exterminating those
savage nations.130
But, as Silvestrini has pointed out, the idea of a just war against the
enemies outside international society is a precondition of the concept of
formalized war between sovereign equals inside international society.131
So just as the state must be purged of practices inimical to its perfection –
such as dueling – international society must be purged of those enemies
whose violent practices violate the spirit of the law of nations either by
128
Ibid., prel. § 21, 76. 129 Ibid., III.I. § 4, 470.
130
Ibid., III.III. § 34, 487.
131
Gabriella Silvestrini, “Justice, War and Inequality: The Unjust Aggressor and
the Enemy of the Human Race in Vattel’s Theory of the Law of Nations,”
Grotiana 31, no. 1 (2010): 44–68.
From Natural Law to the Positive Law of Nations 163
representing illegitimate forms of authority or by resorting to illegitimate

forms of warfare or both.132 Such wars are “undertaken, either without
lawful authority, or without apparent cause, as likewise without the
usual formalities, and solely with a view to plunder . . . A nation attacked
by such sort of enemies is not under any obligation to observe towards
them the rules prescribed in formal warfare. She may treat them as
robbers.”133
Vattel then goes on to list the entities deserving of such treatment.
Apart from pirates of all denominations, we learn that since the Duke
of Savoy committed an act of brigandage when he attacked Geneva in
1602, this provided a perfectly legitimate ground for all the prisoners
taken from the Savoyards to be hanged as robbers. Thus, although
Vattel made few, if any, explicit assumptions about hostility and war
being foundational to the law of nations, the logic of his account
nevertheless implies the existence of a host of others that alone and
together constitute a potent threat to the coherence and cohesion of
any legal order. In a world without the usual suspects of duelists,
pirates, brigands, and Turks, there would be no need for international
law beyond the customary principles that already have been codified
through the intercourse of sovereigns.
From Natural Law to the Positive Law of Nations

The tendency to downplay the violent foundations of the law of
nations becomes even more pronounced during the transition to
legal positivism. Whereas the ius naturalists explained and justified
the existence and necessity of law with reference to the primitive
hostility that would reign unobstructed in its absence, most legal
positivists have little to say about the historical or philosophical
origins of law. Although they remain preoccupied with containing
or abolishing irregular forms violence, the constant possibility of war
remains a background condition inherent in the international system
to be reckoned with rather than lamented or subjected to internation-
alist reform. But this underlying agreement raises the question of how
and why war was increasingly taken for granted as a natural condi-
tion of the international system in an age so obsessed with progressive
reform in other areas of human affairs. This, in turn, makes it
132 133
Vattel, Laws of Nations, prel. § 22, 77. Ibid., III.IV. § 67–8, 507.
imperative to understand what was really at stake in the transition

from natural law to positive law.
While legal positivism sometimes has been seen as opposed to
natural law, I think it makes more sense to view the former as an
offspring of the latter. As Koskenniemi has pointed out, rather than
being opposed to natural law, positivism was a logical response to
many of the practical questions left unresolved by the naturalists.
Natural law still provided the underlying theoretical framework of
the law of nations, but it was left to positivism to elaborate its
practical implications.134 Yet, in Britain, there was no sustained
university tradition of teaching in law and a decline in the belief in
the living force of natural law, which prompted lawyers to create
such a tradition more or less from scratch.135 Thus it has been
argued that in British nineteenth-century legal thought it is hard to
detect any sharp distinction between legal naturalism and legal
positivism because they coexisted and blended with little apparent
contradiction.136 Still those early attempts to build a positive law of
nations on such foundations remained premised on the existence of
hostility and the constant possibility of violence. Even though early
positivist writers rarely made explicit references to the violent ori-
gins of states, their basic assumptions about sovereignty and the
international system indicate that war and hostility were perceived
as natural facts of the legal and political world.
This is nowhere clearer than in the work of von Martens, which is
widely believed to mark an important phase in the transition from
natural law to positivism. He begins by stating in his Precis du droit
des gens modernes de l’Europe (1789) that while each nation should
be considered a moral being living in the state of nature, “[t]heir
common interest obliges them to soften the rigour of the law of
134
Martti Koskenniemi, “Into Positivism: Georg Friedrich von Martens (1756–
1821) and Modern International Law,” Constellations 15, no. 2 (2008): 189–
207, at 190; see also Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The
Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge
135
James Crawford, “Public International Law in Twentieth Century England,” in
Jack Beatson and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds.), Jurists Uprooted German-
Speaking Emigré Lawyers in Twentieth Century Britain (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004), 681–701, at 689.
136
Casper Sylvest, “International Law in Nineteenth-Century Britain,” British
Yearbook of International Law 75, no. 1 (2005): 9–70.
nature, to render it more determinate, and to depart from that

perfect equality of rights, which must ever, according to the law of
nature, be considered as extending itself even to the weakest.”137
Thus, although natural law constitutes the foundation of the law of
nations, its assumptions of perfect equality must be open to mod-
ification in light of the treaties and conventions that actually govern
the intercourse between states and that must take differences in
power and standing into consideration. One of von Martens’ main
contributions to the development of international law was to have
collected treaties made between European states into a series of
volumes entitled Recueil de Traités. Thus it is “the aggregate of the
rights and obligations established among the nations of Europe (or
the majority of them), whether by particular but uniform treaties, by
tacit convention, or by custom, which form the general positive law
of nations.”138 From this it follows that the laws governing the
intercourse of European states cannot be deduced from the princi-
ples of natural law alone but must be sought in the history of
European states. Excluding the Turks, “one may consider Europe
as a society of nations and states, each which has its laws, its
customs, and its maxims, but which it cannot put in execution with-
out observing a great deal of delicacy towards the rest of the
society.”139 Before identifying the laws governing European states,
Martens classifies them according to whether they are fully sovereign
or not, according to how much power they possess, and according to
their form of rule, carefully distinguishing between monarchies and
republics. While fully sovereign states are nominally equal and
therefore equally subject to the law of nations, differences in relative
power and forms of rule imply that they may enter treaties and
conventions from positions of unequal strength and with different
intentions.
In the society of states envisioned by Martens, secular statecraft is a
natural fact of political life that inevitably will be reflected in the
cumulated historical experience that constitutes the depository of posi-
tive laws. This follows from his conception of sovereignty because “[a]
natural consequence of the liberty and independence of nations is, that
137
Georg Friedrich von Martens, A Compendium of the Law of Nations Founded
on the Treatises and Customs of the Modern Nations of Europe, trans. William
Cobbett (London: Cobbett & Morgan, 1802), introduction, II.II.
138
Ibid., introduction, IV.V. 139 Ibid., introduction, I.I.II, 27.
every sovereign has a right to make, in his own dominions, whatever

arrangements he may judge proper for the internal security of the
state.”140 In order to maintain their security, states have a right to
augment their power not only by improvement of their inner resources
but also by external aggrandizement. Since aggrandizement may
sooner or later endanger the liberty and security of neighboring states,
“[i]n such [a] case there arises a collision of rights, which authorizes the
latter to oppose by alliances, and even by force of arms, so dangerous
an aggrandizement, without the least regard to its lawfulness. This
right is still more essential to states which form a sort of general society,
than to such situated at a great distance from each other.”141 Martens
here echoes the contemporary obsession with the balance of power as
the key to maintaining order and stability in the society of states but is
remarkably unwilling to place any restraints on this practice on the
grounds that this would risk contravening the sovereignty and liberty
of individual states.
War is therefore likely to be endemic in such a society of states. If
differences between sovereigns are to be settled by forcible means only
as a last resort, and if nothing “short of the violation of a perfect right,
either committed, committing, or with which a nation is threated in the
future, can justify the undertaking of a war,” war between states
remains a constant possibility and an important rationale for legal
regulation of interstate affairs.142 Not only are states stuck in a quest
for security and liberty that makes it very likely that their rights will
collide in ways that provide them with justifications of war, but the fact
that the scope of domestic sovereignty also is virtually unlimited means
that the ensuing wars are likely to involve the entire social body in the
effort. As Martens argues with respect to the rights of war, “[f]rom the
moment a sovereign is in a state of war, he has a right, strictly speaking,
to act as an enemy, not only with respect to the persons and property
found in the territory of the enemy, but also with respect to his enemy’s
subjects and their property, which may happen to be situated in his own
territory at the breaking out of the war.”143 As Martens goes on to
explain with reference to the ius in bello, “war gives a nation an
unlimited right of exercising violence, against its enemy. But, the civi-
lized nations of Europe, animated by a desire of diminishing the horrors
140 141 142

Ibid., IV.I.II, 123–4. Ibid., IV.I.III, 125–6. Ibid., VIII.II.III, 280.
143
Ibid., VIII.II.V, 282.
of war, now acknowledge certain violences which are as destructive to

both parties, as contrary to sound policy, as unlawful, though not
entirely forbidden by the rigour of the law of nations.”144 Thus the
restriction on the excessive use of force does not derive from natural
law or from positive law in a strict sense but from the latter in the rather
vague sense as that which is being embodied in convention and upheld
by the civilized nations of Europe only. But in relation to non-European
political communities, other conventions kick in. “The ancient custom
of making slaves of the conquered is no longer practiced by the powers
of Europe, except by way of retaliation towards the barbarians.”145
To those who wanted to reform international law in a more liberal and
humanist direction, Martens’ view of the law of nations appeared far too
static to accommodate any real progress. To others, its rationalist under-
pinnings meant that it was unable to make sense of the historical origins
of law and its subsequent development.146 This view gained more trac-
tion because during the first decades of the nineteenth century, the tide of
evolutionism and historicism had already found its way into legal scho-
larship, with authors such as Savigny taking on himself to explain “how
law has actually developed itself amongst nations of the nobler races.” In
his account of the origin of positive law, all law is ultimately an expres-
sion of the popular spirit of a nation, so “law will be found to have
already attained a fixed character, peculiar to the people, like their
language, manners and constitution.”147 While such national tendencies
may become more and more pronounced with the progress of civiliza-
tion, this did not rule out the possibility of a law of nations as long as one
was willing to admit that European nations formed a community of their
own as a consequence of their long historical interconnections and
common cultural heritage.148
144
Ibid., VIII.III.I, 286. 145 Ibid., VIII.III.V, 291.
146
See, for example, Harold Berman, “The Historical Foundation of Law,”
Emory Law Journal 54, no. 1 (2005): 13–24; Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer of
Nations, 42–7.
147
Friedrich Karl von Savigny, Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und
Rechtswissenschaft [1814] [Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and
Jurisprudence], trans. Abraham Hayward (London: Littlewood, 1831), 24. For
a background, see John E. Toews, “The Immanent Genesis and Transcendent
Goal of Law: Savigny, Stahl, and the Ideology of the Christian German State,”
American Journal of Comparative Law 37, no. 1 (1989): 139–69.
148
For a reinterpretation of Savigny’s work, see Andreas Rahmatian, “Friedrich
Carl von Savigny’s Beruf and Volksgeistlehre,” Journal of Legal History 28,
no. 1 (2007): 1–29.
But taking history seriously could equally well lead to a profound

skepticism concerning the ability of international law to restrain the use
of force. The turn to history made it possible to view the law of nations
as little but the outcome of a perpetual struggle for power in which war
was the final arbiter. Thus, to Hegel, “war should not be regarded as an
absolute evil and as a purely external contingency whose cause is
therefore itself contingent.” Instead, now paraphrasing Turgot, Hegel
held that “the ethical health of nations is preserved in their indifference
towards the permanence of finite determinacies, just as the movement
of the wind preserves the sea from that stagnation which a lasting calm
would produce – a stagnation which a lasting, not to say perpetual,
peace would also produce among nations.”149 Since there cannot be
any real and viable legal order above the state, it is not possible to speak
coherently about a society of states. Rather the kind of order that exists
between states is completely lawless and characterized by a constant
struggle for security and survival. As his follower, Lasson, argued in his
Princip und Zukunft des Völkerrechts (1871), since the plurality of
states cannot be transcended by any means, and since the sovereign and
moral personality of states effectively rules out the formation of any
real sense of community between them, constant contest is their natural
form of intercourse. What we call international law is wholly contin-
gent on the shifting self-interest of states, treaties between them being
but expressions of their relative power in the international system.
Within this view, war is a means of negotiation among states and
therefore also an important source of order and progress in its own
right.150
The horrors of the Franco-Prussian War were soon to invalidate any
idea that the European mode of warfare was that civilized and
prompted renewed attempts to reform the law of nations in a liberal
and humanist direction. Koskenniemi has described this concerted
effort as a matter of articulating “the legal conscience of the civilized
world,” to provide it with a firm scientific footing and finding ways to
translate its liberal and humanist principles into legal and political
practice. Yet this posed some difficulties. Publication of The Province
of Jurisprudence Determined in 1832 by John Austin had confronted
149
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophy of Right [1821], trans. H. B.
Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), § 324, 361.
150
Adolf Lasson, Princip und Zukunft des Völkerrechts (Berlin: Wilhelm Hertz,
1871), 9–76.
international lawyers with the challenge to explain to what extent

international law qualified as law proper. If positive law indeed derives
from sovereign command only and depends on the presence of a
political hierarchy for its enforcement, it was hard to see that some-
thing equivalent could be said to exist in the international sphere. To
Austin, international law was a prime example of law improperly so
called and was in fact nothing but a set of moral rules imposed and
possibly enforced by the weak authority of public opinion.151 To
counter this objection and rescue international law, international law-
yers sought the sources of international law not in any supreme author-
ity but in the piecemeal evolution of legal consciousness among
European states. European states now formed a family or community
whose customs and conscience were the foundations of international
law.152 As Lieber stated in 1868, “[t]he civilized nations have come to
constitute a community, and are daily forming more and more a
commonwealth of nations, under the restraint and protection of the
law of nations.”153 From such a viewpoint, the latter “may be regarded
as a living organism, which grows with the growth of experience, and is
shaped in the last resort by the ideas and aspirations current among
civilized mankind.”154
Although the greatest scholar of legal evolution – Henry Maine – had
been mostly concerned with domestic legal institutions, he also gave a
series of lectures in Cambridge that addressed the origins and nature of
international law. Contrary to what had been believed, he argued, “[i]t is
not peace which was natural and primitive and old, but rather war. War
appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern invention.”155
The first effective bridle on incessant warfare had been provided by the
great empires of antiquity. “No doubt they were a result rather of man’s
rapacity than of his humanity . . . but nevertheless no one could say how
much war they extinguished by the prohibition, which they undoubtedly
151
John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995).
152
Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 47–51.
153
Francis Lieber, Fragments of Political Science on Nationalism and Inter-
Nationalism (New York: Schribner, 1868), 22. Quoted in Koskenniemi, Gentle
Civilizer of Nations, 67.
154
Thomas Joseph Lawrence, The Principles of International Law [1894] (Boston:
D.C. Heath, 1900), preface, v.
155
Henry Sumner Maine, International Law: A Series of Lectures Delivered before
the University of Cambridge (London: John Murray, 1888), 8.
carried out, of hostilities among the various sub-divisions of their sub-

jects.”156 This meant that modern international law owed its existence to
Roman law, and Roman law to the authority of the Roman Empire.
From this it followed that if empire had been an effective antidote against
primitive warfare in the past, so would its revival and extension in the
present. Thus the evolutionary view of law provided a new and potent
justification for European imperialism.157
The gradual acceptance of the evolutionary view of law compelled
international lawyers to dig deep into the cultural heritage of interna-
tional society in search for principles that had governed the intercourse
of civilized peoples. This was deemed necessary because international
law is “an inquiry into what is, not into what ought to be. And its
method must of necessity be historical, since statesmen discover what
rules to apply to particular cases by an inquiry into the history of
previous cases.”158 In this context, civilization was conceived of as
both process and outcome, and in this dual sense, the concept of civiliza-
tion provided international law with a way of explaining how interna-
tional law had developed from is primitive origins to a more advanced
stage without invoking any notion of supreme authority, whether divine
or human.159 Evolutionary theories of international law thereby made it
possible to project primitive hostility and irregular forms of violence
outward, if only to justify the spread of civilization through conquest
and colonial rule. Again, the barbarian of the past reappeared on the
outside of the present.
Much of this is evident in the use of the concepts of sovereignty and
civilization. As Anghie and Koskenniemi have shown in great detail,
the increased emphasis on state sovereignty brought by positivism
restricted the scope of international law to sovereign states while
excluding forms of human association that lacked centralized authority
structures or were territorially unbounded.160 But it was precisely by
156
Ibid., 9–10.
157
For an analysis, Karuna Mantena, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends
of Liberal Imperialism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).
158
Lawrence, Principles of International Law, § 16, 20–1.
159
See Sylvest, “International Law in Nineteenth-Century Britain,” 40–1. For a
background, see John W. Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian
Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966).
160
Antony Anghie “Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in
Nineteenth-Century International Law,” Harvard International Law Journal,
40, no. 1 (1999): 1–71; Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 98–179.
taking sovereignty for granted that it became possible to project its

violent origins outward. While many authors were content to argue
that the origins of the state were irrelevant to the elaboration of inter-
national law, they sometimes made revealing assumptions about the
role of human hostility in its creation. As Lawrence put it rather bluntly
in his Principles of International Law (1894), “[t]he methods by which
central authority is created are outside our present subject.”161 But a
decade before publishing his Principles, Lawrence had traced the origin
of the state to the evolutionary pressure generated by private warfare so
that “before law as we understand it now had come into being, before
any central authority existed to enforce obedience to the rules it
imposed . . . the rough justice of revenge impelled the injured party
and his kinsfolk to retaliate as best they were able upon those who
had done them wrong.”162 Following a series of progressive steps, “[a]t
last civilization banishes the vendetta altogether, and civilized man
regards it as a mark of barbarism, when he observes it in less advanced
communities.”163 In a similar vein, Holland held that “[e]ven were the
theory of an original contract within the scope of the present treatise, it
would be unnecessary to repeat here the arguments by which its unten-
ableness has been almost superfluously demonstrated.”164 Yet Holland
could not refrain from quoting Hobbes when defining the object of law.
Laws were brought into the world to “limit the natural liberty of
particular men” so that they could “joyne together against a common
enemy.”165
An interesting exception in this regard is Whewell, whose Elements
of Morality (1845) made references to the desire for safety and security
when explaining the genesis of society and the state. While the latter is
“the necessary Origin of all the Rights which exist within itself,” it was
the outcome of a long process of evolution from “a condition in which
men are in a perpetual state of war and violence, like hostile beasts of
prey.” But, as he was quick to add, “the desires of man, when his
irascible affections are not inflamed by conflict, tend towards a state of
161
Lawrence, Principles of International Law, § 43, 56.
162
Thomas Joseph Lawrence, “The Evolution of Peace,” in Essays on Some
Disputed Questions of International Law (Cambridge: Deighton, Bel, 1885),
234–77, at 249.
163
Ibid., 256.
164
Thomas Erskine Holland, The Elements of Jurisprudence [1880] (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1916), IV, 49.
165
Ibid., VI, 79.
things the opposite of this.”166 So well before the springs of human

action had made society possible, that is, “[i]n rude and half-savage
tribes, in which clansmen assist each other with unbounded zeal, the
stranger is looked upon as naturally an object of enmity.”167 So what
was found at the beginnings of the sovereign state and law could now
be conveniently relocated to the barbarous outside the European family
of states, where the gentleness of the civilizer decreased in direct
proportion to the cultural distance from its targets.
The law of nations consisted of the rules that had evolved among
sovereign states so as to regulate their intercourse and temper their use
of regularized violence. As Wildman defined the subject matter,
“[i]nternational law is the customary law, which determines the rights
and regulates the intercourse of independent states in peace and in
war.”168 Yet this focus on the state created another problem because
many states in Asia and Africa indeed displayed some of the defining
characteristics of sovereignty, such as centralized authority structures
and de facto control over their territories. In response to such embar-
rassing facts, positivist international lawyers shifted focus away from
formal requirements of sovereignty to the question of whether their
societies were civilized or not. By doing so, legal positivists created a
sharp distinction between civilized and uncivilized societies, a distinc-
tion that was sometimes thought to imply that the relations between the
former and the latter were outside the realm of law altogether.169
Whereas early modern naturalists had assumed that the law of
nations was equally applicable to all communities irrespective of any
cultural differences, positivists argued that international law was
applicable to civilized states only. Thus Wheaton could maintain that
there is no such thing as a universal and uniform law of nations but that
166
William Whewell, The Elements of Morality, Including Polity (London: John
W. Parker, 1845), I.471, 39. On Whewell’s influence on the discipline, see Anne
Orford, “Scientific Reason and the Discipline of International Law,” European
Journal of International Law 25, no. 2 (2014): 369–85.
167
Ibid., I. 511.
168
Richard Wildman, Institutes of International Law (London: William Benning,
1849), I. i.
169
Anghie, Finding the Peripheries, 23–30; Brett Bowden, “The Colonial Origins
of International Law: European Expansion and the Classical Standard of
Civilization,” Journal of the History of International Law 7, no.1 (2005): 1–
23; Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of Civilization in International Society
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
“public law, with slight exceptions, has always been, and still is, limited
to the civilized and Christian people of Europe or those of European
origin.”170 Savages were explicitly excluded from statehood because a
“[s]tate is also distinguishable from an unsettled horde of wandering
savages not yet formed into a civil society.”171 It would, Lawrence
argued, “be absurd to expect the Sultan of Morocco to establish a Prize
Court, or to require the dwarfs of the central African forest to receive a
permanent diplomatic mission.”172 Other international lawyers for-
mulated similar arguments in favor of exclusion. To Hall, it was
evident that “international law is a product of the special civilization
of modern Europe, and forms a highly artificial system of which the
principles cannot be supposed to be understood or recognized by
countries differently civilized; such states can only be subject to it as
are inheritors of that civilization.”173 In order to be admitted into the
family of civilized states, uncivilized nations must “do something . . .
which amounts to an acceptance of the law in its entirety beyond all
possibility of misconstruction.”174
That something often amounted to little more than yielding to the
superior military force of European powers and accepting the terms
imposed. Thus, although the European society of states appeared
internally fragmented as a consequence of the emphasis on sovereignty
and resurgence of nationalism, Europe was understood as a political
and cultural unity in its dealings with the rest of the world. As Europe
advances, “it will be her duty to aid in the development of the more
backward quarters of the globe, and to exercise police authority over
barbarous races.”175
It was during this period that the doctrine of international recogni-
tion was reformulated for the purpose of excluding non-European
peoples from membership in international society. Having emerged
during the Age of Revolutions, the modern doctrine of recognition
had been devised to accommodate newborn states in the Americas.
But during the nineteenth century, the requirements of international
170
Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law (London: Sampson Low,
1864), 16–17.
171
Ibid., 30. 172 Lawrence, Principles of International Law, § 44, 58.
173
W. E. Hall, Treatise on International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1890),
42.
174
Ibid., 43. 175 Lawrence, “The Evolution of Peace,” 277.
recognition were modified in accordance with the standard of civiliza-

tion.176 Taking important steps toward to this end, Lorimer suggested
that law should incorporate insights from the nascent discipline of
ethnology – from the “science of races” as he had it – in order to
distinguish between states according to the degree of civilization they
had attained. This led him to divide political communities into civi-
lized, barbarous, and savage ones and to propose that only European
states should be granted full recognition by international law, while
uncivilized ones might be granted partial recognition but denied full
membership in international society on racial and religious grounds.177
This crucial distinction between civilized and uncivilized peoples
also had profound consequences for the laws of war and their
applicability. On the one hand, and as Koskenniemi has pointed
out, liberal lawyers of the late nineteenth century were generally
opposed to war, which they regarded as a manifestation of destruc-
tive impulses that had reigned unobstructed in the past but now
had gradually been brought under control by means of interna-
tional law. It was widely agreed by liberal and positivist lawyers
that the ultimate desideratum was to abolish warfare from the life
of civilized nations and, should that fail, at least to temper its
excesses in the hope of making warfare less brutal and more
humane. To the extent that the resort to force was at all permis-
sible by international law during this period, it was for the vindi-
cation of rights and self-defense only. And in the case that war
broke out, international lawyers insisted that it should be waged in
accordance with humanitarian principles such as those laid down
in the Lieber Code during the American Civil War and in the 1864
Geneva and 1868 St. Petersburg declarations.178 As Lawrence
argued in his essay, “The Evolution of Peace” (1885), since we
should not expect to attain perpetual peace immediately, “we must
be content to give our aid in strengthening all the healthy
176
Jens Bartelson, “Recognition: A Short History,” Ethics & International Affairs
30, no. 3 (2016): 303–21.
177
James Lorimer, “La Doctrine de la Reconnaissance, Fondement du Droit
International,” Revue de Droit International et de Lé gislation Comparé e 16
(1884): 335–59. On the role of international legal recognition in the expansion
of international society, see Hedley Bull, “The Emergence of a Universal
International Society,” in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), The Expansion
of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 117–26.
178
Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 83–90.
sentiments and popularizing all the practical proposals that tend to

make wars less frequent in our own time.”179 To Westlake, it was
obvious that the improvement of the laws of war among European
states represented a major achievement of international law, made
possible by the fact that these states had come to identify them-
selves as members of a common civilization in which warfare was
increasingly understood to be a thing of the past.180
On the other hand, such restraint applied to civilized nations only,
not between them and nations for various reasons deemed uncivilized,
savage, or barbarous. Instead, the latter were fair game for those
practices of conquest and occupation that civilized states were proud
of having made illegal among themselves, since it followed from this
doctrine that “[a]ll territory not in the possession of states who are
members of the family of nations and subjects of international law must
be considered res nullius and therefore open to occupation.”181 Since
war now was narrowly defined in interstate terms, whatever kind of
violence that was inflicted on nonsovereign communities or uncivilized
nations was not war properly understood but fully legitimate means of
creating and maintaining the conditions of civilized government where
it was found lacking or judged necessary to compel uncivilized peoples
to enter into unequal treaties. For example, while reprisals had run
their course in civilized warfare, “in cases where a strong state or group
of states finds itself obliged to undertake what are practically measures
of police against weak or barbarous powers, one or other of the means
above described may be a useful alternative to war.”182 Finally,
although Lawrence affirmed that natives stand outside international
law, “[j]ustice demands that the inhabitants of occupied districts
should be treated with fairness.” Yet, as he was cautious to add,
“when representatives of superior and inferior races come into contact,
the former must prevail.”183
When discussing the position of uncivilized natives with regard to
international law, Westlake maintained that any principle that would
make the free consent of an uncivilized population “necessary to the
establishment over it of a government possessing international
179
Lawrence, “The Evolution of Peace,” 234–77, at 248.
180
John Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1894), X.264–75.
181
182
Ibid., § 160, 299. 183 Ibid., § 96, 155–6.
validity” merely would invite questions “too obscure among uncivi-

lized populations” and give rise to unnecessary controversies among
colonial powers “whether the irregular violence to which savages are
prone amounted to aggression justifying conquest.”184 To Westlake,
the real test of civilization – and the only thing that would protect a
nation from conquest and occupation under international law – was
the possession of government. Apart from protection from arbitrary
violence under the rule of law, a crude form of government is present
when natives observe the laws of war and expect their enemies to do the
same.185 While this had been the case in the old Asian empires, when-
ever native inhabitants had failed to furnish such government for
themselves, it was necessary that others should do that for them:
“international law has to treat such natives as uncivilized. It regulates,
for the benefit of civilised states, the claims which they make to sover-
eignty over the region, and leaves the treatment of the natives to the
conscience of the state to which sovereignty is awarded.”186
Consequently, the title to occupied territories comes with certain duties
that “consist in establishing in the country occupied an authority which
may protect the natives with whom contact has become inevitable, and
under which the civil rights essential to European life can be enjoyed in
tranquility.”187 Westlake thereby saddled those seemingly uncivilized
natives with the same propensity for irregular violence that once had
been posited as the very origin of law in Europe.
The use of force against uncivilized peoples could thereby be further
justified by arguing that since those peoples were prone to uncontrolled
violence, they could therefore not be expected to understand or respect
the laws of war. As Hall argued in the aftermath of the Opium Wars, “it
cannot be hoped that China, for a considerable time to come, would be
able, if she tried, to secure obedience by her officers and soldiers even to
the elementary rules of war.”188 Lamenting the mistreatment of
natives, Lawrence nevertheless observed that “[i]t is commonly sup-
posed that a vast impression is made upon the minds of savages by
driving off their cattle, destroying their crops, and setting fire to the
thatch of their mud huts.”189 As Oppenheim helped to explain to a lay
audience in the 1914 edition of the Manual of Military Law,
184
Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law, VIII, 139–40.
185
Ibid., IX, 142. 186 Ibid., IX, 143. 187 Ibid., IX, 159.
188
Hall, Treatise on International Law, 44.
189
the rules of International Law apply only to warfare between civilized

nations, where both parties understand them and are prepared to carry
them out. They do not apply in wars with uncivilized States and tribes,
where their place is taken by the descretion of the commander and such
rules of justice and humanity as recommend themselves in the particular
circumstances of the case.190
As Mégret has shown, the exclusion of the uncivilized, the savage, and
the barbarian from the protection of humanitarian law was very much
part and parcel of the constitution of that law. During the formative
moments of humanitarian law, European states were simultaneously
engaged in a scramble for colonies in Africa. While the treatment of
native populations was subject to considerable debate among interna-
tional lawyers, it was never doubted that these populations were unciv-
ilized. Those who argued that natives should be excluded from the
protection offered by the laws of war also sanctioned methods of
warfare against native populations that had been banned among
European states, such as the use of dum-dum bullets and the burning
of villages. The use of irregular methods of warfare against uncivilized
peoples was justified on two different but interconnected grounds.
First, since native populations did not constitute sovereign states
according to prevailing standards, they could not have ratified the
relevant humanitarian conventions and were therefore excluded from
their scope. Second, by virtue of being uncivilized or savage, native
populations could not be expected to respect the laws of war and honor
the notions of civilized warfare. Their ways of war lacked all legal and
moral restraint and recognized no distinction between combatants and
noncombatants. According to an impeccable but twisted logic, since
uncivilized peoples were uncivilized partly because they waged war in
uncivilized ways, and since the laws of war apply to civilized states
only, the latter needed not to be restrained by those laws when waging
war against the former.191
Yet, by focusing on the transition to positivism during the late nine-
teenth century, postcolonial historians of international law such as
Anghie and Mégret have failed to note the extent to which the notions
of barbarism and savagery attributed to non-European peoples had
190
Manual of Military Law (London: War Office, 1914), 235.
191
Frédéric Mégret, “From ‘Savages’ to ‘Unlawful Combatants’: A Postcolonial
Look at International Law’s Other,” in Anne Orford (ed.), International Law
and Its Others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 265–317.
been foundational to the enterprise of international law all the way

from its crude naturalist beginnings onward. As I have argued in this
chapter, assumptions about natural hostility and the violent disposi-
tions of men were constitutive of early modern attempts to explain why
law was possible and indeed necessary by pointing to what would the
world would look like in its absence. When the notions of divine
command and a preordained order of things had ceased to convince
as sources of legal authority, such assumptions were invoked to explain
how and why law had emerged in the first place and why it was
necessary to the orderly conduct of human affairs within as well as
between political communities. Early modern ius naturalism was thus
the handmaiden of secular statecraft insofar as it provided the philo-
sophical justifications for sovereignty and law by distinguishing
between different forms of violence and different subjects of violence.
While the forms of violence that could be harnessed for the purposes of
secular statecraft were deemed legitimate and subjected to systematic
attempts at regulation, other forms of violence – such as piracy and
brigandage – were judged to be profoundly destructive of all attempts
to create political and legal order. While certain subjects were vested
with the prerogative of using violence to create and maintain order,
others were seen as inherently threatening by virtue of their propensity
for irregular violence and thus made legitimate targets for an equally
unrestricted use of force. While the Others of international law can be
found in many different times and places, their distinguishing attributes
have displayed a remarkable continuity across both time and space,
making it possible to lump pirates, brigands, duelists, boors, Indians,
Ottomans, and African natives together into one single family of law-
less outcasts lingering in the constitutive shadow of legality and
legitimacy.
This means that there never was any smooth transition from uni-
lateral to bilateral conceptions of war. Rather, as I have tried to make
plain in this chapter, the modern conception of war as a contest
between moral and legal equals has only been possible to uphold as a
consequence of a consistent exclusion and othering of all subjects
thought not to be morally or legally equal. To the extent that the law
of nations has depended on the existence of natural hostility and
irregular violence, it also owed much of its coherence and persuasive-
ness to the existence of such others, whether located in the prehistory of
the state or relegated to the non-European outside of the modern
international system. Thus the savages and barbarians invented by

legal positivists were relative latecomers in this regard, with a rich
ancestry in the history of legal theory. The paradigmatic Other of
international law is not found in the colonies but in the dark past of
European statehood, where barbarians had dwelled undisturbed and
exercised their hidden creative powers at least since the reappropria-
tion of Roman law during the sixteenth century. Rather than sensitiz-
ing themselves to cultural differences and basing their exclusions on
these differences, positivists merely reactivated a legacy that long had
been buried in the same naturalist past they were struggling so hard to
either absorb or shake off and ended up unwittingly projecting what
was still dormant in that legacy onto non-European peoples found
outside the international system.
So perhaps it was never simply the case that the oppressive operation
of the West against the rest was founded on any prejudices among the
Europeans against non-Europeans. Ignorance, nascent Orientalism,
and scanty reports from foreign shores certainly fueled cultural pre-
judice that made everyone else on this planet fair game for a vast array
of practices of othering, exclusion, and discrimination. Yet none of this
would have been possible without first having a veritable cauldron of
hostility simmering inside European political and legal culture, much as
a consequence of the sustained attempts to put political authority on a
secular footing by conceptualizing hostility and violence as the ultimate
sources of law and then reinforcing claims to secular authority with
recurrent appeals to social, religious, and cultural differences between
European peoples while upholding these claims with reference to the
ever-present possibility of war between them.
Conclusion
The Return of the Repressed?
Making War, Making Sense

In the previous chapters we have seen how war has been consistently
invoked to explain the genesis of modern political order and to legit-
imize the identities and boundaries on which this order was built. As a
consequence, the concept of war took on its modern connotations in
the context of an emerging tradition of international thought, a tradi-
tion to which war was a productive force in human affairs. Rather than
reflecting a transition from the medieval conception of war as law
enforcement between unequal parties to a modern conception of war
as an armed contest among legal equals, this was made possible by the
revival of the Roman notion that war is a productive force in human
affairs that ought to be harnessed for political purposes, such as the
creation of a peaceful political and legal order. As I have argued, this
conception is distinct both from the view war as law enforcement and
from war as a contest of equals insofar as both these latter views
presuppose that some political and legal order already exists in order
for war to be a meaningful category of thought and action. The notion
of enforcement only makes sense if there is a law there to enforce, and
this, in turn, presupposes some claim to jurisdiction and some claim to
political authority with which to back law enforcement up. By the same
token, the notion of war as a contest of equals makes sense only on
condition that the belligerents are readily identifiable independently of
the hostilities taking place between them, which requires them to be at
peace with themselves.
Although the purposes of war could range from the creation of tiny
principalities to grand schemes of imperial expansion, many early
modern writings on war came to converge on the assumption that the
main purpose of warfare was the creation of territorial states and their
protection from internal and external enemies. Prompted by a felt
necessity to put political and legal authority on a secular footing in an
180
Making War, Making Sense 181
age beset by profound epistemic doubt and religious discord, war and
its many cognates were invoked when explaining the emergence of
individual states and justifying their existence as the sole locus of
legitimate political authority in the modern world. From there it was
but a short step to account for the nascent international system in
similar terms by construing its emergence as a tragic but inevitable
consequence of the successful escape out of a domestic state of war: if
war had once made states possible, then states now had made war
necessary. In this concluding chapter, I elaborate some implications of
this analysis for how we can understand the phenomenon of war in
general and contemporary warfare in particular. I end with a few
reflections on the possibility and limits of a critical study of war.
But let me start by summarizing some of my main findings. In early
modern historiography, a primordial state of war was postulated in
order to make sense of the historical trajectory of individual states and
to distinguish their present from a past characterized by warfare
between patrimonial groups. Early modern cartographers and geo-
graphers drew on similar imaginaries when making sense of and
justifying practices of territorial demarcation, while military geogra-
phers consistently invoked the possibility of foreign invasion and
threats of domestic unrest when they translated cartographic repre-
sentations of sovereignty to facts on the ground by embarking on
large-scale projects of statistical surveying and fortification of frontier
areas that were typical of early modern state making. The early
modern law of nations – which has been seen as an antidote to the
excessive use of force within this emergent order – nevertheless pos-
ited hostility and violence at the very foundation of international legal
order and then proceeded to explain how irregular forms of warfare
should be harnessed for the purpose of maintaining a modicum of
order among what was in the process of becoming a community of
sovereign equals in the eyes of international lawyers.
Enlightenment historians, geographers, and lawyers continued to
build on those foundations. Having accepted that the sovereign state
originated in war, historians and philosophers were busy coming to
terms with the international state of war that had emerged as a con-
sequence of state formation and the gradual abolition of irregular
forms of warfare in Europe. Apart from placing some confidence in
the balance of power as a means of preserving the liberty of states while
maintaining international order in a context of intensifying rivalries
182 Conclusion: The Return of the Repressed?
between European states, many Enlightenment historians and philoso-

phers saw war as a source of human progress that would contribute to
the spread of civilization and perhaps eventually issue in perpetual
peace. While Enlightenment cartographers now turned territoriality
into a natural fact by representing states as territorially unified and
bounded, geographers continued unabated to chart frontier areas and
colonial spaces in a relentless quest for strategic advantages over a
range of real and imagined enemies. And although Enlightenment
lawyers sought to supplement the inherited naturalist framework
through a more systematic appeal to customs and treaties, this could
but reinforce the impression that war was a natural companion to the
international system, all the while positing the suppression of irregular
forms of warfare as its sine qua non.
During the latter part of the nineteenth century, what had largely
been an internal European affair got literally globalized. To the extent
that assumptions of natural hostility and enmity had animated expla-
nations and justifications of political order in Europe, these accounts
tended to locate the sources of hostility and war in the dark prehistory
of statehood, in the lower strata of society, in the rude populations of
foreign nations, or on the barbarous fringes of the European continent.
Although the sources of hostility were thereby skillfully disowned, they
were still very much alive in European historical consciousness. But,
with the rise of historicism and evolutionism in the human and legal
sciences, it became possible to project those disowned parts of
European experience outward onto non-European peoples. When sta-
tist historiography was challenged by cultural history, it coincided not
only with the emergence of a recognizably modern and rationalist
conception of war as an instrument of state policy but also with the
transposition of notions of race struggle to the stage of world history.
To early sociologists such as Sumner and Ward, international politics
was not primarily a struggle for security and power among states but
essentially a struggle for survival between races that would be carried
out across global space until the superior white race had achieved
conclusive mastery over all others. Simultaneously, within the field of
historical geography, bounded territoriality was seen both as a natural
fact and as a historically contingent outcome of a struggle between
races for limited space, a struggle that eventually must result in some
form of empire, if only to defuse territorial disputes within Europe.
Finally, in what was about to become modern international law, the
Making War, Making Sense 183
confluence of legal positivism and evolutionism made it possible to

distinguish between an international community of civilized and sover-
eign states and an undifferentiated outside composed of peoples lack-
ing the characteristics essential to self-determination. The latter were
therefore fair game for conquest and control by the former, who were
guided by the conviction that the predisposition to unrestrained vio-
lence of the outsiders justified a response in kind.
Thus it was assumed across different intellectual fields that war –
whether between European states or between them and uncivilized
peoples – was not only inevitable given its firm basis in the doctrines
of race struggle and power politics but also desirable from an evolu-
tionary perspective because it would render the superiority of certain
nations unquestionable and their right to govern the world unassail-
able. Although there was an agreement to the effect that European
peoples were superior to non-European peoples, however, there was
no agreement as to which European nation could legitimately claim to
best represent the superior race, just a conviction that this question
could be decided only by an armed contest among states sharing the
same kind of superiority complex. Given that this background under-
standing of war was widely shared among the political and military
elites of the day, the outbreak of the First World War seems less
surprising, as do the genocidal schemes that were implemented simul-
taneously in Africa and elsewhere in what appears as dress rehearsals of
what was to come later in Europe.1
It was this background understanding of war that was superficially
challenged in the interwar period and then downplayed and forgotten
after the end of the Second World War. Although the productive view
of war became unfashionable among the liberal intelligentsia and was
either blamed on the Germans and their obsession with power or
attributed to an accidental confluence of nasty currents in fin de siècle
social thought, it nevertheless survived in military circles during the
interwar period.2 Quite regardless of the pacifism that was widely
professed by liberals during this period, the underlying belief in the
ontogenetic powers of war had hardly been shaken by the experiences
of the First World War. Instead, it was the invention of nuclear
1
See Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to
the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 113–36.
2
See, for example, Wilkinson Dent Bird, The Direction of War: A Study and
Illustration of Strategy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925), 6.
weapons that eventually convinced Western elites that war could no

longer serve any constructive purposes whatsoever. As Brodie then
argued, “[t]he minimum destruction and disorganization that one
could expect from an unrestricted thermonuclear attack in the future
is likely to be too high to permit further meaningful mobilization of
war-making capabilities.” Assessing the damage of such an attack, “we
should also recognize once and for all when it comes to predicting
human casualties [that] we are talking about a catastrophe for which
it impossible to set upper limits appreciably short of the entire popula-
tion of a nation.”3
Making Sense of War

But to what extent does a historical ontology of war such as the
preceding help us to understand war? While a historical ontology
cannot provide a general explanation of why wars occur, it can con-
tribute some potentially valuable insights into how conceptions of war
condition the range of motivations and justifications available to
actors. Conceptions of war imply different answers to the basic ques-
tion of what war is, and those basic commitments make it possible for
actors to make sense of war in terms of its social meaning and political
purpose, and from attributions of meaning and purpose will follow
distinct possibilities of legitimizing war and warfare. Those who
believe that war is a means of law enforcement will go to war for
reasons distinct from those who hold the belief that war is an armed
contest between legal and moral equals, but those who subscribe to an
ontogenetic view of war will go to war to create preconditions for the
kind of political order within which law enforcement and armed con-
test would make sense in the first place. While we might well think that
the idea of ontogenetic war is flawed because it presupposes that war
makes sense in the absence of identifiable belligerents, it remains a
social and historical fact that war has long been conceived of as a
productive force in human affairs and that this understanding has at
times informed legitimizations of war as well as actual practices of
warfare. Investing creative powers in war seems to have been an
important part of the process of state-making in Europe insofar as
3
Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 1959), 167.
Making Sense of War 185
such conceptions were invoked not only by those contemplating its

outcomes from a safe distance but also and more importantly by those
who were in the business of selling it to their contemporaries. To them,
the dictum that “war made the state, and the state made war” would
not only have appeared self-evident but would most likely have com-
manded a very literal interpretation of what such making entailed. The
productive powers attributed to war in the process of state-making
were later reinvested in the international system and conveniently
buried in the constitutive belief that wars occur because there is nothing
there to prevent them. There international anarchy became nothing but
another avatar of Mars, equally impersonal and compelling yet equally
removed from the scope of human volition and intervention. But to
what extent are we today experiencing a return of the ontogenetic view
of war? In this section, I describe what I take to be some important
preconditions of this return, such as the rise and spread of notions of
state failure and the changing norms of military intervention.
During the past decades, there has been a growing conviction that the
international system has come under pressure from another set of
impersonal forces subsumed under the concept of globalization. As
noted in Chapter 1, some of those who argued that international
wars were becoming obsolete pointed to the simultaneous proliferation
of domestic conflicts and argued that these had taken on a new and
transnational character as a consequence of globalization. Many the-
orists have been inclined to blame this on unrestricted flows of capital
and people believed to be corrosive of governmental authority and
national identity, thereby increasing the likelihood of domestic con-
flicts along ethnic and religious lines in already weak states.4 Yet these
accounts are based on the assumption that state weakness or failure
was both a cause and a consequence of violent conflicts. Violent con-
flicts between domestic groups were caused by a lack of state control
over territories and populations, and whenever such conflict remained
unresolved, they could not but erode the authority and legitimacy of the
state further. Yet such notions of state fragility and failure had evolved
well before the forces of globalization were invoked to explain patterns
of domestic conflicts. In fact, it is fully possible to argue that most of the
4
See, for example, Martin Van Creveld, Transformation of War (New York: Free
Press, 1991); Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global
Era (Oxford: Polity Press, 1999).
phenomena that have been lumped together under the label of state
failure were in fact little but the combined consequences of decoloniza-
tion and superpower rivalry in the preceding decades. As Jackson and
Rosberg argued already in 1982, while many African states enjoyed
statehood only by virtue of their membership in international society,
“most of the national governments exercise only tenuous control over
the people, organizations, and activities within their territorial jurisdic-
tions. In almost all of these countries, the populations are divided along
ethnic lines; in some, there has been a threat of political disorder
stemming from such divisions; in a few, disorder has deteriorated
into civil warfare.”5 These civil wars lacked the productive character
of those that had propelled state formation forward in Europe, where
“statesmen created jurisdictions over the course of several centuries in
Machiavellian fashion – by dominating internal rivals and competing
with external rivals – until the international system had attained its
present-day jurisdictions.”6
Such conclusions were further reinforced by another influential
study of Third World states from this period, in which Migdal argued
that despite appearances to the contrary, many states in the Third
World lacked the core capabilities of statehood, such as the capacity
to penetrate society and regulate social relations, as well as the ability
to extract and appropriate resources in an effective way. Since post-
colonial patterns of conflict had failed to produce both strong states
and domestic peace and order, anything like the European experience
of state formation was unlikely to repeat itself on other continents,
thus condemning many postcolonial states to a condition of perpetual
weakness and internal discord unless exposed to exogenous shocks.7
When insights such as these began to penetrate international relations
theory and were assimilated to traditional concerns with international
security, this resulted in the contention that weak states were a threat
not only to themselves and their own populations but also to
5
Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The
Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood,” World Politics 35, no. 1 (1982): 1–24,
at 1. See also Robert H. Jackson, “Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical
Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World,” International
Organization 41, no. 4 (1987): 519–49.
6
Jackson and Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist,” 23.
7
Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and
State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1988).
neighboring states as well and to international order and peace more

generally.8
Soon enough notions of state fragility and failure were followed by
pleas for intervention and the restoration of state capacities by external
actors. In an article that set the tone for much of the subsequent debate,
Helman and Ratner argued that “[a]s those states descend into violence
and anarchy – imperiling their own citizens and threatening their
neighbors through refugee flows, political instability, and random
warfare – it is becoming clear that something must be done.”9 Since
traditional ways of promoting economic and political development by
means of aid were believed to have had failed in this regard, the
international community was now faced with the task of creating an
altogether new political environment for states riven by war, yet it was
prevented from taking constructive action by the “extreme view that all
the internal affairs of a state are beyond the scrutiny of the international
community.”10 Thus, in response to what was perceived as widespread
state failure in the Third World, the international community should
adopt a stance of conservatorship, ranging from governance assistance
to more intrusive forms such as the delegation of governmental author-
ity to the United Nations, which in effect amounted to subjecting many
failed states to a regime of trusteeship. The basic idea underwriting this
proposal, namely, that failed states had to relinquish some of their
external sovereignty and give up on their claims to self-determination
in order to be saved from themselves, would continue to resonate with
academics and policymakers in the coming decade.11
8
Most notably, Barry Buzan, People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International
Security Studies in the Post–Cold War Era (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991);
Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making,
Regional Conflict, and the International System (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,
1995).
9
Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” Foreign Policy
89 (1992): 3–20, at 3.
10
Ibid., 9.
11
See, for example, Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause, “State Failure, State
Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies,”
Development and Change 33, no. 5 (2002): 753–74; Robert O. Keohane,
“Political Authority after Interventions: Gradations in Sovereignty,” in Jeff L.
Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical,
Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003),
275–98; Stephen D. Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for
Collapsed and Failing States,” International Security 29, no. 2 (2004): 85–120.
Partly in response to this predicament, the norms of military inter-

vention began to change. As we saw in Chapter 4, many early modern
and modern lawyers took a quite permissive view on preventive and
preemptive warfare, either in order to nip foreign aggression in the bud
or in order to maintain political order by punishing or eliminating its
imagined enemies. The stronger the belief that the maintenance of
political order depended on the successful taming of irregular forms
of violence, the more permissive the use of force to those ends was
bound to appear. So, although the norm of nonintervention had long
been seen as a corollary of state sovereignty, many scholars of interna-
tional law now maintained that sovereignty entailed the right to inter-
vene in the affairs of other states for a variety of reasons beyond the
imperative of mere self-defense. For example, during the heydays of
colonialism, intervention in non-European states was a prerogative of
imperial powers that extended even to entities granted formal auton-
omy under colonial rule.12 But after decolonization had been more or
less completed, foreign intervention was largely understood as infringe-
ment on sovereignty and exception from the right of non-intervention
that require careful moral and legal justification to be regarded as
legitimate by members of the international community.13 Hence it
can be argued that the connection between norms of sovereignty and
nonintervention is a rather recent invention, dating no further back
than to the United Nations Charter and the Cold War.14
After the end of the Cold War, a much more permissive attitude
toward military intervention in response to humanitarian cata-
strophes and state failure began to emerge among lawyers and policy-
makers. As summarized by a leading expert on humanitarian
12
Lauren Benton, “From International Law to Imperial Constitutions: The
Problem of Quasi-Sovereignty, 1870–1900,” Law and History Review 26, no. 3
(2008): 595–620.
13
See, for example, Neta Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics:
Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002); Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty:
Intervention, the State and Symbolic Exchange (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994); Helle Malmvig, State Sovereignty and Intervention: A
Discourse Analysis of Interventionary and Non-Interventionary Practices in
Kosovo and Algeria (London: Routledge, 2006).
14
See Luke Glanville, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A New
History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); Martha Finnemore, The
Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2004).
interventions, “[m]ilitary interventions in the name of humanity must

be understood in the normative context in which they occur. The post-
cold war normative context gives purpose and meaning to actions that
were politically inconceivable not long ago.”15 Part of this normative
context was provided by the international theorists who attempted to
redefine the concept of sovereignty to entail the responsibility of states
to protect their citizens from severe suffering while arguing that the
right to self-determination and nonintervention was contingent on
their ability to fulfill these responsibilities.16 Should states fail to fulfill
their responsibilities in this regard, and should the international com-
munity have exhausted all other options to assist the target state,
military intervention should be considered legitimate to the extent
that it could be expected to be effective in alleviating human suffering.
Although the purpose of humanitarian interventions is thus limited,
“it has far more meaning and legitimacy when it is accompanied by a
long-term commitment to conflict resolution and reconstruction of
the political, economic and social systems of the war-torn country.”
Disputes over humanitarian interventions and their legality and legiti-
macy eventually resulted in the development of the responsibility-to-
protect doctrine. According to this doctrine, states have a responsi-
bility to protect their populations from atrocities such as genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and the
doctrine stipulates that in the event that states fail to meet this obliga-
tion, the international community has a duty to assist them in a
variety of ways. Should such assistance fail, the international com-
munity has a right to intervene – with military means if deemed
absolutely necessary.17
15
Taylor B. Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions of
Success and Failure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 7.
16
For important statements, see Fernando Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention: An
Inquiry into Law and Morality (Dobbs Ferry: Transnational Publishers, 1988);
Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in
Contemporary Conflict (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); Nicholas Wheeler,
Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000).
17
See Gareth Evans, “From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to
Protect,” Wisconsin International Law Journal 24, no. 3 (2006): 703–22;
Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect,” Foreign
Affairs 81 (2002): 99–110; Alex J. Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect and
the Problem of Military Intervention,” International Affairs 84, no. 4 (2008):
615–39.
As Orford has argued, “by focusing upon the de facto authority, the
responsibility to protect concept implicitly asserts not only that an
international community exists, but that its authority to govern is, at
least in situations of civil war and oppression, superior to that of the
state.”18 Yet it was obvious that while humanitarian interventions
undertaken in the name of this doctrine did not offer long-term solu-
tions to violent conflicts, they must be understood as “an exercise in
clearing away an obstacle so that a new political and social edifice can
be built.”19 Thus, whereas humanitarian interventions could be
expected to solve the most acute problems caused by the failure of
states to protect their own populations from suffering, they were not
designed to handle the sources of state failure that permitted humani-
tarian disasters to take place. To do this required failed states to be
rebuilt more or less from scratch, as reflected in the many strategies of
state-building and nation-building that subsequently emerged in
response to the cataclysmic events of 9/11. As Rotberg now pointed
out, “[b]ecause failed states are hospitable to and harbor non-state
actors – warlords and terrorists – understanding the dynamics of
nation-state failure is central to the war against terrorism.”20 Thus
the grounds on which intervention in failed states could be justified
had changed almost overnight to include the imperative of combating
terrorism, all while the democratic peace thesis evolved from a rela-
tively innocent academic exercise into a full-blown justification for
intervening in nondemocratic states in the hope of thereby creating
the preconditions for international peace.21
This is also the moment when the ontogenetic view of war reap-
peared and started to inform both academic and political discourse.
Since a distinguishing mark of a failed state is the lack of effective
control over its own territory and population, the paramount task of
state builders is to create the conditions for state strength by means of
18
Anne Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 120.
19
Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention, 276.
20
Robert I. Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” Washington
Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2002): 83–96, at 83.
21
See the fascinating study by Piki Ish-Shalom, Democratic Peace: A Political
Biography (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013). For one of the first
attempts to dispute the viability of this strategy, see Karin von Hippel,
Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post–Cold War World
strategic interventions in the political structures of such states.22 What

was subject to some disagreement, however, was the means most
appropriate to this end. While some scholars and policymakers had
been deterred by previous failures to achieve political order by military
means and now placed their bet on softer measures, those disappointed
by earlier attempts to democratize and liberalize failed states main-
tained that the creation of political order requires the prior establish-
ment of a monopoly of violence in order to stand a chance of success.23
From this it was a short step to argue that it takes military muscle to
create order in states beset by inner discord and that the more the
discord, the bigger the muscle needs to be. In the many templates for
nation-building that soon were available off the shelf from think tanks,
military intervention was regarded as the best available instrument to
create political order out of the chaos of rivaling warlords and terrorist
groups now thought to be the defining characteristic of failed states.24
In a widely circulated report with the revealing title “The Beginner’s
Guide to Nation-Building,” we learn that nation-building “involves the
use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and
economic reforms with the objective of transforming a society emer-
ging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors.”25 Yet
attempts at transformation must be encompassing in order to stand a
chance of success. The measures the authors recommend largely fall
under the heading of “deconstruction, under which the intervening
authorities first dismantle an existing state apparatus and then build a
new one, in the process consciously disempowering some element of
society and empowering others.”26 The primary objective of this enter-
prise is “to make violent societies peaceful, not to make poor ones
prosperous, or authoritarian ones democratic. Economic development
22
Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st
Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Francis Fukuyama, “The
Imperative of State-Building,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2 (2004): 17–31.
23
See, for example, Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil
Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
24
See, for example, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, The Challenge of Reducing the
Global Incidence of Civil War (Oxford: Centre for the Study of African
Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University, 2004).
25
James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, and Beth Cole Degrasse, The
Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation
2007), xvii.
26
Ibid., xx.
and political reform are important instruments for effecting this trans-
formation, but will not themselves ensure it.”27 Rather, what is more
important to the success of such missions is the provision of security.
“That security is sometimes imperiled by contending armies and is
always threatened by criminals, gangs, and violence-prone political
groups. International military forces are best suited for dealing with
the first sort of threat, police with the rest.”28
This does not imply that democracy is unimportant, only that it
presupposes prior pacification in order to get off the ground because
“[o]nly when a modicum of security has been restored do prospects for
democracy and sustained economic growth brighten.”29 Hence
“[s]ocieties emerging from conflict may be able to wait for democracy,
but they need a government immediately to provide law enforcement,
education, and public health care.”30 So, although the authors pro-
fessed to believe in the democratic peace thesis, they were quick to
caution their readers that “newly emerging democracies, on the other
hand, are often prone to external aggression and internal conflict.”31
The same goes for governmental institutions, the rule of law, and civil
society in conflicted societies. “While there should be as much conti-
nuity as possible with preexisting constitutional traditions, many con-
flicts are partly caused by the weakness or failure of the preceding
institutional arrangements. Sometimes, significant innovation in insti-
tutional design is needed.”32
Several things are striking about this report. First, the very practice of
nation-building presupposes an underlying claim to boundless sover-
eignty or empire that is taken for granted and hence left unwarranted.
The resort to military intervention for the purpose of nation-building is
never justified other than with the by then mandatory references to
the imperatives of protecting human rights and alleviating human
suffering. While the authors argue that “Western governments thus
increasingly accept that nation-building has become an inescapable
responsibility” and maintain that the practical responsibility for carry-
ing such missions out must be divided roughly equally between actors
with sufficient military capability (NATO), on the one hand, and those
able to provide the civilian components required for success (UN), on
the other, no sustained attempt is being made to justify the claims to
27 28 29 30
Ibid., xxiii. Ibid., xxvi. Ibid., xxxvii. Ibid., 135.
31 32
Ibid., 190. Ibid., 198.
political authority implicit in the idea of nation-building beyond a

broad reference to a Western responsibility to create order where
there is chaos and human suffering. This is reminiscent of the justifica-
tions that invoked the barbarous warfare among uncivilized peoples as
a sufficient ground for their conquest and subjugation. Second, and
consequently, there is no mention of the fact that military interventions
might compromise the territorial integrity and legal personality of the
targeted states. Whereas previous justifications for intervention
focused on restoring a modicum of domestic order while at least aspir-
ing to preserve the territorial integrity and legal standing of targeted
states, nation-building presupposes that since these latter dimensions of
statehood already have been compromised by ongoing turmoil or pre-
vious interventions, military intervention does not require any justifi-
cation beyond that provided by the de facto chaos and suffering present
on the ground. In this we hear a distant echo from those writers of the
early modern period who justified the use of force for the purpose of
state-building with reference to the disorder that otherwise would
ensue and possibly also spread to neighboring polities. Third, there is
an insistence that public security has to be provided by an intervening
military force before that security can be translated into the many
blessings of a stable political order. Not only does this assume that
the presence of an effective monopoly of violence is a necessary require-
ment of social and political order but that the absence of such an order
is a default condition of targeted states that they cannot hope to escape
by themselves. Here again we see the ontogenetic conception of war at
work. Although some forms of war are believed to be productive of
social and political order, others are merely destructive of the same
ends and must therefore be suppressed by means of its productive forms
whenever deemed necessary by the international community.
The fact that this guidebook did not offer any explicit justifications
military intervention and nation-building does not imply that such
justifications were in short supply: The war on terror had already
made such justifications readily available. At least two main positions
can be discerned here, one squarely imperialistic and the other vaguely
cosmopolitan in outlook. The first and straightforward way of legit-
imizing military interventions in weak or failed states was by arguing
that imperialism is legitimate to the extent that it creates and maintains
peace and order and then conclude that the United States and its allies
were most suited to fulfill this role by virtue of their superior military
power. Weigel stated this point bluntly: “[T]he United States has a
unique responsibility for leadership in the war against terrorism and
the struggle for world order . . . that responsibility may have to be
exercised unilaterally on occasion.”33 Or, as Ferguson asked rhetori-
cally, “[m]ight it not be that for some countries some form of imperial
governance, meaning a partial or complete suspension of their national
sovereignty, might be better than full independence, not just for a few
months or years, but for decades?”34 The conviction that American
military action was necessary to combat terrorism and restore order to
failed states was reinforced by the belief that while Europeans subscribe
to a rosier view of international politics, “the United States remain
mired in history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world
where international laws and rules are unreliable, and where true
security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend
on the possession and use of military might.”35 Thus the proponents of
American empire were plugging into a rich tradition of imperial
thought stretching back at least to Livy and Virgil, according to
which the ultimate warrant of peace is imperial aggrandizement with
military means.
A second set of justifications could be derived from an imagined
community of all humankind and the universal values it was thought
to embody.36 Appeals to notions of humanity had already figured
33
Georg Weigel, “The Just War Tradition and the World after September 11,”
Logos 5, no. 3 (2003): 13–44, at 32.
34
Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (New
York: Penguin, 2004), 170. For a penetrating critique, see Jeanne Morefield,
Empires without Imperialism: Anglo-American Decline and the Politics of
Deflection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 133–68.
35
Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World
Order (New York, Knopf, 2003), 3. For illuminating discussions of American
imperial ideology during this period, see Jef Huysmans, “International Politics
of Exception: Competing Visions of International Political Order between Law
and Politics,” Alternatives 31, no. 2 (2006): 135–65; Andrew Hurrell, “Pax
Americana or the Empire of Insecurity,” International Relations of the Asia-
Pacific 5, no. 2 (2005): 153–76; Michael Cox, “Empire, Imperialism, and the
Bush Doctrine,” Review of International Studies 30, no. 4 (2004): 585–608.
36
See, for example, Mary Kaldor, “Cosmopolitanism and Organized Violence,” in
Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen (eds.), Conceiving Cosmopolitanism:
Theory, Context, and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.
268–78. For a critique, see Cécile Fabre, “Cosmopolitanism, Just War Theory
and Legitimate Authority,” International Affairs 84, no. 5 (2008): 963–76;
Cécile Fabre, Cosmopolitan War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
preeminently in earlier justifications for humanitarian interventions

and had been incorporated into the core of the responsibility-to-protect
doctrine. Military interventions in fragile or failed states – even if they
amounted to stripping those states of whatever remained of their
sovereignty – were now justified with reference to universal values
such as the obligation of protecting human lives in the face of atrocities
committed by governments or by groups challenging their right to rule.
In such cases, the international community had a responsibility to assist
and, if necessary, forcefully intervene, so quite aside from the obvious
difficulty in determining who is entitled to act on its behalf, “this
international community appears to date to be largely unlimited in
terms of the actions it can take to achieve its universal mission.”37
Yet it was obvious that attempts to legitimize war with reference to
an imagined world community were profoundly problematic because
the very same division of humankind into distinct communities that
makes the idea of a world community look morally compelling is also
the main obstacle to its realization. As Hedley Bull once described the
Kantian view of international morality, “[t]he community of man-
kind . . . is not only the central reality in international politics, in the
sense that the forces able to bring it into being are present; it is also the
end or object of the highest moral endeavour.”38 But at this point we
encounter a paradox, since Bull was quick to add to this characteriza-
tion that “[t]he rules that sustain coexistence and intercourse should
be ignored if the imperatives of this higher morality require it.”39 This
would imply that any successful attempt to legitimize war in the name
of a world community must find a way to reconcile some set of
universal values with the actual plurality of values present in the
international system. But precisely because of its pluralistic makeup,
every value can easily be recast as an expression of some particular
identity or interest.40 Thus, waging war in the name of some universal
value is likely to generate more conflict rather than world peace.41
37
Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, 134.
38
Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics
(London: Macmillan, 1977), 25.
39
Ibid.
40
See, for example, Thomas McCarthy, “On Reconciling Cosmopolitan Unity and
National Diversity,” Public Culture 11, no. 1 (1999): 175–208.
41
For discussions of this problem, see Adda Bozeman, “The International Order in
a Multicultural World,” in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), The
Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 387–406;
But given assumptions about the ontogenetic capacities of war,

imperialist and cosmopolitan justifications ultimately converged.
Since implicit in appeals to a world community is a claim to possess
rightful authority over humankind as a whole, cosmopolitan justifica-
tions of military intervention bear a striking resemblance to the early
modern notion that those posing a threat to political order also were
the enemies of humanity and therefore fair game for punishment or
elimination in the interest of protecting humankind. So, despite their
differences, both imperialist and cosmopolitan justifications entail
claims to universal and boundless political authority and a correspond-
ing obligation to provide the requirements of peace and order in times
and places where these otherwise would be lacking or in short supply.
Ultimately, the legitimacy of a world empire or a world community
derives from its ability to protect the peoples brought under its sway
from the enemies of empire or the enemies of humankind, but with no
way left to distinguish clearly between different kinds of enemies. The
legitimacy of any such endeavor would then have to depend on superior
military capabilities alone; most advocates of military intervention in
the context of nation-building have assumed that this is a Western
prerogative that is bound to remain unchallenged in the foreseeable
future. Yet, by tacitly accepting that what distinguishes legitimate from
illegitimate interventions is their relative success in producing political
order on the ground, those arguing in favor of military interventions in
fragile or failed states had issued a generous license to other actors to
embark on similar nation-building projects of their own, should they
come to possess sufficient military capabilities.
Thus the ontogenetic view of war is likely to be as contagious in the
present as it was in the past. Once it has taken hold among the power-
ful, it becomes an offer you cannot refuse but something that you have
to emulate in order to survive. And, indeed, other states were already
waiting on the sidelines. From a slightly paranoid perspective, efforts to
create political order by military means are but the final stage of
Jens Bartelson, “The Trial of Judgment: A Note on Kant and the Paradoxes of
Internationalism,” International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1995): 255–72;
Molly Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic
Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Richard Shapcott,
Justice, Community and Dialogue in International Relations (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 30–52; Beate Jahn, “Kant, Mill and Illiberal
Legacies in International Affairs,” International Organization 59, no. 1 (2005):
177–207.
War against War 197
carefully orchestrated campaigns to first destabilize states in order to

create pretexts for military intervention. According to Gerasimov, “a
perfectly thriving state can, in a matter of months and even days, be
transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of
foreign intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian
catastrophe, and civil war.”42 State failure is the outcome of deliberate
attempts to undermine existing governments by a wide range of non-
military means, and “[t]he open use of forces – often under the guise of
peacekeeping and crisis regulation – is resorted to only at a certain
stage, primarily for the achievement of final success in the conflict.”43
In order to counteract such campaigns and regain the geopolitical
initiative, Gerasimov proposes that the Russian military establishment
should adopt its own version of such destabilizing tactics – tactics that
have become known as “hybrid warfare” – to pave the way for the use
of military force whenever necessary to produce the desired outcome.
War against War

While the above-mentioned justifications of intervention have continued
to have rhetorical appeal among pundits and policymakers into the pre-
sent day, they almost invariably failed to convince a more critical audience
about the legitimacy of the use of force as a means to create political and
social order out of its absence. Yet, curiously, some of those who have
criticized the excesses of military intervention have done so from a per-
spective that presupposes that violence is constitutive of political and legal
order. I have already touched on this line of reasoning in previous chap-
ters, noting that it has informed many contemporary critical accounts of
war. In this section, I will spell out some of its problematic implications for
our ability to understand and pass moral judgment on contemporary
forms of war and warfare. Doing this also raises some questions about
my own approach to the study of war that need to be addressed.
The notion that violence and war are constitutive of politics and
political order comes in two main versions, one by an international
analogy and the other by a domestic analogy. To Schmitt – who has been
42
Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges
Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat
Operations,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier, February 27, 2013, trans.
Robert Coalson, Military Review, January–February 2016: 24–9, at 24.
43
Ibid., 24.
a great source of inspiration for many contemporary critics – since war

presupposes that a prior distinction between friends and enemies can be
made, “a world in which the possibility of war is utterly eliminated, a
completely pacified globe, would be a world without the distinction of
friend and enemy, and hence a world without politics.”44 This implies
that without war, the international system would cease to exist in its
present shape and that states would slowly crumble in the absence of
reciprocal enmity. To Agamben, by contrast, violence is constitutive of
the domestic legal order. As he has argued, “if constituting power is, as
the violence that posits law, certainly more noble than the violence that
preserves it, constituting power still possesses no title that might legit-
imate something other than law-preserving violence and even maintains
an ambiguous and ineradicable relation with constituted power.”45 This
means that in the absence of foundational violence, law would lose its
bite, and the state would lose its bearings, plunging us back to the
primitive beginnings of things political.
But does this really help us to distinguish between legitimate and
illegitimate uses of force? If we accept that violence is constitutive of
political and legal order – whether internationally or domestically – it
seems hard to resist the implication that no such order can claim to be
legitimate on any ground uncontaminated by such violence. But then it
becomes difficult to resist the conclusion that the imposition of political
and legal order by means of force is legitimate whenever we succeed in
counteracting its radical absence or its manifold negations, which is
precisely what state-builders and imperialists of different stripes have
always claimed in support of their schemes. Thus critical theorists who
subscribe to an ontogenetic view of violence and war are not likely to
offer much moral guidance in our present predicament and are instead
unwittingly complicit in its perpetuation by debunking existing attempts
to restrict the use of force.
This is no more evident than in the recent reappropriation of the
works of Carl Schmitt by critical international theorists.46 Following
44
Carl Schmitt, The Concept of The Political (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2008), 35.
45
Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Redwood City,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 40.
46
For an excellent overview, see Benno Teschke, “Fatal Attraction: A Critique of
Carl Schmitt’s International Political and Legal Theory,” International Theory
3, no. 2 (2011): 179–227.
War against War 199
him, one way of criticizing humanitarian interventions has been to point

out that an appeal to humanity is but a fig leaf intended to conceal the
real aspirations of the intervening powers.47 Another way of debunking
the imperial and cosmopolitan aspirations of the West has been to reject
“every resurrection of eschatological desire, and to affirm conflict as the
necessary and salutary basis of political life.”48 It would follow that all
attempts to justify war on moral and legal grounds then are futile, since
such justifications are but ideological expressions of state interests
whose only real function is to demonize the opponent in times of
war.49 Hence no world unity beyond the current international system
is possible other than as a contingent manifestation of Western imperial
power.50 It then becomes tempting to claim that politics cannot be but a
continuation of war with other means, and what appears to be demo-
cratic consent only serves to mask underlying relations of hegemony and
domination.51 But since these accounts already presuppose that war is a
priori productive of political and legal order, they cannot offer any
ground for assessing the legitimacy of the domestic and international
orders thus constituted.
Similar convictions about the constitutive function of war under-
write more sophisticated attempts to make sense of contemporary war
and its role in world politics. Thus Jabri argues that in war, “[e]ven in
its most instrumental articulation, therefore, violence has a constitutive
manifestation and is hence seen as being formative of the subject.”52
This assumption is crucial to the rest of her argument, whose point is
“to develop an understanding of the ways in which political violence
and war are, in the late modern age, redefining politics and the sphere
47
See, for example, Danilo Zolo, Invoking Humanity: War, Law and Global
Order (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2002).
48
William Rasch, Sovereignty and Its Discontents: On the Primacy of Conflict and
the Structure of the Political (London: Birkbeck Law Press, 2004), 3.
49
See, for example, Gabriella Slomp, “Carl Schmitt’s Five Arguments against the
Idea of Just War,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19, no. 3 (2006):
435–47.
50
Fabio Petito, “Against World Unity: Carl Schmitt and the Western-Centric and
Liberal Global Order,” in Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Petito (eds.), The
International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal War and the
Crisis of Global Order (London: Routledge, 2007), 166–84.
51
See Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (London: Verso, 1993);
Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000).
52
Vivienne Jabri, War and the Transformation of Global Politics (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 12.
of the international.”53 As she goes on to explain, war is a constitutive

force in the current transformation of world politics and the dissolution
of modern boundaries and identities. “What we see in the late modern
context of boundless and limitless warfare is the dismantling of tradi-
tional conceptions of state boundaries and their associated rules and
the emergence of a global sovereign subjectivity that regards the global
within its sphere of operations.”54 Wars waged for humanitarian pur-
poses thus serve to domesticate the global arena in the name of such
global sovereignty, thus having “a constitutive role in redefining, and
potentially redesigning, the sphere of the international and its ordering
in political and juridical terms.”55
Unlike other critical theorists, however, Jabri makes a sustained
effort to engage contemporary practices of war on critical cosmopoli-
tan grounds. But since all universalistic claims are likely to be con-
tested, such cosmopolitanism must incorporate the fact of irreducible
antagonism into its core. A cosmopolitan ethics cannot therefore
assume that a genuine world community is in existence or even that it
is an attainable goal but must instead assume “an understanding of
universality that is always in question, a universality that does not
subsume conflict, but rather recognises the ever present condition of
struggle and confrontation against all totalising practices, including
those that seek cultural exclusion and domination.”56 With war and
antagonism as inescapable characteristics of late modernity, the only
remaining way to manage the use of force in world politics is by
recognizing the primacy of antagonism in politics and to channel its
productive force for more peaceful ends. In her view, a global politics of
solidarity is the only remaining antidote to global war. Yet it could,
of course, be objected that the process of getting there by means of
antagonism equally well could result in a global politics of identity and
further state failure.
Here the history of the ontogenetic conception of war seems to have
come full circle. While contemporary war and warfare to a large extent
are motivated by the conviction that war is necessary to create or
restore order and peace where they are found lacking, many of those
who criticize what they take to be illegitimate and excessive uses of
force in the present start out from similar assumptions about the
constitutive functions of violence and war that they thereby
53 54 55 56
Ibid., 7. Ibid., 8. Ibid., 187. Ibid., 185.
War against War 201
unwittingly reaffirm. By attributing a range of constitutive functions to

war and violence, those critics are not only relinquishing human
responsibility for the phenomenon of war and the suffering this inevi-
tably brings but also are perpetuating a conception of war whose
looping effects have been and still remain both tragic and disastrous.
A more fruitful line of inquiry – one that I have attempted to
pursue in this book – would be to historicize this view of war in
the hope of lessening its grip on our political imagination and
thereby increasing the scope of human responsibility in relation to
its contemporary manifestations. Yet this historical and descriptive
approach is vulnerable to the objection that it fails to distinguish
between accounts that invoke the ontogenetic capacities of war for
explanatory or critical purposes from those that actually celebrate
the productive force of war in human affairs. But, although it seems
very unfair to lump Tilly and Barkawi together with Montecuccoli
and Bernhardi, the point of doing so derives from the precepts of
historical ontology. What matters in the present context is not why
ontogenetic capacities have been attributed to war but the cumu-
lated consequences – the looping effects – of doing so across time and
space regardless of the intentions of those who have done so. As I
hope to have made plain, we should resist the temptation of passing
moral judgments on the ontogenetic view of war because doing so
would blind us to its looping effects and thus increase the risk of
inadvertently perpetuating them even further into the future. What
we as social scientists reasonably can aspire to, however, is to come
up with new ways of understanding the emergence of political order
that take the many disturbing historical functions of such violent
imaginaries seriously enough without having to believe in them
ourselves.
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Index
Adolphus, Gustavus, 59 Brodie, Bernard, 14, 184

Agamben, Giorgio, 198 Bryce, James, 119–20, 123
Age of Revolutions, 173–4 Bull, Hedley, 195
aggrandizement, 166 Butler, Judith, 11–12
L’Ambassadeur et ses Fonctions
(Wicquefort), 54 capitalism, contradictions of, 76–7
American Indians, 151–2 Carnegie, Andrew, 13
American Revolutionary War, Carnegie Endowment for International
74, 106 Peace, 13
analysis of interest, 48–9 cartography, 90–1, 96–7
anarchy, 148 Enlightenment and, 182
international, 73, 185 fortification and, 108–17
Anglo-Saxon peoples, 44–5 methods of, 101
Armitage, David, 4, 25 militarization of, 104, 106
Arte Della Guerra (Machiavelli), 38 revolutions in, 94, 97–8
artillery, 101, 109 rise of, 98–9
Atlas of the Counties of England and sovereignty and, 127
Wales (Saxton), 98 strategic deployment of, 100
Austin, John, 168–9 territoriality and, 91
topographical mapping, 103
balance of power, 160–1, 181–2 Charles V (Emperor), 64–5, 96
barbarism, 8 citizen militias, 70
changing meaning of, 77–8 civic virtues, 67–8
civilization from, 59–75 loss of, 69
just war and, 142 civil rights issues, 143
legal positivism and, 179 civil society, 156
race and, 81 conjectural accounts of origin
stigma of, 58 of, 157
Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building exclusion from, 173
(Dobbins), 191 civil war, 4, 186
Benjamin, Walter, 131, 134 international war lines blurred
Benton, Lauren, 123 with, 10
Berman, Nathaniel, 132–3 civilization
Biggs, Michael, 91 absence of, 123
Bodin, Jean, 89–90 barbarism to, 59–75
Boucher, David, 150–1 international law and, 176
Boulainvilliers, 47–8 progress of, 167
Bourcet, Pierre, 104–5 Ratzel on, 124
Branch, Jordan, 90–1, 96 Clausewitz, Carl von, 2, 75–6
Brett, Annabel S., 89 Coker, Christopher, 2
233
234 Index
Cold War, 8–9 violence to establish, 40–1

conceptualizing violent conflict after, domestic pacification, 108–9
11–12 Doyle, Michael W., 28–9
end of, 188–9 Le Droit des Gens (Vattel), 158–63
collective memory, 20–1 dueling, 161
colonial encounters, 117
colonialism, 188 early-modern period, 36
The Compleat History of Sweden from changes to war during, 101
Its Origin to This Time geographical scope of warfare in, 41
(Pufendorf), 52, 57 international law since, 134–5
Congress of Vienna, 108 law of nations in, 181
conquest, 44, 175 nationalism during, 40
protection from, 175–6 natural law theorists, 137
Cormontaigne, Louis de, 114 states in, 46
cosmography, 95 East India Company, 106
cosmopolitanism, 200 economic development, 187, 191–2
ontogenetic war and, 196 Einleitung zu der Historie der
Crook, Paul, 78–9 vornehmsten Reiche und Staaten,
Crusades, 19 so itziger Zeit in Europa sich
cultural prejudices, 8, 145–6 befinden (Pufendorf), 50–1
Elements of Law (Hobbes), 147, 150–1
Dann, Ernest W., 122–3 Elements of Morality (Whewell), 171–2
D’Argenson, René Louis de Voyer de empirical assumptions, 46–7
Paulmy, 67 enemies
Darwinism, 78–9, 118. See also social geographers quest for strategic
Darwinism advantages over, 182
geography and, 119 Zouche on, 154
Die Darwin’sche Theorie und das Engels, Friedrich, 76–7
Migrationsgesetz der Organismen Enlightenment, 15, 59–60
(Wagner), 119 cartography and, 182
Davis, Kathleen, 36 critical authors in, 60
d’Avity, Pierre, 41, 56–7 geometrical reasoning preoccupation
De Cive (Hobbes), 148, 149–50 of, 115–16
De l’interest des Princes et Estats de la historiography, 65
Chrestienté (Rohan), 48 on history, 60–1
De Iure Belli (Vitoria), 136 “Essay on the History of Civil Society”
De Iure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres (Ferguson), 68
(Grotius), 143 Les Estats, Empires, Royaumes et
De Iure Naturae et Gentium Principautes du Monde (d’Avity),
(Pufendorf), 156 41
De Jure Belli (Gentili), 138–9 eugenics, 83–4
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire European peoples, hostility and, 152
(Gibbon), 63 European system, 6
democracy, 192 civilizing process of, 69
democratic societies, pacifist values of, maturity of, 73–4
20 Voltaire and Hume on, 64–5
Denmark, 52–3 evolution, doctrines of, 8
Derrida, Jacques, 131 “The Evolution of Peace” (Lawrence),
Dobbins, James, 191 174–5
domestic order, 158 external defense, 114
Index 235
Fasolt, Constantin, 36 Hobbes and, 146–8

Ferguson, Adam, 68, 69 on imperium, 89–90
on war, 72 on violence, 146
foreigners, war against, 136 Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts
fortification, 94 (Hegel), 72–3
cartography and, 108–17 Gumplowicz, Ludwig, 80–1
of states, 108–17
fortresses, 108–9 Hacking, Ian, 22–3
construction of, 109 Hale, John, 102
Foucault, Michel, 35–6, 97 Hassner, Pierre, 9
Franco-Prussian War, 168–9 Heeren, Arnold Hermann Ludwig, 73
Franks, invasion by, 44–5 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 72–3,
Frederick the Great, 104 168
freedom, 73 Heidegger, Martin, 17
Freeman, Edward A., 120–1 Hellenic world, 18
French Revolution, 92 Helman, Gerald B., 187
Fulgosius, 37–8 Heraclitus, 17
Ranke on, 74–5
Zur Genealogie der Moral (Nietzsche), Herz, John, 88
131 Hirschi, Caspar, 40
Gentili, Alberico, 138–9, 142 Histoire de Provinces-Unies des Pais-
on right of self-defense, 144–5 Bas (Wicquefort), 54
on sovereign state and war, 139–40 Historical Geography of Asia Minor
on war as method of dispute (Ramsay), 123
settlement, 139 history
geography Enlightenment on, 60–1
Darwinism and, 119 European historiography, 34, 42
geographies of violence, 117–28 historical ontology of war, 27, 29
historical, 120–1 historicity of war, 2–3
Lloyd on, 116 philosophy of, 26
Mackinder on, 120 war as transhistorical problem, 27–8,
military geographers, 181 56
political arithmetic from, 110 History of the Reign of the Emperor
of race struggle, 121 Charles V (Robertson), 64–5
strategic advantages over enemies Hobbes, Thomas, 147, 155
and, 182 Grotius and, 146–8
geometrical reasoning, 109 on hostility, 150–1
Enlightenment preoccupation of, on sovereignty, 149–50
115–16 on state of nature, 148, 151
geopolitics, 125 Holland, Thomas Erskine, 171
George, Hereford B., 121–2 Hont, Istvan, 155
Gerasimov, Valery, 197 hostility
Gibbon, Edward, 63 as equalizer, 142–3
globalization, 185 European peoples and, 152
Goodman, Nelson, 23–4 Hobbes on, 150–1
Greenfeld, Liah, 61–2 inside states, 159
Greenwood, Christopher, 9–10 law of nations and, 157
Die Grossen Mächte (Ranke), 74–5 mutual, 139
Grotius, Hugo, 143 violence and, 157
on different types of war, 144, 146 Howard, Michael, 15
236 Index
human condition, violence and, 137–8 as scholarly field, 13

human diversity, 117 statist foundations of, 74–5
human rights, 192 international system, 185
humanism emergence and consolidation of, 3
Renaissance, 117–18 emergence in literature, 62
sovereignty and, 158 before Europe, 160
tradition of, 136 historiography and, 49
humanitarian interventions, 31–2, 189, limits and boundaries of, 24–5
200 nations legal independence in, 61
problems solved by, 190 political authority in, 33, 42
humanitarian law, exclusions from, 177 temporal limits of, 93
Hume, David, 59, 62 territoriality and, 126–7
on European system, 64–5 international war, 4
civil war lines blurred with, 10
Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in declining incidence of, 9
weltbürgerlicher Absicht (Kant), interwar period, 183
71–2
illiberal democracy, 68 Jabri, Vivienne, 21, 199–200
the immemorial, 44 Jacob, Christian, 96
imperial expansion, 18 Jomini, Antoine Henri de (Baron), 97
last wave of, 118 Juris et Judiciis fecialis, sive Juris inter
realities of, 124–5 Gentes (Zouche), 153–4
imperial possessions, 107 just war
imperial powers, 6 barbarism and, 142
imperium, 89–90 in medieval era, 37
In primam Pandectarum partem religious differences and, 141–2
Commentaria (Fulgosius), 37–8 Silvestrini on, 162–3
Indian Revolt of 1857, 76–7 tradition of, 135–6
infidels, 142 justifications of war, 11
infrastructural projects, 115 changing legal and moral, 5
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of
the Wealth of Nations (Smith), Kalyvas, Andreas, 70
70–1 Kant, Immanuel, 71–2
international law, 5 Katznelson, Ira, 70
civilization and, 176 Keene, Edward, 145
evolutionary theories of, 170 Kennedy, David, 133
historians of, 132 Koskenniemi, Martti, 132–3, 164,
postcolonial theorists of, 6–7, 130, 168–9, 174
177–8
Roman Empire and, 170 Langins, Janis, 114
Schmitt on medieval to modern, 135 Lasson, Adolf, 168
as shifting self-interest of states, 168 law enforcement, 184
since early-modern period, 134–5 war as means of, 5–6, 7–8
universalistic aspirations of, 129 law of nations, 165
violence of, 132 in early-modern period, 181
as will of most powerful states, hostility and, 157
129–30 natural law and, 153
international relations, 186–7 natural law and modern, 158–63
ontogenetic war and, 21 natural law and positive, 163–79
race and, 81 rationalist underpinnings of, 167
Index 237
states and, 159 mercantilism, 62

violent foundations of, 163 Middle Ages, 36
Lawrence, Thomas Joseph, 171, 174–5 militarism, 20
laws of war, 139, 176 military engineers, 108
Le Bon, Gustave, 79–80 Langins on, 114
Lebensraum, concept of, 124–5 Vauban as among great, 110–11
Lefebvre, Henri, 92 military glory, 38
legal evolution, 169–70 loss of, 69
legal positivism, 163, 170 military intervention, 188, 189, 194–5
barbarism and, 179 legitimacy of, 196
on civilized and uncivilized societies, nation-building with, 191, 192
172 military thought, 4
natural law and, 164 geographical and cartographical
legal scholasticism, 136 revolutions and, 41
legitimate war, 162 modern period, 39
Leviathan (Hobbes), 147, 149–50 monarchy, 43, 71
origin of states in, 151 Montecuccoli, Raimundo, 39
liberalism, 28–9 Morgenthau, Hans J., 14
liberal lawyers, 174 Mukerji, Chandra, 115
liberty myths, 150
natural, 159–60
quest for, 166 Nabulsi, Karma, 66
sources of, 160 Napoleonic Wars, 108
Lieber, Francis, 169 nationalism, 173
Livy, Titus, 18 during early-modern period, 40
Lloyd, Henry, 116 ethnic, 85
on geography, 116 popular sovereignty and, 61–2
Lorimer, James, 174 rise of, 26
Louis XIV (King), 63–4 on scientific footing, 83–4
nation-building, 31–2, 190
Mably, Gabriel Bonnot de, 63, 66–7 with military intervention, 191, 192
Machiavelli, Niccolò, 38, 101 political authority and, 192–3
Mackinder, Halford J., 120, 126 territoriality and, 193
Maguire, T. Miller, 121 nations
Maine, Henry, 169–70 concept of, 61
Malcolm, Noel, 142 legal independence in international
Man, the State and War (Waltz), 27–8 system of, 61
Manual of Military Law (Oppenheim), nineteenth-century writers on, 77
176–7 race and, 79
Martens, Georg Friedrich von, 164–5, native peoples, 176
166–7 methods of warfare against, 177
Marx, Karl, 76–7 sovereignty and, 177
Massumi, Brian, 22 natural boundaries, 94
medieval era natural law
conception of war in, 143 in early-modern period, 137
just war tradition of, 37 law of nations and, 153
Schmitt on international law in, 135 legal positivism and, 164
Mémoire sur le Canal du Languedoc modern law of nations and, 158–63
(Vauban), 115 positive law of nations and, 163–79
Mémoires (Montecuccoli), 39 theorists of, 137–8
238 Index
natural resources, 82 political order

natural selection, doctrines of attempts to deduce universal
territoriality and, 118, 127–8 principles of, 43
violence legitimized by, 8 legitimizing, 25
Neff, Stephen, C., 5–6, 135–6 ontogenetic war as precursor to,
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 20 16–17
nobility, 58 Politics among Nations (Morgenthau),
non-European peoples, unprecedented 14
violence against, 6, 8 Politische Geographie (Ratzel), 125–6
nuclear weapons, 14 Polybius, 18
postcolonial theorists of international
Ogilby, John, 103 law, 6–7, 130, 177–8
ontogenetic war, 16, 21–2, 29, 184, Precis du droit des gens modernes de
200–1 l’Europe (Martens), 164–5
attribution of, 34 preemptive war, 22
cosmopolitan justifications of, 196 preventive war, 140–1, 188
international relations and, 21 Princip und Zukunft des Völkerrechts
looping effects of, 22–3, 29–30 (Lasson), 168
as precursor to political order, 16–17 Les Principes de la Guerre de
reappearance of, 190–1 Montagnes (Bourcet), 104–5
return of, 19 Principles of International Law
Opium Wars, 176 (Lawrence), 171
Oppenheim, Lassa Francis Lawrence, private war, 145, 161
176–7 public war distinction from, 146
orientalism, 179 Protestant elites, 8
Ortelius, Abraham, 99 Protestant liberty, 53
The Province of Jurisprudence
pacifism, 20 Determined (Austin), 168–9
panopticon, 108–9 public war, 144
patriotism, 56 private war distinction from, 146
peace Pufendorf, Samuel von, 50–1, 57,
profound suspicion of, 86 155–7
universal, 82–3 on Peace of Westphalia, 53–4
world peace, 195
Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, 65 race
Peace of Nijmegen, 112 barbarism and, 81
Peace of Westphalia, 53–4, 55 geography of race struggle, 121
Pearson, Karl, 83–4 international relations and, 81
piracy, 151 nations and, 79
Pocock, J. G. A., 42 racial psychology, 80–1
polemos, concept of, 18 social Darwinism differentiation of,
political arithmetic, 110 86
political authority states and, 83
conjectural accounts of origin of, 157 struggles, 77, 82–3, 84–5, 122–3
de-territorialized, 88–9 theories, 81–2
in international system, 33, 42 Ramsay, W. M., 123
nation-building and, 192–3 Ranke, Leopold von, 74–5
secular, 8 Ratner, Steven R., 187
symbolically embodied in maps, 96 Ratzel, Friedrich, 123–4
violent conflict contesting, 45 on civilization, 124
Index 239
on territoriality, 125–6 cartography and, 127

realism, 28–9 D’Argenson on popular, 67
Realpolitik, 85 dreams of unbounded, 95
reason, appeal to, 47 European conception of, 123
rebellion, 39–40 Gentili on sovereign state and war,
recognition, doctrine of, 173–4 139–40
Reflections on the General Principles Hobbes on, 149–50
of War (Lloyd), 116 humanism and, 158
Reformation, 19–20 justifications of, 46–7
religious differences, 141–2 legalistic conceptions of, 35
Renaissance, 49, 90 nationalism and popular, 61–2
humanism, 117–18 native peoples and, 177
republican tradition, 66 royal authority claims to, 45
re-conceptualization of, 68 settlement of differences between,
right to war, 140–1 166
Robertson, William, 64–5 state of war and, 153
Rohan, Henri Duc de, 48 theories of, 43
Roman Empire, 40 violence on non-sovereign
international law and, 170 communities, 175
patriotism ideals of, 56 war and popular, 60
Rome, 18–19 war prerogative of, 37
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 29, 59–60 Zouche on emergence of sovereign
royal authority states, 154–5
claims to sovereignty, 45 standing armies, 70
incursions by, 42–3 state of nature, 148, 151
legitimacy of, 67–8 fiction of, 152
Ruggie, John, 21, 90 human intercourse in, 155
state of war and, 152, 159
Sahlins, Peter, 100 state of war
Sandras, Courtilz de, 40 sovereignty and, 153
Schmitt, Carl, 5–6, 129, 131, 197–8 state of nature and, 152, 159
on medieval to modern international states
law, 135 African, 186
secular statecraft, 137, 165–6, 178 attempts to democratize, 191
self-defense, 14–15, 140–1, 174 belligerence of, 29
right of, 141, 144–5 in early-modern period, 46
self-preservation, 159, 161–2 emergence and consolidation of
Shah, Nisha, 91–2 modern, 3
Siècle de Louis XIV (Voltaire), formation of, 47, 92
63–4 fortification of, 108–17
Silvestrini, Gabriella, 162–3 hostility inside, 159
Skinner, Quentin, 129–30 interests of, 48, 54, 63
slave labor, 76–7 international law as shifting self-
Sloterdijk, Peter, 95–6 interest of, 168
Smith, Adam, 59, 70–1 international law as will of most
social Darwinism, 78–80, 81–2 powerful, 129–30
racial differentiation in, 86 law of nations and, 159
socialism, 28–9 Leviathan on origin of, 151
sovereignty modern, 45
Bodin on, 89–90 as outcome of warfare, 37
240 Index
states (cont.) Vattel, Emer de, 158–63

race and, 83 Vauban, Sebastién Prestre de, 110–11,
secular statecraft, 55 115
temporal limits of, 93 methods of, 112–13
territorial extension defining, 126–7 statistical analysis by, 111
Third World state failure, 187 Ventura, Comino, 39–40
Third World statehood, 186 violence
Vattel on, 159 differentiating between kinds of, 130–1
war double bind with, 34 doctrines of evolution and natural
weakness of, 185 selection to legitimize, 8
Zouche on emergence of sovereign domestic order established by, 40–1
states, 154–5 geographies of, 117–28
strategic instrumentalization, 132–3 Grotius on, 146
Suganami, Hidemi, 34 hostility and, 157
Sumner, William Graham, 82 human condition and, 137–8
surveillance, 108–9 of international law, 132
Sweden, 52–3 law of nations, violent foundations
Swedish Land Survey, 99 of, 163
legitimate and illegitimate forms of,
territorial extension, 126–7 158
territoriality, 88, 96 monopoly of, 193
bounded, 182 against non-European peoples, 6, 8
cartography and, 91 on non-sovereign communities, 175
international system and, 126–7 order maintained with, 178
nation-building and, 193 organized, 27
natural selection and, 118, 127–8 political, 92
political authority de-territorializing, systematic suppression of, 157
88–9 against uncivilized peoples, 176
Ratzel on, 125–6 violent conflict, 10, 126
Virilio on, 92–3 conceptualizing, after Cold War,
Tesoro Politico (Ventura), 39–40 11–12
Theatrum Orbis Terrarum (Ortelius), Foucault on, 35
99 political authority contested by, 45
Third World Virilio, Paul, 92
low intensity conflicts in, 8–9 Vitoria, Francisco de, 136
state failure in, 187 Vitruve, 109
statehood in, 186 Völkerkunde (Ratzel), 123–4
Thirty Years War, 53, 55, 91 Voltaire, 63–4
Thucydides, 18, 28–9 on European system, 64–5
Thury, César-François Cassini de, Vom Kriege (Clausewitz), 75–6
99–100
treaties, 165, 168 Wagner, Moritz, 119
systematic appeal to, 182 Waltz, Kenneth N., 27–8
Tuck, Richard, 147 War of the Austrian Succession, 73–4,
Turgot, Anne-Robert-Jacques, 117–18 104–5
war on terror, 193
United Nations, 187 Ward, Lester F., 84–5
United States (US), 194 Ways of War and Peace (Doyle), 28–9
universal war, 75–87 Weber, Max, 33
US See United States Western imperial power, 199
Index 241
Wheaton, Henry, 172–3 World War I (WWI)

Whewell, William, 171–2 causes of, 85
White, Lynn, 109–10 horrors of, 13
Wicquefort, Abraham de, 54 outbreak of, 183
Wight, Martin, 26
Wildman, Richard, 172 Zimmern, Alfred, 13
William the Conqueror, 44 Zouche, Richard, 153–4
Winch, Peter, 23–4 on emergence of sovereign states,
Withers, Charles W. J, 104–5 154–5
world peace, 195 on enemies, 154

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War in International Thought

As scholars and citizens, we are predisposed to think of war as a profoundly

jens bartelson is Professor of Political Science at Lund University. He is

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

Preface and Acknowledgments page ix

I am certainly not the ﬁrst to write a book on war in international

suggestions over the years either by reading parts of the book or by

describe and render meaningful.1 This book tries to uncover these

theoretical and empirical inquiry into the phenomenon of war and

historical ontology.7 Furthermore, although the changing legal and

between distinct political communities rather than between domes-

assumed non-European peoples to be stuck in an uncivilized and

established jurisdiction within which law enforcement is possible

of the Cold War, when some authors optimistically predicted the

has become an empty shell which international law has already

whom we can attribute motives, causal powers, or moral responsibil-

Moreﬁeld, Covenants without Swords: Liberal Idealism and the Spirit of

sentiment. Since there is a broad agreement to the effect that war is

single conception of war, however abstractly deﬁned.41 Instead, my

Although we hear a distant echo of Heraclitus in Aristotle when

Christian cohesion whenever its fury was directed outward, against

collective memories can be changed without a returned of the

Security discourses have always had a particular afﬁnity with political

tweaking to become useful in this context. The idea of looping effects

achieve, “we are conﬁned to ways of describing whatever is

war as a productive force in human affairs is likely to resurface and to

but that have animated political and legal resistance to power

been put into it by ourselves or our predecessors. To treat war as a

these classics in search for better explanations and prescriptions to

been consistently invoked as the ultimate cause of war long enough to

Plan of the Book

a statist present so that an international state of war is made to appear

legitimacy of these policies and the ambitions they reﬂect. I end by

The intellectual obsession with war during this period is puzzling

Foucault takes the existence of temporally demarcated societies for

War and the Immemorial

had an equal right to ﬁght precisely by virtue of being independent of

was a cut-throat environment.”13 As we shall see in this section, to

it is a matter of prudence on behalf of the ruler to avoid the occurrence

violent means eventually resulted in the emergence of something akin to

force in human affairs. As I argue, war – both as a state of things and as a

the context of religious warfare, with Huguenot writers asserting ancient

If appeals to unbroken historical continuities were a source of poli-

identity.33 For example, to Boulainvilliers, although the Frankish conquest

From the State of War to the State

to reconstruct the past of individual states in such a way that temporal

the historical trajectory of actually existing states, provided that they

uncontaminated by brute force to which those who wanted to dispute

Perhaps the foremost and most systematic exponent of this mode of

Inclinations of the People,” the latter is determined by the “Condition,

Inhabitants . . . and . . . there were a great many Worthy and Brave

and their passions are directly opposed.”62 To this end, he purports to

historical accounts. First, and most obviously, projecting a state of war

of Gunpowder.” But Pufendorf is quick to add some qualiﬁcations,

nations aspire to the perfection already attained by the French. To

From Barbarism to Civilization

Second, since many Enlightenment historians were critical of imperial

ensued from the American and French revolutions. As Greenfeld

reign, Europe “might be considered as a great republic divided into

reign of Charles V, this system emerges largely as an unintended con-