Sameer Overseas Placement Agency vs. Cabiles

8/23/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 732
G.R. No. 170139. August 5, 2014.*

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC.,
petitioner, vs. JOY C. CABILES, respondent.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Employers cannot be

compelled to retain the services of an employee who is guilty of acts
that are inimical to the interest of the employer.—Indeed,
employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and
quality standards at work. They may also impose reasonable rules
to ensure that the employees comply with these standards.
Failure to comply may be a just cause for their dismissal.
Certainly, employers cannot be compelled to retain the services of
an employee who is guilty of acts that are inimical to the interest
of the employer. While the law acknowledges the plight and
vulnerability of workers, it does not “authorize the oppression or
self-destruction of the employer.” Management prerogative is
recognized in law and in our jurisprudence. This prerogative,
however, should not be abused. It is “tempered with the
employee’s right to security of tenure.” Workers are entitled to
substantive and procedural due process before termination. They
may not be removed from employment without a valid or just
cause as determined by law and without going through the proper
procedure.
Same; Same; Inefficiency; To show that dismissal resulting
from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the
employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against
which the employee will be judged; 2) the standards of conduct
and workmanship must have been communicated to the employee;
and 3) the communication was made at a reasonable time prior to
the employee’s performance assessment.—The burden of proving
that there is just cause for termination is on the employer. “The
employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence
that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause.” Failure to show
that there was valid or just cause for termination would
necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal. To show that
dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be
shown that: 1) the employer has set standards of conduct and
workmanship against which the employee will
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be judged; 2) the standards of conduct and workmanship must

have been communicated to the employee; and 3) the
communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the
employee’s performance assessment.
Same; Probationary Employees; Due Process; Due process
requires that the probationary employee be informed of such
standards at the time of his or her engagement so he or she can
adjust his or her character or workmanship accordingly.—The
predetermined standards that the employer sets are the bases for
determining the probationary employee’s fitness, propriety,
efficiency, and qualifications as a regular employee. Due process
requires that the probationary employee be informed of such
standards at the time of his or her engagement so he or she can
adjust his or her character or workmanship accordingly. Proper
adjustment to fit the standards upon which the employee’s
qualifications will be evaluated will increase one’s chances of
being positively assessed for regularization by his or her
employer.
Same; Termination of Employment; Two-Notice Rule; The
employer is required to give the charged employee at least two
written notices before termination; Aside from the notice
requirement, the employee must also be given “an opportunity to be
heard.”—A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and
adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal. The employer is
required to give the charged employee at least two written notices
before termination. One of the written notices must inform the
employee of the particular acts that may cause his or her
dismissal. The other notice must “[inform] the employee of the
employer’s decision.” Aside from the notice requirement, the
employee must also be given “an opportunity to be heard.”
Petitioner failed to comply with the twin notices and hearing
requirements. Respondent started working on June 26, 1997. She
was told that she was terminated on July 14, 1997 effective on the
same day and barely a month from her first workday. She was
also repatriated on the same day that she was informed of her
termination. The abruptness of the termination negated any
finding that she was properly notified and given the opportunity
to be heard. Her constitutional right to due process of law was
violated.
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Same; Same; Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of

1995 (R.A. No. 8042); Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995, states that overseas workers who were terminated

without just, valid, or authorized cause “shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%)
per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.”—Respondent Joy Cabiles,
having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the
unexpired portion of the employment contract that was violated
together with attorney’s fees and reimbursement of amounts
withheld from her salary. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995, states that overseas workers who were terminated
without just, valid, or authorized cause “shall be entitled to the
full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve
(12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
unexpired term, whichever is less.”
Same; Same; Same; Repatriation; Section 15 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8042 states that “repatriation of the worker and the transport
of his [or her] personal belongings shall be the primary
responsibility of the agency which recruited or deployed the worker
overseas.”—Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 states that
“repatriation of the worker and the transport of his [or her]
personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the
agency which recruited or deployed the worker overseas.” The
exception is when “termination of employment is due solely to the
fault of the worker,” which as we have established, is not the case.
It reads: SEC. 15. REPATRIATION OF WORKERS;
EMERGENCY REPATRIATION FUND.—The repatriation of the
worker and the transport of his personal belongings shall be the
primary responsibility of the agency which recruited or deployed
the worker overseas. All costs attendant to repatriation shall be
borne by or charged to the agency concerned and/or its principal.
Likewise, the repatriation of remains and transport of the
personal belongings of a deceased worker and all costs attendant
thereto shall be borne by the principal and/or local agency.
However, in cases where the termination of employment is due
solely to the fault of the worker, the principal/employer or agency
shall not in any
25
manner be responsible for the repatriation of the former and/or

his belongings.
Same; Same; Attorneys Fees; The Labor Code also entitles the
employee to 10% of the amount of withheld wages as attorney’s fees
when the withholding is unlawful.—The Labor Code also entitles
the employee to 10% of the amount of withheld wages as
attorney’s fees when the withholding is unlawful. The Court of

Appeals affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission’s
decision to award respondent NT$46,080.00 or the three-month
equivalent of her salary, attorney’s fees of NT$300.00, and the
reimbursement of the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary, which
answered for her repatriation. We uphold the finding that
respondent is entitled to all of these awards. The award of the
three-month equivalent of respondent’s salary should,
however, be increased to the amount equivalent to the
unexpired term of the employment contract.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the
Laws; Due Process; In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., 582 SCRA 254 (2009), the
Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and
substantive due process.—In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime
Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., 582 SCRA 254
(2009), this court ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and
substantive due process. A statute or provision which was
declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.” We are aware that
the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less” was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042
upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.
Statutory Construction; Statutes; When a law or a provision of
law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the
nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the
same or a similar law or provision.—In the hierarchy of laws, the
Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government
may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the
Constitution, regardless
26
of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The

Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must
be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent
with it is a nullity. Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null
because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot
be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a
similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was
already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless
circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse
conclusion.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; Due

Process; Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons
under like circumstances and falling within the same class are
treated alike, in terms of “privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.”—We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as
provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional
rights to equal protection and due process. Petitioner as well as
the Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling change
in the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the
precedent. We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant
Maritime that limiting wages that should be recovered by
an illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is
both a violation of due process and the equal protection
clauses of the Constitution. Equal protection of the law is a
guarantee that persons under like circumstances and falling
within the same class are treated alike, in terms of “privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced.” It is a guarantee against
“undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality.”
Same; Same; There is no violation of the equal protection clause if
the law applies equally to persons within the same class and if
there are reasonable grounds for distinguishing between those
falling within the class and those who do not fall within the class.
—In creating laws, the legislature has the power “to make
distinctions and classifications.” In exercising such power, it has a
wide discretion. The equal protection clause does not infringe on
this legislative power. A law is void on this basis, only if
classifications are made arbitrarily. There is no violation of the
equal protection clause if the law applies equally to persons
within the same class and if there are reasonable grounds for
distinguishing between those falling within the class and those
who do not fall within the class. A law that does
27
not violate the equal protection clause prescribes a reasonable

classification. A reasonable classification “(1) must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of
the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
must apply equally to all members of the same class.” The
reinstated clause does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable
classification.
Same; Same; There can never be a justification for any form of
government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but
imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the
favored sector is composed of private businesses such as placement
agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of Overseas
Filipino Workers (OFWs) whose protection no less than the
Constitution commands.—[T]here can never be a justification for

any form of government action that alleviates the burden of one
sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially
when the favored sector is composed of private businesses such as
placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed
of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution
commands. The idea that private business interest can be
elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious.”
Along the same line, we held that the reinstated clause violates
due process rights. It is arbitrary as it deprives overseas workers
of their monetary claims without any discernable valid purpose.
Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired
portion of her contract, in accordance with Section 10 of Republic
Act No. 8042. The award of the three-month equivalence of
respondent’s salary must be modified accordingly. Since she
started working on June 26, 1997 and was terminated on July 14,
1997, respondent is entitled to her salary from July 15, 1997 to
June 25, 1998. “To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to
petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong
signal that principals/employers and recruitment/manning
agencies may violate an OFW’s security of tenure which an
employment contract embodies and actually profit from such
violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law.”
Interest Rates; Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799;
The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No. 799 of June
21, 2013, which revised the interest rate for loan or forbearance
from 12% to 6% in the absence of stipulation, applies in this case.
—On the interest rate, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular
No. 799 of
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June 21, 2013, which revised the interest rate for loan or
forbearance from 12% to 6% in the absence of stipulation, applies
in this case. The pertinent portions of Circular No. 799, Series of
2013, read: The Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 796 dated
16 May 2013, approved the following revisions governing the rate
of interest in the absence of stipulation in loan contracts, thereby
amending Section 2 of Circular No. 905, Series of 1982: Section
1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money,
goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence
of an express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be six
percent (6%) per annum. Section 2. In view of the above,
Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and
Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of
Regulations for Non-Bank Financial Institutions are hereby
amended accordingly. This Circular shall take effect on 1 July
2013.
Same; Same; Loans; Circular No. 799 is applicable only in

loans and forbearance of money, goods, or credits, and in
judgments when there is no stipulation on the applicable interest
rate; Circular No. 799 is not applicable when there is a law that
states otherwise.—Circular No. 799 is applicable only in loans and
forbearance of money, goods, or credits, and in judgments when
there is no stipulation on the applicable interest rate. Further, it
is only applicable if the judgment did not become final and
executory before July 1, 2013. We add that Circular No. 799 is not
applicable when there is a law that states otherwise. While the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas has the power to set or limit interest
rates, these interest rates do not apply when the law provides
that a different interest rate shall be applied. “[A] Central Bank
Circular cannot repeal a law. Only a law can repeal another law.”
Same; Same; Labor Law; Placement Fees; There is an implied
stipulation in contracts between the placement agency and the
overseas worker that in case the overseas worker is adjudged as
entitled to reimbursement of his or her placement fees, the amount
shall be subject to a 12% interest per annum. This implied
stipulation has the effect of removing awards for reimbursement of
placement fees from Circular No. 799’s coverage.—Laws are
deemed incorporated in contracts. “The contracting parties need
not repeat them. They do not even have to be referred to. Every
contract, thus, contains not only what has been explicitly
stipulated, but the statutory provisions
29
that have any bearing on the matter.” There is, therefore, an

implied stipulation in contracts between the placement agency
and the overseas worker that in case the overseas worker is
adjudged as entitled to reimbursement of his or her placement
fees, the amount shall be subject to a 12% interest per annum.
This implied stipulation has the effect of removing awards for
reimbursement of placement fees from Circular No. 799’s
coverage.
Same; Same; Same; Awards of salary for the unexpired
portion of the employment contract under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8042 are covered by Circular No. 799 because the law does not
provide for a specific interest rate that should apply.—The same
cannot be said for awards of salary for the unexpired portion of
the employment contract under Republic Act No. 8042. These
awards are covered by Circular No. 799 because the law does not
provide for a specific interest rate that should apply. In sum, if
judgment did not become final and executory before July 1, 2013
and there was no stipulation in the contract providing for a
different interest rate, other money claims under Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042 shall be subject to the 6% interest per

annum in accordance with Circular No. 799. This means that
respondent is also entitled to an interest of 6% per annum on her
money claims from the finality of this judgment.
Labor Law; Overseas Filipino Workers; Solidary Obligations;
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (Republic Act
[R.A.] No. 8042); Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995 provides that the foreign employer and the
local employment agency are jointly and severally liable for money
claims including claims arising out of an employer-employee
relationship and/or damages.—Section 10 of the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 provides that the
foreign employer and the local employment agency are jointly and
severally liable for money claims including claims arising out of
an employer-employee relationship and/or damages. This section
also provides that the performance bond filed by the local agency
shall be answerable for such money claims or damages if they
were awarded to the employee. This provision is in line with the
state’s policy of affording protection to labor and alleviating
workers’ plight. In overseas employment, the filing of money
claims against the foreign employer is attended by practical and
legal complications. The distance of the foreign employer alone
makes it difficult for an overseas worker to reach it and make it
liable for violations of the Labor Code. There are also possible con-
30
flict of laws, jurisdictional issues, and procedural rules that may

be raised to frustrate an overseas worker’s attempt to advance his
or her claims.
Same; Same; Same; In the case of overseas employment, either
the local agency or the foreign employer may be sued for all claims
arising from the foreign employer’s labor law violations.—The
fundamental effect of joint and several liability is that “each of the
debtors is liable for the entire obligation.” A final determination
may, therefore, be achieved even if only one of the joint and
several debtors are impleaded in an action. Hence, in the case of
overseas employment, either the local agency or the foreign
employer may be sued for all claims arising from the foreign
employer’s labor law violations. This way, the overseas workers
are assured that someone — the foreign employer’s local agent —
may be made to answer for violations that the foreign employer
may have committed. The Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995 ensures that overseas workers have recourse
in law despite the circumstances of their employment. By
providing that the liability of the foreign employer may be
“enforced to the full extent” against the local agent, the overseas
worker is assured of immediate and sufficient payment of what is

due them.
Same; Same; Same; It must be emphasized that the local
agency that is held to answer for the overseas worker’s money
claims is not left without remedy. The law does not preclude it
from going after the foreign employer for reimbursement of
whatever payment it has made to the employee to answer for the
money claims against the foreign employer.—Corollary to the
assurance of immediate recourse in law, the provision on joint and
several liability in the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995 shifts the burden of going after the foreign employer
from the overseas worker to the local employment agency.
However, it must be emphasized that the local agency that is held
to answer for the overseas worker’s money claims is not left
without remedy. The law does not preclude it from going after the
foreign employer for reimbursement of whatever payment it has
made to the employee to answer for the money claims against the
foreign employer. A further implication of making local agencies
jointly and severally liable with the foreign employer is that an
additional layer of protection is afforded to overseas workers.
Local agencies, which are businesses by nature, are inoculated
with interest in being always on the lookout against foreign
employers
31
that tend to violate labor law. Lest they risk their reputation or
finances, local agencies must already have mechanisms for
guarding against unscrupulous foreign employers even at the
level prior to overseas employment applications.
Brion, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; View that

take exception to the ponencia’s full adoption of the ruling in
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et al., 582 SCRA 254
(2009), to the extent that it applies the strict scrutiny standard in
invoking the equal protection guarantee.—I take exception to the
ponencia’s full adoption of the ruling in Serrano v. Gallant
Maritime Services, Inc., et al., 582 SCRA 254 (2009), to the extent
that it applies the strict scrutiny standard in invoking the equal
protection guarantee. To my mind, the circumstances of this case
do not justify the ponencia’s approach of extending and expanding
the use of the strict scrutiny standard in invalidating the subject
clause (as reinstated in R.A. No. 8042 by R.A. No. 10022). The
conclusion that the subject clause created a “suspect”
classification is simply misplaced. The approach, sadly, only
unnecessarily shifted the burden to the government, to prove: (1)
a compelling state interest; and (2) that the legislation is

narrowly tailored to achieve the intended result. It also
unnecessarily undermines the presumed constitutionality
of statutes and of the respect that the Court accords to the
acts of a co-equal branch. The differential or rational basis
scrutiny, i.e., where the challenged classification needs only be
shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state
interest, would have undoubtedly served the purpose without
bringing these unnecessary implications.
Labor Law; Overseas Filipino Workers; Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (R.A. No. 8042); View that Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8042 is discernibly a piece of social legislation that
the State enacted in the exercise of its police power, precisely to
give teeth and arms to the constitutional provisions on labor under
its aim to “establish a higher standard of protection and promotion
of the welfare of migrant worker, their families and of overseas
Filipinos in distress.”—R.A. No. 8042 is discernibly a piece of
social legislation that the State enacted in the exercise of its
police power, precisely to give teeth and arms to the constitutional
provisions on labor under
32
its aim to “establish a higher standard of protection and

promotion of the welfare of migrant worker, their families
and of overseas Filipinos in distress.” Otherwise stated, it
draws power and life from the constitutional provisions that it
seeks to concretize and implement. As I pointed out in my Serrano
Opinion, “the express policy declarations of R.A. No. 8042 show
that its purposes are reiterations of the very same policies
enshrined in the Constitution x x x [They] patently characterize
R.A. No. 8042 as a direct implementation of the constitutional
objectives on Filipino overseas work so that it must be read and
understood in terms of these policy objectives. Under this
interpretative guide, any provision in R.A. No. 8042 inimical to the
interest of an overseas Filipino worker (OFW) cannot have any
place in the law.” [Underscoring supplied] Note also (again, as I
reflected in my Serrano Opinion) that while R.A. No. 8042
acknowledges that the State shall “promote full employment,” it
likewise provides that “the State does not promote overseas
employment as a means to sustain economic growth and national
development. The existence of overseas employment program rests
solely on the assurance that the dignity and fundamental human
rights and freedom of Filipino citizens shall not, at any time, be
compromised and violated.” The Act, however, concludes its
Declaration of Policies by stating that “[n]onetheless, the
deployment of Filipino overseas workers, whether land-based or
sea-based, by local service contractors and manning agencies
employing them shall be encouraged. Appropriate incentives may

be extended to them.”
Same; Same; Same; View that Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8042 obviously protects the Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs)
as against the employer and the recruitment agency in cases of
unlawful termination of service. Unfortunately, it limits the
liability to the “reimbursement of the placement fee and interest,
and the payment of his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
unexpired term, whichever is less.”—Of particular importance to
the present case is Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 which governs the
OFWs’ money claims. Pursuant to its terms, the Act obviously
protects the OFW as against the employer and the recruitment
agency in cases of unlawful termination of service.
Unfortunately, it limits the liability to the “reimbursement of the
placement fee and interest, and the payment of his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.”
33
This limitation is a step backward as it imposes a cap on the

liability of the foreign principal/employer and the
contractor/recruitment agency even as it earlier declared their
liability joint and solidary. To be an “appropriate incentive,” this
limitation of liability can only be justified under the terms of the
law, i.e., “the incentive must necessarily relate to the law’s
purpose with reasonable expectation that it would serve
this purpose; it must also accrue to its intended
beneficiaries (the recruitment/placement agencies), and
not to parties to whom the reason for the grant does not
apply.”
Same; Same; Same; View that Section 10 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8042 actually limits what is otherwise the foreign
principal/employer’s full liability under the Act and exceeds what
the Act intended — to grant incentives to recruitment/manning
agencies.—As I pointed out in my Serrano Opinion, Section 10 of
R.A. No. 8042 provides measures that collectively protect OFWs,
i.e., by ensuring the integrity of their contracts; by establishing
the responsible parties; and by providing the mechanisms for
their enforcement that imposes direct and primary liability to the
foreign principal employer. Yet, Section 10 presents a hidden
twist affecting the principal/employer’s liability. As worded, the
Act “simply limits the OFWs’ recovery in wrongful dismissal
situations. Thus, it redounds to the benefit of whoever may be
liable, including the principal/employer — the direct employer
primarily liable for the wrongful dismissal.” From this
perspective, Section 10 actually limits what is otherwise the
foreign principal/employer’s full liability under the Act and

exceeds what the Act intended — to grant incentives to
recruitment/manning agencies. “Section 10, in short, really
operates to benefit the wrong party and allows that party,
without justifiable reason, to mitigate its liability for
wrongful dismissals.” [Emphasis supplied] “Because of this
hidden twist, the limitation of liability under Section 10 cannot
be an “appropriate” incentive.”
Same; Same; Same; View that the liability limitation for
wrongful dismissals of already deployed Overseas Filipino
Workers (OFWs) is really part of a scheme to sell Filipino overseas
labor at a bargain for purposes solely of attracting the market, a
scheme that sadly reduces our OFWs to mere cash cows.—The
chosen mode of granting the incentive, i.e., the liability
limitation for wrongful dismissals of already deployed
OFWs, effectively imposed,
34
with legal sanction, a partial condonation of the foreign

principal/employer’s liability to OFWs. The incentive,
therefore, “from a more practical and realistic view, is really part
of a scheme to sell Filipino overseas labor at a bargain for
purposes solely of attracting the market,” a scheme that sadly
reduces our OFWs to mere cash cows.
Same; Same; Same; View that the “incentive scheme”
effectively benefits the recruitment/manning agencies and foreign
principal/employer at the expense of the Overseas Filipino
Workers (OFWs) from whom the salaries for the unexpired portion
of the contract are taken and to whom these salaries rightfully
belong.—The “incentive scheme” effectively benefits the
recruitment/manning agencies and foreign
principal/employer at the expense of the OFWs from whom
the salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract are
taken and to whom these salaries rightfully belong. In
effect, “the principals/employers and the recruitment/manning
agencies profit from their violation of the security of tenure that
an employment contract embodies.” The OFWs, on the other
hand, are afforded lesser protection because: (1) they are afforded
reduced recovery by operation of law; (2) the reduced recovery
renders wrongful dismissal situations more alluring, easier to
facilitate and less onerous to undertake which foreign employers
will most certainly consider in termination of employment
decisions. These inimical effects obviously will remain as long as
the subject clause remains in Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, this
time as reinstated by R.A. No. 10022. The “inherently oppressive,
arbitrary, confiscatory and inimical provision [under Section 10 of
R.A. No. 8042 should, therefore,] be struck down for its conflict
with the substantive aspect of the constitutional due process

guarantee. Thus, I vote to declare as unconstitutional the phrase
“for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
terms, whichever is less” in the fifth and final paragraph
of Section 10 of R.A. 8042.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Gaspar V. Tagalo for petitioner.
Julio F. Andres, Jr. for private respondent.
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LEONEN, J.:
This case involves an overseas Filipino worker with
shattered dreams. It is our duty, given the facts and the
law, to approximate justice for her.
We are asked to decide a petition for review1 on
certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision2 dated
June 27, 2005. This decision partially affirmed the
National Labor Relations Commission’s resolution dated
March 31, 2004,3 declaring respondent’s dismissal illegal,
directing petitioner to pay respondent’s three-month salary
equivalent to New Taiwan Dollar (NT$) 46,080.00, and
ordering it to reimburse the NT$3,000.00 withheld from
respondent, and pay her NT$300.00 attorney’s fees.4
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is
a recruitment and placement agency.5 Responding to an ad
it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her
application for a quality control job in Taiwan.6
Joy’s application was accepted.7 Joy was later asked to
sign a one-year employment contract for a monthly salary
of NT$15,360.00.8 She alleged that Sameer Overseas
Agency required her to pay a placement fee of P70,000.00
when she signed the employment contract.9
Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co., Ltd.
(Wacoal) on June 26, 1997.10 She alleged that in her
employ-
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 3-29.
2 Id., at pp. 32-44.
3 Id., at pp. 125-131.
4 Id., at p. 131.
5 Id., at p. 3.
6 Id., at p. 126.
7 Id., at p. 102.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id., at pp. 54 and 102.
36
ment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one

year.11 In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.12
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July
14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy,
without prior notice, that she was terminated and that “she
should immediately report to their office to get her salary
and passport.”13 She was asked to “prepare for immediate
repatriation.”14
Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July
14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15 According
to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket
to Manila.16
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint17 with the
National Labor Relations Commission against petitioner
and Wacoal. She claimed that she was illegally dismissed.18
She asked for the return of her placement fee, the withheld
amount for repatriation costs, payment of her salary for 23
months as well as moral and exemplary damages.19 She
identified Wacoal as Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’s
foreign principal.20
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that
respondent’s termination was due to her inefficiency,
negligence in her duties, and her “failure to comply with
the work requirements [of] her foreign [employer].”21 The
agency also claimed
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 6-7 and 195-196.
12 Id., at p. 36.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id., at p. 127.
16 Id.
17 Id., at p. 53.
18 Id.
19 Id., at pp. 33, 53 and 54.
20 Id.
21 Id., at p. 11.
37
that it did not ask for a placement fee of P70,000.00.22 As

evidence, it showed Official Receipt No. 14860 dated June
10, 1997, bearing the amount of P20,360.00.23 Petitioner
added that Wacoal’s accreditation with petitioner had
already been transferred to the Pacific Manpower &
Management Services, Inc. (Pacific) as of August 6, 1997.24
Thus, petitioner asserts that it was already substituted by
Pacific Manpower.25
Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal of petitioner’s
claims against it.26 It alleged that there was no employer-
employee relationship between them.27 Therefore, the
claims against it were outside the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter.28 Pacific Manpower argued that the employment
contract should first be presented so that the employer’s
contractual obligations might be identified.29 It further
denied that it assumed liability for petitioner’s illegal
acts.30
On July 29, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed Joy’s
complaint.31 Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro C.
Ramos ruled that her complaint was based on mere
allegations.32 The Labor Arbiter found that there was no
excess payment of placement fees, based on the official
receipt presented by petitioner.33 The Labor Arbiter found
unnecessary a discussion on petitioner’s transfer of
obligations to Pacific34 and considered
_______________
22 Id., at p. 56.
23 Id., at pp. 56 and 62.
24 Id., at p. 57.
25 Id.
26 Id., at p. 107.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id., at p. 108.
30 Id.
31 Id., at pp. 101-112.
32 Id., at pp. 108-110.
33 Id., at p. 110.
34 Id., at pp. 111-112.
38
the matter immaterial in view of the dismissal of

respondent’s complaint.35
Joy appealed36 to the National Labor Relations
Commission.
In a resolution37 dated March 31, 2004, the National

Labor Relations Commission declared that Joy was
illegally dismissed.38 It reiterated the doctrine that the
burden of proof to show that the dismissal was based on a
just or valid cause belongs to the employer.39 It found that
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to prove that
there were just causes for termination.40 There was no
sufficient proof to show that respondent was inefficient in
her work and that she failed to comply with company
requirements.41 Furthermore, procedural due process was
not observed in terminating respondent.42
The National Labor Relations Commission did not rule
on the issue of reimbursement of placement fees for lack of
jurisdiction.43 It refused to entertain the issue of the
alleged transfer of obligations to Pacific.44 It did not
acquire jurisdiction over that issue because Sameer
Overseas Placement Agency failed to appeal the Labor
Arbiter’s decision not to rule on the matter.45
The National Labor Relations Commission awarded
respondent only three (3) months worth of salary in the
amount
_______________
35 Id.
36 Id., at pp. 113-123.
37 Id., at pp. 125-131.
38 Id., at p. 131.
39 Id., at p. 129.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id., at p. 130.
43 Id.
44 Id., at p. 131.
45 Id.
39
of NT$46,080, the reimbursement of the NT$3,000

withheld from her, and attorney’s fees of NT$300.46
The Commission denied the agency’s motion for
reconsideration47 dated May 12, 2004 through a
resolution48 dated July 2, 2004.
Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency caused the filing of a petition49 for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals assailing the National Labor
Relations Commission’s resolutions dated March 31, 2004
and July 2, 2004.
The Court of Appeals50 affirmed the decision of the

National Labor Relations Commission with respect to the
finding of illegal dismissal, Joy’s entitlement to the
equivalent of three months worth of salary, reimbursement
of withheld repatriation expense, and attorney’s fees.51 The
Court of Appeals remanded the case to the National Labor
Relations Commission to address the validity of petitioner’s
allegations against Pacific.52 The Court of Appeals held,
thus:
Although the public respondent found the dismissal of the

complainant-respondent illegal, we should point out that the
NLRC merely awarded her three (3) months backwages or the
amount of NT$46,080.00, which was based upon its finding that
she was dismissed without due process, a finding that we uphold,
given petitioner’s lack of worthwhile discussion upon the same in
the proceedings below or before us. Likewise we sustain NLRC’s
finding in regard to the reimbursement of her fare, which
_______________
46 Id.
47 Id., at pp. 132-137.
48 Id., at pp. 139-141.
49 Id., at pp. 142-153.
50 Thirteenth Division, decision penned by Associate Justice Renato C.
Dacudao with Associate Justices Edgardo F. Sundiam and Japar B. Dimaampao,
concurring.
51 Rollo, pp. 43-44.
52 Id.
40
is squarely based on the law; as well as the award of attorney’s

fees.
But we do find it necessary to remand the instant case to the
public respondent for further proceedings, for the purpose of
addressing the validity or propriety of petitioner’s third-party
complaint against the transferee agent or the Pacific Manpower &
Management Services, Inc. and Lea G. Manabat. We should
emphasize that as far as the decision of the NLRC on the claims
of Joy Cabiles, is concerned, the same is hereby affirmed with
finality, and we hold petitioner liable thereon, but without
prejudice to further hearings on its third party complaint against
Pacific for reimbursement.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions
are hereby partly AFFIRMED in accordance with the foregoing
discussion, but subject to the caveat embodied in the last
sentence. No costs.
SO ORDERED.53
Dissatisfied, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency filed

this petition.54
We are asked to determine whether the Court of Appeals
erred when it affirmed the ruling of the National Labor
Relations Commission finding respondent illegally
dismissed and awarding her three months’ worth of salary,
the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and
attorney’s fees despite the alleged existence of just causes
of termination.
Petitioner reiterates that there was just cause for
termination because there was a finding of Wacoal that
respondent was inefficient in her work.55 Therefore, it
claims that respondent’s dismissal was valid.56
_______________
53 Id.
54 Id., at pp. 3-29.
55 Id., at p. 11.
56 Id.
41
Petitioner also reiterates that since Wacoal’s

accreditation was validly transferred to Pacific at the time
respondent filed her complaint, it should be Pacific that
should now assume responsibility for Wacoal’s contractual
obligations to the workers originally recruited by
petitioner.57
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’s petition is without
merit. We find for respondent.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that

there was just cause for causing Joy’s dismissal. The
employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of
law.
Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose
productivity and quality standards at work.58 They may
also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees
comply with these standards.59 Failure to comply may be a
just cause for their dismissal.60 Certainly, employers
cannot be compelled to retain the services of an employee
who is guilty of acts that are inimical to the interest of the
employer.61 While the law acknowledges the plight and
vulnerability of workers, it does not “authorize the
oppression or self-destruction of the employer.”62
Management prerogative is recognized in law and in our

jurisprudence.
_______________
57 Id., at pp. 9-11.
58 Leonardo v. National Labor Relations Commission, 389 Phil. 118,
126-127; 333 SCRA 589, 598 (2000) [Per J. De Leon, Jr., Second Division].
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 San Miguel Corporation v. Ubaldo, G.R. No. 92859, February 1,
1993, 218 SCRA 293, 301 [Per J. Campos, Jr., Second Division].
62 Id.
42
This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is

“tempered with the employee’s right to security of
tenure.”63 Workers are entitled to substantive and
procedural due process before termination. They may not
be removed from employment without a valid or just cause
as determined by law and without going through the
proper procedure.
Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by our
Constitution.64
Employees are not stripped of their security of tenure
when they move to work in a different jurisdiction. With
respect to the rights of overseas Filipino workers, we follow
the principle of lex loci contractus.
Thus, in Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v.
NLRC,65 this court noted:
Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the medical certificate

requirement by contending that since Osdana was working in
Saudi Arabia, her employment was subject to the laws of the host
country. Apparently, petitioner hopes to make it appear that the
labor laws of Saudi Arabia do not require any certification by a
competent public health authority in the dismissal of employees
due to illness.
Again, petitioner’s argument is without merit.
First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law
of the place where the contract is made) governs in this
jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of
employment in this case was perfected here in the
Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing
rules and regulations, and other laws affecting labor apply
in this case. Furthermore, settled is the rule that the courts of
_______________
63 Bascon v. Court of Appeals, 466 Phil. 719, 732; 422 SCRA 122, 133 (2004)
[Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
64 Const., Art. XIII, Sec. 3.
65 359 Phil. 955; 299 SCRA 608 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].
43
the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the
forum’s public policy. Here in the Philippines, employment
agreements are more than contractual in nature. The
Constitution itself, in Article XIII, Section 3, guarantees the
special protection of workers, to wit:
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.
They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions
of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law.
. . . .
This public policy should be borne in mind in this case because to
allow foreign employers to determine for and by themselves
whether an overseas contract worker may be dismissed on the
ground of illness would encourage illegal or arbitrary
pretermination of employment contracts.66 (Emphasis supplied,
citation omitted)
Even with respect to fundamental procedural rights,

this court emphasized in PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. v.
NLRC,67 to wit:
Petitioners admit that they did not inform private respondent

in writing of the charges against him and that they failed to
conduct a formal investigation to give
_______________
66 Id., at pp. 968-969; pp. 618-619.
67 540 Phil. 65; 511 SCRA 44 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First Division].
44
him opportunity to air his side. However, petitioners contend that

the twin requirements of notice and hearing applies strictly only
when the employment is within the Philippines and that these
need not be strictly observed in cases of international maritime or
overseas employment.
The Court does not agree. The provisions of the

Constitution as well as the Labor Code which afford
protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether
working within the Philippines or abroad. Moreover, the
principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where
the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. In the
present case, it is not disputed that the Contract of Employment
entered into by and between petitioners and private respondent
was executed here in the Philippines with the approval of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Hence,
the Labor Code together with its implementing rules and
regulations and other laws affecting labor apply in this case.68
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may

only be terminated for a just or authorized cause and after
compliance with procedural due process requirements.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just
causes of termination by the employer. Thus:
Art. 282. Termination by employer.—An employer may

terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee
of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
_______________
68 Id., at pp. 80-81; pp. 60-61.
45
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed

in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against
the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family
or his duly authorized representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Petitioner’s allegation that respondent was inefficient

in her work and negligent in her duties69 may, therefore,
constitute a just cause for termination under Article 282(b),
but only if petitioner was able to prove it.
The burden of proving that there is just cause for
termination is on the employer. “The employer must
affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the
dismissal was for a justifiable cause.”70 Failure to show
that there was valid or just cause for termination would
necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.71
To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in

work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the employer has
set standards of conduct and workmanship against which
the employee will be judged; 2) the standards of conduct
and workmanship must have been communicated to the
employee; and 3) the communication was made at a
reasonable time prior to the employee’s performance
assessment.
_______________
69 Rollo, p. 11.
70 Hilton Heavy Equipment Corporation v. Dy, G.R. No. 164860,
February 2, 2010, 611 SCRA 329, 338 [Per J. Carpio, Second Division],
citing Dizon v. NLRC, 259 Phil. 523, 529; 180 SCRA 52, 57-58 (1989) [Per
J. Feliciano, Third Division].
71 Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 527 Phil. 248, 257; 494 SCRA 661, 667 (2006) [Per J.
Austria-Martinez, First Division].
46
This is similar to the law and jurisprudence on

probationary employees, which allow termination of the
employee only when there is “just cause or when [the
probationary employee] fails to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with reasonable standards made
known by the employer to the employee at the time of his
[or her] engagement.”72
However, we do not see why the application of that
ruling should be limited to probationary employment. That
rule is basic to the idea of security of tenure and due
process, which are guaranteed to all employees, whether
their employment is probationary or regular.
The predetermined standards that the employer sets are
the bases for determining the probationary employee’s
fitness, propriety, efficiency, and qualifications as a regular
employee. Due process requires that the probationary
employee be informed of such standards at the time of his
or her engagement so he or she can adjust his or her
character or workmanship accordingly. Proper adjustment
to fit the standards upon which the employee’s
qualifications will be evaluated will increase one’s chances
of being positively assessed for regularization by his or her
employer.
Assessing an employee’s work performance does not stop
after regularization. The employer, on a regular basis,
determines if an employee is still qualified and efficient,
based on work standards. Based on that determination,
and after complying with the due process requirements of

notice and hearing, the employer may exercise its
management prerogative of terminating the employee
found unqualified.
The regular employee must constantly attempt to prove
to his or her employer that he or she meets all the
standards for employment. This time, however, the
standards to be met are set for the purpose of retaining
employment or promotion.
_______________
72 Labor Code, Art. 281; See also Tamson’s Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 192881, November 16, 2011, 660 SCRA 374, 383 [Per J.
Mendoza, Third Division].
47
The employee cannot be expected to meet any standard of

character or workmanship if such standards were not
communicated to him or her. Courts should remain vigilant
on allegations of the employer’s failure to communicate
work standards that would govern one’s employment “if
[these are] to discharge in good faith [their] duty to
adjudicate.”73
In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent
failed to comply with her foreign employer’s work
requirements and was inefficient in her work.74 No
evidence was shown to support such allegations. Petitioner
did not even bother to specify what requirements were not
met, what efficiency standards were violated, or what
particular acts of respondent constituted inefficiency.
There was also no showing that respondent was
sufficiently informed of the standards against which her
work efficiency and performance were judged. The parties’
conflict as to the position held by respondent showed
that even the matter as basic as the job title was not
clear.
The bare allegations of petitioner are not sufficient to
support a claim that there is just cause for termination.
There is no proof that respondent was legally terminated.
Petitioner failed to comply with
the due process requirements
Respondent’s dismissal less than one year from hiring
and her repatriation on the same day show not only failure
on the part of petitioner to comply with the requirement of
the existence of just cause for termination. They patently
show that
_______________
73 See Dissenting Opinion of J. Brion in Abbott Laboratories
Philippines v. Alcaraz, G.R. No. 192571, July 23, 2013, 701 SCRA 682, 752
[Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]. This ponencia joined J. Brion.
74 Rollo, p. 129.
48
the employers did not comply with the due process

requirement.
A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and
adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal.75 The
employer is required to give the charged employee at least
two written notices before termination.76 One of the written
notices must inform the employee of the particular acts
that may cause his or her dismissal.77 The other notice
must “[inform] the employee of the employer’s decision.”78
Aside from the notice requirement, the employee must also
be given “an opportunity to be heard.”79
Petitioner failed to comply with the twin notices and
hearing requirements. Respondent started working on
June 26, 1997. She was told that she was terminated on
July 14, 1997 effective on the same day and barely a month
from her first workday. She was also repatriated on the
same day that she was informed of her termination. The
abruptness of the termination negated any finding that she
was properly notified and given the opportunity to be
heard. Her constitutional right to due process of law was
violated.
II
Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed,

is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of the
employment contract that was violated together with
attorney’s fees and reimbursement of amounts withheld
from her salary.
_______________
75 Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Doza, et al., G.R. No. 175558,
February 8, 2012, 665 SCRA 412, 426 [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
49
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as

the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,
states that overseas workers who were terminated without
just, valid, or authorized cause “shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve
(12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.”

Sec. 10. MONEY CLAIMS.—Notwithstanding any provision of

law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90)
calendar days after filing of the complaint, the claims arising out
of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment
including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this
section shall be joint and several. This provisions [sic] shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be
a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be
filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law,
shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be
awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a
juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners
as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily
liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims
and damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration
of the employment contract and shall not be affected by any
substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a
foreign country of the said contract.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on
money claims inclusive of damages under
50
this section shall be paid within four (4) months from the
approval of the settlement by the appropriate authority.
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid
or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers
shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee
with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 states that

“repatriation of the worker and the transport of his [or her]
personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of
the agency which recruited or deployed the worker
overseas.” The exception is when “termination of
employment is due solely to the fault of the worker,”80
which as we have established, is not the case. It reads:
SEC. 15. REPATRIATION OF WORKERS; EMERGENCY

REPATRIATION FUND.—The repatriation of the worker and the
transport of his personal belongings shall be the primary
responsibility of the agency which recruited or deployed the
worker overseas. All costs attendant to repatriation shall be borne
by or charged to the agency concerned and/or its principal.
Likewise, the repatriation of remains and transport of the
personal belongings of a deceased worker and all costs attendant
thereto shall be borne by the principal and/or local agency.
However, in cases where the termination of employment is due
solely to the fault of the worker, the principal/employer or agency
shall not in any manner be responsible for the repatriation of the
former and/or his belongings.
. . . .
_______________
80 Rep. Act. No. 8042 (1995), Sec. 15.
51
The Labor Code81 also entitles the employee to 10% of

the amount of withheld wages as attorney’s fees when the
withholding is unlawful.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the National Labor
Relations Commission’s decision to award respondent
NT$46,080.00 or the three-month equivalent of her salary,
attorney’s fees of NT$300.00, and the reimbursement of the
withheld NT$3,000.00 salary, which answered for her
repatriation.
We uphold the finding that respondent is entitled to all
of these awards. The award of the three-month
equivalent of respondent’s salary should, however, be
increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired
term of the employment contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc.,82 this court ruled that the
clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less”83 is unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection clause and substantive due

process.84
A statute or provision which was declared
unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.”85
We are aware that the clause “or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” was
rein-
_______________
81 Article 111. Attorney’s Fees.—(a) In cases of unlawful withholding
of wages, the culpable party may be assessed attorney’s fees equivalent to
ten percent of the amount of wages recovered.
82 601 Phil. 245; 582 SCRA 254 (2009) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En
Banc].
83 Rep. Act. No. 8042 (1995), Sec. 10, par. 5.
84 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., supra at pp. 302 and 304;
p. 302.
85 Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management, G.R. No. 179532, May 30,
2011, 649 SCRA 369, 380 [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].
52
stated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of

Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010. Section 7 of Republic Act
No. 10022 provides:
Section 7. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, as amended,

is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 10. Money Claims.—Notwithstanding any provision of
law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90)
calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising
out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law
or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment
including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damage. Consistent with this mandate, the NLRC shall endeavor
to update and keep abreast with the developments in the global
services industry.
The liability of the principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this
section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be
a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to de
[sic] filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by
law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that
may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement

agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors
and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and
solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the
aforesaid claims and damages.
53
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or

duration of the employment contract and shall not be affected by
any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a
foreign country of the said contract.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement
on money claims inclusive of damages under this section shall be
paid within thirty (30) days from approval of the settlement by
the appropriate authority.
In case of termination of overseas employment without just,
valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, or any
unauthorized deductions from the migrant worker’s salary, the
worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement if [sic] his
placement fee and the deductions made with interest at twelve
percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
In case of a final and executory judgment against a foreign
employer/principal, it shall be automatically disqualified, without
further proceedings, from participating in the Philippine Overseas
Employment Program and from recruiting and hiring Filipino
workers until and unless it fully satisfies the judgment award.
Noncompliance with the mandatory periods for resolutions of
case provided under this section shall subject the responsible
officials to any or all of the following penalties:
(a) The salary of any such official who fails to render his
decision or resolution within the prescribed period shall be, or
caused to be,
54
withheld until the said official complies therewith;

(b) Suspension for not more than ninety (90) days; or
(c) Dismissal from the service with disqualification to hold
any appointive public office for five (5) years.
Provided, however, That the penalties herein provided shall be
without prejudice to any liability which any such official may
have incured [sic] under other existing laws or rules and
regulations as a consequence of violating the provisions of this
paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)
Republic Act No. 10022 was promulgated on March 8,

2010. This means that the reinstatement of the clause in
Republic Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the time of
respondent’s termination from work in 1997.86 Republic Act
No. 8042 before it was amended by Republic Act No. 10022
governs this case.
When a law is passed, this court awaits an actual case
that clearly raises adversarial positions in their proper
context before considering a prayer to declare it as
unconstitutional.
However, we are confronted with a unique situation.
The law passed incorporates the exact clause already
declared as unconstitutional, without any perceived
substantial change in the circumstances.
This may cause confusion on the part of the National
Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals. At
minimum, the existence of Republic Act No. 10022 may
delay the execution of the judgment in this case, further
frustrating remedies to assuage the wrong done to
petitioner. Hence, there is a necessity to decide this
constitutional issue.
_______________
86 Supra note 75 at p. 430.
55
Moreover, this court is possessed with the constitutional

duty to “[p]romulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights.”87 When cases become
moot and academic, we do not hesitate to provide for
guidance to bench and bar in situations where the same
violations are capable of repetition but will evade review.
This is analogous to cases where there are millions of
Filipinos working abroad who are bound to suffer from the
lack of protection because of the restoration of an identical
clause in a provision previously declared as
unconstitutional.
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme.
No branch or office of the government may exercise its
powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution,
regardless of the existence of any law that supports such
exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other
law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any
law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it
is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be
cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a
similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was

already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless
circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse
conclusion.
We are not convinced by the pleadings submitted by the
parties that the situation has so changed so as to cause us
to reverse binding precedent.
Likewise, there are special reasons of judicial efficiency
and economy that attend to these cases.
The new law puts our overseas workers in the same
vulnerable position as they were prior to Serrano. Failure
to reiterate the very ratio decidendi of that case will result
in the same untold economic hardships that our reading of
the
_______________
87 Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5).
56
Constitution intended to avoid. Obviously, we cannot

countenance added expenses for further litigation that will
reduce their hard-earned wages as well as add to the
indignity of having been deprived of the protection of our
laws simply because our precedents have not been followed.
There is no constitutional doctrine that causes injustice in
the face of empty procedural niceties. Constitutional
interpretation is complex, but it is never unreasonable.
Thus, in a resolution88 dated October 22, 2013, we
ordered the parties and the Office of the Solicitor General
to comment on the constitutionality of the reinstated clause
in Republic Act No. 10022.
In its comment,89 petitioner argued that the clause was
constitutional.90 The legislators intended a balance
between the employers’ and the employees’ rights by not
unduly burdening the local recruitment agency.91
Petitioner is also of the view that the clause was already
declared as constitutional in Serrano.92
The Office of the Solicitor General also argued that the
clause was valid and constitutional.93 However, since the
parties never raised the issue of the constitutionality of the
clause as reinstated in Republic Act No. 10022, its
contention is that it is beyond judicial review.94
On the other hand, respondent argued that the clause
was unconstitutional because it infringed on workers’ right
to contract.95
_______________
88 Rollo, pp. 266-267.

89 Id., at pp. 309-328.
90 Id., at p. 311.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id., at pp. 364-371.
94 Id., at p. 371.
95 Id., at p. 304.
57
We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as

provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96
Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have failed to
show any compelling change in the circumstances that
would warrant us to revisit the precedent.
We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant
Maritime that limiting wages that should be
recovered by an illegally dismissed overseas worker to
three months is both a violation of due process and
the equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons
under like circumstances and falling within the same class
are treated alike, in terms of “privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.”97 It is a guarantee against “undue
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality.”98
In creating laws, the legislature has the power “to make
distinctions and classifications.”99 In exercising such power,
it has a wide discretion.100
The equal protection clause does not infringe on this
legislative power.101 A law is void on this basis, only if
classifications are made arbitrarily.102 There is no violation
of the equal protection clause if the law applies equally to
persons within the same class and if there are reasonable
grounds for distin-
_______________
96 Const., Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
97 Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1164 (1957) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc].
98 Id., at p. 1164.
99 Id., at p. 1177.
100 Id.
101 Id., at pp. 1164 and 1177.
102 Id., at pp. 1165 and 1177.
guishing between those falling within the class and those

who do not fall within the class.103 A law that does not
violate the equal protection clause prescribes a reasonable
classification.104
A reasonable classification “(1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the
law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.”105
The reinstated clause does not satisfy the requirement of
reasonable classification.
In Serrano, we identified the classifications made by the
reinstated clause. It distinguished between fixed-period
overseas workers and fixed-period local workers.106 It also
distinguished between overseas workers with employment
contracts of less than one year and overseas workers with
employment contracts of at least one year.107 Within the
class of overseas workers with at least one-year
employment contracts, there was a distinction between
those with at least a year left in their contracts and those
with less than a year left in their contracts when they were
illegally dismissed.108
The Congress’ classification may be subjected to judicial
review. In Serrano, there is a “legislative classification
which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage
of a suspect class.”109
_______________
103 Id., at p. 1164.
104 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 18 (1939) [Per J. Moran, En Banc].
105 Id., at p. 18.
106 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., supra note 82 at pp.
294-298; p. 302.
107 Id., at pp. 287-292; p. 283.
108 Id., at pp. 292-294; p. 290.
109 Id., at p. 282; p. 278.
59
Under the Constitution, labor is afforded special

protection.110 Thus, this court in Serrano, “[i]mbued with
the same sense of ‘obligation to afford protection to labor,’
. . . . employ[ed] the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for
it perceive[d] in the subject clause a suspect classification
prejudicial to OFWs.”111
We also noted in Serrano that before the passage of
Republic Act No. 8042, the money claims of illegally
terminated overseas and local workers with fixed-term
employment were computed in the same manner.112 Their

money claims were computed based on the “unexpired
portions of their contracts.”113 The adoption of the
reinstated clause in Republic Act No. 8042 subjected the
money claims of illegally dismissed overseas workers with
an unexpired term of at least a year to a cap of three
months worth of their salary.114 There was no such
limitation on the money claims of illegally terminated local
workers with fixed-term employment.115
We observed that illegally dismissed overseas workers
whose employment contracts had a term of less than one
year were granted the amount equivalent to the unexpired
portion of their employment contracts.116 Meanwhile,
illegally dismissed overseas workers with employment
terms of at least a year were granted a cap equivalent to
three months of their salary for the unexpired portions of
their contracts.117
Observing the terminologies used in the clause, we also
found that “the subject clause creates a sub-layer of
discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods are for
more than
_______________
110 Const., Art. XIII, Sec. 3.
111 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., supra note 82 at p. 286;
p. 302.
112 Id., at pp. 297-298; p. 294.
113 Id., at p. 298; p. 295.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id., at pp. 287-292; p. 292.
117 Id.
60
one year: those who are illegally dismissed with less than
one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to their
salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while
those who are illegally dismissed with one year or more
remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the
reinstated clause, and their monetary benefits limited to
their salaries for three months only.”118
We do not need strict scrutiny to conclude that these
classifications do not rest on any real or substantial
distinctions that would justify different treatments in
terms of the computation of money claims resulting from
illegal termination.
Overseas workers regardless of their classifications are

entitled to security of tenure, at least for the period agreed
upon in their contracts. This means that they cannot be
dismissed before the end of their contract terms without
due process. If they were illegally dismissed, the workers’
right to security of tenure is violated.
The rights violated when, say, a fixed-period local
worker is illegally terminated are neither greater than nor
less than the rights violated when a fixed-period overseas
worker is illegally terminated. It is state policy to protect
the rights of workers without qualification as to the place
of employment.119 In both cases, the workers are deprived
of their expected salary, which they could have earned had
they not been illegally dismissed. For both workers, this
deprivation translates to economic insecurity and
disparity.120 The same is true for the distinctions between
overseas workers with an employment contract of less than
one year and overseas workers with at least one year of
employment contract, and between overseas workers with
at least a year left in their contracts and overseas workers
with less than a year left in their contracts when they were
illegally dismissed.
_______________
118 Id., at p. 293; p. 290.
119 Id., at p. 281; p. 308.
120 Id.
61
For this reason, we cannot subscribe to the argument

that “[overseas workers] are contractual employees who
can never acquire regular employment status, unlike local
workers”121 because it already justifies differentiated
treatment in terms of the computation of money claims.122
Likewise, the jurisdictional and enforcement issues on
overseas workers’ money claims do not justify a
differentiated treatment in the computation of their money
claims.123 If anything, these issues justify an equal, if not
greater protection and assistance to overseas workers who
generally are more prone to exploitation given their
physical distance from our government.
We also find that the classifications are not relevant to
the purpose of the law, which is to “establish a higher
standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of
migrant workers, their families and overseas Filipinos in
distress, and for other purposes.”124 Further, we find
specious the argument that reducing the liability of
placement agencies “redounds to the benefit of the

[overseas] workers.”125
Putting a cap on the money claims of certain overseas
workers does not increase the standard of protection
afforded to them. On the other hand, foreign employers are
more incentivized by the reinstated clause to enter into
contracts of at least a year because it gives them more
flexibility to violate our overseas workers’ rights. Their
liability for arbitrarily terminating overseas workers is
decreased at the expense of the workers whose rights they
violated. Meanwhile, these overseas workers who are
impressed with an expectation of a stable job overseas for
the longer contract period disregard
_______________
121 Id., at p. 277; p. 272.
122 Id.
123 Id., at pp. 276-277; p. 295.
124 Rep. Act. No. 8042 (1995); See also Rep. Act No. 10022 (2010).
125 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., supra note 82 at p. 277;
p. 316.
62
other opportunities only to be terminated earlier. They are

left with claims that are less than what others in the same
situation would receive. The reinstated clause, therefore,
creates a situation where the law meant to protect them
makes violation of rights easier and simply benign to the
violator.
As Justice Brion said in his concurring opinion in
Serrano:
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 affects these well-laid rules and

measures, and in fact provides a hidden twist affecting the
principal/employer’s liability. While intended as an incentive
accruing to recruitment/manning agencies, the law, as worded,
simply limits the OFWs’ recovery in wrongful dismissal situations.
Thus, it redounds to the benefit of whoever may be liable,
including the principal/employer — the direct employer primarily
liable for the wrongful dismissal. In this sense, Section 10 — read
as a grant of incentives to recruitment/manning agencies —
oversteps what it aims to do by effectively limiting what is
otherwise the full liability of the foreign principals/employers.
Section 10, in short, really operates to benefit the wrong party and
allows that party, without justifiable reason, to mitigate its
liability for wrongful dismissals. Because of this hidden twist, the
limitation of liability under Section 10 cannot be an “appropriate”
incentive, to borrow the term that R.A. No. 8042 itself uses to
describe the incentive it envisions under its purpose clause.
What worsens the situation is the chosen mode of granting the
incentive: instead of a grant that, to encourage greater efforts at
recruitment, is directly related to extra efforts undertaken, the
law simply limits their liability for the wrongful dismissals of
already deployed OFWs. This is effectively a legally-imposed
partial condonation of their liability to OFWs, justified solely by
the law’s intent to encourage greater deployment efforts. Thus,
the incentive, from a more practical and realistic view, is really
part of a scheme to sell Filipino overseas labor at a bargain for
purposes solely of attracting the market. . . .
63
The so-called incentive is rendered particularly odious by its

effect on the OFWs — the benefits accruing to the
recruitment/manning agencies and their principals are taken
from the pockets of the OFWs to whom the full salaries for the
unexpired portion of the contract rightfully belong. Thus, the
principals/employers and the recruitment/manning agencies even
profit from their violation of the security of tenure that an
employment contract embodies. Conversely, lesser protection is
afforded the OFW, not only because of the lessened recovery
afforded him or her by operation of law, but also because this
same lessened recovery renders a wrongful dismissal easier and
less onerous to undertake; the lesser cost of dismissing a Filipino
will always be a consideration a foreign employer will take into
account in termination of employment decisions. . . .126
Further, “[t]here can never be a justification for any

form of government action that alleviates the burden of one
sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector,
especially when the favored sector is composed of private
businesses such as placement agencies, while the
disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose
protection no less than the Constitution commands. The
idea that private business interest can be elevated to the
level of a compelling state interest is odious.”127
Along the same line, we held that the reinstated clause
violates due process rights. It is arbitrary as it deprives
overseas workers of their monetary claims without any
discernable valid purpose.128
Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the
unexpired portion of her contract, in accordance with
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the
three-month
_______________
126 See Concurring Opinion of J. Brion in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime

Services, Inc., supra note 82 at pp. 319-321; pp. 319-320.
127 Id., at p. 301; p. 299.
128 Id., at p. 304; p. 302.
64
equivalence of respondent’s salary must be modified

accordingly. Since she started working on June 26, 1997
and was terminated on July 14, 1997, respondent is
entitled to her salary from July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998.
“To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and
other OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal that
principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies
may violate an OFW’s security of tenure which an
employment contract embodies and actually profit from
such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of
law.”129
III
On the interest rate, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
Circular No. 799 of June 21, 2013, which revised the
interest rate for loan or forbearance from 12% to 6% in the
absence of stipulation, applies in this case. The pertinent
portions of Circular No. 799, Series of 2013, read:
The Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 796 dated 16 May

2013, approved the following revisions governing the rate of
interest in the absence of stipulation in loan contracts, thereby
amending Section 2 of Circular No. 905, Series of 1982:
Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of
any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in
the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest, shall
be six percent (6%) per annum.
Section 2. In view of the above, Subsection X305.1 of the
Manual of Regulations for Banks and Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3
and 4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial
Institutions are hereby amended accordingly.
This Circular shall take effect on 1 July 2013.
_______________
129 Supra note 85 at p. 381.
65
Through the able ponencia of Justice Diosdado Peralta,

we laid down the guidelines in computing legal interest in
Nacar v. Gallery Frames:130
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the

concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest,
as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment
of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the
interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in
writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal
interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence
of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial
demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of
the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of
money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages
awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the
rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged
on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the
demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable
certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the
claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil
Code), but when such cer-
_______________
130 G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
66
tainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the

demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the
date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been
reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of
legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally
adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money
becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether
the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall
be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this
interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
forbearance of credit.
And, in addition to the above, judgments that have become final
and executory prior to July 1, 2013, shall not be disturbed and
shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest
fixed therein.131
Circular No. 799 is applicable only in loans and

forbearance of money, goods, or credits, and in judgments
when there is no stipulation on the applicable interest rate.
Further, it is only applicable if the judgment did not

become final and executory before July 1, 2013.132
We add that Circular No. 799 is not applicable when
there is a law that states otherwise. While the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas has the power to set or limit interest
rates,133 these
_______________
131 Id., at pp. 457-458. This court modified the guidelines laid down in
Eastern Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994,
234 SCRA 78, 97 [Per J. Vitug, En Banc] to embody Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas Circular No. 799.
132 Nacar v. Gallery Frames, supra note 130 at p. 457.
133 Id.
67
interest rates do not apply when the law provides that a

different interest rate shall be applied. “[A] Central Bank
Circular cannot repeal a law. Only a law can repeal
another law.”134
For example, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042
provides that unlawfully terminated overseas workers are
entitled to the reimbursement of his or her placement fee
with an interest of 12% per annum. Since Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas circulars cannot repeal Republic Act No. 8042,
the issuance of Circular No. 799 does not have the effect of
changing the interest on awards for reimbursement of
placement fees from 12% to 6%. This is despite Section 1 of
Circular No. 799, which provides that the 6% interest rate
applies even to judgments.
Moreover, laws are deemed incorporated in contracts.
“The contracting parties need not repeat them. They do not
even have to be referred to. Every contract, thus, contains
not only what has been explicitly stipulated, but the
statutory provisions that have any bearing on the
matter.”135 There is, therefore, an implied stipulation in
contracts between the placement agency and the overseas
worker that in case the overseas worker is adjudged as
entitled to reimbursement of his or her placement fees, the
amount shall be subject to a 12% interest per annum. This
implied stipulation has the effect of removing awards for
reimbursement of placement fees from Circular No. 799’s
coverage.
The same cannot be said for awards of salary for the
unexpired portion of the employment contract under
Republic Act No. 8042. These awards are covered by
Circular No. 799 because the law does not provide for a
specific interest rate that should apply.
_______________
134 Palanca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106685, December 2, 1994,
238 SCRA 593, 601 [Per J. Quiason, En Banc].
135 Maritime Company of the Philippines v. Reparations Commission,
148-B Phil. 65, 70; 40 SCRA 70, 74 (1971) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
68
In sum, if judgment did not become final and executory

before July 1, 2013 and there was no stipulation in the
contract providing for a different interest rate, other money
claims under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 shall be
subject to the 6% interest per annum in accordance with
Circular No. 799.
This means that respondent is also entitled to an
interest of 6% per annum on her money claims from the
finality of this judgment.
IV
Finally, we clarify the liabilities of Wacoal as principal

and petitioner as the employment agency that facilitated
respondent’s overseas employment.
Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995 provides that the foreign employer
and the local employment agency are jointly and severally
liable for money claims including claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship and/or damages. This
section also provides that the performance bond filed by the
local agency shall be answerable for such money claims or
damages if they were awarded to the employee.
This provision is in line with the state’s policy of
affording protection to labor and alleviating workers’
plight.136
In overseas employment, the filing of money claims
against the foreign employer is attended by practical and
legal complications. The distance of the foreign employer
alone makes it difficult for an overseas worker to reach it
and make it
_______________
136 ATCI Overseas Corporation v. Echin, G.R. No. 178551, October 11,
2010, 632 SCRA 528, 533 [Per J. Carpio-Morales, Third Division], citing
Datuman v. First Cosmopolitan Manpower and Promotion Services, Inc.,
591 Phil. 662, 673; 571 SCRA 41, 52-53 (2008) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro,
First Division]; Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, Sec.
2(b).
69
liable for violations of the Labor Code. There are also

possible conflict of laws, jurisdictional issues, and
procedural rules that may be raised to frustrate an
overseas worker’s attempt to advance his or her claims.
It may be argued, for instance, that the foreign employer
must be impleaded in the complaint as an indispensable
party without which no final determination can be had of
an action.137
The provision on joint and several liability in the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995
assures overseas workers that their rights will not be
frustrated with these complications.
The fundamental effect of joint and several liability is
that “each of the debtors is liable for the entire
obligation.”138 A final determination may, therefore, be
achieved even if only one of the joint and several debtors
are impleaded in an action. Hence, in the case of overseas
employment, either the local agency or the foreign
employer may be sued for all claims arising from the
foreign employer’s labor law violations. This way, the
overseas workers are assured that someone — the foreign
employer’s local agent — may be made to answer for
violations that the foreign employer may have committed.
The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995 ensures that overseas workers have recourse in law
despite the circumstances of their employment. By
providing that the liability of the foreign employer may be
“enforced to the full extent”139 against the local agent, the
overseas worker is as-
_______________
137 Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 7.
138 PH Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 821, 832; 370
SCRA 155, 165 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
139 See also Azucena, Jr., C.A., Everyone’s Labor Code, p. 29. (5th ed.,
2007).
70
sured of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due

them.140
Corollary to the assurance of immediate recourse in law,
the provision on joint and several liability in the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 shifts the

burden of going after the foreign employer from the
overseas worker to the local employment agency. However,
it must be emphasized that the local agency that is held to
answer for the overseas worker’s money claims is not left
without remedy. The law does not preclude it from going
after the foreign employer for reimbursement of whatever
payment it has made to the employee to answer for the
money claims against the foreign employer.
A further implication of making local agencies jointly
and severally liable with the foreign employer is that an
additional layer of protection is afforded to overseas
workers. Local agencies, which are businesses by nature,
are inoculated with interest in being always on the lookout
against foreign employers that tend to violate labor law.
Lest they risk their reputation or finances, local agencies
must already have mechanisms for guarding against
unscrupulous foreign employers even at the level prior to
overseas employment applications.
With the present state of the pleadings, it is not possible
to determine whether there was indeed a transfer of
obligations from petitioner to Pacific. This should not be an
obstacle for the respondent overseas worker to proceed
with the enforcement of this judgment. Petitioner is
possessed with the resources to determine the proper legal
remedies to enforce its rights against Pacific, if any.
_______________
140 Id.
71
V
Many times, this court has spoken on what Filipinos
may encounter as they travel into the farthest and most
difficult reaches of our planet to provide for their families.
In Prieto v. NLRC:141
The Court is not unaware of the many abuses suffered by our

overseas workers in the foreign land where they have ventured,
usually with heavy hearts, in pursuit of a more fulfilling future.
Breach of contract, maltreatment, rape, insufficient nourishment,
sub-human lodgings, insults and other forms of debasement, are
only a few of the inhumane acts to which they are subjected by
their foreign employers, who probably feel they can do as they
please in their own country. While these workers may indeed
have relatively little defense against exploitation while they are
abroad, that disadvantage must not continue to burden them
when they return to their own territory to voice their muted

complaint. There is no reason why, in their very own land, the
protection of our own laws cannot be extended to them in full
measure for the redress of their grievances.142
But it seems that we have not said enough.

We face a diaspora of Filipinos. Their travails and their
heroism can be told a million times over; each of their
stories as real as any other. Overseas Filipino workers
brave alien cultures and the heartbreak of families left
behind daily. They would count the minutes, hours, days,
months, and years yearning to see their sons and
daughters. We all know of the joy and sadness when they
come home to see them all grown
_______________
141 G.R. No. 93699, September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA 232 [Per J. Cruz,
First Division].
142 Id., at pp. 239-240, also cited in Triple Eight Integrated Services v.
NLRC, 359 Phil. 955, 968; 299 SCRA 608, 618 (1998) [Per J. Romero,
Third Division].
72
up and, being so, they remember what their work has cost
them. Twitter accounts, Facetime, and many other gadgets
and online applications will never substitute for their lost
physical presence.
Unknown to them, they keep our economy afloat
through the ebb and flow of political and economic crises.
They are our true diplomats, they who show the world the
resilience, patience, and creativity of our people. Indeed, we
are a people who contribute much to the provision of
material creations of this world.
This government loses its soul if we fail to ensure decent
treatment for all Filipinos. We default by limiting the
contractual wages that should be paid to our workers when
their contracts are breached by the foreign employers.
While we sit, this court will ensure that our laws will
reward our overseas workers with what they deserve: their
dignity.
Inevitably, their dignity is ours as well.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification.
Petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency is
ORDERED to pay respondent Joy C. Cabiles the amount
equivalent to her salary for the unexpired portion of her
employment contract at an interest of 6% per annum from
the finality of this judgment. Petitioner is also ORDERED

to reimburse respondent the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary
and pay respondent attorney’s fees of NT$300.00 at an
interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this
judgment.
The clause, “or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No.
8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and
void.
SO ORDERED.
73
Carpio (Acting CJ.), Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro,

Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
Mendoza, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Sereno, CJ., On Leave.
Brion, J., See: Concur/Dissenting Opinion.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

BRION, J.:
I concur with the ponencia’s conclusion that respondent
Joy C. Cabiles was illegally dismissed for lack of valid
cause and due process.
I likewise concur with the conclusion that Section 10
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipino Act of 1995),1 as reinstated by R.A. No.
10022,2 is unconstitutional insofar as it provides that:
In case of termination of overseas employment without just,

valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the
workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less. [Emphasis and italics ours]
My conclusion on the constitutionality of the above

quoted clause (subject clause) of Section 10, R.A. No. 8042,
however, proceeds from a different reason and
constitutional basis. I maintain the view that the subject
clause should be struck down for violation of the
constitutional provi-
_______________
1 Enacted on June 7, 1995.
2 Enacted on July 8, 2010.
74
sions in favor of labor, under Section 3, Article XIII,

and of the substantive aspect of the due process
clause, under Section 1, Article III.
Thus, I take exception to the ponencia’s full adoption of
the ruling in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et
al.3 to the extent that it applies the strict scrutiny standard
in invoking the equal protection guarantee. To my mind,
the circumstances of this case do not justify the ponencia’s
approach of extending and expanding the use of the strict
scrutiny standard in invalidating the subject clause (as
reinstated in R.A. No. 8042 by R.A. No. 10022). The
conclusion that the subject clause created a “suspect”
classification is simply misplaced.
The approach, sadly, only unnecessarily shifted the
burden to the government, to prove: (1) a compelling state
interest; and (2) that the legislation is narrowly tailored to
achieve the intended result. It also unnecessarily
undermines the presumed constitutionality of
statutes and of the respect that the Court accords to
the acts of a co-equal branch. The differential or
rational basis scrutiny, i.e., where the challenged
classification needs only be shown to be rationally related
to serving a legitimate state interest, would have
undoubtedly served the purpose without bringing these
unnecessary implications.
As I maintain the same view and legal reasoning, and if
only to emphasize my position in the present case, I quote
below portions of my Concurring Opinion in Serrano v.
Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et al. (Serrano Opinion)4
rejecting the validity of using the strict scrutiny standard
to test the validity of the subject clause under the equal
protection guarantee. I invoke the same legal reasoning as
basis, mutatis mutandis, of my stance in the present case.
_______________
3 G.R. No. 167614, 601 Phil. 245; 582 SCRA 254 (2009).
4 Id., at pp. 312-324; pp. 321-324.
75
A suspect classification is one where distinctions are made

based on the most invidious bases for classification that violate
the most basic human rights, i.e., on the basis of race, national
origin, alien status, religious affiliation, and to a certain extent,
sex and sexual orientation. With a suspect classification, the
scrutiny of the classification is raised to its highest level: the
ordinary presumption of constitutionality is reversed and

government carries the burden of proving that its challenged
policy is constitutional. To withstand strict scrutiny, the
government must show that its policy is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest; if this is proven, the state must then
demonstrate that the legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve
the intended result.
In the present case, I do not see the slightest indication that
Congress actually intended to classify OFWs — between and
among themselves, and in relation with local workers — when it
adopted the disputed portion of Section 10. The congressional
intent was to merely grant recruitment and manning agencies an
incentive and thereby encourage them into greater deployment
efforts, although, as discussed above, the incentive really works
for the foreign principals’ benefit at the expense of the OFWs.
Even assuming that a classification resulted from the law, the
classification should not immediately be characterized as a
suspect classification that would invite the application of the
strict scrutiny standard. The disputed portion of Section 10
does not, on its face, restrict or curtail the civil and human
rights of any single group of OFWs. At best, the disputed
portion limits the monetary award for wrongful
termination of employment — a tort situation affecting an
OFW’s economic interest. This characterization and the
unintended classification that unwittingly results from the
incentive scheme under Section 10, to my mind, render a strict
scrutiny disproportionate to the circumstances to which it is
applied.
I believe, too, that we should tread lightly in further
expanding the concept of suspect classifica-

76
tion after we have done so in Central Bank, where we held

that classifications that result in prejudice to persons
accorded special protection by the Constitution requires a
stricter judicial scrutiny. The use of a suspect classification label
cannot depend solely on whether the Constitution has accorded
special protection to a specified sector. While the Constitution
specially mentions labor as a sector that needs special protection,
the involvement of or relationship to labor, by itself, cannot
automatically trigger a suspect classification and the
accompanying strict scrutiny; much should depend on the
circumstances of the case, on the impact of the illegal differential
treatment on the sector involved, on the needed protection, and on
the impact of recognizing a suspect classification on future
situations. In other words, we should carefully calibrate our
moves when faced with an equal protection situation so that we
do not misappreciate the essence of what a suspect classification

is, and thereby lessen its jurisprudential impact and value.
Reserving this approach to the worst cases of unacceptable
classification and discrimination highlights the importance of
striking at these types of unequal treatment and is a lesson that
will not be lost on all concerned, particularly the larger public.
There is the added reason, too, that the reverse onus that a strict
scrutiny brings directly strikes, in the most glaring manner, at
the regularity of the performance of functions of a co-equal branch
of government; inter-government harmony and courtesy demand
that we reserve this type of treatment to the worst violations of
the Constitution.
Incidentally, I believe that we can arrive at the same
conclusion and similarly strike down the disputed Section
10 by using the lowest level of scrutiny, thereby rendering the
use of the strict scrutiny unnecessary. Given the OSG’s positions,
the resulting differential treatment the law fosters between
Philippine-based workers and OFWs in illegal dismissal
situations does not rest on substantial distinctions that are
germane to the purpose of the law. No reasonable basis for
classification exists since the distinctions the OSG pointed out do
not justify the different treatment of
77
OFWs and Philippine-based workers, specifically, why one class

should be excepted from the consequences of illegal termination
under the Labor Code, while the other is not.
To be sure, the difference in work locations and working
conditions that the OSG pointed out are not valid grounds for
distinctions that should matter in the enforcement of employment
contracts. Whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, the integrity
of contracts — be they labor, commercial or political — is a
zealously guarded value that we in the Philippines should not
demean by allowing a breach of OFW contracts easy to undertake.
This is true whatever may be the duration or character of
employment; employment contracts, whatever their term and
conditions may be subject only to their consistency with the law,
must be respected during the whole contracted term and under
the conditions agreed upon.
Significantly, the OSG could not even point to any reason other
than the protection of recruitment agencies and the expansion of
the Philippine overseas program as justification for the limitation
of liability that has effectively distinguished OFWs from locally-
based workers. These reasons, unfortunately, are not on the same
plane as protection to labor in our constitutional hierarchy of
values. Even RA 8042 repeats that “the State does not promote
overseas employment as a means to sustain economic growth and
national development.” Under RA 8042’s own terms, the overseas
employment program exists only for OFW protection. Thus viewed,

the expansion of the Philippine overseas deployment program and
the need for incentives to achieve results are simply not valid
reasons to justify a classification, particularly when the incentive
is in the form of oppressive and confiscatory limitation of liability
detrimental to labor. No valid basis for classification thus exists
to justify the differential treatment that resulted from the
disputed Section 10.5
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 322-324; pp. 321-324; italics and emphasis supplied, citations
omitted.
78
In this regard, I likewise reiterate my reasons and

explanation for striking down the subject clause on the
ground that it violates the constitutional provisions in
favor of labor and the substantive aspect of the due
process clause.
For proper perspective, I quote below the pertinent
constitutional provision that secures a special status and
treatment in favor of labor.
Article XIII
x x x x
Section 18. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local
and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.
They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of
work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as
may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility
between workers and employers and the preferential use of
voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and
shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster
industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and
employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the
fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable
returns to investments, and to expansion and growth.
This constitutional protection afforded to labor

articulates in clearer and more concrete terms the
constitutional policy under Section 18, Article II that

declares and affirms labor as
79
a primary social economic force aimed at protecting the

rights of workers and promoting their welfare.
On the other hand, R.A. No. 8042 provides, among
others:
(b) The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
Towards this end, the State shall provide adequate and timely
social, economic and legal services to Filipino migrant workers.
x x x x
(e) Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by
reason of poverty. In this regard, it is imperative that an effective
mechanism be instituted to ensure that the rights and interests of
distressed overseas Filipinos, in general, and Filipino migrant
workers, in particular, documented or undocumented, are
adequately protected and safeguarded.

Under these terms, R.A. No. 8042 is discernibly a piece
of social legislation that the State enacted in the exercise of
its police power, precisely to give teeth and arms to the
constitutional provisions on labor under its aim to
“establish a higher standard of protection and
promotion of the welfare of migrant worker, their
families and of overseas Filipinos in distress.”6
Otherwise stated, it draws power and life from the
constitutional provisions that it seeks to concretize and
implement.
As I pointed out in my Serrano Opinion, “the express
policy declarations of R.A. No. 8042 show that its purposes
are reiterations of the very same policies enshrined in the
Constitution x x x [They] patently characterize R.A. No.
8042 as a direct implementation of the constitutional
objectives on Filipino overseas work so that it must be read
and understood in terms
_______________
6 The long title of R.A. No. 8042.
80
of these policy objectives. Under this interpretative guide,

any provision in R.A. No. 8042 inimical to the interest of an
overseas Filipino worker (OFW) cannot have any place in
the law.”7 [Underscoring supplied]
Note also (again, as I reflected in my Serrano Opinion)
that while R.A. No. 8042 acknowledges that the State shall
“promote full employment,” it likewise provides that “the
State does not promote overseas employment as a means to
sustain economic growth and national development. The
existence of overseas employment program rests solely on the
assurance that the dignity and fundamental human rights
and freedom of Filipino citizens shall not, at any time, be
compromised and violated.”8 The Act, however, concludes
its Declaration of Policies by stating that “[n]onetheless,
the deployment of Filipino overseas workers, whether land-
based or sea-based, by local service contractors and
manning agencies employing them shall be encouraged.
Appropriate incentives may be extended to them.”9
[Underscoring supplied]
Thus, the Act recognizes that to encourage greater
deployment efforts, “incentives” can be given, BUT, to
service contractors and manning agencies ONLY.10
Contractors’ and agencies’ principals, i.e., the foreign
employers in whose behalf the contractors and agencies
recruit OFWs are not among those to whom incentives can
be given as they are not mentioned at all in the Act.11
Of particular importance to the present case is Section
10 of R.A. No. 8042 which governs the OFWs’ money
claims.12
_______________
7 Supra note 3 at pp. 313-314; pp. 312-313.
8 Id., at p. 314; p. 313.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 pertinently reads:
SECTION 10. Money Claims.—Notwithstanding any provision of law to
the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) shall have the
Pursuant to its terms, the Act obviously protects the

OFW as against the employer and the recruitment agency
in cases of unlawful termination of service. Unfortunately,
it limits the liability to the “reimbursement of the placement
fee and interest, and the payment of his salaries for the
unexpired portion
_______________
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety
(90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out
of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for
actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement
agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several.
This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas
employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The
performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as
provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that
may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a
juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the
case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the
corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of
the employment contract and shall not be affected by any substitution,
amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said
contract.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money
claims inclusive of damages under this section shall be paid within four
(4) months from the approval of the settlement by the appropriate
authority.
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
82
of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every

year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.”13
This limitation is a step backward as it imposes a cap on
the liability of the foreign principal/employer and the
contractor/recruitment agency even as it earlier declared
their liability joint and solidary.14 To be an “appropriate
incentive,” this limitation of liability can only be justified
under the terms of the law, i.e., “the incentive must
necessarily relate to the law’s purpose with
reasonable expectation that it would serve this
purpose; it must also accrue to its intended
beneficiaries (the recruitment/placement agencies),
and not to parties to whom the reason for the grant
does not apply.”15
Viewed in this light, the subject clause can only pass

constitutional muster if it shows: (1) a lawful purpose; and
(2) lawful means to achieve the lawful purpose.
On the lawful purpose requirement, the policy of
extending incentives to local service contractors and
manning agencies to encourage greater efforts at securing
work for OFWs is, undeniably, constitutionally valid.
There is nothing inherently unconstitutional in
providing such incentives for not only are local
service contractors and manning agencies
significant stakeholders in the government’s
overseas employment program;16 the Constitution
itself also expressly recognizes “the right of labor to
its just share in the fruits of production and the right
to reasonable returns on investments, and expansion
and growth.”17 [Underscoring supplied]
On the lawful means requirement, i.e., whether the
means employed to achieve the purpose of encouraging
recruitment
_______________
13 Supra note 3 at p. 316; p. 315.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at p. 317; p. 317.
17 Id.
83
efforts (through the incentive granted of limiting the

liability of recruitment/manning agencies for illegal
dismissals) is reasonable, the subject clause obviously fails.
First, as I pointed out in my Serrano Opinion, Section 10
of R.A. No. 8042 provides measures that collectively protect
OFWs, i.e., by ensuring the integrity of their contracts; by
establishing the responsible parties; and by providing the
mechanisms for their enforcement that imposes direct and
primary liability to the foreign principal employer.18 Yet,
Section 10 presents a hidden twist affecting the
principal/employer’s liability. As worded, the Act “simply
limits the OFWs’ recovery in wrongful dismissal situations.
Thus, it redounds to the benefit of whoever may be liable,
including the principal/employer — the direct employer
primarily liable for the wrongful dismissal.”19
From this perspective, Section 10 actually limits what is
otherwise the foreign principal/employer’s full liability
under the Act and exceeds what the Act intended — to
grant incentives to recruitment/manning agencies.20
“Section 10, in short, really operates to benefit the

wrong party and allows that party, without
justifiable reason, to mitigate its liability for
wrongful dismissals.”21 [Emphasis supplied] “Because of
this hidden twist, the limitation of liability under Section
10 cannot be an “appropriate” incentive.”22
[Underscoring supplied]
Second, the chosen mode of granting the incentive, i.e.,
the liability limitation for wrongful dismissals of
already deployed OFWs, effectively imposed, with
legal sanction, a partial condonation of the foreign
principal/
_______________
18 Id., at p. 319; p. 319.
19 Id., at p. 320; id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
84
employer’s liability to OFWs.23 The incentive, therefore,

“from a more practical and realistic view, is really part of a
scheme to sell Filipino overseas labor at a bargain for
purposes solely of attracting the market,”24 a scheme that
sadly reduces our OFWs to mere cash cows.
And third, the “incentive scheme” effectively
benefits the recruitment/manning agencies and
foreign principal/employer at the expense of the
OFWs from whom the salaries for the unexpired
portion of the contract are taken and to whom these
salaries rightfully belong.25 In effect, “the
principals/employers and the recruitment/manning
agencies profit from their violation of the security of tenure
that an employment contract embodies.”26 The OFWs, on
the other hand, are afforded lesser protection because: (1)
they are afforded reduced recovery by operation of law; (2)
the reduced recovery renders wrongful dismissal situations
more alluring, easier to facilitate and less onerous to
undertake which foreign employers will most certainly
consider in termination of employment decisions.27
These inimical effects obviously will remain as long as
the subject clause remains in Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042,
this time as reinstated by R.A. No. 10022. The “inherently
oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory and inimical provision
[under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 should, therefore,] be
struck down for its conflict with the substantive aspect of
the constitutional due process guarantee.28 Thus, I vote to

declare as unconstitutional the phrase “for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired terms,
whichever is less” in the fifth and final paragraph of
Section 10 of R.A. 8042.”
_______________
23 Id., at p. 320; pp. 319-320.
24 Id.
25 Id., at p. 320; p. 320.
26 Id., at pp. 320-321; p. 320.
27 Id., at p. 321; p. 320.
28 Id.
85
In sum, given these considerations and conclusions,

further testing the validity of the assailed clause under the
equal protection guarantee, particularly under the strict
scrutiny standard that the ponencia in the present case
deemed appropriate to employ, is clearly unnecessary.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed with modification.

The clause, “or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of R.A. No.
10022 amending Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
Notes.—As a just cause for an employee’s dismissal,

inefficiency or neglect of duty must not only be gross but
also habitual; A single or isolated act of negligence does not
constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the employee.
(St. Luke’s Medical Center, Incorporated vs. Fadrigo, 605
SCRA 728 [2009])
We have already declared in Serrano that the clause “or
for three months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” provided in the 5th paragraph of Section
10 of R.A. No. 8042 is unconstitutional for being violative of
the rights of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) to equal
protection of the laws. (Yap vs. Thenamaris Ship’s
Management, 649 SCRA 369 [2011])
——o0o——
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8/23/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 732

G.R. No. 170139. August 5, 2014.*

Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Employers cannot be

be judged; 2) the standards of conduct and workmanship must

Same; Same; Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of

Act of 1995, states that overseas workers who were terminated

manner be responsible for the repatriation of the former and/or

attorney’s fees when the withholding is unlawful. The Court of

of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The

Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; Due

not violate the equal protection clause prescribes a reasonable

Constitution commands.—[T]here can never be a justification for

Same; Same; Loans; Circular No. 799 is applicable only in

that have any bearing on the matter.” There is, therefore, an

Republic Act No. 8042 shall be subject to the 6% interest per

flict of laws, jurisdictional issues, and procedural rules that may

worker is assured of immediate and sufficient payment of what is

Brion, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; View that

a compelling state interest; and (2) that the legislation is

its aim to “establish a higher standard of protection and

employing them shall be encouraged. Appropriate incentives may

This limitation is a step backward as it imposes a cap on the

foreign principal/employer’s full liability under the Act and

with legal sanction, a partial condonation of the foreign

with the substantive aspect of the constitutional due process

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

ment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one

that it did not ask for a placement fee of P70,000.00.22 As

the matter immaterial in view of the dismissal of

In a resolution37 dated March 31, 2004, the National

of NT$46,080, the reimbursement of the NT$3,000

The Court of Appeals50 affirmed the decision of the

Although the public respondent found the dismissal of the

is squarely based on the law; as well as the award of attorney’s

Dissatisfied, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency filed

Petitioner also reiterates that since Wacoal’s

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that

Management prerogative is recognized in law and in our

This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is

Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the medical certificate

Even with respect to fundamental procedural rights,

Petitioners admit that they did not inform private respondent

him opportunity to air his side. However, petitioners contend that

The Court does not agree. The provisions of the

By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may

Art. 282. Termination by employer.—An employer may

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed

Petitioner’s allegation that respondent was inefficient

To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in

This is similar to the law and jurisprudence on

and after complying with the due process requirements of

The employee cannot be expected to meet any standard of

the employers did not comply with the due process

Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed,

Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as

Sec. 10. MONEY CLAIMS.—Notwithstanding any provision of

Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 states that

SEC. 15. REPATRIATION OF WORKERS; EMERGENCY