572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Villalon vs. Villalon

*
G.R. No. 167206. November 18, 2005.

JAIME F. VILLALON, petitioner, vs. MA. CORAZON N.

VILLALON, respondent.

Civil Law; Family Code; Annulment of Marriage; The totality

of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital
obligations; Although he engaged in marital infidelity in at least
two occasions, the same does not appear to be symptomatic of a
grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of
performing his spousal obligations.—The totality of the evidence
in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On
the contrary, what is evident is the fact that petitioner was a good
husband to respondent for a substantial period of time prior to
their separation, a loving father to their children and a good
provider of the family. Although he engaged in marital infidelity
in at least two occasions, the same does not appear

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

573

VOL. 475, NOVEMBER 18, 2005 573

Villalon vs. Villalon

to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which

rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. The
same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his
marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in
petitioner’s personal history.
 Same; Same; Same; Psychological incapacity, as a ground for
the declaration of nullity of a marriage, must be characterized by
juridical attendance, gravity and incurability.—In Santos v. Court
of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995), the court held that psychological
incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a
marriage, must be characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity
and incurability. It should—... [R]efer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
“psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated....
Same; Same; Same; Court agrees with the Court of Appeals
that petitioner failed to establish the incurability and gravity of
his alleged psychological disorder.—We agree with the Court of
Appeals that petitioner failed to establish the incurability and
gravity of his alleged psychological disorder. While Dr. Dayan
described the symptoms of one afflicted with Narcissistic
Histrionic Personality Disorder as “self-centered,” “characterized
by grandiose ideation” and “lack of empathy in relating to others,”
and one with Casanova Complex as a “serial adulterer,” the
evidence on record betrays the presence of any of these symptoms.
Same; Same; Same; Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not
sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological
incapacity; It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
marriage.—Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that
petitioner is suffering from psycho-

574

574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Villalon vs. Villalon

logical incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of

unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality
which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of marriage. The evidence on record fails to
convince us that petitioner’s marital indiscretions are
symptomatic of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. On the contrary, the evidence reveals that
petitioner was a good husband most of the time when he was
living with respondent, a loving father to his children as well as a
good provider.
Same; Same; Same; The cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court
of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198 (1997).—In Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of
Appeals, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), we held that the cause of the
alleged psychological incapacity must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Further—The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Refusal to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage is not psychological incapacity within the
meaning of the law.—As held in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of
Appeals, refusal to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage is not psychological incapacity within the meaning of
the law. The policy of the State is to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic social institution and marriage is the
foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of validity of the marriage.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Abesamis Law Offices for petitioner.
          Manalo, Puno, Jocson & Guerzon Law Offices for
private respondent.

575

VOL. 475, NOVEMBER 18, 2005 575

Villalon vs. Villalon

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On July1 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a

petition for the annulment of his marriage to respondent
Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City where it was docketed as JDRC No. 3917 and
raffled to Branch 69. As ground therefor, petitioner cited
his psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even
prior to his marriage.
According to petitioner, the manifestations of his
psychological incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal to
maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of
interest in having a normal married life; (b) his immaturity
and irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential
obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; (c) his
desire for other women and a life unchained from any
spousal obligation; and (d) his false assumption of the
fundamental obligations of companionship and consortium
towards respondent. Petitioner thus prayed that his
marriage to respondent be declared null and void ab initio. 2
On September 25, 1996, respondent filed an answer
denying petitioner’s allegations. She asserted that her 18-
year marriage to petitioner has been “fruitful and
characterized by joy, contentment and hopes for more
growth in their relationship” and that their marital
squabbles were normal based on community standards.
Petitioner’s success in his professional life aided him in
performing his role as husband, father, and provider.
Respondent claimed that petitioner’s commitment to his
paternal and marital responsibilities was beyond reproach.
On October 7, 1996, the trial court directed the
prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether there
was collusion

_______________

1 RTC Records, pp. 1-4.

2 Id., at pp. 21-26.

576

576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Villalon vs. Villalon

3
between the parties. The report submitted4 to the trial
court stated that there was no such collusion.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) subsequently
entered its5 appearance in behalf of the6 Republic of the
Philippines and submitted an opposition to the petition on
September 23, 1997. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Petitioner testified that he met respondent sometime in
the early seventies when he applied for a job at Metrobank,
where respondent was employed as a foreign exchange
trader. They began dating 7in 1975 and had a romantic
relationship soon thereafter. After going steady for about
two years, petitioner and respondent were married at the
San Pancracio Chapel in Paco, Manila on April 22, 1978.
Petitioner claimed that he married respondent because he
believed that it was the right time to raise a 8family and
that she would be a good mother to his children.
In the middle of 1993, petitioner decided to separate
from respondent. According to him, their marriage reached
a point where there was no longer any communication
between them and their relationship became devoid of love,
affection, support9 and respect due to his constant urge to
see other women. Moreover, their relationship tended to be
“one-sided” since respondent was unresponsive and10
hardly
ever showed her love, needs, wants and emotions.
Petitioner admitted that on certain occasions before his
marriage, he had two girlfriends at the same time. He also
saw other women even when he became engaged to and,
later

_______________

3 Id., at p. 27.
4 Id., at p. 28.
5 Id., at p. 73.
6 Id., at pp. 69-72.
7 TSN, October 22, 1997, pp. 9-10.
8 Id., at p. 34.
9 Id., at pp. 13, 14 & 16.
10 Id., at pp. 19, 20 & 24.

577

VOL. 475, NOVEMBER 18, 2005 577

Villalon vs. Villalon

11
on, married respondent. Respondent12 learned of his affairs
but reacted in a subdued manner. Petitioner surmised
that it was 13
respondent’s nature to be silent and
withdrawn.
In January 1994, petitioner left the conjugal abode and
moved into an apartment located five to ten minutes away.
Before he left, he and his wife spoke to their three children
who, at that 14
time, were 14, 8, and 6 years old,
respectively. Petitioner consulted
15
a child psychologist
before talking to his children. He considered himself as a
good and loving father 16and described his relationship with
the children as “great.”
Despite the separation, petitioner would regularly visit
his children who stayed with him on alternate weekends.
He voluntarily gave monthly support to the children and
paid for their tuition fees. He also shouldered the children’s
medical expenses as well as the maintenance 17
and
miscellaneous fees for the conjugal abode.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical
psychologist, to testify on his alleged psychological disorder
of “Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder” with
“Casanova Complex.” Dr. Dayan described the said
disorder as “a pervasive maladaptation in terms of
interpersonal and occupational functioning” with main
symptoms of “grand ideation about oneself, self-
centeredness, thinking he is unique and wanting to always
be the one followed, the I personality.” A person afflicted
with this disorder believes that he is entitled to gratify his
emotional and sexual feelings and thus engages in serial
infidelities. Likewise, a person with “Casanova Com-

_______________

11 Id., at pp. 17-18.

12 Id., at pp. 26, 28.
13 Id., at p. 30.
14 Id., at p. 49.
15 Id.
16 TSN, November 19, 1997, p. 7.
17 Id., at p. 24.

578

578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Villalon vs. Villalon

plex” exhibits habitual adulterous

18
behavior and goes from
one relationship to another.
Dr. Dayan submitted a psychological report on both
petitioner and respondent
19
based on clinical interviews and
psychological tests.
Respondent testified that she first learned of her
husband’s infidelity in 1980. She discovered that he was
having an affair with one of her friends who worked as a
trader in her husband’s company. The affair was cut short
when the woman left for the United States to work.
Eventually, she and petitioner were20 able to rebuild their
relationship and overcome the crisis.
 When asked about the womanizing ways of her husband,
respondent averred that she did not know whether her
husband’s acts could be deemed “womanizing” since there
were only two
21
instances of infidelity which occurred 13
years apart. She also theorized that petitioner wanted to
have their
22
marriage annulled so he could marry her old
friend. She stated that she has not closed her doors to
petitioner but the latter
23
would have to give up his extra-
marital relationship.
To controvert the findings of petitioner’s expert witness,
respondent presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas,
who testified that Dr. Dayan’s findings were incomplete
because a “team approach” was necessary in evaluating an
individual’s personality. An evaluation of one’s
psychological capacity requires24
the expertise of a
psychiatrist and social worker.

_______________

18 TSN, August 19, 1998, pp. 12-14.

19 Rollo, pp. 104-134.
20 TSN, February 16, 2000, pp. 8-12.
21 Id., at p. 36.
22 Id., at p. 26.
23 Id., at p. 31.
24 TSN, October 1, 1999, pp. 7-16.

579

VOL. 475, NOVEMBER 18, 2005 579

Villalon vs. Villalon

Upon order of the trial 25

court, the parties submitted their
respective 26memoranda. The OSG likewise filed a
certification
27
pursuant to Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of
Appeals. In due course, the trial court rendered judgment
as follows:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the

marriage between petitioner and respondent Ma. Corazon N.
Villalon celebrated on April 22, 1978, as null and void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal assets and liabilities are hereby
ordered to be liquidated and the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains be effected in accordance with Article 129 of
the Family Code.
 As petitioner manifested that he wishes to maintain the
custody arrangement now existing, the custody of the three (3)
children—Miguel Alberto, Fernando Alfonso, and Ma. Joanna
Victoria—shall remain with the respondent subject to visitation
rights of petitioner as may be mutually agreed upon by the
parties. In order to cancel the registration of the Marriage
Contract between herein parties appearing in the Book of
Marriage of the city of Manila, let copies of this Decision be
furnished to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila as well as the
National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO), CRD Legal
Department, EDSA,28 Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.”

Respondent and the OSG seasonably filed an appeal from

the decision of the trial court, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
74354. On March 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision, the dispositive part of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the assailed decision

dated November 12, 2001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a

_______________

25 RTC Records, pp. 374-393 & 401-407.

26 Id., at pp. 418-423.
27 335 Phil. 664; 268 SCRA 198 (1997).
28 Rollo, p. 103. Penned by Judge Lorifel Lacap Pahimna.

580

580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Villalon vs. Villalon

new judgment entered DISMISSING the petitioner’s petition for

lack of merit. 29
SO ORDERED.”

Contrary to the trial court’s findings, the appellate court

held that petitioner failed to prove the juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of his alleged
psychological incapacity. Although Dr. Dayan testified that
petitioner’s psychological incapacity preceded the marriage,
she failed to give sufficient basis for such a finding. Dr.
Dayan also stated that parental marital instability was the
root cause of petitioner’s psychological incapacity but failed
to elaborate thereon or link the two variables. Moreover,
petitioner’s sexual infidelity was made to appear as
symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder when, in
reality, the same merely resulted from a general
dissatisfaction with the marriage.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
appellate court’s decision 30which was denied in an order
dated October 28, 2004. Thus, petitioner took this
recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, asserting
that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that he failed to
prove his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
The petition has no merit.
The totality of the evidence in this case does not support
a finding that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to
fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what is
evident is the fact that petitioner was a good husband to
respondent for a substantial period of time prior to their
separation, a loving father to their children and a good
provider of the family. Although he engaged in marital
infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not
appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder
which rendered him incapable

_______________

29 Id., at p. 82. Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis

and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Hakim S.
Abdulwahid.
30 Id., at p. 84.

581

VOL. 475, NOVEMBER 18, 2005 581

Villalon vs. Villalon

of performing his spousal obligations. The same appears as

the result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage
rather than a psychological disorder rooted in petitioner’s
personal history. 31
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the court held that
psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of
nullity of a marriage, must be characterized
32
by juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability. It should—

“... [R]efer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that

causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic
33
condition must exist
at the time the marriage is celebrated....”

In the case at bar, although Dr. Dayan testified that

petitioner suffered from Narcissistic Histrionic Personality
Disorder with Casanova Complex even before the marriage
and thus had the tendency to cheat on his wife, such
conclusion was not sufficiently backed by concrete evidence
showing that petitioner indeed had several affairs and
finds it difficult to be faithful. Except for petitioner’s
general claim that on certain occasions he had two
girlfriends at the same time, no details or explanations
were given of such circumstances that would demonstrate
petitioner’s inability to be faithful to respondent either
before or at the time of the celebration of their marriage.

_______________

31 310 Phil. 21; 240 SCRA 20 (1995).

32 Id., at p. 39; p. 33.
33 Id., at p. 40.; p. 34.

582

582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Villalon vs. Villalon

Similarly, we agree with the Court of Appeals that

petitioner failed to establish the incurability and gravity of
his alleged psychological disorder. While Dr. Dayan
described the symptoms of one afflicted with Narcissistic
Histrionic Personality Disorder as “self-centered,”
“characterized by grandiose ideation” and “lack of empathy
in relating to others,” and one with Casanova Complex as a
“serial adulterer,” the evidence on record betrays the
presence of any of these symptoms.
Moreover, we are not convinced that petitioner is a
“serial or habitual adulterer,” as he wants the court to
believe. As stated by respondent herself, it cannot be said
that two instances of infidelity which occurred 13 years
apart could be deemed “womanizing,” especially
considering that these instances involved the same woman.
In fact, at the time of respondent’s testimony, petitioner’s
illicit relationship has been going on for six years. This is
not consistent with the symptoms of a person suffering
from “Casanova Complex” who, according to Dr. Dayan, is
one who jumps from one relationship to another.
Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that
petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It
must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make
petitioner completely unable
34
to discharge the essential
obligations of marriage. The evidence on record fails to
convince us that petitioner’s marital indiscretions are
symptomatic of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. On the contrary, the evidence reveals
that petitioner was a good husband most of the time when
he was living with respondent, a loving father to his
children as well as a good provider. 35
In Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, we held that
the cause of the alleged psychological incapacity must be
identi-

_______________

34 Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 919, 931-932; 320 SCRA 76,
87-88 (1999).
35 Supra.

583

VOL. 475, NOVEMBER 18, 2005 583

Villalon vs. Villalon

fied as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature

fully explained. Further—

“The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,

not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting 36and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.”

In the instant case, it appears that petitioner has simply

lost his love for respondent and has consequently refused to
stay married to her. As revealed by his own testimony,
petitioner felt that he was no longer part of respondent’s 37
life and that the latter did not need or want him.
Respondent’s uncommunicative and withdrawn nature
apparently led to petitioner’s discontentment with the
marital relationship.
 However,
38
as held in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of
Appeals, refusal to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage is not psychological incapacity within the
meaning of the law. The policy of the State is to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic social institution and
marriage is the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
39
should be resolved in favor of validity of the marriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 23,
2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
74354 and its October 28, 2004 Resolution, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

     Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Quisumbing, Carpio

and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

_______________

36 Id., at p. 678; pp. 211-212.

37 TSN, October 22, 1997, p. 30.
38 Supra.
39 Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, supra at p. 932; p. 88.

584

584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Magno vs. Velasco-Jacoba

Note.—A mere showing of irreconcilable and conflicting

personalities in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. (Choa vs. Choa, 392 SCRA 641 [2002])

——o0o——

© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.