554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Patalinghug vs. Court of Appeals

E
*
G.R. No. 104786. January 27, 1994.

ALFREDO PATALINGHUG, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT

OF APPEALS, RICARDO CRIBILLO, MARTIN ARAPOL,
CORAZON ALCASID, PRIMITIVA SEDO, respondents.

Taxation; Zoning; Tax declaration is not conclusive of the

nature of the property for zoning purposes.—The reversal by the
Court of Appeals of the trial court’s decision was based on
Tepoot’s building being declared for taxation purposes as
residential. It is our considered view, however, that a tax
declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for
zoning purposes. A property may have been declared by its owner
as residential for real estate taxation purposes but it may well be
within a commercial zone. A discrepancy may thus exist in the
determination of the nature of property for real estate taxation
purposes vis-a-vis the determination of a property for zoning
purposes.

Same; Same; Real Estate Tax Code; Under Section 22 of Real

Estate Tax Code, appraisal and assessment are based on the
actual use irrespective of any previous assessment or taxpayer’s
valuation.—Needless to say, even if we are to examine the
evidentiary value of a tax declaration under the Real Property
Tax Code, a tax declaration only enables the assessor to identify
the same for assessment levels. In fact, a tax declaration does not
bind a provincial/city assessor, for under Sec. 22 of the Real
Estate Tax Code, appraisal and assessment are based on the
actual use irrespective of “any previous assessment or taxpayer’s
valuation thereon,” which is based on a taxpayer’s declaration. In
fact, a piece of land declared by a taxpayer as residential may be
assessed by the provincial or city assessor as commercial because
its actual use is commercial.

Same; Same; Even if a building declared for taxation purposes

as residential, once a local government has reclassified an area as
commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail.
—The trial court’s determination that Mr. Tepoot’s building is
commercial and, therefore, Sec. 8 is inapplicable, is strengthened
by the fact that the Sangguniang Panlungsod has declared the
questioned area as commercial or C-2. Consequently, even if
Tepoot’s building was declared for taxation purposes as
residential, once a local government has reclassified an area as
commercial, that determination for zoning

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

555

VOL. 229, JANUARY 27, 1994 555

Patalinghug vs. Court of Appeals

purposes must prevail. While the commercial character of the

questioned vicinity has been declared thru the ordinance, private
respondents have failed to present convincing arguments to
substantiate their claim that Cabaguio Avenue, where the funeral
parlor was constructed, was still a residential zone.
Unquestionably, the operation of a funeral parlor constitutes a
“commercial purpose,” as gleaned from Ordinance No. 363.

Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Police Power; Declaration of

an area as a commercial zone thru a municipal ordinance is an
exercise of police power.—The declaration of the said area as a
commercial zone thru a municipal ordinance is an exercise of
police power to promote the good order and general welfare of the
people in the locality. Corollary thereto, the state, in order to
promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty,
with property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons
may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in
order to secure the general welfare of the state and to this
fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may
be subordinated. The ordinance which regulates the location of
funeral homes has been adopted as part of comprehensive zoning
plans for the orderly development of the area covered thereunder.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Gonzales, Batiller, Bilog & Associates for petitioner.
     Garcilaso F. Vega for private respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

In the case before us, we are called upon to decide whether

or not petitioner’s operation of a funeral home constitutes
permissible use within a particular district or zone in
Davao City.
On November 17, 1982, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982
otherwise known as the “Expanded Zoning Ordinance of
Davao City,” Section 8 of which states:

“Section 8. USE REGULATIONS IN C-2 DISTRICTS (Shaded

light red in the Expanded Zoning Map)—A C-2 District shall be
dominantly for commercial and compatible industrial uses as
provided

556

556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Patalinghug vs. Court of Appeals

hereunder:

1. x x x      x x x      x x x
2. x x x      x x x      x x x
3.1 Funeral Parlors/Memorial Homes with adequate off street
parking space (see parking standards of P.D. 1096) and
provided that they shall be established not less than 50
meters from any residential structures, churches and other
institutional buildings.” (Italics provided)

Upon prior approval and certification of zoning compliance

by Zoning Administrator Hector Esguerra, Building Official
Demetrio Alindad issued on February 10, 1987 Building
Permit No. 870254 in favor of petitioner for the
construction of a funeral parlor in the name and style of
Metropolitan Funeral Parlor at Cabaguio Avenue, Agdao,
Davao City.
Thereafter, petitioner commenced the construction of his
funeral parlor.
Acting on the complaint of several residents of Barangay
Agdao, Davao City that the construction of petitioner’s
funeral parlor violated Ordinance No. 363, since it was
allegedly situated within a 50-meter radius from the
Iglesia ni Kristo Chapel and several residential structures,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod conducted an investigation
and found that “the nearest residential structure, owned 1
by
Wilfred G. Tepoot is only 8 inches to the south. x x x.”
 Notwithstanding the findings of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, petitioner continued to construct his funeral
parlor which was finished on November 3, 1987.
Consequently, private respondents filed on September 6,
1988 a case for the declaration of nullity of a building
permit with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory 2
injunction and/or restraining order with the trial court.
After conducting its own ocular inspection on March 30,
1989, the lower court, in its order dated July 6, 1989, 3
dismissed the complaint based on the following findings:

_____________

1 Rollo, p. 43.
2 Annex “C,” Rollo, p. 55.
3 Annex “P,” Rollo, pp. 106-110.

557

VOL. 229, JANUARY 27, 1994 557

Patalinghug vs. Court of Appeals

“1. That the residential building owned by Cribillo and

Iglesia ni Kristo chapel are 63.25 meters and 55.95
meters away, respectively from the funeral parlor.
2. Although the residential building owned by certain
Mr. Tepoot is adjacent to the funeral parlor, and is
only separated therefrom by a concrete fence, said
residential building is being rented by a certain Mr.
Asiaten who actually devotes it to his laundry
business with machinery thereon.
3. Private respondent’s suit is premature as they
failed to exhaust the administrative remedies
provided by Ordinance No. 363.” Hence, private
 respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. (CA
G.R. No. 23243)
CA = TATM in 6 It G
In its decision dated November 29, 1991, the Court of
Appeals reversed the lower court by annulling4 building
permit No. 870254 issued in favor of petitioner. It ruled V Watts
that although the buildings owned by Cribillo and Iglesia
Ni Kristo were beyond the 50-meter residential radius
prohibited by Ordinance 363, the construction of the OND Man A-
funeral parlor was within the 50-meter radius measured
from the Tepoot’s building. The Appellate Court disagreed
with the lower court’s determination that Tepoot’s building Don't hfn so m

was commercial and ruled that although it was used by Mr.

fun tepuots
Tepoot’s lessee for laundry business, it was a residential lot
as reflected in the tax declaration, thus paving the way for
the application of Ordinance No. 363.
Hence, this appeal based on the following grounds: Business
the 'd
“The Respondent Court of Appeals erred in concluding, that the
Tepoot building adjacent to petitioner’s funeral parlor is H was I
residential simply because it was allegedly declared as such for
taxation purposes, in complete disregard of Ordinance No. 363
(The Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City) declaring the
Pen tax PEL
subject area as dominantly for commercial and compatible
industrial uses.”

I
We reverse the Appellate Court and reinstate the ruling of

thvtnstca
the lower court that petitioner did not violate Section 8 of :
Davao City Ordinance No. 363. It must be emphasized that
the question of whether Mr. Tepoot’s building is residential -

or not is a factual determination which we should not

disturb. As we have repeat-

PETH oven PD
!
_______________

4 Rollo, pp. 40-50.

WT Ululate
558
 commercial or
'
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
RESD L WT
Patalinghug vs. Court of Appeals

edly enunciated, the resolution of factual issues is the

function of the lower courts where findings on these Immaterial !
matters are received with respect and are in fact binding
on this court, except only where the case is shown as -
5
coming under the accepted exceptions.
Although the general rule is that factual
6
findings of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive on us, this admits of
exceptions as when the findings or conclusions of the Court7

fnntepoutbts
of Appeals and the trial court are contrary to each other.
While the trial court ruled that Tepoot’s building was
commercial, the Appellate Court ruled otherwise. Thus we
see the necessity of reading and examining the pleadings
and transacripts submitted before the trial court. Dual urse
In the case at bar, the testimony of City Councilor
Vergara shows that Mr. Tepoot’s building was used for a
dual purpose both as a dwelling8 and as a place where a
laundry business was conducted. But while its commercial ↳ tax du is
aspect has been established by the presence of machineries
and laundry paraphernalia, its use as a residence, other
than being declared for taxation purposes as such, was not hit conclusive
fully substantiated.
The reversal by the Court of Appeals of the trial court’s
decision was based on Tepoot’s building being declared for
taxation purposes as residential. It is our considered view,
however, that a tax declaration is not conclusive of the
nature of the property for zoning purposes. A property may
have been declared by its owner as residential for real
estate taxation purposes but it may well be within a
commercial zone. A discrepancy may thus exist in the
determination of the nature of property for real estate
taxation purposes vis-a-vis the determination of a property
for zoning purposes.

______________

5 FNCB Finance v. Estavillo, G.R. No. 93394, December 20, 1990, 192
SCRA 514.
6 Guita v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 60409, November 11, 1985, 139
SCRA 576.
7 Quality Tobacco Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
65005, July 5, 1990, 187 SCRA 210; Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 83122, October 19, 1990, 191 SCRA 1.
8 Hearing, October 27, 1988.

559

VOL. 229, JANUARY 27, 1994 559

Patalinghug vs. Court of Appeals

Needless to say, even if we are to examine the evidentiary

value of a tax declaration under the Real Property Tax
Code, a tax declaration only enables the assessor to identify
the same for assessment levels. In fact, a tax declaration
does not bind a provincial/city
9
assessor, for under Sec. 22 of
the Real Estate Tax Code, appraisal and assessment are
based on the actual use irrespective of “any previous
assessment or taxpayer’s valuation thereon,” which is
based on a taxpayer’s declaration. In fact, a piece of land
declared by a taxpayer as residential may be assessed by
the provincial or city assessor as commercial because its
actual use is commercial.
The trial court’s determination that Mr. Tepoot’s
building is commercial and, therefore, Sec. 8 is
inapplicable, is strengthened by the fact that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod has declared the questioned area
as commercial or C-2. Consequently, even if Tepoot’s
building was declared for taxation purposes as residential,
once a local government has reclassified an area as San 666mm Has
commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must
prevail. While the commercial character of the questioned
vicinity has been declared thru the ordinance, private thwart THE
respondents have failed to present convincing arguments to
substantiate their claim that Cabaguio Avenue, where the
funeral parlor was constructed, was still a residential zone.
Unquestionably, the operation of a funeral parlor Amin as
constitutes a “commercial purpose,” as gleaned from
Ordinance No. 363.
The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone
thru a municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power to
wmnenunr !
promote the good order and general welfare of the people in
the locality. Corollary thereto, the state, in order to
promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
10
-

zoning
Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
welfare of the state and to this fundamental aim of must
________________

9 Presidential Decree No. 464, entitled, “Enacting a Real Property Tax

PNERAIL
Code.
10 Sangalang v. Intermediate Court, G.R. Nos. 71169, 76394, 74376 and
82281, December 22, 1988, 168 SCRA 634; Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership
v. Feati Bank and Trust Co., No. L-24670, December 14, 1989, 94 SCRA
533.

560

560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine Commercial International Bank vs. Court of
Appeals
 government, the rights of the individual may be
subordinated. The ordinance which regulates the location
of funeral homes has been adopted as part of
comprehensive zoning plans for the orderly development of
the area covered thereunder.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated November 29, 1991 is hereby REVERSED and the
order dated July 6, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

          Feliciano (Chairman), Bidin, Melo and Vitug, JJ.,

concur.

Challenged decision reversed.

Notes.—The appraisal and assessment of real property

for taxation purposes is that the property must be
appraised at its current and fair market value (Reyes vs.
Almanzor, 196 SCRA 322).
The exercise by local government of the power to tax is
ordained by the present constitution, only guidelines and
limitations that may be established by Congress can define
and limit such power of local governments (Philippine
Petroleum Corporation vs. Municipality of Pililia, Rizal,
198 SCRA 82).

——o0o——

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