RULE 114 – BAIL accused were already released from detention.

He further points out

that during the pendency of said motion, representatives of the
[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1774. May 27, 2004] Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) informed him that said office
PROV. PROSECUTOR DORENTINO Z. FLORESTA, complainant, vs. was not interested in setting aside the order of dismissal but that it
Judge ELIODORO G. UBIADAS, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, was suggesting an amendment of the order. [7] Respondent explains
Branch 72respondent. though that since the accused had already been released from
DECISION detention and had left the Philippines, and the interest of the DFA
CARPIO MORALES, J.: was merely for the amendment of the order of dismissal, the motion
By a Sworn Complaint[1] dated January 24, 2000, then Provincial had already become academic.
Prosecutor, now Regional Trial Court Judge Dorentino Z. Floresta As to the second charge, respondent informs that the petition for
(complainant) administratively charged Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas of bail of Mangohig who was then under preliminary investigation,
the Olongapo City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72 with gross which motion was filed on January 3, 2000 on which same date a
ignorance of [the] law, grave abuse of authority and violations of the copy of said petition was furnished the public prosecutor, was as set
Code of Judicial Conduct. by Mangohig heard on the morning of January 4, 2000 during which
Complainant faults respondent for dismissing for lack of jurisdiction, there was no appearance from the Prosecutors Office; and that as
on motion of the accused, by Order[2] of July 9, 1997, Crim. Case No. the offense for which Mangohig was charged is ordinarily a bailable
212-97, People of the Philippines v. Chia Say Chaw, et al., for illegal offense, respondent granted him bail.
entry. As for his order disqualifying complainant in Crim. Case No. 634-99,
Complainant alleges that by dismissing Crim. Case No. 219-97 respondent explains that he had already reconsidered the same
[d]espite . . . the provision of P.D. 1599 which established the through his February 10, 2000 Order, [8] he having earlier failed to see
Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines and [the apprehension of petitioners designation by the Ombudsman.
the accused] within the 200 nautical miles of the . . . Zone, In its August 16, 2002 Report, [9] the Office of the Court Administrator
respondent virtually surrender[ed] our sovereignty and criminal (OCA) found, as to the first charge, that it was not shown that
jurisdiction to the Chinese government. [3] respondent acted with malice, oppression or bad faith sufficient to
Complainant likewise faults respondent for failure to resolve, as he find him guilty of gross ignorance of the law, it having appeared that
has yet to resolve, the Motion for Reconsideration and/or respondent based his dismissal order on his interpretation of a
Clarification of the abovesaid Order of July 9, 1997, despite the lapse provision of law. The OCA thus concluded that as respondents
of more than two years since the filing of the motion. By such failure, conclusions in his assailed order are not without logic or reason, and
complainant charges respondent with violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.05 unattended by fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith,[10] he could
of the Code of Judicial Conduct which enjoins judges to dispose of not be faulted for gross ignorance of the law. The OCA hastened to
the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required add, however, that respondent is nonetheless required to act on the
periods, and of SC Circular No. 13 (July 1, 1987) which requires lower motion for reconsideration.
courts to resolve cases or matters before them within three months As to the second charge, the OCA stressed that the Rules of Court
or ninety days from date of submission. requires a movant to serve notice of his motion on all parties
Complainant furthermore faults respondent for granting, without concerned at least three days before the hearing thereof,
giving notice to the prosecution, the petition for bail of Jose hence, respondent erred in granting the petition for bail without
Mangohig, Jr. who was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the hearing the prosecutions side.
Municipal Trial Court of Subic, Zambales which found probable cause Finally, on the third charge, the OCA found that respondents
against him for violation of Section 5(b), Art. III of Republic Act No. explanations were fraught with inconsistencies since his allegation
7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, that he failed to see complainants designation as Ombudsman-
Exploitation and Discrimination Act). [4] Prosecutor in Crim. Case No. 634-99 is belied by his December 17,
Finally, complainant faults respondent for disqualifying him 2000 Order[11] wherein he noted that complainant was deputized by
(complainant) from appearing in Crim Case No. 634-99, People v. the Office of the Ombudsman to prosecute said case. The OCA in fact
Esmane-Diaz, despite his (complainants) designation to handle the noted that respondents subsequent February 10, 2001 Order
prosecution of the case by the Ombudsman. reconsidering his December 17, 2000 Order was issued only after the
By Second Indorsement-Comment of March 20, 2000,[5] respondent latter order had attained finality and the instant case was filed.
contends that petitioner has no personality to initiate the complaint The OCA accordingly recommended that respondent be FINED in the
against him as he is not a party to the cases subject thereof. amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos.
On the merits of the charges, respondent counters that territorial By Resolution of February 26, 2003,[12] this Court noted the OCA
jurisdiction over the area where the accused in Crim. Case No. 212- Report and required the parties to MANIFEST within twenty (20)
97 were arrested within the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal has not yet days from notice, whether they are submitting the case on the basis
been established by controlling jurisprudence, given the conflicting of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted.
claims thereover by the Philippines and China and the absence of an By Manifestation dated April 1, 2003,[13] complainant proffered
inter-country agreement determining the common boundaries of the additional charges against respondent and submitted in support
Exclusive Economic Zone.[6] thereof, among other things an administrative complaint filed by one
As to his failure to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of his July Dr. Reino Rosete against respondent and photocopies of orders
9, 1997 Order dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, Crim. Case No. 212- issued by respondent. Dr. Rosetes complaint, which was addressed
97, respondent points out that said motion was filed after the to then Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo, is both undated and

1
unsigned, however. In the same Manifestation, complainant did not relieve respondent from resolving it as in fact he even issued
submitted the case for decision. an order stating that it was submitted for resolution.
On May 9, 2003, the Docket and Clearance Division of this Court Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3, Rule
received an undated manifestation [14] of respondent stating that he 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct direct judges to dispose of their
was submitting the case on the basis of the pleadings/records cases promptly and within the prescribed periods, failing which they
already filed in the case. are liable for gross inefficiency.[21]
This Courts Findings To thus ensure that the mandates on the prompt disposition of
I. On the dismissal of Crim. Case No. 212-97 judicial business are complied with, this Court laid down guidelines
On innumerable occasions this Court has impressed upon judges in SC Administrative Circular No. 13[22] which provides, inter alia,
that, as mandated by the Code of Judicial Conduct, they owe it to the that:
public and the legal profession to know the very law they are Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article
supposed to apply to a given controversy. [15] They are called upon to VIII, Section 15, of the Constitution for the adjudication and
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all
procedural rules, to be conversant with the basic law, and to cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months
maintain the desired professional competence. [16] from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other
The propriety of the dismissal, on motion of the accused, of Crim. lower courts are given a period of three months to do so.
Case No. 212-97 on jurisdictional grounds is, however, a matter for (Underscoring supplied)
judicial adjudication and the proper recourse of a party aggrieved by This injunction is reiterated in SC Administrative Circular No. 3-
the decision of a judge is to appeal to the proper court, not file an 99[23] which requires all judges to scrupulously observe the periods
administrative complaint.[17] prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases, failure to observe
For, as a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty which is a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties
or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are generally to speedy disposition of their cases. [24]
not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are Having failed to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent
erroneous. [18] Only in cases where the error is gross or patent, is liable for undue delay in rendering a decision or order which is a
deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith may less serious charge under Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
administrative sanctions be imposed.[19] There is no showing that this and which carries the penalty of suspension from office without
was the case here. salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than
With respect to the non-resolution of the prosecutions Motion for three (3) months or a fine of more thanP10,000 but not
Reconsideration of the order of dismissal of Crim. Case No. 212- exceeding P20,000.
97 no resolution of which has been issued, complainant, in his Reply II. On the grant of bail to the accused in Crim. Case No. 271-99
to the Comment of respondent, refutes respondents explanation in Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, and even if no charge
this wise: has yet been filed in court against a respondent-suspect-detainee,
When the said motion was filed in Court on July 11, 1997, the reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the
Chinese fishermen were not yet released from detention. It was prosecutor, or at least his recommendation must be sought.
[25]
during the pendency of the motion that the Chinese fishermen were So Fortuna v. Penaco-Sitaca[26] instructs:
allowed to leave by the Chief of Police of Subic, Zambales despite our [A]dmission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes
representation that they should not be released from jail as another the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the
case for illegal fishing was still pending investigation. . . . The applicable legal principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an
representatives from the Foreign Affairs merely wanted to convey to opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of
Judge Ubiadas the serious implications of his Order of dismissal on deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that
the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the territorial integrity and judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the
national security of our country. In fact, Foreign Secretary Domingo guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be
Siazon publicly denounced the Order of dismissal issued by Judge exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due
Ubiadas as evidenced of an article which appeared in the July 13, process, that is, after the evaluation of the evidence submitted by
1997 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Copy of said article is the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a
hereto attached as Annex A and made integral part hereof. product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and
There is no truth that they told Judge Ubiadas that they are no outright arbitrariness. (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
[27]
longer interested in the setting aside of his Order of dismissal. In
fact, the Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order of dismissal True, a hearing of the petition for bail was conducted in Crim. Case
was already filed in his Court and he even issued an Order dated 18 No. 271-99 on January 4, 2000 at 8:30 a.m.[28] Given the filing of the
July 1997 submitting the said Motion for resolution. Copy of said petition only the day before, at close to noontime, it cannot be said
Order dated 18 July 1997 is hereto attached as Annex B and made that the prosecution was afforded reasonable
integral part hereof. Since the said Motion for Reconsideration of his notice and opportunity to present evidence after it received a copy of
Order of dismissal was already considered by him as submitted for the petition minutes before it was filed in court. It bears stressing
resolution as of 18 July 1997, Judge Ubiadas should have resolved that the prosecution should be afforded reasonable opportunity to
one way or the other, the said motion. [20] (Underscoring supplied) comment on the application for bail by showing that evidence of
Whether the accused in Crim. Case No. 212-97 were already guilt is strong.[29]
released at the time of the filing of the motion for reconsideration While in Section 18 of Rule 114 on applications for bail, no period is
provided as it merely requires the court to give a reasonable notice
2
of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his been deputized by the Office of the Ombudsman to prosecute this
recommendation, and the general rule on the requirement of a case, no special reason was given for such authority. Instead, it
three-day notice for hearing of motions under Section 4 of Rule 15 appears that such designation was merely based on the premise that
allows a court for good cause to set the hearing on shorter notice, the offense charged was committed in Subic municipality as
there is, in the case of Mangohig, no showing of good cause to call erroneously indicated in the original Information filed with this
for hearing his petition for bail on shorter notice. Court.
Reasonable notice depends of course upon the circumstances of Inasmuch as the Information as amended, upon the initiative of
each particular case, taking into account, inter alia, the offense Prosecutor Floresta himself, shows that the place of the commission
committed and the imposable penalties, and the evidence of guilt in of the offense charged is in Olongapo City, the Office of the
the hands of the prosecution. Provincial Prosecutor does not have the authority to continue
In Crim. Case No. 271-99, Mangohig was arrested for violation of Sec. prosecuting this case for the People of the Philippines (Section 2,
5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610,[30] which is punishable by reclusion Rule 117, 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure). For this reason, the
temporal to reclusion perpetua, and subsequently indicted for Office of the City Prosecutor should take his place inasmuch as the
statutory rape[31] qualified by relationship which is punishable by Office of the City Prosecutor of Olongapo has territorial jurisdiction
death. over the offense charged.[40] (Underscoring supplied),
Under the circumstances, by respondents assailed grant of bail, the shows that he was not only aware of complainants designation,
prosecution was deprived of due process for which he is liable for hence, belying his explanation that he must have overlooked the
gross ignorance of the law or procedure [32] which is a serious charge same. It also shows his ignorance of the above-cited provision of the
under Sec. 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. The charge carries the Ombudsman Act which does not require the presence of a special
penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all or part of reason for the designation or deputization by the Ombudsman of
the benefits or suspension from office without salary and other any prosecutor or government lawyer to assist him.
benefits for more than 3 but not exceeding 6 months or a fine of It would appear though from respondents above-quoted December
more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.[33] 17, 1999 Order that he was of the belief that it was the City
This Court takes this occasion to reiterate the injunction that a judge Prosecutor, rather than the Provincial Prosecutor, who had territorial
is called upon to balance the interests of the accused who is entitled jurisdiction over the offense. It is in this light that he is given the
to the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven beyond benefit of the doubt, absent any showing that he was motivated by
reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense without malice or bad faith.
being subject to punishment prior to conviction, [34] against the right With respect to the charges raised against respondent in
of the State to protect the people and the peace of the community complainants April 1, 2003 Manifestation, by which complainant
from dangerous elements.[35] submitted an unsigned and undated complaint by a certain Dr. Reino
III. On the failure to recognize complainants special designation from Rosete and copies of respondents other assailed decisions: While
the Ombudsman in Crim. Case No. 634-99 Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, allows the
The brushing aside by the OCA of respondents explanation on the institution of administrative proceedings upon an anonymous
matter is well taken. complaint, the veracity of Rosetes complaint is doubtful as it does
In the exercise of his power to investigate and prosecute on its own not bear his signature. It is clearly not intended to be an anonymous
or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public complaint.
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission Finally, on the rest of the charges against respondent, this Court is
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient, [36] the unable to pass upon them as complainant merely submitted
Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors or lawyers in the photocopies of respondents assailed orders without stating clearly
government service for assistance.[37] Section 31 of the Ombudsman and concisely the alleged acts and omissions constituting violations
Act of 1989 provides: of standards of conduct prescribed for judges by law, the Rules of
Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors The Ombudsman may Court or the Code of Judicial Conduct.
utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas, Presiding
fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as Judge of RTC Branch 72, Olongapo City, is found GUILTY of undue
special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and delay in resolving a motion and of gross ignorance of the law or
prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist procedure in granting an application for bail without affording the
him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control. prosecution due process. He is accordingly FINED in the amount of
It is on the basis of the above-quoted provision of law that Deputy TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), with WARNING that
Ombudsman for Luzon Jesus Guerrero endorsed Case No. OMB-1-98- repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
2418 (Chan v. Esmane-Diaz) to complainant with the instruction to severely.
file the Information and to prosecute the case.[38] The indorsement SO ORDERED.
included an order to submit a monthly report to the Office of the Vitug, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
Ombudsman of any actions taken in relation to the case. [A.M. OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ. November 26, 2004]
Respondents December 17, 1999 Order[39] which states, inter alia, as Chief State Prosecutor JOVENCITO R. ZUO, complainant, vs. Judge
follows: ALEJADRINO C. CABEBE, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac,
The Officer-in-Charge of the City Prosecutors Office is hereby Ilocos Norte,respondent.
directed to designate any of the Assistant Prosecutors of the City DECISION
Prosecutors Office to take the place of Provincial Prosecutor SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Dorentino Z. Floresta. While Prosecutor Floresta appears to have
3
The instant administrative case stemmed from the sworn death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a
complaint[1] dated January 15, 2003 of Chief State Prosecutor matter of discretion. Under the present Rules, a hearing is
Jovencito R. Zuo of the Department of Justice, against Judge mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or
Alejandrino C. Cabebe,[2] then Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, discretion.[11] It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail
Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte. The charges are knowingly rendering in cases where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of
an unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law and partiality. whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, and
In his complaint, Chief State Prosecutor Zuo alleged that Criminal the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a
Case No. 3950-18 for illegal possession of prohibited or regulated matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order
drugs was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first
Norte against Rey Daquep Arcangel, Victorino Gamet Malabed, conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is
William Roxas Villanueva, all police officers, Jocelyn Malabed Manuel strong.[12] In fact, even in cases where there is no petition for bail, a
and Pelagio Valencia Manuel. Upon arraignment, all the accused, hearing should still be held.[13]
assisted by their counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to the
charged. On March 14, 2001, the prosecution filed with this Court a accused without conducting a hearing, in violation of Sections 8 and
petition for change of venue but was denied in a Resolution dated 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, quoted as
August 13, 2001.[3] On October 8, 2001, the accused filed a motion follows:
for reconsideration.[4] In the meantime, the proceedings before Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an
respondents court were suspended. application for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the
On May 6, 2002, the accused filed a motion to dismiss invoking as commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
ground the right of the accused to a speedy trial. On November 5, perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of
2002, respondent judge motu propio issued an Order[5] granting bail showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented
to the accused, fixing the bail for each at P70,000.00 in cash or during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced
property bond at P120,000.00, except for accused Evelyn Manuel at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall any
whose bail was fixed at P20,000.00 in cash. Respondent judge issued witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside
the Order without the accuseds application or motion for bail. the Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify.
The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration. [6] Instead of Sec. 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. In the application for bail
acting thereon, respondent judge issued an order inhibiting himself under section 8 of this Rule, the court must give reasonable notice of
from further proceeding with the case, realizing that what he did the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his
was patently irregular. Complainant thus prays that respondent judge recommendation. (18a)
be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and be In Cortes vs. Catral,[14] we laid down the following rules outlining the
disbarred from the practice of law. duties of the judge in case an application for bail is filed:
In his comment,[7] respondent denied the charges. While admitting 1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify
that he issued the Order dated November 5, 2002 granting bail to the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require
the accused without any hearing, the same was premised on the him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial. There was delay Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure);
in the proceedings due to complainants frequent absences and 2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
failure of the witnesses for the prosecution to appear in court, application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
resulting in the cancellation of the hearings. The prosecution did not refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
object to the grant of bail to the accused. [8] He added that the strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
administrative complaint filed against him is purely harassment. It is discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);
not the appropriate remedy to question his alleged erroneous Order. 3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the
Accordingly, and considering his forty (40) years of government summary of evidence of the prosecution;
service, he prays that the administrative complaint be dismissed. 4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused
On March 26, 2003, respondent judge compulsorily retired. upon the approval of the bail bond (Section 19, id.); otherwise the
In his Report dated July 7, 2003, Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. petition should be denied.
Perez found respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of the law Based on the above-cited procedure, after the hearing, the courts
and recommended that a fine of P20,000.00 be imposed upon him, order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense evidence of the prosecution and based thereon, the judge should
will be dealt with more severely. formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so
In our Resolution[9] dated August 25, 2003, we directed that the presented is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. [15]
complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules and procedure
required the parties to manifest whether they are submitting the enumerated in Cortes.[16] He did not conduct a hearing before he
case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. Both parties granted bail to the accused, thus depriving the prosecution of an
submitted the required manifestations that they are submitting the opportunity to interpose objections to the grant of bail. Irrespective
case for decision on the basis of the records. of his opinion on the strength or weakness of evidence to prove the
In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas,[10] we held that guilt of the accused, he should have conducted a hearing and
jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural necessity thereafter made a summary of the evidence of the prosecution. The
of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be
bail, especially in cases involving offenses punishable by downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural due process
4
for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate unjust judgment or order, respondent judge must have acted in bad
the grant or denial of bail.[17] faith, with malice or in willful disregard of the right of a litigant. [19] A
Neither did respondent require the prosecution to submit its perusal of the records, specifically the assailed Order, hardly shows
recommendation on whether or not bail should be granted. that any of these incidents has been proven.
He maintains that the prosecution did not object to the grant of bail On the charge of gross ignorance of the law, suffice it to say that to
to the accused, hence, he cannot be held administratively liable for constitute such infraction, it is not enough that the subject decision,
not conducting a hearing. order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official
In Santos vs. Ofilada,[18] we held that the failure to raise or the duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most
absence of an objection on the part of the prosecution in an importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
application for bail does not dispense with the requirement of a bail corruption. [20] In Guillermo vs. Judge Reyes, Jr.[21] we categorically
hearing. Thus held that good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
Even the alleged failure of the prosecution to interpose an objection improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge
to the granting of bail to the accused will not justify such grant charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. In Villanueva-
without hearing. This Court has uniformly ruled that even if the Fabella vs. Lee,[22] we ruled that a judge may not be held
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose any administratively accountable for every erroneous order he renders.
objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order of a
conduct a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions from judge must not only be erroneous; more important, it must be
which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or lack of it, motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar
against the accused. Where the prosecutor refuses to adduce motive. Complainant, having failed to present positive evidence to
evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the show that respondent judge was so motivated in granting bail
court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the without hearing, can not be held guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
strength of the States evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount As to the charge of partiality, we find no evidence to sustain the
of bail. Irrespective of respondent judges opinion that the evidence same. It is merely based on complainants speculation. Mere
of guilt against the accused is not strong, the law and settled suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear
jurisprudence demand that a hearing be conducted before bail may and convincing evidence to prove this charge. The only exception to
be fixed for the temporary release of the accused, if bail is at all the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an
justified. ineluctable inference of bad faith and malice, [23] which are not
Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no present here.
objection to the grant of bail to the accused, the respondent judge We thus find respondent judge guilty of violation of Supreme Court
therein should nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing Rules, specifically Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
and diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter was Procedure on the grant of bail. This administrative offense is
not in fact contesting the bail application. In addition, a hearing was considered a less serious charge, punishable under Section 9(4) and
also necessary for the court to take into consideration the guidelines Section 11(B-2), Rule 140 of the same Rules, thus:
set forth in the then Section, 6, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Sec. 9. Less Serious Charges. Less serious charges include:
Criminal Procedure for the fixing of the amount of the bail, Only xxx
after respondent judge had satisfied himself that these requirements 4. Violation of Supreme Court Rules, directives, and circulars;
have been met could he then proceed to rule on whether or not to xxx
grant bail. Sec. 11. Sanctions. x x x
Clearly, therefore, respondent judge cannot seek refuge on the B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the
alleged absence of objection on the part of the prosecution to the following sanctions shall be imposed:
grant of bail to the accused. 1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not
Respondent judge contends that the accused were entitled to their less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
right to a speedy trial, hence, he granted bail without a hearing. He 2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
blames the prosecution for the delay. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe, now retired,
Respondents contention is bereft of merit. There is no indication in is found guilty of violation of Supreme Court Rules and is hereby
the records of the criminal case that the prosecution has fined in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), the same
intentionally delayed the trial of the case. Even assuming there was to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
delay, this does not justify the grant of bail without a hearing. This is SO ORDERED.
utter disregard of the Rules. The requirement of a bail hearing has Panganiban, (Chairman), Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
been incessantly stressed by this Court. In the same vein, the Code Corona, J., on leave.
of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be conversant with the law and G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
the Rules and maintain professional competence; and by the very GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,
nature of his office, should be circumspect in the performance of his represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
duties. He must render justice without resorting to shortcuts clearly vs.
uncalled for. Obviously, respondent failed to live up to these HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO
standards. MUÑOZ, Respondents.
It bears reiterating that respondent is being charged with knowingly DECISION
rendering unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law and partiality. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
We ruled that in order to be held liable for knowingly rendering an
5
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify respondent is a high "flight risk."
the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from
(presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to
Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, private respondent, to post bail; On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for
and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This
the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20,
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further
alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is granted subject to the
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as following conditions:
there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential 1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that
extraditee. accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the
The facts are: issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear
British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will
Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June be forfeited in favor of the government;
20, 1997. 2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of 3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and
China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as 4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors
agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any
Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before
the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal,
of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the
of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge. of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong noted therein accordingly.
Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private SO ORDERED.
respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge in his Order
Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private dated April 10, 2002.
respondent. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
arrested and detained him. nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely
Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus with to criminal proceedings.
application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that
of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest. the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process
declaring the Order of Arrest void. resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to
review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed. Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
on April 10, 2001. impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction.
for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion
99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be
Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- granted bail.
a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B.
Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through
6
then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of
held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles
extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as
thus: customarily binding upon the members of the international
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4, granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been Constitution,3 the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted
does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the
do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not due process.
be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well
doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is
per Fernando,J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides:
on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
presumption of innocence is not at issue. full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested
corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their
must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are
of habeas corpusfinds application "only to persons judicially charged under obligation to make available to every person under detention
for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.
invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this
sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties
offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the
in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private in Purganan is in order.
respondent’s case. However, this Court cannot ignore the following First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an
trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal
individual person in public international law who, in the 20th proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as
century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.
value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not
human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only.
this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this
other. jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of
on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human
rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may rights.
properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese
vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of
only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that
the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined
World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has
defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war, committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while
crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery
the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating
war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.
Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of
is now a valid subject of international law. Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail
organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated,
rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.
7
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty.
why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted
considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies the extradition court to grant him bail.
to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an
extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her
where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this Constitution.
jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of
and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the
presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines accused. As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major
should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail
impaired. arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the
Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential
from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a
foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective
hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is
against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government." The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it
power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign
correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does
demanding state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding. 9 Even if the not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the
potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life,
its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are
such punishment may follow extradition. 10 It is sui generis, tracing its guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international
existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. 11 It conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not,
is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail,
extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof
person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond
the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
punishment.14 preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized character, the standard of substantial evidence used in
by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of
the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from
purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then
is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a
Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary new standard which he termed "clear and convincing
detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition
justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
"in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of
pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and
from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all
of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently." the orders and processes of the extradition court.
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented
administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case
extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private
liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing
proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the evidence."
process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to
be reasonable. the trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the
23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his
the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition
been detained for over two (2) years without having been proceedings with dispatch.
convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of SO ORDERED.
8
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ x x x respondent had been charged already by the complainants
Associate Justice before the Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur,
[G.R. Nos. 115439-41. July 16, 1997] went to jail on detention in 1984 under the same set of facts and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE same evidence x x x but said case after arraignment, was ordered
SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, dismissed by the court upon recommendation of the Department of
JR. and GENEROSO S. SANSAET, respondents. Justice. Copy of the dismissal order, certificate of arraignment and
DECISION therecommendation of the Department of Justice are hereto
REGALADO, J.: attached for ready reference; thus the filing of this case will be a case
Through the special civil action for certiorari at bar, petitioner seeks of double jeopardy for respondent herein x x x.[9] (Italics supplied.)
the annulment of the resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan, A criminal case was subsequently filed with the
promulgated on December 22, 1993, which denied petitioners Sandiganbayan[10] charging respondent Paredes with a violation of
motion for the discharge of respondent Generoso S. Sansaet to be Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. However, a
utilized as a state witness, and its resolution of March 7, 1994 motion to quash filed by the defense was later granted in
denying the motion for reconsideration of its preceding disposition. [1] respondent courts resolution of August 1, 1991[11] and the case was
The records show that during the dates material to this case, dismissed on the ground of prescription.
respondent Honrada was the Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had
of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-Bunawan- initiated the perjury and graft charges against respondent Paredes,
Rosario in Agusan del Sur. Respondent Paredes was successively the sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the
Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same three respondents herein for falsification of public documents. [12] He
province, and is at present a Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was claimed that respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his herein co-
a practicing attorney who served as counsel for Paredes in several respondents, simulated and certified as true copies certain
instances pertinent to the criminal charges involved in the present documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment, dated July 1,
recourse. 1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during
The same records also represent that sometime in 1976, respondent the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge. [13] These falsified
Paredes applied for a free patent over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the documents were annexed to respondent Paredes motion for
Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey. His application was approved reconsideration of the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of a graft
and, pursuant to a free patent granted to him, an original certificate charge against him, in order to support his contention that the same
of title was issued in his favor for that lot which is situated in would constitute double jeopardy.
the poblacion of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a certification
However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action [2] for the that no notice of arraignment was ever received by the Office of the
cancellation of respondent Paredes patent and certificate of title Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in connection with that perjury
since the land had been designated and reserved as a school site in case; and a certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ario that said
the aforementioned subdivision survey. The trial court rendered perjury case in his court did not reach the arraignment stage since
judgment[3] nullifying said patent and title after finding that action thereon was suspended pending the review of the case by the
respondent Paredes had obtained the same through fraudulent Department of Justice.[14]
misrepresentations in his application. Pertinently, respondent Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but Sansaet
Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case.[4] subsequently discarded and repudiated the submissions he had
Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial court, upon the made in his counter-affidavit. In a so-called Affidavit of Explanations
subsequent complaint of the Sangguniang Bayan and the preliminary and Rectifications,[15] respondent Sansaet revealed that Paredes
investigation conducted thereon, an information for perjury [5] was contrived to have the graft case under preliminary investigation
filed against respondent Paredes in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by making it that the
[6]
On November 27, 1985, the Provincial Fiscal was, however, perjury case had been dismissed by the trial court after he had been
directed by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the dismissal arraigned therein.
of the case on the ground inter alia of prescription, hence the For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by
proceedings were terminated.[7] In this criminal case, respondent respondent Sansaet in the preliminary investigation were prepared
Paredes was likewise represented by respondent Sansaet as counsel. and falsified by his co-respondents in this case in the house of
Nonetheless, respondent * Paredes was thereafter haled before the respondent Paredes. To evade responsibility for his own participation
Tanodbayan for preliminary investigation on the charge that, by in the scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and
using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and inducement of respondent Paredes. This was intended to pave the
induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his way for his discharge as a government witness in the consolidated
application for free patent, he had violated Section 3(a) of Republic cases, as in fact a motion therefor was filed by the prosecution
Act No. 3019, as amended. For the third time, respondent Sansaet pursuant to their agreement.
was Paredes counsel of record therein. Withal, in a resolution[16] dated February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman
On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a approved the filing of falsification charges against all the herein
resolution[8] recommending the criminal prosecution of respondent private respondents. The proposal for the discharge of respondent
Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for his aforenamed co-respondent, Sansaet as a state witness was rejected by the Ombudsman on this
moved for reconsideration and, because of its legal significance in evaluative legal position:
this case, we quote some of his allegations in that motion: x x x Taking his explanation, it is difficult to believe that a lawyer of
his stature, in the absence of deliberate intent to conspire, would be
9
unwittingly induced by another to commit a crime. As counsel for a clearer understanding of that evidential rule, we will first sweep
the accused in those criminal cases, Atty. Sansaet had control over aside some distracting mental cobwebs in these cases.
the case theory and the evidence which the defense was going to 1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential
present. Moreover, the testimony or confession of Atty. Sansaet falls communication made by Paredes to Sansaet in connection with
under the mantle of privileged communication between the lawyer Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93 for falsification before respondent
and his client which may be objected to, if presented in the trial. court, and this may reasonably be expected since Paredes was the
The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that resolution [17] and, accused and Sansaet his counsel therein. Indeed, the fact that
ostensibly to forestall any further controversy, he decided to file Sansaet was called to witness the preparation of the falsified
separate informations for falsification of public documents against documents by Paredes and Honrada was as eloquent a
each of the herein respondents. Thus, three criminal cases,[18] each communication, if not more, than verbal statements being made to
of which named one of the three private respondents here as the him by Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such falsification. It is
accused therein, were filed in the graft court.However, the same significant that the evidentiary rule on this point has always referred
were consolidated for joint trial in the Second Division of the to any communication, without distinction or qualification. [22]
Sandiganbayan. In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential rule
As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the People on July 27, was taken, there is no particular mode by which a confidential
1993 for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness. It communication shall be made by a client to his attorney.The privilege
was submitted that all the requisites therefor, as provided in Section is not confined to verbal or written communications made by the
9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, were satisfied insofar as client to his attorney but extends as well to information
respondent Sansaet was concerned. The basic postulate was that, communicated by the client to the attorney by other means. [23]
except for the eyewitness testimony of respondent Sansaet, there Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process, considering
was no other direct evidence to prove the confabulated falsification their past and existing relations as counsel and client and, further, in
of documents by respondents Honrada and Paredes. view of the purpose for which such falsified documents were
Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan, prepared, no word at all passed between Paredes and Sansaet on
hewing to the theory of the attorney-client privilege adverted to by the subject matter of that criminal act. The clincher for this
the Ombudsman and invoked by the two other private respondents conclusion is the undisputed fact that said documents were
in their opposition to the prosecutions motion, resolved to deny the thereafter filed by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to the
desired discharge on this ratiocination: motion for reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of the
From the evidence adduced, the opposition was able to establish graft case before the Tanodbayan.[24]Also, the acts and words of the
that client and lawyer relationship existed between Atty. Sansaet and parties during the period when the documents were being falsified
Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during and after the period alleged in were necessarily confidential since Paredes would not have invited
the information. In view of such relationship, the facts surrounding Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the same except
the case, and other confidential matter must have been disclosed by under conditions of secrecy and confidence.
accused Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in his 2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at the
professional capacity. Therefore, the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on instance of Paredes in the criminal act for which the latter stands
the facts surrounding the offense charged in the information is charged, a distinction must be made between confidential
privileged.[19] communications relating to past crimes already committed, and
Reconsideration of said resolution having been likewise denied, future crimes intended to be committed, by the client. Corollarily, it
[20]
the controversy was elevated to this Court by the prosecution in is admitted that the announced intention of a client to commit a
an original action for the issuance of the extraordinary writ crime is not included within the confidences which his attorney is
of certiorari against respondent Sandiganbayan. bound to respect. Respondent court appears, however, to believe
The principal issues on which the resolution of the petition at bar that in the instant case it is dealing with a past crime, and that
actually turns are therefore (1) whether or not the projected respondent Sansaet is set to testify on alleged criminal acts of
testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is respondents Paredes and Honrada that have already been
barred by the attorney-client privilege; and (2) whether or not, as a committed and consummated.
consequence thereof, he is eligible for discharge to testify as The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a
a particeps criminis. somewhat inaccurate basis. It is true that by now, insofar as the
I falsifications to be testified to in respondent court are concerned,
As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that due to the those crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But for the
lawyer-client relationship which existed between herein respondents application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be
Paredes and Sansaet during the relevant periods, the facts considered is the date when the privileged communication was
surrounding the case and other confidential matters must have been made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime
disclosed by respondent Paredes, as client, to respondent Sansaet, committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be
as his lawyer. Accordingly, it found no reason to discuss it further committed in the future. In other words, if the client seeks his
since Atty. Sansaet cannot be presented as a witness against accused lawyers advice with respect to a crime that the former has
Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. without the latters consent. [21] theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual
The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-client privilege confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot
cannot apply in these cases, as the facts thereof and the actuations be broken by the attorney without the clients consent. The same
of both respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule. For privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a

10
crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future be a state witness need not prevent this Court from resolving that
and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyers advice. issue as prayed for by petitioner. Where the determinative facts and
Statements and communications regarding the commission of a evidence have been submitted to this Court such that it is in a
crime already committed, made by a party who committed it, to an position to finally resolve the dispute, it will be in the pursuance of
attorney, consulted as such, the ends of justice and the expeditious administration thereof to
are privilegedcommunications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of resolve the case on the merits, instead of remanding it to the trial
judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between attorney court.[28]
and client having to do with the clients contemplated criminal acts, 2. A reservation is raised over the fact that the three private
or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of respondents here stand charged in three separate informations. It
privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications will be recalled that in its resolution of February 24, 1992, the
between attorney and client.[25] (Emphases supplied.) Ombudsman recommended the filing of criminal charges for
3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from falsification of public documents against all the respondents
Sansaet as state witness are the communications made to him by herein. That resolution was affirmed but, reportedly in order to
physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the time he obviate further controversy, one information was filed against each
and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of of the three respondents here, resulting in three informations for the
Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the same acts of falsification.
documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and This technicality was, however, sufficiently explained away during the
culminated in the criminal charges now pending in respondent deliberations in this case by the following discussion thereof by Mr.
Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications Justice Davide, to wit:
thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in Assuming no substantive impediment exists to block Sansaets
reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been discharge as state witness, he can, nevertheless, be discharged even
committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with if indicted under a separate information. I suppose the three cases
his present co-respondents, later committed. Having been made for were consolidated for joint trial since they were all raffled to the
purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2, Rule XV of the
pale of the attorney-client privilege. Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan allows consolidation in only one
4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission Division of cases arising from the same incident or series of
of that crime of falsification which he, Paredes and Honrada incidents, or involving common questions of law and
concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is well settled that in fact. Accordingly, for all legal intents and purposes, Sansaet stood as
order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be co-accused and he could be discharged as state witness. It is of no
privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a moment that he was charged separately from his co-accused. While
lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the Section 9 of Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure uses
privilege from attaching. [26] In fact, it has also been pointed out to the the word jointly, which was absent in the old provision, the
Court that the prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and consolidated and joint trial has the effect of making the three
client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every accused co-accused or joint defendants, especially considering that
communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal they are charged for the same offense. In criminal law, persons
purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only indicted for the same offense and tried together are called joint
lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain defendants.
circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of As likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice Francisco along the
justice.[27] same vein, there having been a consolidation of the three cases, the
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent several actions lost their separate identities and became a single
Sandiganbayan to insist that such unlawful communications intended action in which a single judgment is rendered, the same as if the
for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are nonetheless different causes of action involved had originally been joined in a
covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving single action.[29]
counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime which was later Indeed, the former provision of the Rules referring to the situation
committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection (w)hen two or more persons are charged with the commission of a
thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the worst travesties certain offense was too broad and indefinite; hence the word joint
in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law. was added to indicate the identity of the charge and the fact that the
II accused are all together charged therewith substantially in the same
On the foregoing premises, we now proceed to the consequential manner in point of commission and time. The word joint means
inquiry as to whether respondent Sansaet qualifies, as a particeps common to two or more, as involving the united activity of two or
criminis, for discharge from the criminal prosecution in order to more, or done or produced by two or more working together, or
testify for the State. Parenthetically, respondent court, having arrived shared by or affecting two or more.[30] Had it been intended that all
at a contrary conclusion on the preceding issue, did not pass upon the accused should always be indicted in one and the same
this second aspect and the relief sought by the prosecution which information, the Rules could have said so with facility, but it did not
are now submitted for our resolution in the petition at bar. We shall, so require in consideration of the circumstances obtaining in the
however, first dispose likewise of some ancillary questions requiring present case and the problems that may arise from amending the
preludial clarification. information. After all, the purpose of the Rule can be achieved by
1. The fact that respondent Sandiganbayan did not fully pass upon consolidation of the cases as an alternative mode.
the query as to whether or not respondent Sansaet was qualified to
11
2. We have earlier held that Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime prohibits is that the most guilty will be set free while his co-accused
of falsification, and the rule is that since in a conspiracy the act of who are less guilty will be sent to jail. And by most guilty we mean
one is the act of all, the same penalty shall be imposed on all the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the
members of the conspiracy. Now, one of the requirements for a state commission of the offense and not necessarily the severity of the
witness is that he does not appear to be the most guilty. [31] not that penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same
he must be the least guilty[32] as is so often erroneously framed or penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered least
submitted. The query would then be whether an accused who was guilty if We take into account his degree of participation in the
held guilty by reason of membership in a conspiracy is eligible to be perpetration of the offense. Fifth, there is no evidence that he has at
a state witness. any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
To be sure, in People vs. Ramirez, et al.[33] we find this obiter: xxx
It appears that Apolonio Bagispas was the real mastermind. It is Thus, We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that
believable that he persuaded the others to rob Paterno, not to kill the rule on the discharge of an accused to be utilized as state witness
him for a promised fee. Although he did not actually commit any of clearly looks at his actual and individual participation in the
the stabbings, it was a mistake to discharge Bagispas as a state commission of the crime, which may or may not have been
witness. All the perpetrators of the offense, including him, were perpetrated in conspiracy with the other accused. Since Bermudez
bound in a conspiracy that made them equally guilty. was not individually responsible for the killing committed on the
However, prior thereto, in People vs. Roxas, et al.,[34] two conspirators occasion of the robbery except by reason of conspiracy, it cannot be
charged with five others in three separate informations for multiple said then that Bermudez appears to be the most guilty. Hence, his
murder were discharged and used as state witnesses against their discharge to be a witness for the government is clearly warranted.
confederates. Subsequent thereto, in Lugtu, et al. vs. Court of (Italics ours.)
Appeals, et al.,[35] one of the co-conspirators was discharged from the The rule of equality in the penalty to be imposed upon conspirators
information charging him and two others with the crime of found guilty of a criminal offense is based on the concurrence of
estafa. The trial court found that he was not the most guilty as, being criminal intent in their minds and translated into concerted physical
a poor and ignorant man, he was easily convinced by his two co- action although of varying acts or degrees of depravity. Since the
accused to open the account with the bank and which led to the Revised Penal Code is based on the classical school of thought, it is
commission of the crime. the identity of the mens rea which is considered the predominant
On appeal, this Court held that the finding of respondent appellate consideration and, therefore, warrants the imposition of the same
court that Lugtu was just as guilty as his co-accused, and should not penalty on the consequential theory that the act of one is thereby
be discharged as he did not appear to be not the most guilty, is the act of all.
untenable. In other words, the Court took into account the gravity or Also, this is an affair of substantive law which should not be equated
nature of the acts committed by the accused to be discharged with the procedural rule on the discharge of particeps criminis. This
compared to those of his co-accused, and not merely the fact that in adjective device is based on other considerations, such as the need
law the same or equal penalty is imposable on all of them. for giving immunity to one of them in order that not all shall escape,
Eventually, what was just somehow assumed but not explicitly and the judicial experience that the candid admission of an accused
articulated found expression in People vs. Ocimar, et al.,[36] which we regarding his participation is a guaranty that he will testify
quote in extenso: truthfully. For those reasons, the Rules provide for certain qualifying
Ocimar contends that in the case at bar Bermudez does not satisfy criteria which, again, are based on judicial experience distilled into a
the conditions for the discharge of a co-accused to become a state judgmental policy.
witness. He argues that no accused in a conspiracy can lawfully be III
discharged and utilized as a state witness, for not one of them could The Court is reasonably convinced, and so holds, that the other
satisfy the requisite of appearing not to be the most guilty. Appellant requisites for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness
asserts that since accused Bermudez was part of the conspiracy, he is are present and should have been favorably appreciated by the
equally guilty as the others. Sandiganbayan.
We do not agree. First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual
of Bermudez. For, despite the presentation of four (4) other commission of the falsification charged in the criminal cases pending
witnesses, none of them could positively identify the accused except before respondent court, and the prosecution is faced with the
Bermudez who was one of those who pulled the highway heist which formidable task of establishing the guilt of the two other co-
resulted not only in the loss of cash, jewelry and other valuables, but respondents who steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest
even the life of Capt. Caeba, Jr. It was in fact the testimony of their innocence. There is thus no other direct evidence available for
Bermudez that clinched the case for the prosecution. Second, the prosecution of the case, hence there is absolute necessity for the
without his testimony, no other direct evidence was available for the testimony of Sansaet whose discharge is sought precisely for that
prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. Third, his testimony purpose. Said respondent has indicated his conformity thereto and
could be, as indeed it was, substantially corroborated in its material has, for the purposes required by the Rules, detailed the substance
points as indicated by the trial court in its well-reasoned of his projected testimony in his Affidavit of Explanations and
decision. Fourth, he does not appear to be the most guilty. As the Rectifications.
evidence reveals, he was only invited to a drinking party without His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material
having any prior knowledge of the plot to stage a highway points by reputable witnesses, identified in the basic petition with a
robbery. But even assuming that he later became part of the digest of their prospective testimonies, as follows: Judge Ciriaco C.
conspiracy, he does not appear to be the most guilty. What the law Ario, Municipal Circuit Trial Court in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur;
12
Provincial Prosecutor and Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor Before us is a petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the
Claudio A. Nistal; Teofilo Gelacio, private complainant who initiated Rules of Court, as amended, that part of the Decision [1] of the Court
the criminal cases through his letter-complaint; Alberto Juvilan of the of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60732 dismissing her petition for
Sangguniang Bayan of San Fernando, Agusan del Sur, who certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the
participated in the resolution asking their Provincial Governor to file nullification of the August 25 and 28, 2000 Orders of the respondent
the appropriate case against respondent Paredes, and Francisco judge in Criminal Case No. 00-0749.
Macalit, who obtained the certification of non-arraignment from The Antecedents
Judge Ario. Cecilia Maruyama executed a fifteen-page affidavit-complaint[2] and
On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not appear that filed the same with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City, on
respondent Sansaet has at any time been convicted of any offense December 29, 1999, charging Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita
involving moral turpitude. Thus, with the confluence of all the Tanghal Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa. In her affidavit,
requirements for the discharge of this respondent, both the Special Maruyama alleged, inter alia, that on December 11, 1998, she
Prosecutor and the Solicitor General strongly urge and propose that entrusted Y11,410,000 with the peso equivalent of P3,993,500 to the
he be allowed to testify as a state witness. petitioner, who was engaged in the business of door-to-door delivery
This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that, on this from Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged that the petitioner
procedural aspect, the prosecution may propose but it is for the trial failed to deliver the money as agreed upon, and, at first, denied
court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to determine the merits receiving the said amount but later returned only US$1,000 through
of the proposal and make the corresponding disposition. It must be Lorna Tanghal.
emphasized, however, that such discretion should have been During the preliminary investigation, the complainant, respondent
exercised, and the disposition taken on a holistic view of all the facts Maruyama, submitted the affidavit of her witnesses, namely,
and issues herein discussed, and not merely on the sole issue of the Hermogena Santiago, Wilma Setsu and Marilette G. Izumiya and
applicability of the attorney-client privilege. other documentary evidence. In her affidavit, Setsu alleged that the
This change of heart and direction respondent Sandiganbayan money which was entrusted to the petitioner for delivery to the
eventually assumed, after the retirement of two members of its Philippines belonged to her and her sister Annie Hashimoto, and
Second Division [37]and the reconstitution thereof. In an inversely their mother Hermogena Sanchez-Quicho, who joined respondent
anticlimactic Manifestation and Comment [38] dated June 14, 1995, as Maruyama in her complaint against petitioner Okabe and
required by this Court in its resolution on December 5, 1994, the Tanghal. Respondent Maruyama, likewise, submitted a reply [3] to the
chairman and new members thereof [39]declared: petitioners counter-affidavit. After the requisite preliminary
4) That the questioned Resolutions of December 22, 1993 and March investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came
7, 1994 upon which the Petition for Certiorari filed by the out with a resolution dated March 30, 2000, finding probable cause
prosecution are based, was penned by Associate Justice Narciso T. for estafa against the petitioner.[4] Attached to the resolution, which
Atienza and concurred in by the undersigned and Associate Justice was submitted to the city prosecutor for approval, was the
Augusto M. Amores; Information[5]against the petitioner and Maruyamas affidavit-
5) That while the legal issues involved had been already discussed complaint. The city prosecutor approved the resolution and the
and passed upon by the Second Division in the aforesaid Resolution, Information dated March 30, 2000 attached thereto. [6]
however, after going over the arguments submitted by the Solicitor- On May 15, 2000, an Information against the petitioner was filed in
General and re-assessing Our position on the matter, We respectfully the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, docketed as Criminal Case No.
beg leave of the Honorable Supreme Court to manifest that We are 00-0749. The case was raffled to Branch 119 of the court presided by
amenable to setting aside the questioned Resolutions and to grant Judge Pedro de Leon Gutierrez.[7] The accusatory portion of the
the prosecutions motion to discharge accused Generoso Sansaet as Information reads:
state witness, upon authority of the Honorable Supreme Court for That on or about December 12, 1998 in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
the issuance of the proper Resolution to that effect within fifteen Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
(15) days from notice thereof. above-named accused defrauded Cecilia Maruyama and Conchita
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted Quicho, complainant herein, in the following manner, to wit: said
SETTING ASIDE the impugned resolutions and ORDERING that the accused received in trust from Cecilia Maruyama the amount of
present reliefs sought in these cases by petitioner be allowed and Japanese Yen 1141 (sic) with peso equivalent to P3,839,465.00 under
given due course by respondent Sandiganbayan. obligation to deliver the money to Conchita Quicho at the NAIA
SO ORDERED. International Airport, Pasay City, immediately upon accused arrival
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, from Japan, but herein accused once in possession of the same, did,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur. then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate
Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., on leave. and convert to her own personal benefit the said amount, and
[G.R. No. 150185. May 27, 2004] despite demands accused failed and refused to do so, to the damage
TERESITA TANGHAL OKABE, petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO DE LEON and prejudice of the complainants in the aforesaid amount.
GUTIERREZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Pasay City, Contrary to law.[8]
Branch 119; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and CECILIA Appended to the Information was the affidavit-complaint of
MARUYAMA, respondents. respondent Maruyama and the resolution of Investigating Prosecutor
DECISION Vibandor. On May 19, 2000, the trial court issued a warrant for the
CALLEJO, SR., J.: arrest of the petitioner with a recommended bond of P40,000. On
June 15, 2000, the petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the said
13
amount, duly approved by Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, the 3. Accused is (sic) widow and the legitimate mother of three (3)
Presiding Judge of Branch 79 of the RTC of Quezon City, who children, two (2) of whom are still minors, namely:
forthwith recalled the said warrant. The approved personal bail bond 3.1. Okabe, Jeffrey-18 years old born on 13 August 1981.
of the petitioner was transmitted to the RTC of Pasig City on June 21, 3.2. Okabe, Masatoshi-14 years old and born on 16 October 1985,
2000. Upon her request, the petitioner was furnished with a certified 3rd year High School student at Hoshikuki, Chiba City, Matsugaoka,
copy of the Information, the resolution and the criminal complaint High School, residing at Chiba City, Chuo-Ku, Yahagi-cho, 205,
which formed part of the records of the said case. The petitioner left Telephone No. 043-224-5804.
the Philippines for Japan on June 17, 2000 without the trial courts 3.3. Okabe, Tomoki-13 years old and born on 13 March 1986, 2nd
permission, and returned to the Philippines on June 28, 2000. She year High School student at Hoshikuki, Chiba City, Matsugaoka, High
left the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, and returned on July 12, School, residing at Chiba City, Chuo-Ku, Yahagi-cho, 205, Telephone
2000. No. 043-224-5804.
On July 14, 2000, the trial court issued an Order setting the 3.4. The accused has to attend the Parents Teachers Association
petitioners arraignment and pre-trial at 2:00 p.m. of July 16, (PTA) at the Hoshikuki High School where her two (2) minor sons
2000. On the same day, the private prosecutor filed an urgent ex aforesaid are presently enrolled and studying because Okabe,
parte motion for the issuance of the hold departure order, alleging Masatoshis graduation will take place on 26 July 2000.
as follows: 3.5. The two (2) minor children of the accused absolutely depend
3. It has come to the knowledge of private complainant that there is their support (basic necessities) for foods, clothings, medicines,
an impending marriage within the Philippines of either the son or rentals, schooling and all other expenses for their survival to their
daughter of the above-named accused and that the above-named legitimate mother who is the accused herein.
accusedwho has businesses in Japan, and is presently in Japanwill 3.6. The issuance of the hold departure order (HDO) will impair the
soon exit Japan and enter the Philippines to precisely attend said inherent custodial rights of the accused as the legitimate mother
wedding; over these two (2) minor children which is repugnant to law.
4. Given [a] the bail was fixed at merely P40,000.00 and b] the 3.7. The issuance of the hold departure order (HDO) will unduly
considerable financial capability of the accused, it is a foregone restrict the accused to her custodial rights and visitation over her
conclusion that the above-named accused will, upon arrest, readily aforesaid minor children who are permanently living in Japan.
and immediately post bond, and leave for Japanthereby frustrating 3.8. The issuance of the hold departure order (HDO) will unduly
and rendering inutile the administration of criminal justice in our deprived (sic) these minor children to their right to obtain education
country. The speed with which accused Teresita Sheila Tanghal and survival.
Okabe can post bond and leave for Japaneffectively evading 4. Accuseds only source of income and livelihood is door-to-door
arraignment and pleathus necessitates the immediate issuance of a delivery from Japan to the Philippines and vice versa which has been
Hold Departure Order even before her arrival here in the Philippines; taking place for a very long period of time and in the process she has
[9]
been constantly departing from the Philippines on a weekly basis
The trial court issued an order on the same day, granting the motion and arriving in Japan on the same frequency, as evidenced by xerox
of the private prosecutor for the issuance of a hold departure order copies of the pages of her Philippine Passports which are hereto
and ordering the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) attached as Annexes A, A-1, A-2 up to A-30, respectively. To deprive
to hold and prevent any attempt on the part of the petitioner to her of this only source of her livelihood to which the aforesaid two
depart from the Philippines.[10] For her part, the petitioner filed on (2) minor children are deriving their very survival in a foreign land
July 17, 2000 a verified motion for judicial determination of probable will (sic) tantamount to oppression rather than prosecution and
cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only depriving the said minor sons of their right to live even before trial
documents appended to the Information submitted by the on the merits of this case that will (sic) tantamount to the
investigating prosecutor were respondent Maruyamas affidavit- destruction of the future of these minor children. [13]
complaint for estafa and the resolution of the investigating The private prosecutor opposed the petitioners motions during the
prosecutor; the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the hearing on July 21, 2000 which was also the date set for her
respondents counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by arraignment. The hearing of the motions as well as the arraignment
the parties were not attached thereto. The petitioner further alleged was reset to 2:00 p.m. of July 26, 2000. On the said date, the
that the documents submitted by the investigating prosecutor were petitioner filed a manifestation objecting to her arraignment prior to
not enough on which the trial court could base a finding of probable the resolution of her pending motions. She alleged that her
cause for estafa against her. She further averred that conformably to arraignment for the crime charged should not be made a condition
the rulings of this Court in Lim v. Felix[11] and Roberts, Jr. v. Court of for the granting of her motion to recall the hold departure order
Appeals,[12] it behooved the investigating prosecutor to submit the issued against her. The arraignment of the petitioner was again reset
following to the trial court to enable it to determine the presence or to 2:00 p.m. of August 28, 2000, pending the resolution of her two
absence of probable cause: (a) copies of the affidavits of the motions. On August 25, 2000, the petitioner filed a motion for the
witnesses of the complainant; (b) the counter-affidavit of Okabe and postponement of her arraignment alleging that, in case the trial
those of her witnesses; (c) the transcripts of stenographic notes court ruled adversely thereon, she would refuse to enter a plea and
taken during the preliminary investigation; and, (d) other documents seek relief from the appellate court. The court denied the petitioners
presented during the said investigation. motions on the following grounds:
On July 19, 2000, the petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion To (a) Based on its personal examination and consideration of the
Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated July 17, 2000 and/or allow Information, the affidavit-complaint of respondent Maruyama and
her to regularly travel to Japan alleging, thus: the resolution of the investigating prosecutor duly approved by the
14
city prosecutor, the court found probable cause for the petitioners trial courts decision was denied and her petition for the nullification
arrest. Since the petitioners motion for a determination of probable of the August 25, 2000 Order of the respondent judge was
cause was made after the court had already found probable cause dismissed. The CA ruled that by posting bail and praying for reliefs
and issued a warrant for the petitioners arrest, and after the latter from the trial court, the petitioner waived her right to assail the
filed a personal bail bond for her provisional liberty, such motion was respondent judges finding of the existence of probable cause. The
a mere surplusage; appellate court cited the ruling of this Court in Cojuangco, Jr. v.
(b) When the petitioner posted a personal bail bond for her Sandiganbayan.[20] Thus, the appellate court affirmed the assailed
provisional liberty, she thereby waived her right to question the order of the RTC, based on the respondent judges personal
courts finding of the existence of probable cause for her arrest and examination of respondent Maruyamas affidavit-complaint, the
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court, more so when she resolution of the investigating prosecutor and the Information
filed the motion for the lifting of the hold departure order the court approved by the city prosecutor, a finding of probable cause was in
issued, and the motion to defer the proceedings and her order. However, the appellate court allowed the petitioner to travel
arraignment; and to Japan under the following conditions:
(c) The hold departure order issued by the trial court was in accord (1) That petitioner post a bond double the amount of her alleged
with Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97 dated June 19, 1997, as well monetary liability under the Information filed against her, as
as the ruling of this Court in Manotoc, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.[14] recommended by the Office of the Solicitor General;
When the case was called for the petitioners arraignment at 2:00 (2) That petitioner inform respondent Court of each and all of her
p.m., on August 28, 2000, she refused to plead.[15] Her counsel travel itinerary prior to leaving the country;
advised her, in open court, not to enter a plea and, with leave of (3) That petitioner make periodic reports with respondent Court;
court, left the courtroom. The court then entered a not guilty plea (4) That petitioner furnish respondent Court with all the addresses of
for the petitioner.[16] It also issued an order, on the said date, setting her possible place of residence, both here and in Japan; and
the pre-trial and initial presentation of the evidence of the (5) Such other reasonable conditions which respondent Court may
prosecution at 8:30 a.m. of September 20, 2000.[17] deem appropriate under the circumstances. [21]
The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition The appellate court did not resolve the issue of whether the trial
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a plea for a court had prejudged the case and was partial to the prosecution. The
writ of preliminary injunction. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP decretal portion of the decision of the CA reads:
No. 60732. The petitioner ascribed the following errors to the trial WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant special civil action
court: for certiorari is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED insofar as the denial of
I petitioners Motion to Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated 14 July,
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT ISSUED 2000 and/or Allow the accused to Regularly Travel to Japan is
WARRANT OF ARREST DESPITE OF (SIC) LACK concerned. In all other respect, the same is hereby DENIED.
OF PROBABLE CAUSE SO ORDERED.[22]
II On March 6, 2001, the petitioner filed a motion for a partial
RESPONDENT COURT HAS VIOLATED THE reconsideration of the decision of the CA contending that the
RIGHT OF THE PETITIONER TO DUE PROCESS appellate court erred in applying the ruling of this court
III inCojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals[23] instead of Section 26, Rule 114
RESPONDENT COURT HAS ALREADY PRE-JUDGED of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The petitioner posited
THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER FOR ESTAFA that the said rule, which took effect on December 1, 2000, before
IV the court rendered its decision, had superseded the ruling of this
RESPONDENT COURT HAS EXHIBITED ITS APPARENT Court in the Cojuangco case. However, the appellate court held that
PARTIALITY TOWARDS THE PROSECUTION AND Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
AGAINST THE PETITIONER cannot be applied retroactively, because the petitioner had posted
V bail on June 15, 2000 before the Revised Rules on Criminal
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DENIES (SIC) THE Procedure took effect.
MOTION FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari for the reversal of
PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF ROBERTS, JR. the decision and resolution of the CA and praying that after due
VI proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor, thus:
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DENIES (SIC) WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme
THE LIFTING/RECALL OF THE HDO AND/OR ALLOWING THE Court that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in favor of
PETITIONER TO TRAVEL TO JAPAN REGULARLY FOR the petitioner and against the respondents as follows:
HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATION (a) GIVING DUE COURSE to the instant petition;
VII (b) ORDERING the REVERSAL and PARTIALLY SETTING ASIDE of the
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF Decision promulgated on 31 January 2001 (Annex A hereof) of the
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION Honorable Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60732 as well as its
WHEN IT ISSUED THE QUESTIONED ORDERS[18] Resolution promulgated on 27 September 2001 (Annex B hereof);
On January 31, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision [19] partially granting (c) ORDERING the DISMISSAL of Crim. Case No. 00-0749 for lack of
the petition in that the assailed order of the trial court denying the probable cause;
petitioners motion to lift/recall the hold departure order was set (d) DECLARING the entire proceedings in Crim. Case No. 00-0749 as
aside. However, the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the null and void;
15
(e) ORDERING the private respondents to pay the petitioners the The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error in not
following amount: applying Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
(i) at least P1,000,000.00 as moral damages; Procedure.
(ii) at least P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages; II
(iii) at least P500,000.00 as attorneys fees and for other expenses of The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error in ruling that
litigation. the infirmity, if any, in the issuance by the respondent Judge of the
(f) ORDERING the private respondent to pay the costs of this suit. warrant of arrest against petitioner was cured when petitioner
(g) Petitioner further prays for such other reliefs just and equitable voluntarily submitted to the trial courts jurisdiction when she posted
under the premises.[24] bail and filed motions seeking for affirmative reliefs from the trial
The petitioner asserts that the CA committed the following reversible court, such as the motion to lift/recall Hold Departure Order (HDO)
errors: and to allow petitioner to travel regularly to Japan.
I III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error in applying
WHEN IT COMPLETELY DISREGARDED THE APPLICATION OF SECTION the ruling in the Cojuangco case.
26, RULE 114 OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IV
WHICH TOOK EFFECT ON 01 DECEMBER 2000 WHICH IS FAVORABLE The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error in finding
TO THE PETITIONER/ACCUSED. that respondent Judge complied with the constitutional
II requirements on the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN V
RULING THAT WHATEVER INFIRMITY THERE WAS IN THE ISSUANCE The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error when it did
OF THE WARRANT OF ARREST, THE SAME WAS CURED WHEN not rule on the partiality of the respondent Judge in handling
PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE RESPONDENT Criminal Case No. 00-0749.
COURTS JURISDICTION WHEN SHE POSTED BAIL AND FILED VI
MOTIONS SEEKING AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF SUCH AS MOTION TO The Honorable Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error
LIFT/RECALL HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER AND TO ALLOW PETITIONER when it did not rule on petitioners claim of forum shopping. [26]
TO TRAVEL REGULARLY TO JAPAN (Last paragraph, Page 9 DECISION The Court shall resolve the assigned errors simultaneously as they
dated 31 January 2001). are interrelated.
III The petitioner asserts that the respondent judge could not have
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR determined the existence of probable cause for her arrest solely on
WHEN IT RELIED UPON THE RULING IN THE CASE OF COJUANGCO, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor and the undated
JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, [300 SCRA 367 (1998)] WHEN IN FACT SAID affidavit-complaint of respondent Maruyama. She posits that the
RULING IS NOW OBSOLETE AND NO LONGER APPLICABLE. respondent judge should have ordered the investigating prosecutor
IV to submit the affidavits of the witnesses of respondent Maruyama
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN and the latters documentary evidence, as well as the counter-
RULING THAT RESPONDENT COURT COMPLIED WITH THE affidavit of the petitioner and the transcripts of the stenographic
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ON THE ISSUANCE OF WARRANT notes, if any, taken during the preliminary investigation. The
OF ARREST WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE, WHEN THE RESPONDENT petitioner adds that the respondent judge should have personally
COURT MERELY RELIED ON [THE] (i) COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT OF reviewed the said documents, conformably to the rulings of this
CECILIA MARUYAMA; (ii) RESOLUTION OF THE INVESTIGATING Court in Lim v. Felix,[27]Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals[28] and Ho v.
PROSECUTOR; AND (iii) CRIMINAL INFORMATION. People,[29] before determining the presence or absence of probable
V cause. She posits that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying
WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE ON THE PARTIALITY OF THE RESPONDENT her motion for a determination of probable cause, and the
JUDGE IN HANDLING THE CASE BELOW WHICH IS VIOLATIVE OF THE alternative motion for a dismissal of the case against her for lack of
PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. probable cause.
VI The petitioner further asserts that the appellate court erred in
THE FILING OF CRIM. CASE NO. 4297 (MTC, ANGAT, BULACAN) FOR affirming the ruling of the respondent judge that, by posting a
ESTAFA ENTITLED PEOPLE VS. SHEILA OKABE; CIVIL CASE NO. 331-M- personal bail bond for her provisional liability and by filing several
98 (RTC, MALOLOS, BULACAN) FOR SUM OF MONEY WITH motions for relief, she thereby voluntarily submitted herself to the
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT ENTITLED CONCHITA SANCHEZ-QUICHO jurisdiction of the trial court and waived her right to assail the
VS. SHEILA TERESITA TANGHAL OKABE; AND CRIM. CASE NO. 00-07- infirmities that infected the trial courts issuance of the warrant for
19 (RTC, PASAY CITY, BRANCH 119) ENTITLED PEOPLE VS. TERESITA her arrest. She avers that the appellate courts reliance on the ruling
TANGHAL OKABE CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON NON- of this Court in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[30] is misplaced, and
FORUM SHOPPING.[25] submits that the appellate court should have applied Section 26,
By way of comment, the Office of the Solicitor General refuted the Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court retroactively, as it rendered
petitioners assigned errors, contending as follows: the ruling of this Court in the Cojuangco, Jr. case obsolete.
I The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, asserts that
the respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
when he found probable cause against the petitioner for estafa, and
16
thereafter issued a warrant for her arrest. It argues that the necessity to avert her incarceration; it should not be deemed as a
respondent judge personally determined the existence of probable waiver of her right to assail her arrest. So this Court ruled inPeople v.
cause independently of the certification of the investigating Red:[38]
prosecutor, and only after examining the Information, the resolution The present defendants were arrested towards the end of January,
of the investigating prosecutor, as well as the affidavit-complaint of 1929, on the Island and Province of Marinduque by order of the
the private complainant. It asserts that such documents are judge of the Court of First Instance of Lucena, Tayabas, at a time
sufficient on which to anchor a finding of probable cause. It insists when there were no court sessions being held in Marinduque. In
that the appellate court correctly applied the ruling of this Court in view of these circumstances and the number of the accused, it may
theCojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals case, and that the respondent properly be held that the furnishing of the bond was prompted by
judge complied with both the requirements of the constitution and the sheer necessity of not remaining in detention, and in no way
those set forth in the Rules of Court before issuing the said warrant. implied their waiver of any right, such as the summary examination
[31]
of the case before their detention. That they had no intention of
We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the appellate waiving this right is clear from their motion of January 23, 1929, the
court erred in not applying Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules same day on which they furnished a bond, and the fact that they
on Criminal Procedure, viz: renewed this petition on February 23, 1929, praying for the stay of
SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or their arrest for lack of the summary examination; the first motion
irregular preliminary investigation. An application for or admission to being denied by the court on January 24, 1929 (G.R. No. 33708, page
bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his 8), and the second remaining undecided, but with an order to have it
arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing presented in Boac, Marinduque.
the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary Therefore, the defendants herein cannot be said to have waived the
investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them right granted to them by section 13, General Order No. 58, as
before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early amended by Act No. 3042.[39]
as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case. Moreover, the next day, or on June 16, 2000, the petitioner, through
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on counsel, received certified true copies of the Information, the
Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended to modify previous rulings resolution of the investigating prosecutor, the affidavit-complaint of
of this Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the private complainant, respondent Maruyama, and a certification
the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to assail the from the branch clerk of court that only the Information, resolution
warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities and affidavit-complaint formed part of the entire records of the
thereon.[32] The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court case. The next day, June 17, 2000, the petitioner, through counsel,
in People v. Red.[33] The new rule is curative in nature because filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause
precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in and to defer the proceedings and her arraignment. All the foregoing
procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are are inconsistent with a waiver of her right to assail the validity of her
applicable. Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in arrest and to question the respondent judges determination of the
application.[34] Besides, procedural rules as a general rule operate existence of probable cause for her arrest.
retroactively, even without express provisions to that effect, to cases Neither can the petitioners filing of a motion for the lifting of the
pending at the time of their effectivity, in other words to actions yet hold departure order and for leave to go to Japan be considered a
undetermined at the time of their effectivity.[35] Before the appellate waiver of her right to assail the validity of the arrest warrant issued
court rendered its decision on January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules by the respondent judge. It bears stressing that when the petitioner
on Criminal Procedure was already in effect. It behooved the filed the motion to lift the hold departure order issued against her by
appellate court to have applied the same in resolving the petitioners the respondent judge, her motion for a determination of probable
petition for certiorari and her motion for partial reconsideration. cause was still unresolved. She sought a lifting of the hold departure
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting order on July 14, 2000 and filed a motion for leave to go to Japan, to
her personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that she waived her right give the respondent judge an opportunity to reconsider the said
to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of order, preparatory to assailing the same in the appellate court in
arrest issued against her by the respondent judge. There must be case her motion was denied.
clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual The issue that now comes to fore is whether or not the respondent
intention to relinquish her right to question the existence of judge committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess
probable cause.[36] When the only proof of intention rests on what a or lack of jurisdiction in issuing his August 25, 2000 Order. By grave
party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and abuse of discretion is meant such patent and gross abuse of
indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
[37]
In this case, the records show that a warrant was issued by the contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
respondent judge in Pasay City for the arrest of the petitioner, a and despotic manner by reasons of passion or personal hostility.
[40]
resident of Guiguinto, Bulacan. When the petitioner learned of the Hence, when the court has jurisdiction over the case, its
issuance of the said warrant, she posted a personal bail bond to questioned acts, even if its findings are not correct, would at most
avert her arrest and secure her provisional liberty. Judge Demetrio B. constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by
Macapagal of the RTC of Quezon City approved the bond and issued the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. [41]
an order recalling the warrant of arrest against the petitioner. Thus, We agree with the petitioner that before the RTC judge issues a
the posting of a personal bail bond was a matter of imperative warrant of arrest under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court [42] in
17
relation to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the judge for a long length of time. The expense to establish innocence may
must make a personal determination of the existence or non- also be prohibitive and can be more punishing especially to the poor
existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. The duty and the powerless. Innocence ought to be enough and the business
to make such determination ispersonal and exclusive to the issuing of this Court is to shield the innocent from senseless suits right from
judge. He cannot abdicate his duty and rely on the certification of the start.[48]
the investigating prosecutor that he had conducted a preliminary In determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for
investigation in accordance with law and the Rules of Court, as the arrest of the accused, the RTC judge may rely on the findings and
amended, and found probable cause for the filing of the Information. conclusions in the resolution of the investigating prosecutor finding
Under Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the probable cause for the filing of the Information. After all, as the
investigating prosecutor, in conducting a preliminary investigation of Court held in Webb v. De Leon,[49] the judge just personally reviews
a case cognizable by the RTC, is tasked to determine whether there is the initial determination of the investigating prosecutor finding a
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.
[50]
been committed and the respondent therein is probably guilty However, in determining the existence or non-existence of
thereof and should be held for trial. A preliminary investigation is for probable cause for the arrest of the accused, the judge should not
the purpose of securing the innocent against hasty, malicious and rely solely on the said report.[51] The judge should consider not only
oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the
accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a affidavit/affidavits and the documentary evidence of the parties, the
public trial.[43] counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the
If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause for the filing of transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary
the Information against the respondent, he executes a certification investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating
at the bottom of the Information that from the evidence presented, prosecutor upon the filing of the Information. [52] Indeed, in Ho v.
there is a reasonable ground to believe that the offense charged has People,[53] this Court held that:
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the
thereof. Such certification of the investigating prosecutor is, by itself, case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and
ineffective. It is not binding on the trial court. Nor may the RTC rely examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial
on the said certification as basis for a finding of the existence of courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every
probable cause for the arrest of the accused. [44] case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an
In contrast, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must
filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the existence have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint,
or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or
accused. Probable cause is meant such set of facts and transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the
man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or any findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The
offense included therein has been committed by the person sought point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutors
to be arrested.[45] In determining probable cause, the average man recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the
weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the
of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives
relies on common sense.[46] A finding of probable cause needs only to his report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat,
rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the
committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a
cause demands more than bare suspicion, it requires less than judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification
evidence which would justify conviction. [47] or the report of the investigating officer. [54]
The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable The rulings of this Court are now embedded in Section 8(a), Rule 112
cause for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very start of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that an
those falsely charged of crimes from the tribulations, expenses and Information or complaint filed in court shall be supported by the
anxiety of a public trial: affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses,
It must be stressed, however, that in these exceptional cases, the together with the other supporting evidence of the resolution:
Court took the extraordinary step of annulling findings of probable SEC. 8. Records. (a) Records supporting the information or
cause either to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to complaint. An information or complaint filed in court shall be
protect the orderly administration of justice. The constitutional duty supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and
of this Court in criminal litigations is not only to acquit the innocent their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence and the
after trial but to insulate, from the start, the innocent from resolution on the case.
unfounded charges.For the Court is aware of the strains of a criminal If the judge is able to determine the existence or non-existence of
accusation and the stresses of litigation which should not be suffered probable cause on the basis of the records submitted by the
by the clearly innocent. The filing of an unfounded criminal investigating prosecutor, there would no longer be a need to order
information in court exposes the innocent to severe distress the elevation of the rest of the records of the case. However, if the
especially when the crime is not bailable. Even an acquittal of the judge finds the records and/or evidence submitted by the
innocent will not fully bleach the dark and deep stains left by a investigating prosecutor to be insufficient, he may order the
baseless accusation for reputation once tarnished remains tarnished dismissal of the case, or direct the investigating prosecutor either to
18
submit more evidence or to submit the entire records of the the latter admitted in her affidavit-complaint that the document
preliminary investigation, to enable him to discharge his duty. [55] The evidencing the remittance was signed by Lorna Tanghal, not by the
judge may even call the complainant and his witness to themselves petitioner. The petitioner claimed that Lorna Tanghal had to remit
answer the courts probing questions to determine the existence of US$1,000 to respondent Maruyama because the latter made it
probable cause.[56] The rulings of this Court in Soliven v. appear to Tanghal that the police authorities were about to arrest
Makasiar[57] and Lim v. Felix[58] are now embodied in Section 6, Rule the petitioner, and Tanghal was impelled to give the amount to
112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, with respondent Maruyama to avert her arrest and incarceration;
modifications, viz: Sixth. In her counter-affidavit, the petitioner alleged that respondent
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Maruyama had no case against her because the crime charged in the
Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or latters affidavit-complaint was the same as that filed against her in
information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the the Metropolitan Trial Court of Bulacan, which was withdrawn by the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss complainant herself;
the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable Seventh. The investigating prosecutor stated in his resolution that
cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, the private complainant established the element of deceit. However,
or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested the crime charged against the petitioner as alleged in the
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the Information is estafa with abuse of confidence.
preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was In sum, then, we find and so declare that the respondent judge
filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to lack of jurisdiction in finding probable cause for the petitioners arrest
present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the in the absence of copies of the affidavits of the witnesses of the
issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the private complainant and her reply affidavit, the counter-affidavit of
filing of the complaint of information. the petitioner, and the evidence adduced during the preliminary
In this case, the investigating prosecutor submitted to the investigation before the investigating prosecutor.
respondent judge only his resolution after his preliminary In view of the foregoing disquisitions, there is no more need to
investigation of the case and the affidavit-complaint of the private resolve the other issues raised by the petitioner.
complainant, and failed to include the affidavits of the witnesses of IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
the private complainant, and the latters reply affidavit, the counter- assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
affidavit of the petitioner, as well as the evidence adduced by the ASIDE. The assailed Orders dated August 25 and 28, 2000 and the
private complainant as required by case law, and now by Section Warrant of Arrest issued by the respondent judge in Criminal Case
8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The No. 00-0749 are SET ASIDE. The records are REMANDED to the
aforecited affidavits, more specifically the fax message of Lorna Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 119. The respondent judge
Tanghal and the document signed by her covering the amount of is hereby DIRECTED to determine the existence or non-existence of
US$1,000, are of vital importance, as they would enable the probable cause for the arrest of the petitioner based on the
respondent judge to properly determine the existence or non- complete records, as required under Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the
existence of probable cause. Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
First. When respondent Maruyama handed the money to the SO ORDERED.
petitioner, she did not require the latter to sign a document Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga,
acknowledging receipt of the amount. The petitioner avers that it is JJ., concur.
incredible that Maruyama would entrust P3,993,500 in Japanese Yen Puno, (Chairman), J., on official leave.
to her without even requiring her to sign a receipt therefor, JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, G.R. No. 189122
especially since respondent Maruyama was not even the owner of Petitioner,
the money; Present:
Second. The affidavit of Hermogena Santiago, a witness of the
respondent, is unreliable, because it is based on information relayed CORONA, J., Chairperson,
to her by Lorna Tanghal that she (Tanghal) saw the petitioner VELASCO, JR.,
carrying a Louis Vuitton bag while on board a Mitsubishi L300 van - v e r s u s - NACHURA,
with the petitioner. It appears that Tanghal failed to submit any PERALTA and
counter-affidavit to the investigating prosecutor; MENDOZA, JJ.
Third. The affidavit of Marilette G. Izumiya, another witness of the
respondent, is also unreliable, as it was based on information relayed THE COURT OF APPEALS
to her by Thelma Barbiran, who used to work for the petitioner as a and PEOPLE OF THE
housemaid, that she (Barbiran) had in her possession a fax message PHILIPPINES,
from Lorna Tanghal, implicating the petitioner in the crime Respondents. Promulgated:
charged. Barbiran did not execute any affidavit; March 17, 2010
Fourth. There is no indication in the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor that the petitioner received the fax message of Lorna x---------------------------------------------------
Tanghal; x
Fifth. The private complainant claims that the petitioner tried to
reimburse the P3,993,500 by remitting US$1,000 to her. However,
19
DECISION The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail.[13] It
invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal,
that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should
CORONA, J.: be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Citing
well-established jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside
law for his release to guarantee his appearance before any court as the prison facility. It found that petitioner
may be required,[1] is the answer of the criminal justice system to a
vexing question: what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his
has not yet been proven, in the dubious interval, often years long, continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his
between arrest and final adjudication? [2] Bail acts as a reconciling health or put his life in danger. x x x Notably, the physical condition
mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in pretrial of [petitioner] does not prevent him from seeking medical attention
liberty and societys interest in assuring the accusedspresence at trial. while confined in prison, though he clearly preferred to be attended
[3]
by his personal physician.[14]

Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not

punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the For purposes of determining whether petitioners application for bail
accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically begin could be allowed pending appeal, the Court of Appeals also
serving time immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to considered the fact of petitioners conviction. It made a preliminary
bail.[4] An accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an evaluation of petitioners case and made a prima facie determination
appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper. An that there was no reason substantial enough to overturn the
erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to evidence of petitioners guilt.
pay a debt to society he has never owed. [5] Even if the conviction is Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.[15]
subsequently affirmed, however, the accuseds interest in bail
pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review, Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of
opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential his application for bail, considering that none of the conditions
hardships of prison.[6] On the other hand, society has a compelling justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual who 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioners theory is that,
is found guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years
warrant prison time.[7] Other recognized societal interests in the but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the
denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an
theaccuseds flight from court custody, the protection of the appellant pending appeal.
community from potential danger and the avoidance of delay in
punishment.[8] Under what circumstances an accused may obtain bail THE ISSUE
pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of
society and those of the accused.[9]
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail
grant of bail pending appeal to those convicted by the Regional Trial pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the
life imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that
courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances
the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules
laxity but with grave caution and only for strong of Court?
reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by
the trial court. [10] Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
THE FACTS
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it
minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court.
maximum.[11] However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused
changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.[12] Pending application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the
appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appellate court.
appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming
the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
20
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed any of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of
to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, petitioner
under the same bail subject to the consent of thebondsman. asserts that the Court of Appeals committed a grave error and
prejudged the appeal by denying his application for bail on the
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding ground that the evidence that he committed a capital offense was
six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be strong.
cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the We disagree.
accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or resolution without or in excess of its jurisdiction. One, pending
has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
reiteration; punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary. Two, the
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid this where the decision of the trial court convicting the accused
justification; changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable is
exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate court. Thus, the
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioners
or conditional pardon; urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal.

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals
flight if released on bail; or committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners
application for bail pending appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime simply an error in judgment but it is such a capricious and whimsical
during the pendency of the appeal. exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
[18]
Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an
review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
adverse party in either case. (emphasis supplied) hostility.[19] It must be so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by
Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances or to act at all in contemplation of the law. In other words, for a
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of
of Court, an application for bail by an appellant sentenced by the caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. [20]
Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than six years
imprisonment should automatically be granted. Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail
pending appeal, the Court of Appeals exercised its
Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of judgment capriciously and whimsically. No capriciousness or
procedural and substantive rules. arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion was ever imputed to the
appellate court. Nor could any such implication or imputation be
BASIC PROCEDURAL CONCERNS inferred. As observed earlier, the Court of Appeals exercised grave
FORBID GRANT OF PETITION caution in the exercise of its discretion. The denial of petitioners
application for bail pending appeal was not unreasonable but was
the result of a thorough assessment of petitioners claim of ill health.
Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of By making a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case for the
the Rules of Court to assail the denial by the Court of Appeals of his purpose of granting bail, the court also determined whether the
urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal. While the appeal was frivolous or not, or whether it raised a substantial
said remedy may be resorted to challenge an interlocutory order, question. The appellate court did not exercise its discretion in a
such remedy is proper only where the interlocutory order was careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings of this Court.
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[16] At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeals erroneous
application and interpretation of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Other than the sweeping averment that [t]he Court of Appeals Court. However, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners issued to cure errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of
application for bail pending appeal despite the fact that none of the law or fact.[21] In this connection, Lee v. People[22] is apropos:
conditions to justify the denial thereof under Rule 114, Section 5 [is]
present, much less proven by the prosecution,[17] however, petitioner Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the
actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction over the case,
with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the even if its findings are not correct. Its questioned acts would at most
Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the absence of
21
constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by
certiorari. Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right
when the offense charged is not punishable by
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand,
jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
courts findings and conclusions. An interlocutory order may be punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail
assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the becomes a matter of discretion.
court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of
allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5,
will not only delay the administration of justice but will also unduly Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied.[25] (emphasis supplied)
burden the courts. [23] (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This
means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has
WORDING OF THIRD PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 5, the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending
RULE 114 CONTRADICTS PETITIONERS appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating [26] circumstances in
INTERPRETATION the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other
words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where
none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself,
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios constitute abuse of discretion.
where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is
imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with the On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court
circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain
quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission of the crime whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail
legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending
of his bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.
while under probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances
indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail
committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two
other similar circumstances) not present. The second scenario stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the
contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances. appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will
The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound
clarity in the commentary of retired Supreme Court discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in remedial law: pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where,
assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario allowing
Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all
accused may be summarized in the following rules: relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity
xxxxxxxxx and justice;[27] on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow
bail.
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second
imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any scenario, the appellate courts stringent discretion requires that the
other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the
discretion (Sec. 5); proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial
to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is
any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such
circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent
court (Sec. 5); x x x[24] (emphasis supplied) sound discretion approach.

Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the

Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority two different situations that are governed by the third paragraph of
in remedial law, is of the same thinking: Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a simplistic
22
treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said provision and the appeal is not pro forma and merely intended for delay but
trivializes the established policy governing the grant of bail pending presents a fairly debatable issue.[35] This must be so; otherwise, the
appeal. appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting
appeals made for the purpose of taking advantage of a lenient
In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments reveals that attitude on bail pending appeal. Even more significantly, this
it interprets the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all comports with the very strong presumption on appeal that the lower
situations where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the courts exercise of discretionary power was sound,[36]specially since
appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such the rules on criminal procedure require that no judgment shall be
a situation, the grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to reversed or modified by the Court of Appeals except for substantial
limited discretion, that is, one restricted to the determination of error.[37]
whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances exists. The
implication of this position is that, if any such circumstance is Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five
present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be granted situations mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is
pending appeal. wrong. By restricting the bail-negating circumstances to those
expressly mentioned, petitioner applies
Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere the expressio unius est exclusio alterius[38] rule in statutory
fact-finding body whose authority is limited to determining whether construction. However, the very language of the third paragraph of
any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts the idea that the enumeration of the
Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its discretion into five situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The provision
merely filling out the checklist of circumstances in the third categorically refers to the following or other similar
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where the penalty circumstances. Hence, under the rules, similarly relevant situations
imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is other than those listed in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
imprisonment exceeding six years. In short, petitioners interpretation may be considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail
severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court by requiring it to pending appeal.
determine a singular factual issue whether any of the five bail-
negating circumstances is present. Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that
leads to unreasonable or senseless consequences. An absurd
However, judicial discretion has been defined as choice.[28] Choice situation will result from adopting petitioners interpretation that,
occurs where, between two alternatives or among a possibly infinite where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment
number (of options), there is more than one possible outcome, with exceeding six years, bail ought to be granted if none of the listed
the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker. [29] On the bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal
other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years of
the end of discretion.[30] Thus, by severely clipping the appellate imprisonment will be more lenient than in cases where the penalty
courts discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding imposed does not exceed six years. While denial or revocation of bail
body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years
the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment must be made only if any of the five bail-negating
imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioners theory effectively conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty
renders nugatory the provision thatupon conviction by the Regional imposed does not exceed six years imprisonment may be denied
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by even without those conditions.
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail
is discretionary. Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that
bail pending appeal be more accessible to those convicted of serious
The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of offenses, compared to those convicted of less serious crimes?
Appeals in this case) to rule on applications for bail pending appeal
must necessarily involve the exercise of judgment on the part of the
court. The court must be allowed reasonable latitude to express its PETITIONERS THEORY DEVIATES FROM HISTORY
own view of the case, its appreciation of the facts and its AND EVOLUTION OF RULE ON BAIL PENDING APPEAL
understanding of the applicable law on the matter. [31] In view of the
grave caution required of it, the court should consider whether or
not, under all circumstances, the accused will be present to abide by Petitioners interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the
his punishment if his conviction is affirmed. [32] It should also give due history and evolution of the provisions on bail pending appeal.
regard to any other pertinent matters beyond the record of the
particular case, such as the record, character and reputation of the The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under Sections
applicant,[33] among other things. More importantly, the discretion to 3 to 6, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure:
determine allowance or disallowance of bail pending appeal
necessarily includes, at the very least, an initial determination that Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of
the appeal is not frivolous but raises a substantial question of law or First Instance. After judgment by a municipal judge and before
fact which must be determined by the appellate court. [34] In other conviction by the Court of First Instance, the defendant shall be
words, a threshold requirement for the grant of bail is a showing that admitted to bail as of right.
23
 thanreclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted
Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court of First by the trial court of the offense charged or of a lesser offense than
Instance. After conviction by the Court of First Instance, defendant that charged in the complaint or information, he may be allowed to
may, upon application, be bailed at the discretion of the court. remain free on his original bail pending the resolution of his appeal,
unless the proper court directs otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec.
Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. A capital offense, as the term is used 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, as amended;
in this rule, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of
its commission, and at the time of the application to be admitted to 2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense
bail, may be punished by death. which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time
of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is
Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. No person in custody for the out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser
commission of a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the offense than that charged in the complaint or information, the
evidence of his guilt is strong. same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied;

3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense

The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of
Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the the application for bail is punishable by reclusionperpetua and is out
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to on bail and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense
read as follows: charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, in confinement pending resolution of his appeal.
shall before final conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right,
except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the are now pending appeal before his Court where the accused is still
application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when on provisional liberty, the following rules are laid down:
evidence of guilt is strong.
1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused
Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used within ten (10) days from notice to the court of origin. The
in this Rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time bondsman thereupon, shall inform this Court of the fact of
of its commission, and at the time of the application to be admitted surrender, after which, the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered
to bail, may be punished by death. (emphasis supplied) by this Court;

The significance of the above changes was clarified in Administrative 2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National
Circular No. 2-92 dated January 20, 1992 as follows: Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police as the accused
shall remain under confinement pending resolution of his appeal;
The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is
laid down in Section 3 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal 3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid
Procedure, as amended, which provides: period of ten (10) days, his bond shall be forfeited and an order of
arrest shall be issued by this Court. The appeal taken by the accused
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall shall also be dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised
before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except Rules of Court as he shall be deemed to have jumped his bail.
those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the (emphasis supplied)
law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application
for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No.
is strong. 12-94 dated August 16, 1994 which brought about important
changes in the said rules as follows:
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with
a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. All persons in custody shall: (a)
shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial
that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong. Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with
as well as pending cases before the trial courts, this Court en sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by
banc lays down the following policies concerning theeffectivity of the law of this Rule. (3a)
bail of the accused, to wit:
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the
1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on
application for bail is punishable by a penalty lower application, may admit the accused to bail.
24
 bail was a matter of right at any stage of the action where the charge
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on was not for a capital offense or was not punished
provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period of by reclusion perpetua.[39]
appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94
years but not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be made bail pending appeal (of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court
denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the imprisonment) discretionary. Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-94
following or other similar circumstances: laid down more stringent rules on the matter of post-conviction
grant of bail.
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by
circumstance of reiteration; clearly identifying which court has authority to act on applications
for bail pending appeal under certain conditions and in particular
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal situations. More importantly, it reiterated the tough on bail pending
confinement, evaded sentence or has violated the conditions of his appeal configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In
bail without valid justification; particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, before final conviction.[40] Under the present rule, bail is a matter of
parole, under conditional pardon; discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the Indeed, pursuant to the tough on bail pending appeal policy, the
probability of flight if released on bail; or presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or
revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense
the accused may commit another crime. punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where
bail is prohibited.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial
Court, on motion and with notice to the adverse party. (n) Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards
approach to bail pending appeal? What is more in conformity with
SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is an ex abundante cautelam view of bail pending appeal? Is it a rule
used in these Rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the which favors the automatic grant of bail in the absence of any of the
time of its commission and at the time of the application to be circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114? Or
admitted to bail, maybe punished with death. (4) is it a rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due consideration
of all relevant circumstances, even if none of the circumstances
SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown
byreclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is on bail pending appeal parallels the approach adopted in the United
strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the States where our original constitutional and procedural provisions on
criminal prosecution. (emphasis supplied) bail emanated.[41] While this is of course not to be followed blindly, it
nonetheless shows that our treatment of bail pending appeal is no
different from that in other democratic societies.
The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to Rule In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the
114 were thereafter amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as allowance of bail pending appeal is anchored on the principle that
they do now. judicial discretion particularly with respect to extending bail should
The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for strong
towards a more restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. It reasons.[42] In fact, it has even been pointed out that grave caution
indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that is, bail that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to
pending appeal should be allowed not with leniency but with grave a convicted accused is best illustrated and exemplified in
caution and only for strong reasons. Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section 5.[43]

The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:
conviction for a non-capital offense by the Court of First Instance
(predecessor of the Regional Trial Court) discretionary. The 1988 The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying
amendments made applications for bail pending appeal favorable to principle that bail should be granted only where it is uncertain
the appellant-applicant. Bail before final conviction in trial courts for whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that
non-capital offenses or offenses not punishable uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be
by reclusion perpetua was a matter of right, meaning, admission to absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted
25
the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE
applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be DECISION
properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so BERSAMIN, J.:
enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and
attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction. during trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and
[44]
(emphasis supplied) determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution's case,
albeit a good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight or for
As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of
relying thereon, the Court declared in Yap v. Court of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial. 1
Appeals[45] (promulgated in 2001 when the present rules were The Case
already effective), that denial of bail pending appeal is a matter of Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan
wise discretion. Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the resolutions dated July 14,
20142 and August 8, 20143 issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged
A FINAL WORD with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the
resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides: Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable Antecedents
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of
recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied) their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence his Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6 praying, among
terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be
[46]
From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At found against him. The motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan
the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition. 7
grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying
accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail Enrile’s motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of
pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily
This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and surrendered or been placed under the custody of the
evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 law.8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile. 9
of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial courts On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile
initial determination that the accused should be in voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the
prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame,
conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This Quezon City, and was later on confined at the Philippine National
is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical examination. 10
often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General
addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain Hospital ,11 and his Motion to Fix Bail ,12 both dated July 7, 2014,
prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014.13 In support
bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail
in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the
which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with
processes. plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal , not
reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. physical condition must further be seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed
The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the resolution denying Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:
merits, the appeal of petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA- x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its
G.R. CR No. 32159, with dispatch. evidence and the Court shall have made a determination that the
Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand
RENATO C. CORONA bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-
Associate Justice bound to fix the amount of his bail.
G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015 To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, fact, accused Enrile has not filed an application for bail. Necessarily,
vs. no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature
for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.
26
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty,
because while he is charged with plunder, "the maximum penalty regardless of the attendant circumstances.
that may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not Ruling of the Court
reclusion perpetua." He anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70) 1.
years old and that he voluntarily surrendered. "Accordingly, it may Bail protects the right of the accused to
be said that the crime charged against Enrile is not punishable by due process and to be presumed innocent
reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable." In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
The argument has no merit. until the contrary is proved.18 The presumption of innocence is
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the
circumstance/s is not taken into consideration. These circumstances constitutional right to be released on bail,19 and further binds the
will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the
trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense charged. x x x accused.20
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused
because he is not a flight risk and his physical condition must also be from committing additional crimes.[[21] The purpose of bail is to
seriously considered by the Court. guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever
Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being a so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high
flight risk are among the factors that are considered in fixing a enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but
reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty
strong. before or during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s accused’s presence at trial.23
Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of merit. 2.
SO ORDERED.14 Bail may be granted as a
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s second assailed matter of right or of discretion
resolution to deny Enrile’s motion for reconsideration filed vis-à-vis The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of
the July 14, 2014 resolution. 15 Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
certiorari , namely: reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
matter of right. Enrile may be deemed to fall within the exception recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
only upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
of guilt is strong. This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 114 24 of
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that the Rules of Court , as follows:
Enrile, if ever he would be convicted, is punishable by reclusion Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right. perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
evidence of Enrile’s guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
to bail as a matter of right. evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.16 prosecution.
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that,
entitled to bail as matter of right; th at it is the duty and burden of under the law existing at the time of its commission and the
the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes application for admission to bail, may be punished with death. 25
under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being
to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is
convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with
the presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age and his reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his
voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or
proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the
that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he
he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or
standing. with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
In its Comment ,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. 26 Once it has
bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense; that to be been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail
granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to shall be recognized.27
determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court
27
in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the
right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the
offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life accused to due process.
imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by of evidence and reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to
death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even prior to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the
conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the
or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong. 28 evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and
conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, whether or not the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; 29 or (2) if the RTC has Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court can
imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination where the
none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section Fiscal is neither present nor heard.
5, Rule 114 is present, as follows: The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or discretion of the court, should primarily determine whether or not
has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. For this purpose,
reiteration; a summary hearing means:
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of
justification; hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the
conditional pardon; merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it
flight if released on bail; or speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime may be therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be
during the pendency of the appeal. left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to
3. receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters,
Admission to bail in offenses punished avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion examination.33
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the
offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral,34 to wit:
imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the 1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify
Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma ,30 "such discretion may the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require
be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be Rules of Court, as amended);
granted provisional liberty." It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail 2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
the Prosecution. 31 The indispensability of the hearing with notice has strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
been aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz. :32 discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court 3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the
already ruled in People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is summary of evidence of the prosecution;
mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is charged 4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused
with a capital offense, in this wise: upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder petition should be denied.
case without any hearing on the motion asking for it, without 3.
bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment, as it Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail
turned out later, over its strong objections. The court granted bail on We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the
the sole basis of the complaint and the affidavits of three policemen, presence of two mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated
not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever the in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time of
court possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was the alleged commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily
intended only for prima facie determining whether or not there is surrendered.35
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime Enrile’s averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution,
was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably whose Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that –
committed it. Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each 8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that
individual accused still has to be established unless the prosecution might be imposed upon Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the
submits the issue on whatever it has already presented. To presence of two mitigating circumstances, suffice it to state that the
28
presence or absence of mitigating circumstances is also not conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering from the following
consideration that the Constitution deemed worthy. The relevant conditions:
clause in Section 13 is "charged with an offense punishable by." It is, (1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on
therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that has multiple drug therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
bearing and not the possibility of mitigating circumstances being (2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the
appreciated in the accused’s favor. 36 following :
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and
Enrile’s averment on the presence of the two mitigating vertebral artery disease ; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
against him being punishable with reclusion perpetua ,37 simply c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications. (Annex
because the determination, being primarily factual in context, is 1.6)
ideally to be made by the trial court. (3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat)
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the documented by Holter monitoring ; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, (4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip
which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or syndrome; (Annexes 2.1, 2.2)
whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of (5) Ophthalmology:
the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the
from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
Human Rights to: b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens.
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the (Annexes 3.1, 3.2)
worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in (6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility c. Alpha thalassemia;
of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and d. Gait/balance disorder;
due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate
delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if on recent ultrasound).42
justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or
obligation to make available to every person under detention such collectively, could pose significant risk s to the life of Enrile, to wit:
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart
remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. 38 complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia,
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events,
as well as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications
the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings associated with coronary artery disease, because they could indicate
but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that a future risk for heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4)
the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain
and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen
circumstances. 39 exposure) which could cause a deterioration in patients with asthma
In our view, his social and political standing and his having or COPD.43
immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced
in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this age and ill health required special medical attention. His
jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own
of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated instance,44 was not even recommended by the officer-in-charge (O
his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do IC) and the internist doctor of that medical facility because of the
not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been limitations in the medical support at that hospital. Their testimonies
charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, ran as follows:
he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the JUSTICE MARTIRES:
legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued
because he was not seen as a flight risk.40 With his solid reputation in confinement of Senator Enrile at the Philippine National Police
both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, Hospital?
and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted DR. SERVILLANO:
bail. No, Your Honor.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another JUSTICE MARTIRES:
compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which the Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued
Sandiganbayan did not recognize. confinement of Senator Enrile at the PNP Hospital ?
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the PSUPT. JOCSON:
Director of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as No, Your Honor.
a geriatric patient who was found during the medical examinations JUSTICE MARTIRES:
29
Why? It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will
PSUPT. JOCSON: then enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of
the best. his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his
JUSTICE MARTIRES: defense but, more importantly , will guarantee his appearance in
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, court for the trial.
Senator Enrile, are you happy or have any fear in your heart of the On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to
present condition of the accused vis a vis the facilities of the finish before a meaningful consideration of the application for bail
hospital? can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the
DR. SERVILLANO: accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear. circumstances decisive of the issue of bail – whose existence is either
JUSTICE MARTIRES: admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation? notice – that the courts can already consider in resolving the
DR. SERVILLANO: application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish. 49 The Court
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the
probably if the condition of the patient worsen, we have no facilities People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at
to do those things, Your Honor.45 the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored
charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during
injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the
bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the
objective of preventive incarceration during the trial. Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the
unprecedented. The Court has already held in Dela Rama v. The issuance of the writ of certiorari , connotes whimsical and capricious
People’s Court:46 exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount
the following: to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
case, the illness of the prisoner, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the reason of passion or hostility.51 WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the
humanity of the law makes it a consideration which should, petition for certiorari ; ISSUES the writ of certiorari ANNULING and
regardless of the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third
the court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail ; 47 Division) in Case No. SB-14 CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8,
xxx 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond
Institute to the effect that the petitioner "is actually suffering from of P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate
minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is
granular pharyngitis," and that in said institute they "have seen being detained for some other lawful cause.
similar cases, later progressing into advance stages when the No pronouncement on costs of suit.
treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail;" taking into SO ORDERED.
consideration that the petitioner’s previous petition for bail was LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
denied by the People’s Court on the ground that the petitioner was Associate Justice
suffering from quiescent and not active tuberculosis, and the implied WE CONCUR:
purpose of the People’s Court in sending the petitioner to the MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Quezon Institute for clinical examination and diagnosis of the actual Chief Justice
condition of his lungs, was evidently to verify whether the petitioner
is suffering from active tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in
deciding his petition for bail; and considering further that the said
People’s Court has adopted and applied the well-established
doctrine cited in our above-quoted resolution, in several cases,
among them, the cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and
Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said defendants were
released on bail on the ground that they were ill and their continued
confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be injurious to their health
or endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently hold that
the People’s Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
re lease the petitioner on bail.48

30