The case involved a petition for certiorari regarding a surety agreement. WMC obtained two loans from PISO, secured by Antonio Garcia and Ernest Kahn as sureties. When WMC and Garcia failed to pay, Lasal (to whom the credit was assigned) sued Garcia for recovery of the debt. The court ruled that the surety becomes liable for the debt of another even without receiving direct consideration, as the consideration to the principal obligor is sufficient. A surety agreement does not require consideration to pass directly to the surety. The court found Garcia liable as the surety agreement was signed in his personal capacity.
The case involved a petition for certiorari regarding a surety agreement. WMC obtained two loans from PISO, secured by Antonio Garcia and Ernest Kahn as sureties. When WMC and Garcia failed to pay, Lasal (to whom the credit was assigned) sued Garcia for recovery of the debt. The court ruled that the surety becomes liable for the debt of another even without receiving direct consideration, as the consideration to the principal obligor is sufficient. A surety agreement does not require consideration to pass directly to the surety. The court found Garcia liable as the surety agreement was signed in his personal capacity.
The case involved a petition for certiorari regarding a surety agreement. WMC obtained two loans from PISO, secured by Antonio Garcia and Ernest Kahn as sureties. When WMC and Garcia failed to pay, Lasal (to whom the credit was assigned) sued Garcia for recovery of the debt. The court ruled that the surety becomes liable for the debt of another even without receiving direct consideration, as the consideration to the principal obligor is sufficient. A surety agreement does not require consideration to pass directly to the surety. The court found Garcia liable as the surety agreement was signed in his personal capacity.
The case involved a petition for certiorari regarding a surety agreement. WMC obtained two loans from PISO, secured by Antonio Garcia and Ernest Kahn as sureties. When WMC and Garcia failed to pay, Lasal (to whom the credit was assigned) sued Garcia for recovery of the debt. The court ruled that the surety becomes liable for the debt of another even without receiving direct consideration, as the consideration to the principal obligor is sufficient. A surety agreement does not require consideration to pass directly to the surety. The court found Garcia liable as the surety agreement was signed in his personal capacity.
CA principal is said to be direct, primary and absolute; in other words, he is
Suretyships | Nov 20, 1990 | Cruz, J. directly and equally bound with the principal. c. The surety therefore becomes liable for the debt or duty of another Nature of Case: Petition for certiorari although he possesses no direct or personal interest over the obligations SUMMARY: WMC obtained 2 loans from PISO. The loans were secured by Antonio Garcia nor does he receive any benefit therefrom. and Ernest Kahn as sureties. WMC and Garcia failed to pay. Lasal ( to which the credit had d. The peculiar nature of a surety agreement is that it is regarded as valid been assigned by PISO) sued Garcia for recovery of the debt. Garcia moved to dismiss on despite the absence of any direct consideration received by the surety the grounds that the suit would result in unjust enrichment of the plaintiff because he had either from the principal obligor or from the creditor. not received any consideration from PISO. TC granted the motion on the ground that the e. A contract of surety, like any other contract, must generally be supported surety agreement was invalid for absence of consideration. CA Reversed. SC affirmed the by a sufficient consideration. However, the consideration necessary to CA and ruled that the surety becomes liable for the debt or duty of another although he support a surety obligation need not pass directly to the surety; a possesses no direct or personal interest over the obligations nor does he receive any benefit consideration moving to the principal alone will suffice. therefrom. f. It has been held that if the delivery of the original contract is contemporaneous with the delivery of the surety’s obligation, each contract DOCTRINE: The peculiar nature of a surety agreement is that it is regarded as valid becomes completed at the same time, and the consideration which despite the absence of any direct consideration received by the surety either from the supports the principal contract likewise supports the subsidiary one. principal obligor or from the creditor. g. It follows from the above principles that Lasal would not be unjustly A contract of surety, like any other contract, must generally be supported by a sufficient enriched if the petitioner were to be held liable for the obligation contracted consideration. However, the consideration necessary to support a surety obligation need by WMC. The creditor would only be recovering the amount of its loan plus not pass directly to the surety; a consideration moving to the principal alone will suffice. its increments. The petitioner, for his part, can still go against WMC for the amount he may have to pay Lasal as assignee of the PISO credit 2. WON Garcia is liable only as a corporate officer of WMC - NO FACTS: a. the surety agreement shows that he signed the same not in representation Western Minolco Corporation (WMC) obtained from the Philippine Investments of WMC or as its president but in his personal capacity. He is therefore Systems Organization (PISO) two loans for P2,500,000.00 and P1,000,000.00 for which personally bound. it issued corresponding promissory notes payable 3. WON there was novation – No On the same date, Antonio Garcia and Ernest Kahn executed a surety agreement a. Petitioner: argued that he is released from liability because there was a binding themselves jointly and severally for the payment of the loan of P2,500,000.00 novation by virtue of a memorandum agreement supposedly entered into on due date. by WMC and its creditors. Upon failure of WMC to pay after repeated demands, demand was made on Garcia SC: signed only by Don M. Ferry as chairman of the board of directors of WMC and does not carry the signature of any of the creditors. Hence, it pursuant to the surety agreement. Garcia also failed to pay has no binding force whatsoever on such creditors. Hence, on April 5, 1983, Lasal Development Corporation (to which the credit had b. Petitioner: There was still a novation because of the extension of the been assigned earlier by PISO) sued Garcia for recovery of the debt in the Regional original period of payment and the compounding of the interest on the Trial Court of Makati. principal obligations. On May 18, 1983, Garcia moved to dismiss on the grounds that: (a) the complaint Art. 2079. An extension granted to the debtor by the creditor without the stated no cause of action; (b) the suit would result in unjust enrichment of the consent of the guarantor extinguishes the guaranty. The mere failure on the plaintiff because he had not received any consideration from PISO; (c) the surety part of the creditor to demand payment agreement violated the doctrine of the limited liability of corporations; and (d) the after the debt has become due does not of itself constitute any principal obligation had been novated. extension of time referred to herein. TC: granted the motion and dismissed the complaint on the ground that the surety SC: In the surety contract, the petitioner not only consented to an agreement was invalid for absence of consideration. extension in the payment of the obligation but even waived his right to be CA: Reversed notified of such extension. He cannot now claim that he has been released from his undertaking because of the extension granted to the principal. ISSUE/S & RATIO: As for the compounded interest, the court has held in previous cases that 1. WON surety agreement was invalid because no consideration had been paid to him - the change in the rate of interest was merely a collateral agreement between NO the creditor bank and the principal debtor that did not affect the surety. a. Suretyship is a contractual relation resulting from an agreement whereby When the debtor promised to pay the extra rate of interest on demand of one person, the surety, engages to be answerable for the debt, default or the plaintiff, the liability he assumed was his alone and was separate and miscarriage of another, known as the principal. The surety’s obligation is apart from the original contract. His agreement to pay the additional rate of not an original and direct one for the performance of his own act, but interest was an additional burden upon him and him only. That obligation merely accessory or collateral to the obligation contracted by the principal. in no way affected the original contract of the surety, whose liability b. Nevertheless, although the contract of a surety is in essence secondary only remained unchanged. to a valid principal obligation, his liability to the creditor or promisee of the Thus, despite the compounding of the interest, the liability of the surety remains only up to the original uncompounded interest, as stipulated in the promissory note, that is, 17% per annum, with a penalty charge of 2 1/2% per month until full payment. c. Petitioner: Cites other supposed agreements in support of his theory of novation such as the prepayment of the restructured loans of WMC before the distribution of dividends to the common stockholders, the proposed sale on installments of its assets to Negros Occidental Copperfield Mines, and the preference given to other creditors of WMC over PISO. SC: This was a risk he took when he signed the surety agreement. As it did not prohibit the alienation of the properties of the principal debtor, the sale to Negros cannot be considered a novation of the original agreement. In fact, the proposed sale was intended precisely to enable WMC to meet its pending obligations. d. The most important argument against the alleged novation is the failure of the petitioner to establish the validity of the new contract, an essential requisite for the novation of a previous valid obligation. i. Petitioner insists that the various communications made by WMC with DBP, together with the memorandum of agreement are sufficient to establish the new undertaking made by WMC with all its creditors, including DBP. ii. SC: It is true as a general rule no form of words or writing is necessary to give effect to a novation.9 Nevertheless, since the parties involved here are corporations, it must first be proved that the contracts, assuming they were made, were executed by the persons possessing the proper authority to bind their respective principals. What were submitted are mere exchange of correspondence between the officers of WMC and DBP.
In The Matter of Save The Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy-Digest