George Bing Tonks Appeal Ruling, 2012 Southern New York
George Bing Tonks Appeal Ruling, 2012 Southern New York
George Bing Tonks Appeal Ruling, 2012 Southern New York
USDC SDNY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DOCUMENT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC #: _________________
---------------------------------------------------------------X :
GEORGE BING TONKS, :DATE FILED: October 17, 2012
:
:
Petitioner, :
: 06 Cr. 771, 11 Civ. 2687 (PAC)
- against - : OPINION & ORDER
:
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :
:
Respondent. :
---------------------------------------------------------------X
HONORABLE PAUL A. CROTTY, United States District Judge:
Defendant George Bing Tonks (Tonks) petitions under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate, set
On November 27, 2007, Tonks pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement, dated
June 18, 2007. The plea agreement stated “defendant will not file a direct appeal, nor litigate
under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255 . . . any sentence within or below the Stipulated
Guidelines Range [of] . . . 108 to 135 months . . . .” When the plea was taken, the Court
specifically called this waiver provision to Tonks’ attention. (Nov. 27, 2007 Tr. at 10:15-22.)
Tonks said in open Court, while under oath, that he understood this waiver. (Id. at 10:22.)
Notwithstanding his waiver, Tonks appealed and raised the same scandalous grounds he
raised before he voluntarily pled guilty. The Second Circuit affirmed his conviction. U.S. v.
Catalano, et al., 372 Fed. App’x 168, 170, 2010 WL 1559067, at *2 (2d Cir. 2010). Tonks’ 2255
petition returns to his scandal mongering, makes the same allegations, but now claims ineffective
assistance of counsel. He contends that had defense counsel properly and competently
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investigated his scandalous allegations, somehow Tonks would not have been forced to plead
guilty.
challenge, object or appeal issues relating to a claim of outrageous government conduct that he
raised before the Court prior to his guilty plea (Mot. at 7.), and failure to request a competency
hearing (id.); (2) failure to investigate, challenge, object or appeal his allegedly involuntary plea
(id. at 10.); and (3) failure to challenge vindictive prosecution and fraud upon the Court (id. at
14.).
Tonks’ petition is DENIED. Tonks voluntarily agreed to waive his right to collaterally
attack his sentence and that waiver is enforceable. Further, the claims of ineffective trial and
BACKGROUND
On September 11, 2006, Tonks and his co-conspirators were charged in a two-count
indictment with wire fraud conspiracy and a wire fraud scheme, in which Tonks solicited interest
from people who wanted to appear in adult movies. (Criminal Indictment, Dkt 23; PSR ¶¶ 43,
47-48.) When people responded to the advertisements, they were solicited for “advance fees” for
various costs such as screen testing, AIDS testing, and studio space. (PSR ¶ 14, 65.) Needless to
say, the money went to Tonks, and when victims called, they were solicited for more money.
(Id.)
On November 27, 2007 Tonks pled guilty to Counts One (conspiracy to commit wire
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349) and Two (wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343),
pursuant to a plea agreement dated June 18, 2007. (Gov’t Opp. Ex. A at 1.) The plea agreement
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stipulated a Guidelines sentencing range of 108 to 135 months’ imprisonment, which Tonks
agreed was reasonable in light of all the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. (Id. at 3-5.) In addition,
[T]he defendant will not file a direct appeal, nor litigate under Title 28, United
States Code, Section 2255 and/or Section 2241, any sentence within or below the
Stipulated Guidelines Range set forth above (108 to 135 months) . . . .
At the plea session, Tonks, under oath, said he understood the indictment’s charges, appreciated
the consequences of a plea of guilty and was satisfied with his counsel’s advice and
representation. (Nov. 27, 2007 Tr. at 4:10-22.) Further, Tonks said he had read the plea
agreement, discussed it with counsel, and understood its parameters. (Id. at 8:11 to 9:3.) The
Court specifically addressed the waiver of appeal and collateral attack provision. (Id. at 10:15-
From August 2001 to, I would say, June of 2006, I agreed with others to operate a
business geared towards individuals seeking employment in the adult film industry. We
began to defraud those individuals by seeking money from them to participate in films.
As part of the conspiracy, I placed ads in newspapers around the country, soliciting
individuals to work in the adult film industry. I also picked up money that was wired
through Western Union to Manhattan.
(Id. at 12:16-24.) In response to further questions, Tonks said he knew the wire transfers were
coming from out of state, into New York State, and he acknowledged that he knew what he was
On May 6, 2008, the Court sentenced Tonks within the guidelines range set forth in the
plea agreement to 115 months’ imprisonment on Counts One and Two to run concurrently. (Dkt.
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After the plea agreement was prepared in June 2007 but prior to pleading guilty in
November 2007, Tonks contended that he was victimized by truly scandalous government
misbehavior which led to his indictment. The allegations were articulated in two letters to the
Court, dated October 9 and October 22, 2007. The core of the pro se letters is that a federal
agent named Brian Hamoui or Brian Hamway had a sexual relationship with Tonks and induced
Tonks to participate in illegal activities unrelated to the crimes charged in the indictment. Tonks
further asserted that Assistant U.S. Attorney (“AUSA”) Brett Williams, a prosecutor previously
assigned to the case, entered Tonks’ office in the Empire State Building and used his computer
on several occasions. Tonks met with both the Assistant U.S. Attorneys assigned to the criminal
matter to discuss his allegations of misbehavior. (Nov. 14, 2007 Tr. 4:25 to 5:4.)
At the October 25, 2007 hearing, the Court inquired further about these allegations.
Tonks’ counsel reported that Tonks had passed a polygraph test, and that he would like the
Government to continue its investigation. (Oct. 25, 2007 Tr. 3:19-22; 4:3-6.) The Court
adjourned the plea scheduled for that day and directed Tonks’ counsel to submit a detailed report
regarding the allegations to the Government, which would then conduct an investigation. (Id. at
11:7-12.) At the same proceeding, Tonks withdrew his request for new counsel, which had been
the subject of two letters to the Court, dated October 14, 2007 and said he was satisfied with
Tonks’ claims. On November 9, 2007, the Government stated that it had conducted a computer
search and certified that Hamoui or Hamway was neither a federal law enforcement agent nor an
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employee of the New York Police Department (“NYPD”). The report also certified that AUSA
Williams had never been in contact with Tonks and had never gone to his office in the Empire
State Building. On November 14, 2007, the Court evaluated the Government’s submissions, and
finding that Tonks offered no proof beyond repetition of his allegations, determined that there
was no basis for a hearing prior to acceptance of the plea agreement. (See Nov. 14, 2007 Tr. at
5:20-25; 6:1-13.) Two weeks later, Tonks pled guilty pursuant to the agreement he had signed.
On May 13, 2008, Tonks appealed his conviction. (See Gov’t Opp. Ex. B at 4.) Tonks’
first assigned counsel filed an Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), brief and requested
permission to withdraw. The Second Circuit found the Anders brief insufficient because it
“lacks any discussion of the validity of Appellant’s appellate waiver provision and guilty plea in
conduct.” Appellate counsel was directed to file a supplemental Anders brief to address (in
addition to any other) “allegations on the voluntary and knowing nature of the appellate waiver
provision and the guilty plea.” (Id. at 6-7 of 16.) Assigned appellate counsel complied with the
Court’s directions and filed a revised Anders brief. She moved for permission to withdraw, and
the Government moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, for a summary affirmance. The Court
denied the motions. The Court “determined that non-frivolous issues exist for appeal.” It
relieved appellate counsel and appointed new counsel. New counsel was ordered to brief, in
addition to any other appropriate issue, “whether the district court abused its discretion by not
ordering a competency hearing before accepting Appellant’s plea agreement and allowing
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Tonks raised three issues on appeal: (1) the district court should have ordered an
evidentiary hearing with respect to the allegation of outrageous government misconduct; (2) the
district court should have conducted a competency hearing; (3) counsel was ineffective for
failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence at sentencing. U.S. v. Catalano et al., 372
With respect to the first claim, the Second Circuit held that Tonks’ “unconditional guilty
plea precludes his claim of outrageous government conduct.” Id. Tonks’ voluntary guilty plea,
with his specific allocution as to all of the elements of the crimes charged in the indictment, was
an unconditional waiver of all challenges to the prosecution. Id. at 169-70. With respect to the
second issue, the Court determined that the district judge was in the best position to decide
Tonks’ competence. The District Court “had no shortage of opportunities . . . to observe Tonks
and arrive at an informed assessment that Tonks was competent to plead and be sentenced.” Id.
at 170. Included in these opportunities were Tonks’ numerous pro se letters that he sent to the
Court raising the allegations of outrageous misconduct. Tonks followed the same letter writing
practices with the Second Circuit. He specifically raised the issues of outrageous misconduct,
and further claimed that if the charges were not true, then he was delusional and not competent to
plead guilty. While Tonks’ claims are both bizarre and perverse, there is no doubt as to his
DISCUSSION
Tonks’ Section 2255 petition faces a heavy burden, as “a collateral attack on a final
judgment in a federal criminal case is generally available under § 2255 only for a constitutional
error, a lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court, or an error of law or fact that constitutes ‘a
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United States, 208 F.3d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
With limited exceptions, knowing and voluntary waivers of the right to appeal or
collaterally attack one’s sentence are valid and enforceable. See, e.g., Garcia-Santos v. United
States, 273 F.3d 506, 509 (2d Cir. 2001). These limited exceptions are:
[w]hen the waiver was not made knowingly and voluntarily, and competently,
when the sentence was imposed based on constitutionally impermissible factors,
such as ethnic, racial or other prohibited biases, when the government breached
the plea agreement, or when the sentencing court failed to enunciate any rationale
for the defendant’s sentence.
United States v. Gomez-Perez, 215 F.3d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
A defendant's Section 2255-waiver is knowing and voluntary where the defendant “fully
understood the consequences of the waiver,” and his decision was not “the product of actual or
threatened physical harm, mental coercion overbearing the defendant's will, or the defendant's
sheer inability to weigh his options rationally.” Lindsey v. United States, No. 04 Civ. 7985
(KMW), 2007 WL 4562927, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing United States v. Rogue, 421 F.3d
118, 122 (2d Cir. 2005)). One consideration is whether the court pointed to the specific rights to
be waived. See United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1996).
Where the record reveals that the waiver was knowing and voluntary, and if there is no
merit to the ineffective assistance claim, the waiver should be enforced. See United States v.
Monzon, 359 F.3d 110, 115, and 119 (2d Cir. 2004). During the plea allocution, Tonks stated
that he read the plea agreement, reviewed it with counsel, fully understood its terms, and
voluntarily pled guilty. (Nov. 27, 2007 Tr. at 8:16 to 9:3.) He said that the plea was not the
product of threat or coercion, but rather was voluntary. When asked whether Tonks understood
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that by agreeing to the waiver provision he was “restricting [his] rights to appeal,” Tonks
responded, “Yes.” (Id. at 10:22.) Tonks offers no explanation for why the Court should
disregard this express waiver. The Court is entitled to rely on Tonks’ statements regarding his
understanding of the waiver provision. See United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110, 112-13
(2d Cir. 2011). The Court finds that Tonks’ waiver bars the instant petition. See Luna v. United
States, No. 98 Civ. 7970 (PKL), 1999 WL 767420, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1999).
To overcome a valid waiver, Tonks must show that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel “in connection with the negotiation and execution of the agreement containing the
waiver.” Lindsey, 2007 WL 4562927, at *2 (emphasis in original). The petitioner must also
show both “(1) that counsel made errors so serious that defendant was deprived of reasonably
competent representation and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”
Hernandez v. United States, 202 F.3d 486, 488 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 693-94 (1984)). In assessing the first factor, a court must adopt the
“strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. As to the second factor, a petitioner must
show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result . . . would have been different.” Id. at 694. Where “the motion and the files and records of
the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief,” Section 2255 does not
require any ineffective assistance of counsel hearing. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); see also Dalli v.
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Under Strickland, defense counsel has a duty “to make reasonable investigations . . . .”
466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984). The law does not, however, “compel defense counsel to investigate
comprehensively every lead or possible defense . . . .” Grenier v. Wells, 417 F.3d 305, 321 (2d
Cir. 2005). Where “certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful,” “counsel’s failure
Tonks alleges that government agents sexually tortured him and that the torture led to his
indictment. He disclosed this tale to his counsel, but they failed to properly investigate. Based
on this, Tonks claims that defense counsel 1) did not investigate unspecified, “crucial available
evidence”; (2) failed to request a competency hearing (i.e., if the charges he made were not true,
he must have been delusional) (3) failed to challenge the fact that documents submitted by the
Government were “unsworn hearsay assertions;” (4) inserted their personal views regarding the
telephone conversations made by Tonks to support his claim; (6) did not interview “six viable
witnesses”; (7) did not submit unspecified “pertinent evidence”; and (8) neglected to take
There is absolutely no support for any of these charges. While Tonks makes a perverse
offer of proof concerning the private parts of the alleged perpetrators, he fails to explain how the
perversion he describes is related to his counsel’s conduct or to his voluntary plea of guilty to
Counts 1 and 2. The allegations of his contention which could be verified turned out to be not
so. After an investigation, the Government verified that Brian Hamway or Hamoui was not a
government law enforcement agent. As to AUSA Williams, Tonks’ charges were completely
lacking in specificity, and Williams denied having any contact with Tonks or being in the Empire
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State Building. At present, as before, Tonks still fails to bring forward any evidence to support
his contention that additional investigation by his counsel would have resulted in a different
Further, counsel was not deficient in representing Tonks. Counsel reported the results of
Tonks’ polygraph test and demanded that the United States Attorney’s Office continue its
investigation of Tonks’ allegations. The plea hearing was adjourned so that the Government
After claiming that his allegations of outrageous government misconduct were so serious
that counsel was ineffective for not investigating them, Tonks shifts gears and asserts the
allegations are so “outlandish” that he must be “delusional.” (D. Mot. at 7.) And if “delusional,”
Tonks claims that counsel should have demanded a competency hearing; and was deficient for
failing to do so. (Id.) These ludicrous charges can fare no better than they did when Tonks
raised them on appeal. In light of numerous pro se filings in the Second Circuit, that Court
directed appellate counsel to brief whether the district court should have conducted a
competency hearing before accepting the plea agreement. (Gov. Opp. Br. Ex. B page 9 of 16.)
The Second Circuit rejected the argument and it is rejected as well in this 2255 petition. U.S. v.
Tonks claims that his counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the plea agreement,
both its negotiation and in failing to challenge it on appeal. (Mot. at 6.) Tonks contends that had
not have signed the plea agreement. This is meritless because counsel in fact pursued Tonks’
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government misconduct claim prior to the plea proceeding. While the misconduct issue was
being pursued, Tonks withdrew his written requests, dated October 14, 2007, that his trial
counsel be relieved. Further, Tonks repeatedly assured the Court that he was satisfied with his
counsels’ representation, which further undermines his claim that counsel did not perform
acceptably. (Oct. 25, 2007 Tr. at 11; Nov. 27, 2007 Tr. at 4.)
Finally, Tonks cannot satisfy the second prong of Strickland. To demonstrate prejudice, a
petitioner “must proffer arguably credible evidence of a prima facie case that, but for counsel’s
improper advice, [he] would have” entered the opposite plea. Puglisi v. United States, 586 F.3d
209, 215 (2d Cir. 2009). The bald statement that the petitioner would have accepted or declined
a plea had it not been for counsel’s advice alone will not suffice. Id. at 216. Tonks still fails to
identify any evidence or proof of his claims. The absence of any proof in this case and the ample
evidence supporting Tonks’ guilt, (see 11-cv-02687-PAC, Dkt. No. 23 (the Criminal
Indictment)) (including Tonks’ admission of the factual allegations in the indictment), confirm
Tonks claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge “malicious” or
prosecution claim, a defendant must allege that the prosecution was in retribution for the exercise
of a legal right. See, e.g., United States v. White, 972 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1992) (citations
omitted). The record does not support a claim of vindictive prosecution as charges against Tonks
preceded his claim of outrageous government conduct. Accordingly, the argument that Tonks’
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