Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,

vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.

Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.

First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for
respondent.

RESOLUTION

In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court,
acting on the petition for habeas corpusfiled by Anastacio Laurel and
based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving
the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of
the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the
legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative
allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that
there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic:

(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and

temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in
the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign;
and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused
with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the
government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he
remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which consists
in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign.
(Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster
Report to the President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6
Web. Works, 526);

Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants

of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or
sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because
the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred
thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must
necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the
sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power
which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be
distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be
destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be
suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended
without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at
least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be
suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and
government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to
the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy
during the war, "although the former is in fact prevented from exercising
the supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our
times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by
necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation;
and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not
suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of
the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and
therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory
on which the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests;

Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State
was suspended in Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United
States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our
decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and
Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with the
question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de
factotherein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the occupied
territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted
subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military
occupation of an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the
occupant; that, in the first case, the word "sovereignty" used therein
should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights of sovereignty,
because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not
transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of
existence or divesting said government thereof; and that in the second
case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to the suspension of
the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the
Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the
present case;

Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance,"

repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the
relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy
toward the military government established over them, such allegiance
may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a
foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he
resides in return for the protection he receives as above described, and
does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the
citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or
sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign
may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign
country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the
military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own
legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the
latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen
or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience
to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily
follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one
hand, ipso factoacquire the citizenship thereof since he has enforce public
order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the
protection he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original
citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of
his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a
foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;

Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the

rights of sovereignty by the legitimate government in the territory occupied
by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power
to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague
Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties
and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance
during military occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and
dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation to
the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable to
the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against
national security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war,
correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as
those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty,
illegal possession of firearms, which are of political complexion because
they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as
crimes against the legitimate government, are also suspended or become
inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can not be committed
against the latter (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while
the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate
government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the
reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as
against the ousted government for the latter was not responsible for the
preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of
the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed
against the national security of the legitimate government, because the
inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to
the latter during the enemy occupation;

Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or

continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those
laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life
of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of de
facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing
laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service
demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so
for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the
restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages
established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the
requirements of public conscience (Peralta vs.Director of Prisons, supra;
1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that,
consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these
limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are
bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government which
have not been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in
force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be
considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said
inhabitants;

Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation

of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or
sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive
attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid
and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding
consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason,
essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to
their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and
comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not demanded by
the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control of the
inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is
tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their
allegiance to the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an
inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military
occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort,
the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit
thereto without becoming a traitor;

Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended

allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak
nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and
requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally
recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight
against their own government without the latter incurring the risk of being
prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not aid them in
their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to
completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them
all of their own independence or sovereignty — such theory would
sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and
sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving
themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the
exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a
political suicide;

(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the
Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though
originally intended to be a crime against said government as then
organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United States,
exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and the
President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the
Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of
the Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in
whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2,
Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands .
. . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and
all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine
Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
Government and corresponding officials under this constitution;

Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign

government, though not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed
in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our
Constitution, was recognized not only by the Legislative Department or
Congress of the United States in approving the Independence Law above
quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the
declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also by the
Executive Department of the United States; that the late President
Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I
stated on August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the
Philippines as having now the status as a government of other
independent nations — in fact all the attributes of complete and respected
nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that
it is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many
cases, among them in the case of Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202;
34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is "a purely political
 question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive
departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as
all other officers, citizens and subjects of the country.

Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the

Constitution which provides that pending the final and complete
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of the
Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States", was one of the few
limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the United
States, but these limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said
sovereignty, in the same way that the people of each State of the Union
preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of the United States
conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason may be
committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government,
in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese
occupation against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against
the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of
our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect
the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed
during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same
government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our
Constitution provides that "The government established by this
constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United
States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the
Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the
Republic of the Philippines";

This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended

opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the
reasons above set forth and for others to be stated in the said opinion,
without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices
Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto
concurs in a separate opinion.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be committed in

peace time. While there is peace, there are no traitors. Treason may be
incubated when peace reigns. Treasonable acts may actually be perpetrated
during peace, but there are no traitors until war has started.
As treason is basically a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of
self-defense and self-preservation. The law of treason is an emergency measure.
It remains dormant until the emergency arises. But as soon as war starts, it is
relentlessly put into effect. Any lukewarm attitude in its enforcement will only be
consistent with national harakiri. All war efforts would be of no avail if they should
be allowed to be sabotaged by fifth columnists, by citizens who have sold their
country out to the enemy, or any other kind of traitors, and this would certainly be
the case if he law cannot be enforced under the theory of suspension.

Petitioner's thesis that allegiance to our government was suspended during

enemy occupation is advanced in support of the proposition that, since allegiance
is identical with obedience to law, during the enemy occupation, the laws of the
Commonwealth were suspended. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, the law
punishing treason, under the theory, was one of the laws obedience to which was
also suspended.

Allegiance has been defined as the obligation for fidelity and obedience which
the individual owes to his government or his sovereign in return for the protection
which he receives.

"Allegiance", as the return is generally used, means fealty or fidelity to the

government of which the person is either a citizen or subject.
Murray vs. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch), 64, 120; 2 Law. ed.,
208.

"Allegiance" was said by Mr. Justice Story to be "nothing more than the tie
or duty of obedience of a subject to the sovereign, under whose protection
he is." United States vs. Wong Kim Ark, 18 S. Ct., 461; 169 U.S., 649; 42
Law. ed., 890.

Allegiance is that duty which is due from every citizen to the state, a
political duty binding on him who enjoys the protection of the
Commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal government. It
is that duty which is reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from the
political relations between the government and the citizen.
Wallace vs. Harmstad, 44 Pa. (8 Wright), 492, 501.

By "allegiance" is meant the obligation to fidelity and obedience which the

individual owes to the government under which he lives, or to his
sovereign, in return for the protection which he receives. It may be an
absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and temporary
one. A citizen or subject owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to
his government or sovereign, or at least until, by some open and distinct
act, he renounces it and becomes a citizen or subject of another
government or sovereign, and an alien while domiciled in a country owes it
a temporary allegiance, which is continuous during his residence.
Carlisle vs.United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.), 147, 154; 21 Law ed., 426.

"Allegiance," as defined by Blackstone, "is the tie or ligament which binds

the subject to the King, in return for that protection which the King affords
the subject. Allegiance, both expressed and implied, is of two sorts, the
one natural, the other local, the former being perpetual, the latter
temporary. Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born within
the King's dominions immediately upon their birth, for immediately upon
their birth they are under the King's protection. Natural allegiance is
perpetual, and for this reason, evidently founded on the nature of
government. Allegiance is a debt due from the subject upon an implied
contract with the prince that so long as the one affords protection the other
will demean himself faithfully. Natural-born subjects have a great variety of
rights which they acquire by being born within the King's liegance, which
can never be forfeited but by their own misbehaviour; but the rights of
aliens are much more circumscribed, being acquired only by residence,
and lost whenever they remove. If an alien could acquire a permanent
property in lands, he must owe an allegiance equally permanent to the
King, which would probably be inconsistent with that which he owes his
natural liege lord; besides, that thereby the nation might, in time, be
subject to foreign influence and feel many other inconveniences." Indians
within the state are not aliens, but citizens owing allegiance to the
government of a state, for they receive protection from the government
and are subject to its laws. They are born in allegiance to the government
of the state. Jackson vs. Goodell, 20 Johns., 188, 911. (3 Words and
Phrases, Permanent ed., 226-227.)

Allegiance. — Fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is

either a citizen or subject; the duty which is due from every citizen to the
state; a political duty, binding on him who enjoys the protection of the
commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal government; the
obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the
government or to the sovereign under which he lives in return for the
protection he receives; that duty is reciprocal to the right of protection he
receives; that duty which is reciprocal to the right of protection, arising
from the political relations between the government and the citizen.

Classification. — Allegiance is of four kinds, namely: (1) Natural allegiance

— that which arises by nature and birth; (2) acquired allegiance — that
arising through some circumstance or act other than birth, namely, by
denization or naturalization; (3) local allegiance-- that arising from
residence simply within the country, for however short a time; and (4) legal
allegiance — that arising from oath, taken usually at the town or leet, for,
by the common law, the oath of allegiance might be tendered to every one
upon attaining the age of twelve years. (3 C.J.S., p.885.)
 Allegiance. — the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual
owes to the government under which he lives, or to his sovereign in return
for the protection he receives. 15 R.C.L., 140. (Ballentine Law Dictionary,
p. 68.).

"Allegiance," as its etymology indicates, is the name for the tie which binds
the citizen to his state — the obligation of obedience and support which he
owes to it. The state is the political person to whom this liege fealty is due.
Its substance is the aggregate of persons owing this allegiance. The
machinery through which it operates is its government. The persons who
operate this machinery constitute its magistracy. The rules of conduct
which the state utters or enforces are its law, and manifest its will. This
will, viewed as legally supreme, is its sovereignty. (W.W. Willoughby,
Citizenship and Allegiance in Constitutional and International Law, 1
American Journal of International Law, p. 915.).

The obligations flowing from the relation of a state and its nationals are
reciprocal in character. This principle had been aptly stated by the
Supreme Court of the United States in its opinion in the case of
Luria vs. United States:

Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of

allegiance on the part of the member and a duty protection on the part of
the society. These are reciprocal obligations, one being a compensation
for the other. (3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 1942 ed., p.6.)

Allegiance. — The tie which binds the citizen to the government, in return
for the protection which the government affords him. The duty which the
subject owes to the sovereign, correlative with the protection received.

It is a comparatively modern corruption of ligeance (ligeantia), which is

derived from liege (ligius), meaning absolute or unqualified. It signified
originally liege fealty, i. e., absolute and qualified fealty. 18 L. Q. Rev., 47.

xxx xxx xxx

Allegiance may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a

qualified and temporary one; the citizen or subject owes the former to his
government or sovereign, until by some act he distinctly renounces it,
whilst the alien domiciled in the country owes a temporary and local
allegiance continuing during such residence. (Carlisle vs. United States,
16 Wall. [U.S.], 154; 21 Law. ed., 426. (1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p.
179.).

The above quotations express ideas that do not fit exactly into the Philippine
pattern in view of the revolutionary insertion in our Constitution of the
fundamental principle that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them." (Section 1, Article II.) The authorities above
quoted, judges and juridical publicists define allegiance with the idea that
sovereignty resides somewhere else, on symbols or subjects other than the
people themselves. Although it is possible that they had already discovered that
the people and only the people are the true sovereign, their minds were not yet
free from the shackles of the tradition that the powers of sovereignty have been
exercised by princes and monarchs, by sultans and emperors, by absolute and
tyrannical rules whose ideology was best expressed in the famous words of one
of the kings of France: "L'etat c'est moi," or such other persons or group of
persons posing as the government, as an entity different and in opposition to the
people themselves. Although democracy has been known ever since old Greece,
and modern democracies in the people, nowhere is such principle more
imperative than in the pronouncement embodied in the fundamental law of our
people.

To those who think that sovereignty is an attribute of government, and not of the
people, there may be some plausibility in the proposition that sovereignty was
suspended during the enemy occupation, with the consequence that allegiance
must also have been suspended, because our government stopped to function in
the country. But the idea cannot have any place under our Constitution. If
sovereignty is an essential attribute of our people, according to the basic
philosophy of Philippine democracy, it could not have been suspended during the
enemy occupation. Sovereignty is the very life of our people, and there is no
such thing as "suspended life." There is no possible middle situation between life
and death. Sovereignty is the very essence of the personality and existence of
our people. Can anyone imagine the possibility of "suspended personality" or
"suspended existence" of a people? In no time during enemy occupation have
the Filipino people ceased to be what they are.

The idea of suspended sovereignty or suspended allegiance is incompatible with

our Constitution.

There is similarity in characteristics between allegiance to the sovereign and a

wife's loyalty to her husband. Because some external and insurmountable force
precludes the husband from exercising his marital powers, functions, and duties
and the wife is thereby deprived of the benefits of his protection, may the wife
invoke the theory of suspended loyalty and may she freely share her bed with the
assailant of their home? After giving aid and comfort to the assailant and allowing
him to enjoy her charms during the former's stay in the invaded home, may the
wife allege as defense for her adultery the principle of suspended conjugal
fidelity?

Petitioner's thesis on change of sovereignty at the advent of independence on

July 4, 1946, is unacceptable. We have already decided in Brodett vs. De la
Rosa and Vda. de Escaler (p. 752, ante) that the Constitution of the Republic is
the same as that of the Commonwealth. The advent of independence had the
effect of changing the name of our Government and the withdrawal by the United
States of her power to exercise functions of sovereignty in the Philippines. Such
facts did not change the sovereignty of the Filipino people. That sovereignty,
following our constitutional philosophy, has existed ever since our people began
to exist. It has been recognized by the United States of America, at least since
1935, when President Roosevelt approved our Constitution. By such act,
President Roosevelt, as spokesman of the American people, accepted and
recognized the principle that sovereignty resides in the people that is, that
Philippine sovereignty resides in the Filipino people.

The same sovereignty had been internationally recognized long before the
proclamation of independence on July 4, 1946. Since the early part of the Pacific
war, President Quezon had been sitting as representative of a sovereign people
in the Allied War Council, and in June, 1945, the same Filipino people took part
— outstanding and brilliant, it may be added — in the drafting and adoption of the
charter of the United Nations, the unmistakable forerunner of the future
democratic federal constitution of the world government envisioned by all those
who adhere to the principle of unity of all mankind, the early realization of which
is anxiously desired by all who want to be spared the sufferings, misery and
disaster of another war.

Under our Constitution, the power to suspend laws is of legislative nature and is
lodged in Congress. Sometimes it is delegated to the Chief Executive, such as
the power granted by the Election Code to the President to suspend the election
in certain districts and areas for strong reasons, such as when there is rebellion,
or a public calamity, but it has never been exercised by tribunals. The Supreme
Court has the power to declare null and void all laws violative of the Constitution,
but it has no power, authority, or jurisdiction to suspend or declare suspended
any valid law, such as the one on treason which petitioner wants to be included
among the laws of the Commonwealth which, by his theory of suspended
allegiance and suspended sovereignty, he claims have been suspended during
the Japanese occupation.

Suppose President Quezon and his government, instead of going from

Corregidor to Australia, and later to Washington, had fled to the mountains of
Luzon, and a group of Filipino renegades should have killed them to serve the
interests of the Japanese imperial forces. By petitioner's theory, those renegades
cannot be prosecuted for treason or for rebellion or sedition, as the laws
punishing them were suspended. Such absurd result betrays the untenability of
the theory.

"The defense of the State is a prime duty of Government, and in the fulfillment of
that duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal, military or civil
service." Thus, section 2 of Article II of the Constitution provides: That duty of
defense becomes more imperative in time of war and when the country is
invaded by an aggressor nation. How can it be fulfilled if the allegiance of the
citizens to the sovereign people is suspended during enemy occupation? The
framers of the Constitution surely did not entertain even for the moment the
absurdity that when the allegiance of the citizens to the sovereign people is more
needed in the defense of the survival of the state, the same should be
suspended, and that upon such suspension those who may be required to render
personal, military or civil service may claim exemption from the indispensable
duty of serving their country in distress.

Petitioner advances the theory that protection in the consideration of allegiance.

He argues that the Commonwealth Government having been incapacitated
during enemy occupation to protect the citizens, the latter were relieved of their
allegiance to said government. The proposition is untenable. Allegiance to the
sovereign is an indispensable bond for the existence of society. If that bond is
dissolved, society has to disintegrate. Whether or not the existence of the latter is
the result of the social compact mentioned by Roseau, there can be no question
that organized society would be dissolved if it is not united by the cohesive power
of the citizen's allegiance. Of course, the citizens are entitled to the protection of
their government, but whether or not that government fulfills that duty, is
immaterial to the need of maintaning the loyalty and fidelity of allegiance, in the
same way that the physical forces of attraction should be kept unhampered if the
life of an individual should continue, irrespective of the ability or inability of his
mind to choose the most effective measures of personal protection.

After declaring that all legislative, executive, and judicial processes had during
and under the Japanese regime, whether executed by the Japanese themselves
or by Filipino officers of the puppet government they had set up, are null and
void, as we have done in our opinions in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and
Dizon (75 Phil., 113), in Peralta vs. Director of Prison (75, Phil., 285), and in
several other cases where the same question has been mentioned, we cannot
consistently accept petitioner's theory.

If all laws or legislative acts of the enemy during the occupation were null and
void, and as we cannot imagine the existence of organized society, such as the
one constituted by the Filipino people, without laws of the Commonwealth were
the ones in effect during the occupation and the only ones that could claim
obedience from our citizens.

Petitioner would want us to accept the thesis that during the occupation we owed
allegiance to the enemy. To give way to that paradoxical and disconcerting
allegiance, it is suggested that we accept that our allegiance to our legitimate
government was suspended. Petitioner's proposition has to fall by its own weight,
because of its glaring absurdities. Allegiance, like its synonyms, loyalty and
fidelity, is based on feelings of attraction, love, sympathy, admiration, respect,
veneration, gratitude, amity, understanding, friendliness. These are the feelings
or some of the feelings that bind us to our own people, and are the natural roots
of the duty of allegiance we owe them. The enemy only provokes repelling and
repulsive feelings — hate, anger, vexation, chagrin, mortification, resentment,
contempt, spitefulness. The natural incompatibility of political, social and ethical
ideologies between our people and the Japanese, making impossible the
existence of any feeling of attraction between them, aside from the initial fact that
the Japanese invaded our country as our enemy, was aggravated by the morbid
complexities of haughtiness, braggadocio and beastly brutality of the Nippon
soldiers and officers in their dealings with even the most inoffensive of our
citizens.

Giving bread to our enemy, and, after slapping one side of our face, offer him the
other to be further slapped, may appear to be divinely charitable, but to make
them a reality, it is necessary to change human nature. Political actions, legal
rules and judicial decisions deal with human relations, taking man as he is, not as
he should be. To love the enemy is not natural. As long as human pyschology
remains as it is, the enemy shall always be hated. Is it possible to conceive an
allegiance based on hatred?

The Japanese, having waged against us an illegal war condemned by prevailing

principles of international law, could not have established in our country any
government that can be legally recognized as de facto. They came as bandits
and ruffians, and it is inconceivable that banditry and ruffianism can claim any
duty of allegiance — even a temporary one — from a decent people.

One of the implications of petitioner's theory, as intimated somewhere, is that the

citizens, in case of invasion, are free to do anything not forbidden by the Hague
Conventions. Anybody will notice immediately that the result will be the doom of
small nations and peoples, by whetting the covetousness of strong powers prone
on imperialistic practices. In the imminence of invasion, weak-hearted soldiers of
the smaller nations will readily throw away their arms to rally behind the paladium
of the invaders.

Two of the three great departments of our Government have already rejected
petitioner's theory since September 25, 1945, the day when Commonwealth Act
No. 682 took effect. By said act, creating the People's Court to try and decide all
cases of crime against national security "committed between December 8, 1941
and September 2, 1945," (section 2), the legislative and executive departments
have jointly declared that during the period above mentioned, including the time
of Japanese occupation, all laws punishing crimes against national security,
including article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, punishing treason, had
remained in full effect and should be enforced.

That no one raised a voice in protest against the enactment of said act and that
no one, at the time the act was being considered by the Senate and the House of
Representatives, ever dared to expose the uselessness of creating a People's
Court to try crime which, as claimed by petitioner, could not have been
committed as the laws punishing them have been suspended, is a historical fact
of which the Supreme Court may take judicial notice. This fact shows universal
and unanimous agreement of our people that the laws of the Commonwealth
were not suspended and that the theory of suspended allegiance is just an
afterthought provoked by a desperate effort to help quash the pending treason
cases at any cost.

Among the arguments adduced in favor of petitioner's theory is that it is based on

generally accepted principles of international law, although this argument
becomes futile by petitioner's admission that the theory is advantageous to
strong powers but harmful to small and weak nations, thus hinting that the latter
cannot accept it by heart. Suppose we accept at face value the premise that the
theories, urged by petitioner, of suspended allegiance and suspended
sovereignty are based on generally accepted principles of international law. As
the latter forms part of our laws by virtue of the provisions of section 3 of Article II
of the Constitution, it seems that there is no alternative but to accept the theory.
But the theory has the effect of suspending the laws, especially those political in
nature. There is no law more political in nature than the Constitution of the
Philippines. The result is an inverted reproduction of the Greek myth of Saturn
devouring his own children. Here, under petitioner's theory, the offspring devours
its parent.

Can we conceive of an instance in which the Constitution was suspended even

for a moment?

There is conclusive evidence that the legislature, as policy-determining agency of

government, even since the Pacific war started on December 7, 1941, intimated
that it would not accept the idea that our laws should be suspended during
enemy occupation. It must be remembered that in the middle of December, 1941,
when Manila and other parts of the archipelago were under constant bombing by
Japanese aircraft and enemy forces had already set foot somewhere in the
Philippines, the Second National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671,
which came into effect on December 16, 1941. When we approved said act, we
started from the premise that all our laws shall continue in effect during the
emergency, and in said act we even went to the extent of authorizing the
President "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or
otherwise become inoperative," (section 2, [d]), and also to "promulgate such
rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy,"
(section 2), that "the existence of war between the United States and other
countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary
to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting
emergency." (Section 1.) To give emphasis to the intimation, we provided that the
rules and regulations provided "shall be in force and effect until the Congress of
the Philippines shall otherwise provide," foreseeing the possibility that Congress
may not meet as scheduled as a result of the emergency, including invasion and
occupation by the enemy. Everybody was then convinced that we did not have
available the necessary means of repelling effectivity the enemy invasion.

Maybe it is not out of place to consider that the acceptance of petitioner's theory
of suspended allegiance will cause a great injustice to those who, although
innocent, are now under indictment for treason and other crimes involving
disloyalty to their country, because their cases will be dismissed without the
opportunity for them to revindicate themselves. Having been acquitted upon a
mere legal technicality which appears to us to be wrong, history will
indiscriminality classify them with the other accused who were really traitors to
their country. Our conscience revolts against the idea of allowing the innocent
ones to go down in the memory of future generations with the infamous stigma of
having betrayed their own people. They should not be deprived of the opportunity
to show through the due process of law that they are free from all blame and that,
if they were really patriots, they acted as such during the critical period of test.

HILADO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion to the effect that during the
so-called Japanese occupation of the Philippines (which was nothing more than
the occupation of Manila and certain other specific regions of the Islands which
constituted the minor area of the Archipelago) the allegiance of the citizens of
this country to their legitimate government and to the United States was not
suspended, as well as the ruling that during the same period there was no
change of sovereignty here; but my reasons are different and I proceed to set
them forth:

I. SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE.

(a) Before the horror and atrocities of World War I, which were multiplied more
than a hundred-fold in World War II, the nations had evolved certain rules and
principles which came to be known as International Law, governing their conduct
with each other and toward their respective citizens and inhabitants, in the armed
forces or civilian life, in time of peace or in time of war. During the ages which
preceded that first world conflict the civilized governments had no realization of
the potential excesses of which "men's inhumanity to man" could be capable. Up
to that time war was, at least under certain conditions, considered as sufficiently
justified, and the nations had not on that account, proscribed nor renounced it as
an instrument of national policy, or as a means of settling international disputes.
It is not for us now to dwell upon the reasons accounting for this historical fact.
Suffice it to recognize its existence in history.
But when in World War I civilized humanity saw that war could be, as it actually
was, employed for entirely different reasons and from entirely different motives,
compared to previous wars, and the instruments and methods of warfare had
been so materially changed as not only to involve the contending armed forces
on well defined battlefields or areas, on land, in the sea, and in the air, but to
spread death and destruction to the innocent civilian populations and to their
properties, not only in the countries engaged in the conflict but also in neutral
ones, no less than 61 civilized nations and governments, among them Japan,
had to formulate and solemnly subscribe to the now famous Briand-Kellogg Pact
in the year 1928. As said by Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme
Court, as chief counsel for the United States in the prosecution of "Axis war
criminals," in his report to President Truman of June 7, 1945:

International law is not capable of development by legislation, for there is

no continuously sitting international legislature. Innovations and revisions
in international law are brought about by the action of governments
designed to meet a change circumstances. It grows, as did the common
law, through decisions reached from time to time in adopting settled
principles to new situations.

xxx xxx xxx

After the shock to civilization of the war of 1914-1918, however, a marked

reversion to the earlier and sounder doctrines of international law took
place. By the time the Nazis came to power it was thoroughly established
that launching an aggressive war or the institution of war by treachery was
illegal and that the defense of legitimate warfare was no longer available
to those who engaged in such an enterprise. It is high time that we act on
the juridical principle that aggressive war-making is illegal and criminal.

The re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war is traceable in many

steps. One of the most significant is the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 by
which Germany, Italy, and Japan, in common with the United States and
practically all the nations of the world, renounced war as an instrument of
national policy, bound themselves to seek the settlement of disputes only
by pacific means, and condemned recourse to war for the solution of
international controversies.

Unless this Pact altered the legal status of wars of aggression, it has no
meaning at all and comes close to being an act of deception. In 1932 Mr.
Henry L. Stimson, as United States Secretary of State, gave voice to the
American concept of its effect. He said, "war between nations was
renounced by the signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty. This means
that it has become illegal throughout practically the entire world. It is no
longer to be the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to be the
principle around which the duties, the conduct, and the rights of nations
 revolve. It is an illegal thing. . . . By that very act we have made obsolete
many legal precedents and have given the legal profession the task of re-
examining many of its Codes and treaties.

This Pact constitutes only one reversal of the viewpoint that all war is legal
and has brought international law into harmony with the common sense of
mankind — that unjustifiable war is a crime.

Without attempting an exhaustive catalogue, we may mention the Geneva

Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
signed by the representatives of forty-eight governments, which declared
that "a war of aggression constitutes .. an International crime. . . .

The Eight Assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, on unanimous

resolution of the representatives of forty-eight member-nations, including
Germany, declared that a war of aggression constitutes an international
crime. At the Sixth Pan-American Conference of 1928, the twenty-one
American Republics unanimously adopted a resolution stating that "war of
aggression constitutes an international crime against the human species."

xxx xxx xxx

We therefore propose to change that a war of aggression is a crime, and

that modern international law has abolished the defense that those who
incite or wage it are engaged in legitimate business. Thus may the forces
of the law be mobilized on the side of peace. ("U.S.A. — An American
Review," published by the United States Office of War Information, Vol. 2,
No. 10; emphasis supplied.).

When Justice Jackson speaks of "a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder
doctrines of international law" and "the re-establishment of the principle of
justifiable war," he has in mind no other than "the doctrine taught by Grotius, the
father of international law, that there is a distinction between the just and the
unjust war — the war of defense and the war of aggression" to which he alludes
in an earlier paragraph of the same report.

In the paragraph of said report immediately preceding the one last above
mentioned Justice Jackson says that "international law as taught in the 19th and
the early part of the 20th century generally declared that war-making was not
illegal and no crime at law." But, as he says in one of the paragraphs
hereinabove quoted from that report, the Briand-Kellogg Pact constitutes a
reversal of the view-point that all war is legal and has brought international law
into harmony with the common sense of mankind — that unjustifiable war is a
crime. Then he mentions as other reversals of the same viewpoint, the Geneva
Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, declaring
that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; the 8th assembly of
the League of Nations in 1927, declaring that a war of aggression constitutes an
international crime; and the 6th Pan-American conference of 1928, which
unanimously adopted a resolution stating that war of aggression constitutes an
international crime against the human species: which enumeration, he says, is
not an attempt at an exhaustive catalogue.

It is not disputed that the war started by Japan in the Pacific, first, against the
United States, and later, in rapid succession, against other allied nations, was a
war of aggression and utterly unjustifiable. More aggressive still, and more
unjustifiable, as admitted on all sides, was its attack against the Philippines and
its consequent invasion and occupation of certain areas thereof.

Some of the rules and principles of international law which have been cited for
petitioner herein in support of his theory of suspended allegiance, have been
evolved and accepted during those periods of the history of nations when all war
was considered legal, as stated by Justice Jackson, and the others have
reference to military occupation in the course of really justifiable war.

Japan in subscribing the Briand-Kellogg Pact thirteen years before she started
the aggressive war which threw the entire Pacific area into a seething cauldron
from the last month of 1941 of the first week of September, 1945, expressly
agreed to outlaw, proscribe and renounce war as an instrument of national
policy, and bound herself to seek the settlement of her disputes with other
nations only by pacific means. Thus she expressly gave her consent to that
modification of the then existing rules and principles of international law
governing the matter. With the modification, all the signatories to the pact
necessarily accepted and bound themselves to abide by all its implications,
among them the outlawing, prescription and renunciation of military occupation of
another nation's territory in the course of a war thus outlawed, proscribed and
renounced. This is only one way of saving that the rules and principles of
international law therefore existing on the subject of military occupation were
automatically abrogated and rendered ineffective in all future cases of war
coming under the ban and condemnation of the pact.

If an unjustifiable war is a crime; if a war of aggression constitutes an

international crime; if such a war is an international crime against the human
species: a nation which occupies a foreign territory in the course of such a war
cannot possibly, under any principle of natural or positive law, acquire or posses
any legitimate power or right growing out or incident to such occupation.
Concretely, Japan in criminally invading the Philippines and occupying certain
portions of its territory during the Pacific war, could not have nor exercise, in the
legal sense — and only this sense should we speak here — with respect to this
country and its citizens, any more than could a burglar breaking through a man's
house pretends to have or to exercise any legal power or right within that house
with respect either to the person of the owner or to his property. To recognize in
the first instance any legal power or right on the part of the invader, and in the
second any legal power or right on the part of the burglar, the same as in case of
a military occupant in the course of a justifiable war, would be nothing short of
legalizing the crime itself. It would be the most monstrous and unpardonable
contradiction to prosecute, condemn and hang the appropriately called war
criminals of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and at the same time recognize any
lawfulness in their occupation invaded. And let it not be forgotten that the
Philippines is a member of the United Nations who have instituted and conducted
the so-called war crimes trials. Neither should we lose sight of the further fact
that this government has a representative in the international commission
currently trying the Japanese war criminals in Tokyo. These facts leave no room
for doubt that this government is in entire accord with the other United Nations in
considering the Pacific war started by Japan as a crime. Not only this, but this
country had six years before the outbreak of the Pacific war already renounced
war as an instrument of national policy (Constitution, Article II, section 2), thus in
consequence adopting the doctrine of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

Consequently, it is submitted that it would be absolutely wrong and improper for

this Court to apply to the occupation by Japan of certain areas of the Philippines
during that war the rules and principles of international law which might be
applicable to a military occupation occurring in the course of a justifiable war.
How can this Court recognize any lawfulness or validity in that occupation when
our own government has sent a representative to said international commission
in Tokyo trying the Japanese "war criminals" precisely for the "crimes against
humanity and peace" committed by them during World War II of which said
occupation was but part and parcel? In such circumstances how could such
occupation produce no less an effect than the suspension of the allegiance of our
people to their country and government?

(b) But even in the hypothesis — and not more than a mere hypothesis — that
when Japan occupied the City of Manila and certain other areas of the
Philippines she was engaged in a justifiable war, still the theory of suspended
allegiance would not hold good. The continuance of the allegiance owed to a
notion by its citizens is one of those high privileges of citizenship which the law of
nations denies to the occupant the power to interfere with.

. . . His (of occupant) rights are not, however, commensurate with his
power. He is thus forbidden to take certain measures which he may be
able to apply, and that irrespective of their efficacy. The restrictions
imposed upon him are in theory designed to protect the individual in the
enjoyment of some highly important privileges. These concern his
allegiance to the de jure sovereign, his family honor and domestic
relations, religious convictions, personal service, and connection with or
residence in the occupied territory.
 The Hague Regulations declare that the occupant is forbidden to compel
the inhabitants to swear allegiance to the hostile power. . . . (III Hyde,
International Law, 2d revised ed., pp. 1898-1899.)

. . . Nor may he (occupant) compel them (inhabitants) to take an oath of

allegiance. Since the authority of the occupant is not sovereignty, the
inhabitants owe no temporary allegiance to him. . . . (II Oppenheim,
International Law, pp. 341-344.)

The occupant's lack of the authority to exact an oath of allegiance from the
inhabitants of the occupied territory is but a corollary of the continuance of their
allegiance to their own lawful sovereign. This allegiance does not consist merely
in obedience to the laws of the lawful sovereign, but more essentially consists in
loyalty or fealty to him. In the same volume and pages of Oppenheim's work
above cited, after the passage to the effect that the inhabitants of the occupied
territory owe no temporary allegiance to the occupant it is said that "On the other
hand, he may compel them to take an oath — sometimes called an 'oath of
neutrality' — . . . willingly to submit to his 'legitimate commands.' Since, naturally,
such "legitimate commands" include the occupant's laws, it follows that said
occupant, where the rule is applicable, has the right to compel the inhabitants to
take an oath of obedience to his laws; and since according to the same rule, he
cannot exact from the inhabitants an oath of obedience to his laws; and since,
according to the same rule, he cannot exact from the inhabitants an oath of
allegiance, it follows that obedience to his laws, which he can exact from them,
does not constitute allegiance.

(c) The theory of suspended allegiance is unpatriotic to the last degree. To say
that when the one's country is unable to afford him in its protection, he ceases to
be bound to it by the sacred ties of allegiance, is to advocate the doctrine that
precisely when his country is in such distress, and therefore most needs his
loyalty, he is absolved from the loyalty. Love of country should be something
permanent and lasting, ending only in death; loyalty should be its worth offspring.
The outward manifestation of one or the other may for a time be prevented or
thwarted by the irresistible action of the occupant; but this should not in the least
extinguish nor obliterate the invisible feelings, and promptings of the spirit. And
beyond the unavoidable consequences of the enemy's irresistible pressure,
those invisible feelings and promptings of the spirit of the people should never
allow them to act, to speak, nor even to think a whit contrary to their love and
loyalty to the Fatherland. For them, indicted, to face their country and say to it
that, because when it was overrun and vanquished by the barbarous invader
and, in consequence was disabled from affording them protection, they were
released from their sacred obligation of allegiance and loyalty, and could
therefore freely adhere to its enemy, giving him aid and comfort, incurring no
criminal responsibility therefor, would only tend to aggravate their crime.

II. CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY

Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that "Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them." The Filipino people
are the self-same people before and after Philippine Independence, proclaimed
on July 4, 1946. During the life of the Commonwealth sovereignty resided in
them under the Constitution; after the proclamation of independence that
sovereignty remained with them under the very same fundamental law. Article
XVIII of the said Constitution stipulates that the government established thereby
shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that upon the final
and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the
proclamation of Philippine independence, "The Commonwealth of the Philippines
shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines." Under this
provision the Government of the Philippines immediately prior to independence
was essentially to be the identical government thereafter — only the name of that
government was to be changed.

Both before and after the adoption of the Philippine Constitution the people of the
Philippines were and are always the plaintiff in all criminal prosecutions, the case
being entitled: "The People of the Philippines vs. (the defendant or defendants)."
This was already true in prosecutions under the Revised Penal Code containing
the law of treason. "The Government of the Philippines" spoken of in article 114
of said Code merely represents the people of the Philippines. Said code was
continued, along with the other laws, by Article XVI, section 2, of the Constitution
which constitutional provision further directs that "all references in such laws to
the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far
as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this
Constitution" — of course, meaning the Commonwealth of the Philippines before,
and the Republic of the Philippines after, independence (Article XVIII). Under
both governments sovereignty resided and resides in the people (Article II,
section 1). Said sovereignty was never transferred from that people — they are
the same people who preserve it to this day. There has never been any change
in its respect.

If one committed treason againsts the People of the Philippines before July 4,
1946, he continues to be criminally liable for the crime to the same people now.
And if, following the literal wording of the Revised Penal Code, as continued by
the Constitution, that accused owed allegiance upon the commission of the crime
to the "Government of the Philippines," in the textual words of the Constitution
(Article XVI, section 2, and XVIII) that was the same government which after
independence became known as the "Republic of the Philippines." The most that
can be said is that the sovereignty of the people became complete and absolute
after independence — that they became, politically, fully of age, to use a
metaphor. But if the responsibility for a crime against a minor is not extinguished
by the mere fact of his becoming of age, why should the responsibility for the
crime of treason committed against the Filipino people when they were not fully
politically independent be extinguished after they acquire this status? The
offended party continues to be the same — only his status has changed.
PARAS, J., dissenting:

During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the
Philippines were suspended. This is full harmony with the generally accepted
principles of the international law adopted by our Constitution(Article II, section 3)
as a part of the law of the Nation. Accordingly, we have on more than one
occasion already stated that "laws of a political nature or affecting political
relations, . . . are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military
occupation" (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 113, 124),
and that the rule "that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are
considered suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation, is intended
for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory." (Ruffy vs. Chief
of Staff, Philippine Army, 75, Phil., 875, 881.)

The principle is recognized by the United States of America, which admits that
the occupant will naturally suspends all laws of a political nature and all laws
which affect the welfare and safety of his command, such action to be made
known to the inhabitants.(United States Rules of Land Welfare, 1940, Article
287.) As allegiance to the United States is an essential element in the crime of
treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, and in view of its position in
our political structure prior to the independence of the Philippines, the rule as
interpreted and practiced in the United States necessarily has a binding force
and effect in the Philippines, to the exclusion of any other construction followed
elsewhere, such as may be inferred, rightly or wrongly, from the isolated
cases 1 brought to our attention, which, moreover, have entirely different factual
bases.

Corresponding notice was given by the Japanese occupying army, first, in the
proclamation of its Commander in chief of January 2, 1942, to the effect that as a
"result of the Japanese Military operations, the sovereignty of the United States
of America over the Philippines has completely disappeared and the Army
hereby proclaims the Military Administration under martial law over the district
occupied by the Army;" secondly, in Order No. 3 of the said Commander in Chief
of February 20, 1942, providing that "activities of the administrative organs and
judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders,
ordinances and customs until further orders provided that they are not
inconsistent with the present circumstances under the Japanese Military
Administration;" and, thirdly, in the explanation to Order No. 3 reminding that "all
laws and regulations of the Philippines has been suspended since Japanese
occupation," and excepting the application of "laws and regulations which are not
proper act under the present situation of the Japanese Military Administration,"
especially those "provided with some political purposes."
The suspension of the political law during enemy occupation is logical, wise and
humane. The latter phase outweighs all other aspects of the principle aimed
more or less at promoting the necessarily selfish motives and purposes of a
military occupant. It thus consoling to note that the powers instrumental in the
crystallization of the Hague Conventions of 1907 did not forget to declare that
they were "animated by the desire to serve . . . the interest of the humanity and
the over progressive needs of civilization," and that "in case not included in the
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under
the protection and the rule of the principles of international law, as they result
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity,
and the dictates of the public conscience." These saving statements come to the
aid of the inhabitants in the occupied territory in a situation wherein, even before
the belligerent occupant "takes a further step and by appropriate affirmative
action undertakes to acquire the right of sovereignty for himself, . . . the occupant
is likely to regard to himself as clothed with freedom to endeavor to impregnate
the people who inhabit the area concerned with his own political ideology, and to
make that endeavor successful by various forms of pressure exerted upon
enemy officials who are permitted to retain the exercise of normal governmental
functions." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p.
1879.)

The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole
authority of the invading power, whose interest and requirements are naturally in
conflict with those of the displaced government, if it is legitimate for the military
occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabitants such obedience as may be
necessary for the security of his forces, for the maintenance of law and order,
and for the proper administration of the country (United States Rules of Land
Warfare, 1940, article 297), and to demand all kinds of services "of such a nature
as not to involve the population in the obligation of taking part in military
operations against their own country" (Hague Regulations, article 52);and if, as
we have in effect said, by the surrender the inhabitants pass under a temporary
allegiance to the government of the occupant and are bound by such laws, and
such only, as it chooses to recognize and impose, and the belligerent occupant
`is totally independent of the constitution and the laws of the territory, since
occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance and safety of his forces,
and the purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his interest and must be
promoted under all circumstances or conditions." (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons,
75 Phil., 285, 295), citing United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, and quoting
Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. II. Sixth Edition, Revised, 1944,p. 432.)

He would be a bigot who cannot or would refuse to see the cruel result if the
people in an occupied territory were required to obey two antagonistic and
opposite powers. To emphasize our point, we would adopt the argument, in a
reverse order, of Mr. Justice Hilado in Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil.,
285, 358), contained in the following passage:
 To have bound those of our people who constituted the great majority who
never submitted to the Japanese oppressors, by the laws, regulations,
processes and other acts of those two puppet governments, would not
only have been utterly unjust and downright illegal, but would have placed
them in the absurd and impossible condition of being simultaneously
submitted to two mutually hostile governments, with their respective
constitutional and legislative enactments and institutions — on the one
hand bound to continue owing allegiance to the United States and the
Commonwealth Government, and, on the other, to owe allegiance, if only
temporary, to Japan.

The only sensible purpose of the treason law — which is of political complexion
and taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed
against the belligerent occupant, incident to a state of war and necessary for the
control of the occupant (Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 494), — must
be the preservation of the nation, certainly not its destruction or extermination.
And yet the latter is unwittingly wished by those who are fond of the theory that
what is suspended is merely the exercise of sovereignty by the de
jure government or the latter's authority to impose penal sanctions or that,
otherwise stated, the suspension refers only to the military occupant. If this were
to be the only effect, the rule would be a meaningless and superfluous optical
illusion, since it is obvious that the fleeing or displaced government cannot, even
if it should want, physically assert its authority in a territory actually beyond its
reach, and that the occupant, on the other hand, will not take the absurd step of
prosecuting and punishing the inhabitants for adhering to and aiding it. If we were
to believe the opponents of the rule in question, we have to accept the absurd
proposition that the guerrillas can all be prosecuted with illegal possession of
firearms. It should be borne in the mind that "the possession by the belligerent
occupant of the right to control, maintain or modify the laws that are to obtain
within the occupied area is an exclusive one. The territorial sovereign driven
therefrom, can not compete with it on an even plane. Thus, if the latter attempt
interference, its action is a mere manifestation of belligerent effort to weaken the
enemy. It has no bearing upon the legal quality of what the occupant exacts,
while it retains control. Thus, if the absent territorial sovereign, through some
quasi-legislative decree, forbids its nationals to comply with what the occupant
has ordained obedience to such command within the occupied territory would not
safeguard the individual from the prosecution by the occupant." (Hyde,
International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1886.)

As long as we have not outlawed the right of the belligerent occupant to

prosecute and punish the inhabitants for "war treason" or "war crimes," as an
incident of the state of war and necessity for the control of the occupied territory
and the protection of the army of the occupant, against which prosecution and
punishment such inhabitants cannot obviously be protected by their native
sovereign, it is hard to understand how we can justly rule that they may at the
same time be prosecuted and punished for an act penalized by the Revised
Penal Code, but already taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new
offense committed against the belligerent occupant.

In Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 296), we held that "the
Constitution of the Commonwealth Government was suspended during the
occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces or the belligerent occupant
at regular war with the United States," and the meaning of the term "suspended"
is very plainly expressed in the following passage (page 298):

No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the
precepts of our Commonwealth Constitution relating to the rights of the
accused under that Constitution, because the latter was not in force during
the period of the Japanese military occupation, as we have already stated.
Nor may said Constitution be applied upon its revival at the time of the re-
occupation of the Philippines by the virtue of the priciple of postliminium,
because "a constitution should operate prospectively only, unless the
words employed show a clear intention that it should have a retrospective
effect," (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition, page 97, and
a case quoted and cited in the foot-note), especially as regards laws of
procedure applied to cases already terminated completely.

In much the same way, we should hold that no treason could have been
committed during the Japanese military occupation against the United States or
the Commonwealth Government, because article 114 of the Revised Penal Code
was not then in force. Nor may this penal provision be applied upon its revival at
the time of the reoccupation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle
of postliminium, because of the constitutional inhibition against any ex post
facto law and because, under article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal laws
shall have a retroactive effect only in so far as they favor the accused. Why did
we refuse to enforce the Constitution, more essential to sovereignty than article
114 of the Revised Penal Code in the aforesaid of Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons if, as alleged by the majority, the suspension was good only as to the
military occupant?

The decision in the United States vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), conclusively
supports our position. As analyzed and described in United States vs. Reiter (27
Fed. Cas., 773), that case "was decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States — the court of highest human authority on that subject — and as the
decision was against the United States, and in favor of the authority of Great
Britain, its enemy in the war, and was made shortly after the occurrence of the
war out of which it grew; and while no department of this Government was
inclined to magnify the rights of Great Britain or disparage those of its own
government, there can be no suspicion of bias in the mind of the court in favor of
the conclusion at which it arrived, and no doubt that the law seemed to the court
to warrant and demand such a decision. That case grew out of the war of 1812,
between the United States and Great Britain. It appeared that in September,
1814, the British forces had taken the port of Castine, in the State of Maine, and
held it in military occupation; and that while it was so held, foreign goods, by the
laws of the United States subject to duty, had been introduced into that port
without paying duties to the United States. At the close of the war the place by
treaty restored to the United States, and after that was done Government of the
United States sought to recover from the persons so introducing the goods there
while in possession of the British, the duties to which by the laws of the United
States, they would have been liable. The claim of the United States was that its
laws were properly in force there, although the place was at the time held by the
British forces in hostility to the United States, and the laws, therefore, could not at
the time be enforced there; and that a court of the United States (the power of
that government there having since been restored) was bound so to decide. But
this illusion of the prosecuting officer there was dispelled by the court in the most
summary manner. Mr. Justice Story, that great luminary of the American bench,
being the organ of the court in delivering its opinion, said: 'The single question is
whether goods imported into Castine during its occupation by the enemy are
liable to the duties imposed by the revenue laws upon goods imported into the
United States.. We are all of opinion that the claim for duties cannot be
sustained. . . . The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, of
course, suspended, and the laws of the United States could no longer be
rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and
submitted to the conquerors. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a
temporary allegiance of the British Government, and were bound by such laws,
and such only, as it chose to recognize and impose. From the nature of the case
no other laws could be obligatory upon them. . . . Castine was therefore, during
this period, as far as respected our revenue laws, to be deemed a foreign port,
and goods imported into it by the inhabitants were subjects to such duties only as
the British Government chose to require. Such goods were in no correct sense
imported into the Unites States.' The court then proceeded to say, that the case
is the same as if the port of Castine had been foreign territory, ceded by treaty to
the United States, and the goods had been imported there previous to its
cession. In this case they say there would be no pretense to say that American
duties could be demanded; and upon principles of public or municipal law, the
cases are not distinguishable. They add at the conclusion of the opinion: 'The
authorities cited at the bar would, if there were any doubt, be decisive of the
question. But we think it too clear to require any aid from authority.' Does this
case leave room for a doubt whether a country held as this was in armed
belligerents occupation, is to be governed by him who holds it, and by him alone?
Does it not so decide in terms as plain as can be stated? It is asserted by the
Supreme Court of the United States with entire unanimity, the great and
venerated Marshall presiding, and the erudite and accomplished Story delivering
the opinion of the court, that such is the law, and it is so adjudged in this case.
Nay, more: it is even adjudged that no other laws could be obligatory; that such
country, so held, is for the purpose of the application of the law off its former
government to be deemed foreign territory, and that goods imported there (and
by parity of reasoning other acts done there) are in no correct sense done within
the territory of its former sovereign, the United States."

But it is alleged by the majority that the sovereignty spoken of in the decision of
the United States vs. Rice should be construed to refer to the exercise of
sovereignty, and that, if sovereignty itself was meant, the doctrine has become
obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907. In answer, we may
state that sovereignty can have any important significance only when it may be
exercised; and, to our way of thinking, it is immaterial whether the thing held in
abeyance is the sovereignty itself or its exercise, because the point cannot
nullify, vary, or otherwise vitiate the plain meaning of the doctrinal words "the
laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be
obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors."
We cannot accept the theory of the majority, without in effect violating the rule of
international law, hereinabove adverted to, that the possession by the belligerent
occupant of the right to control, maintain or modify the laws that are to obtain
within the occupied area is an exclusive one, and that the territorial sovereign
driven therefrom cannot compete with it on an even plane. Neither may the
doctrine in the United States vs. Rice be said to have become obsolete, without
repudiating the actual rule prescribed and followed by the United States, allowing
the military occupant to suspend all laws of a political nature and even require
public officials and inhabitants to take an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of
Land Warfare, 1940, article 309). In fact, it is a recognized doctrine of American
Constitutional Law that mere conquest or military occupation of a territory of
another State does not operate to annex such territory to occupying State, but
that the inhabitants of the occupied district, no longer receiving the protection of
their native State, for the time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the
control and protection of the victorious power, owe to that power fealty and
obedience. (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931],
p.364.)

The majority have resorted to distinctions, more apparent than real, if not
immaterial, in trying to argue that the law of treason was obligatory on the
Filipinos during the Japanese occupation. Thus it is insisted that a citizen or
subject owes not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent
allegiance, and that "temporary allegiance" to the military occupant may be
likened to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or
sovereign to the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he
receives therefrom. The comparison is most unfortunate. Said foreigner is in the
territory of a power not hostile to or in actual war with his own government; he is
in the territory of a power which has not suspended, under the rules of
international law, the laws of political nature of his own government; and the
protections received by him from that friendly or neutral power is real, not the
kind of protection which the inhabitants of an occupied territory can expect from a
belligerent army. "It is but reasonable that States, when they concede to other
States the right to exercise jurisdiction over such of their own nationals as are
within the territorial limits of such other States, should insist that States should
provide system of law and of courts, and in actual practice, so administer them,
as to furnish substantial legal justice to alien residents. This does not mean that a
State must or should extend to aliens within its borders all the civil, or much less,
all the political rights or privileges which it grants to its own citizens; but it does
mean that aliens must or should be given adequate opportunity to have such
legal rights as are granted to them by the local law impartially and judicially
determined, and, when thus determined, protected." (Willoughby, The
Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p. 360.)

When it is therefore said that a citizen of a sovereign may be prosecuted for and
convicted of treason committed in a foreign country or, in the language of article
114 of the Revised Penal Code, "elsewhere," a territory other than one under
belligerent occupation must have been contemplated. This would make sense,
because treason is a crime "the direct or indirect purpose of which is the delivery,
in whole or in part, of the country to a foreign power, or to pave the way for the
enemy to obtain dominion over the national territory" (Albert, The Revised Penal
Code, citing 3 Groizard, 14); and, very evidently, a territory already under
occupation can no longer be "delivered."

The majority likewise argue that the theory of suspended sovereignty or

allegiance will enable the military occupant to legally recruit the inhabitants to
fight against their own government, without said inhabitants being liable for
treason. This argument is not correct, because the suspension does not exempt
the occupant from complying with the Hague Regulations (article 52) that allows
it to demand all kinds of services provided that they do not involve the population
"in the obligation of taking part military operations against their own country."
Neither does the suspension prevent the inhabitants from assuming a passive
attitude, much less from dying and becoming heroes if compelled by the
occupant to fight against their own country. Any imperfection in the present state
of international law should be corrected by such world agency as the United
Nations organizations.

It is of common knowledge that even with the alleged cooperation imputed to the
collaborators, an alarming number of Filipinos were killed or otherwise tortured
by the ruthless, or we may say savage, Japanese Army. Which leads to the
conclusion that if the Filipinos did not obey the Japanese commands and feign
cooperation, there would not be any Filipino nation that could have been
liberated. Assuming that the entire population could go to and live in the
mountains, or otherwise fight as guerrillas — after the formal surrender of our
and the American regular fighting forces, — they would have faced certain
annihilation by the Japanese, considering that the latter's military strength at the
time and the long period during which they were left military unmolested by
America. In this connection, we hate to make reference to the atomic bomb as a
possible means of destruction.
If a substantial number of guerrillas were able to survive and ultimately help in
the liberation of the Philippines, it was because the feigned cooperation of their
countrymen enabled them to get food and other aid necessary in the resistance
movement. If they were able to survive, it was because they could camouflage
themselves in the midst of the civilian population in cities and towns. It is easy to
argue now that the people could have merely followed their ordinary pursuits of
life or otherwise be indifferent to the occupant. The fundamental defect of this
line of thought is that the Japanese assumed to be so stupid and dumb as not to
notice any such attitude. During belligerent occupation, "the outstanding fact to
be reckoned with is the sharp opposition between the inhabitants of the occupied
areas and the hostile military force exercising control over them. At heart they
remain at war with each other. Fear for their own safety may not serve to deter
the inhabitants from taking advantage of opportunities to interfere with the safety
and success of the occupant, and in so doing they may arouse its passions and
cause to take vengeance in cruel fashion. Again, even when it is untainted by
such conduct, the occupant as a means of attaining ultimate success in its major
conflict may, under plea of military necessity, and regardless of conventional or
customary prohibitions, proceed to utilize the inhabitants within its grip as a
convenient means of military achievement." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III,
Second Revised Edition [1945], p. 1912.) It should be stressed that the Japanese
occupation was not a matter of a few months; it extended over a little more than
three years. Said occupation was a fact, in spite of the "presence of guerrilla
bands in barrios and mountains, and even in towns of the Philippines whenever
these towns were left by Japanese garrisons or by the detachments of troops
sent on patrol to those places." (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75
Phil., 371, 373.) The law of nations accepts belligerent occupation as a fact to be
reckoned with, regardless of the merits of the occupant's cause. (Hyde,
International Law, Second Revised Edition [1945], Vol. III, p. 1879.)

Those who contend or fear that the doctrine herein adhere to will lead to an over-
production of traitors, have a wrong and low conception of the psychology and
patriotism of their countrymen. Patriots are such after their birth in the first place,
and no amount of laws or judicial decisions can make or unmake them. On the
other hand, the Filipinos are not so base as to be insensitive to the thought that
the real traitor is cursed everywhere and in all ages. Our patriots who fought and
died during the last war, and the brave guerrillas who have survived, were
undoubtedly motivated by their inborn love of country, and not by such a thing as
the treason law. The Filipino people as a whole, passively opposed the Japanese
regime, not out of fear of a treason statute but because they preferred and will
prefer the democratic and civilized way of life and American altruism to Japanese
barbaric and totalitarian designs. Of course, there are those who might at heart
have been pro-Japanese; but they met and will unavoidably meet the necessary
consequences. The regular soldiers faced the risks of warfare; the spies and
informers subjected themselves to the perils of military operations, likely received
summary liquidation or punishments from the guerrillas and the parties injured by
their acts, and may be prosecuted as war spies by the military authorities of the
returning sovereign; those who committed other common crimes, directly or
through the Japanese army, may be prosecuted under the municipal law, and
under this group even the spies and informers, Makapili or otherwise, are
included, for they can be made answerable for any act offensive to person or
property; the buy-and-sell opportunists have the war profits tax to reckon with.
We cannot close our eyes to the conspicuous fact that, in the majority of cases,
those responsible for the death of, or injury to, any Filipino or American at the
hands of the Japanese, were prompted more by personal motives than by a
desire to levy war against the United States or to adhere to the occupant. The
alleged spies and informers found in the Japanese occupation the royal road to
vengeance against personal or political enemies. The recent amnesty granted to
the guerrillas for acts, otherwise criminal, committed in the furtherance of their
resistance movement has in a way legalized the penal sanctions imposed by
them upon the real traitors.

It is only from a realistic, practical and common-sense point of view, and by

remembering that the obedience and cooperation of the Filipinos were effected
while the Japanese were in complete control and occupation of the Philippines,
when their mere physical presence implied force and pressure — and not after
the American forces of liberation had restored the Philippine Government — that
we will come to realize that, apart from any rule of international law, it was
necessary to release the Filipinos temporarily from the old political tie in the
sense indicated herein. Otherwise, one is prone to dismiss the reason for such
cooperation and obedience. If there were those who did not in any wise
cooperate or obey, they can be counted by the fingers, and let their names adorn
the pages of Philippine history. Essentially, however, everybody who took
advantage, to any extent and degree, of the peace and order prevailing during
the occupation, for the safety and survival of himself and his family, gave aid and
comfort to the enemy.

Our great liberator himself, General Douglas MacArthur, had considered the laws
of the Philippines ineffective during the occupation, and restored to their full vigor
and force only after the liberation. Thus, in his proclamation of October 23, 1944,
he ordained that "the laws now existing on the statute books of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . are in full force and effect and legally
binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control," and that "all laws . . . of any other government in the Philippines than
that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas
of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control." Repeating what we
have said in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113, 133), "it
is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent
or a representative of the Government and the President of the United States,
constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army, did not intend to
act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court of
the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by the President
of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907."
The prohibition in the Hague Conventions (Article 45) against "any pressure on
the population to take oath to the hostile power," was inserted for the moral
protection and benefit of the inhabitants, and does not necessarily carry the
implication that the latter continue to be bound to the political laws of the
displaced government. The United States, a signatory to the Hague Conventions,
has made the point clear, by admitting that the military occupant can suspend all
the laws of a political nature and even require public officials and the inhabitants
to take an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article
309), and as already stated, it is a doctrine of American Constitutional Law that
the inhabitants, no longer receiving the protection of their native state, for the
time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the control and protection of
the victorious power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. Indeed, what is
prohibited is the application of force by the occupant, from which it is fair to
deduce that the Conventions do not altogether outlaw voluntary submission by
the population. The only strong reason for this is undoubtedly the desire of the
authors of the Conventions to give as much freedom and allowance to the
inhabitants as are necessary for their survival. This is wise and humane, because
the people should be in a better position to know what will save them during the
military occupation than any exile government.

"Before he was appointed prosecutor, Justice Jackson made a speech in which

he warned against the use of judicial process for non judicial ends, and attacked
cynics who "see no reason why courts, just like other agencies, should not be
policy weapons. If we want to shoot Germans as a matter of policy, let it be done
as such, said he, but don't hide the deed behind a court. If you are determined to
execute a man in any case there is no occasion for a trial; the word yields no
respect for courts that are merely organized to convict." Mussoloni may have got
his just desserts, but nobody supposes he got a fair trial. . . . Let us bear that in
mind as we go about punishing criminals. There are enough laws on the books to
convict guilty Nazis without risking the prestige of our legal system. It is far, far
better that some guilty men escape than that the idea of law be endangered. In
the long run the idea of law is our best defense against Nazism in all its forms."
These passages were taken from the editorial appearing in the Life, May 28,
1945, page 34, and convey ideas worthy of some reflection.

If the Filipinos in fact committed any errors in feigning cooperation and obedience
during the Japanese military occupation, they were at most — borrowing the
famous and significant words of President Roxas — errors of the mind and not of
the heart. We advisedly said "feigning" not as an admission of the fallacy of the
theory of suspended allegiance or sovereignty, but as an affirmation that the
Filipinos, contrary to their outward attitude, had always remained loyal by feeling
and conscience to their country.

Assuming that article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was in force during the
Japanese military occupation, the present Republic of the Philippines has no
right to prosecute treason committed against the former sovereignty existing
during the Commonwealth Government which was none other than the
sovereignty of the United States. This court has already held that, upon a change
of sovereignty, the provisions of the Penal Code having to do with such subjects
as treason, rebellion and sedition are no longer in force (People vs. Perfecto, 43
Phil., 887). It is true that, as contended by the majority, section 1 of Article II of
the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "sovereignty resides in the
people," but this did not make the Commonwealth Government or the Filipino
people sovereign, because said declaration of principle, prior to the
independence of the Philippines, was subervient to and controlled by the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution under which, in addition to its many
provisions essentially destructive of the concept of sovereignty, it is expressly
made clear that the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines had not
then been withdrawn. The framers of the Constitution had to make said
declaration of principle because the document was ultimately intended for the
independent Philippines. Otherwise, the Preamble should not have announced
that one of the purposes of the Constitution is to secure to the Filipino people and
their posterity the "blessings of independence." No one, we suppose, will dare
allege that the Philippines was an independent country under the Commonwealth
Government.

The Commonwealth Government might have been more autonomous than that
existing under the Jones Law, but its non-sovereign status nevertheless
remained unaltered; and what was enjoyed was the exercise of sovereignty over
the Philippines continued to be complete.

The exercise of Sovereignty May be Delegated. — It has already been

seen that the exercise of sovereignty is conceived of as delegated by a
State to the various organs which, collectively, constitute the Government.
For practical political reasons which can be easily appreciated, it is
desirable that the public policies of a State should be formulated and
executed by governmental agencies of its own creation and which are not
subject to the control of other States. There is, however, nothing in a
nature of sovereignty or of State life which prevents one State from
entrusting the exercise of certain powers to the governmental agencies of
another State. Theoretically, indeed, a sovereign State may go to any
extent in the delegation of the exercise of its power to the governmental
agencies of other States, those governmental agencies thus becoming
quoad hoc parts of the governmental machinery of the State whose
sovereignty is exercised. At the same time these agencies do not cease to
be Instrumentalities for the expression of the will of the State by which
they were originally created.

By this allegation the agent State is authorized to express the will of the
delegating State, and the legal hypothesis is that this State possesses the
legal competence again to draw to itself the exercise, through organs of its
own creation, of the powers it has granted. Thus, States may concede to
 colonies almost complete autonomy of government and reserve to
themselves a right of control of so slight and so negative a character as to
make its exercise a rare and improbable occurence; yet, so long as such
right of control is recognized to exist, and the autonomy of the colonies is
conceded to be founded upon a grant and the continuing consent of the
mother countries the sovereignty of those mother countries over them is
complete and they are to be considered as possessing only administrative
autonomy and not political independence. Again, as will be more fully
discussed in a later chapter, in the so-called Confederate or Composite
State, the cooperating States may yield to the central Government the
exercise of almost all of their powers of Government and yet retain their
several sovereignties. Or, on the other hand, a State may, without parting
with its sovereignty of lessening its territorial application, yield to the
governing organs of particular areas such an amplitude of powers as to
create of them bodies-politic endowed with almost all of the characteristics
of independent States. In all States, indeed, when of any considerable
size, efficiency of administration demands that certain autonomous
powers of local self-government be granted to particular districts.
(Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 74,
75.).

The majority have drawn an analogy between the Commonwealth Government

and the States of the American Union which, it is alleged, preserve their own
sovereignty although limited by the United States. This is not true for it has been
authoritatively stated that the Constituent States have no sovereignty of their
own, that such autonomous powers as they now possess are had and exercised
by the express will or by the constitutional forbearance of the national
sovereignty, and that the sovereignty of the United States and the non-sovereign
status of the individual States is no longer contested.

It is therefore plain that the constituent States have no sovereignty of their

own, and that such autonomous powers as they now possess are had and
exercised by the express will or by the constitutional forbearance of the
national sovereignty. The Supreme Court of the United States has held
that, even when selecting members for the national legislature, or electing
the President, or ratifying proposed amendments to the federal
constitution, the States act, ad hoc, as agents of the National Government.
(Willoughby, the Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p.250.)

This is the situation at the present time. The sovereignty of the United
States and the non-sovereign status of the individual States is no longer
contested. (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931],
pp. 251, 252.)

Article XVIII of the Constitution provides that "The government established by this
Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the
final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the
proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines
shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines." From this, the
deduction is made that the Government under the Republic of the Philippines
and under the Commonwealth is the same. We cannot agree. While the
Commonwealth Government possessed administrative autonomy and exercised
the sovereignty delegated by the United States and did not cease to be an
instrumentality of the latter (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public
Law [1931], pp. 74, 75), the Republic of the Philippines is an independent State
not receiving its power or sovereignty from the United States. Treason committed
against the United States or against its instrumentality, the Commonwealth
Government, which exercised, but did not possess, sovereignty (id., p. 49), is
therefore not treason against the sovereign and independent Republic of the
Philippines. Article XVIII was inserted in order, merely, to make the Constitution
applicable to the Republic.

Reliance is also placed on section 2 of the Constitution which provides that all
laws of the Philippines Islands shall remain operative, unless inconsistent
therewith, until amended, altered, modified or repealed by the Congress of the
Philippines, and on section 3 which is to the effect that all cases pending in
courts shall be heard, tried, and determined under the laws then in force, thereby
insinuating that these constitutional provisions authorize the Republic of the
Philippines to enforce article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. The error is
obvious. The latter article can remain operative under the present regime if it is
not inconsistent with the Constitution. The fact remains, however, that said penal
provision is fundamentally incompatible with the Constitution, in that those liable
for treason thereunder should owe allegiance to the United States or the
government of the Philippines, the latter being, as we have already pointed out, a
mere instrumentality of the former, whereas under the Constitution of the present
Republic, the citizens of the Philippines do not and are not required to owe
allegiance to the United States. To contend that article 114 must be deemed to
have been modified in the sense that allegiance to the United States is deleted,
and, as thus modified, should be applied to prior acts, would be to sanction the
enactment and application of an ex post facto law.

In reply to the contention of the respondent that the Supreme Court of the United
States has held in the case of Bradford vs. Chase National Bank (24 Fed. Supp.,
38), that the Philippines had a sovereign status, though with restrictions, it is
sufficient to state that said case must be taken in the light of a subsequent
decision of the same court in Cincinnati Soap Co. vs. United States (301 U.S.,
308), rendered in May, 1937, wherein it was affirmed that the sovereignty of the
United States over the Philippines had not been withdrawn, with the result that
the earlier case only be interpreted to refer to the exercise of sovereignty by the
Philippines as delegated by the mother country, the United States.
No conclusiveness may be conceded to the statement of President Roosevelt on
August 12, 1943, that "the United States in practice regards the Philippines as
having now the status as a government of other independent nations--in fact all
the attributes of complete and respected nationhood," since said statement was
not meant as having accelerated the date, much less as a formal proclamation
of, the Philippine Independence as contemplated in the Tydings-McDuffie Law, it
appearing that (1) no less also than the President of the United States had to
issue the proclamation of July 4, 1946, withdrawing the sovereignty of the United
States and recognizing Philippine Independence; (2) it was General MacArthur,
and not President Osmeña who was with him, that proclaimed on October 23,
1944, the restoration of the Commonwealth Government; (3) the Philippines was
not given official participation in the signing of the Japanese surrender; (4) the
United States Congress, and not the Commonwealth Government, extended the
tenure of office of the President and Vice-President of the Philippines.

The suggestion that as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as
against the State Government, in the same way treason may have been
committed against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the
sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth, is immaterial because, as we have
already explained, treason against either is not and cannot be treason against
the new and different sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines.

Footnotes

PARAS, J., dissenting:

1English case of De Jager vs. Attorney General of Naval; Belgian case of
Auditeur Militaires vs. Van Dieren; cases of Petain, Laval and Quisling.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 171673 May 30, 2011

BANAHAW BROADCASTING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
CAYETANO PACANA III, NOE U. DACER, JOHNNY B. RACAZA, LEONARDO
S. OREVILLO, ARACELI T. LIBRE, GENOVEVO E. ROMITMAN, PORFERIA
M. VALMORES, MENELEO G. LACTUAN, DIONISIO G. BANGGA,
FRANCISCO D. MANGA, NESTOR A. AMPLAYO, LEILANI B. GASATAYA,
LORETA G. LACTUAN, RICARDO B. PIDO, RESIGOLO M. NACUA and
ANACLETO C. REMEDIO, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure assailing the Decision1dated April 15, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57847, and its Resolution2 dated January 27, 2006
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:

Respondents in the case at bar, Cayetano Pacana III, Noe U. Dacer, Johnny B.
Racaza, Leonardo S. Orevillo, Araceli T. Libre, Genovevo E. Romitman, Porferia
M. Valmores, Meneleo G. Lactuan, Dionisio G. Bangga, Francisco D. Manga,
Nestor A. Amplayo, Leilani B. Gasataya, Loreta G. Lactuan, Ricardo B. Pido,
Resigolo M. Nacua and Anacleto C. Remedio (collectively, the DXWG
personnel), are supervisory and rank and file employees of the DXWG-Iligan City
radio station which is owned by petitioner Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC), a corporation managed by Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation
(IBC).

On August 29, 1995, the DXWG personnel filed with the Sub-regional Arbitration
Branch No. XI, Iligan City a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice,
reimbursement of unpaid Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) benefits, and
attorney’s fees against IBC and BBC.

On June 21, 1996, Labor Arbiter Abdullah L. Alug rendered his

Decision3 awarding the DXWG personnel a total of P12,002,157.28 as unpaid
CBA benefits consisting of unpaid wages and increases, 13th month pay,
longevity pay, sick leave cash conversion, rice and sugar subsidy, retirement
pay, loyalty reward and separation pay.4 The Labor Arbiter denied the other
claims of the DXWG personnel for Christmas bonus, educational assistance,
medical check-up and optical expenses. Both sets of parties appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
On May 15, 1997, a Motion to Dismiss, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim,5 was
jointly filed by IBC and the DXWG personnel based on the latter’s admission that
IBC is not their employer as it does not own DXWG-Iligan City. On April 21,
1997, the NLRC granted the Motion and dismissed the case with respect to IBC. 6

BBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that (1) neither BBC nor its duly
authorized representatives or officers were served with summons and/or a copy
of the complaint when the case was pending before the Labor Arbiter or a copy
of the Decision therein; (2) since the liability of IBC and BBC is solidary, the
release and quitclaim issued by the DXWG personnel in favor of IBC totally
extinguished BBC’s liability; (3) it was IBC that effected the termination of the
DXWG personnel’s employment; (4) the DXWG personnel are members of the
IBC union and are not employees of BBC; and (5) the sequestered properties of
BBC cannot be levied upon.

On December 12, 1997, the NLRC issued a Resolution vacating the Decision of
Labor Arbiter Alug and remanding the case to the arbitration branch of origin on
the ground that while the complaint was filed against both IBC and BBC, only IBC
was served with summons, ordered to submit a position paper, and furnished a
copy of the assailed decision.7

On October 15, 1998, Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan rendered a

Decision adjudging BBC to be liable for the same amount discussed in the
vacated Decision of Labor Arbiter Alug:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the

respondent Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation to pay complainants the
following:

1. Cayetano Pacana III P 1,730,535.75

2. Noe U. Dacer 886,776.43

3. Johnny B. Racaza 1,271,739.34

4. Leonardo S. Orevillo 1,097,752.70

5. Araceli T. Libre 543,467.22

6. Genovevo E. Romitman 716,455.72

7. Porferia M. Valmores 562,564.78

8. Meneleo G. Lactuan 678,995.91

9. Dionisio G. Bangga 580,873.78

 10. Francisco D. Manga 29,286.65

11. Nestor A. Amplayo 583,798.51

12. Leilani B. Gasataya 42,669.75

13. Loreta G. Lactuan 757,252.52

14. Ricardo B. Pido 756,835.64

15. Resigolo M. Nacua 887,344.75

16. Anacleto C. Remedio 887,345.39

GRAND TOTAL P 12,002,157.28

Respondent is likewise ordered to pay 10% of the total award as attorney’s fee. 8

Both BBC and respondents appealed to the NLRC anew. The appeal was
docketed as NLRC CA No. M-004419-98. In their appeal, the DXWG personnel
reasserted their claim for the remaining CBA benefits not awarded to them, and
alleged error in the reckoning date of the computation of the monetary award.
BBC, in its own Memorandum of Appeal, challenged the monetary award itself,
claiming that such benefits were only due to IBC, not BBC, employees.9 In the
same Memorandum of Appeal, BBC incorporated a Motion for the
Recomputation of the Monetary Award (of the Labor Arbiter),10 in order that the
appeal bond may be reduced.

On September 16, 1999, the NLRC issued an Order11 denying the Motion for the
Recomputation of the Monetary Award. According to the NLRC, such
recomputation would result in the premature resolution of the issue raised on
appeal. The NLRC ordered BBC to post the required bond within 10 days from
receipt of said Order, with a warning that noncompliance will cause the dismissal
of the appeal for non-perfection.12 Instead of complying with the Order to post the
required bond, BBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 alleging this time that
since it is wholly owned by the Republic of the Philippines, it need not post an
appeal bond.

On November 22, 1999, the NLRC rendered its Decision14 in NLRC CA No. M-
004419-98. In said Decision, the NLRC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of
BBC on its September 16, 1999 Order and accordingly dismissed the appeal of
BBC for non-perfection. The NLRC likewise dismissed the appeal of the DXWG
personnel for lack of merit in the same Decision.

BBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Decision. On January 13,
2000, the NLRC issued a Resolution15 denying the Motion.
BBC filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court assailing the above dispositions by the NLRC. The Petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 57847.

On April 15, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision denying
BBC’s Petition for Certiorari. The Court of Appeals held that BBC, though owned
by the government, is a corporation with a personality distinct from the Republic
or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, and therefore do not partake in the
latter’s exemption from the posting of appeal bonds. The dispositive portion of
the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public

respondents, We DENY the petition. The challenged decision of public
respondent dated November 22, 1999, as well as its subsequent resolution dated
January 13, 2000, in NLRC Case No. M-004419-98 are hereby AFFIRMED. The
decision of the Labor Arbiter dated October 15, 1998 in RAB Case No. 12-09-
00309-95 is hereby declared FINAL AND EXECUTORY.16

On January 27, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Resolution
denying the Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition for Review.

As stated above, both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals dealt with only one
issue – whether BBC is exempt from posting an appeal bond. To recall, the
NLRC issued an Order denying BBC’s Motion for the Recomputation of the
Monetary Award and ordered BBC to post the required bond within 10 days from
receipt of said Order, with a warning that noncompliance will cause the dismissal
of the appeal for non-perfection.17 However, instead of heeding the warning, BBC
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that it need not post an appeal bond
since it is wholly owned by the Republic of the Philippines.

There is no dispute as regards the history of the ownership of BBC and IBC. Both
BBC and IBC, together with Radio Philippines Network (RPN-9), were formerly
owned by Roberto S. Benedicto (Benedicto). In the aftermath of the 1986 people
power revolution, the three companies, collectively denominated as Broadcast
City, were sequestered and placed under the control and management of the
Board of Administrators (BOA).18 The BOA was tasked to operate and manage
its business and affairs subject to the control and supervision of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG).19 In December 1986, Benedicto and
PCGG allegedly executed a Management Agreement whereby the Boards of
Directors of BBC, IBC and RPN-9 were agreed to be reconstituted. Under the
agreement, 2/3 of the membership of the Boards of Directors will be PCGG
nominees, and 1/3 will be Benedicto nominees. A reorganized Board of Directors
was thus elected for each of the three corporations. The BOA, however, refused
to relinquish its function, paving for the filing by Benedicto of a Petition for
Prohibition with this Court in 1989, which was docketed as G.R. No. 87710.
In the meantime, it was in 1987 when the Republic, represented by the PCGG,
filed the case for recovery/reconveyance/reversion and damages against
Benedicto. Following our ruling in Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc.
(BASECO) v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,20 the institution of
this suit necessarily placed BBC, IBC and RPN-9 under custodia legis of the
Sandiganbayan.

On November 3, 1990, Benedicto and the Republic executed a Compromise

Agreement whereby Benedicto, in exchange for immunity from civil and criminal
actions, "ceded to the government certain pieces of property listed in Annex A of
the agreement and assigned or transferred whatever rights he may have, if any,
to the government over all corporate assets listed in Annex B of the
agreement."21 BBC is one of the properties listed in Annex B.22 Annex A, on the
other hand, includes the following entry:

CESSION TO THE GOVERNMENT:

I. PHILIPPINE ASSETS:

xxxx

7. Inter-Continental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC), 100% of total assets

estimated at P450 million, consisting of 41,000 sq.mtrs. of land, more or less,
located at Broadcast City Quezon City, other land and buildings in various
Provinces, and operates the following TV stations:

a. TV 13 (Manila)

b. DY/TV 13 (Cebu)

c. DX/TV 13 (Davao)

d. DYOB/TV 12 (Iloilo)

e. DWLW/TV 13 (Laoag)

as well as the following Radio Stations

a. DZMZ-FM Manila

b. DYBQ Iloilo

c. DYOO Roxas

d. DYRG Kalibo
 e. DWLW Laoag

f. DWGW Legaspi

g. DWDW Dagupan

h. DWNW Naga

i. DXWG Iligan . . . . . . . . . . P352,455,286.0023 (Emphasis

supplied.)

Then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition seeking to invalidate the Compromise Agreement, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 96087. The Petition was consolidated with G.R. No.
87710.

On March 31, 1992, this Court, in Benedicto v. Board of Administrators of

Television Stations RPN, BBC and IBC,24promulgated its Decision on the
consolidated petitions in G.R. No. 87710 and G.R. No. 96087. Holding that the
authority of the BOA had become functus oficio, we granted the Petition in G.R.
No. 87710, ordering the BOA to "cease and desist from further exercising
management, operation and control of Broadcast City and is hereby directed to
surrender the management, operation and control of Broadcast City to the
reorganized Board of Directors of each of the Broadcast City television
stations."25 We denied the Petition in G.R. No. 96087 for being premature, since
the approval of the Compromise Agreement was still pending in the
Sandiganbayan.26

The Sandiganbayan subsequently approved the Compromise Agreement on

October 31, 1992, and the approval was affirmed by this Court on September 10,
1993 in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.27 Thus, both BBC and IBC were
government-owned and controlled during the time the DXWG personnel filed
their original complaint on August 29, 1995.

In the present Petition, BBC reiterates its argument that since it is now wholly
and solely owned by the government, the posting of the appeal bond was
unnecessary on account of the fact that it is presumed that the government is
always solvent.28 Citing the 1975 case of Republic (Bureau of Forestry) v. Court
of Appeals,29 BBC adds before us that it is not even necessary for BBC to raise
its exempt status as the NLRC should have taken cognizance of the same. 30

When the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal by the NLRC of BBC’s appeal
for failure of the latter to post an appeal bond, it relied to the ruling of this Court in
Republic v. Presiding Judge, Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal.31 The
appellate court, noting that BBC’s primary purpose as stated in its Articles of
Incorporation is to engage in commercial radio and television broadcasting, held
that BBC did not meet the criteria enunciated in Republic v. Presiding Judge for
exemption from the appeal bond.32

We pertinently held in Republic v. Presiding Judge:

The sole issue implicit in this petition is whether or not the RCA is exempt from
paying the legal fees and from posting an appeal bond.

We find merit in the petition.

To begin with, We have to determine whether the RCA is a governmental agency

of the Republic of the Philippines without a separate, distinct and independent
legal personality from the latter. We maintain the affirmative. The legal character
of the RCA as a governmental agency had already been passed upon in the
case of Ramos vs. Court of Industrial Relations wherein this Court held:

"Congress, by said Republic Act 3452 approved on June 14, 1962, created RCA,
in pursuance of its declared policy, viz:

‘SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government that in

order to stabilize the price of palay, rice and corn, it shall engage in the 'purchase
of these basic foods directly from those tenants, farmers, growers, producers and
landowners in the Philippines who wish to dispose of their produce at a price that
will afford them a fair and just return for their labor and capital investment and
whenever circumstances brought about by any cause, natural or artificial, should
so require, shall sell and dispose of these commodities to the consumers at
areas of consumption at a price that is within their reach.’

"RCA is, therefore, a government machinery to carry out a declared government

policy just noted, and not for profit.

"And more. By law, RCA depends for its continuous operation on appropriations
yearly set aside by the General Appropriations Act. So says Section 14 of
Republic Act 3452:

‘SECTION 14. The sum of one hundred million pesos is hereby appropriated, out
of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the
capitalization of the Administration: Provided, That the annual operational
expenses of the Administration shall not exceed three million pesos of the said
amount: Provided further, That the budget of the Rice and Corn Administration
for the fiscal year nineteen hundred and sixty-three to nineteen hundred and
sixty-four and the years thereafter shall be included in the General appropriations
submitted to Congress.’
"RCA is not possessed of a separate and distinct corporate existence. On the
contrary, by the law of its creation, it is an office directly under the Office of the
President of the Philippines."

Respondent, however, contends that the RCA has been created to succeed to
the corporate assets, liabilities, functions and powers of the abolished National
Rice & Corn Corporation which is a government-owned and controlled
corporation separate and distinct from the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines. He further contends that the RCA, being a duly capitalized entity
doing mercantile activity engaged in the buying and selling of palay, rice, and
corn cannot be the same as the Republic of the Philippines; rather, it is an entity
separate and distinct from the Republic of the Philippines. These contentions are
patently erroneous.

xxxx

The mercantile activity of RCA in the buying and selling of palay, rice, and corn is
only incident to its primary governmental function which is to carry out its
declared policy of subsidizing and stabilizing the price of palay, rice, and corn in
order to make it well within the reach of average consumers, an object obviously
identified with the primary function of government to serve the well-being of the
people.

As a governmental agency under the Office of the President the RCA is thus
exempt from the payment of legal fees as well as the posting of an appeal bond.
Under the decisional laws which form part of the legal system of the Philippines
the Republic of the Philippines is exempt from the requirement of filing an appeal
bond on taking an appeal from an adverse judgment, since there could be no
doubt, as to the solvency of the Government. This well-settled doctrine of the
Government's exemption from the requirement of posting an appeal bond was
first enunciated as early as March 7, 1916 in Government of the Philippine Island
vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloiloand has since been so
consistently enforced that it has become practically a matter of public knowledge
and certainly a matter of judicial notice on the part of the courts of the land.33

In the subsequent case of Badillo v. Tayag,34 we further discussed that:

Created by virtue of PD No. 757, the NHA is a government-owned and controlled

corporation with an original charter. As a general rule, however, such
corporations -- with or without independent charters -- are required to pay legal
fees under Section 21 of Rule 141 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

"SEC. 21. Government Exempt. - The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities, are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this rule.
Local governments and government-owned or controlled corporations with or
without independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees."
On the other hand, the NHA contends that it is exempt from paying all kinds of
fees and charges, because it performs governmental functions. It cites Public
Estates Authority v. Yujuico, which holds that the Public Estates Authority (PEA),
a government-owned and controlled corporation, is exempt from paying docket
fees whenever it files a suit in relation to its governmental functions.

We agree. x x x.35

We can infer from the foregoing jurisprudential precedents that, as a general rule,
the government and all the attached agencies with no legal personality distinct
from the former are exempt from posting appeal bonds, whereas government-
owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) are not similarly exempted. This
distinction is brought about by the very reason of the appeal bond itself: to
protect the presumptive judgment creditor against the insolvency of the
presumptive judgment debtor. When the State litigates, it is not required to put up
an appeal bond because it is presumed to be always solvent. 36 This exemption,
however, does not, as a general rule, apply to GOCCs for the reason that the
latter has a personality distinct from its shareholders. Thus, while a GOCC’s
majority stockholder, the State, will always be presumed solvent, the
presumption does not necessarily extend to the GOCC itself. However, when a
GOCC becomes a "government machinery to carry out a declared government
policy,"37 it becomes similarly situated as its majority stockholder as there is the
assurance that the government will necessarily fund its primary functions. Thus,
a GOCC that is sued in relation to its governmental functions may be, under
appropriate circumstances, exempted from the payment of appeal fees.

In the case at bar, BBC was organized as a private corporation, sequestered in

the 1980’s and the ownership of which was subsequently transferred to the
government in a compromise agreement. Further, it is stated in its Amended
Articles of Incorporation that BBC has the following primary function:

To engage in commercial radio and television broadcasting, and for this purpose,
to establish, operate and maintain such stations, both terrestrial and satellite or
interplanetary, as may be necessary for broadcasting on a network wide or
international basis.38

It is therefore crystal clear that BBC’s function is purely commercial or proprietary

and not governmental. As such, BBC cannot be deemed entitled to an exemption
from the posting of an appeal bond.

Consequently, the NLRC did not commit an error, and much less grave abuse of
discretion, in dismissing the appeal of BBC on account of non-perfection of the
same. In doing so, the NLRC was merely applying Article 223 of the Labor Code,
which provides:
ART. 223. Appeal. - Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final
and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within
ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such
appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:

(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the
Labor Arbiter;

(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion,
including graft and corruption;

(c) If made purely on questions of law; and

(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause
grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer

may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount
equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. (Italization
supplied.)

The posting of the appeal bond within the period provided by law is not merely
mandatory but jurisdictional. The failure on the part of BBC to perfect the appeal
thus had the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. 39

Neither was there an interruption of the period to perfect the appeal when BBC
filed (1) its Motion for the Recomputation of the Monetary Award in order to
reduce the appeal bond, and (2) its Motion for Reconsideration of the denial of
the same. In Lamzon v. National Labor Relations Commission,40 where the
petitioner argued that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing her
appeal on the ground of non-perfection despite the fact that she filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File an Appeal Bond, we held:

The pertinent provision of Rule VI, NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended,

provides as follows:

xxxx

Section 6. Bond. - In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter, POEA Administrator

and Regional Director or his duly authorized hearing officer involves a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by
the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary
award, exclusive of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
The employer as well as counsel shall submit a joint declaration under oath
attesting that the surety bond posted is genuine and that it shall be in effect until
final disposition of the case.

The Commission may, in meritorious cases and upon Motion of the Appellant,
reduce the amount of the bond. The filing, however, of the motion to reduce bond
shall not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal.1awphil

Section 7. No Extension of Period. - No motion or request for extension of the

period within which to perfect an appeal shall be allowed."

As correctly observed by the NLRC, petitioner is presumptuous in assuming that

the 10-day period for perfecting an appeal, during which she was to post her
appeal bond, could be easily extended by the mere filing of an appropriate
motion for extension to file the bond and even without the said motion being
granted. It bears emphasizing that an appeal is only a statutory privilege and it
may only be exercised in the manner provided by law. Nevertheless, in certain
cases, we had occasion to declare that while the rule treats the filing of a cash or
surety bond in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from, as a jurisdictional requirement to perfect an appeal, the bond
requirement on appeals involving monetary awards is sometimes given a liberal
interpretation in line with the desired objective of resolving controversies on the
merits. However, we find no cogent reason to apply this same liberal
interpretation in this case. Considering that the motion for extension to file appeal
bond remained unacted upon, petitioner, pursuant to the NLRC rules, should
have seasonably filed the appeal bond within the ten (10) day reglementary
period following receipt of the order, resolution or decision of the NLRC to
forestall the finality of such order, resolution or decision. Besides, the rule
mandates that no motion or request for extension of the period within which to
perfect an appeal shall be allowed. The motion filed by petitioner in this case is
tantamount to an extension of the period for perfecting an appeal. As payment of
the appeal bond is an indispensable and jurisdictional requisite and not a mere
technicality of law or procedure, we find the challenged NLRC Resolution of
October 26, 1993 and Order dated January 11, 1994 in accordance with law. The
appeal filed by petitioner was not perfected within the reglementary period
because the appeal bond was filed out of time. Consequently, the decision
sought to be reconsidered became final and executory. Unless there is a clear
and patent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
the NLRC's denial of the appeal and the motion for reconsideration may not be
disturbed.41 (Underscoring supplied.)

In the case at bar, BBC already took a risk when it filed its Motion for the
Recomputation of the Monetary Award without posting the bond itself. The
Motion for the Recomputation of the Monetary Award filed by BBC, like the
Motion for Extension to File the Appeal Bond in Lamzon, was itself tantamount to
a motion for extension to perfect the appeal, which is prohibited by the rules. The
NLRC already exhibited leniency when, instead of dismissing the appeal outright,
it merely ordered BBC to post the required bond within 10 days from receipt of
said Order, with a warning that noncompliance will cause the dismissal of the
appeal for non-perfection. When BBC further demonstrated its unwillingness by
completely ignoring this warning and by filing a Motion for Reconsideration on an
entirely new ground, the NLRC cannot be said to have committed grave abuse of
discretion by making good its warning to dismiss the appeal. Therefore, the Court
of Appeals committed no error when it upheld the NLRC’s dismissal of
petitioner’s appeal.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 15, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 57847,
and its Resolution dated January 27, 2006 are hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* Per Special Order No. 994 dated May 27, 2011.
1Rollo, pp. 57-73; penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja with
Associate Justices Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and Normandie B. Pizarro,
concurring.
2 Id. at 74-75.
3 Id. at 111-125.
4WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents IBC and BBC are
hereby ordered to severally and jointly pay complainants the following as
presented opposite their respective names, to wit:

1. Cayetano Pacana III P 1,730,535.75

2. Noe U. Dacer 886,776.43

3. Johnny B. Racaza 1,271,739.34

4. Leonardo S. Orevillo 1,097,752.70

5. Araceli T. Libre 543,467.22

6. Genovevo E. Romitman 716,455.72

7. Porferia M. Valmores 562,564.78

8. Meneleo G. Lactuan 678,995.91

9. Dionisio G. Bangga 580,873.78

10. Francisco D. Manga 29,286.65

11. Nestor A. Amplayo 583,798.51

12. Leilani B. Gasataya 42,669.75

13. Loreta G. Lactuan 757,252.52

14. Ricardo B. Pido 756,835.64

15. Resigolo M. Nacua 887,344.75

16. Anacleto C. Remedio 887,345.39

GRAND TOTAL P 12,002,157.28

 Plus 10% of the grand total as attorney’s fees.
All other claims not discussed above are hereby ordered dismissed
for want of legal basis. (Rollo, p. 125.)
5 CA rollo, pp. 140-141.
6 Id. at 143-145.
7 Id. at 147-150.
8 Id. at 194.
9 Id. at 198-199.
10 Id. at 199.
11 Rollo, pp. 237-238.
12 Id. at 238.
13 Id. at 239-243.
14 CA rollo, pp. 49-61.
15 Id. at 63-64.
16 Rollo, p. 72.

17 Id. at 238.
18 Sequestration Order; CA rollo, p. 159.
19 Executive Order No. 11, April 8, 1986.
20 234 Phil. 180 (1987).
21Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108292, September 10, 1993,
226 SCRA 314, 319.
22 CA rollo, p. 174.
23 Id. at 173.
24 G.R. Nos. 87710 and 96087, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 659.
25 Id. at 668.
26 Id.
27 Supra note 21.
28 Rollo, pp. 35-36.

29 160-A Phil. 465 (1975).

30 Rollo, p. 36.
31 188 Phil. 69 (1980).
32 Rollo, p. 68.

33Republic v. Presiding Judge, Branch XV, Court of First Instance of

Rizal, supra note 31 at 72-75.
34 448 Phil. 606 (2003). 145846, April 3, 2003
35 Id. at 617.
36 Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 328, 340 (1957).
37Republic v. Presiding Judge, Branch XV, Court of First Instance of
Rizal, supra note 31 at 72.
38 CA rollo, p. 308.
39 See Santos v. Velarde, 450 Phil. 381, 388 (2003).
40 367 Phil. 169 (1999).
41 Id. at 176-179. The Court in Lamzon quoted a provision of the 1990
NLRC Rules of Procedure, which had been effective at the time BBC filed
its appeal with the NLRC in 1998. Under the 2005 NLRC Rules of
Procedure, the provision reads:

Rule VI

xxxx

SECTION 6. Bond. – x x x.

xxxx
 No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on
meritorious grounds, and only upon the posting of a bond in a
reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award. The mere
filing of a motion to reduce bond without complying with the
requisites in the preceding paragraphs shall not stop the running of
the period to perfect an appeal.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed

OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA
OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents
CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA,
all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO
and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her
parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA.
CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their
parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor,
represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE
ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA
ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her
parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO,
CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents
GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS
IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ,
minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ,
KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all
surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE
KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed
ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA
ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors,
represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN,
MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented
by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE,
NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by
their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN
JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by
their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO,
ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented
by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE
PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and
THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced
and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin
concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."
Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause
of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests
and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems
and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before
Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National
Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal
petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network,
Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the
purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of
our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by
the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered
upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate
that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other

persons acting in his behalf to —

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,

renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises." 5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine
archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000)
hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied,
rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests
contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are
also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured
and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to
maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be
utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and
forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and
other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of
deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a)
water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as
the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the
water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible
examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of
Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and
agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion
(1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire
island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's
unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of
cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous
cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of
corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the
entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the
absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains
arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation
and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and
operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the
generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to
process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic
climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known
as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of

continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that
the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding,
they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as
documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen

(16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the
country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no

more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent
(4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of

virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land
mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of
immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have

granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations
to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial
logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is

hereto attached as Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares

per annum or 25 hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of
forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury

and irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to
the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are
evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental
damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt,
experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut

and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage
and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and
their successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and
enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or

impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the
benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and

healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the

defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon
defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the
country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto

attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing

TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of
plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the

TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff
minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare,
barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous
cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is

manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine
Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the
policy of the State —

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under

which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable
harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present

and future generations of Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is

conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June
1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the

aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of
the State to —

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and

wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)."
(Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and

resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and

healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."
(Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of

humankind — the natural law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to
self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law

other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of
the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion
to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs
have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a
political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches
of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action,
(2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned

motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that
the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the
relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by
the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not
only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners
filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of
action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound
environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human
Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR,
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide
in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation
and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard
the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave
abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more
areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-

impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case
because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be
considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be
revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in
their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for
which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague
and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly
entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens
patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of
action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should
be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly
addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They
therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but
to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the
same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a
TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25)
years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless
the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the
terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite
hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters.
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original
defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The
subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to
several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are
so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of
them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit
under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the
said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert
that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find
no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation
and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its
entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next
to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now
proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous

consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the
parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the
respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said
order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the

Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we
believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic)
fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal
right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal
wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2,
RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete
with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on
unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it,
being impressed with political color and involving a matter of public
policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing
violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the
three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter

how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
 For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege
with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong
committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies
these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section
16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the
preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of
the people and instill health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it
does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement
of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for
they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded
fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and
to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day
would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present
generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit
nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of
the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following
exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and
Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide

sanctions against all forms of pollution — air, water
and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic)

environment necessarily carries with it the correlative
duty of not impairing the same and, therefore,
sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be

irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution
concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987
E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of
the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing
lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas,
and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all
natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable
sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future
generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of
policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of

the State to ensure the sustainable use, development,
management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources,
including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the
population to the development and the use of the country's natural
resources, not only for the present generation but for future
 generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize
and apply a true value system including social and environmental
cost implications relative to their utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the

Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the
benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development
as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making the exploration,
development and utilization of such natural resources equitably
accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future
generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value
system that takes into account social and environmental cost
implications relative to the utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological

balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2
of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the
DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being
subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and

Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of

carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives
which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers
and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental
right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment
Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to
create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature
can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the
social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is
conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the
"responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment
for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh
to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by
virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done
with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be
renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or

rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the
plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission
of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that
the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the
court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint
itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of
the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed
hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is:
admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs.
Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the
utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the
ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a
correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted,
what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is
a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements
under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments
under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to
show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they
may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing,
however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the
need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are
indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political
question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative
branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved
is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed
in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question
doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial
power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions
from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of

judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to
review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of
the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly

the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their
acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of
"grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can
expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
 In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes
even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were
to assume that the issue presented before us was political in
nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-
impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a
quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter

how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by
such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did
not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-
impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity
to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages
to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the
Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and
conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest
and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into
every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D.
No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the

President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted
herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by

executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested
by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of
Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates

the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within
the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or
 privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would

be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal,
state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested
right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy
Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the

principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence
a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest
in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be
validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not
deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law
clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548,
October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be

passed. 27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the
instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the
cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-
impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a
law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the
same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This
is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been
passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of
advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting
their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
 The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not
meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to
reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public
health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by
the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of
public health, safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted
in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making
of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public
concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental
interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are
absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use
his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom
of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private
right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment
clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in
the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled
to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby

GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may
therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo

and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

 Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide,

Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided
by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this
decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the
protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the
utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have
therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be
saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to
sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus
standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as
a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff
must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the
concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to
embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the
course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested
with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be
recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection,
as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the
private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved.
Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all
circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of
the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left
for future determination in an appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon
"one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with
very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language
more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a
balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be
subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and
control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles;
of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers,
inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole
communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets
and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit
mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs
and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other
chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of
fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court:
Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV,
Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977
— all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the
constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a
balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment
Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific
environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth
"Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor
the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the
Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which
petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code
identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of
the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment
Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part
of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal

right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in
effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are
self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those
implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more
specific legal right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of
generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by
the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so
that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief
prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that
such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law,
considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should
have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of
aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a

cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or
statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right
claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational
terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and
effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law

or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to
fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph
of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
 jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and

healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial
standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted,
to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy
making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection
and management, our courts have no claim to special technical
competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no
specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy
making departments — the legislative and executive departments — must
be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those
norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should
intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies,
whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents
should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked
that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof
of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and
conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly
assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that
they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners
should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between
petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of
public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the
appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all
the circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the
environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance
for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should,
however, be subjected to closer examination.

# Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide,

Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided
by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this
decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the
protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the
utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have
therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be
saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to
sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus
standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as
a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff
must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the
concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to
embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the
course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested
with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be
recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection,
as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the
private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved.
Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all
circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of
the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left
for future determination in an appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon
"one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with
very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language
more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a
balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be
subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and
control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles;
of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers,
inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole
communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets
and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit
mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs
and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other
chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of
fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court:
Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV,
Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977
— all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the
constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a
balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment
Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific
environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth
"Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor
the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the
Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which
petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code
identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of
the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment
Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part
of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal

right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in
effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are
self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those
implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more
specific legal right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of
generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by
the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so
that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief
prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that
such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law,
considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should
have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of
aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a

cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or
statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right
claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational
terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and
effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law

or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to
fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph
of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and

healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial
standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted,
to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy
making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection
and management, our courts have no claim to special technical
competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no
specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy
making departments — the legislative and executive departments — must
 be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those
norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should
intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies,
whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents
should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked
that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof
of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and
conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly
assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that
they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners
should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between
petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of
public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the
appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all
the circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the
environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance
for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should,
however, be subjected to closer examination.

# Footnotes

1 Rollo, 164; 186.

2 Id., 62-65, exclusive of annexes.

3 Under Section 12, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court.

4 Rollo, 67.

5 Id., 74.

6 Rollo, 70-73.

7 Annex "B" of Petitions; Id., 43-44.

8 Paragraph 7, Petition, 6; Rollo, 20.

9 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, unabridged, 1986,

1508.

10 Title XIV (Environment and Natural Resources), Book IV of the

Administrative Code of 1987, E.O. No. 292.
11 Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 43-44.

12 Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 4, 913.

13 For instance, the Preamble and Article XII on the National

Economy and Patrimony.

14 The Reorganization Act of the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources.

15 E.O. No. 292.

16 Section 1.

17 Section 2.

18 Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666 [1947];

Community Investment and Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215
[1951]; Remitere vs. Vda. de Yulo, 16 SCRA 251 [1966]; Caseñas
vs. Rosales, 19 SCRA 462 [1967]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, 202
SCRA 680 [1991]; Madrona vs. Rosal, 204 SCRA 1 [1991].

19 Section 1(q), Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court.

20 Adamos vs. J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. 25 SCRA 529 [1968];
Virata vs. Sandiganbayn, supra; Madrona vs. Rosal, supra.

21 39 SCRA 473, 479 [1971].

22 1991 ed., 226-227.

23 180 SCRA 496, 501-502 [1989]. See also, Coseteng vs. Mitra,
187 SCRA 377 [1990]; Gonzales vs. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452
[1990]; Llamas vs. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 [1991]; Bengzon vs.
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 [1991].

24 Rollo, 44.

25 125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983].

26 190 SCRA 673, 684 [1990].

27 Article III, 1987 Constitution.

28 110 Phil. 198, 203 [1960]; footnotes omitted.

29 291 U.S. 502, 523, 78 L. ed. 940, 947-949.

30 22 SCRA 135, 146-147 [1968].

31 Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 [1950]; Abe vs. Foster

Wheeler Corp. supra.; Phil. American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General, supra.; Alalayan vs. NPC, 24 SCRA 172[1968]; Victoriano
vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54 [1974]; Kabiling vs.
National Housing Authority, 156 SCRA 623 [1987].