[G.R. No. 142565.

July 29, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. NESTOR G. SORIANO

alias “Boy,” appellant.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is
intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house
or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements concur in the case at bar.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the
degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed
under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are
characterized as heinous crimes “for being grievous, odious and hateful
offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized
and ordered society.” On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613
[21]

constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and
viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple
Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and
national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling
underSimple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive
Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances present.
In the present case, the act committed by accused-appellant neither
appears to be heinous nor represents a greater degree of perversity and
viciousness as distinguished from those acts punishable under Art. 320 of The
Revised Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance was established to convert
the offense to Destructive Arson. The special aggravating circumstance that
accused-appellant was “motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or
occupant of the property burned” cannot be appreciated in the present case
where it appears that he was acting more on impulse, heat of anger or risen
temper rather than real spite or hatred that impelled him to give vent to his
wounded ego. Nothing can be worse than a spurned lover or a disconsolate
[22]

father under the prevailing circumstances that surrounded the burning of the
Cimagala house. Thus, accused-appellant must be held guilty of Simple
Arson penalized under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 for the act of intentionally
burning an inhabited house or dwelling.
 In addition, we find that there exists a mitigating circumstance that should
have been appreciated by the trial court in determining the penalty to be
imposed on the accused-appellant: a circumstance similar and analogous to
passion and obfuscation. An impulse of invidious or resentful feelings
[23]

contemplates a situation akin to passion and obfuscation. This circumstance is

mitigating since, like passion and obfuscation, the accused who acts with these
feelings suffers a diminution of his intelligence and intent, a reduction in his
mental and rational faculties.
It has been satisfactorily shown by the court a quo that the lovers’ quarrel
between Nestor Soriano and Honey Rosario Cimagala ignited the chain of
events that led to the conflagration that occurred in the early dawn of 18
September 1998. Passions were inflamed in the evening of 17 September 1998
due to the impending return of Soriano to Manila the following day with the
prospect of leaving behind in Davao his son Otoy who bears his namesake
“Nestor Jr.” But reason, unfortunately, did not prevail; emotions took control of
the events that were to unfold. His efforts went to naught; his attempts to win
back his forbidden love were likewise thwarted. Verily, the resentment accused-
appellant felt came from the realization that he may never see his son again
once he left Davao; that his utter frustration in trying to convince Honey Rosario
Cimagala to return to Manila with their son brought with it a reduction of his
rational faculties within that moment in time. Although emanating from lawful
sentiments, the actuations of accused-appellant led to his criminal act of
burning the Cimagala home, and other neighboring houses. In other words,
accused-appellant was in a state of extreme emotional stress.

Mr. Justice Adam C. Carson, in his concurring opinion in United States v.

Butardo, gives his view on the graduation of penalties for the crime
[24]

of Arson under the Spanish Penal Code. In the old law on which The Revised
Penal Code is based, he comments that the authors clearly had in mind certain
considerations in imposing penalties of exceptional severity in the various cases
of arson. The observations of Mr. Justice Carson in Butardo are thus still
relevant in our contemporary interpretation of criminal law:

The authors of the Spanish Penal Code, in imposing penalties of exceptional severity
in certain cases of arson, clearly had in mind:

First. The extreme danger to which human lives may be exposed by the malicious
burning of dwelling houses and the like;

Second. The danger to property resulting from widespread conflagrations;

Third. The fact that it is extremely difficult to adopt precautions against the
commission of the crime, and to discover the perpetrators after its commission.

Formerly, where these elements marked the commission of the crime, the single
penalty prescribed by law was that of death, but this severity was finally relaxed, and
while exceptionally severe penalties are still imposed in such cases, the authors of the
Penal Code appear to have endeavored to graduate these penalties in accordance
with the degree of danger to life and property, resulting from the commission of the
crime.

To this end the severest penalties are prescribed for the malicious burning of edifies
in which large numbers of persons are assembled. Less harsh, but still very severe
penalties are imposed on those setting fire to dwelling houses and other buildings
more or less permanently occupied. Less severe penalties on those guilty of burning
unoccupied dwellings, the penalty being more or less severe as the house appeared to
be situated so as to make a widespread conflagration more or less probable. And
finally, sufficient, but not notably harsh penalties are prescribed in cases where the
property of others is set on fire under conditions which do not suggest special danger
to human life or the likelihood of considerable destruction of property.

In a concurring opinion, this time in U.S. v. Burns, Mr. Justice Ignacio

Villamor explains the rationale behind the penalties for Arson: [25]

In the opinion of Groizard, one of the most famous commentators on the Spanish
Penal Code, of which ours is but a copy, “it is the potential damage that is considered
here in fixing the grave penalty of cadena temporal to cadena perpetua. The risk
which a person runs who may be found in a place that is burned, whether it be a
building, a farm-house, a hut or shelter, or a vessel in port, is what constitutes the
gravity which is the object of this crime; just as the damaging intent of the agent,
manifested by his setting fire to a place where he knows there is one or more persons,
gives an idea of his subjective perversity.”

The same author adds: “In the classification of the crime attention must be given to
the intention of the author. When fire is used with the intent to kill a determined
person who may be in a shelter, and that object is secured, the crime committed is not
that defined herein, but that of murder, penalized in article 418 (art. 403 of the Penal
Code of the Philippines), with the penalty of cadena temporal in its maximum degree
to death” (Groizard, Vol. 8, p. 45).

Accused-appellant is undoubtedly responsible for the fire that occurred in

the wee hours of 18 September 1998 that razed to the ground the Cimagala
home and a number of other houses in the vicinity. Still, we believe that the
record shows that the elements discussed by Mr. Justice Carson in his separate
concurring opinion in Butardo are wanting. We are therefore not adequately
convinced that imposing the exceptionally severe penalty of reclusion
perpetua is proper in the case at bar.
First. There appears to be no reckless disregard for human lives indicative
of a cold, calculating, wicked and perverse intention to burn the Cimagala home.
The action of accused-appellant was the result of a lovers’ tiff between him and
Honey over their son, Otoy, and concerning the future of their unbridled
relationship. His spontaneous, albeit criminal, act was carried out without any
intention to exterminate human lives. His purpose in going to Davao was to
convince his lover to move back with him to Manila and bringing along their
son Otoy.
Second. Neither was there any reckless disregard for the rights of the
neighboring property owners. The criminal act of burning the Cimagala home
was carried out by accused-appellant in a diminished emotional state, which
mitigates his criminal liability to a lesser degree of criminality.
Third. The testimony of Honey clearly points to accused-appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime. However, the conduct of accused-appellant after he
consummated the crime, i.e., when he set fire to the clothes of Honey, is
material in determining the severity of the penalty to be imposed. After his
impulsive act of setting fire to both the plastic partition of the room and Honey’s
clothes, he attempted to mend his ways immediately by attempting to put out
the flames although it was too late. His act of burning Honey’s clothes set in
motion a chain of events that spun out of control and led to the blaze that
destroyed houses in its path. However, despite the mayhem caused by
accused-appellant, he never fled the scene of the crime; in fact, he watched
helplessly as the flames consumed the Cimagala home and the neighboring
houses. He did not resist the police authorities when he was invited for
questioning at the police station to shed light on the incident.
Thus, applying Mr. Justice Carson’s exceptional severity standard as
regards the imposition of penalties for the crime of Arson, the degree of
criminality involved in the accused-appellant’s act is lessened by the fact that
he acted on an impulse that diminished his reasoning faculties, thus mitigating
the punishment to be imposed. The proper penalty to be imposed should
therefore take into consideration the analogous mitigating circumstance to
passion and obfuscation under Art. 13, par. 10, as discussed above, in relation
to Art. 64, par. 2, of The Revised Penal Code. [26]

Under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, in relation to Art. 64, par. 2, of The Revised
Penal Code, the imposable penalty for simple arson is reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua the range of which is twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to reclusion perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
penalty next lower in degree to the imposable penalty is prision mayor the range
of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years in any of its periods.
Under the circumstances, it is believed that an indeterminate prison term of six
(6) years four (4) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor minimum as
minimum to fourteen (14) years two (2) months and ten (10) days of the
minimum of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua as maximum may be
imposed on the accused.
As to the award of damages, this Court has consistently held that proof is
required to determine the reasonable amount of damages that may be awarded
to the victims of conflagration. As a rule, therefore, actual or compensatory
damages must be proved and not merely alleged. We believe that the records
do not adequately reflect any concrete basis for the award of actual damages
to the offended parties. The court a quo granted the award solely on the bare
assertions of the complaining witnesses. Moral damages cannot be awarded in
this case, as there is no evidentiary basis to justify it. However, accused-
appellant’s civil liability is beyond cavil; what needs to be resolved is the amount
of indemnity he should pay to the owners of the burned houses for the damage
caused. In lieu thereof, this Court may award temperate or moderate damages
to the victims of the conflagration in accordance with Art. 2224 of the Civil Code.
Indeed, the records evince that the victims suffered some pecuniary loss
although the amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty. Consequently,
temperate damages in the amount of P250,000.00 which is considered
reasonable under the circumstances should be awarded to each of the
complaining witnesses or their heirs as the case may be.
Exemplary or corrective damages should likewise be awarded as a way to
correct future conduct of this nature and preserve the public good. Such
damages are designed to reshape behavior that is socially deleterious in its
consequences. Hence, exemplary or corrective damages in the amount
[27]

of P50,000.00 for each of the above-mentioned complaining witnesses or their

heirs is fair and just under the premises.
It must be noted that accused-appellant became an unwitting victim of his
own extra-marital indiscretions. His flawed emotional disposition coupled with a
lapse in judgment became his own undoing as he now languishes in jail for
choosing the road to perdition. Although he has no one to blame but himself for
his vicissitudes, we believe that the lessons to be learned from this sad and
miserable chapter of his life are more than adequate from which he can gain
insight and wisdom, while he sits patiently in his prison cell waiting for the day
when he can once again breathe the invigorating air of freedom.