Sargon George Donabed

Reforging a Forgotten History
Reforging a Forgotten History

Iraq and the Assyrians in the
Twentieth Century
Sargon George Donabed

© Sargon George Donabed, 2015
Edinburgh University Press Ltd

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Contents
List of Figures viii

List of Tables x
Abbreviationsxi
Acknowledgementsxiii
Introduction 1
The Assyrians 3
A New Approach to Meaning 12
Moving Forward with Purpose 15
Chapter Analysis 19
Notes 21
1 Integrating the Assyrian Question 27

A Historiography of Historiography and a Theoretical
Framework 30
Key Sources: Mapping Iraqi Assyrians and Sectarianisation 42
Notes 49
2 Framing the Assyrian Narrative: Late Nineteenth and Early
Twentieth Century 54
Assyrian Demography: Between Deteriorating Empires and
Colonial Expansion 54
Modern Roots of Interreligious Animosity 55
The First World War 61
From Versailles 1919 to Lausanne 1923 68
The Period of the Iraqi Levies and the Assyrian Settlement 71
vi | ref org i ng a f org otte n h is to r y
General Settlement Plans 76

Notes 81
3 Iraq: Building a ‘Nation’-State 93
The Patriarch and Temporal Authority 94
The Massacre at Simele 109
International Recognition? 123
Road to the Republic 124
Notes 128
4 The Birth of the Republic and an Autonomist Struggle 138
The 1958 Coup and Renewed Internal Strife 139
The S.oriya Massacre of 1969 154
Demographic Situation 155
Notes 163
5 Enduring Discord: Political Machinations and Border Clearings 169
A Resumption of Violence 174
The Border Clearings of 1977–8 178
Notes 188
6 New Movements and War on the Horizon 191
The Iran–Iraq War 191
The Calm before the Storm 192
Renewed International Interest in Iraq: the Anfal Campaign 199
Notes 214
7 State Formation, State-building and Contentious Pluralism 221
Situating the Assyrian Experience 223
Agency, Failed Strategies and Transdenominationalism 225
Simele Revisited 228
Development and Consequences of Urbanisation and
Arabisation 239
State-sponsored Acculturation 244
Notes 253
8 Conclusion 263
Notes 268
Glossary 269
contents | vii
Appendix A: Village Data 271

Description of Villages Affected in the 1960s by Region 271
Notes 347
Appendix B: Documents Concerning Cultural
and Political Organisations 370
Bibliography377
Index404
Figures
1 Map of Iraq xvi

2 Map given to the Paris Peace Conference 1919 by the Assyrian
delegation 4
3 Chart representing the granting of agency 16
4 Chart illustrating various perspectives or identifiers that create
lenses through which experience is filtered 17
5 Diagram demonstrating the interdependency and
interconnectivity of narratives 18
6 Letter from three Barwari Bala chiefs 41
7 The original legend to Father Josephe Omez’s map 43
8 General Petros Elia’s map of Assyrian territory 66
9 Batarshah, approximately 15 miles northwest of Simele 119
10 Dakhan or Dikan village following desertion of at least
five families 120
11 Unnamed Assyrian village destroyed in 1933 121
12 Assyrian Sports Club, Christmas/New Year 1967–8 (Men) 139
13 Assyrian Sports Club, Christmas/New Year 1967–8 (Women) 140
14 Shrine to Ethniel Shleimon of Dūre 149
15 A portion of the 1965 Iraqi census 152
16 A cover of Mordinna Atouraya from 1973 174
17 ADM militia near Mar Mattai in 1987 195
18 ADM militia in the ruins of an Assyrian village in Barwar during
the 1980s 196
19 Key to Omez’s map translated into English 272
20 Omez’s map showing northwestern Iraq 273
f i g ures | ix
21 Omez’s map showing the Barwari Bala, Sapna/Sarsang, Nerwa/

Rekan and ‘Aqra/Nahla subdistricts 274
22 Omez’s map showing the Mosul region 275
23 Ruins of Mar Qayyoma 296
24 Mar Gewargis, Dūre, prior to destruction on 8 August 1978 297
25 The last vestiges of Mar Gewargis following the border clearings
of 1978 297
26 Ruins of houses in Dūre, 1978 298
27 Mar ‘Abdyešu‘ monastery in Dere, 1991 319
28 Ruins of Hayyis, Barwar, destroyed in 1988 323
29 ADM figures among the ruins of a village in Nerwa 326
30 Ruins of Mar Gewargis, Hizane 332
31 Ruins of Kashkawa, 1987 333
32 Ruins of Mar Gewargis church, Bakhitme 339
33 Ruins of Bakhitme 340
34 Ruins of Bakhitme 341
35 Ruins of Sheze, circa 1987 343
36 Ruins of Levo following the Anfal operations, 1988 345
37 Security major, Sulaymaniyah district security manager to all
administrative departments, ‘Assyrian National Front’,
September 1984, p. 1 370
38 Security major, Sulaymaniyah district security manager to
all administrative departments, ‘Assyrian National Front’,
September 1984, p. 2 371
39 Translation of ‘Assyrian National Front’ 372
40 Security major, Sulaymaniyah Security Directorate to all security
divisions, ‘Assyrian Democratic Movement’, 14 October 1984 374
41 Translation of ‘Assyrian Democratic Movement’ 375
42 Document concerning the ill treatment of an individual Assyrian 376
Tables
1 Assyrian population statistics in Van and Hakkâri 59

2 Statistics of ‘Ashiret (independent) Nestorians in 1869 60
3 Statistics of Rayat (subject) Nestorians in 1869 60
4 Assyrian population figures of the Middle East presented
to the Paris Peace Conference 1919 69
5 Pro- and anti-patriarchal tribal factions 103
6 Villages destroyed, razed, looted, and/or forcibly abandoned
during the Simele massacres 112
7 Assyrian settlement along the Khabur, 31 August 1938 125
8 List of people killed in the S.oriya massacre on 16 September
1969 156
9 Assyrian village summary, 1960s 158
12 Instances of internal violence against Iraqis by state, political
party or military, 1933–91 223
Abbreviations
AAS Assyrian Academic Society

ADM Assyrian Democratic Movement
ADO Assyrian Democratic Organization
AI Amnesty International
AIDP Association internationale de droit pénal
AIJ International Alliance for Justice
AIR Air Ministry Files, Public Record Office, London
AUA Assyrian Universal Alliance
CO Colonial Office Files, Public Record Office, London
FIDH International Federation for Human Rights
FO Foreign Office Files, Public Record Office, London
HRW Human Rights Watch
ICP Iraqi Communist Party
IMF Iraq Memory Foundation
IPC Iraqi Petroleum Company
KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party
MARA Modern Assyrian Research Archive
NARA National Archives and Records Administration (USA)
NCRD Nineveh Center for Research and Development
PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
RAF Royal Air Force
TNA The National Archives (UK)
UAR United Arab Republic
UNGC United Nations Genocide Convention
XXH Kheit Kheit Allap I & II
Acknowledgements
I am indebted to a variety of people for their support and kindness. Firstly,

without the diligence and guidance from the team at EUP – Nicola Ramsey,
Ellie Bush, Eddie Clark, Rebecca Mackenzie and especially my copy editor,
Jonathan Wadman – I don’t know how this work could have found its cul-
mination. Cheers to you all.
A special thanks to those who passed on personal experiences – specifically
Elias Haroon, who was kind enough to allow me to articulate his story. Elias
Haroon survived the massacre at Simele as a young child. During our inter-
view session he remarked on my research protocols for the oral history por-
tion. Assuring him that I would not use his name in the study if so desired,
Elias responded, ‘I will give you my name, and my father’s name, as well
as that of my grandfather. Anyone who does not is not truly a man.’ After
some months had passed following my initial ethnographic research, I recall
receiving a phone call one afternoon. Elias asked me one simple question in
his native tongue: ‘Lad, when will your book come out?’
‘Soon. It will take some time,’ I responded.
Elias took a deep breath and began, ‘Our story has to come out. It
is important. People should know what happened to the Assyrians during
Simele or in the villages years later. No one knows our story.’
I thanked him for his confidence in my work and for all of his infor-
mation and material and assured him the book would indeed be printed.
Despite this, till today I never truly grasped the importance of an academic
work to real people. Of course I had lofty ideas that what I did mattered, but
that was more a way to assuage any feelings of inadequacy. The truth was, it
meant a great deal to Elias, as it revealed his life, his experience, indeed his
significance. ‘Someone has to tell our story, tell the world what happened to
xiv | ref org i ng a f org o tte n h is to r y
us. Just so they know, just so they know.’ I hope I did them justice. Without
them, this work would never exist.
To my family and friends, especially George and Elsie, Ninos, Shamiran,
Heather Snow, Manuel and Anna Sousa and family, and the unsung heroes,
Cheeks, Ghost, Monster† (we miss you, little one) and Tails, wherever he
may be – this work was born of your constant support and empathy, includ-
ing a persistent reminder that amid such undertakings there is neither sub-
stitute nor greater inspiration than joy come of gratitude for being a part of
something larger than oneself.
Further, much appreciation for their invaluable aid is due to Peter
Sluglett, Hannibal Travis, Mar Emmanuel Emmanuel, Mikhael Benjamin,
David Malick, Hormuz Bobo, Afram Koumi, Nahrin Barkho, Fadi Dawood,
Ferida Danyal, Father Gregory Christakos, Nicholas Al-Jeloo, Tomas Isik,
Aryo Makko, Efrem Yildiz, Nineb Lamassu, Atour and Janey Golani, Michael
Youash, Joseph Hermiz, Firas Jatou, Yourem Mako, Efrem Yildiz, Robert
Karoukian, Ninos David, Alda Benjamen, Mark Tomass, Peter BetBasoo and
Shamiran Zendo. Ann Hanson for her aid in indexing. Also to the Roger
Williams University Foundation to Promote Scholarship and teaching for
granting me time to write through course releases. While the following have
passed on, this work would have been impossible without their efforts: Yacoub
Khoshaba and his photographs of Barwar’s destruction, Professor Father J.
Brian Peckham (1934–2008) for his kindness and compassion as well as
direction, Dr Hirmis Aboona (1940–2009) for his generosity and pioneering,
and Dr Donny George Youkhanna (1950–2011) for his courage and resolve.
Although we never met, a special heartfelt thanks to James Oliver Rigney Jr
(Robert Jordan, 1948–2007), who created a world with friends who have been
my companions for many years. His creativity remains an inspiring reminder
of the power inherent in the fashioning of stories.
The Wheel of Time turns, and Ages come and pass, leaving memories that
become legend. Legend fades to myth, and even myth is long forgotten when
the Age that gave it birth comes again. In one Age, called the Third Age by
some, an Age yet to come, an Age long past, a wind rose in the Mountains
of Mist. The wind was not the beginning. There are neither beginnings nor
endings to the turning of the Wheel of Time. But it was a beginning.
Robert Jordan, Eye of the World (1990)
For my parents, George and Elsie Donabed
In memory of Shamson Orahem Babella (1924–2012),
the most brilliant storyteller I had the honour of knowing.
xvi | ref org i ng a f org o tte n h is to r y
Figure 1 Map of Iraq

Introduction
Inspired by the suffering of Iraq’s martyrs – Sunni and Shiite, Arab, Kurd,
and Turkomen, and the remaining brethren in all communities – inspired
by the injustice against the holy cities in the popular uprising and against
the marshes and other places; recalling the agonies of the national oppres-
sion in the massacres of Halabja, Barzan, Anfal and against the Faili Kurds;
inspired by the tragedies of the Turkomen in Bashir and the suffering of the
people of the western region . . .1
Constitution of Iraq (2005)
Half of writing history is hiding the truth.
Captain Malcolm Reynolds, Serenity (2005)
An unnamed song is like an unnamed child, it has no identity.
Robyn Hitchcock, musician
R ecent events in Iraq, especially those which surfaced between January and
March of 2014 calling for an autonomous or independent state in the
Nineveh province of the country, have brought the minority issue and the
Assyrians closer to the spotlight. In theory, the province could become a bas-
tion for the ethnic and religious minorities who have become the last living
link to ancient Mesopotamia in a period where their numbers have drastically
decreased due to displacement, war, immigration, economic hardship, and
ethno-religious and political discrimination.2 Demographic change would
speak to that reality as the overall population of Christians, the overwhelm-
ing majority of whom are of Assyrian descent, decreased from 1.4 million
in 1987 to approximately 750,000, or 3 per cent of the Iraqi population, by
2 | ref org i ng a f org o tte n h is to r y
2005, according to the United States Department of State. In the 1980s they
made up roughly 30 per cent of the population of the northern regions of
Iraq and there were approximately 700,000 more living in diaspora.3 Between
2005 and 2014 many continued to find themselves part of a disproportion-
ate number of internally displaced persons with little hope of an end to their
plight.4
On 10 June 2014 the group known originally as the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant/Syria (ISIL/ISIS) and later simply as IS, began to take
control of Mosul, marking Christian houses with the Arabic letter N for
Nazarene/Christian. Those who could not pay the Islamic tax or jizya were
forced to convert or flee. By late July there were no Christians left in Mosul,
the few families who remained forced to convert, and all of the churches and
monasteries not destroyed had come under IS control. On the road to the
elimination of anything deemed contrary to their particular view of Islam,
IS destroyed shrines such as that of Nabi Yunis/the Prophet Jonah, which
sat atop a church and earlier an ancient Assyrian temple, now part of the
rubble. Between the destruction of the old Christian sites, ancient temples
and artefacts, and conversion/forced expulsion, few remnants of Assyrian
identity and life survive.5
By 8 August IS had captured the last Assyrian strongholds in the
region, namely Qaraqosh/Baghdede, Alqosh, Tel Keppe and Karamles, forcing
approximately 200,000 Christians and their families to flee to Iraqi Kurdistan.
Many more fled outside the Middle East with aid from their kin in diaspora.
IS then took the Sinjar Mountains, and in the process drove any Yezidis
who had not been killed or captured and sold into slavery into the harsh ter-
rain, where many died of thirst in the 45°C heat. Some were used as human
shields against pêşmerge troops while taking Christian villages.6 It was a
human rights disaster. Further, even the military actions of the United States
would have repercussions as depleted uranium from missiles and bombs has
poisoned the earth and groundwater, making the region more and more of
an enormous brownfield.7 In reality there may soon be no Assyrians left in the
region as remnants of ancient Mesopotamia, both animate and inanimate,
have become existentially threatened in Iraq.
But these events, taken out of their historical context, may not make a
great deal of sense to readers who have no knowledge of the Assyrians,
i ntroducti on | 3
whether in the context of their diaspora, Iraq or the Middle East in

general.8
The Assyrians
Geographically, Assyrians are a transnational population indigenous to

northern Mesopotamia (effectively ancient Assyria and its environs), part of
today’s northern Iraq, southeastern Turkey, northwestern Iran and northeast-
ern Syria.9 They speak Assyrian, sometimes referred to as a modern form of
Mesopotamian Aramaic (also more commonly in scholarly parlance as Neo-
Aramaic and Neo-Syriac), with a heavy Akkadian influence (both Akkadian
and Aramaic were official languages in the ancient Neo-Assyrian Empire,
which flourished from 934 bc to approximately 600 bc)10 as well as utilising
classical Syriac as an ecclesiastical tongue. Today many continue to affiliate
with one of the following Christian religious communities: the Chaldean
Catholic Church, the Assyrian Church of the East (referred to as Nestorian),
the Syrian Orthodox Church (referred to as Jacobite and originally in English
as Assyrian Apostolic)11 and the Syrian Catholic Church.12 In the past two
millennia, the Assyrians have been more widely known by their ecclesiastical
designations, increasingly balkanised, mostly due to their incorporation into
Muslim-dominated states.13
Their language and material culture constitutes the oldest continuous
tradition in Iraq. From ancient Arba’ilū to Arbela during the Christian period
in the ecclesiastical province of Adiabene between the fifth and the fifteenth
centuries, the presence and culture of the people of upper Mesopotamia
endured. Adiabene itself included Mosul, Nineveh, Karkā d-Beth Slōkh
(ancient Arrapha and today’s Kirkuk), Beth Nuhadra (today’s Dohuk) and
beyond, but as ˘part of the central authority of the so-called Nestorian Church
or Assyrian Church of the East.14
Despite this history, Assyrians are both actively (directly) and passively
(indirectly) unimagined from the Middle East, its culture and its history,
even in periods where they play a pivotal role. In true Gramscian fashion,
they are functionally of the subaltern. Few people know of these remnants of
the ancient world and their history, particularly in a twenty-first-century con-
text. Part of the lacunae stems from popular culture and knowledge accumu-
lated from soundbites of modern media and scholarship, which have labelled
Figure 2 Map given to the Paris Peace Conference 1919 by the Assyrian delegation detailing the region of Assyrian concentration
as desired autonomy. From the appendix to a book by two members of the delegation, Said Namik and Rustom Nedjib, La
Question assyro-chaldéenne devant la Conférence de la paix (Paris, 1919). The term ‘Assyro-chaldéenne’ is a French-created noun that
reflects the Franco-Catholic focus on the Catholic/Chaldean religious element of the Assyrians, which in turn harks back to the
early Dominican missionary activity in Mesopotamia
i ntroducti on | 5
and mislabelled these people with designations including Iraqi Christians,

Kurdish Christians, Arab Christians, Syriac-speaking Christians, Aramaic-
speaking Christians, Syrian Christians, Nestorians, Jacobites, Chaldeans,
Persian Christians, Semitic Turks, Turkish Christians, and a host of other
appellations. Besides displaying a lack of clarity and consistency, most of
these terms are unapologetically unsuitable or with varying degrees of verac-
ity have been imposed by others as more ‘proper’ historic identities. In some
cases they have been actualised by the community itself, creating further
confusion.15
This work is concerned with the Assyrians and their relationship to
Iraq in the twentieth century.16 Since the formation of the modern Middle
East following the First World War they have been both a numerical and
a political minority and thus have found little room for inclusion in the
nation-states created after the war, in particular for the purposes of this
study Iraq, with the exception of their commodification and commoditisa-
tion.17 In previous literature, the Simele massacres of 1933, arguably the
defining moment of Iraqi nationhood, are dismissed or glossed over with
little attention paid to the personal experience of survivors.18 The Anfal
campaign (1988), made notorious by popular media outlets during the
trial of Saddam Hussein, is framed solely as a Kurdish experience. The
natural question becomes: were the Assyrians and other minorities simply
bystanders – victims of collateral damage who played a passive role in the
history of Iraq?
While views on ownership and possession (and by extension indigene-
ity) as expressions of power and agency have changed, a characteristic of the
modern political climate as defined by still fairly feudal nation-states contin-
ues to be a numerically small, landless and dispossessed people, indigenous or
not, as subordinate or at best ancillary to the past, present and future of the
territory in question. The addition of an Assyrian narrative crafts an evocative
history of Iraq and the Middle East in general. Stories which have been deni-
grated to footnotes in history books and the margins of memory are integral
to producing and relating a more inclusive and representative accounting of
events. Such stories represent living communities; each individual experience
is both distinct and simultaneously reflective of the whole community and
region.
History is a story, a memory of a memory and in some fashion a quest for

immortality. The retelling of experience or narrative is an attempt to assure
an instinctive human hope that something of worth will endure eternally.
Yet, history is an equal process of forgetting, a counterpart to remembrance.
As no story can ever be history in its totality but rather a perspective of the
whole, half of writing history will always hide truth since certain perspectives
inevitably subsume or consume others. The necessity of this investigation
– its evidence, its analysis and the lacunae which it fills – begins with and
is driven by a n ormative condition that there is meaning in all experience
and, though limited by its perspective, integral to a more complete repre-
sentation. It is an assumption that life and the experience thereof is always
something of value, of worth. Thus it is this accepted pattern – stories of
‘Sunni and Shiite, Arab, Kurd, and Turkomen’, chronicles bereft of the
Assyrians and their experience – which sparked this investigation, which
seeks herein to reforge or reshape a history by bestowing a name to a char-
acter and a voice to a ballad, thereby restoring significance and meaning to
an experience.
Language is a powerful tool. Terms and ideas have weight and further,
they influence emotions and shape thoughts that in turn shape actions.
Iraq, like all such labels, becomes what people define it to be; it becomes
words on a page, words in the news, and while Iraq creates the news,
media and books create Iraq and moreover how people view Iraq and how
Iraq and the peoples of the region see themselves. Words can also derogate,
denigrate and uncreate. As names sometimes epitomise and create people,
individuals and communities (though they fall well short in an attempt to
encompass their entireties in a simple word), so when such a name is over-
looked, those it describes in essence lack form and being. The Assyrians
lack identity as a part without its whole. So too without the Assyrians the
historical record of Iraq is wanting. If the Assyrians are forgotten and fade,
with them vanishes their perspective, the personification or avatar of the
historical narrative, which this book reforges by acknowledging meaning
as inherent to existence regardless of geopolitics. History or stories exist
at all times and in all places. In the words of the Armenian–American
writer William Saroyan from the short story Seventy Thousand Assyrians, ‘I
am thinking of Theodore Badal, himself seventy thousand Assyrians and
i ntroducti on | 7
seventy million Assyrians, himself Assyria, and man, standing in a barber

shop, in San Francisco, in 1933, and being, still, himself, the whole race.’
Hence this work lends new voices, like that of a Theodore Badal, to the
record of the past, making them essential building blocks rather than the
distant echoes to which they have been consigned.
Yet, in a more focused manner one must consider the query of historian
Benjamin White: while these ‘minorities are not marginal to the history
of modern states, how has their history been marginalised?’19 White offers
reasons for how this is accomplished, pegging both majorities and minorities
as culpable. In addition, something remains aloof that could ascertain not
only the how but also the why. So this work addresses the following general
questions:
1. Did/do Assyrians play an active role in the history of Iraq? If so,

then
2. a. What are those ways in which the Assyrians contribute to (in this
geopolitical case) Iraqi history?
b. How and why is the Assyrian role in the (or a) narrative diminished
or unnoticed both directly and indirectly and what purpose does that
diminution serve?
c. Is there a way to remedy it?
This inquiry begins from a purely inductive position leading back to the
general deductive syllogistic method in order to problematise the lacunae
of the Assyrians in Middle Eastern and Iraqi history, since it is the most
undeviating tactic with measurable consequences, an Ockham’s razor: major
premise, minor premise and conclusion. The normative premise is that all
peoples and communities are integral to the human history of the Middle
East including Iraq; the Assyrians are a community of Iraq; the Assyrians are
an integral part of Iraq.
On the other hand, how does one circumvent the perceived problem
of exceptionality or uniqueness of experience? The continued debate over
numerical and political minorities and indigenous peoples remains resolute
in the belief that minority and indigenous histories are consistently exclu-
sive and have no basis in the more official narratives including purportedly
more inclusive ones. The phenomenon of the Assyrian–Iraqi case is, like any
people/community, both exceptional and not. It is exceptional because it is
not exceptional. In other words the non-exceptionality or lack of a marked
history equal to all others and warranting equal exposure makes the case
remarkable as it has thus far remained subordinate.
Initially, this study is at its core a microcosm for a macrocosm. If one
accepts the premise, complete with the inherent impediments which may
arise from it (a premise that remains appropriated by but little adhered to by
researchers), that the best approach to understanding the past is a holistic one,
inclusive of all its parts, and if the Assyrians have some relation to Iraq, then
in order to more holistically or universally grasp Iraq and its modern history
one must understand the Assyrians therein. This work weaves the Assyrians
into the power relations of the formation and state-building processes of
the Iraqi state in the twentieth century but also unpacks other narratives
outside the traditional normative majoritist histories, all the while probing
why some perspectives or histories are remembered, and others unheeded and
unheard. Assyrian narratives of Iraqi history on their own illuminate a few
major themes which mark them as an unequivocally recognised part of the
historical milieu in the region. In order to make proper sense of the problem,
initially, they must be understood as narratives within the discourse on Iraqi
studies, creating the necessity of their inclusion as part and parcel of a more
complete history.
Secondly, this work offers a technique for understanding the commodi-
fication and commoditisation of people, land and cultures, and thereby com-
prehending forms of extermination by examining the development of that
commodification between the years 1933 and 1988. Furthermore, the book
is a study of the deep correlation of place (or land) to identity and vice versa:
how both identity and place (or land) and all their interactions influence
the acceptance and availability of narratives/stories, which in turn influence
perceptions of belonging and notions of home from internal and external
viewpoints. Finally, if identity survives when place is destroyed, how does it
shift, and further, is a new ‘place’, both figuratively and literally, found? The
relationship of the Assyrians to the land and how that link is perceived is of
great significance to this work.
This book also functions as a case in point of the unimagining of
i ntroducti on | 9
communities in the nation-building schema and the continued struggle for

power, be it social, political, economic etc. From a more political angle, it
delineates how emerging states respond to contentious pluralism or groups
they perceive as a threat to their attempts at political, economic, social and ter-
ritorial consolidation. Comparisons are drawn between the present narrative
and that of other minorities and indigenous peoples and comparable events
such as the Wounded Knee massacre of the Lakota by the United States 7th
Cavalry regiment in 1890 and the treatment of Japanese Americans in the
United States during the Second World War.
If we accept the premise of a holistic approach to history then the first act
of the Iraqi regime’s new military force against unarmed civilians, the Simele
massacre, should be noted. Just two months later, in the winter of 1933, a
young Raphael Lemkin, eventual creator of the United Nations Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), was
moved to begin his attempts at defining and codifying crimes of ‘barbarity’
and ‘vandalism’.20 Theoretically the same should be true of those hundreds
of villages, churches, and schools destroyed alongside Kurdish ones in the
1960s–1980s. Yet, the Assyrian ones are curiously absent from the narrative,
which begs the question: what does this gap in the literature tell us about how
history is written, processed and remembered?
The most balanced approach appeared to be a direct objectivist/positivist
one in order to frame the why and how of the Assyrian lacunae.21 During
the course of ferreting out what the focus of this work would become it was
strikingly apparent that while sometimes the Assyrians were mentioned in
modern secondary sources, it was more often than not as an afterthought,
even though in Western colonial archival sources (British, French and US)
from the early 1900s and from the 1930s in the wake of the Simele massacre
there are numerous records. One can add to that an inability of scholars
to read Assyrian memoirs in their original language, an ostensible lack of
desire to search for them in the first place, as well as an apparent disdain for
the ethnographic work perhaps ideally suited to this indigenous group.22
Moreover, little that transpired in the history of Iraq, according to many
chronologies, involved the Assyrians in a major role, including what some
authors have termed the ‘Simele incident’.23 It was as if the story was veiled
or obscured, either directly or indirectly. And if the Assyrians are a people
10 | ref org i ng a f org otte n h is to r y
who exist in Iraq and if the ‘incident’ of Simele was a defining moment of
Iraqi nationhood, and if indeed the Assyrians fought alongside Kurds for
their rights during the 1960s–1980s, losing hundreds of villages and find-
ing refuge in the West (for many years being the largest expatriate Iraqi
community), how could they not have played a major role in the history of the
region?
But while this approach is important, it lacks ascendancy as objectivism
assumes one tool to repair the damage. A further reading of civil rights writer
and activist Audre Lorde makes it clear that objectivism, or the positivist
discourse in the form of colonised academic research, is part of the reduction-
ist problem as it calculates people and actions as scientists measure natural
phenomena, diminishing them to numbers and on a page in a detached way,
or at least assuming the guise of a dispassionate endeavour supported by sci-
ence.24 Positivism is a tool, neither one of my own devising nor one that is
able (at least on its own) to solve the issue of inattention, for ‘the master’s
tools will never dismantle the master’s house. They may allow us to temporar-
ily beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about
genuine change.’25 Nor is it suitable for it lacks substance and empathy for the
studied. It may be able to argue the significance of the Assyrians in Iraq, but as
time passed the theory would lose prominence, most likely overwhelmed by
longstanding rubrics, once again unimagining the Assyrians.
Other tools situate the issue with greater accuracy. Unsurprisingly Edward
Said’s Orientalism creates a powerful dualistic worldview and explicates a
variety of issues from a constructivist viewpoint. But here the Assyrians still
do not figure: they are neither Arab nor principally Muslim. Yet Said’s frame-
work for the attitude of how people define themselves and others is pertinent.
In essence Assyrians function as the Third World of the Third World and
‘Assyrian issues are thus now no longer real history’ and have been relegated
to ‘4th world identity issues’.26 While misunderstandings of the West have
led to the Assyrian overshadowing in recent years, misunderstandings of the
East have done likewise for a lengthier period; in other words, the Orient too
otherises the Assyrians. Furthermore, the ever-sung archetype of a ‘Sunni,
Shia and Kurdish’ Iraq endures because people believe what scholars and the
media continue to report and compose as truth. The notion that scholars are
experts and history is fact (or if recounted enough it becomes fact), granting
i ntroducti on | 11
both Western and non-Western scholars (who operate in a similar framework

that benefits those in power) authority which intentionally and unintention-
ally marginalises Assyrians and others.
The post-structuralist and/or constructivist approach, while partially
useful, has two major pitfalls or internal contradictions. While one would
assume in such an approach Assyrianesque narratives would be viewed along-
side thousands of others, they have not been, or at least not on an equal
footing. Why? There are two reasons. Firstly, the inherent logical conclu-
sion to constructivist discourse ends in nihilism. In effect the narratives have
no meaning as every narrative can be deconstructed an infinite amount of
times, which in turn deconstructs meaning. Secondly, in order for post-
structuralists/constructivists to counter the objectivist colonial metanarrative
of the state, they have utilised other majoritist perspectives. This approach
leaves room for hierarchical structures which can impose, relegate and even
overwhelm more modest community narratives. In Middle East studies,
scholars simply reproduce the metanarrative in a different light which mar-
ginalises indigenous and minority groups to a citation in history. Academics
do this because they have an inherently normative agenda, from either an
oriental or an occidental perspective. In other words, the failure of Saidist
orientalist discourse was and indeed is that it fails to see that majority groups
and states in the Middle East otherised sub-groups long before the Western
colonialist and imperialist enterprise.
The ontological postulation of this study believes that modern
constructivist notions of created realities, and in this case created histo-
ries, make it impossible for the Assyrians to play a role in Iraq. Consensus
deals with numbers, and the numbers of realities/narratives of Iraqi his-
tory which acknowledge the role of the Assyrians are few, partially because
most of those who view the Assyrians as essential to Iraqi history are
the Assyrians themselves and as an indigenous minority they ‘have been
excluded, marginalised and “Othered”.’27 How does one avoid reinforc-
ing power structures and creating a monolithic explanation of the puzzle,
or a m etanarrative? Likewise, how can the Assyrian case gain ascendency,
importance and meaning amid a myriad of narratives where they play a
minor role simply due to the fact that power structures influence scholarship
as well as politics, and individual narratives as well as the metanarrative? In
addition by virtue of individuality, there are far fewer Assyrians writing their
history, telling their account of events, which in a post-structuralist world
means that the more individual narratives of majority groups (written by
those groups or from the perspective of those groups) the less important the
Assyrian narrative becomes. How then is the impasse skirted?
A New Approach to Meaning
This impasse generates the need for a new foundation that will not assimilate,
violate or do violence to the Assyrian and other similar cases. Thus there is a dis-
tinct difference between this new worldview and the objectivist/positivist and
constructivist ones. While I am concerned with the overall puzzle that is reality
or history I am also concerned with a small piece which makes up the reality
or history. Essentially there is the need for a pragmatic approach to why all the
elements, the pieces (including the Assyrians) matter to the puzzle (the history
of Iraq). This new ontological and epistemological approach, which could
be applied to all such similar cases, could be a bridge across the vast chasm
between the objectivists and constructivists. It is a balance of three postulations
that simultaneously incorporate and counter both positivism and constructiv-
ist theories. The three axioms are: (1) Human reality is shaped largely by
socially accepted ‘knowledge’ of that reality. (2) Intent therefore, is a powerful
instrument that is employed both heedfully and unwittingly to either pro-
duce and/or extinguish significance. These two axioms, while constructivist in
nature, have failed to incorporate or guarantee the inclusion of the Assyrians in
Iraqi history on their own. But the final postulation, while initially appearing
objectivist in its principle approach, has a built in failsafe. (3) Both relative
axiomatic expressions (1) and (2) are beholden to an objective reality con-
comitantly defined by yet greater than and independent of their suppositions.
There exists a real normative project which posits the Assyrians as a
people, as a culture, as individuals, matter, and that merely through their
‘being’ they are vital components to the puzzle and their deeds have meaning
in the context of Iraqi history.28 I began imagining existence as a border-
less, omnidirectional, omni-coloured, ever-expanding, three-dimensional
tapestry. Adding then the fourth dimension of time, as the study of history
deals with everything that has happened, whether we view it as linear or cycli-
cal, granting it another infinite quality – change. Finally there was an even
i ntroducti on | 13
more elusive immeasurable character of reality that I could not quantify and
indeed found difficult to qualify. This becomes, in my opinion, meaning: an
attribute which can only be partially described by human perception or lan-
guage since it is by its very nature inadequate as humanity is but one element
of reality. Furthermore I accept the axiom that while each element of reality
is different, it is of equal significance. From a theological perspective, it is the
soul or spirit of something. It is the difference between viewing all the threads
which make up a hand-woven rug, and seeing the graceful pattern expressed
on the obverse; the difference between having all the knowledge concerning
a matter and the wisdom to understand it. To put it another way, history or
the past is an infinitely faceted gem and while this book is a work of Middle
East history, to put it in anthropological terms, it combines elements of an
emic history of the Assyrians and Iraq with an etic history utilising a variety
of other narratives and formulating them in a way which may reveal a more
balanced representation of the past.29 An emic meaning or account comes
from a person within the culture. ‘Etic’, on the other hand, refers to the view
of an observer with a goal of neutrality in language, judgement, assessment
etc., eliminating the bias of the investigator. The two accounts are sometimes
termed an insider and an outsider perspective respectively.
Again an in opposition to the must be stressed given my approach to the
totality of history, especially in response to why the Assyrian model not only
makes a difference but is fundamental to our understanding of (in this case)
Iraqi history; while all of the stories or narratives are part of and necessary
to the whole, it is unreasonable to expect a full understanding simply by
considering the parts which make up the whole since there are innumerable
stories – making the story, the metanarrative, which is not simply a combina-
tion of them but rather lies beyond them as well. And finally, each story lacks
something of its own: its own meaning, its spirit or soul which is mysterious
or unique despite its equality to all others.30 This has been the continued
problem of historians. In other words, the understanding of history can be
segmented thus:
1. there is a totality to history, and

2. the parts comprise the whole, yet
3. one cannot understand the whole without all the parts, and
4. there is an infinite number of parts, which are borderless and ever

expanding, creating space and new stories, thus
5. making the whole always transcendent of our complete understanding of
it, yet
6. reminding us of the immeasurable meaning to each story which, though
unique to each case, entwines all the pieces of the fabric of reality as an
ever-shifting multi-hued infinite cloak.
I would like to propose the concept of panenhistoricism for this view. It is

an ontological worldview that suggests each perspective (histories) or expe-
rience is reflective of the whole (history) and integral to it as well as the
whole (history) being reflective of the parts (histories), while transcending
them in its totality. It is a solution to the rational objectivist overpowering
nature of the metanarrative and the post-structuralist/constructivist fear of
the metanarrative of dominant groups since each story/thread is of equal yet
intrinsic value to the lifecycle of events.31 In essence it allows for an infinite
number of universalities. Secondly, it also relegates the post-structuralist/
constructivist cultural relativist (which necessarily links to moral relativism
if one accepts ethics as a cultural creation) approach, which inevitably trends
toward a deconstructing path to nihilism by reinserting individual meaning
and value to each narrative in an authentic manner, and, furthermore, goes
beyond simply enhancing the narrative to changing the fundamental nature
and indeed importance of narratives. In other words it accepts the norma-
tive framework that while there may be individual experience and meaning
assigned to existence, meaning and existence, while universally or in total-
ity mysterious, are eternally present (or eternal presences). To borrow the
interpretation of the ‘Great Spirit or Great Mystery’ from the Santee Dakota
writer Ohiyesa (Charles Alexander Eastman):
The original attitude of the American Indian toward the Eternal, the ‘Great
Mystery’ that surrounds and embraces us, was as simple as it was exalted.
To him it was the supreme conception, bringing with it the fullest meas-
ure of joy and satisfaction possible in this life. The worship of the ‘Great
Mystery’ was silent, solitary, free from all self-seeking. It was silent, because
all speech is of necessity feeble and imperfect; therefore the souls of my
i ntroducti on | 15
ancestors ascended to God in wordless adoration. It was solitary, because

they believed that He is nearer to us in solitude, and there were no priests
authorized to come between a man and his Maker. None might exhort
or confess or in any way meddle with the religious experience of another.
Among us all men were created sons of God and stood erect, as conscious
of their divinity. Our faith might not be formulated in creeds, nor forced
upon any who were unwilling to receive it; hence there was no preaching,
proselyting, nor persecution, neither were there any scoffers or atheists.32
If meaning then is accepted as immeasurable or unquantifiable and the

understanding of it as imperfect, then how could such an element be con-
tained? How does one define that which by its very nature escapes definition?
One must become aware of and bequeath significance to its individual and
interrelated parts, as only through their life and experience does a fuller
understanding of the eternal mystery come about. Using J. R. R. Tolkien’s
Middle-Earth as the principal reality, independent scholar Patrick Curry
observed the importance of Tolkien’s myth for the modern world, especially
in terms of the significance of individual natural place in an increasingly
mechanised and homogenous world:
Middle-Earth’s places – each wood and indeed glade within it, streams no
less than mighty rivers and individual mountains as much as their ranges,
let alone villages towns and cities: each one unique, and all named not
arbitrarily, but as they are natured – these are among its chief glories and
embody its wisdom.33
Thus creation is a reflection of the creator. Applied to the historical case and
indeed places of Iraq as each unique Assyrian experience of human, village,
cultural site etc., with an appellation and character according to its nature, it
offers wisdom in the form of a more complete and representative understand-
ing of Iraqi history.
Moving Forward with Purpose
In order to support this panenhistorical view of the past, this study actively
reinserts the Assyrians into the fabric of Iraq, in a sense granting them agency.
This will be done by discussing the violent and non-violent suppression of
Figure 3 Granting agency: this chart represents an Assyrian narrative of their

twentieth-century experience in Iraq. The first part of the process is to tell a story
illustrating it as of equal value to the whole of the country’s history
their identity including physical place in Iraqi nation-building from the

1930s to 1988. In essence it demonstrates that the Assyrians are critical (as
Assyrians) to the history of the Middle East and specifically Iraq by raising a
previously unrecognised matter: that the decay experienced by the Assyrians
during the second half of the twentieth century can be argued as part and
parcel of the unimagining of minorities and indigenous people in the struggle
for economic, social and political power – often through violent coercion and
policies of fear, which, when not recognised and confronted (in an ethical
manner) by scholars, politicians, activists and others, continue until the com-
munity is treated (if it is considered at all) as negligibly significant collateral
damage, partially dooming its future and in turn destroying part of the whole
which makes up Iraq.34 Despite this panenhistorical ontological approach to
the past, this work is not meant to be comprehensive, as none are, but rather
aims to be an integral thread in the expanding tapestry of the saga that is the
Middle East and more specifically Iraqi history.
Scientists and philosophers often ponder the implications of and hierar-
chy between the indirect gradual disappearance of a species or a people or a
culture due to war, disease, environmental degradation etc. and a direct active
i ntroducti on | 17
Communist
Yazidi Artists
Turkoman Shi’i
Arab Architecture
Mandaean Urban
History of
Iraq in the
20th
Century
Sunni Rural
Sexual
Shabak identity
Jewish Assyrian
Christian Gender
Kurdish
Figure 4 This chart illustrates various perspectives or identifiers that create lenses
through which experience is filtered. These factors are infinite and further they are
not monolithic categories as each contains distinct individual narratives reflective of
its whole. Furthermore each perspective or category above could equally be swapped
for the central theme or whole, depending on the overall context that one wishes to
use as the foundation or framework
purging that utilises immediate physical power to accomplish said goal. In

doing so they assign value and blame based on a culturally influenced ethical
system. Yet to those affected, a convenient rational theory does little to stem
loss. Likewise, few consider the mode of extinction as it occurs. Scientists, his-
torians, scholars in general, a day late and a dollar short, spend copious hours
in study formulating countless hypotheses as to how and why this eradication
occurred. Scholarship is generally a passive field, thinking, postulating, won-
dering, deliberating long after the event has passed. Yet even in their passivity,
historical narratives can be active forms of preservation and/or eradication.
Vocatus atque non vocatus, Deus aderit. (Bidden or unbidden, God is present.)35
The history of the Assyrians, and this case study of Iraq, is a prime
example. Some investigators are hesitant to side with those perceived simply
as victims (rather than agents in their own right), to be seen as activists
rather than objective researchers relating the facts. But if being victimised is
part of the story, then it must be conveyed as part of the story, though not the
whole story. The Assyrians also participated as actors in foundational events
which would shape the twentieth century. The goal is for this work to be an
epochal point for future exploration. Yet as more individuals tell their story
and actively engage the academy there will certainly be a reaction, a backlash
specifically geared towards deconstructing, questioning and mocking rather
than re-fashioning or re-forging. This is not necessarily grafting a new tale,
but rather remembering an old one while retelling it with greater empathy for
things others may have considered circumstantial details. It involves shat-
tering a story and using the fragments along with other pieces to forge it
Assyrian
Narrative
Figure 5 This diagram demonstrates the interdependency and interconnectivity of

the narratives which is only possible if and when an Assyrian narrative is re-forged
and secondly reinserted into the body of histories that contextualise Iraqi history.
Also it solves the issue of relation based on Benjamin White’s theory that within
national or majority histories, minorities ‘enter the picture only to the extent that
their history touches on the majority’ while at the same time safeguarding against
self-marginalisation
i ntroducti on | 19
anew. When this occurs, it will be evident that the thread of the Assyrians
had become a prominent and integral part of the histories, a reminder of the
necessary panenhistorical basis.
And so to commence this version of the saga with the final question ‘Is
there a way to remedy this to give real meaning to a comparatively anonymous
existence?’, the answer is yes,36 by reconstructing the history of Iraq as want-
ing, partial, incomplete, and the understanding of it as futile without the
inclusion of Assyrians and their presence as indigenous to the region, as natives
rather than foreigners. This is the first bulwark: in simple terms, reframing
the Assyrians as an inseparable segment of the history of the region, state and
nation of Iraq. Thus the antithesis or remedy to fragmentation is the inter-
weaving of narratives or perspectives (while not losing their distinctiveness),
making one impossible to tell without the other; to remember that history,
and the history of twentieth-century Iraq, is a series of interrelated threads
woven into a gradually ever-expanding and ever more detailed landscape.
Chapter Analysis
The first chapter discusses methodology while conceptualising the Assyrian

question in the field of Middle Eastern history and contextualising it within
various historiographical contexts. It details all the past and recent discussions
on human rights with a focus on the development of hierarchies of suffering
both as presented politically to the mainstream public and in academia. This
will enhance the argument for the undeniability of the significance of the
Assyrians.
Chapter 2 presents a basic history of the Assyrians and explains their
demographic distribution before, during and after the First World War. It
discusses their involvement in various world conferences as well as external
conflicts and internal divergences. Further, it clarifies the lens through which
the Assyrians were and indeed continue to be viewed in most histories of the
region.
Chapter 3 addresses in detail the Simele massacres by weaving together
three distinct stories of the events: British, Iraqi and Assyrian. Thus it is built
on British archival material from 1933; Iraqi apologias from a rchival sources;
the writings of Khaldun Husry, son of Arab nationalist Sāt.i‘ al-H.us.rī;
Assyrian eyewitness reports from oral sources; and material from the League
of Nations archive. Furthermore, the American documents from the period

were also inspected for perhaps a fourth narrative of events. This chapter
exposes and explores reactions to Simele by Assyrians, Iraqis and the British
and American governments. It frames Simele as the critical event that defined
the emergent Iraqi nation-state. The chapter proceeds to briefly contextualise
the Assyrian influence on other ideologies and mainstream politics.
Chapter 4 examines the period from end of the Second World War
through the end of the monarchy to Abdul Karim Qasim (1958–63). It
also discusses the armed autonomist movement, sometimes known as the
Barzani uprising or Kurdish–Iraqi War, and the position of the Assyrians in
it from 1961 to 1963 and the following years. This period witnessed massive
upheavals in all aspects of Iraqi society during the clashes between govern-
ment military and non-governmental opposition forces.
Chapter 5 focuses on the 1970s. It includes the renewal of internal fight-
ing between the Iraqi government and opposition groups and further forced
demographic shifting. It elucidates the destruction of villages in the mid-
1970s and the border clearings of 1977–8, including the setting up of col-
lective towns in the midst of a large ethnic cleansing campaign. The research
examines the villages affected and their historical and cultural significance to
the Assyrian population. The chapter also takes a critical look at governmen-
tal acculturation policies and their effect on individuals.37
Following the border clearings, Chapter 6 surveys the 1980s from the
rise of Saddam Hussein and the Iran–Iraq War to the Anfal period and its
aftermath. It begins with a review of Anfal-related material and literature. The
empirical contribution of this chapter is a list of Assyrian villages destroyed
during the 1980s. This list of villages and their historical significance was
compiled with the aid of NGO documentation and corroborated by oral
interviews parallel to those compiled in Chapters 4 and 5. The list is included
in full detail in Appendix A.
The findings of the chapters are readdressed and analysed in their larger
contexts in Chapter 7. This chapter also discusses the recognition of the
Assyrian experience and the precedence it sets within a global context.
Further, it confronts reasons for and dimensions of acculturation, compar-
ing Eastern ethnic-based nations and Western civic democracies and their
treatment of minorities and indigenous peoples. A brief conclusion brings
i ntroducti on | 21
the argument full circle with considerations for the future and new ways
of viewing historical research outside age-old rubrics founded in propagan-
distic and negligent assumptions of human society. Lastly included are two
extensive appendices: the first, as mentioned above, contains basic historical
data concerning those villages that were affected during distinct intervals of
the twentieth century, including cultural edifices, population and known
geographic details, while the second contains important archival material.
Notes
1. Based on http://www.npr.org/documents/2005/aug/constitution_ap_8-29.pdf
(accessed 20 August 2014).
2. Ali Mamouri, ‘Assyrians discuss possible state in Iraq’, Al-Monitor, 20 August
2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/08/assyrians-iraq-auto
nomous-state-dreams.html (accessed 7 July 2014); American Embassy in
Baghdad to Secretary of State, ‘Ninewa: diversity of views from Assyrian Christian
Leaders in Al-Qosh’, Confidential Baghdad 002139, http://wikileaks.ch/
cable/2008/07/08BAGHDAD2139.html (accessed 7 July 2014). For reports
concerning maltreatment of Assyrians in the Nineveh region as well as attempts
at Kurdifying see Preti Taneja, Assimilation, Exodus, Eradication: Iraq’s Minority
Communities since 2003 (London: Minority Rights Group International,
2007), 20.
3. United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, ‘International Religious Freedom Report 2005: Iraq’, http://www.state.
gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2005/51600.htm (accessed 7 July 2014). Due to the framework
and function of Islamic and Christian politics in the Middle East (the Assyrians
being a predominantly religiously Christian population), church/ecclesiastical
leaders have generally held the majority control over their respective flocks and
thus are inevitably those interviewed, surveyed and queried by news outlets,
government personnel and scholars in their studies on the region and its people.
In that vein this USDOS report sectarianises their population.
4. Mardean Isaac, ‘The desperate plight of Iraq’s Assyrians and other minorities,’
The Guardian, 24 December 2011.
5. Numerous outlets have covered the situation. See Jack Healy, ‘Exodus from north
signals Iraqi Christians’ slow decline’, New York Times, 10 March 2012, http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/world/middleeast/exodus-from-north-signals-
iraqi-christians-decline.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 20 August 2014).
For more on the Jonah shrine and Assyrian temple see Eve Conant, ‘Q&A:
Why Sunni extremists are destroying ancient religious sites in Mosul’, National
Geographic Daily News, 2 August 2014, http://news.nationalgeographic.
com/news/2014/08/140802-iraq-mosul-christian-muslim-islamic-state-syria-
history/ (accessed 20 August 2014).
6. Margaret Talev and Tony Capaccio, ‘US jets, drones hit militants in new round
of strikes in Iraq’, Bloomberg, 9 August 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2014-08-08/obama-pulled-back-into-iraq-conflict-amid-genocide-threat.
html (accessed 20 August 2014).
7. There are numerous cases of humans and animals with severe birth defects
and high rates of cancer due to depleted uranium. Some US veterans have also
cited this as the cause for their inability to function in society. See Deborah
Hastings, ‘Sickened Iraq vets cite depleted uranium’, Boston.com, 12 August
2006, http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2006/08/12/
is_an_armament_sickening_us_soldiers/?page=full (accessed 20 August 2014).
8. Assyrians accounted for more than 80 per cent of the Iraqi diaspora in the US
through the 1960s.
9. The most common endonym or autonym used cross-denominationally by
Assyrian commoners and elites alike in the twenty-first century is Sūrōyō/
Sūrāyā (western/eastern dialects) to refer to themselves and Sūrayt/Sūreth to
denote their native tongue. Both are derived directly from the Neo-Assyrian
word (going back to at least the seventh century bc) [Assūrāyu], which ‘had a
shorter variant [Sūrāyu] in the seventh century’. See Simo Parpola, ‘National
and Ethnic Identity in the Neo-Assyrian Empire and Assyrian Identity in
the Post-Empire Times’, Journal of Assyrian Academic Studies 18.2 (2004),
16–17.
10. See Geoffrey Khan, ‘Remarks on the Historical Background of the Modern
Assyrian Language,’ Journal of Assyrian Academic Studies 21.1 (2007), 5–6. This
is a more detailed account of modern Assyrian and its relation to Aramaic/Syriac
and Akkadian. See also Simo Parpola, ‘Assyrian Identity in Ancient Times and
Today’, 9, www.aina.org/articles/assyrianidentity.pdf (accessed 7 July 2014);
Parpola, ‘National and Ethnic Identity in the Neo-Assyrian Empire and Assyrian
Identity in Post-Empire Times’.
11. See Naures Atto, Hostages in the Homeland, Orphans in the Diaspora: Identity
Discourses among the Assyrian/Syriac Elites in the European Diaspora (Leiden:
Leiden University Press 2011), 157. The book is a comprehensive study of
identity issues among Jacobite Assyrians in the European context.
i ntroducti on | 23
12. Prior to the rise of local nationalisms in the region, some Yezidis, like the Christian
communities mentioned above, espoused Assyrian descent, and many nineteenth-
and twentieth-century scholars believed that to be the case. See W. Francis
Ainsworth, ‘The Assyrian Origin of the Izedis or Yezidis – the So-called “Devil
Worshippers”,’ Transactions of the Ethnological Society of London, vol. 1 (1861),
11–44. For further discussions on how the Yezidis self-identified as such, see
Mark Sykes, The Caliphs’ Last Heritage: A Short History of the Turkish Empire
(London: Macmillan, 1915), 93, quoted in Christine Allison, The Yezidi Oral
Tradition in Iraqi Kurdistan (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001), 40; Isya Joseph,
Devil Worship: Sacred Books and Traditions of the Yezidiz (Boston: Gorham Press,
1919), 92. Henry Layard also discussed the preservation of Assyrian myth and
legend by the Yezidi and Christian religious communities: see Austen Henry
Layard, Nineveh and Its Remains: With an Account of a Visit to the Chaldæan
Christians of Kurdistan, and the Yezidis, or Devil Worshippers; and an Enquiry into
the Manners and Arts of the Ancient Assyrians (London: John Murray, 1849), 190.
13. If one had to strictly define the Assyrians, perhaps the most inclusive and thor-
ough recent definition comes from Agnes Korbani, The Political Dictionary of the
Modern Middle East (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995).
14. E. A. Wallis Budge (ed.), The Book of Governors: The Historia Monastica of
Thomas, Bishop of Marga, AD 840, vol. II: The English Translation (London:
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1893), 316.
15. See Sargon Donabed, ‘Rethinking Nationalism and an Appellative Conundrum:
Historiography and Politics in Iraq’, National Identities 14.4 (2012), 407–31 for
a full discussion of this issue.
16. The terms ‘Chaldean’, ‘Jacobite’ and ‘Nestorian’ are used to refer to the ethnic
Assyrian members of the Chaldean Catholic Church, Syrian Orthodox Church
and Assyrian Church of the East respectively, as points of reference and for
statistical purposes. While I acknowledge ‘Nestorian’ and ‘Jacobite’ to be largely
pejorative today, I have used them in conjunction with current appellations, as
many archival records erroneously use these labels. There is also a current trend
that has aided the creation of distinct and often hostile ethnic groups from one
people based on these ecclesiastical adherences. It may be applicable to use the
neologism ‘balkanisation’ in terms of Assyrians being ethnically identified (and
later in some cases identifying themselves) by their ecclesiastical background in
a sectarian fashion. ‘Sectarianisation’ is an alternative term.
17. The Assyrians’ importance as a fighting force in the First World War and
the levies or as an actual physical buffer or wall are prime examples of this
phenomenon and will be discussed further. If ‘numerical’ is linked to quantity

then ‘political’ must be linked to quality of both economic and social power,
which are indeed precursors to and building blocks of political power. The issue
of the commodification and commoditisation of people is taken even further by
Gloria Jean Watkins (bell hooks) in the term ‘cultural commodification’.
18. See, for example, the BBC’s timeline of events in Iraqi history and even Iraqi
Kurdistan history. Both are largely partial to current majority perspectives and
make no mention of Simele as a specific event, nor are the Assyrians mentioned
in general (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14546763; http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-15467672; accessed 7 July 2014).
19. Benjamin Thomas White, The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East:
The Politics of Community in French Mandate Syria (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2011), 211.
20. Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala (ed.), Rafał Lemkin: A Hero of Humankind (Warsaw:
Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2010), 79.
21. Perhaps the best explanation of such an approach (at least for my formulations)
was demonstrated in a fantasy series by Terry Goodkind entitled The Sword
of Truth. By all accounts it seems evident that Goodkind’s ‘rules’ were largely
constructed around a portion of Ayn Rand’s philosophy of objectivism. See
Terry Goodkind’s Sword of Truth series. While I employ a multitude of ideas
and mechanisms to draw out and then analyse the elements of this work, I
have incorporated works from seemingly distant fields such as fantasy literature
(apparent here), religious studies and ecological philosophy, as they offer much
insight for this case.
22. This also occurs in more popular works in a visual media age by scholars, jour-
nalists, activists etc. See Deborah Ellis, Children of War: Voices of Iraqi Refugees
(Toronto: Groundwood, 2009) and Mark Kukis, Voices from Iraq: A People’s
History 2003–2009 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011) as examples
where Assyrians find little or no inclusion.
23. Most fascinating is how this has become part of mainstream knowledge: see
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/39628/Assyrian-incident (acces
sed 7 July 2014). For chronologies see ‘Iraq profile’, BBC News Middle East, 24
June 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14546763 (accessed
7 July 2014); Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), x–xvi.
24. Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous
Peoples, 2nd ed. (London: Zed, 2012), 44–5.
i ntroducti on | 25
25. Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches (New York: Random House,
2012), 112.
26. Prof. Peter Gran, personal correspondence with author, 11 November 2013.
27. Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies, 35.
28. There is a common phrase in Assyrian to signify when a person or thing is miss-
ing from where it ought to be: ‘shawpeh mabyuneleh’, literally ‘its place (where it
belongs) is showing’.
29. See Kenneth Lee Pike (ed.), Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of Structure
of Human Behavior, 2nd ed. (The Hague: Mouton, 1967); Conrad Kottak,
Mirror for Humanity: A Concise Introduction to Cultural Anthropology, 4th ed.
(Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 47.
30. I would like to explore this more in the future as it seems the spiritual views
of the Lakota, Nakota and Dakota echo this concept, with their expression of
Wakȟáŋ Tȟáŋka, sometimes translated as ‘Great Spirit’ or ‘Great Mystery’.
31. See Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, tr.
Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, [1984] 1997), xxiv–xxv.
32. Kent Nerburn (ed.), The Soul of an Indian and Other Writings from Ohiyesa
(Charles Alexander Eastman) (Novato, CA: New World Library, 2001), 5–6.
33. Sue Clifford and Angela King, ‘Losing Your Place’, in Local Distinctiveness:
Place, Particularity and Identity, quoted in Patrick Curry, Defending Middle-
Earth: Tolkien, Myth and Modernity (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004), 145.
34. On 24 September 2008, Iraq’s Council of Representatives voted to eliminate
Article 50 of the Provincial Law. This article, which had passed into legislation
only two months earlier, on 22 July, guaranteed almost fifty reserved seats (as
in a quota system) in provincial councils for minorities: see ‘UNPO calls for
return of Article 50’, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, 12
October 2008, http://www.unpo.org/article/8775 (accessed 8 July 2014). The
repeal of the act was marked by the ethnic cleansing of Christians in Mosul in
October: see Bradley S. Klapper, ‘3,000 Christians Flee “Killing Campaign” in
Mosul, Iraq’ Huffington Post, 11 October 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2008/10/11/3000-christians-flee-kill_n_133912.html (accessed 8 July
2014).
35. A proverb of Erasmus, later copied by Jung. It serves as an appropriate reminder
of the omnipresence of meaning, discerned or not, accepted or not, that pervades
all things.
36. Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies, 144–62.
37. This problem continues in the Assyrian diaspora today. See the Arab American
Institute’s demographics page, http://www.aaiusa.org/pages/demographics/
(accessed 8 July 2014), which lists Assyrians as constituting 5 per cent of the
Arab-American population.
1
Integrating the Assyrian Question
Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.

Martin Luther King Jr
T o return to the tripartite inquiries of the introduction in reverse, a

solution to remedy the situation is now loosely established and will
become more apparent in the succeeding chapters. The second major query
mentioned comprises two parts: (a) What are the ways in which the Assyrians
contribute to (in this geopolitical case) Iraqi history? (b) How and why is the
Assyrian role in the (or a) narrative diminished or unnoticed both directly and
indirectly and what purpose does it serve? As the major queries o utlined, my
own epistemology and methods are influenced by a p anenhistorical approach
to the past, meaning an inherent interconnectivity of all things which make
up the experience of the past. Touching on this theme, it would do the
reader well to recall the words of Martin Luther King Jr in his letter from a
Birmingham jail: ‘Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We
are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment
of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly.’ In a very real
way, this testifies to the importance of the Assyrian case for Iraq and the
Middle East, as a microcosm reflective of a macrocosm.
Returning yet again to the introduction, part of remedying the problem of
unacknowledgement is tying their (the Assyrians’) past, present and future in
with that of all of Iraq and its communities. The question becomes: on whom
does the onus fall to create and sustain this effort? The Assyrians themselves
are laden with the burden of responsibility for recounting their own history,
otherwise they will continue to be omitted or relegated to a tertiary role of
consequence in modern dialogues regarding Iraq. They have only recently
become more involved in writing their own history, and that of their experi-
ence in Iraq, and offering it to a wider audience. There are numerous reasons
for this, including the circumstance that academic pursuits are of minimal
importance to peoples still living in a transient survival mode. It stands to
reason that being a stateless, oppressed, underrepresented and sometimes
unrecognised people can lead to further disassociation from such pursuits.
To illustrate this I retreat to Dr King and utilise his paradigm that allows us
to understand how oppressed or marginalised people/communities respond
to oppression. I will endeavour to place each element of the paradigm in the
context of the Iraqi Assyrian case.1
Acquiescence: the oppressed resign themselves to their doom. They

tacitly adjust themselves to oppression and thereby become conditioned
to it.
Acquiescence is embedded in the Assyrian community in different forms,

an example being accepted ‘isations or ications’ of new identities, e specially
sectarian ones (solely based on religious ties), which sometimes vie for suprem-
acy and total consumption of identity rather than being a complimenting
layer.
Physical violence and corroding hatred: Violence often brings about

momentary results. Nations have frequently won their independence in
battle. But in spite of temporary victories, violence never brings perma-
nent peace. It solves no social problem; it merely creates new and more
complicated ones.
Some resort to violent confrontation with their oppressors. As an exam-

ple, both the Armenian and the Palestinian causes elicit(ed) a great deal
of political, scholarly and mass media-oriented attention and coverage, due
(at least in part) to violent actions against Turks and Israelis respectively.
Ingrained hatred has the knack of being fostered in succeeding generations
and staying forgiveness, comprising both group and individual emancipa-
tion. Additionally, there is a possibility of such animosity then transfer-
ring to the oppressor group and blinding them to their own subjugation of
others. Justice untempered by mercy depreciates into self-righteousness. The
conversion of oppressed to oppressor is a common phenomenon of human
int e g ra ti ng the assyri an qu e s tio n | 29
civilisation.2 While the Assyrians fought in the armed anti-government strug-

gle of the 1960s and more recently formed a militia under the umbrella of
the Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM) in 1979, they have not resorted
to violence for violence sake; in other words they have at most been willing to
defend using force only when physically attacked.
Non-violent Resistance. Like the synthesis in Hegelian philosophy, the prin-

ciple of non-violent resistance seeks to reconcile the truths of two opposites,
acquiescence and violence, while avoiding the extremes and immoralities of
both. The non-violent resister agrees with the person who acquiesces that
one should not be physically aggressive toward his opponent; but he bal-
ances the equation by agreeing with the person of violence that evil must
be resisted. He avoids the non-resistance of the former and the violent
resistance of the latter. With non-violent resistance, no individual or group
need submit to any wrong, nor need anyone resort to violence in order to
right a wrong. Non-violent resistance is not aimed against oppressors, but
against oppression.
Of the three elements, King believed that only the option of non-violent
resistance (in its various emanations) offered a path to freedom and liberation
from past wounds. A pitfall of the Assyrians remains the acrimony caused by
years of acquiescence. Dividing already numerically and politically limited
groups halves their strength, making non-violent protest complex to say the
least. However, this can be and in some cases has been remedied with a
more ethical concern among researchers towards the Assyrian experience. For
Assyrians, recounting experiences of Iraq, allowing them to tell their own
stories, is not only a form of catharsis parallel to ethical practices of research,
but more basically, it enriches the mosaic of Iraq. Additionally, it relates
camaraderie in Iraq with other communities at an individual human level,
reminding the reader of shared experiences and further that political systems
are not the people and have seldom been truly representative of the people.
This allows for a more bottom-up history of Iraq, rather than the usual state-,
party- or military-oriented narrative so commonly recounted. Yet, despite
all of this, there remains an innate aversion to works by Assyrians, making
alleviating the condition challenging.3
A Historiography of Historiography and a Theoretical Framework
Different parts of the picture highlight the same frame

Jurassic 5, ‘Work It Out’
Deeply embedded in this work is a methodological lens that will be useful

for similar cases of historical alienation and disenfranchisement. To that end,
this work builds partly on theories of history and religious studies/theology
to create a panenhistorical worldview that is inclusive by its very nature. By
contrast, as historian Chris Lorenz explains, the way history has been prac-
tised in a bipartite structure has involved ‘scientific’ historians affirming an
epistemological claim with a practical end in mind:
The epistemological claim related to the status of history writing as a

Wissenschaft, that is, a methodical truth-seeking discipline: academic his-
tory, above all else, claimed to do away with all myths about the past and to
replace them with The Truth – or, at least, some truths.
Next to this epistemological claim, however, academic history always
claimed to fulfill a practical function, namely, to provide a certain degree of
guidance in practical life . . . For most professional historians over much of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries this practical orientation was about
creating some kind of identification with the state, most often the nation-
state. This was no accident since the professionalisation of academic history
was very much a state affair; most professional historians were literally fed
by the state. Not without justification, then, have historians been called
‘priests of the state’.4
Bearing this in mind, the very nature of the academic discipline of history
is embedded in state structures and apparatuses which, in some fashion,
claim an irrevocable link to historical fact and Truth. The panenhistorical
paradigm refashions or reforges that by allowing for many truths sans

hierarchical structures to generate a more thorough depiction of the

Truth while at the same time acknowledging this very pursuit as beyond
human capacity.5 Lorenz, harkening back to the early nineteenth-century
Prussian philosopher and empiricist historian Wilhelm von Humboldt,
remarks:
Humboldt’s equally famous treatise On the Historian’s Task (1821) empha-

sises the ‘theoretical’, non-empirical aspect of scientific history even more
clearly than Ranke: ‘The historian’s task is to present what actually hap-
pened. [. . .] An event, however, is only partially visible in the world of the
senses; the rest has to be added by intuition, inference, and guesswork.’ The
facts are just the ‘raw material, but not history itself. [. . .] The truth of any
event is predicated on the addition – mentioned above – of that invisible
part of every fact, and it is this part, therefore, which the historian has to
add. Regarded in this way, he does become active, even creative [. . .].’6
The panenhistoricist would further argue that while history is in the imagin-
ing of the raw data or facts into a story, perspective playing a large role in
interpretation, raw material or fact is also neither true nor false but also
embedded in perception. One historian’s fact is another’s fancy.
To return to Iraq, the last twenty years have seen an increase in research
on the Iraqi state that has taken place from a variety of perspectives. Much
of this, especially in relation to Iraqi Assyrians, is deconstructed and
reviewed in an article entitled ‘Rethinking Nationalism and an Appellative
Conundrum’.7 The article included celebrated historians of Iraq from Hanna
Batatu and Peter Sluglett to Charles Tripp, Sami Zubaida and others. The
findings of the research into the historiography supported the theory that
even the most recent publications, while purporting to be inclusive by the
simple fact that more information is readily available to the modern histo-
rian, use the same dogmatic lens and interpretation that confine Assyrians to
little beyond sectarian divisions – far more so than the Assyrians themselves
did, specifically referring to early in the twentieth century before widespread
Arabisation, in what is sometimes dubbed their nationalist discourse.
Some historians espouse a left-leaning, anti-nationalist, anti-colonialist
perspective on the Middle East, and more recently minorities and issues
surrounding the buzzword term ‘agency’ have become part and parcel of
the discourse. Despite this and by the very nature of the apparatuses that
fund academia, most continue to engage in national histories or utilise the
language of the nation-state.8 Iraq is a prime example. In 1991, historians
Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett illustrated the problematic nature
of Iraqi studies and historiography:
1. The notion of the heterogeneity of Iraqi society is another theme

that needs further definition and refinement. The facts are that the
population of Iraq, now about 18 million, is divided on both ethnic
and sectarian lines. Of course, neither the communities nor the sects
constitute homogeneous or monolithic single entities. As far as it is
possible to make any general calculations (since only primary religious
affiliation, that is ‘Christian’ or ‘Muslim’ is recorded in Iraqi censuses),
some 72 percent are Arabs, about 22 percent Kurds, and the remainder
Turcomans, Armenians, and others. Muslims make up 95 percent;
the remainder are Christians and members of various heterodox sects.
Almost all Kurds (apart from the Yazidis), and all but a tiny minority
of Arabs (who are Christians), are Muslims; to that extent, therefore,
there is a degree of homogeneity arising from the fact that some 70
percent of the population is both Muslim and Arab . . .
2. Among the more tragic aspects of the brutal and despotic regimes
under which the population of Iraq has suffered for so long is that
many of its most talented citizens have been forced into exile and that
the best of its scholars can only express themselves freely outside Iraq.
3. More insidious is that, until recently, much that has purported to be
scholarly writing on Iraq, including books that still find their way into
university reading lists, consists either of uncritical apologia for present
or past regimes or records the ‘official version’ of events, presented by
the researcher as if it were historical fact.9
To summarise and explain, the Slugletts’ second notion above accurately

acknowledges a harsh reality of despotic governments whereby due to the
brutality of past regimes it has been difficult for any Iraqis to convey their
perspective or to craft their own narratives of historical events. On the other
hand, notions one and three create a plethora of issues in which they appear
to contradict each other. Notion three negates the second half of notion one.
To clarify, a quintessential drawback to contend with is state or majority apo-
logia. In fact while this has shifted (at least in outward appearance in recent
years) the history of the region is still neatly packaged in state records. Census
accounts for example are one of many nation-political and institutional appa-
ratuses which are conceived and utilised in a way to reflect the aspirations
of the state. On the other hand, notion one repudiates that: Iraqi society is
discernibly heterogeneous and the communities from which it is built are
far from homogenous, being (quite panenhistorically speaking) something
more than simply the sum of their parts. Yet, while this is the case, there is a
remarkable range of homogeneity as 70 per cent of the population is Arab and
Muslim according to state census accounts. On a return to academic history’s
birth from within the nation-state, it appears blindingly obvious yet unques-
tioned that census accounts are in fact trappings of the national agenda of the
state, thus begging the retort, what is more apologetic than archival sources?
What is additionally overlooked is state apologias may also mirror a
Western perspective. This stems in part from a sometimes conscious and
at other times unconscious assumption that archival accounts (especially
British, French etc.) are etic and more culturally neutral than authoritarian
government archives, certainly more so than personal emic tales and accounts
of events, and further, that oral accounts are coloured by bias whereas Eastern
and emphatically Western archival records are less corruptible and more
salient. In essence utilising materials, names, vocabulary, including writing
under a proper name and surname or government agency, creates a sense
of verisimilitude, granting the narrative greater authenticity, and decreasing
attachments and venality.
Included in this viewpoint is a predisposition for scholars to maintain
the status quo. Giles Mohan and Gordon Wilson have called into ques-
tion similar propensities in the field of development studies, which they so
appropriately term ‘regimes of truth and currencies of expertise’ for research
methods, topics and findings that at least uphold or endorse and at most edify
the proclivity for particular hegemonic discourses.10 Such scholarship, which
by its very research furthers the hegemonic understanding of history even in
its sympathies, is discussed in a critique of modern civilisation and the perva-
siveness of ‘pop’ monoculture (perhaps in this case academic monoculture is
more appropriate) in the following quote by Sue Clifford and Angela King:
The bigger the scale the more reduced the sensitivity and the easier it
becomes to steamroller strategies for the ‘greater good’ which prescribe the
same solutions to subtly different circumstances encouraging convergence
and homogeneity . . . thereby missing the whole point.
. . . The forces of homogenization rob us of visible and invisible things

which have meaning to us, they devalue our longitudinal wisdom and erase
the fragments from which to piece together the stories of nature and history
through which our humanity is fed. They stunt our sensibilities and starve
our imagination.11
Thus to return to the importance of individual or ‘smaller-scale’ narratives

reflective of Patrick Curry’s named places and Martin Luther King Jr’s
reminder of the interconnectedness of justice, let us view some native sources.
Reflections on native sources
With this knowledge and recalling King’s idea of resistance, a look back into
the histories of Iraq and its societies, past and present, shows an Assyrian
narrative in diverse forms. If and how they were used becomes the question.
To illuminate this a closer look at a native account of the Assyrians in Iraq
and specifically the Simele massacres written by Iraqi author Yusuf Malek is
a logical point of departure.
Yusuf Malek was born 1899 in the Chaldean or Catholic stronghold of
Tel Keppe (Telkaif) in Iraq.12 He was educated at Latin College in Baghdad
and later at the American College in Basra.13 Captured by the Turkish mili-
tary during the First World War, Malek later escaped and took work with the
Iraqi civil service from June 1917 to September 1930. In 1920, he was special
assistant to the governor of Samarra, and finally he held the office of secretary
for the administration inspector in the Nineveh (Mosul) region. He left Iraq
for Beirut in April 1931 and, along the way, remained in Aleppo for a general
conference of Assyrians and Kurds. Malek regularly challenged the British
high commissioner in Iraq for his treatment of Assyrians in official positions,
which led the high commissioner to complain to the French authorities in
Lebanon. Malek made regular attempts to return to Iraq but was continually
denied re-admittance by the Iraqi government at the behest of the British
consul general of Beirut, Sir Harold Satow.14
Two days after the initial massacres in Simele, the French authorities in
Beirut asked Malek to leave Lebanon, where he published a regular newspa-
per, Atra (‘Country’). He later joined the exiled Patriarch of the Church of
the East in Cyprus, Mar Eshai Shimun, in order to take the Assyrian cause
to the international community. Following the horrendous events of Simele

in August 1933, the two Assyrians left Cyprus for Geneva, to petition the
League of Nations in September and October of that year. Malek wrote
his magnum opus, The British Betrayal of the Assyrians, in 1935, in protest at
what he perceived as continuous maltreatment of the Assyrians by the British
administration in Iraq, especially in response to the Simele massacres.15 While
it appears from the title that the author laid the bulk of the blame for the
Assyrian predicament and the devastation dealt to them in 1933 at the feet
of the British colonial power, the book retains a native perspective of one
who laboured alongside the British and later critiqued their motives and
integrity. In fact Malek charged the following fifteen officials, eight Iraqi and
seven British, as responsible for the massacres either through direct action or
indifference:
Rashid Ali al-Gaylani, Prime Minister

Hikmat Sulayman, Minister of the Interior
Yasin al-Hashimi, Minister of Finance
Nuri al-Said, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Muhammed Amin Zaki, Minister of Justice
Jalal Baban, Minister of Defence
Rustam Haidar, Minister of Communications and Works, assistant to
T. E. Lawrence
Sayyid Abdul Mahdi, Minister of Education
Sir Francis Humphrys, British ambassador to Iraq
Captain V. Holt, oriental secretary to the British embassy, Baghdad
Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, chief administrative inspector
Major C. J. Edmonds, first assistant advisor to Cornwallis
Major W. C. F. A. Wilson, administrative inspector, Mosul
Colonel R. S. Stafford, administrative inspector, Mosul
Major Douglas B. Thompson – English expert on the Assyrian
settlement
As a counterbalance to these accusations, four sections of the book were

either written by or republished with permission by British authors: the
Introduction (William Ainger Wigram, Anglican priest); Chapter 5, on
the Baqubah and Mindan refugee camps (Colonel F. Cunliff-Owen);

Chapter 13, regarding the Assyrians in 1918–19 (Colonel J. J. McCarthy);
and Chapter 29, entitled ‘The Crisis in Iraq’ (Lieutenant Colonel A. T.
Wilson). The book includes an extensive appendix containing copies of cor-
respondence from Assyrian, Iraqi and British officials as well as a partial list
of villages destroyed and names of Assyrians executed during the events.16
While not disputing the existence of bias, The British Betrayal retains
an inclusive narrative filtered through the perspective of a native Iraqi who
worked in the region as an interpreter for the British and their Indian regi-
ments and was with them during the failed assault known as the Battle of
Ctesiphon in 1915. He was later part of the siege of Kut al-Amara, which
lasted from the end of that year until the spring of 1916. Following the sur-
render of the starving British garrison to Ottoman forces on 29 April, Malek
along with the other prisoners was sent on foot to Aleppo to be pressed into
work. He escaped within two months and, as mentioned above, was later
employed by the British in the Iraq civil service.
Though Malek was an Iraqi who lived and worked in the region under the
British and who had close ties to the Patriarch of the Church of the East, his
work is perceived as a ‘polemic’ utilising ‘fantastical accounts’ and is simply
‘not a trustworthy source’.17 Incongruously in the Iraqi nationalist argument
that ‘in the case of the Assyrian Affair of 1933 history has been decidedly the
propaganda of the victims’, Khaldun Husry, son of staunch Arab national-
ist Sāt.i‘ al-H.us.rī, found himself published in in the International Journal
of Middle East Studies (IJMES) in 1974, which afforded his article a sense
of integrity unavailable to Malek.18 The work, which extensively employs
British FO archival documents, is certainly polemical. Analytically, the argu-
mentation focuses on exonerating the Iraqi government, of which Malek
was a part, of any wrongdoing. Husry employs basic logical reasoning to
promote his perspective of the case, sometimes questioning British accounts
as circumstantial while at other times utilising archival sources as if they were
infallible.19
One of the sources Husry employs is Lieutenant Colonel Ronald Sempill
Stafford (1890–1972), British administrative inspector for Mosul. Regarded
by some as an Assyrian apologist, in actuality he considered the Assyrians to
be ‘savage and uncivilized’, exemplifying the emblematic disdainful colonial
attitude for the colonised regardless of religious adherence.20 This attitude

transferred to and was adopted by the British protégés, the new Iraqi admin-
istration (including Khaldun Husry and his father) and King Faisal, who
himself regarded the Assyrians contemptuously as ‘boorish and child-like’.21
Yet it is Husry and his perspective that have become the foundation for all
things Simele, and while problematic, some experiential information should
be scrutinised in greater detail.
The writer met Bakr Sidqi for the first time a few days after his return from
Mosul. When he patted me on the shoulder and asked me what I wanted
to be when I finished school I said: an army officer. (So popular was the
army then that probably no boy of the writer’s age could think at the time
of taking any other profession.)22
Husry was an eyewitness to the celebrations for the returning Iraqi troops and
remembers his feelings (and that of a large portion of the country) well. This
one statement tells of nascent Iraqi Arab nationalism tied to a strong military,
setting its prominence in Iraqi politics in the future. Yet, there remains the
paradox of the Assyrian perspective as nothing beyond ‘a tired account of an
oppressed minority’.23
In framing the criticism of the production of discursive knowledge relat-
ing to the events of 1933 a disparity exists. Whereas the discourse on British
colonial and imperial history in Iraq has correctly deconstructed and scruti-
nised its effects on the socio-cultural, economic and political transformation
of Iraqi society, a similar account of British treatment of Assyrians in Iraq by
Assyrians writing during this critical period is often dismissed as invalid, eth-
nocentric, and thus not worthy of consideration, essentially creating a form
of domination and repression/oppression in academic discourse.
There are at least three other Assyrian sources which are intrinsically vital
to the early historiographical record of Iraq: Malik Yaqo d’Malik Ismael’s
Aturayé w-tre plashe tībilayé (‘Assyrians and the Two World Wars’, 1964),
‘Abdyešu‘ Barzana’s Šinnē d-‘asqūtā: Qrābā d-Dayrabūn w-Gunh.ā d-Simele
(‘Years of Hardship: The Battle of Dayrabūn and Massacre of Simele’, 2003),
and Assyrian Struggle for National Survival in the 20th and 21st Centuries
(2012), written by Malik Loko Shlimon d’bit Badawi. Malik Ismael and Loko
Shlimon’s works come from the perspective of tribal leaders and levy officers.
Both were intensely involved in the settlement of the Hakkâri Assyrians and
were among those who decided to leave for Syria. Their works give interesting
eyewitness accounts of the events leading up to the Simele massacre, as well
as examining the internal politics of the Assyrians, especially within the patri-
archal family, which included Mar Eshai Shimun, the Patriarch himself, his
aunt, the Lady Surma, and his father, Rab Tremma (later promoted to Rab
Khayla or General) Dawid. Shlimon’s work is of great relevance as it contains
original letters from the 1920s and 1930s that communicate a different and
additionally complex story of the internal politics of the Assyrian commu-
nity. Finally Barzana’s text is an eyewitness account of a fifteen-year-old boy
who participated in the skirmish between the Iraqi army and the Assyrians on
4 August 1933 at Dayrabūn, a village near where the borders of Iraq, Syria
and Turkey meet.
A chapter in a book entitled Writing the Modern History of Iraq:
Historiographical and Political Challenges, published in 2012 and based on
a conference held in Geneva in 2008, zeroes in on the fear of the sectarian
master narrative. In the chapter, twelve ‘methodological suggestions for deal-
ing with reporting with a sectarian bias on the post-2003 situation in Iraq’
are listed, one of which is:
Question the representativeness of individuals who speak in the name of

sectarianism. For example, who is an Assyrian in Iraq? What about those
Christians who prefer to describe themselves as Chaldeans and see them-
selves as Iraqis rather than as an ethnic minority in search of a homeland?
Historically, the most ardent ‘Assyrianists’ among the Iraqi Christians
are also the smallest and by far the most recent addition to the Christian
Community – the Nestorians, previous inhabitants of the Hakkari moun-
tains who were settled in Iraq after the First World War.24
The suggestion achieves two things: first, it reminds the reader of issues of
context due to the absence of historical processes, an absence which can con-
sequently create what it purports to safeguard against, namely sectarianism;
and second, it illustrate some of the continuing generalisations or stereo-
types of who Assyrians are and whence they came. There has been a general
postulation become fact that the Assyrians are in some form alien to the
region, perhaps partly because they are predominantly distributed between
four contiguous Middle Eastern states and thus constitute a transnational

community. I propose the following alleged truisms, popularly and often
academically accepted, concerning the Assyrians:
1. Assyrians are Nestorians from the Hakkâri mountains in Turkey.

2. Only Nestorians (who are not native to Iraq) are Assyrians.
3. They are better referred to under more neutral and less political terms like
Iraqi Christians (or by ecclesiastical grouping).
4. Their own experiences and self-histories are ‘fantastical’ tales, ‘nationalist
polemics’ and cannot be objective.
5. Simele was an isolated event in Iraqi history.
The minority is unimagined by the majority narrative(s) since the majority

narrative(s) require hegemony to retain power. This is furthered in all aspects
of the nation’s culture from school curriculums to media to politics and
everything in between. This issue can be termed subordinating narrativisation.
A partial remedy to this problem is the introduction of historical Assyrian
material culture (discussed in the subsequent chapters) as well as innovative
perspectives which challenge previous assumptions of ‘alienness’. In the case
of the description of Assyrians as the ‘most recent edition’ to Iraq or as
refugees from Turkey following the First World War, N. E. Bou-Nacklie
clarifies similar characterisations in Syria in a table concerning ethnic groups
recruited by the French to participate in a local security force. The group
‘Christians’ is divided into ‘Local’ and ‘Foreign’ by the French. In a footnote
Bou-Nacklie states:
There were admittedly groups of Assyrians and Armenians in the region

long before Islam; they are referred to as foreign because most of the recruits
from these two groups – from Turkey and Iran – came from the embit-
tered, impoverished, and unemployed Armenians and Assyrian refugees
who flocked to the Troupe recruitment centers.25
Such sentiments are echoed by Tareq and Jacqueline Ismael, who note that
‘Assyrians have ancient roots in the Iraq but their population had increased
markedly since the beginning of WWI’.26 Essentially, one must recognise that
the settlements of this community, like all others, fluctuated and transformed
over both time and an expansive territory undelineated by modern borders.

The political placement of such borders did not create a new reality, but
rather simply how the reality was viewed. In other words utilising a historical
soundbite (migration during the First World War) as the basis for a presumed
truism (Assyrians are foreign to Iraq) by upholding it as the initial event of its
kind (as if the region post-WWI was as now) is detached from the reality of
history as a series of continuous interconnected processes. Much of this stems
from an inability to note that Assyrians in early twentieth-century Iraq could
be categorised as geographically distinct yet interrelated groups:
1. Those who at the time of the division of the Ottoman Empire resided
in what would become Iraq, including urban Assyrians who were
largely Arabised from Chaldean (Catholic) and Jacobite-rite (Orthodox)
religious communities, and rural Assyrians to the far north who
were largely unassimilated, retaining native languages and culture, of
Chaldean and Church of the East (Nestorian) religious denominations
(see Figure 6).
2. Those Assyrians of Hakkâri and Urmia, numbering Chaldean, Nestorian
and Protestant denominations, forced into Iraq during the fighting of the
First World War.
In order to arrive at a more genuine panenhistorical understanding (steering

clear of the subordination trap) illustrated via objectivist discourse, this work
adopts as its core the necessity of telling and retelling unidentified, dismissed
or rejected narratives within a given historical period without declaring each
as objective truth (‘master narrative’) but rather as a continuous contribu-
tion to the whole as an ever-expanding puzzle with no discernible borders.
The more observable the pieces are, the greater the chance for an improved
understanding of the intricacies while recognising the infinite nature of the
puzzle, allowing it to remain just out of reach and making new studies and
perspectives perpetually essential. Problematising and resolving the accepted
truisms and assumptions will situate Assyrians in the midst of all other narra-
tives that engage Iraqi history in a proper panenhistorical web.
Finally, aligning with Benjamin White’s understanding that if within
majority histories or writing national histories, minorities ‘enter the picture
Figure 6 Letter from three Barwari Bala Iraqi chiefs indicating they were
landowners and had dwelt in the region long before the war, yet became refugees
along with the rest of their brethren from Hakkâri and Urmia. The chiefs also make
evident their support of Mar Eshai Shimun, Patriach of the Church of the East, in
his temporal endeavours
only to the extent that their history touches on the majority’, then a solu-
tion to the inattention is to give Assyrian narratives agency to forge an
account of Iraqi history, making them necessary to the account and all
subsequent narratives.27 Thus the Assyrian perspectives that had previously
been inadequately studied will be reinserted and analysed as part of the
larger history. If Sami Zubaida’s article title ‘The Fragments Imagine the
Nation’ is to be accepted, then it must be actualised. The Assyrians must be
part of imagining or reimagining Iraq. This book is just that: an aspiration

to enhance the vibrancy of the story by incorporating various perspectives
and personal experience.
Key Sources: Mapping Iraqi Assyrians and Sectarianisation
To illuminate the issue of identity fragmentation and its connectedness to

place, which contributed to a lacunae of references to the people in question,
the Western Christian missionary enterprise must be examined to deter-
mine its role in triggering and instigating additional perplexities. Almost all
nineteenth-century information on the Assyrians that is studied or repro-
duced is based on sources by Western travelogues. The Assyrians had long
contact with the Church of England under the auspices of the Archbishop of
Canterbury. While most of the explorers were missionaries, many if not all
were also politically motivated, demonstrating deep religion–state connec-
tions in what many would have thought of as a post-Enlightenment ‘secular’
western Europe. They included Edward Lewes Cutts, George Percy Badger
and archaeologists such as Sir Austin Henry Layard. In many ways they
served as a bastion of the British crown/church fearful of growing French
Catholic influence; an unremitting competition beginning in 1534.
From the mid-1850s to 1971, the Ordo Praedicatorum, also known as
the Roman Catholic Dominican Order, had been converting large numbers
of predominantly Nestorian Assyrians to Catholicism, further fragmenting
the community. Yet some knowledge and perhaps wisdom may be drawn
from an otherwise questionable endeavour. It is undeniable that Christian
ecclesiastical communities were actively engaged in data collection. A prime
example of this is the Dominican father and scholar Jean-Maurice Fiey,
who between 1940 and 1960 compiled a three-volume ecclesiastic geogra-
phy of northern Iraq, which he later entitled Assyrie chrétienne (‘Christian
Assyria’), published between 1963 and 1965. Fiey’s work prompted a fellow
Dominican, Fr Josephe Omez, to cartographically detail the settlement of
Christian villages in the region during this period. When the map was com-
pleted it was entitled ‘Les Chrétiens en Iraq, régions de Mossoul, Alcoche,
Zakho, Amadia, Aqra, seules les localités où se trouvent des Chrétiens figurent
sur cette carte (situation en 1961)’28 and records more than 230 villages in
northern Iraq, not including areas to the east such as Arbil and Kirkuk, both
with significant Assyrian communities.29 The work, while fairly extensive,

was incomplete for these eastern regions, as 1961 saw the first of three waves
of large-scale demographic shifting of Assyrians in Iraq during the second
half of the twentieth century, which began alongside the armed autonomist
movement (also referred to as the Kurdish uprising, the Kurdish–Iraqi War,
or the Barzani uprising).
The labour of Omez was based on his own personal observations, Fiey’s
work and many Syriac manuscripts that detailed the past significance and
location of cultural sites, many of which have since been destroyed or fallen
into ruin from disuse. Furthermore, the Dominican map and its key, which
mention the ecclesiastical ties of each village – including Chaldeans, Syrians,
Nestorians, Jacobites, Gregorians, Armenians, Protestants and Seventh-day
Adventists, Greek Catholics, the Orthodox, and Latin-rite Christians –
helped to identity religious affiliation, necessary for detailing changes in affili-
ation over the years. The first four sects constitute the majority of Assyrians,
Figure 7 The original legend to Father Josephe Omez’s map

while the latter six are more recent additions to Iraq and exist mostly in urban
areas.30
The previously unpublished Dominican map along with the his-
torical empirical evidence gathered sheds light on the Assyrian indige-
neity to Iraq, distinct from the colonial-invented notions of invaders or
mercenaries deposited in Iraq by the British following the First World
War. The empirical portion of the study is built on the following research:
the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century histories of the villages are
based on Fiey’s work, which is in turn grounded in early studies such
as that done by Badger.31 All population statistics from 1850 are based
on Badger as well, though his numbers should be understood in light of
his own reduction of all population numbers by one-third, as he felt the
Patriarch Mar Shimun and Archdeacon Qasha Auraha had exaggerated
them.32 The figure of one-third is completely arbitrary and problematic,
and while Badger cites personal observation as his justification for adjust-
ment, his explorations were brief at best and never thorough as he himself
did not travel to each village mentioned. Furthermore it must be noted that
Badger’s studies were carried out immediately following the massacres of
Assyrians in Bohtan and Hakkâri by Bedr Khan Beg (1840–3), again call-
ing into question the accuracy of the statistics. I have therefore added the
original figures to show the range between those of Badger and the official
church figures.
The statistics from 1913 arise from Chaldean priest Joseph Tfinkdji’s
research but are subject to scrutiny since the numbers are solely indicative
of the Chaldean religious community. The numbers by Tfinkdji are also
rounded estimates. Population figures from 1957 are based on the 1957
Iraqi census, which was also used by researcher Majed Eshoo.33 Eshoo (a
pen name) is also the main source for the situation during the 1961–3 civil
wars in Iraq. Eshoo likely utilised this pseudonym as a means of protection
from possible retribution; after having spoken with various Assyrians in Iraq,
it appears that Eshoo’s work drew the suspicion of some Iraq officials.34
His compilation is indebted to the ADM’s research and collections, as well
as other Assyrian groups and local NGOs, including the Nineveh Center
for Research and Development (NCRD), which has corroborated much
of Eshoo’s research and begun a collection of Anfal-related material. These
studies are incorporated into a January 2003 report co-published by the

International Federation for Human Rights and the International Alliance
for Justice, entitled Iraq: Continuous and Silent Ethnic Cleansing – Displaced
Persons in Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraqi Refugees in Iran.
The significance and steadfastness of Eshoo’s work is comparable to
that of Shorsh Haji Resool’s research on Kurdish villages and the Anfal
campaign. In the case of studying minorities, since much of the research
on them is more often done by the minority themselves, objectivity is often
legitimately questioned but also illegitimately dismissed. With regard to
the legitimate concern over Assyrian objectivity, the Assyrian researchers,
for whatever reason, have not had the advantage of added support from
NGOs such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) that have worked alongside
Kurdish researchers since 1991. This study has elected to use these compila-
tions under scrutiny and to further substantiate their evidence through oral
interviews.
As a brief aside, it is logical to expect some sensationalism in the Assyrian-
compiled data, as the events were traumatic for the individuals involved.
However, this should not negate the data’s utility and importance. As
Assyrians are neglected from generalist histories, ethnographic/oral history
(the people themselves as living repositories of history) becomes a crucial tool
for both the researcher and the researched in order to provide some agency
within experienced events. It is fascinating that while all archives are written
by humans and subject to the exact same deficiency of human error, many
written by those who did not witness the events which they depict still appear
as more objective in the literature. The reality remains that living human
beings and their experience are an equally valid historical source and thus
should be used, especially in cases of explicit governmental propaganda and/
or a lack of written sources due to political, social or economic maladies and
misfortunes, from destruction of material culture to fear tactics to problems
with illiteracy and, as was the case with some indigenous cultures, lack of a
written language.
It is worth recalling that if indigenous populations or minorities did not
produce their own research, much of today’s academic research by scholars
would not have begun. History is generally written by the victor, and even in
a world of progress and technology, indigenous populations have often been
scorned. One should not forget the example of Carthage and her culture,
which, despite its grand history, comes to us through the writings of her
enemies and conquerors, the Romans, who had in fact obliterated most of
the Carthaginian records.
The more recent statistics are based on my field research, the HRW
findings, the Assyrian Academic Society’s (AAS) previously unpublished
‘Field Mission Iraq 2004, Report and Database’ (primarily an ethnographic
study of the region), the work of the NCRD, based in Qaraqosh, Iraq, and
finally my oral interviews. Fieldwork in Iraq today must be scrutinised,
as after 1991 and 2003 Iraq has seen large-scale demographic shifts and
even some village rebuilding.35 In addition, the fluidity of the destruction
makes it difficult to pinpoint the exact date of devastation and, in some
cases, the actual location of every village, school and monument destroyed.36
Many of the archival documents consulted in this investigation come from
the League of Nations Archives in Geneva, the (British) National Archives
(TNA) in Kew, west London, and the (US) National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA), located in College Park, Maryland. The Boston
Athenaeum and the Congregational Library in Boston were also consulted.
Few academics working on this period consult NARA as they were a minor
player in the events in mandate and post-mandate Iraq, in essence once again
assuming TNA to be more relevant and thereby constructing a hierarchy of
sources. In the case of Simele, most studies rely solely on British Foreign
Office documents or Air Ministry files and do not consult the Assyrian
records, letters etc., making the event one-sided and lacking in depth. I
elected to use many of the US documents, as the United States seems to
have had a less involved role due to the fact that it still maintained a relative
degree of isolation and unlike the British had fewer stakes in Iraq prior to
the Second World War; the primary US foreign interest at the time con-
cerned Latin America. Therefore, the archives of the AAS, the Ashurbanipal
(Assyrian Universal Alliance Foundation) Library in Chicago, the Modern
Assyrian Research Archive in Frölunda, Sweden, and the files of the NCRD.
Numerous personal archives including the collection, housed in Michigan,
of Afram Rayis, former secretary general of the Assyrian Universal Alliance
(AUA), which includes the Assyrian Sentinel, the organ of the AUA was also
consulted.
With reference to Iraqi government documents seized after the fall of the
Ba‘th regime, the papers will also help to illustrate the government policies
aimed against the Assyrians, Kurds and others. Following the first Gulf War,
many documents were found by the Kurdish political parties the Kurdistan
Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, as well as some
Assyrian parties such as the ADM. With the aid of the US Foreign Relations
Committee and Middle East Watch they were brought to the United States
in 1993 for scanning and processing and housed in Colorado. In 2007, the
originals were sent back to Iraq, though not to the central government.37
These documents are also subject to review and reliability questioning.38
The Iraq Memory Foundation (IMF, the successor to the Iraq Research and
Documentation Project) went to Iraq following the second Gulf War and
captured numerous documents from Baghdad that they brought back to their
headquarters in Washington, DC, and later stored at the Hoover Institution.
In January 2008 these were also scrutinised.39 The sub-sections analysed
included the Ba‘th Regional Command Collection and the North Iraq Data
Set. Furthermore I was able to obtain both originals and copies of documents
from Assyrian political and civil society organisations in Iraq, some of which
corresponded to those housed at Stanford. The most important set of these is
perhaps the Secret Documents of the Iraqi Government, as collected by the
ADM.
This research is also interdependently interlaced by interviews con-
ducted with more than 100 Assyrians from 2004 to 2013, many immigrants
from Iraq following the US-led Gulf War in 1991, concerning their lives
as Assyrians under successive Iraqi regimes. The interviewees were chosen
based on their place of residence in Iraq (villages) and from a range of
Assyrian ecclesiastical communities. The bibliography lists Assyrians who
represent the villages discussed in the body of this study for the period of
1933 to 1991, though some also dwelled in the major cities of Baghdad,
Mosul, Dohuk and elsewhere. The questions and approach used in the inter-
view process were evaluated and approved by the Office of Research Ethics
at the University of Toronto and all subsequent ethnographic work followed
the same trajectory.
There is an added importance to the inclusion of personal oral interviews
with individuals from 1933 to the Anfal campaign. These interviews refute
or corroborate the data of archival materials and secondary sources, as well

as provide an alternative view of events. Furthermore, as expressed by Linda
Tuhiwai Smith (pertinent in the Assyrian case), since indigenous peoples
struggled under colonialism against a Western view of their history, this
allows for the Assyrians to retell part of their history from their own perspec-
tive, which in some ways circumvents both Western and Eastern views of
Assyrian history.40 As such it is the onset of remedying an ethical dilemma
created by the now unequivocal assumption that the Assyrians are inconse-
quential to the history of Iraq and the modern Middle East. Yet in order to
illustrate these problems and misconceptions, and attempt to remedy the
Assyrian lacuna, a very unpretentious and rudimentary argument based in
syllogisms must be made, a marriage of two seemingly incompatible views as
the former argues the malleable and capricious nature of history where the
latter discusses straightforward cause and effect. Both deal with how the past
is remembered but also why it is remembered.
One particular drawback to oral memory is its inconsistency, especially
with, in the case of Simele, a gap of more than eighty years. This concern
cannot be avoided in any historical study. Also there exists a supposition
that the more the accounts substantiate one another the more valid or true
they become. This too is a problematic theory as again it implies more in the
sense of ‘majority equals truth’, or at least alludes to things having greater
accuracy, which is not necessarily the case. Furthermore, while historians
are overly concerned with the reliability of human memory, they should be
equally wary of official documentation. Most written knowledge begins as
oral knowledge, which, too, is subject to personal interpretation and political
bias. It is equally arguable and evident that the same historic event has mul-
tiple and often-conflicting written accounts and further, that those sources
accumulated and displayed in archives and museums are filtered through a
very tangible national lens.
The photographs included in this study are necessary for assessing the
extent of the destruction in the various Assyrian villages. Since the villages have
either been obliterated completely or, in some cases, recently rebuilt, these
visual aids both verify the destruction and allow the reader to better perceive
the damage to this community’s culture and obtain a sense of the magnitude
of the historic importance of these sites. These visual aids will supplement the
village descriptions and histories in the body of this research.41 In addition

the breadth of this research is limited by the same sources it is indebted to. In
most cases, all the research conducted, including by human rights NGOs, is
subject to the influence of modern politics, just as all pre-modern records are
equally subject to political bias. Knowing this, it is understandable that most
knowledge regarding events in Iraq contains various political, ethnic and
religious biases, especially since the state- and nation-building process is still
under way in both central Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan. This being the case, the
question remains, where does our Iraqi-Assyrian narrative begin?
Notes
1. The three responses of oppressed peoples to oppression are based on and quoted
directly from Martin Luther King Jr, Stride toward Freedom: The Montgomery
Story (Boston: Beacon Press, [1958] 2010), 206–10.
2. In the case of Kurds oppressed by the Iraqi regime then oppressing Assyrians
and others see ‘Political Oppression and Targeting in the KRG: A Personal
Story of Terror and Tragedy’, ISDP Issue Focus, October 2007, http://www.
iraqdemocracyproject.org/issuefocus_political.html (accessed 8 July 2014);
‘KRG Continues to Fail Vulnerable Minorities in Iraq’, ISDP Policy Alert,
5 December 2011, http://www.iraqdemocracyproject.org/policy_alert_16.html
(accessed 8 July 2014).
3. This aversion is reflected in studies on other minorities and indigenous com-
munities around the globe.
4. Chris Lorenz, ‘Drawing the Line: “Scientific” History between Myth-making
and Myth-breaking’, in Stefan Berger, Linas Eriksonas and Andrew Mycock
(eds), Narrating the Nation: Representations in History, Media and the Arts, (New
York: Berghahn, 2008), 36.
5. The question for some becomes: if it is by its very nature unknowable, then why
the pursuit? The answer is discussed in greater detail below.
6. Lorenz, ‘Drawing the Line’, 48.
7. Sargon Donabed, ‘Rethinking Nationalism and an Appellative Conundrum:
Historiography and Politics in Iraq’, National Identities 14.4 (2012): 407–31.
8. Many funding sources for academia are government based, such as the National
Endowment for the Humanities and the National Science Foundation.
9. Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, ‘The Historiography of Modern
Iraq’, American Historical Review 96.5 (1991), 1408, 1412–13.
10. Giles Mohan and Gordon Wilson, ‘The Antagonistic Relevance of Development
Studies’, Progress in Development Studies 5.4 (2005), 266.
11. Sue Clifford and Angela King, ‘Losing Your Place’, in Local Distinctiveness:
Place, Particularity and Identity, quoted in Patrick Curry, Defending Middle-
Earth: Tolkien, Myth and Modernity (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004), 145.
12. Malek also published further works in English, French and Arabic, including
Les Conséquences tragiques du mandat en Iraq (‘The Tragic Consequences of the
Mandate in Iraq’) in 1932, Simmel, the Cemetery of Betrayed Giants in 1938,
Kurdistan, Aw Bilād al-Akrād (‘Kurdistan, or the Land of the Kurds’) in 1945,
and a weekly political newspaper, Al-Hurriya (‘Freedom’), from 1957 until his
death two years later.
13. See the back cover of Malek’s The British Betrayal of the Assyrians (Chicago:
Assyrian National Federation/Assyrian National League of America, 1935).
14. Ibid., ii.
15. Assyrian Star, March–August 1996. See also Zinda Magazine, 13 October 1997.
16. Malek, The British Betrayal of the Assyrians, 333–9. This list is corroborated by or
based on ‘Report of Mar Shimun, Catholicos Patriarch of the Assyrians, Oct. 8,
1933’, Protection of Minorities in Iraq, League of Nations, Geneva, 31 October
1933.
17. Author’s personal correspondence with an unnamed academic.
18. Khaldun S. Husry, ‘The Assyrian Affair of 1933 (I)’, International Journal of
Middle East Studies 5.2 (1974), 161.
19. Khaldun S. Husry, ‘The Assyrian Affair of 1933 (II)’, International Journal of
Middle East Studies 5.3 (1974), 346.
20. R. S. Stafford, The Tragedy of the Assyrians (London: George Allen & Unwin,
1935), 12.
21. Orit Bashkin, The Other Iraq: Pluralism and Culture in Hashemite Iraq (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 198. In many cases, this attitude is reflec-
tive of early portrayals of Native Americans as savage and uncivilised, which in
later years developed into a more romanticised (and perhaps slightly less degrad-
ing) view of the ‘noble savage’, something British attitudes to Assyrians seemed
to portray as well. It should become blatantly evident after reading the major-
ity of this work that the Arab ruling elite had far more in common with and
would reap far more rewards from British intervention than their co-religionist
Assyrians would.
22. Husry, ‘The Assyrian Affair of 1933 (II)’, 354–5.
23. Author’s personal correspondence with an unnamed academic.
24. Reidar Visser, ‘The Sectarian Master Narrative in Iraqi Historiography’, in Jordi
Tejel, Peter Sluglett, Riccardo Bocco and Hamit Bozarslan (eds), Writing the
Modern History of Iraq: Historiographical and Political Challenges (Hackensack,
NJ: World Scientific, 2012), 56–57.
25. N. E. Bou-Nacklie, ‘Les Troupes Speciales: Religious and Ethnic Recruitment,
1916–46,’ International Journal of Middle East Studies 25.4 (1993), 650. The
quote also cites Albert Hourani, A Vision of History (Beirut: Khayats, 1961),
101–3.
26. Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, Government and Politics of the
Contemporary Middle East: Continuity and Change (Abingdon: Routledge,
2011), 192.
27. Benjamin Thomas White, The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East:
The Politics of Community in French Mandate Syria, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
28. I am very grateful to Fr Yousif Thomas OP of Baghdad, who kindly provided
me with the unpublished map through Professor Amir Harrak. Despite the
comprehensiveness of Omez’s work and my own work’s indebtedness to it, there
are a few limiting gaps. Due to the condition of the map, some villages remain
unreadable. I have attempted to clarify as many as possible, yet some remain
unrecognisable. Further, it must be mentioned that since Omez utilised his
own French spellings, I have adjusted the village names to be more consistent
with Assyrian pronunciation and etymology, where appropriate. Nevertheless,
a combination of this map and United Nations Humanitarian Affairs reference
maps on Iraq has allowed for a more accurate demarcating of Assyrian villages,
which, when possible, includes longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates. See
Appendix B.
29. Some 37,720 people were forcibly displaced from Kirkuk between 1970 and
1990, while more than 182,000 went missing; see Iraq: Continuous and Silent
Ethnic Cleansing – Displaced Persons in Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraqi Refugees in Iran
(Paris: FIDH/International Alliance for Justice, 2003), 7.
30. See Hormizd Rassam, ‘Biblical Nationalities Past and Present’, Transactions of the
Society of Biblical Archaeology, vol. 8 (London: Society of Biblical Archaeology,
1885), 370. Rassam, a native Assyrian (of the Chaldean Church) archaeologist,
mentions that with the exception of some Armenian families in Baghdad and
Diyarbekir, the rest of the Christians of the region of Iraq and the old vilayet
(province) of Mosul are ‘Chaldean Nestorians, Chaldean Catholics, Syrian
Jacobites, and Syrian Catholics’.
31. See J.-M. Fiey, Assyrie Chrétienne, 3 vols (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1963);
George Percy Badger, The Nestorians and Their Rituals, 2 vols (London: Darf,
[1852] 1987).
32. Badger, The Nestorians and Their Rituals, vol. 1, 392.
33. Majed Eshoo, ‘The Fate of Assyrian Villages Annexed to Today’s Dohuk
Governorate in Iraq and the Conditions in These Villages Following the
Establishment of the Iraqi State in 1921’, tr. Mary Challita (2004), Assyrian
General Conference website, http://www.assyriangc.com/magazine/eng1.pdf
(accessed 9 July 2014).
34. Eshoo’s writings have been republished by various Assyrian news agencies and
political groups, including the Assyrian National Assembly (ANA – an Iraqi
Assyrian political group). His writings (and those of the ANA) have singled
out certain persons of rank in the Kurdistan Regional Government for crimes
against local Assyrians, perhaps adding to possible disfavour and the need for the
past and continued use of a pseudonym.
35. See Hannibal Travis, ‘After Regime Change: United States Law and Policy
Regarding Iraqi Refugees, 2003–2008’, Wayne Law Review 55.2, 1009–61.
36. For the use of diacritics in the names of villages, I have tried to remain close to
the local Assyrian and Kurdish pronunciation and Syriac manuscript renditions,
but this has been difficult for the mapping section as the British and French ren-
ditions of Assyrian village names are sometimes grossly inaccurate in comparison
with the native spelling and/or pronunciation.
37. See ‘Perspectives’, Trudy Huskamp Peterson, Certified Archivist, http://
trudypeterson.com/perspectives (accessed 9 July 2014).
38. Concerning these Iraqi documents, it is possible that some may be forgeries, due
to the chaos in Iraq following the 2003 invasion, where much Ba‘th stationery
was stolen. Since it is impossible to detect this with accuracy, I have been as cau-
tious as possible in my approach and mentioned discrepancies where apparent.
39. See http://www.iraqmemory.org/en/index.asp (accessed 9 July 2014). Special
thanks are due to Professor Kanan Makiya for his aid and permission to browse
the IMF documents long before they were removed from the online archive.
The removal of such material from Iraq under intellectual property rights and
its return to Kurdish political parties rather than to the Iraqi National Library
and Archives is another issue which has been addressed by some academics but
requires further unpacking and discussion.
40. Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies, 33.
41. I was unable to obtain high-quality scans of many of the villages and their
cultural sites, but they can be viewed online at sites such as http://www.barwar.
net, a major portal to individual village sites including http://www.assyrian-
dooreh.com (both accessed 9 July 2014).
2
Framing the Assyrian Narrative: Late
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century
It was an ill day for his tribe when he led them to fight in a war for the
liberty of small nations. Now we have to meet death at long last, so let us
prepare to face the enemy whom we know, that we may the more readily
forget the desertion of those whom we once thought to be our friends.1
Yaqo Ismael translating for his father, Malik Ismael,

of Upper Tiyari, 1932
Assyrian Demography: Between Deteriorating Empires

and Colonial Expansion
C ontextualising the Assyrians, starting in the late nineteenth century in

the region of Iraq, begins by distinguishing them socially and geographi-
cally (which sometimes includes dialect and ecclesiastical adherence) into two
major categories. While the two groups had a notion of shared ancestry there
were some distinctions that waxed and waned throughout the centuries.2
The first group comprised those centred in and around the cities of
Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk, Zakho and Dohuk in modern-day Iraq, most of whom
were converted from the Church of the East/Nestorianism (though bas-
tions of Nestorians remained in and around the Barwar and Sapna regions
and elsewhere) or Orthodoxy (referred to predominantly as Jacobite) to
Catholicism primarily via Dominican missions. Many were urban dwellers,
some having lost their native Assyrian-Aramaic language to Arabic and were
thus Arabised. Others who had retained their mother tongue lived in large
semi-rural regions.3
The second category of Assyrians hailed from the region of Hakkâri
in today’s southeastern Turkey and Urmia in northwestern Iran. They fled
frami ng the assyri an na rr a tive | 55
during the Great War into what would become Iraq. They were typically
rural, predominantly of Nestorian ecclesiastical background in Hakkâri
with some Uniate Catholics, while the Urmia Assyrians numbered many
Protestants, Catholics and Russian Orthodox. The Hakkâri segment also
made up the bulk of the Iraqi Levies in the latter years of their institution,
alongside Assyrians of Barwar and Sapna.
In both cases, the Assyrians were native to the region of northern
Mesopotamia, which would later find itself divided by Western political enti-
ties during colonial expansion. Not unlike the scramble for Africa following
the Berlin Conference in 1884, Assyrians, like many native African peoples,
found themselves fragmented by arbitrarily created boundaries that would
become the basis for internal and external components of otherisation.
In many ways, the mid-nineteenth century is a prudent starting point for
this study of the Assyrians and the state as it elucidates the transition period of
the Middle East from Ottoman Empire to nation-states. During this period,
many rural Assyrians living in today’s southeast Turkey had been living for
centuries in close proximity to their Kurdish neighbours in similar tribal and
social formations, and in relative autonomy, free from most state influence.
This relative independence would come to an end with the rise of a promi-
nent and powerful Kurdish chieftain, Bedr Khan Beg. Bedr Khan’s campaigns
were initially directed against Ottoman rule, and in many cases Assyrians
and Kurds fought together to ‘defend their autonomous status’.4 Yet, once
the Ottomans ceased their attacks on Bedr Khan in 1842, he directed his
attention towards the Assyrians – the culmination of an attempt at power
consolidation. During his rise to power, Bedr Khan massacred approximately
10,000 people among the Assyrian tribes of the Bohtan and Hakkâri regions
in one campaign in 1842.5 The Ottomans capitalised on the ambitiousness of
Bedr Khan, and once the independent Assyrian tribes had been subdued, the
Ottomans planned to eliminate the bastion of Kurdish power.6
Modern Roots of Interreligious Animosity7
While Assyrian woes seemed to be felt by co-religionists half a world away,

missionaries seemed less interested in preservation of Assyrians and their
way of life, and more interested in their conversion to the ‘true faith’. Such
evangelising activity especially among the Nestorians and Orthodox of Urmia
(Reza’iyeh, Iran), provided opportunities for conversion and forced moderni-

sation (ripe with a Christian martyr complex) in the guise of humanitarian aid:
In their eagerness to foster a culture of missionary service among Nestorians,

the Americans encouraged their students to identify with a vision of the
future in which Christians who suffered persecution became leading agents
in Christ’s triumph of the world. This vision nurtured expectations of mar-
tyrdom and happened to coincide with the violence that the Nestorians
were actually suffering at the hands of Muslims, partly as a result of mis-
sionary involvement in Nestorian affairs. Missionaries took the massacre of
mountain Nestorians by Kurds in 1843 as an opportunity to foster conver-
sion experiences in the refugees who poured into Urmiyah, and Asahel
Grant wrote positively about the effect of survivors’ sufferings on their
religious lives: ‘A new hope seemed to kindle in their bosoms,’ he wrote
after the massacres, ‘they eagerly drank the encouragement I presented.’8
Many acrimonious divisions within the Assyrian community can be traced to

such missionary aid following the massacres. The assistance of Asahel Grant
further fostered anti-Christian sentiments among the Assyrians’ Muslim
neighbours. It also added to interdenominational intolerance, which, in
the case of Eastern Christianity, certainly needed no supplementary fuel.9
Finally, the American missions had ‘stirred up and created much hostility
between the various tribes, on the one hand, and the maliks and the patriarch,
on the other’, thus dividing the previously independent and reasonably uni-
fied Nestorian Assyrian community as well as, in some cases, contributing to
a general Assyrian culture of apathy.10
George Percy Badger, a nineteenth-century English scholar of the Church
of the East, spent a year during 1842–3 among Nestorian Assyrians, travers-
ing the region more to create opposition to Grant and the Protestants (whom
he loathed) as well as the persistent Catholic enterprise, than as a missionary
priest. The idea of favouritism granted to the Assyrians by virtue of their
Christian religion was not necessarily accurate. Edward Lewes Cutts, who
followed Grant to the region, as part of the Archbishop of Canterbury’s mis-
sion, remarks in his travelogue that while he served in some capacity during a
eucharistic service, he did not fully commune with the celebrants as they and
the church remained anathematised by heresy.11
The Dominican (Catholic) interest and aid for Christians was certainly
focused on the Chaldean sect (including increasing their numbers through
proselytisation) by virtue of it being Catholic, though they, as well as the
Protestants, actively fed off the dying legacy of the Church of the East as it had
no wellspring of restoration or protection. During this post-Bedr Khan period,
the Assyrian Church of the East’s foothold in the plains of Nineveh, in par-
ticular at Rabban Hormizd in Alqosh, was finally shattered by the Dominican
missions, who were converting the bulk of the region to Catholicism propelled
by a desire for a French/Catholic beachhead in the region, aided by a red her-
ring in the guise of benevolence and coupled with the Church of the East’s
poor socio-economic status.12 The coercive conversion to Catholicism of those
Hakkâri Nestorians seeking refuge in the Mosul region in exchange for basic
sustenance, and the lack of support and aid for those Nestorian and Jacobite
Assyrians unwilling to convert, is testament to the beginnings of conflict and
hierarchy within the community based on sectarian divisions.
The Roman Catholic Church was the most authoritative of the three
Western missions vying for supremacy in the region. Its presence served two
purposes: first, to convert the Assyrians by any means, including bribery and
preferential treatment for converts, as seen in the relatively poor treatment of
the local Nestorians and Jacobites;13 and second, the Catholic missionaries
endeavoured to further French imperial interests in the region in order to
offset growing British authority. It is conceivable that the less-than-cordial
reaction of the Patriarch of the Church of the East (Nestorians), Mar Shimun
XVII Abraham, to a bribe and promise to make him head of all Christians of
the East sparked French-led Catholic annoyance:14
Tell your master that I shall never become a Catholic; and should you even
induce my whole people, to the last man, to do so, I would sooner become
a Dervish, or a Koordish Moollah, than degrade myself by an alliance with
the people.15
This patriarchal impudence, coupled with the already ingrained revulsion for
the ‘heresy’ of the Nestorians (and Jacobites), further fuelled the missionar-
ies to actively convert the entire region, or see the end of an ancient heresy.
The French used this opportunity under the guise of the Catholic Church to
increase their control over the region as well, leaving the natives to reap the
problematic consequences of these communal divisions inculcated by various

colonial powers.16
The depth of this French-Catholic connection was formidable. As
early as the 1830s, the three main Christian merchant families of Iraq, the
Rassams, the Halabis and the Sayighs, were tightly bound to French trade in
the region, which multiplied their assets ‘bolstered by their conversion and
sponsorship of Catholicism in Mosul under the Dominicans’.17 Furthermore,
the most prominent among the merchant families adopted Catholicism ‘as
a marker of affluence’, emboldening young Catholic peasants of Mosul’s
plains to unyoke themselves from the Diyarbekir and Alqosh dioceses by
supporting an independent patriarchal see in the city of Mosul itself.18 While
the original reason for conversion may have been personal profit, the socio-
economically based enmity which it produced became ingrained within sec-
tarian divisions in that its influence desired to ‘divert dues paid by Christians
[Assyrians] as taxes to the Nestorian [Assyrian Church of the East] diocese’.19
So the Assyrians found themselves in the midst of a sectarian power struggle
for the Middle East between the French/Dominican Catholics, the English/
Anglicans (Badger, Rev. Wigram, Layard) and the Americans/Presbyterians
(Grant, Cumberland, Shedd). This missionary activity, including conversion
and evangelisation missions in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, though
non-violent, further contributed to increased Muslim persecution as well as
intra-Assyrian social and religious antagonism.20
In the realm of figures, exact population statistics, especially those
of the Ottoman Empire concerning the Assyrians, are difficult to legiti-
mise.21 One reason stems from the fact that large numbers of Assyrians had
lost their native tongue. In the case of Armenian-speaking Assyrians, for
instance (especially in the regions of Harput, Malatiya and Adana), more
than 175,000 were slain and listed as Armenian atrocities during the First
World War.22 This is partly since, in the example of the Jacobite Church
‘they remained attached to the Armenian patriarchate for civil affairs’ under
Ottoman rule.23 According to the 1849 census the population of Mosul
totalled 2,050 Muslim families, 200 Jewish families and 1,100 Christian
families.24 Moreover, ‘Amēdīyāh had more than 2,000 Assyrian Christian
and Jewish families in the 1840s. A decade later, there were barely 300
remaining in those communities combined, due to continued oppression
Table 1 Assyrian population statistics in Van and Hakkâri (includes Bitlis and
Erzeroum but excludes Sa‘irt)25
Source Year Ecclesiastical Assyrian population Total

affiliation population
J. G. Taylor 1869 Nestorians 110,000 1,130,400
(consul of Erzeroum)
Vital Cuinet26 1870 Nestorians 97,000 –
(French geographer) (52,000 semi-
autonomous)
Berlin Project 1878 Nestorians 14,000 1,700,000
Official to Sir Charles 1880 Nestorians 84,995 1,220,038
Dilke
Armenian Patriarch 1880 Nestorians 85,000 758,000
Vice Consul Clayton 1880 Nestorians 53,940 –
Official figures 1880 Nestorians 61,778 1,208,540
(Baker Pasha)
Official figures 1880 Nestorians 29,350 156,692
(males) (males)
by what Badger termed ‘Muhammadan despotism’.27 Demographic esti-

mates of Assyrians vary for numerous reasons including limited accessibility
to their mountain steadings. General numbers for the Assyrians from the
region of Hakkâri who fled into Iraq during the period of the Great War,
as mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, are given in Table 1, specific
tribes are mentioned in Tables 2 and 3. In the case of the Tkhuma tribe,
their numbers had been greatly reduced following the slaughter in the wake
of the rise of Bedr Khan in 1842. Peculiarly, despite this and other Kurdish–
Assyrian intercommunal calamities, there is much evidence of an uneasy yet
functional coexistence at the tribal level.28
But how did the largely rural Hakkâri Assyrians become entwined
with the British authorities and how did this affect their identification both
internally within the larger Assyrian community (including among urban
Chaldeans and Syrian Orthodox/Catholics) and externally, by the British,
Iraqi Arabs, Kurds and others? The majority of the citations of ‘Assyrian’
in British archival documentation refer to those highlanders of Hakkâri in
present-day Turkey who lived as independent tribes prior to the First World
War. The British interest in the martial spirit of the highlanders of Hakkâri
Table 2 Assyrian population statistics of ‘Ashiret (independent) Nestorians in 186929
‘Ashiret Houses Total population

Tiyari 2,500 15,000
Diz 2,400 14,400
Jilu 2,000 12,000
Baz 1,700 10,200
Tkhuma 1,500 9,000
Walto 650 3,900
Other 12,000
Total 76,500
Table 3 Assyrian population statistics of Rayat (subject) Nestorians in 186930
Rayat Houses Total population

Mar Bishu 1,200 7,200
Albaq (Elbek) 720 4,320
Van District 700 4,200
Gawar 600 3,600
Leyone 600 3,600
Mahmoodieh 500 3,000
Norduz 500 3,000
Gawar Pinyānish 300 1,800
Pinyānish 300 1,800
Oromaree 200 1,200
Shemdino 45 370
Deyree 60 360
Doskee 20 120
Kharawatta 7 40
Total 34,610
was methodically beneficial, especially the skills of the independent tribes of

Tiyari, Tkhuma, Jilu, Diz and Baz, leading to their commodification in the
period prior to the First World War:
The Ashiret can furnish 13,000 able-bodied men, all armed with good
muskets . . . The knowledge of their strength, their poverty, and the non-
fulfillment of lavish promises made to them by the Turks subsequent to
Bedr Khan Beg’s massacre of the Nestorians, together with constant skir-
mishes with the Moslem Koords, keep up that martial spirit, unfavourable
to entire submission, inclining them in consequence to warlike rather than

peaceful pursuits.31
The British military would use this intelligence to their advantage in the
near future as they armed these Assyrians, who would also become prob-
lematically referred to as ‘British protégés’ in the Middle East, due to their
Christian religious affiliation. By the turn of the century those Assyrians of
the regions of Urmia and Hakkâri, not counting the Tigris region, amounted
to more than 450 villages and between 18,000 and 20,000 families, totalling
126,000–140,000 people in 1902–3.32 Hannibal Travis, Associate Professor
of Law at Florida International University, estimates that using the Armenian
patriarchal assumption of a 25 per cent population growth ever 20 years, this
was but part of a much larger population of 600,000–800,000 that would
fluctuate dramatically.33 The data suggests that at the onset of war there were
an estimated 80,000 Assyrians in the Tigris valley from Mosul to the villages
of the Bohtan region, 35,000 in seventy villages in Urmia and Salamas, and
100,000 in Hakkâri.34
The First World War
In most cases, the First World War was the epitome of violence in an age
of nationalist and colonial fervour.35 It embodied the final efforts of dying
empires to retain some semblance of power in the midst of the failing the
old world order and the rise of the new nation-state, which would forever
change the political power structure. Late 1914 saw an initial build-up of
Turkish military forces in Assyrian regions of the sanjak of Hakkari. Between
Turkey’s entrance into the First World War in November and March 1915,
both Russian and Turkish leaders courted the Assyrians. A prolonged battle
at Sarikamish, which lasted from 22 December 1914 until 17 January 1915,
featured a number of major mêlées. Elsewhere the Wali of Julamerk, fear-
ful that the Assyrians might side with the Russians, preemptively struck at
them in the region of Albaq.36 This required the Assyrians to become mobile.
January saw a major engagement as Enver Pasha brought two corps to cut the
Russian lines south of Kars in northwest Turkey, eventually capturing the
city as well as Sarikamish and the majority of the railway. The Russians would
pull back to Djoulfa as the Assyrians and Armenians under commander
Raphael Khan protected the besieged villages of the plains while an evacua-
tion of inhabitants began in earnest.37
By March 1915, more than 100 Assyrian villages were destroyed while
12,000 refugees fled to the Caucasus and more than 27,000 men, women
and children were butchered in the Urmia region alone. In the village of
Ada, some 300 Assyrians were locked inside a church and burned alive.38
Meanwhile, in an act of extermination in Gulpashan, the last of the villages
to be destroyed by March 1915, Kurdish forces urged on by Ottoman prom-
ises massacred the entire male population of the village and carried away its
young women.39 Later that spring Turkish authorities arrested Hormuzd,
a brother of Patriarch Mar Benyamin Shimun who had been living and
studying in Istanbul, and moved him to Mosul as ransom until the patri-
arch had declared war against Russia.40 The mountaineer Eastern Assyrians41
were forced into the fray after these attacks and the slow surrounding of
their Hakkâri homes by Kurdish Ottoman troops. They moved from their
homes to higher elevations in the fastness of the mountains. As the siege
wore on, food became scarce, most surviving on the fruit of the mulberry
tree alone. This continued through August. Realising the gravity of the situ-
ation, in mid-July Mar Shimun called a war council where he and the tribal
chieftains decided to approach the Russians for support in escaping the cur-
rent siege and slow wasting of their people. Promises of support furthered
the Assyrians’ desire to connect with Allied forces; they hoped the Allies
would plead with the Russians for assistance. As their trek continued, in late
September of 1915, the men of Tkhuma who remained defended their land
with homemade ammunition and fought for two days (27–28 September)
until their villages of Gundiktha and Mazra among others were destroyed.42
A day later bands of Kurds looking for the Patriarch, who had been in Tal
overseeing the burial of his brother Eshaya, killed upwards of 500 and took
captive around 200 women and children along with livestock and household
goods.43
In October 1915 a contingent of the Hakkâri tribes finally made the long
trek to Russian-controlled Persia just west of Lake Urmia, which already held
a bastion of their lowland brethren.44 There they formed battalions to stem
the Ottoman Turkish and Kurdish advance, which had begun its plundering
across Assyrian lands. In 1916, acting on governmental authority, companies
of Turks and Kurds massacred villages in the Bohtan region where those
women who were not killed ended their own lives rather than suffer the
alternative of being carried off into captivity.45
Autumn 1917 was a time of great transformation in the war. In Russia
the Bolshevik revolution had arisen, causing chaos on the battlefront for
soldiers deciding to whom allegiance was owed. Northwest Persia, and the
region of Urmia in particular, originally under heavy Russian influence,
paid a particularly high price. Anarchy governed the day as the Bolsheviks
ordered the return of Russian troops in the Caucasus front in November. The
American missionaries hinted at incidents of Muslim-on-Christian violence
as retribution for acts committed by the failing Russian forces. Ironically, the
Russian trade of weapons and ammunition to local Kurds and Persians would
become problematic for the already tenuous relationship with Assyrians and
other Christians.46
As the Russians withdrew from the battlefront, the Allies approached
the Assyrians for aid in holding the eastern front alongside Georgian and
Armenian companies. The retreating Russians had left some machine guns,
as well as ammunition which was supplemented by 20,000 French Lebel
rifles and dispersed throughout the troops commanded by General Petros
Elia of Baz on one flank, and Malik Khoshaba of Lower Tiyari on the
other.47 According to eyewitness Mary Shedd, on 22 February 1918 the
Persians attacked the Christian part of Urmia. In her letters, she recognised
the military tactics of Malik Khoshaba, recently converted to American
Protestantism, and Petros Elia that were able to drive the Persians back till
the Assyrians controlled the greater part of the city.48 Until March 1918
and the Brest-Litovsk Treaty that ended Russian participation in the war,
the Assyrian militia with 25,000 soldiers was able to hold the Urmia region
in six major engagements against legions made up of German, Kurdish and
Turkish troops.49 On the third day of that formative month, along with 150
men acting as vanguard, Mar Benyamin Shimun was assassinated in Salamas
by Agha Simko Ismail Shikak under a flag of parley as he turned to leave in
his carriage.50
In April, a Turkish force began advancing against the Assyrian positions
in the east. Assyrian troops were able to turn the Turks back at Ushnu,
creating a seemingly striking victory. They were not able to celebrate for
long as their brethren, some 4,000 strong who had settled at Khoy, 50 kil-
ometres north of Salamas, were unexpectedly attacked and massacred by
Simko Ismail and his men, who had escaped Assyrian retribution.51 By July
1918, the Ottoman advance into Assyrian territory instigated the major
flight. American Protestant missionaries William Ambrose Shedd and Mary
Lewis Shedd, then proselytising among the Assyrians, observed a variety of
calamities and heroism during their time in residence. Such events were
consistent throughout the run of the war. Relentless combat, killing, death,
forced expulsion, and loss of home and hearth exemplified the period. The
Assyrians of Urmia refer to this time as Raqa raqa or more simply ‘the Flight’
or ‘the Escape’ as a mass exodus of 30,000 men, women and children from
among themselves and their Hakkâri brethren traversed the region, travelling
more than 600 kilometres to Baqubah, a refugee camp 30 miles northeast of
Baghdad.52 Records count almost a third dying along the way, some of expo-
sure, others murdered by bandits on the road. Most men were killed outright.
Younger women were carried off as brides if they were lucky, raped and left
for dead if not, while the elderly were killed and burned to extract gold they
had allegedly swallowed. Those with child were slaughtered in a manner that
pushed the boundaries of savagery as the unborn were cut from mother’s
wombs, killing both mother and child.53 Those who were lucky enough to
make it to the camp were fatigued and destitute.
Early in its history, Brigadier General H. H. Austin became the com-
mandant of the camp, one of the few places of refuge. In his memoirs Austin
relates numerous observations of the framework, activities and personnel
of Baqubah. Those musings indicate that there were few Catholics in the
camp, which was reflective of a larger community issue. Austin offers an
anecdote about the intra-community obstacles faced by those Assyrians who
had fought in the war, and those who had remained neutral. He observes that
when the British took control of the region, those of Chaldean ecclesiastical
bearing tried to take credit for the opposition of their brethren against the
Turks and Kurds. Anecdotally he refers to an Assyrian mountaineer who had
made the trek from Urmia to Mosul in stealth (telling the tale of his travels to
Austin months later) receiving poor treatment at the hands of the Chaldeans
(Catholics) he encountered ‘though they were of his own race and blood’.54
Such tension became more palpable in later years as identity fragmentation
was added to geographical and ecclesiastical divisions amidst overt and subtle
policies of assimilation. This was coupled with geopolitics and became even
more evident as the Assyrians were courted yet again by the French.55
Besides the tribal chieftains and religious hierarchy, the Assyrians had
numerous individuals who wielded power within the community as well as
without. One charismatic leader, Malik Kambar Warda of Jilu, appeared in
1918 with a new plan as an alternative to the British plan for the Assyrians.
Kambar was a Catholic (Chaldean) to whom France had promised the estab-
lishment of a self-ruling protectorate in the Syrian Jazira region. France com-
menced communications with Kambar through the Chaldean Church, the
normal conduit between Rome and France and the Assyrians.56 After the
flight of refugees from Urmia to Georgia and Armenia in January 1918,
Kambar had settled in Georgia with 170 people from his tribe. Here, he com-
menced relations with Georgian officials as the spokesman for the refugees. In
Tbilisi 7,000 Assyrian refugees also met Dr Fraidon (Aturaya) Bet-Avraham,
a philosopher and theorist behind modern Assyrianism, who at that time was
a physician in the Russian army.57
It is not clear exactly when, but at the behest of local leaders, Kambar
and his family travelled to Istanbul early in 1920 and there met Fr Paul
Barro and Mgr Petros Ubaid of the Chaldean Church. Later, General Henri
Joseph Eugène Gouraud of the French Fourth Army invited Malik Kambar
to Beirut, where he arrived on 7 July 1920. At that time Gouraud divulged to
Kambar that France had decided to allot Djeziret Ben Omar, Urfa (Edessa)
and Mardin to the Assyrians if he were to return to the Caucasus and raise
a militia.58 The French and Assyrian leaders, especially those Chaldean-rite
individuals like Petros Elia, had begun talks that would entice the Assyrians
to the northwest and Syria, away from British influence. This became a tangi-
ble fear for British authorities. In some cases the French movement in Mosul
itself was done under the guise of Dominican camaraderie, all of which was
an attempt to further draw the Assyrians into a military role to be used at
France’s behest.59
The concerns of the British were valid as the Assyrians both courted and
were courted by the French. Kambar had a significant military in the jazirah
and the British feared mounting French influence over the battle-hardened
Assyrians.
Figure 8 General Petros Elia’s map of Assyrian territory from confidential letter
No. 2990 to Sir Percy Cox, High Commissioner, Mesopotamia, 28 December 1920,
FO 839/23
From Versailles 1919 to Lausanne 192360
In the diplomatic arena, conceivably emboldened by the principles set forth

in Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points of 1918, especially those concerning
the rights to self-determination and autonomy, delegations were formed.
Crossing ecclesiastical lines the Transcaucasian delegation included Shlimon
Ganja, Lazar George, Abraham Yohannan PhD61 and Lazar Yacoboff of Iran.62
From the United States, Captain Dr Abraham K. Yoosuf, of Worcester,
Massachusetts (Jacobite) and Rev. Joel Werda, president of the Assyrian
Associations of America (Protestant) represented the Assyrians of America
alongside Bishop Severius Afram Barsoum, of the Assyrian Apostolic Church
of Antioch (Jacobite).63
Abraham K. Yoosuf (1866–1924), an army paramedic, was born in
Harput (Kharput), Elazig, in 1866. He graduated from Central Turkey
College in Aintab in 1886.64 In 1889, Yoosuf moved to the United States and
in 1895 graduated from Baltimore Medical College. He founded the Assyrian
Benevolent Association in 1897. As a response to what he felt was continu-
ous persecution against Christians in the Ottoman state, Yoosuf published
The Religion of Muhammad and Christian Sufferings, wherein he spoke on the
religious reasons for intolerance in the East and specifically on the Armenian
question in Turkey.65 He then conducted postgraduate work in London and
Vienna in 1912 before returning to Turkey at the onset of the Balkan Wars,
where he volunteered as a surgeon for the Red Crescent Society and was deco-
rated for his medical prowess by Sultan Abdel Hamid.66 Yoosuf returned to
the United States and soon offered his medical services again during the First
World War among the American forces, where he attained the rank of major.
He eventually settled in Worcester, Massachusetts. Following the war and
the massacres committed against the Assyrians, Yoosuf, along with his friend
Joel (Yoel) Werda, attended the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Speaking on
Turkish reforms and the division of the Ottoman Empire, Yoosuf remarked,
‘Reforms under the Turkish rule must be dismissed as hopeless. The history
for the past hundred years has been a history of reform written in the blood
of Assyrians.’67 After what he and fellow Assyrians felt was a conference on
unfulfilled promises, he returned to the United States. Yoosuf published vari-
ous academic articles in the field of medicine and wrote prolifically for various
Assyrian publications, including the Assyrian Progress and the New Assyria,
both published in the United States.68
Yoosuf was one of many Jacobite Assyrians to attend and support the
delegation to the conference. Perhaps the best-known advocate of this
delegation was Bishop Severius Afram Barsoum (1887–1957), born in

Mosul. He was instrumental in requesting for an Assyrian homeland.69 The
written manifesto of the desires of some attendees was later formulated as
The Claims of the Assyrians as Presented to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919,
which defined the Assyrian people as including Nestorians, Chaldeans,
Jacobites, a Maronite element, Persian Assyrians, Assyrians in Russia, and a
Muslim Assyrian group that included Shakkaks70 and Yezidis.71 The Assyro-
Chaldean delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 provided the
following figures including a total worldwide population (excluding India)
of 1,015,000 (see Table 4):72
The massacres of Assyrians and others in the waning Ottoman Empire
and Persia during the First World War, which saw the deaths of possibly
two-thirds of the entire Assyrian population,73 were the inaugural enterprise
of the Kemalist nation-building project.74 Though the Assyrians were not
completely eradicated, the data suggests at least one-third perished during
the massacres while forced expulsion caused a major demographic shift that
would frame Assyrian relations with what would become the new state of Iraq.
Furthermore the assumption of the delegations to the conference in 1919
that their Allied leanings would grant them a hearing met with impediments.
Table 4 Assyrian population figures of the Middle East presented to the Paris Peace
Conference 1919
Region Number of Assyro-Chaldeans

Hakkâri 165,000
Diyarbekir 117,000
Mosul 122,000
Urmia and Salamas 78,000
Sa‘irt (Seert) 61,000
Urfa and Aleppo 16,000
Deyr-Zor 4,000
Total 563,000
The Assyrian delegation from Iraq under Lady Surma d’Mar Shimun, sister
of the late Benyamin Shimun, the Church of the East patriarch assassinated
by Agha Ismail Simko, and aunt to the then current Patriarch Eshai, was
met in London by British officials but prevented from journeying to Paris
and petitioning its case.75 S. Antoine Namik, R. Louis Nedjib, and Dr Jean
Zebouni also attended and were greeted as part of the Assyro-Chaldean
representation.76
As the Treaty of Versailles never settled the issue of the Ottoman Empire
for the Allies, two other conferences including negotiations and treaties
occurred. Eventually signed on 10 August 1920 following negotiations that
began in April, the Treaty of Sèvres became the newly formulated peace
treaty between the Ottomans and the Allied forces. In a letter to the con-
ference Bishop Barsoum on April 1920 furthered the Assyrian desire for a
homeland by introducing himself thus:
Nous avons l’honneur d’exposer à la Conférence de la Paix que S.B. notre

Patriarche nous a chargé de venir lui porter l’écho des malheurs et des voeux
de notre nation syrienne, ancienne descendante de la race assyrienne, qui
reside en general en Mésopotamie et en Arménie. [We have the honour
to bring before the Peace Conference information entrusted to us by His
Beatitude our patriarch, information concerning the sufferings and the
wishes of our Syrian nation, descendants of the ancient Assyrian race, who
chiefly reside in Mesopotamia and Armenia.]77
Despite pleading and attempts at inclusion, Assyrian voices were largely

ignored. Article 62 of the treaty stated, ‘The scheme shall contain full safe-
guards for the protection of the Assyro-Chaldeans and other racial or religious
minorities within these areas . . .’78 For the Assyrian representatives, this was
both too general as well as inherently problematic as it and they were con-
fined under the larger section on Kurdistan. Ultimately, the Treaty of Sèvres
failed as the relationship between Sultan Mehmed VI in Constantinople
and Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and the nationalists of Anadolu ve Rumeli
Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti was completely sundered by the creation of the
Grand National Assembly (GNA) in Ankara at the end of April 1920. The
Kemalists were outraged at Sèvres and due to their overwhelming popularity,
effectively made the treaty null and void.
Battles waged across Turkey for the next two years. In November 1922
another chance for restitutions came through the Treaty of Lausanne, but
again the Assyrians were not allowed a seat at the talks. The pact was finally
signed 24 July 1923 by İsmet İnönü of the GNA, in effect eliminating the
power of the sultanate. Despite a lack of Assyrian participation, General
Petros Elia began lobbying the Turkish government in earnest for the right of
the mountaineer Assyrians to return to their indigenous lands in the Hakkâri
region.79 This was seen as a whimsical fancy and dismissed by the new govern-
ment initially. But individuals and organisations continued their petitioning
efforts. In most cases, the Assyrians took what jobs they were allotted, and
in many cases such positions further commodified their soldiering prowess.
While France unofficially held much of modern Syria and Lebanon (from
the San Remo conference in 1920) and Britain much of modern Iraq, French-
mandate Syria was not considered internationally ratified until 29 September
1923. Soon thereafter, France dissolved Malik Kambar Warda’s Assyro-
Chaldean battalion and amalgamated it with the French Foreign Legion.
When this occurred, Kambar moved to Lebanon to join the more diplomatic
efforts of Yusuf Malek and others including Petros Elia, now abroad in France.
The Period of the Iraqi Levies and the Assyrian Settlement80
If a sword had memory, it might be grateful to the forge fire, but never
fond of it.
Robert Jordan, Winter’s Heart
Administratively, the new Iraq was divided into liwas or provinces, formerly
vilayets under the Ottomans. Liwas were divided into aqd.iyah (singular
qadaa) or districts and further into nawāh.ī (singular nāh.iyah) or sub-districts.
The chief administrative official of a liwa is a mutasarrif, of a qadaa a qaim-
aqam and of a nāh.iyah a mudir. While the British governed the region with a
local (predominantly Sunni Arab) leadership, it became apparent something
supplementary would be needed.
Following the First World War, most of the highlanders of Hakkâri
were forced out of their homes and established themselves among their kin
across the newly created border. Whether of their own volition or not, these
dispossessed Assyrians were a vital component in protecting British interests
including the territorial integrity of both Turkey and Iraq, especially after the
extension of the Soviet rule over Caucasia in 1921. While many saw them as
but chess pieces to be utilised, several governmental officials felt compelled
to honour previous promises. Since there was no political boon in aiding this
numerical minority, it remains probable that dissidents among the British
officers speaking out against the poor treatment of the Assyrians were fulfill-
ing an unheeded sense of military honour and loyalty:
The Assyrians deserve well of us. They have had less than justice at our
hands. They can expect it from no other Government, and care for their
interests is, in my humble view, one of our major obligations in Iraq.81
Whether or not the British were sympathetic to the Assyrians at an individual

level was superseded by larger political and military expediency. The former
desire to create both a Kurdistan and an Assyria in the region was discussed
by both the British Foreign Office and A. T. Wilson, the acting British civil
commissioner in Iraq, from 1918 to 1920.82 The imperial historian Arnold
Toynbee, a participant in British colonial decision-making, proposed another
autonomous enclave for the Assyrians of Tur Abdin (inaccurately referred
to as Jebel Tur in archival sources) within the Mosul vilayet, to effectively
make two regions.83 Neither of these aspirations came to fruition. When
another problem presented itself, it became apparent that perhaps both could
be satisfied with one solution. Realising that they required a local security
force in the region of Iraq, the British adopted the same strategy they main-
tained in India. A militia was recruited from among the local population and
subjected to training and deployment under a British officer, centring on
military execution and loyalty.84 This ensured the protection of His Majesty’s
interests, including oil reserves and airbases, in the newly established Iraq
while lessening expenses.85
In 1915 Major John Inglis Eadie of the Indian Army ‘recruited forty
Mounted Arabs from the tribes round Nasiriyah, on the Euphrates, for duty
under the Intelligence Department’.86 After various name changes, this growing
force became known as the Iraqi Levies. Originally consisting solely of Arabs
during recruitment in 1915, the levies are sometimes thought of as a colonial
police force for British authority.87 By 1919 a large number of Kurds had been
added to the fighting forces, leading to their official renaming on 12 August
as the Arab and Kurdish Levies.88 Only after small Assyrian battalions had
fought the Barwari, Goyan and Guli Kurdish tribes in ‘Amēdīyāh on 8 August
1919 and shown fighting prowess did they catch the attention of the British.89
Major recruitment of Assyrians began during this time.
Over the years, the Assyrians found themselves skirmishing with their
neighbours with various intentions. September 1919 saw them successfully
defend the Assyrian repatriation camp at Mindan, 30 miles northeast of
Mosul, against Kurdish forces. As a counterstroke, they effectively contained
the rebellious activities of Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji in 1919, who proclaimed
himself king of an independent Kurdish state, and later in July 1920, when
Arab forces attacked the Baqubah refugee camp, the Assyrian forces led a suc-
cessful defence and counterattack, though vastly outnumbered.90
Though some repatriation of Assyrians had commenced to an area north
of Rowanduz, by 11 June 1920 there were a reported 26,000 Assyrians
and 14,000 Armenians in the Baqubah refugee camp.91 The refugees faced
threats from Arab attacks in the midst of region-wide uprisings as mentioned
above. Five months later, a report stated that the Assyrians had been moved
and concentrated in Mosul despite the uneasiness surrounding the revolts.
Intriguingly it is at this very same time that the French took an interest in
the Assyrians and their predicament.92 In 1921, while the new Iraqi army
was being created, Arabs were advised to transfer from the levies to the newly
fashioned armed forces. It was clear that this was an opportune moment to
recruit the services of the Assyrians to assist in the majority of levy duties.93
Sensing that the Assyrians would not be well received in the new Iraqi army
nor in Iraq itself, the British presented recruitment as a way for them to retain
their martial spirit, further otherising them from the newly created Iraqi
polity. Other Iraqi communities including the Sunni intelligentsia fostered
and promoted rumours that the British harboured co-religionist sympathies
for the Assyrians, which began to filter down through the general population,
widening the gap between Assyrians and other communities of Iraq.94
The initial British recruitment began at the Mindan camp. ‘All they
wanted was that the British should send them back to their country [Hakkâri],
which they had lost through joining the Allies.’95 After constant urging by the
British officers and Rev. W. A. Wigram, whom these Assyrians had held in
high esteem, some fifty men conceded and were unceremoniously guided
into the British ranks. Though initially relenting, these fifty men attempted
once again to withdraw but were blocked. Two leading British officers took
the new troops and some of their family members in two groups, the first
heading towards Nabi Yunis and the second towards ‘Aqra. Among those first
levy officers were Rab-Khamshi Yusuf Yokhana I,96 and later Daniel Ismael,
the son of Malik Ismael, leader of the Assyrians of Upper Tiyari.97 This
distancing from their cultural and communal relations invigorated a sense of
cultural survival among the resettled Assyrians, a sense embedded in folklore
and ancient cultural characteristics that had been preserved for centuries in
their mountainous enclaves.
The Assyrians’ role in the levy consisted of spearheading attacks, defend-
ing military camps and, in some cases, suppressing rebellions and uprisings.98
This followed a more recent failed coup by the Iraqi army under General
Abdul-Jabar Barzinji (later friend to Mustafa Barzani). Yet although the
Assyrians, like the Kurds, Arabs and Turkomans, worked with the British
to secure the newly formed Iraqi state, and in many cases were instrumental
in suppressing various sectarian revolts and movements, they were singled
out in the following years for the brunt of anti-British and anti-Western
sentiment.99
Conflicting ideologies
Any partiality shown to the Assyrians by the British would be calculable or

measurable in various capacities. A detailed look at the new education system
by Stephen Hemsley Longrigg (1893–1979), British officer and petroleum
company executive, relates that by the end of 1919, seventy-five primary
schools had been opened throughout Iraq. Fifty-six employed Arabic as the
primary language, eleven Turkish, seven Kurdish and one Persian.100 In refer-
ence to those private institutions, Longrigg states only that the Jewish and
Christian schools, as well as foreign mission schools, were ‘fostered by sup-
port and subsidy’.101 Additionally any independence such schools enjoyed was
quelled quickly. For example, those religious schools in and around Mosul
divided by ecclesiastical sect (Chaldean, Syrian Orthodox, Syrian Catholic)
were taken over by the Ministry of Education in 1920, allegedly with the
consent of the religious heads. The language of instruction became (if it was
not already) Arabic, and there was no doubt that under the newly minted
system, devised by the noted Arab nationalist Sāt.i‘ al-H.us.rī, the indoctrina-
tion of an Arab ideology was gradually and deliberately formalised in the
education system.102
The same can be said of printing presses in Baghdad, Basra, Najaf,
Sulaymaniyah, Mosul and Kirkuk during the same period.103 Neither the
language of the Assyrians nor they themselves were represented. The modus
operandi of both of these social and educational institutions by the British
further ostracised the Assyrians from the general Iraqi populace, hinder-
ing their integration into Iraq’s cultural mosaic. Those familiar with Arabic
became influenced and later assimilated by the Iraqi political machine
through the printing press and by the late 1930s through radio, while some
(mostly Hakkâri Assyrians) were labelled at times as a tiny foreign Christian
community distinct from their brethren across the border.
Concurrently alongside Arab nationalism, the early 1920s saw the devel-
opment and propagation of nationalist ideas and tendencies among the
Assyrians and Kurds, albeit still in a fledgling phase, with far less promotional
power than al-H.us.rī.104 Initially, the Assyrian nationalist network consisted of
transnational and non-sectarian elites living in a variety of countries. In some
cases those persons worked in conjunction with each other, in other cases
they worked contrary to one another.105 In the midst of broken promises, the
desire for an Assyrian homeland created what may be called a more fervent
pan-Assyrian nationalist sentiment. As early as April 1917, poet and writer
Dr Fraidon (Aturaya) Bet-Avraham (1891–1926) had completed the inte-
grally Marxist yet nationalist Urmia Manifesto, calling for a united free Assyria
from Tur Abdin and Nisibis to Hakkâri, Mosul and Urmia with economic
and military ties to Russia.106 Alongside Benyamin Arsanis, Baba Bet Parhad
and others, Bet-Avraham created the Assyrian Socialist Party the same year.107
Beginning with Soviet expansion into Central Asia and the Caucasus in
1921, Western powers embarked upon a policy of supporting highly cen-
tralised nationalist and militarist regimes in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey.
Likewise, in the midst of competing ideologies, communism found fertile
ground within various Middle Eastern minority communities. This great
game would shape the fate of the Assyrians and others who would become
pawns in a Cold War battlefield. Yet the Assyrians were not without some
influence, though perhaps at an individual level, notably with the birth of
Pyotr (Petros) Vasili. Vasili, raised and educated in Tbilisi, Georgia, was
the child of an Assyrian immigrant from the ‘Amēdīyāh region in Iraq, and
strongly influenced by the labour movements of the new twentieth century.
In the early 1920s he immigrated back from Tbilisi to his father’s home-
land, where while living and working as a tailor he began to build a strong
ideological following throughout the country. Celebrated for ‘teaching his
competitors more modern methods of tailoring’, in reality he was laying the
foundation for the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP).108 From its establishment
in 1934 (having conceivably gained impetus from the massacre at Simele the
previous year) until the 1970s, the ICP played a fundamental role in shaping
the political landscape of Iraq.
On the educational flank, the refugees, who in the minds of Arab
nationalist intellectuals and British alike were perceived as ‘alien,’ integrated
and contributed to a territory on the verge of change. Notwithstanding the
nationalisation of schools begun in 1920, an Assyrian school (Madrashtā
Ātūraytā) and printing press were founded in Mosul in 1921 and overseen by
Qasha Joseph (Yosip) de Kelaita until 1945. By 1922 there were around 130
students enrolled in the coeducational facility, which required pupils to study
Assyrian, Arabic and English as well as mathematics, history, science, religion
and music, with scouting added by 1923. An attempt at secularisation of the
school was made by some prominent teachers including Benyamin Arsanis,
but was ultimately rebuffed by church officials.109
General Settlement Plans
Prior to the creation of the modern Middle East, the Iraq, Syria and Turkey
of contemporary maps were still part of an Ottoman empire with ever-shift-
ing borders. Many communities including Armenians, Assyrians, Kurds and
Yezidis had lived in this region for centuries, travelling frequently within it
with little governmental interference. The later division of the region into
modern states served to alienate largely homogeneous populations from each
other at the stroke of a pen. Thus, the Assyrians became divided between
four modern nation-states, which, from their perspective, certainly reflected
artificial demarcations. These new borders created a greater sense of territo-
rial nationalism and territorial fear. Iraqi fears of a possible threat posed by
the still-armed and well-trained alien Assyrians provided the blueprint for
plans to urbanise them. These plans were optimal in both pacifying and later
Arabising the Assyrian community in Iraq. Assyrians resisting Arabisation
and assimilationist policies were continually alienated as foreigners: part of
that alien element from beyond Iraq, and ill suited to integration therein.
Despite this, many attempts were made with colonial assistance to settle
certain segments of their population in Iraq.
The settlement of the Urmia and Hakkâri Assyrian refugees in Iraq is
best divided into three major periods: 1920–5, 1925–32 and 1932–3.110 The
Assyrians little desired to leave the fastness of their mountain homes and be
integrated into larger nation-states as they feared repercussions from their
Muslim neighbours, a fear attributed by many to a sense of co-religionist
sympathy afforded them by the British. Initially, the British had discussed
the idea of allocating part of the Hakkâri range to Iraq, which would allow
the Assyrians to be settled in their former homes as a homogeneous group
with autonomy, and some Assyrians attempted unsuccessfully to return to
this former territory in 1922–3. The League of Nations would also fail them
in this instance, negotiating a return to Turkey while seemingly oblivious of
their expulsion that very same year.111
Despite their military aid, having successfully repelled the Turkish inva-
sion of Mosul, the reality remained that the possible settlement of Assyrians
was objectionable to local Mosulis. In a telegram of May 1923, h andwritten
in English and entitled ‘Petition to King, Prime Minister and Rashid Beg’,
147 notables of Mosul requested the removal of the Assyrians of Tiyari living
in the Mosul region. The notables made it clear that if the Crown were
unwilling or unable to commit to action, then they should be notified so that
they might take matters into their own hands.112 Their action was partially
motivated by the rise of pan-Arabism influenced by Sāt.i‘ al-H.us.rī as it had
been his focus as director of education in Iraq, and would in turn influence
an entire generation.113
Ultimately the Iraqi government agreed to a settlement plan on 30 April
1924 which was explained in detail at the Constantinople Conference, held on
19 May. Sir Percy Cox, high commissioner of Iraq, stated:
His Majesty’s Government has decided to endeavour to secure a good

treaty frontier, which will at the same time admit of the establishment
of the Assyrians in a compact community within the limits of the ter-

ritory in respect of which His Majesty’s Government holds a Mandate
under the authority of the League of Nations, if not in every case in their
ancestral habitation, at all events in suitable adjacent districts. This policy
for the settlement of the Assyrians has the full sympathy and support of
the Iraqi Government, which is prepared for its part, to give the necessary
co-operation for giving effect thereto.114
While it appeared at first that the British had found a place for the Assyrians
in the new Iraq, the conference agreement never came to fruition as Turkey
evicted the Assyrians from their homes in Hakkâri in the autumn of 1924.
Having no alternative, some retained the hope that the British would find
them a place in Iraq, which they did as part of the Iraqi Levies, thus retaining
a sense of obligation to aid in the settlement of these former Hakkâri moun-
taineers in Iraq. During the settlement process some British representatives
attempted without success to persuade Iraqi officials to integrate the Assyrians
into the workforce, especially the tribal chiefs or maliks. ‘It was unfortunate
that red tape, suspicion, and a general dislike of Assyrians stood in the way, as
nothing could have been more successful in inducing the Assyrians to accept
their lot.’115 Thus, for a time, the Assyrians were left in a precarious position,
surrounded by competitors and countries seemingly unconcerned of their
welfare, especially as it produced little political or economic benefit. The
Assyrians became an encumbrance – a burden easier set aside or disposed of,
leaving them at the mercy of geopolitical manoeuvrings and schemes.
Foreshadowing ten years into the future and the continued disillusion-
ment concerning lack of rights in 1933, it was evident that some Assyrians
such as Malik Ismael of Upper Tiyari would not be amiable to the settlement
arrangements.116 It was obvious even then that Ismael and his son Yaqo along
with the bulk of those under their care wanted to emigrate long before the
infamous border crossing of 4 August 1933. Why ten years, a battle and a
massacre needed to ensue for the authorities to take note can be chalked up
to blatant negligence or conspiratorial designs.
In the years following the Great War, the numbers of Assyrians had
halved once again.117 Having no recourse as they found themselves strangers
and unwanted in the Mosul region, the second settlement schema, 1925–32,
saw a number of Hakkâri tribesmen attempt to resettle in the Hakkâri region

only to be repelled by the Turkish forces during the beginning of what was
termed the Z Plan.
The Z Plan, implemented by the Iraqi authorities with direction from the
British, was used to spread the Hakkâri Assyrians throughout northern Iraq.
Following the failure of the reparations scheme developed by Assyrian com-
mander Petros Elia and the British, 7,450 Assyrians were settled in the regions
of Dohuk, Zakho, and ‘Aqra between 1924 and 1928.118 As Sir Francis
Humphrys, the British high commissioner in Baghdad, stated, ‘The Assyrians
provide an excellent buffer vis-à-vis the Kurds’ for the Iraqi state.119 That was
indeed the only recorded motive the Iraqi government voiced for keeping the
Hakkâri Assyrians in Iraq proper. As the regions considered hospitable were
promoted, many succumbed to infectious diseases such as malaria, which ran
rampant through the settlements. These settlements, resembling ramshackle
refugee camps, became so disease ridden and famished that at times the
death toll was estimated at above 95 percent in particular areas.120 Because
of the poor conditions of their settlement, many desired to return to their
Hakkâri villages. Meanwhile, the Turkish consul general in Baghdad stated
on 25 June 1928, ‘The Turkish amnesty law did not cover the Assyrians, who
would not be permitted in any circumstances to enter Turkey; and . . . any
Assyrian who attempted to enter Turkey would be punished.’121 Thus, the
Hakkâri contingent had no way home and began to suffer from the condition
of dispossession.
Finally, the third period, 1932–3, saw a settlement attempt based on a
League of Nations resolution. No plan came to culmination, leaving them
targets once again. Despite their military role in the First World War (at least
that of the independent Hakkâri tribes), the events of the conflict would crip-
ple this people for decades to follow. The Western romanticisation of their
downfall was expressed by the historian D. K. Fieldhouse as an unfortunate
yet otherwise acceptable event:
Such was the beginning of the end of an ancient, brave, and warlike race of
mountaineers. They lingered for another twelve to fifteen years and more
will be heard of them later; but the fact [that] they had joined the victori-
ous Allies and lost everything as a result was the primary cause of all their
subsequent troubles, and historians will no doubt have great difficulty in

excusing the Allies – particularly the British – for the way this small and
gallant nation was let down.122
Despite external politics, the Assyrians were not without their own internal
issues, and not unaware of their own shortcomings, as this song demonstrates:
Khā millat surtā d-Suryāyé, A small nation of Assyrians,

Pīsh-lā zlīmtā b-Yūropnāyé. Persecuted by Europeans.
Jwanqoh pīshé akh gīwāyé, Her youths have become as
beggars,
‘Aynéh ‘al zūzé d-Inglisnāyé. Their eyes fixed upon English
money
Gūrānan pīshé ‘uldīyé, Our leaders were fooled,
Zubné millattan b-rūpīyé. They sold our nation for pennies
(rupees).
Kul khā ․tawūyā bar qnayteh, Everyone seeking after his own
welfare,
d-Garwis-leh shimmā d-bayteh. To further his family name.
Rābā shinné min qamaytā, Many years ago,
Ātūr ki-khakmā-wā kullāh brītā. Assyria ruled the entire world.
Zhāré ‘allo, The poor thing,
Hadiyā b-kirrī dwīqtā baytā. Now she rents a home.
Kmā d-līt-lan khubbā As long as we lack love and

w-khūyādā, unity,
Gāw dāh ahwal b-hāwakh We will continue to burn in this
qyādā. situation.
Har akh d-hāw nāshā sayyadā Just like the fisherman
d-Dāré gardūh w-līt-lā paydā.123 Who casts his net to no avail!
They grieved their leaders’ decision to place hope in European powers and many
became resigned to their fate, not unaware of their own naïveté. This, coupled
with distrust fostered by power politics and endless religious and tribal divi-
sions and disunity, created large-scale apathy and dissention within an already
dispossessed population. Despite various tribulations, the previously displaced
community began to build itself a home where it was able, as illustrated in

Kirkuk, where the transient Hakkâri and Urmia Assyrians erected a school
in 1928 under the direction of Rev. Isaac Rehana until he was deported to
Cyprus in 1933 for political reasons.124 A vibrant ecclesiastical community
which had thrived from the fourteenth to the nineteenth century had returned
in the midst of urbanisation and settlement schemes to an ancestral region.
Communal action was varied and not as monolithic as previously assumed
even within the three sub-groups and their social and political strata.
Notes
1. A. M. Hamilton, Road through Kurdistan: The Narrative of an Engineer in Iraq,
new ed. (London: Faber & Faber, 1958), 217.
2. These markers are more for the researcher than for the Assyrians themselves.
No doubt there are an incalculable number of exceptions to such ‘rules’ but for
the purpose of keeping the work based on notions of Western research, I have
elected to aid the reader in understanding the variant groupings.
3. See Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements in
Iraq (London: Saqi, [1978] 2004). Though Batatu offers no explanation for the
term, it is likely he assumed those ‘Arabised’ to have been from urban regions,
to have lost their native tongue, and perhaps no longer to hold any major sense
of distinctness from their Muslim neighbours other than their Christian faith.
4. Hirmis Aboona, Assyrians, Kurds, and Ottomans: Intercommunal Relations on
the Periphery of the Ottoman Empire (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2008), 190.
5. Hannibal Travis, ‘“Native Christians Massacred”: The Ottoman Genocide
of the Assyrians during World War I’, Genocide Studies and Prevention 1.3
(2006), 329. Also see Aboona, Assyrians, Kurds, and Ottomans, 196–208.
6. Aboona, Assyrians, Kurds, and Ottomans, 191.
7. Portions of this section have been published in Sargon Donabed, ‘Rethinking
Nationalism and an Appellative Conundrum: Historiography and Politics in
Iraq’, National Identities 14.4 (2012), 407–31.
8. Amanda Porterfield, Mary Lyon and the Mount Holyoke Missionaries (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 75.
9. Eden Naby, ‘The Assyrians of Iran: Reunification of a “Millat”, 1906–1914,’
International Journal of Middle East Studies 8.2 (1977), 239.
10. Aboona, Assyrians, Kurds, and Ottomans, 206. Most other works focus on
the damaging effect the missions had on Assyrian–Kurdish, Assyrian–Arab
or Assyrian–Turkish relations while neglecting the more negative conse-

quence within the Assyrian community itself. For a case on the conversion
of indigenous groups to Catholicism, see Peter Iadicola and Anson Shupe,
Violence, Inequality, and Human Freedom, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2003), 197.
11. Edward Lewes Cutts, Christians under the Crescent in Asia (London: Society for
Promoting Christian Knowledge / New York: Pott, Young, 1877), 221.
12. Aboona, Assyrians, Kurds, and Ottomans, 279.
13. Horatio Southgate, Narrative of a Visit to the Syrian Church of Mesopotamia
(New York: Dana, 1844), 237–8; George Percy Badger, The Nestorians and
Their Rituals (London: Darf, [1852] 1987), vol. 1, 170.
14. Justin Perkins, A Residence of Eight Years in Persia among the Nestorian
Christians; with Notices of the Muhammedans (Andover, MA: Allen, Morrill &
Wardwell, 1843), 278.
15. American Sunday-School Union, Committee of Publication, The Nestorians of
Persia: A History of the Origin and Progress of That People, and of Missionary Labours
among Them (Philadelphia: American Sunday-School Union, 1848), 125.
16. Aboona, Assyrians, Kurds, and Ottomans, 72–4.
17. Dina Rizk Khoury, State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul
1540–1834, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 147.
18. Ibid, 148.
19. Ibid.
20. Most of the literature on the American Protestant missions in north Iraq is
housed at the Presbyterian Historical Society in Philadelphia. Some of it is
reproduced in Kamal Salibi and Yusuf K. Khoury (eds), The Missionary Herald:
Reports from Northern Iraq 1833–1870 (Amman: Royal Institute for Inter-faith
Studies, 1995).
21. Indeed this is the case for all communities during this period. There is no
reason to assume the Ottoman or Armenian statistics, for that matter, are any
more correct or valid than the Assyrian ones.
22. The Claims of the Assyrians before the Conference of the Preliminaries of Peace
at Paris (Paris: Rosen, 1919), also seen in Joel E. Werda, The Flickering Light
of Asia or the Assyrian Nation and Church (Joel E. Werda, 1924), 199–200.
See also David Gaunt, ‘Failed Identity and the Assyrian Genocide’, in Omer
Bartov and Eric D. Weitz (eds), Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence
in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2013), 318.
23. Roderic H. Davison, Nineteenth-century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms

(Istanbul: Isis Press, 1999), 395.
25. Major Trotter to Mr Goschen, Inclosure 3, Table II A, FO 424/107, pp
177–9, no. 104/3; Table III, FO 424/107, p. 180, no. 104/3.
26. Vital Cuinet, La Turquie d’Asie: géographie administrative, statistique, descrip-
tive et raisonée de chaque province de l’Asie-Mineure (Paris: Leroux, 1890–95),
vol. 2, 526–7; Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and
Political Structures of Kurdistan (London: Zed, 1992), 197. In the sense of
being autonomous, these Assyrians were not subject to any Kurdish amirs or
aghas. The autonomous Assyrian regions are as follows: Baz, Diz, Jelu, Tkhuma
and Tyari. There are no precise population statistics of the Hakkâri Nestorians
because the relative inaccessibility of certain villages of the mountainous region
probably made an accurate tally highly difficult in the 1870s.
27. Ibid., 202.
28. As testament to this, in 1928, Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan, his brother Mustafa
Barzani and their relatives were taken by Malik Barkhu to Tkhuma in the
Hakkâri range to find refuge from Turkish forces. See David Barsum Perey
JSD, Whither Christian Missions? Reflections on the Works of a Missionary and on
the Assyrian Case, rev. ed. (Paterson, NJ: Kimball Press, 1946), 24; Theodore
d’Mar Shimun, The History of the Patriarchal Succession of the d’Mar Shimun
Family, 2nd ed. (Turlock, CA: Mar Shimun Memorial Foundation, 2008),
124. This anecdote, though a footnote in the struggles and wars of the early
twentieth century, speaks to tentative receptivity, based in natural localism
transitioning through the generations, of the Kurds and Assyrians towards one
another.
29. Based on Consul Taylor to the Earl of Clarendon, in ‘Report on the Social
and Political Condition of the Consulate for Koordistan’, 19 March 1869,
Inclosure no. 25, Reports by Her Majesty’s Diplomatic and Consular Agents in
Turkey Respecting the Condition of the Christian Subjects of the Porte 1868–75
(London, 1877).
30. Ibid.
31. Consul Taylor to the Earl of Clarendon.
32. This is my conservative estimate (at seven persons per household) based on oral
interviews, the figures of Commander (Agha) Petros Elia in General Petros Elia
to Mr Forbes Adam, 26 November 1922, FO839/23, Assyrian maps of the
region at the turn of the century, and William A Shedd, ‘The Syrians of Persia
and Eastern Turkey’, Bulletin of the American Geographical Society 35.1 (1903),
7. There are many inaccuracies in Shedd’s work and it is simply not precise
enough. The phrase ‘Tigris valley’ could reflect anything from Mosul to Sa‘irt.
Shedd estimated five persons per family in the Urmia region through Baradost
and seven for all other regions. It appears he simply based his estimates on
the 1870s records and included 338 villages and 13,335 families, totalling
80,645 people. Including the Tigris valley the sum increased to over 110,000
people in 1903. See Arianne Ishaya, ‘Settling into Diaspora: A History of
Urmia Assyrians in the United States’, Journal of Assyrian Academic Studies
20.1 (2006), 4, quoting V. Minorsky, ‘Urmiya: A District & Town in the
Persian Province of Adharbaijan’, in Encyclopedia of Islam, 1st ed. (1934).
33. Hannibal Travis, Genocide in the Middle East: The Ottoman Empire, Iraq, and
Sudan, (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2010), 273. Travis notes that
by comparison the total Iraqi population increased by 75 per cent, from 4.8
million to 8 million, between 1947 and 1965. See Helen Chapin Metz (ed.),
Iraq: A Country Study, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1990),
79.
34. William Walker Rockwell, The Pitiful Plight of the Assyrian Christians in Persia
and Kurdistan (New York: American Committee for Armenian and Syrian
Relief, 1916), 11–12. Also Joseph Naayem, Shall This Nation Die? (New York:
Chaldean Rescue, 1921), 261–5 mentions 100,000 for a mountaineer popula-
tion and 60,000 for Urmia and the surrounding plains.
35. The destruction of the Assyrians during the First World War is dealt with
in detail by Hannibal Travis, Anahit Khosoreva, David Gaunt and others.
For Assyrian eyewitness sources see Naayem, Shall This Nation Die?; Abraham
Yohannan, The Death of a Nation; or, the Ever Persecuted Nestorians or Assyrian
Christians, (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1916); Abel Messiah Nu‘man
Qarabashi, Dmo Zliho (Bloodshed/Vergossenes Blut:: The Sorrowful Massacres
and Tragedies of the Years 1915–1918 (Jönköping, Sweden: Ashurbanipals
Bokförlag, 1997).
36. Brigadier-General J. G. Browne, ‘The Assyrians: A Debt of Honour’,
Geographical Magazine 4.6 (1936), 431.
37. Naayem, Shall This Nation Die?, 268–9.
38. Ibid., 272.
39. ‘US flag saves Christians in Turkish raid,’ San Antonio Light, 25 March
1915. This is echoed by the eyewitness account of a Chaldean priest, Paul
Bedjan, to ‘Syrian Orthodox’ bishop Afram Barsoum. See Khalid Dinno and
Amir Harrak, ‘Six Letters from Paul Bedjan to Aphram Barsoum, the Syriac
Orthodox Patriarch of Syria and Lebanon’, Journal of the Canadian Society for
Syriac Studies 9 (2009), 55–73, especially 55, 56, 65.
40. Rockwell, The Pitiful Plight of the Assyrian Christians in Persia and Kurdistan, 31.
41. In geographical opposition to the Western Assyrians of the Tur Abdin,
Mardin, Diarbekir, Malatya, Adana, Harput, Sivas etc. Among the Assyrians
today sometimes the terms madinkhaya/madinhoyo (easterner) and ma’erwaya/
ma‘erwoyo (westerner) are used to distinguish geography, dialect and church
affiliation.
43. Ibid., 39.
44. Daniel Silverfarb, Britain’s Informal Empire in the Middle East: The Case Study
of Iraq 1929–1941 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 34.
and Kurdistan, 14–15.
46. Mary Lewis Shedd, The Measure of a Man: The Life of William Ambrose Shedd,
Missionary to Persia (New York: George H. Doran, 1922), 218.
47. Naayem, Shall This Nation Die?, 281. As reported by several witnesses to the
negotiations, the Assyrians, should they be victorious, were promised money,
equipment, arms, reinforcements to substitute for weary volunteer soldiers,
and autonomy.
48. Shedd, The Measure of a Man, 231. Petros Elia (1880–1932), often referred
to using the honorific Agha, was born in the Hakkâri region of Baz and was a
convert to Catholicism. He worked in the Turkish consulate in Urmia, as he
was fluent in eight languages, and became consul in 1909. He was a weathered
military leader of the Hakkâri Assyrians, which consisted entirely of voluntary
recruits from the regions of Tur Abdin and Syria. Following the end of the
war, he laboured to find a suitable home for the Assyrians from 1919 until
1923, when he was exiled by British–Iraqi authorities to France for a period
(Christoph Baumer, The Church of the East: An Illustrated History of Assyrian
Christianity (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 261). In 1932, Elia died in his home
in Toulouse, France, as he worked on his memoirs (‘Friend of Allies dies’,
Canberra Times, 11 April 1932).
49. Naayem, Shall This Nation Die?, 265.
50. Ibid., 286; John Joseph, The Modern Assyrians of the Middle East: Encounters
with Western Christian Missions, Archaeologists, and Colonial Powers (Leiden:
Brill, 2000), 147.
51. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India, ‘The Assyrian and Armenian
Refugees in Mesopotamia’, 4 November 1920, CAB 24/114/74.
52. For a full discussion of the Baqubah camp see Fadi Dawood, ‘Minorities and
Makings of the Modern Iraqi State: Refugees and Warriors – The Case of
Assyrians 1920–1933’, PhD thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London, 2014.
53. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Earl Curzon of Kedleston, 4 March
1919, FO 608/97, Note 169, forwarding memorandum from Dr E. W.
McDowell, political officer in Mosul, entitled ‘Atrocities Committed by the
Turks in the Mosul Vilayet Enclosing a Memorandum of Atrocities’, 25
December 1918.
54. H. H. Austin, The Baqubah Refugee Camp: An Account of Work on Behalf
of the Persecuted Assyrian Christians (London: Faith House Press, 1920),
99–100.
55. It was evident as early as 1916 from the Sykes–Picot agreement that France and
Great Britain had desires to continue their spheres of influence in the Middle
East. Though the agreement was loosely held together early on, it congealed
over the succeeding treaties and was cemented with the creation of the respec-
tive mandate authorities by the League of Nations.
56. This becomes quite obvious after an in-depth scrutiny of Fr M. Kyriakos and
Dr V. Yonann, ‘Devant la Conference de la paix’, Action assyro-chaldéenne
1 (1920). The periodical, published out of the residence of the Patriarchal
Vicariate of the Chaldean Church in Beirut, is entirely in French and contains
letters and commentaries from a variety of dignitaries.
57. Sam Parhad, Beyond the Call of Duty: The Biography of Malik Kambar of Jeelu
(Chicago: Metropolitan Press, 1986), 21.
58. Ibid., 25–7; Declaration du Général Gouraud, Haut commissaire français en
Syrie & Cilicie, Dossier 5: Étude sur la question assyro-chaldéenne et formation
d’un bataillon, 12 July 1920. This is evidenced by the map (Figure 8) as well
as Secret Dispatch No. 676 from Special Service Office, Mosul, to divisional
advisor, Mosul, 19 June 1922; Secret Telegram No. 686 (Y1115) from Special,
Mosul to General, Baghdad, 29 June 1922; Secret Dispatch No. I/2138 from
General Headquarters, British Forces in Iraq, to secretary to the high commis-
sioner, Baghdad, 9 July 1922, regarding French desire to control upper Khabur
and Balikah valleys, AIR 23/449.
59. Confidential Dispatch No. So1738 from secretary to high commissioner for
Iraq to General Headquarters, and advisor to the Ministry of Defence, 25
August 1922, enclosing letter No. 5780/C/21 from divisional advisor, Mosul
to advisor to the Ministry of Interior, 15 August 1922, regarding reports con-
cerning French officers’ involvement with Arab Shaeikhs and Yezidi Aghas,
AIR 23/449.
60. For a full analysis of the Assyrian delegation at the Peace Conference 1919 see
Claire Weibel Yacoub, Le Rêve brisé des Assyro-Chaldéens: l’introuvable autono-
mie (Paris: Cerf, 2011).
61. Yohannan was an ordained Episcopal priest, having attended the General
Theological Seminary in New York, as well as a lecturer in Oriental lan-
guages at Columbia University. His PhD was in Semitic and Indo-European
languages.
62. A Catalogue of Paris Peace Conference Delegation Propaganda in the Hoover War
Library, Hoover War Library, Biographical Series I (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1926), 7, 80.
63. This event among growing Syrian and Arab nationalism coupled with the
Simele massacres would lead Barsoum, enthroned as Patriarch of Antioch in
Syria on 30 January 1933, to alter of the name of the church to ‘Syrian’, begin-
ning a process of de-Assyrification of the Jacobites.
64. Harold Perch, ‘Biography of Abraham K. Yousef’, in Fiftieth Anniversary of St
Mary’s Assyrian Apostolic Church (Worcester, MA: St Mary’s Assyrian Apostolic
Church, 1974).
65. A. K. Yoosuf, The Religion of Mohammed and Christian Sufferings (Worcester,
MA, 1905).
66. See ‘Real terrors of war’, Lowell Sun, 10 September 1914; Sargon Donabed,
Remnants of Heroes: The Assyrian Experience (Chicago: Assyrian Academic
Society Press, 2003), 93.
67. ‘Capt. Yoosuf pleads Assyrian cause’, Lowell Sun, 7 September 1919.
68. For a full history of Yoosuf’s accomplishments in New England see Albert
Nelson Marquis, Who’s Who in New England, 2nd ed. (Chicago: A. N. Marquis,
1916), 1189.
69. See Sargon George Donabed and Shamiran Mako, ‘Ethno-cultural and
Religious Identity of Syrian Orthodox Christians’, Chronos 19 (2009), 106;
Donabed, Remnants of Heroes, 97.
70. The Claims of the Assyrians as Presented to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919;
Donabed and Donabed, Assyrians of Eastern Massachusetts (Charleston, SC:
Arcadia, 2006), 81. ‘Shakkak’ (also ‘Shikak’) most probably refers to a Kurdish-
speaking tribe situated to the west of Urmia and Salamas. Their leader, Ismail
Simko, was the assassin of the Nestorian Patriarch Mar Benyamin Shimun and
150 of his bodyguards in March 1918. The reason for their inclusion may stem
from some Assyrian records, which refer to the Kurdish-speaking Shikaks using
the honorific ‘uncle’ for the Nestorian Patriarch. See Werda, The Flickering
Light of Asia, 201.
71. Claims of the Assyrians as Presented to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, in Werda,
The Flickering Light of Asia, 199–202. It is also true that the Assyrian desire for
an autonomous region and/or to remain in the regions of Mesopotamia which
would be under British or American mandate had its basis in fear of persecu-
tion by their Muslim neighbours. See the section concerning Mesopotamia in
the King–Crane Commission Report, 28 August 1919. The commission was
an official investigation during 1919 by the United States government into the
circumstances and conditions existing in certain parts of the former Ottoman
Empire.
72. This refers to the population in 1918 but neglects those Assyrian regions
under the jurisdiction of the Armenian patriarchate (i.e. Harput, Erzerum,
Van, Bitlis and Sivas), where the patriarchate estimated an Assyrian popula-
tion of 123,000. See David Gaunt, Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim–
Christian Relations in Eastern Anatolia during World War I (Piscataway, NJ:
Gorgias Press, 2006), 405–6. James Tashjian, Turkey: Author of Genocide –
The Centenary Record of Turkey 1822–1922 (Boston: Commemorative
Committee on the 50th Anniversary of the Turkish Massacres of the
Armenians, 1965), 23–4 refers to 500,000 Assyrians of all Christian denomi-
nations living in Turkey. This is without regard to those under the Armenian
patriarchate. See ‘La Question assyro-chaldéenne’, Action assyro-chaldéenne 1
(1920), 11.
73. David Gaunt cites preliminary numbers at around 200,000 persons (Gaunt,
Massacres, Resistance, Protectors). ‘La Question Assyro-chaldéenne’ cites 250,000
dead from a then current population of 1,520,000, which included the ‘com-
munity of India’ (p. 11). See also Travis, ‘“Native Christians Massacred”’, 350
n2. Tashjian, Turkey: Author of Genocide cites 424,000 Assyrians killed under
the failing Ottoman state since 1895 (p. 24).
74. In a 16 December 2007 press release, the International Association of Genocide
Scholars voted to recognise what they termed genocides inflicted on Assyrian
and Greek populations of the Ottoman Empire and succeeding states between
1914 and 1923.
75. Gaunt, ‘Failed Identity and the Assyrian Genocide’, 329.
76. Peace Conference diary entry, 17 April 1919, Cary T. Grayson Papers,
Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library. See also ‘La Délégation assyro-
chaldéenne’, Action assyro-chaldéenne 1 (1920).
77. Archevêché Syrien de Syrie, Memorandum 128, Archevêque Severius Barsoum,
Paris, 2 April 1920, and secret letter No. AJ76 from Severius Barsum to Mr
Lloyd George, Prime Minister, March 1920, CAB 29/30.
78. The full treaty can be viewed at http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_I,_
Articles_1_-_260 (accessed 10 July 2014).
79. İsmet İnönü, ‘Hey’et-i Vekîle Riyâsetine’, tr. Racho Donef, Turkish Historical
Society, 15 January 1923. See also Eastern Conference Lausanne, Autonomy
for Assyrian Christians, FO 839/23.
80. See Betty Cunliffe-Owen, Thro’ the Gates of Memory: From the Bosphorus to
Baghdad (London: Hutchinson, 1924) for a very candid and orientalist account
of events following the First World War concerning the Assyrians in Iraq and
the Urmia region of Iran.
81. Arnold T. Wilson, ‘The Middle East’, Journal of the British Institute of
International Affairs 5.2 (1926), 96–110.
82. Wilson took over while Sir Percy Cox was temporarily in Iran.
83. John Fisher, Curzon and British Imperialism in the Middle East 1916–19
(London: Frank Cass, 1999), 251–2.
84. In the 1920s the French recruited a similar force made up largely of non-
dominant communities in mandate Syria, referred to as Troupes spéciales du
Levant.
85. Between 1920 and 1930 all 102,000 British and Indian troops were gradually
withdrawn from Iraq. See Briton Cooper Busch, Britain, India, and the Arabs
1914–1921 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 448; Silverfarb,
Britain’s Informal Empire in the Middle East, 48.
86. J. Gilbert Browne, The Iraq Levies 1915–1932 (London: Royal United Service
Institution, 1932), 1.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid., 4, 14. Thus, the initial postulation of most previous scholarship concern-
ing the Assyrians as holding a favoured position within the British military is
incorrect. Contrary to this proposal, the Assyrians were quite late in joining
the Iraqi Levies. For the makeup in 1920 see the Arab and Kurdish Levy and
Gendarmerie Proclamation, 1920, AIR 5/295.
89. Browne, The Iraq Levies, 7.
90. Ibid.
91. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War, ‘Refugee Camp in Baqubah
in Mesopotamia’, 13 June 1920, CAB 24/107/62.
92. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India, ‘The Assyrian and Armenian
Refugees in Mesopotamia’, 4 November 1920, CAB 24/114/74.
94. This is true of inter- as well as intra-community relationships as many of the
Nestorians (Assyrian Church of the East) as well as Chaldeans and Jacobites
dwelling in Mosul and to the north further distanced themselves from each
other in a gradual self-sectarianisation process. Refer to Austin’s comments
above for earlier intra-community animosity.
96. Rab is reflective of an ancient Assyrian title for soldiers of rank. In this instance,
rab-khamshi denotes that Yokhana was the commander of fifty men. There
were also higher- and lower-ranked officers, denoted by the number of men
under their command, including for instance, rab-isra, rab-imma and rab-
trimma, or commander of 10, 100 and 200 respectively. The highest rank of
general was referred to as rab-khayla.
98. Such a role was exemplified during the rebellion of Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan,
the older brother of Mustafa Barzani (leader of the KDP), in 1931. See Browne,
The Iraq Levies, 73.
99. Surprisingly, whether due to their small numbers or to their hope that the
British, French or others would make good with their word to grant them an
autonomous region, Assyrians had not participated in any rebellion up to this
point in Iraqi history.
100. Stephen Longrigg, Iraq 1900–1950: A Political, Social, and Economic History
(Beirut: Librairie du Liban), 110.
101. Ibid.
102. Observations of His Majesty’s Government on the Petition Dated the 23rd of
September 1930 from Captain A. Hormuzd Rassam, Relating to the Position
of Non-Moslems in ‘Iraq and Also on Captain Rassam’s Letter of the 9th of
December 1930 to the Chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission,
CO 730/163/1. See a full discussion of this in Phebe Marr, ‘The Development
of a Nationalist Ideology in Iraq 1920–1941’, Muslim World 75.2 (1985).
103. Longrigg, Iraq 1900–1950, 110.
104. ‘Nationalist’ and ‘nationalism’ are problematic terms due to the negative ideas
associated with them today, as are the terms ‘intellectual’ and ‘elite’. None is
properly defined and thus I am hesitant to use them. Moreover, there were
those writers and actors among the Assyrians who advocated for a free and
independent homeland, and those who did not concern themselves with the
issue.
105. This is clearly evident in the interactions between the Assyrian delegates to the
Paris Peace Conference of 1919, as illustrated and discussed in the personal
notes of Abraham K. Yoosuf, now housed in the MARA collection, as well as
in the writings of Malik Kambar Warda of Jilu as seen in Khuyada Umtanaya
(founded in 1928) and Action assyro-chaldéenne, both published in Beirut.
106. See Fred Aprim, ‘Assyrians in the World War I Treaties: Paris, Sèvres, and
Lausanne’, Assyrian Star 58.1 (2006); Sergei G. Osipov, ‘Fraidon Atturaya in
the Focus of the Soviet Press’, Melta 10 (2000).
107. Despite his Russian leanings, he was imprisoned and died in jail at the age of
thirty-five.
108. Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements In Iraq, 404.
109. See the Assyrian School of Mosul Project, which contains photographs and
information concerning the school and its history (http://www.aina.org/
mosulschool/school.htm (accessed 11 July 2014)).
110. Yusuf Malek, The Assyrian Tragedy (Annemasse, Switzerland: Granchamp,
1934), 36. The third period will be discussed in the following chapter.
111. Stafford, The Tragedy of the Assyrians, 87.
112. Secretariat of HE the High Commissioner of Iraq, Baghdad to advisor to the
Minister of the Interior, Baghdad, Memorandum, 14 June 1923, AIR23/449.
113. Joseph Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Ba‘th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 17.
114. Stafford, The Tragedy of the Assyrians, 83–4.
115. Ibid., 61.
116. Secretariat of HE the High Commissioner of Iraq, Baghdad to Air
Headquarters, Baghdad, Memorandum, 26 September 1923, AIR23/449. The
callousness with which the Assyrians are addressed is palpable as the death of
Shamasha Nanu or Ashitha is referred to in the appendix to the memo as a
‘thorn removed’. Furthermore, it seemed that the government (British–Iraqi)
recognised that they had ignored Assyrian leadership structures when they
bypassed the maliks to appoint government liaisons.
117. Ibid.
118. Military Report on Iraq (Area 9) Central Kurdistan, Air Ministry, 1929,
196–8.
119. Paul Knabenshue, US ambassador to Iraq, to Secretary of State, ‘Assyrian

Problem – British Policy’, 28 August 1933, 890g.4016 Assyrians/86.
120. Yusuf Malek, The Assyrian Tragedy, 18–20.
121. League of Nations Secretariat, League of Nations Questions (1935), 12.
122. David K. Fieldhouse (ed.), Kurds, Arabs and Britons: The Memoir of Wallace
Lyon in Iraq 1918–44 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002), 83.
123. As sung by Shamshon Orahem Babella to the author in California during an
informal recorded interview in the summer of 2006. Babella was born in the
Urmia region in Iran and lived much of his life in Iraq in the refugee settlement
of Gaylani Camp Babella and his family were among those forced to leave Iraq
under Ba‘th pressure for being ‘Iranian’ by birth in the early 1980s. The song
was sung by him during a conversation about the Assyrian situation in Iraq
following British withdrawal. The song seems to be solely oral in character, and
other Assyrians of the same generation, including some of those interviewed for
this book, were familiar with it. Thanks to Nicholas Al-Jeloo for his comments
and creation of a superb transliteration system.
124. The Assyrians of Kirkuk website contains information about the history of
Assyrians in the region post-WWI including names of graduates and vol-
unteer organisations, as well as numerous photographs. See http://www.
assyriansofkirkuk.com.
3
Iraq: Building a ‘Nation’-State
We preferred our own way of living. We were no expense to the government.

All we wanted was peace and to be left alone.
Crazy Horse, Oglala Lakota, 1877
B etween 1914 and 1933 the Middle East transformed rapidly.

Nationalism became a new cash crop, a commodity more profitable
than oil. Where this created new possibilities and prospects in the region, it
also gave birth to tales of broken promises and future despondency. Forced
from semi-autonomy into the First World War, the Assyrians watched as
their patriarch Mar Benyamin Shimun XXI was murdered by Agha Simko
Ismail in 1918 under a flag of parley, only to find themselves alongside the
very same Kurds, completely homeless following the war. Soon after the
Assyrians in Iraq became detached from their brethren, divided via borders
of newly conceived states by the very powers they had endeavoured to aid
in the Great War. But it was the events of the late 1920s and early 1930s
that would in many ways cement the community’s socio-economic, ethno-
cultural and religious trajectory to the present. According to Yusuf Malek,
(then working for the secretary to the administration inspector in Mosul), as
early as 1929 circulars from the Iraqi ministries were disseminated through-
out the Kurdish regions of northern Iraq, pressing for a massacre of the
Assyrians.1 As the attempt initially gained little support, officials began to
play on religious animosities and a more assertive call for a general massacre
of Christians was announced. This call appealed to fundamentalist religious
convictions, bridging the gap between Kurd and Arab.2 In this instance, it
was the British forces in the streets of Mosul that prevented an immediate
massacre.
During the late 1920s, Assyrians had been targeted by central-

government manoeuvrings. Seventy-six individuals were marked for political
assassination during this time.3 In 1930, five Assyrians were found murdered
near Rawanduz, and more near Mosul, with no criminal investigation into the
killings.4 The machinations of Baghdad were obvious in its attempts to pit the
Kurds and Assyrians against each other, while at the same time uniting Iraqis
in their hatred of ‘outsiders’ and ‘tools’ of Western occupation. During the
same year, relations between Britain and Iraq became closer still with the new
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. The treaty, not very dissimilar to the original of 1922
paid particular attention to continued relations between the two c ountries
following significant oil discoveries in 1927. In light of these discoveries, the
stability of the Iraqi regime became of paramount importance. They were
prepared to admit the Iraqi state into the League of Nations provided Iraq
signed a treaty of alliance safeguarding Britain’s oil rights.
The Patriarch and Temporal Authority
By 1931 the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of

Nations approved Iraq’s admission as an independent sovereign state into
the League of Nations, with the recommendation that it guarantee certain
rights to its minorities.5 In light of this news, Assyrians under the leadership
of Mar Eshai Shimun, cognisant of the imminent termination of the m andate,
held a general conference in Mosul pressing their case at the upcoming
Geneva meeting. During his visit with the mountaineers in Mosul in 1931,
Sir Francis Humphrys, UK high commissioner to Iraq, promised his full sup-
port at Geneva only to verbally assail Mar Eshai Shimun and his leadership
at the meeting.6 In general, British officers thought very little of Humphrys
and believed he was ill prepared for the task of leadership. Captain Gerald de
Gaurey was among those colonial officials who believed that Humphrys had
little skill, was quite egotistical, driven by ambition, and only held his posi-
tion through his friendship with King George V.7
Roger Cumberland, an American missionary, noticed a shift in the
Assyrian political stance on the return of Captain Anthony Hormuzd
Rassam, (grandson of the vice consul of the British in Mosul and the first
Middle Eastern archaeologist, Hormud Rassam), and Captain Matthew
Cope from England in 1929.8 The major concern of the Iraqi government
iraq: bui ldi ng a ‘nati on’-s ta te | 95
seemed to be the ambitions of Mar Shimun to retain his temporal author-

ity over the mountaineers. Prior to 1930 there seemed little evidence that
the patriarchal family which included Mar Shimun’s aunt Surma, would
become inflexible in their political ambitions. Rassam and Cope brought
with them some secret political intelligence which they utilised to stir
Assyrian desires towards independence and autonomy.9 Cumberland
reported that in a speech about Easter in 1931, the Lady Surma allegedly
proclaimed, ‘We will be kings or we will be killed.’10 Despite the obvious
disagreement over patriarchal family’s temporal authority it is pertinent to
recall British/Iraqi usage of the power wielded by that family to their own
advantage. In the early 1920s, while chaos and a g eneral uncertainty gripped
the Assyrian population, the British continued their recruitment of young
men en masse to the Iraq levy battalions through such means:
I found that the present system of recruiting through the Patriarchal

family, Maliks, and villages is extremely satisfactory. The influence of the
Patriarchal family throughout all the districts appear[s] to be enormous.
At each village the inhabitants crowded round David de Mar Shimun,
the Patriarch’s father, to kiss his hand while men and women would leave
their work in the fields on hearing that he was going by and rush up to do
the same.11
Thus it should not have been a shock to find the patriarchal family both wield-
ing temporal authority and desiring some sense of its continuation. While
Humphrys harboured ill feelings toward Mar Eshai Shimun, he did present
some of the petitions to the League of Nations as provided to him by the
Assyrians. One petition was sent by Captain Rassam and included the concerns
of the Yezidi and Jewish communities. Another asked for special consideration
to migrate to French-controlled Syria, or out of the Middle East.
Letter to the Mandates Commission

By The Mar Shimun et al
Mosul, October 23rd, 1931

To: His Excellency
The Chairman, Mandates Commission
League of Nations, Geneva
Reference the attached document. I beg to convey to Your Excellency the

following:
The Assyrian Nation which is temporarily living in Iraq, having placed
before their eyes the dark future, and the miserable conditions which are
undoubtedly awaiting them in Iraq, after the lifting of the mandate, have
unanimously held a Conference with me in Mosul on the 20th October
1931. At this Conference were present the temporal and spiritual leaders of
the Assyrian Nation in its entirety as it will be observed from the document
quoted above bearing the leaders’ signatures. The future conditions were
fully discussed and these center around two points. (Can we or can we Not
live in Iraq?) At the conclusion of lengthy deliberations, it was unanimously
decided by all those present that it is quite impossible for us to live in Iraq.
The leaders’ Will was entrusted with me vide the document signed by them
to explore all means that I deem possible to find a way for the emigration of
the Assyrians from Iraq. Under the circumstances, I, together with the under
mentioned signatories being the responsible leaders of the Assyrian Nation
submit before Your Commission our Nation’s humble request, which in
past centuries numbered millions but reduced to a very small number due
to repeated persecutions and massacres that faced us, we have been able to
preserve our Language and Faith up to the present time. The Not distant
past relating to the conditions of Our Nation has been fully made known to
you by the medium of the official workers for our Nation. This being so, it is
unnecessary for us to enlarge upon each item, but we are positively sure
that if we remain in iraq, we shall be exterminated in the course of few
years.
we therefore implore your mercy to take care of us, and arrange
our emigration to one of the countries under the rule of one of the Western
Nations whom you may deem fit. And should this be impossible, we beg you
to request the French Government to accept us in Syria and give us shelter
under her responsibility for we can no longer live in iraq and we shall
leave.
Sd. Eshai Shimun

By the Grace of God,
Catholics Patriarch of the East
Other Signatories:
(Mar) Yosep Khnanishu, Metropolitan
(Mar) Zaya Sargis, by Grace Bishop
Khoshaba M. Yosep (Lower Tiyari)
Zaya M. Shamizdin
Malik Andrious, Jelu
Malik Marogil
Malik Khnanu, Tkhuma
Malik Khammo, Baz
Malik Ismael, Upper Tiyari
Copy to:
H.E. High Commissioner for Iraq
H.E. Minister for Foreign Affairs, London12
While the letter included all the major signatures of the maliks and chiefs,
even those who would by 1933 become part of the ‘anti-patriarchal faction’,
Humphrys dismissed these requests. In his argumentation he suggested to the
committee that the petitions held no authority (especially Rassam’s) despite
being authorised by Mar Eshai Shimun.
At least three more petitions were sent by Assyrian groups to the
League in 1931 and 1932. The requests and pleas to honour their prom-
ises fell on deaf ears, and the desire to continue to exploit Assyrian levy
officers as guards for the airbases of Habbaniyya and Shu‘aiba with no fur-
ther obligations paved the way for the atrocities that would occur two years
later.13
The handover of Iraq was now imminent. In May 1932 Mar Eshai
Shimun again called a meeting of the heads of all the Assyrian tribal factions
in communion with the Church of the East.14 On 1 June the British were
faced with the unthinkable: all Assyrian levy officers had signed a document
voluntarily terminating their positions with effect from 1 July.15 This was
a major blow to the British, who relied on the Assyrians for internal Iraqi
missions and peacekeeping. Mar Shimun called a secondary meeting on 16
June. As a result of both of these meetings, he was elected as the Assyrians’
representative in any and all negotiations with secondary parties. The now
fully sovereign Kingdom of Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations
unanimously on 3 October 1932, yet Britain retained many previous rela-

tions, especially those with the Iraqi Sunni elite and of course her treaty
guaranteeing oil rights.16 Following the handover, in a final effort to bar-
gain with the League, Mar Eshai Shimun left for the Geneva conference in
December 1932.
The final decision of the League of Nations conference was released on
15 December 1932. The release made evident the failure of Assyrian aspira-
tions as brought forth by Mar Eshai Shimun. The Patriarch left Geneva on
19 December and by the start of 1933 he had arrived in Damascus. There
he met with writer Yusuf Malek, informing him of what had transpired
at the convention.17 It appeared that the Assyrian refugees of Hakkâri had
little hope of seeing promises fulfilled. Upon his arrival in Baghdad, Mar
Shimun was requested to report immediately to the police barracks as the
Iraqis wished to be assured of his obedience. On 5 January Mar Shimun was
invited to dinner at Sir Francis Humphrys’s house, where he was pleaded
with to restrain the Assyrian levies from any reaction and to promise their
continued obedience to the British and the state. Seeing no other acceptable
options, Mar Eshai, exhausted and defeated, made his way back to Mosul
and called a final meeting on 16 January. Here he publicly explained the
outcome of the Geneva meeting and its possible effect to every malik and
rayis (headman) in attendance.
Discouraged by Britain’s failure to make due on its promises, in January
1933 Rab Tremma Yaqo, the son of the elderly Malik Ismael of Upper Tiyari,
resigned from the Iraqi Levies. Yaqo had served with them for the three pre-
vious years at Diana, near Rawanduz, working with a New Zealand-born
British civil engineer, Archibald Hamilton, to create a new motor road from
Arbil through the gorge of Rawanduz into Iran.18 When Yaqo had resigned
his levy commission both he and his father made their way to Simele, a large
village about 14 kilometres west of Dohuk. While some of the Assyrians in
Simele belonged to the tribe of Upper Tiyari, like Yaqo, the majority were
originally from the Baz region of Hakkâri. The bulk of the settled families of
Upper Tiyari occupied villages on the main road that stretched from Dohuk
to ‘Amēdīyāh.
In a March 1933 letter to strategic ministries, King Faisal seemed
aware of the lack of national unity in Iraq. He remarked that ‘an Iraqi
people does not yet exist’ and rather what made up the country was
‘throngs of human beings lacking any national consciousness or sense of
unity . . . inclined toward anarchy and always prepared to rise up against
any government whatsoever’.19 Amid a rising tension which became
palpable and at times physically threatening as the year wore on, Faisal’s
sentiments echoed in the halls of Iraq’s elite ministries and the ears of ex-
Sharifian officers, who led the ‘Arab revolt’ during the Ottoman period.
The Assyrians were or had become a disease in the eyes of many in the
Arab nationalist party Hizb al-Ikha al-Watani, founded by Ali al-Gaylani,
an Arab nationalist and future Prime Minister of Iraq.20 Whereas this
generated complications, it also brought possible solutions for remedying
the issue of Iraq’s national unity. Officials surmised that a fabricated enemy
of alien origin, speaking a barbaric tongue and adhering to an antiquated
religion they held in common with the foreign British, could stem Kurdish
and Shia insurgent tendencies and turn their focus to an enemy common
to all.21
Thus a situation was fostered where a clash with the Assyrians became
inevitable. On 31 March, Yaqo Ismael met with Mekki Beg al-Sherbiti,
qaimaqam of Dohuk, and spoke at length of the desires of the Assyrian com-
munity, especially in regard to possible emigration. According to Yaqo’s own
memoirs, Mekki Beg responded positively, stating that those who wished to
emigrate would be given leave to do so, while those who desired to integrate
into Iraq would also be accommodated. From there Yaqo left to speak to
the various villages of the new possibilities.22 Concurrently, during May and
June 1933 the government campaigned to urge Iraqis to donate funds for
military supplies that would be used to quell the Assyrian unrest. At approxi-
mately the same time, Major Arnold Wilson recommended the summoning
of the Patriarch Mar Eshai Shimun to Baghdad to be detained there. ‘All
necessary steps should be taken to oblige the Patriarchal family to accept the
Dashtazi region [for settlement].’23 On 22 May Mar Shimun indulged the
request to meet with Hikmat Sulayman and a newly appointed settlement
expert, Major Thompson, in Baghdad to discuss the Dashtazi settlement
project. He addressed Assyrian autonomy with Hikmat Sulayman in May
and early June. Following a breakdown of the talks, Baghdad decided it
would be necessary to retain the cleric in custody, infuriating the Assyrian
population worldwide as they feared a repeat of the assassination of Mar

Benyamin Shimun.
Major Thompson, however, went directly to the Mosul region. There
he spoke with forty Assyrians concerning the settlement. Thirty-six of them
informed him that they agreed with the position of Mar Eshai Shimun. ‘The
remaining four said they would agree to whatever settlement the government
proposed.’24 At the time, Thompson recorded more than 400 families dis-
tributed over thirty-one villages between the Barwari Bala and Nerwa/Rekan
regions who were under patriarchal authority, with a population of almost
3,000. Added to that were more than 3,500 families formerly of Hakkâri,
around 24,500 people, giving a total of more than 27,500 Assyrians in Iraq
under Mar Shimun’s authority.25
Yaqo Ismael and others had felt betrayed by the British for whom they
worked even prior to the beginning of the mandate. It was said the Assyrians
were the only people in the new Iraq that had not rebelled or taken up
arms against the authorities. Yet despite this and following numerous failed
meetings, the detention of Mar Eshai Shimun in Baghdad, a campaign of
slander and bribery, and no end to the settlement talks, Yaqo and Malik
Loko of the Tkhuma tribe began a tour of the ‘Amēdīyāh and Sapna regions
to persuade Assyrians to not accept Iraqi nationality and any new settlement
arrangement as it was unrealistic for the amount of people who needed
residences. While the British, especially Lieutenant Colonel Ronald Sempill
Stafford, administrative inspector for Mosul, felt this was antagonistic as
well as a monumental error in judgement, Yaqo had earlier, when under the
supervision of Archibald Hamilton building the new ‘Hamilton Road’, been
notified point blank by a British officer, Captain Baker, of the major plan
of settlement which would effectively disarm the mountaineer Assyrians,
disband them and move them to regions in Iraq south of the river Zab. He
then relayed this message to his ageing and ailing father, Malik Ismael, as
Hamilton relates:
Yacu spoke a few sentences to the old man, who had sat during our con-
versation still as some sculptured figure hewn from rock. He looked round
upon us as Yacu ceased speaking and gave his reply in a voice that betrayed
emotion. A grim, formidable warrior in his time, this head of the Fighting
Tiyaris, as they proudly called themselves. Even now as he spoke to his son
he was calm and dignified, but no longer was there any hope to give life to
his lined face.26
Yet the Iraqi government’s response was an increase in military force.
I must admit that it was with very considerable misgivings that, when
consulted by Baghdad, I agreed to the employment of the Army. The Army
officers were known to hate the Assyrians and in particular Bekir Sidqi,
who was in command in the north, had openly stated what he would do
to them if the opportunity occurred. The transfer of this officer had again
and again been recommended by the British advisory officials, and, indeed,
King Feisal in May promised that it would be immediately carried out. But
he nevertheless remained at Mosul, with what tragic results . . .27
The Assyrians feared there was little chance for them in the new Iraq,
and the failure of Mar Eshai Shimun at the League of Nations solidified
that truth for Yaqo. Iraqi deputies made speeches in parliament on 29 June
1933, inciting hatred toward the Assyrians, which were disseminated and
published in al-Istiqlal newspaper among others.28 For the Assyrians, the
future appeared bleak. Eventually, Yaqo, not desiring a conflict, returned
from the mountains in late June or early July at the behest of Colonel
Stafford, who had promised that any grievances would be discussed
at Mosul.29 There was no end to the anti-Assyrian fervour, for ‘between July
1, and July 14, over eighty leading articles were written in the Iraqi press by
all classes of the population, all demanding the final extermination of the
Assyrians’.30
Factions
Mosul native Mekki Beg al-Sherbiti, qaimaqam of Dohuk, was a staunch Iraqi
nationalist. Al-Sherbiti believed Mar Shimun, Yaqo and the Assyrians as a whole
to be a major threat to the country. He had been instrumental in the defection
of a number of Assyrian leaders.31 Malik Yosip Khoshaba of Lower Tiyari was
perhaps the greatest feather in the cap for the Iraqi regime. Khoshaba, a hero
of the First World War, through lofty promises and bribery according to some
and rational practicality according to others was cajoled into becoming a voice
against autonomy. Mar Eshai Shimun, Yusuf Malek and others believed that
Khoshaba was assured of being made sheikh of all Assyrians and his children
were to be granted official titles in the military and government.32 Indeed there
seemed to be a mutual dislike between Khoshaba and Mar Eshai Shimun,
which most probably stemmed from ecclesiastical divergences that came to
the forefront in the First World War as Khoshaba became strongly aligned
with the American Protestants and one of their ‘mountain preachers’ while
Mar Shimun’s leanings oriented towards the Church of England.33 The Iraqi
government furthered division and animosity between the Assyrian leaders by
appointing Khoshaba president of the Assyrian Advisory Committee while the
patriarch was detained in Baghdad.34 Along with Khoshaba, Mar Zaya Sargis,
Bishop of Jilu, was similarly influenced into a pro-government position with
promises of houses, an unsettled land claim to be settled satisfactorily, and
favourable positions in the government for family members.35 Others would
join this faction and thus the divide grew.
Two major groups emerged among the Assyrians that would eventually
be apportioned simply as the patriarchal faction and the non-patriarchal fac-
tion. In fact, Iraqi and British officials utilised the terms to undermine the
solidarity of the Assyrian tribes. The Iraqi Minister of the Interior called a
meeting of the Assyrian leadership for 10–11 July, to be held in Mosul in
the office of the acting mutasarrif, Khalil Azmi, along with Colonel Stafford
and Major Thompson. There, the growing divide became terribly clear, and
with Mar Eshai Shimun under house arrest at the YMCA in Baghdad, the rift
would widen further.36
At the time, Yusuf Malek and others suspected that government officials
would use the meeting to increase tensions with the hope that the Assyrians
would in effect neutralise themselves:
The meetings were arranged by the Government with the ulterior purpose
of causing friction among the Assyrians by employing paid servants to
cause quarrels at the meetings and to create disrespect for the leaders. This
group was given the privilege of arming with daggers and revolvers and was
spurred on by the officials to use abusive language to antagonize the leaders;
but the latter, being apprised by experience dealt with the situation calmly
and wisely. Thus the trouble at which the Government aimed was averted.37
Table 5 Pro- and anti-patriarchal tribal factions
Patriarchal faction
Mar Yosip Khnanisho, Metropolitan
Yaqo d’Malik Ismael, Upper Tiyari
Malik Loko Shlimon, Tkhuma
Qasha Gewargis, Tkhuma
Malik Andrewos, Jilu
Malik Hurmizd Younan, Mar Zaya
Shamasha Kanno?, Jilu
Malik Dawid, Tkhuma
Zadoq Nwiya, Ashitha, Lower Tiyari
Sayfo Keena, Bnay l’Gippa, Lower Tiyari
Rayis Booko, Ashitha, Lower Tiyari
Shamasha Yosip Eliya, Walto(b), Upper Tiyari
Rayis Odisho Khbash, Rumtha
Malik Qambar, Jilu
Rayis Yawp Sawkho, Chamba, Upper Tiyari
Rayis Younan, Halmon
Rayis Warda Oshana of Rarwa, Upper Tiyari
Shlimun Zomaya, Gundiktha, Tkhuma
Kuma Mkhamodo?, Baz
Hurmizd Talia, Baz
Telow Dawid, Baz
Non-patriarchal faction38
Mar Zaya Sargis, Bishop of Jilu
Malik Khoshaba Yosip, Lower Tiyari
Zaya d’Shamisdin, Lower Tiyari
Malik Khammo, Baz
Chikko Giwo of the house of Dadosh, Upper Tiyari
Odisho Dadesho, Walto, Upper Tiyari
Khayo(b) Odisho, Ashitha, Lower Tiyari
Gabriel Shimun, Baz
Shimun Barkhisho, Bnay Maya (Mata), Jilu
Odisho Qambar Lawando, Bnay l’Gippa, Lower Tiyari
Malik Loko, present at the meeting, agreed with Malek:
The declared reason for the meeting was to get the two Assyrian par-
ties reconciled with one another and to provide an opportunity . . . to
explain to the Assyrians the Government’s settlement policy . . . But the
real reason for the meeting was . . . to set a trap to create conflict between
the Assyrian leaders.39
Loko’s sentiments of the event echoed Malek’s, and it became obvious that
the Assyrians would have to speak to the government officials separately.
Four of the patriarchal faction remained. Though the Assyrians narrowly
averted disaster at the meeting, the situation was anything but pacified. The
settlement policy in the Dashtazi region was unacceptable to the Assyrians
(especially those not influenced by government enticement), and yet it was
their only recourse. Those who abstained from the agreement to settle 15,000
persons in a region suited only for 200 families were told to leave the country
at any time.40 Two of the four patriarchal faction members, Malik Andrewos
of Jilu and Mar Yosip Khnanisho, were given leave to exit as they felt they
had little to offer. Only Yaqo Ismael and Loko Shlimon remained and when
confronted with the ultimatum of going to Baghdad and convincing Mar
Shimun to sign or leave, both refused. They feared detainment in Baghdad
and had heard on good authority that this was the ultimate subtlety of the
British–Iraqi regime. The qaimaqam of ‘Amēdīyāh, Majid Baik, responded in
repugnance to the British officers and acting mutasarrif. According to Loko
he retorted:
Your policy is weak and with this policy you will bring ruin to Iraq . . .
Give us the order and we will carry the stick. Any Assyrian who does not
listen, we will break his head, tie his hands and send him to the south of
Iraq until he dies there . . . We are Kurds, and we and the Assyrians know
each other well.41
In no uncertain terms, Loko and Yaqo were told to relocate to the capital, and
while both knew that they must acquiesce, they had no intention of moving
to Baghdad. In response to the situation, on the night of 14–15 July an armed
group of Assyrians under the leadership of Yaqo and Loko of Tkhuma and
four others left Mosul for Bosriya and then the village of ‘Ain Diwar, on the
border with Syria, which they reached on the 18th. They surrendered their
arms to the French authorities and entered Syria, requesting settlement rights
in the Khabur basin.42 There, the French p rofessed no understanding of the
Assyrian issue.43
Worried that their people in Iraq would follow, the leaders
sent an immediate letter urging them to remain where they were. The letter
was either misunderstood or disregarded as on 20 July, approximately a thou-
sand men, all armed, having left their families in Iraq arrived in Feshkhābur.44
Iraqi officials learned of the crossing only when the Assyrians sent a letter to
the Minister of the Interior and former member of the Committee of Union
and Progress (Young Turks), Hikmat Sulayman, which read as follows: 45
July 23, 1933

Near Khanik
Minister of Interior, Baghdad
Excellency,
As a result of the Mosul meeting, the Iraqi Government policy was explained
to us both regarding the settlement and the Patriarch.
The Mutasarrif openly said ‘those unsatisfied with this policy are free to emi-
grate from Iraq’. Accordingly we have come to the frontier and we request the
Iraqi Government not to block the road to those who want to join us.
We have no intention to fight unless forced.

Signed
Yaqo d’Malik Ismael (Upper Tiyari)
Malik Baito (Tkhuma)
Malik Loko Shlimun (Tkhuma)
Malik Warda (Diz)
Rayis Esha (Nochiyya)
Rayis Ishaq (Nochiyya)
Malik Maroguil (Sara)
Tooma d’Makhura (Baz)
Yushia Esho (Drinayi)
Malik Salim (Barwar)
Shamasha Ismail (Liwan)
Rayis Mikhail (Sara)
Esho d’Kelaita (Timar d’Wan)
The battle at Feshkhābur and Dayrabūn and the Iraqi government reaction
The regime feared the ‘general atmosphere of government defiance was unset-
tling the Kurds’ and even the Shias to the south.46 Yet the Assyrians continued
with attempts at moving across the border. On 25 and 26 July 190 men
attempted to cross the border. Some were disarmed and arrested and others
disarmed and let go, while a large portion made it across successfully with
no incident on either side.47 Over the course of 30 and 31 July the Assyrians
became aware that they would be allowed settlement on the condition of
disarmament. Most agreed, though some remained in Iraq, awaiting their
families before proceeding. In Syria, French authorities reneged on their ear-
lier promise and turned the Assyrians back due to a League decree concerning
the illegality of the effort, with promises that they would be allowed to re-enter
Iraq without incident.48 Iraqi forces determined either to disarm or eliminate
them began firing with machine guns on those who had crossed to the east
side of the Tigris as well as those who remained on the west bank in Syria. Five
thousand Iraqi soldiers and police including support aircraft were brought to
bear against fewer than 800 Assyrians during the confrontation.49 At the end
of the skirmish by the count of Malik Loko Shlimon, thirteen Assyrians were
dead and eleven wounded among dozens of Iraqi army casualties.50
Iraqi army battalions combed the area around Jebel Bekhair in the Zakho
region between 5 and 9 August looking for Assyrians who had returned from
Syria.51 On 6 August some 392 Assyrians were reported to have gone back into
Syria, where they were permanently detained and moved to the interior of the
country, and on the evening of the 7th, French authorities gave leave for 1,500
people to be settled in the Syrian region.52 While the Iraqis cried outrage at
the French for allowing armed Assyrians to return to Iraq, the French response
was simple: the British authorities in Iraq had granted the rifles to them and
there was no evidence of any unlawful action taken with said arms.53
When news of the debacle at Feshkhābur and Dayrabūn reached
Baghdad, fear was replaced by rage. Animosity against Assyrians throughout
the country became an active physical threat:
Even in the highest circles there was talk of the ‘rid me of this turbulent
priest’ order. ‘Let all the Assyrian men be killed,’ they cried, ‘but spare the
women and children as the eyes of the world are on us. Let the Arabs and
Kurds be raised against the Assyrians. Let trouble be stirred up in Syria
against the treacherous French.’54
Thus began a propaganda campaign. In August more than 230 anti-Assyrian

articles were published.55 The Ministry of Education solicited funds from
students and teachers to purchase a tank, while their Arab nationalist neigh-
bours in Syria proposed to send funds for a plane or tank to be used in the
anti-Assyrian operations and to be named Southern Syria.56 The propaganda
machine reported that armed Assyrians returning from Syria had muti-
lated the bodies of Iraqi soldiers, despite other reports that the French had
disarmed the Assyrians.57 An investigation was launched and according to
British reports, the army’s political officer was interviewed:
The political officer with the Army, who is present at Mosul, now gives
the account that the Assyrians burnt all the piquet equipment and that he
himself would go no further than to say the bodies were burnt inadvertently
in the burning of the tent etc. As to the beheading, all he knows for a fact is
that the unarmed(?) driver of the lorry had his throat cut.58
The reports indicated that the Iraqi political officer saw no evidence of
methodical injury. Yet it is evident from the final line that regardless of
the inquiry and evidence which would lessen the growing anti-Assyrian
zealotry, despite the Army official’s account, ‘the story which is believed’
and propagated became fact. True to his observation, the misinformation
about Assyrians mutilating bodies gave rise to a call by the Ikha al-Watani
(National Brotherhood) party in Mosul to eliminate all ‘foreign elements’
from Iraq, and it seemed Faisal had the intention to teach the Assyrians a
lesson.59
On 7 August, three days after the fighting began, Air Vice Marshal C. S.
Burnett, the British air officer commanding in Iraq, responded to an Iraqi
request for assistance by providing 100 bombs for use in military operations
against Assyrians.60 While Burnett may have been initially reluctant, Article
5 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 dictated that ‘His Britannic Majesty
must grant whenever possible ammunition arms equipment etc. for the forces
of His Majesty the King of Iraq’.61 He may have found numerous ways to
circumvent the matter, but he conceded fairly quickly that it remained the
only action to be taken. His sentiments were echoed by Prime Minister
Ramsay MacDonald not long after.62
It is unclear why the Iraqi army moved to surround Simele as most of
the men who had left for Syria were either hiding in the mountains, dead or
actually in Syria, while Simele housed predominantly women and children
as well as men who had not participated in the battles on the border and in
fact had sided with the non-patriarchal faction led by Malik Khoshaba. By
8 August, army personnel from Zakho entered Simele and collected all the
ammunition belonging to Assyrians in the village.63 On the following day the
weaponless men sought refuge in the local police headquarters, where they
waited for the qaimaqam of Dohuk. Upon arrival the qaimaqam collected all
the weapons and ammunition of the local Assyrians and sent it to Dohuk.
Soon after he sent for a local priest, Qasha Sada, Badal of Kharab Kulki and
Rayis Talo of Baz, who were rounded up with eleven other men and sent by
armoured car to Dohuk, meeting their end in the vicinity of the village of
Aloka, where they were shot.64 Eyewitnesses reported of Sada that ‘his male
organ having been cut was placed in his mouth, his head had been severed
from his body’.65 This occurred consistently over the next few days: Assyrians
were rounded up and shot in the road.
On the same day the Iraqi air force bombed the village of Ziwa and
killed a woman, under the false pretence that Assyrians had been in the
village. After further investigation, local residents stated that no Assyrians
had been in the vicinity. The immediate British response to the grow-
ing fear and destruction was indifference: ‘Four squadrons of British Air
Force, whose intervention has been confined, of recent months, to drop-
ping leaflets on Assyrians telling them to surrender. [The Assyrians] did
so and were m assacred a day or two later in cold blood.’66 On the 10th
the round-up continued and Assyrians were taken again from the village
and shot on the road. The army was in Simele, the last known residence of
Yaqo Ismael, the leader of the troublesome element. While his wife was in
residence, the vast majority of the Assyrians in Simele were in fact of the Baz
tribe, and evidently not a party to the plans of the patriarchal faction led by
Yaqo.67
The tide of hate arose across the country. Between 9 and 14 August Arab
employees of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) in Baiji, a refinery town

more than 120 miles north of Baghdad on the way to Mosul, attacked local
Assyrian workers in a fit of mob zealotry. As night fell on the infamous day
of 11 August, Assyrians were attacked by what appeared to be both local
tribesmen and IPC w orkers, who wounded fourteen and killed one. A few
days later the IPC’s Arab employees went on strike until the majority of
Assyrian workers were let go.68
The Massacre at Simele
During those weeks preceding the massacre, Assyrians from south of Simele
had begun moving into the village since suffering continuous raiding from
nearby tribes. On Friday 11 August two lorry-loads of police from Dohuk
visited Simele armed with machine guns.69 On the same morning, following
the entrance of the police, between 300 and 500 Assyrians came into the vil-
lage. When they arrived they were asked to surrender their arms to the Iraqi
military, who ‘then proceeded to massacre them with machine gun and rifle
fire. Aside from one wounded man, there were no survivors’; all the adult
males in the village that day were killed.70
A cold-blooded and methodical massacre of all the men in the village then
followed, a massacre for which in the black treachery in which it was con-
ceived and the callousness with which it was carried out, was as foul a crime
as any in the blood-stained annals of the Middle East. The Assyrians had no
fight left in them partly because of the state of mind to which the events of
the past week had reduced them, largely because they were disarmed. Had
they been armed it seems certain that Ismail Abawi Tohalla and his bravos
would have hesitated to take them on in a fair fight. Having disarmed them,
they proceeded with the massacre according to plan. This took some time.
Not that there was any hurry, for the troops had the whole day ahead of
them. Their opponents were helpless and there was no chance of any inter-
ference from any quarter whatsoever. Machine gunners set up their guns
outside the windows of the houses in which the Assyrians had taken refuge,
and having trained them on the terror-stricken wretches in the crowded
rooms, fired among them until not a man was left standing in the shambles.
In some other instances the blood lust of the troops took a slightly more
active form, and men were dragged out and shot or bludgeoned to death
and their bodies thrown on a pile of dead.71
This was not the only incident, and the killing, raping and pillaging did
not cease for a full month. Eyewitnesses recounted the abhorrent barbar-
ity of the slaughter that affected both men and women. Women had their
bellies slashed and their wombs ripped out and placed upon their heads for
amusement. Girls were taken into captivity by the army, and were never seen
again.72 In one house, eighty-two men of the Baz tribe and their families
who had surrendered were massacred. Even Goriel (Gabriel) Shimun of Baz,
known to be friendly towards the Iraqi government, was shot while hoisting
a white flag of parley.73 Some children survived through the quick thinking
of the womenfolk:
My friends and I saw a plane fly into Simele and start firing on us. Assyrians
gathered in houses. [Since the men were being slaughtered,] the women
began making the young boys (including me) look like girls so they would
not be killed. The third day after the killing began, they (some wearing Iraqi
uniforms, some not) rounded up some Assyrians and said, ‘Either become
Muslim or we will kill you.’74
Initially this spared the boys and young men who were being killed on site.
Soon this tactic too would fail as reports began to surface that even nine-year-
old girls were being raped and burnt alive.75 Most children were stabbed to
death as they threw themselves over the naked and headless corpses of their
mothers.
While the massacre had begun in Simele village, Assyrians were rounded
up elsewhere, including the steps of the American mission house at Dohuk.
On the same day, 11 August, two men of the Diz tribe were tied, handcuffed
and escorted by five policemen towards a governmental building where they
were shot in cold blood. A day later another Diz man, bleeding from a gun-
shot wound, was left by the local police to die by a stream 150 yards from the
government building. The local priest, Qasha Shmiwal, was beaten, arrested
and taken away by the qaimaqam and his men. He was later stripped, taken
to a location out of sight and shot.76
According to reports, on 12 August eleven Assyrians were killed,
seventeen wounded and seventeen more captured by a patrol.77 On the 13th

in the village of Badi more than forty Arab and Kurdish policemen took four
men out of a house and shot them immediately. The elderly men were forced
to walk to the nearby mosque and obliged to become Muslim. After the first
refused and was killed, the remaining men silently accepted, whereupon they
were instructed by the local mullah in the teachings of Islam and its expecta-
tions. This campaign against the men continued in Badi for five days and
included the looting of households and finally the arrest and appropriation
of most of the remaining young women to a nearby village; they were never
heard from again.78 Any fleeing Assyrians were shot on sight. The military
had incited Kurdish irregulars to attack Assyrian regions, and in Dohuk and
Zakho, more than 100 peasants, including priests on three occasions, were
taken out of their houses by the Iraqi army and ‘shot in batches’.79
Here and there in the mountains they came up with fugitive Assyrians. And
every Assyrian they caught they shot out of hand. Clearly by now the Army
had decided that the Assyrians, as far as possible, were to be exterminated.
No pretence was made that these operations had any purely military objec-
tive, for the Army Intelligence officers did not even take the trouble to
cross-question the captured Assyrians, who were simply shot as they were
rounded up . . . it was evident by now that the Army Command was quite
certain in its own mind that, in its decision to wipe out the Assyrians, it
would . . . be backed not only by Arab public opinion, but by the Baghdad
Government.80
In his account of the events, Gerald de Gaury, British military officer to Saudi
Arabia, lamented:
Whoever fired the first shot in a brush on the Syrian frontier on the fourth
of August, there could be no justification for the shooting down of Assyrians
in villages far away . . . The people killed were entirely innocent. It was
enough for them to be Assyrians to be shot.81
Beyond the death toll were many atrocities including women and children
raped and abducted as booty, as well as hundreds of villages looted, razed and
destroyed (see Table 6).82
Table 6 Villages destroyed, razed, looted and/or forcibly abandoned during the
Simele massacres (Region is divided into governorate, district and sub-district – in
some cases two of the three or all three are identical)95
Village Population/tribe Families/houses Region

1 Gere-Bahen
2 Garmawa Baz Dohuk
3 Iazkin Dohuk
4 Karrana 110 Baz 25 houses Dohuk
5 Khabartu Baz Dohuk
(Kabartu, Kabirtu)
6 Kola Hassan Dohuk
7 Kore-Gavana Upper Tiyari Dohuk
8 Ruhaidi Baz Dohuk
9 Shindokha Dohuk
10 Tutika Dohuk
11 At.ush Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh
12 Berbangi Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh
13 Cham Ashaki Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh
14 Deralok 130 Baz Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh
15 Gund Kosa 150 Lower Tiyari 28 families Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh
(in 1938)
16 Musalakia Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh
17 Safra Zor 35 Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh
18 Sawura (Sawra) Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh
19 Challik (Chelok, 210 Lower Tiyari Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh
Chalke, Chelki) Barwari Bala
20 Kani Balav (Kanya 110 Lower Tiyari Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh
Balave, Kani Balaf ) Barwari Bala
21 Pirozan (Beluzan) Tkhuma (200?) Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh
Barwari Bala
22 Barzanke Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh
Sarsang
23 Cham ‘Ashrat Upper Tiyari Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh
(70?) Sarsang
24 Dohoke (Dahoki) Tkhuma Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh
Sarsang
25 Masiki (Musa Laka) Baz (55?) Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh
Sarsang
26 Qadish (Akdish) (150?) Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh
Sarsang
27 Sikrīne Tkhuma (65?) Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh
Sarsang

28 Suse (Cham Sus) Lower Tiyari 200 Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh
Sarsang
29 Tahlawa Lower Tiyari Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh
(75?) Sarsang
30 Bazhora Lower Tiyari Dohuk ‘Aqra
Girdasin
31 Jalan-Arabok Lower Tiyari Dohuk ‘Aqra
Girdasin
32 Khalikan Lower Tiyari 12 families Dohuk ‘Aqra
(in 1938) Girdasin
33 Guske Upper Tiyari Dohuk ‘Aqra Nahla
34 Kashkawa 134 35 families Dohuk ‘Aqra Nahla
(in 1938)
35 Kortka (Kurtkan) Lower Tiyari Dohuk ‘Aqra Nahla
36 Shirti (Sherita) Lower Tiyari Dohuk ‘Aqra Nahla
37 Ala Kina Dohuk Doski
38 Alqoshta (Alkishke) Baz Dohuk Doski
39 Cham Kare Lower Tiyari Dohuk Doski
40 Derke Dohuk Doski
41 Gundikta (Gundik Dohuk Doski
Nabi)
42 Gund-Naze Lower Tiyari Dohuk Doski
43 Kavla-Sin Upper Tiyari 80 Dohuk Doski
(Kola-Sine, Kafla
Sin, Kavla Hasan)
44 Korbel (Kar Bile, Dohuk Doski
Karbil)
45 Majal Makhte Upper Tiyari Dohuk Doski
(190?)
46 Nawdara (Navdara) Dohuk Doski
47 Aloka (upper) Upper Tiyari Dohuk Sheikhan
(30?) Atrush
48 Badrdin (Badr Upper Tiyari Dohuk Sheikhan
al-Din) Atrush
49 Bestawa (Bastava) Dohuk Sheikhan
Atrush
50 Nourdinawa Dohuk Sheikhan
(Nurdinawa) Atrush
51 Badariyah 100 Tkhuma Dohuk Sheikhan
Qasrok
52 Bajilla Tkhuma Dohuk Sheikhan
Qasrok
Table 6 (continued)

53 Kifre Tkhuma Dohuk Sheikhan
Qasrok
54 Malla- Birwan 35 Jilu Dohuk Sheikhan
(Mulla Barwan) Qasrok
55 ‘Ain Dulbe (Dulip, Dohuk Simele
Deleb, Idlib)
56 Badaliya Baz Dohuk Simele
57 Bakhitme Dohuk Simele
58 Be Torshi (Batirshi, Tkhuma/Upper Dohuk Simele
Batarshah) Tiyari
59 Cham Jihane Tkhuma/Upper Dohuk Simele
(Jajamani) Tiyari
60 Cham-Gaur/Gawir Lower Tiyari Dohuk Simele
61 Dari Dohuk Simele
62 Gera-Gora Dohuk Simele
(Gre-Gure)
63 Giril (Karpil, Garfil) Tkhuma/Upper Dohuk Simele
Tiyari
64 Gutba (Qutba) Dohuk Simele
65 Hajisni Upper Tiyari Dohuk Simele
66 Hejerke (Hizeerke) Baz (85?) Dohuk Simele
67 Kharab Kulke Baz Dohuk Simele
68 Kolabni (Kulabne) Baz Dohuk Simele
69 Kwashe (Kowashe) Upper Tiyari Dohuk Simele
70 Lazga (Lazaka, Dohuk Simele
Lazkin)
71 Mansuriya (Misurik) Lower Tiyari Dohuk Simele
72 Marona Dohuk Simele
73 Mavan (Mawana) Baz Dohuk Simele
74 Muqble Dohuk Simele
75 Qasr Yazdin Baz Dohuk Simele
76 Sayyid Zahir (Sezari) Baz Dohuk Simele
77 Ser Shari (Sar Shur) Tkhuma/Upper Dohuk Simele
Tiyari
78 Simele Baz Dohuk Simele
79 Tel Zayt (Tal Zer) Tkhuma/Upper Dohuk Simele
Tiyari
80 Der Jindi/Jundi Dohuk Simele
Fayda

81 Dosteka (Dostka) Tkhuma Dohuk Simele
Fayda
82 Kani-Gulan Dohuk Simele
Fayda
83 Karaiphan Shamizdin 11 families Dohuk Simele
(Cariphan, (in 1938) Fayda
Kraipahin)
84 Khirsheniya Marbishu/Jilu Dohuk Simele
(15?) Fayda
85 Qala‘ d’Badri Baz Dohuk Simele
Fayda
86 Reqawa (Rekawa) Jilu, some Baz/ 3 families Dohuk Simele
Marbishu (in 1938) Fayda
87 Salah.iya Tkhuma Dohuk Simele
Fayda
88 Sheikhidra (Sheikh- Marbishu Dohuk Simele
Khidr) Fayda
89 Sina Dohuk Simele
Fayda
90 Tel Hish (Tel Khish, Tkhuma/Gawar/ Dohuk Simele
Khishaf ) Mar-Bishu Fayda
91 Zeniyat Baz Dohuk Simele
Fayda
92 Zorawa Dohuk Simele
Fayda
93 Bamir (Ba-Mere) Bohtan Dohuk Simele
Slevani
94 Basitke (lower) Tkhuma Dohuk Simele
Slevani
95 Basitke (upper) Tkhuma Dohuk Simele
Slevani
96 Kar-Sin (Gar-Shin) Tkhuma Dohuk Simele
Slevani
97 Spindarok Lower Tiyari Dohuk Zakho
Guli
98 Babilo (Babalu) Baz 18 families Dohuk Zawita
(in 1938)
99 Badi (Bade) Dohuk Zawita
100 Bagiri (Bakir) Lower Baz/Upper Tiyari Dohuk Zawita
150
101 Bagiri (Bakir) Upper Lower Tiyari Dohuk Zawita
Table 6 (continued)

102 Baroski (Baroshke) Upper and Lower Dohuk Zawita
Tiyari
103 Biswaya (Be Sawa) Marbishu Dohuk Zawita
104 ‘Ain Sifni Baz Ninawa Sheikhan
105 Basifni Jilu Ninawa Sheikhan
106 Naristik Ninawa Sheikhan
107 Bativer (Be-Tafre, Upper Tiyari Ninawa Sheikhan
Ba-Tipre) Atrush
108 Begahe (Begah) Upper Tiyari Ninawa Sheikhan
Atrush
109 Benarink Upper Tiyari Ninawa Sheikhan
(Be-Naringe) Atrush
110 Dizze Ninawa Sheikhan
Atrush
111 ‘Ain Baqri Jilu Ninawa Tell-Kayf
Alqosh
112 ‘Ain Helwa 100 Bohtan 27 families Ninawa Tell-Kayf
(in 1938) Alqosh
113 Baqqaq Baz Ninawa Tell-Kayf
Alqosh
114 Dikan (Dahkan, 32 5 houses Ninawa Tell-Kayf
Dakhan) Alqosh
115 Jarahiya 11 Jilu Ninawa Tell-Kayf
Alqosh
116 Karanjawa 35 Ninawa Tell-Kayf
(Karanjak) Alqosh
117 Makana (Machna) Jilu Ninawa Tell-Kayf
Alqosh
118 Pirozawa (Porusawa, 65 Baz Ninawa Tell-Kayf
Birozawa) Alqosh
119 Qasrune 38 Bohtan 7 families Ninawa Tell-Kayf
(in 1938) Alqosh
120 Taftiya(n) (Totiyan) 120 Ninawa Tell-Kayf
Alqosh
121 Nās.erīyā 41 Jilu 18 families Sheikhan
(only 2
remained
in 1938)
The narrative of Jatou
The extermination plan did not end with the civilians at Simele. The govern-
ment and military desired to make an example of the Hakkâri tribesmen for
their settled brethren sympathetic to their cause. After the initial extermina-
tions took place, a call from Baghdad was made to Jatou of Dohuk, a police
station chief in ‘Aqra.83 Directives from Baghdad ordered Jatou to round
up three truck-loads of Assyrians and bring them to Simele, presumably for
execution. Jatou, himself an Assyrian, struggled with the order for a sleepless
night as he relived the deaths of his sister and mother, who had been killed
in the massacres not twenty years earlier in the failing Ottoman empire and
the creation of the Young Turk regime. But by daybreak, he had come to a
decision and executed the preliminary part of his orders.
As the native Assyrians (here many were of Chaldean ecclesiastical
background) observed from rooftops, the former Hakkâri Assyrians were
loaded onto the trucks. As they drove off, sighs were expelled and fears
voiced as onlookers lamented, ‘Shmutlokhun khasan’ (‘You have broken our
strength [literally ‘back’]’).84 Jatou then drove his wards in the direction of
Simele. At a major junction along the way he decided to turn off towards the
town of Ma‘althaya and continue to the Jacobite monastery of Mar Mattai,
situated in a remote mountain pass 100 kilometres south of Simele. There
he unloaded and spoke to a resident monk, threatening to return without
notice to check on the welfare of his wards. The fugitives remained in the
monastery for three months, after which time they began to trickle back
towards their homes following a lull in the persecution and discrimination
that had begun in August 1933. Thus some were saved, but the damage had
been done. The message of what could happen to any man, woman or child
identified as Assyrian created dread in their more integrated or assimilated
brethren.
Rhetoric from the regime
As King Faisal was abroad, his regent, Prince Ghazi, gave permission to
the leader of the governmental forces, Colonel Baqr Sidqi, to eliminate any
and all Assyrians.85 Sidqi, of Kurdish descent, was among many to utilise a
growing tide of anti-Western, anti-Christian (Assyrian) rhetoric to further
his consolidation of power. Sidqi used the murders of these thousands of

Assyrian ‘separatists’, as they became popularly termed by the national media,
to catapult his career as a military hero.86 The government’s rejoinder to the
massacres was abject denial:
The Iraq Government denies the massacre, claiming that it was punitive
action against rebels. Obviously Government officials, the police and the
army will not testify to it, and there seem to be no male survivors. Also
intimidation would doubtless play a part in the prevention of testimony.87
When Faisal returned to comment on the issue, he stated, ‘It is a disgrace to

talk about massacres. Not one woman was molested.’88 Eyewitness testimony,
however, painted a very different picture:
After killing all the men, the soldiers stripped the dead, taking their things
of value, and went after the women. The Arabs and the Kurds looted the vil-
lage. The better-looking women were mishandled, stripped, and let go. The
wife of Yako, the supposed leader of the Assyrians, who left for Syria, was
repeatedly violated, stripped, and let go, and so were her two daughters.89
The Minister of the Interior, Hikmet Beg Suleiman, had left Baghdad to
see the destruction with his own eyes. His reaction was recorded by Colonel
R. S. Stafford:
I was sitting in my office on the morning of August 15th when Hikmet

Beg returned. He came straight into my room in a state of collapse, for
he had just come from Simmel, and even he, cynical Turk as he was, had
been overcome by the horrors which he had seen. On the previous day
I had received reports that there were large numbers of Assyrian women
and children in Simmel living in a state of starvation, but not a word had
been said in these reports about the massacre which was the cause of this
destitution . . . When I visited Simmel myself with Major Thomson on
August 17th few traces could be seen of what had occurred, but the sight
of the women and children is one which I shall never forget – and I spent
more than three years in the trenches in France!90
To add further injury, on 16 August the Iraqi government passed an emer-

gency law for the deportation of the entire family of the Church of the
Figure 9 Batarshah, approximately 15 miles northwest of Simele, reportedly attacked by Arab and Kurdish irregulars, 18 September
1933. The circular pits are traits of bombings (The Service of Air Vice-Marshal Gerard Combe in the Royal Air Force, 1923–1946,
HU 89458, Imperial War Museum)
Figure 10 Dakhan or Dikan village following desertion of at least five families. Simele surveillance photo, AIR 2/883/002
Figure 11 Unnamed Assyrian village destroyed in 1933. Simele surveillance photo, AIR 2/883/010. Many thanks to Fadi Dawood for
his extensive research in unearthing these photographs
East patriarch, including his father David and his brother Theodore. On the
morning of 18 August, Mar Eshai Shimun along with his two relatives was
carried by British aeroplane ‘to Cyprus via Palestine accompanied by two
Assyrian officers, Rab Imma Malik Hormiz of Tkhuma and Rab Khamshi
officer Yaku Eliya’.91 As for the mass destruction, there was a cursory official
inquiry into the massacres, but no one was held responsible for the brutal-
ity reported. In stark contrast, in the wake of the crimes perpetrated against
mostly unarmed civilians, Colonel Sidqi was promoted and received a victory
parade upon his return to Baghdad.
The American minister resident/consul general in Iraq, Paul Knabenshue,
reported in two dispatches at the end of August that parades for Iraqi troops
in both Baghdad and Mosul were met by cheering men, women and chil-
dren. Shops were closed and a holiday ensued amid palpable jubilation as the
victorious troops were strewn with flowers and rosewater.92
One section of the victorious Iraq army returning from the front is now
quartered at Mosul, and another section is arriving at Baghdad to-day.
Mosul gave an enthusiastic welcome to its allotment. Triumphal arches
were erected, decorated with watermelons shaped as [Assyrian] skulls into
which daggers were thrust and with red streamers suspended, intended, it is
assumed, to represent blood.93
Only one unfortunate incident marked the otherwise peaceful dem-
onstration during the day. Most of the Baghdad Assyrian population, cog-
nizant of the potential danger to themselves, remained quietly secluded in
their houses. One recently discharged Assyrian Levies’ Officer, however,
was on his way to the railway station to meet his wife and family when the
crowd suddenly espied and maliciously murdered him.94
The aftermath
Not only the massacres but also the repercussions from them exponentially
altered as a whole. In Iraq as in Geneva, the Assyrians, both patriarchal and
non-patriarchal factions, felt the chill of betrayal. The British voiced their
fear for the safety of the Assyrians only to stall the inquiry commissioner, a
representative of the League of Nations, in his attempts to enter Iraq in the
immediate aftermath of Simele.
Since they had created this state of affairs, the British authorities were
naturally disinclined to change it. Even after the end of the mandate, the
embassy was more concerned to cover up for the Iraqi government than to
deplore their sins of commission: after the Assyrian massacre in the summer
of 1933, Sir Francis Humphrys recommended that Britain should do her
utmost to forestall the dispatch of a League of Nations Commission of
Enquiry.96
Perhaps a comment by William Yale sums up the colonial and Middle Eastern
perceptions concerning the Assyrians and their harsh predicament: ‘These
valiant and stubborn people had come to the end of their long tempestuous
history, victims of hatreds engendered by the clash between Western imperi-
alism and the rising nationalism of Near Eastern peoples.’97
International Recognition?
Though influential writers and researchers lamented the Assyrian

predicament, some strove to remedy the situation directly. In the most
renowned case, the Simele massacres (alongside those of the Ottoman
Empire) were not only invoked but became viable paradigms that influenced
a young Raphael Lemkin in the development of a framework concerning
the legal concept of mass murder. In October 1933, Lemkin left for Madrid
to present a paper on terrorism to the Association internationale de droit
pénal (AIDP). He had been moved to action by the horrific massacres and
violent destruction in the wake of the tragedy in and around Simele on 11
August 1933 and during the following weeks.98 Lemkin hoped that this
event would garner sympathy for his proposals to the AIDP and League
of Nations for outlawing crimes against humanity.99 Lemkin proposed to
outlaw barbarity, ‘the extermination of ethnic, social, and religious groups
by pogroms, massacres, or economic discrimination’, and vandalism, ‘the
destruction of cultural or artistic works which embod[y] the genius of a
specific people’.100 Regrettably, his proposal was never voted on and upon
his return to Poland he fell under pressure from the Polish Foreign Minister
for comments made in Madrid to resign from his position as a public pros-
ecutor. It was evident that promoting minority rights and challenging the
status quo was not well thought of, and while Lemkin’s professional life
suffered, he continued to be propelled by the events of the First World

War and Simele, as well as the treatment of European Jewry in the follow-
ing decades, leading to the proposal and ratification of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNGC) by
the newly formed United Nations in 1948. Lamentably for the victims
of Simele and the First World War, the UNGC was not applied to prior
events, as it lacked retroactivity.
Road to the Republic
The events of Simele served as a blueprint for succeeding governments’

treatment of minorities, while catapulting the army into the centre of Iraqi
politics. From 1933 until 1940, under the reign of Prince Ghazi, a series of
military coups attempted to take control over the country until the crown
prince’s death in 1939. Meanwhile the Assyrians who had fled Iraq to Syria
on that auspicious day in August in 1933 were now living new lives along
the river Khabur. They settled in sixteen villages (see Table 7), four of
which – Tel Chama, Tel Umrane and Tel Ajaj (of the Tkhuma tribe) and
Tel Asafir (Diz) – were subsequently divided into fourteen new villages to
give a grand total of twenty-six.101
Back on the other side of the border, not two years after Ghazi’s death,
on 1 April 1941, while Iraq was under the regency of Prince ‘Abdallah
(ruling for the underage Faisal II), the anti-British Prime Minister, Rashid
‘Ali al-Gaylani, staged a successful coup. The new order under al-Gaylani
was exceedingly Arab nationalist and at the least ideologically influenced if
not supported by the fascist regime of Nazi Germany. In June 1941, after
the Anglo-Iraqi War had ended, the Pan-Arab agenda under al-Gaylani’s
leadership became frighteningly apparent when Yunis Sab‘awi, an associate
of al-Gaylani’s government and a member of the far-right and pan-Arab al-
Muthanna Club, led a mob attack on the Baghdad Jewish community (who
like the Assyrians were painted as supporters of the West), an assault some-
times referred to as the farhud.102 The event, in blueprint rather than scope,
exhibited uncanny and ‘disturbing parallels’ to Simele as yet another Iraqi
community would suffer in the midst of political and security instabilities
and arrogance.103 The man at the centre of much of the ideology was Colonel
Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh, who unlike Colonel Baqr Sidqi and others who
Table 7 Assyrian settlement along the Khabur, 31 August 1938
Village Population Tribe
Tel Tammar 1,542 Tiyari

Tel Umrane 1,077 Tkhuma
Tel Chama 1,054 Tkhuma
Tel Maghas 965 Sara
Tel Um Rafa 603 Tiyari
Tel Shamiran 574 Mar Bishu
Tel Nasri 501 Tiyari
Tel Jama 487 Halamon
Tel Tal’a 427 Sara
Tel/Wadi Massas 392 Barwar
Tel Asafir 361 Diz
Tel Hafyan 318 Quchanis
Tel Ajaj 146 Tkhuma
Tel Kaifji 141 Liwan
Tel Baz 137 Baz
Tel Um Kaif 113 Timar d’Van
Total 8,838
utilised such movements for political gain, candidly believed in the discourse
of the Pan-Arab movement.104
Al-Gaylani sundered the Anglo-Iraqi Agreement of 1930 with the besieg-
ing of the RAF force at Habbaniya, about 90 kilometres west of Baghdad,
on 30 April 1941. In response to the coup, the British once again acted to
restore the monarchy. The Iraqi levies of the RAF at Habbaniya still con-
tained forty Assyrian officers and hundreds of others of various ranks who
helped defend their position at the camp against foot soldiers as well as aerial
attacks by German warplanes, effectively dissipating any momentum Gaylani
had formed. Sending in larger forces, specifically the Indian 20th infantry
brigade through Basra and reinforcements from the Transjordan, the British
eventually quelled the rebellion by pursuing the Iraqi army to Fallujah and
finally to Baghdad. A week later the monarchy was reinstated.
In the following years, integration into Iraq became the new concern
of most Assyrians no longer a part of the levies force. Most settled/urban
Assyrians managed to integrate with relative ease into the new culturally
Arab-dominated Iraq with the exception of those farther north in the Dohuk
and Zakho regions, where Arab influence was negligible.105 In the example of
the Mosul region, most urban dwellers identified solely with their religious
community. Indeed, Assyrian-Aramaic had been lost among the majority of
city dwellers of the region (those of the outlying villages excluded), though
the form of Arabic spoken in Mosul (as well as the Syrian Jezirah) retained a
strong Aramaic and Akkadian influence.106 Undoubtedly, those tribes of the
Hakkâri region lacked this assimilationist deportment and rather retained
aspects of a fiercely sovereign tribal warrior culture, something akin to their
Kurdish neighbours. Such an attitude and mindset would be the prime
reason behind their initial and continued service in elite battalions in the
Royal Air Force.
An added issue was a deliberate policy to contain any spread of (as
well as Kurdish and Turkoman) nationalist sentiments and secondly,
in the case of the Assyrians, the denial of nativeness. This became more
apparent as the Iraqi monarchy attempted to consolidate control once

again after the humiliation of the Gaylani coup, especially in the form
of print capital as what was disseminated to the world about Iraq and
its people. In an official governmental publication from 1946 entitled
Kingdom of Iraq, Assyrians are mentioned briefly under the umbrella term
‘Christians’ and as Nestorians, ‘who have the purely political denomination
“Assyrians”’ and were brought ‘back to Iraq’ in 1917 thanks to the ‘fortunes
of war’.107
The Assyrians found themselves bereft of positions and titles in post-
1941 Iraq. They counted neither among the ‘senior officials, magistrates,
judges, army officers, or ministers’ nor among the deputies in parliament,
while other communities benefited tremendously.108 Under these conditions,
lacking both internal strength in numbers and political clout and external
(foreign) support, the Assyrian cultural and national movement developed
more slowly and with more difficulty than those of their Arab and Kurdish
neighbours. This was especially true following the detrimental fragmentation
of its religious communities, through foreign and domestic influence, and as
a repercussion from the Simele massacre.
Consequently, early attempts at creating Assyrian cultural and political
groups to aid in the establishment of Assyrian ethno-religious, cultural and
political rights in Iraq were few. Some underground groups were established
during this period, the most renowned of which was Khubbā w-Khuyada
Ātūrayā (Assyrian Love and Unity). A previous organisation with the same
initials, Kheit Kheit Allap (XXH), was founded in 1942 as an underground
organisation among RAF personnel (as Assyrian activities deemed national-
ist were forbidden by both the RAF and the Iraqi government) by a carpen-
ter, Mushe Khoshaba, in Habbaniya. Ousta Mushe, as he was commonly
known, was born in Solduz, Persia in 1876 and fought with General Petros
Elia in the First World War.109 As for Khubbā w-Khuyada Ātūrayā, its struc-
ture was highly systematised with oaths of allegiance, secret ceremonies of
initiation, codenames and passwords.110 The movement found compatriots
and supporters within the IPC in Kirkuk, Basra and Mosul, in Urmia in
Iran and in Syria, as well as reaching across ecclesiastical lines to include the
Church of the East, Chaldeans, Protestants, and others. XXH lasted until
the end of the decade, when it disbanded in the midst of the chaos that
ensued following the dismantling of the remaining levy battalions and their
abandonment by the British military.111
By contrast, the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) became a refuge for politi-
cally and numerically smaller peoples with financial backing from a large
external player. It grew intensely in popularity among the minorities in Iraq,
especially the secular elites and academics. With Soviet expansion into central
Asia and the Caucasus in 1921, Western powers had begun a policy of sup-
porting the highly centralised, nationalist and militarist regimes in Iran, Iraq,
Syria and Turkey. Assyrians through the ICP played a fundamental role in
shaping the political history of Iraq. In 1941 Yusuf Salman Yusuf, known
by the cadre name Fahd (‘Panther’), became secretary of the party and set
about restructuring the organisation and expanding membership among the
working classes.112 Yusuf integrated a greater population into the Communist
Party, and between 1941 and 1949 under the restored monarchy, Assyrians
made up a sizeable percentage of the party.113
The power of the King was failing, and a young Faisal II (not coming
into his majority until May of 1953) could not control the ambitions of
his regent, General Nur al-Din Mahmud, who had declared martial law in
November 1952 after widespread discord and protests by the ICP. Such
discord resulted in eighteen executions, the banning of various parties, and
more than 300 arrests.114
Meanwhile the European continent faced the gradual development of

ultra-nationalism, embroiling it in the tumultuous period of the Second
World War. During this time, in some small yet significant way, the Assyrians
continued to influence Raphael Lemkin. In the preface of his 1943 book Axis
Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals
for Redress Lemkin coined the term genocide (from the Greek genos, meaning
‘race’ or ‘tribe,’ and the Latin ending -cide, denoting ‘killing’). He used the
term synonymously with ethnocide (or cultural genocide/destruction), which
he defined as a combination of the crimes of barbarism and vandalism, as
brought forth to the AIDP in Madrid in late 1933.115 Lemkin likened the
brutal Nazi policies and massacres of the Jews during the Second World War
and the Holocaust to the massacres of the Armenians (including the Greeks
and Assyrians) in the waning Ottoman period during the nation-building
process under the Young Turks.116 Thus, two major events – the massacres of
Simele and those within Eastern Anatolia – that Lemkin utilised to shed light
on human rights violations on the international stage (especially in regard
to the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany and the subsequent treatment of
European Jewry) specifically involved the Assyrians. After numerous failed
attempts, Lemkin would use those past atrocities as examples and momen-
tum in the midst of the horrors of the Second World War to ignite support
for the UNGC, which would go on to be ratified by the United Nations on
9 December 1948.117
Notes
1. Most of this is mentioned in oral accounts. See the story of Ezra Warda
(Effendi) of Baz and his interception of the government telegram calling for an
Assyrian massacre in ‘Abdyešu‘ Barzana, Šinnē d-‘Asqūtā: Qrābā d-Dayrabūn
w-Gunh.ā d-Simele [‘Years of Hardship: The Battle of Dayrabūn and the Simele
Massacre’] (Chicago: Assyrian Academic Society, 2003), 212–20.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 324–5.
4. Report by the UK to the League of Nations on the Administration of ‘Iraq for the
Year 1930, Colonial No. 62 (London: 1931), 29.
5. Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002), 74.
6. Yusuf Malek, The British Betrayal of the Assyrians (Chicago: Assyrian National
Federation/Assyrian National League of America, 1935), 196–7.
7. Alexander Sloan, ambassador to Iraq, American Consular Services, American
Consulate General, Jerusalem, Palestine, to Wallace Murray, Near Eastern
Affairs, Department of State, 31 August 1933, 890g.4016 Assyrians/
93.
8. Paul Knabenshue, US ambassador to Iraq, to Wallace Murray, containing letter
from Mr Cumberland to Secretary of State, 13 September 1933, 890g.4016
Assyrians/110.
9. Theodore d’Mar Shimun, The History of the Patriarchal Succession of the d’Mar
Shimun Family, 2nd ed. (Turlock, CA: Mar Shimun Memorial Foundation,
2008), 102–3.
Assyrians/110.
11. Memorandum from Air Headquarters, Iraq to secretary to high commissioner,
Baghdad, 2 October 1923, enclosing secret report from Major J. M. S. Renton,
Headquarters, Iraq Levies, Mosul to officer commanding, Iraq Levies, Mosul,
12 September 1923, AIR 23/449.
12. Malek, The British Betrayal of the Assyrians, 222–3. Use of capitals is true to
Malek’s version.
13. Tripp, A History of Iraq, 75. See also Rev. W. A. Wigram DD, Our Smallest Ally:
A Brief Account of the Assyrian Nation in the Great War (London: Society for
Promoting Christian Knowledge / New York: Macmillan, 1920); Humphrys
as quoted in Malek, The British Betrayal of the Assyrians, 196.
14. D’Mar Shimun, The History of the Patriarchal Succession of the D’Mar Shimun
Family, 105.
1935), 114.
16. Ibid., 78.
17. Malek, The British Betrayal of the Assyrians, 213.
18. See A. M. Hamilton, Road through Kurdistan: The Narrative of an Engineer in
Iraq, new ed. (London: Faber & Faber, 1958). Hamilton speaks frequently of
Yaqo and the attitude of the Assyrians during the creation of the road.
19. See Ofra Bengio, ‘Faysal’s Vision of Iraq: A Retrospect’, in Asher Susser and
Aryeh Shmuelevitz (eds), The Hashemites in the Modern Arab World: Essays in
Honour of the Late Professor Uriel Dann (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 143–9.
An Arabic version exists in ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Hasani, Ta’rikh al-Wizarat al-

‘Iraqiyya, Vol. 3.
20. League of Nations, Official Journal 14 (December 1933), 1808.
21. Daniel Silverfarb, Britain’s Informal Empire in the Middle East: The Case Study
of Iraq 1929–1941 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 42.
22. Malik Yaqo Ismael, Aturayé w-tre plashe tībilayé [‘Assyrians and the Two World
Wars’] (Tehran: Assyrian Writers Board, 1964), 214–15.
23. Malek, The British Betrayal of the Assyrians, 238; ‘Letter and Report from Major
Thompson, Expert for the Settlement of the Assyrians in Iraq, to the Iraqi
Government, Mosul, September 28, 1933’, League of Nations Official Journal
14 (1933), 1831. The report was completed prior to the Simele massacres.
25. ‘Letter and Report from Major Thompson’, 1841. Thompson estimated five
souls per family, rather lower than the reality of closer to seven. Thompson
calls those of Hakkâri ex-Ottoman subjects, which is misleading as everyone
in Iraq was an ex-Ottoman subject. Furthermore, Thompson seemingly is only
concerned with those Assyrians under Mar Shimun’s authority and therefore
neglects Catholics and Jacobites.
26. Hamilton, Road through Kurdistan, 217.
28. Ibid., 121.
29. Ibid., 139.
30. Malek, The British Betrayal of the Assyrians, 250. See also Silverfarb, Britain’s
Informal Empire in the Middle East, 42.
33. Mary Lewis Shedd, The Measure of a Man: The Life of William Ambrose Shedd,
Missionary to Persia (New York: George H. Doran, 1922), 231.
36. Ismael, Aturayé w-tre plashe tībilayé, 223.
38. The non-patriarchal faction grew in number to forty-five, claiming to represent
approximately 2,160 families numbering around 15,000 people. They signed
a document sent to the League of Nations stating that the Mar Shimun did
not speak for all the Assyrians in Iraq. See Textes des petitions et observations y
relatives des puissances mandataires examinees au cours de la 22ème session de la
commission permanente des mandats tenue a Genève du 3 novembre au 6 décembre

1932, League of Nations Archives, c.p.m. 1298.
39. Malik Loko Shlimon d’Bit Badawi, Assyrian Struggle for National Survival in
the 20th and 21st Centuries (2012), 330, 333.
41. Shlimon d’Bit Badawi, Assyrian Struggle for National Survival in the 20th and
21st Centuries, 331.
42. H. S. Goold, American Consulate General, Beirut, Syria to Secretary of State,
‘Irruption of Assyrians’, 9 August 1933, 890g.4016 Assyrians/61.
44. There seems to be some discrepancy regarding the correct day. Loko mentions
the 21st whereas Barzana, who was among those who arrived that day, recalls
the 20th (Shlimon d’Bit Badawi, Assyrian Struggle for National Survival in the
20th and 21st Centuries 338–9; Barzana, Šinnē d-‘asqūtā, 119–20. Here again
it is worth remembering the constant confusion over the actual position of the
border. Neither side seemed to know this and regularly debated about jurisdic-
tion. See Secret Memorandum from Special Service Officer, Mosul to Air Staff
(Intelligence), Air Headquarters, 23 July 1933, AIR 23/655.
45. Malek, The British Betrayal of the Assyrians, 254–5, also in Malik Loko Shlimon
(d’bit Badawi), Assyrian Struggle for National Survival in the 20th and 21st
Centuries, (2012), 340 as well as an original copy referred to as appendix 5.
46. Royal Government of Iraq, Correspondence Relating to Assyrian Settlement from
13th July, 1932 to 5th August, 1933 (Baghdad: Government Press, 1933), 2.
47. Secret Memorandum from Special Service Officer, Mosul to Air Staff
(Intelligence), Air Headquarters, 23 July 1933, AIR 23/655.
49. Ibid., 347.
50. Ibid., 358–9.
51. Parallel to the unfolding tribulations and the in light of recent events, the
British authorities created a list of undesirables who were slated for arrest and
deportation to Baghdad, including Lady Surma, Dawid d’Mar Shimun, Zaya
(Mar Shimun’s uncle), Alexander (Mar Shimun’s uncle), Dadda (agent of Mar
Shimun), Malik Andrius, Malik Sawa of Tal, Father Ishaq and Father Hanna
(possibly Church of the East priests), Shamasha Elia of Baz, Esho of Tkhuma,
Adam Zir of Jilu, Attu son of Shlimun son of Malik Ismael, Malikisdek son
of Shlimun son of Malik Ismael, Yuhanna Qass Iskharia (a teacher), Matti

of Quchanis, Yonathan Merkhail, Iskharia Patti, Father Paulos Bedari (a
Chaldean priest), Father Akhikar Kalaita (a Chaldean priest) and Theodore
(Mar Shimun’s brother). Secret Memorandum, serial no. 125, from Special
Service Officer, Mosul to Air Staff (Intelligence), Air Headquarters, 5 August
1933, AIR 23/655. Eventually only a handful were arrested and detained.
52. Goold to Secretary of State, ‘Irruption of Assyrians’; Malek, The British
Betrayal of the Assyrians, 254. See also Joseph Yacoub, The Assyrian Question
(Chicago: Alpha Graphic, 1986), 14–15. For more on the Nestorian settle-
ments along the Khabur in Syria, see Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq: Report
of the Committee of the Council on the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq in the
Region of the Ghab (French Mandated Territories of the Levant), League of
Nations Publications, Series I: Political, vol. 1935.VII.12.3. See also Shlimon
d’Bit Badawi, Assyrian Struggle for National Survival in the 20th and 21st
Centuries, 356–7.
53. Goold to Secretary of State, ‘Irruption of Assyrians’.
55. Malek, The British Betrayal of the Assyrians, 267; Silverfarb, Britain’s Informal
Empire in the Middle East, 42.
56. General Conditions/5, Knabenshue, Baghdad, 3 May 1933, USDOS 890g.00;
General Conditions/6, Knabenshue, Baghdad, 24 May 1933, USDOS
890g.00.
57. Stafford, The Tragedy of the Assyrians, 162; Report by Air Commodore A. D.
Cunningham, 5 August 1933, AIR 23/655. The report was based on his recent
visit to Mosul and stated that the stories were exaggerated and propagandistic.
58. See Secret Memorandum serial no. 126 from Special Service Officer, Mosul to
Air Staff (Intelligence), Air Headquarters, 6 August 1933, AIR 23/655.
59. Report by Air Vice Marshal C. S. Burkett, Air Headquarters, Iran Command,
of interview with King Faisal and Mr Ogilvie-Forbes at the Palace, 6 August
1933, AIR 23/655. The report contains the elements of Faisal’s comments
concerning the events at Feshkhābur and Dayrabūn.
60. Burnett to Air Ministry, 8 August 1933, FO 371/16884.
61. Silverfarb, Britain’s Informal Empire in the Middle East, 43.
62. Sir Robert Vansittart to MacDonald, 7 August 1933, FO 371/16884,
including a note from MacDonald dated 8 August 1933. This matter is cov-
ered extensively in Silverfarb, Britain’s Informal Empire in the Middle East,
43–5.
64. ‘Statement Made by Yushiya Dinka, of Malik Ismail, Upper Tiyari, Exhibit E
to Supplementary Petition, Dated September 24 1933, from the Mar Shimun,
“Catholicos” Patriarch of the Assyrians to the League of Nations’, League of
Nations Official Journal 14 (1933), 1827.
65. ‘Statement Made by Miryam, Wife of David Jindo, A Corporal in the Iraq
Levies, Exhibit D to Supplementary Petition, Dated September 24 1933, from
the Mar Shimun, “Catholicos” Patriarch of the Assyrians to the League of
Nations’, League of Nations Official Journal 14 (1933), 1826.
66. Malek, The British Betrayal of the Assyrians, 262, 305.
67. Secret Memorandum No. 1/M/33 serial no. 114 from Special Service Officer,
Mosul to Air Staff (Intelligence), Air Headquarters, 25 July 1933, giving a
list of the Assyrian tribal leaders reported to be with the immigrants, none of
whom were from the Baz tribe. AIR 23/655.
68. ‘Attack on the Assyrian Employed by the Iraq Petroleum Company, Exhibit F
to Supplementary Petition, Dated September 24 1933, from the Mar Shimun,
Nations Official Journal 14 (1933), 1828.
69. Extract from dispatch no. S11126 from Air Officer Commanding to Air
Commodore Cunningham, 22 August 1933, enclosing translation from Arabic
of proclamation by the acting mutasarrif of Mosul published in Al Tariq, 20
August 1933, AIR 23/656
70. United States Department of State, Diplomatic (no. 164), P. Knabenshue,
Subject: ‘Assyrians – Massacres in Northern Iraq’, Baghdad, 21 August 1933;
secret memorandum, serial no. 143, Special Service Officer, Mosul to Air Staff
(Intelligence), Air Headquarters, 18 August 1933, AIR 23/656.
73. ‘Statement Made by Miryam, Wife of David Jindo, a Corporal in the Iraq
Nations’, League of Nations Official Journal 14 (1933), 1826. See also secret dis-
patch no. 30s/ADC/MSL from Air Commander Cunningham, Headquarters,
no. 30 (B) Squadron, Royal Air Force, Mosul to Air Vice Marshal C. S. Burnett,
Air Headquarters, Iraq Command, Hinaidi, 18 August 1933, enclosing secret
statement from R. K. Odishu made to Major Merry, undated, AIR 23/656.
74. Elias Haroon Bazi (Hejerke-Simele), interview with author, 24 February 2008,
Toronto. Elias Bazi lost his father and suffered personal injury, including being
shot in the arm, and continues to feel discomfort and pain from shrapnel still
lodged above his lip. See also Interview with Elias Haroon, Lamassu Nineb.
(Eastern Assyrian Language). [Toronto, Canada, 2011]. Modern Assyrian
Research Archive. This is echoed by ‘Statement Made by Miryam, Wife of
David Jindo’.
76. ‘Statement Made by Rabi Armunta, an Assyrian Woman, Exhibit C, to
Supplementary Petition, Dated September 24 1933, from the Mar Shimun,
Nations Official Journal 14 (1933), 1825; ‘Statement Made by Yushiya Dinka,
of Malik Ismail, Upper Tiyari, Exhibit E to Supplementary Petition, Dated
September 24 1933, from the Mar Shimun, “Catholicos” Patriarch of the
Assyrians to the League of Nations’, League of Nations Official Journal 14
(1933), 1827.
77. See secret report by Major C. J. Edmonds, Ministry of the Interior, Baghdad
to Mr. G. A. D. Ogilvie-Forbes, British Embassy, Baghdad, 24 August 1933,
AIR 23/656, which attempted to address a full account of the massacres.
78. ‘Statement Made by Victoria Yokhannan, a Young Girl of 12 Years of Age of
the Tribe of Diz, Exhibit B, to Supplementary Petition, dated 24 September
1933, from the Mar Shimun, “Catholicos” Patriarch of the Assyrians to the
League of Nations’, League of Nations Official Journal 14 (1933), 1825.
79. R. S. Stafford, ‘Iraq and the Problem of the Assyrians’, International Affairs
13.2 (1934), 176.
81. Gerald de Gaury, Three Kings in Baghdad: The Tragedy of Iraq’s Monarchy
(London: I. B. Tauris, [1961] 2008), 89.
82. Estimates range from 2,000 to 6,000 for the number of persons killed. See
USDOS, letter to Wallace Murray, American Consular Services, Near Eastern
Affairs, American Consulate General, Jerusalem, Palestine, 31 August 1933.
The figure usually mentioned of 300–305, used by Husry and others, is based
on Stafford and only for 11 August in the village of Simele. Stafford himself
only came to the scene some days later, and it was surmised at the time that
most of the bodies had already been buried by the military to cover the mas-
sacre. The attacking of random villages was also reported in the Iraq Times on
19 August.
83. Jatou acquired an infamous reputation among local Kurdish tribesmen and
bandits as a feared bounty hunter.
84. Firas Jatou (grandson of Jatou), interview with author, San Jose, CA, 5 July
2012.
85. Sidqi was well known for his anti-Assyrian sentiments. The British authorities
had warned the Iraqi government of this and suggested his removal from the
post as commander of the northern forces. The suggestion was agreed to but
never carried out. See secret dispatch from Air Headquarters, Iraq Command
Hinaidi to Mr. G. A. D. Ogilvie Forbes, British embassy, Baghdad, 25 July
1933, AIR23/655, p. 418.
86. Through the Simele massacres Sidqi gained enough prestige and power to
challenge the Iraqi establishment in a failed coup attempt in 1936.
87. Paul Knabenshue, US ambassador to Iraq, to Secretary of State, ‘Assyrian
Problem – British Policy’, 28 August 1933, 890g.4016 Assyrians/86.
88. ‘No massacres: Feisal emphatic’, Brisbane Courier-Mail, 6 September 1933.
89. Barclay Acheson, executive secretary, Near East Foundation to Hon. Wallace
S. Murray, chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, 13 September 1933,
890g.4016 Assyrians/90.
90. Stafford, The Tragedy of the Assyrians, 170–1, 177–8.
92. Paul Knabenshue, US ambassador to Iraq, to Secretary of State, ‘Iraq’s Victorious
Army Returns to Baghdad’, 30 August 1933, 890g.4016 Assyrians/89.
93. Paul Knabenshue, US ambassador to Iraq, to Secretary of State, ‘Suppression
of Assyrian Revolt’, (no. 165), 23 August 1933, 890g.4016 Assyrians/82.
94. Knabenshue to Secretary of State, ‘Iraq’s Victorious Army Returns to Baghdad’.
95. Based on numerous sources including Malek, The British Betrayal of the Assyrians,
338–9; ‘Report of Mar Shimun, Catholicos Patriarch of the Assyrians, Oct. 8,
1933’, Protection of Minorities in Iraq, League of Nations, Geneva, 31 October
1933; Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, League of Nations, Geneva, 18 January
1934, 0.69.1934.VII, enclosure II–IV, 8–11; ‘Sketch Map of Villages in Which
Assyrians Were Settled 1920–1933’, in Stafford, Tragedy of the Assyrians; Air
Ministry and Foreign Office documents and pictures; and eyewitness testimony.
In villages where a population returned, numbers are given if reported.
96. Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country 1914–1932 (New
York: Colombia University Press, 2007), 212.
97. William Yale, The Near East: A Modern History (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1958), 326.
98. Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala (ed.), Rafał Lemkin: A Hero of Humankind

(Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2010), 79; Tanya Elder,
‘What You See before Your Eyes: Documenting Raphael Lemkin’s Life by
Exploring His Archival Papers 1900–1959’, in Dominik J. Schaller and Jürgen
Zimmerer (eds), The Origins of Genocide: Raphael Lemkin as a Historian of Mass
Violence (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 31.
99. United States Department of State, Diplomatic, P. Knabenshue, Subject:
‘Assyrians – Massacres in Northern Iraq’, Baghdad, 21 August 1933.
100. John Cooper, Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 18–19.
101. ‘Assyrian villages on the Khabur: results of latest census’, Athra, 5 January
1939.
102. Farhud is an Arabic word meaning ‘pogrom’ or ‘violent riot.’

103. Eric Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern
Iraq (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 70.
104. Ibid., 71.
105. David Wilmshurst, The Ecclesiastical Organization of the Church of the East
1318–1913 (Leuven: Peeters, 2000), 126, states that on the eve of the First
World War there were 4,000 Nestorians and 12,000 Chaldeans in the
‘Amēdīyāh, Barwar and ‘Aqra regions. These numbers were extremely mini-
mised as in all cases of Christian populations in the densely Muslim East.
Smaller statistics guaranteed less attention from what were perceived as pos-
sibly hostile Muslim groups. Despite this discrepancy, it is certain there existed
a significant number of Assyrians in the extreme north of what later became
Iraq prior to the settlement of the Hakkâri mountaineers.
106. For more on the influence of Akkadian on the modern Arabic dialect of Mosul,
see Amir Harrak, ‘Middle Assyrian bīt hašīmi’, Zeitschrift für Assyriologie und
˘
Vorderasiatische Archäologie 79.1 (1989), 67.
107. A Committee of Officials, An Introduction of the Past and Present of the
Kingdom of Iraq (Baltimore, MD: Lord Baltimore Press, 1946), 29. Coming
‘back’ suggests returning to a place lived previously, and thus in this case
while attempting to deny the Assyrians nativeness, the Iraqi authorities in fact
established it.
108. Hamilton, Road through Kurdistan, 216.
109. Michael K. Pius, ‘Koubba Khouyada Aturaya was Born in Desert’, Nineveh
22.3 (1999), 17.
110. Ibid., 15.
111. Pius alleges that according to his interviewees Mushe was expelled in 1947 or
1948 but the organisation lasted until 1952 or 1955. See ibid., 16.
112. Robert Brenton Betts, Christians in the Arab East: A Political Study (Athens:
Lycabettus Press, 1975), 177.
113. See Walter Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956), for a description of minorities in the com-
munist parties of in the Middle East. Despite their involvement, most works
mention Assyrians briefly if at all, or generically as ‘Christians’. In this book
the Kurds occupy eleven pages and the Armenians two; the Assyrians are men-
tioned just once in passing. Despite his elite status, Fahd or Yusuf Salman
Yusuf is only mentioned briefly under ‘The Christian Orthodox Churches’.
Pyotr (Petros) Vasili, the initial proponent of communism in Iraq, is not men-
tioned at all.
114. Phebe Marr, A Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985),
112–13.
115. Lawrence J. LeBlanc, The United States and the Genocide Convention (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 1991), 18.
116. Ibid., 250.
117. ‘Guide to the Raphael Lemkin (1900–1959) Collection, 1763–2002 (Bulk
1941–1951), American Jewish Historical Society, 2014, http://digifindingaids.
cjh.org/?pID=109202 (accessed 14 July 2014).
4
The Birth of the Republic and
an Autonomist Struggle
The roots of violence: wealth without work, pleasure without conscience,

knowledge without character, commerce without morality, science without
humanity, worship without sacrifice, politics without principles.
Mahatma Gandhi
I n 1955, with the years following the end of the Second World War p roviding
a cushion, the Western powers signed the Baghdad Pact, bringing about the
Central Treaty Organisation, in an attempt to keep Soviet influence in the
Middle East at bay. Despite the fear of rising communism, the British began
a slow withdrawal of troops and military institutions from Iraq. Prior to the
dissolution of the levies in May 1955 (though the RAF remained until 1959),
its soldiers worked predominately as guards, with an overall composition of
approximately 1,200 Assyrians, 400 Kurds and 400 Arabs.1 This external
force was a constant threat to the ruling Iraqi elite, which perceived the
highly trained and well-armed levies a threat to its sovereignty – a sovereignty
dependent on the national unity of an otherwise pluralist society. Though
their service in the levies was concluding, the troops were militarily recog-
nised with medals of gallantry and valour for almost forty years of service. On
2 May 1955, the British finally transferred the last two airbases, Habbaniya
and Shuaiba (Shaiba), to the Iraqi government.
City life had also begun to shift. Refugees who had settled in Baghdad
formed Nādi al-Riyadhi al-Āthūrī (Assyrian Sports Club) as well as Nādi
al-Thaqāfi al-Āthūrī (Assyrian Cultural Club) in March 1955.2 The sports
club became the focus of athletics not only for Assyrians but also for the
entire country. It was here that the national footballers Emmanuel ‘Ammo’
Baba Dawud (who played from 1957 until 1967 and later coached the Iraqi
t he bi rth of the republ ic | 139
Figure 12 Assyrian Sports Club, Christmas/New Year 1967–8 (Men)
national team off and on from the late 1970s to the 1990s), Edison David
(1955–65) and Douglas Aziz (1967–79) found their beginnings.3 The same is
true for basketball, volleyball, tennis and other sports4 (see figures 12 and 13).
The 1958 Coup and Renewed Internal Strife
By February 1957 in the realm of politics, an opposition front had been

established consisting of the National Democratic Party, Hizb al-Istiqlal al-
Iraqi (the Iraqi Independence Party), the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) and
the Ba‘th Party, which had approximately 300 members in Iraq in 1955.5 It
Figure 13 Assyrian Sports Club, Christmas/New Year 1967–8 (Women)
became apparent that the opposition had no true power with which to con-
test the regime. Instead, it operated as a clandestine organisation of military
officers who brought about the July 1958 coup.
On 14 July 1958, the downfall of the Iraqi monarchy (and the subsequent
execution of King Faisal II, former regent Abdullah, and Prime Minister Nuri
al-Said) and the formation of the Republic of Iraq under Free Officers General
Abd al-Karim Qasim and his second, ‘Abd as-Salam ‘Arif gave new hope to a
frustrated population. Renewed promises of minority rights gave Iraq’s popu-
lation reason for celebration. The new republic recognised Kurdish national
rights and allowed Kurdish nationalists to organise openly after many years
in hiding. In April 1959, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) was given
permission to publish the daily newspaper Xebat (‘Struggle’), and in the same
month Mustafa Barzani, along with 850 other Kurds, returned from exile in
the USSR aboard Soviet ships.6 The Iraqi regime created representation of
the republic including the Arab sword and the Kurdish dagger ‘as a symbol
of their formation of the Iraqi people since the ancient times and that they
are partners in this nation’ and further made the acceptance of the KDP,
ICP and others official with the passing of the Associations Law on 6 January
1960, which allowed previously banned political parties (in this case anything
non-governmental from as early as 1954) to practise openly.7
Such concessions were viewed as inadequate from the perspective of the
Kurdish leadership and soon relations between the KDP and the new Iraqi
regime deteriorated. Yet, while outwardly the KDP retained its anti-Qasim
stance, some members within the party had agreed with ‘the ICP’s general
view that Qasim should be supported because of his general commitment to
anti-imperialism and his refusal to join the UAR [United Arab Republic].’8
During this period of general discord, tensions flared up between the Barzani-
led KDP and Qasim’s regime over what political concessions Iraqi Kurds
would be granted.
On 5 November 1960, Barzani left once again for the Soviet Union
to garner more support, with the aim of forcing Qasim’s government
towards concessions. The year 1960 also witnessed a minor insurrection
by the sheikh of the Surchi Kurdish tribe near Rawanduz in reaction to
the Iraqi Agrarian Reform Law, which, interestingly, was quelled by local
police, the ICP and a contingent of Barzani followers.9 Such ever-changing
loyalties and divisions within the autonomist movement would fluctuate
throughout the 1960s. Monolithic rubrics concerned with ethnic-based alli-
ances and enmities do not allow for a clear interpretation of communal
relations during the 1960s, although the mutual distrust between Kurds
and Assyrians for example had not disappeared. These tense relations were
exploited by the Iraqi regime and other interested parties. The Kurds, like the
Assyrians, were divided in their internal loyalties, and the constant struggles
between the Surchi, Herki, Barzani, Bradost,10 Lolani and Zebari tribes attest
to such division. Due to longstanding tribal feuds, the Iraqi government
was able to coax the Bradosts and Zebaris to fight on behalf of the govern-
ment forces. Known disdainfully as jah.sh (‘foal/young donkey’), generally
as chatta (‘militia’) or boastfully as fursan (‘knights [of Saladin]’) among
the resistance forces, these fighters were despised for their pro-government
actions.11 Around 100 Kurdish chiefs were Iraqi government loyalists during
this period.12 These pro-government forces were initially indoctrinated to
fight against their Kurdish kin by seeing them as ‘traitors’ of Islam.13 Yet
despite this, on many occasions, as illustrated by the demographic shift
following this period and through first-hand accounts, the pro-government
tribes targeted Assyrian villages more often than villages of Kurdish tribes. It
is evident that the pro-government militia operated most frequently against
the Assyrians rather than the more numerous Kurds.14
Yet, despite such internal divisions among both Assyrians and Kurds,
the pro-government Zebari and Bradost Kurds managed to appropriate what
the Assyrians began losing demographically, preventing the only other major
ethnic group, the Arabs, from settling in the region.15 By the time Barzani
returned from the USSR in January 1961, fighting had erupted between
the Barzanis and the neighbouring Bradosts and Zebaris. In the summer of
1961, further fighting broke out between the Barzanis and their traditional
Kurdish rivals, the Herkis and the Surchis, who had been supported by the
Iraqi government.16 In September of the same year, Barzani forces occupied
Zakho, causing the government to retaliate with air attacks on Barzan. Soon
after the initial skirmishes, the Qasim-led government began its redress of
the Kurdish question as military actions commenced against dissidents in the
north. In many cases, the Iraqi military employed Zebari and Bradost Kurds
as militias against the opposition, both Assyrian and Kurdish. The Zebari and
Bradost irregulars forced many Assyrians, including those who had not found
cause with ‘Barzani’s revolt’, to flee their villages, while Zebari tribesmen
ransacked, appropriated and resettled them.17
The Kurdish armed resistance for autonomy and recognition gained
momentum, although the outbreak of military actions initially went unrec-
ognised by the international community.18 The fighting that had begun in
1961 in the northwest between the Barzanis and their tribal allies, and the
Zebari tribe and their allies, initially resulted in victory for the Barzanis, rout-
ing their enemies far into Turkish territory. During this time, some Assyrians
north of Mosul who found common cause with the Barzanis earned the
respect of their Kurdish allies.19 Qasim was not their enemy, and initially
the Assyrians remained sidelined within the struggle, until Mustafa Barzani
began a tour of the northern region attempting to recruit Assyrians to his
cause prior to the outbreak of the war.20 The strongest in the Barwar region,
Barzani’s message to the Assyrians was straightforward: join the movement or
yield weapons for the struggle.21 The Assyrians found themselves at a critical
juncture: desiring freedom and self-governance, yet fearful of both the Iraqi
regime and its Kurdish opponents.
The two options Barzani presented to the Assyrians had various implica-
tions: (1) they could support the Kurdish movement, which already had
received backing from outside sources, and struggle alongside the Kurds for
Assyrian rights, or (2) they could flee south to the major cities and assume
the mantle of urbanisation and, thus, Arabisation. Furthermore, their villages
had begun to see bombers, some attacked outright by government forces.22
As a result of both options, a major demographic shifting of the Assyrians
in north Iraq was under way, and regardless of choice, the final fibres of
autonomy and connection to their ancestral lands would soon fray.
As a minority (ethnic, linguistic and religious) within a minority (non-
Arab peoples of Iraq), the Assyrians lacked independent parties to protect their
rights, since they had been subservient to British power under the levies. With
the dissolution of the levies, they looked toward the formation of cultural
and political parties that would protect their interests. Auspiciously for the
Assyrians, April 1961 saw the birth of Kheit Kheit Allap II under the name
Khuyada w-Kheirūta Åtūraytå (Assyrian Unity and Freedom). Their mission
was to ‘spread among our youth and students raising awareness about our
rights and educating them about our history’.23 Since the formation of such a
party was outlawed, Baghdad and Kirkuk were dangerous places to be active.
Though it succeeded among students and elites, the movement also took root
among villagers in the Assyrian north. This progress would lead some Assyrians
in the remote northern regions to side with the anti-government forces.
Elsewhere, the Assyrians found a home in places to the far south. The
Qasim regime had allotted lands to be used for religious and cultural edi-
fices and in 1960, the Assyrian community consecrated the church of Mart
Maryam in the al-Joumhouria district of Basra. Furthermore thanks to the
aptly termed society law, allowing for the formation of civic organisations
upon the approval of the Ministry of Guidance and the Interior, Assyrians
were able to create two distinct social associations: one charitable and linked to
the church, known as the Assyrian Mercy Society, and another, the Rafidain
Club in the district of al-Tuwaisa (later known simply as the Assyrian Club)
for social events and athletics.24 Slowly a disenfranchised and dispossessed
community began to find purchase in the cities in the south as well as in their
rural villages in the north.
Given the complexities surrounding communal relations during this
period, it would be premature to assume that the autonomist movement back
in the north was a specifically ethno-national Kurdish struggle; rather it was
something larger. The Assyrians identified it as pêşmerge and defined the term,
which was foreign to their native tongue, as simply ‘guerrillas’ or ‘opposition
fighters’.25 This was illustrated by the 5,000-strong attack by Kurds and
Assyrians on the Lolani and Zebari Kurdish tribes that were unwilling to
accept Barzani’s leadership of the armed resistance.26 Despite some sections
of the Assyrian population joining the resistance movement, other regions
preferred non-alignment. In ‘Amēdīyāh, for example, the Assyrian districts,
which initially preferred to remain neutral during the infighting, ‘passed from
Barzani to Zebari hands in autumn 1961, and the pro-government forces
pillaged and destroyed numerous villages’.27 In the winter of 1961, Kurdish
forces loyal to Barzani and those working for the Iraqi government remained
in a stalemate. When Barzani’s forces returned in December, they accused the
Assyrians of treachery. Despite ardent Assyrian protests, the Barzani adminis-
tration took over the town in December 1961 under the command of Mustafa
Barzani, who ‘had little time for his temporary Assyrian allies’.28 In the village
of Annūnē (Kani Masi), Barzani’s men took revenge by killing every male
aged over fifteen whom they could capture, including a bishop, two priests
and more than fifteen men. Part of this retaliation stemmed from Annūnē’s
traditional support of the government as it was an administrative centre.29
According to US Department of State reports Mustafa Barzani agreed to talks
with Iraqi government officials in late December 1961. Prior to Barzani’s
intended arrival, which was briefly delayed, the Iraqi Air Force bombarded
the meeting site, killing some of his supporters and further raising his ire.
Soon afterwards Kurdish forces attacked several bastions of the Iraqi army,
and during these engagements utilised less savoury techniques of torture and
mutilation on the wounded and other prisoners. Arab officials fled to Baghdad
for their lives as none felt safe in predominantly Kurdish regions.30
Those Assyrians who managed to escape the civil war fled to Turkey
and eventually made their way to Baghdad.31 By early January 1962, approxi-
mately 4,500 Assyrians had fled their homes for other parts of Iraq.32 Though
the Assyrians were left with few options, some held strong to their previ-
ous autonomy and independence, further strengthened by the bazikke tribal
system,33 which strengthened inter-tribal relations during times of war. Yet
they were relegated to a marginal role in the sight of the American govern-
ment and other Western powers despite the paradox of their relation to the
civil war. According to a report from the American embassy in Baghdad:
Although Christians are only of marginal importance in Iraq, it might be

worthwhile to review briefly their role in the Kurdish revolt. Allowing for
traditional Assyrian tendencies to play on the sympathies of their European
Christian brethren and ignoring their reports of the number of the Assyrian
dead and the size of Mulla Mustafa’s forces, the situation in the Christian
area seems to have been roughly as follows: When the revolt started, the
Christians, who would have preferred to remain neutral, were surrounded
by the Kurds and were forced to assist them; apparently some of the men
actually joined the Kurdish insurgents. At this time Mulla Mustafa was
solicitous of the Christian welfare and there were no accounts of any
oppressive action. The government bombed the Assyrian villages, along
with Kurdish Muslim ones; the Assyrians were angered and took a some-
what more active part in the Kurdish revolt. Their villages were then retaken
by the government forces, or rather by Kurds cooperating with Baghdad
who engaged in considerable looting and some murder. The Christians
tried to propriate the government and to assure it that their loyalties were
with Baghdad. When winter came, Mulla Mustafa returned to the villages,
unopposed by the government or nearly so, and took vengeance upon the
Christians for their ‘treason’ to his cause. Many of these villages are still cut
off from the outside world and the Christians in Baghdad, while not believ-
ing that their women and children have been molested by the Kurds, do
fear that their relatives still in the north are dying of hunger and exposure.34
The embassy’s report is further confirmed by oral history and ethnography.

Evidently, Assyrians were set on by both sides. Kurds who aligned with
the Iraqi regime against the armed resistance were often ‘chatta by day but
pêşmerge by night’ according to oral sources, something substantiated by the
USDOS report.35 Pro-government Kurds would resettle the appropriated
villages and while some Assyrian villages were routed by the government in
other regions, the Kurds would resettle both Assyrian villages and their own
ethnic Kurdish ones. This was surely an unintended side-effect of the Iraqi
governmental actions including the bombing of Assyrian villages, but one
which ensured that, regardless of the victor, the Assyrians were the major
political and demographic losers of the early 1960s.
Others, ever distrustful of the Iraqi government, united with the Kurdish
struggle, hoping that through resistance they too would be granted equal
rights within Iraq.36 They were joined by additional opposition groups,
including – unofficially – members of the ICP, which had a large minority
contingent.37 General numbers given for the paramilitary fighters vary. Some
estimate 20,000 troops and 40,000 reserve fighters, although whether these
were entirely made up of ethnic Kurds is uncertain.38 Since the Assyrians
were not unified in their stance, being neither entirely for nor against the
autonomist movement, they faced repercussions on all sides. A product of
this was the razing and plundering of the episcopal see of ‘Amēdīyāh in 1963
by Zebari Kurds, another retaliatory massacre.39 Between the hammer and
the anvil, many felt little choice in becoming embattled during the civil war,
regardless of support. While some of various denominations living north
of Mosul were sympathetic to the Barzani-led opposition for the reasons
outlined, it had been assumed that those of the Mosul region remained on
good terms with the Iraqi government and, thus, generally neutral during
the armed resistance. Alqosh, however, long a bastion of the ICP under the
leadership of native Toma Tomas, was sometimes in support of the opposi-
tion and at others neutral, depending on ICP leanings.40 Regardless of the
tactical shifts, the town was subject to raids and massacres both by Kurdish
forces loyal to Barzani and by the government militia forces, as power and
politics fluctuated.41
Alongside Tomas, formed secondary individuals opposition groups loyal
first to the Assyrian cause, meaning protection of villages from both the
Kurdish forces and the Baghdad regime. Kheit Kheit Allap was among those
that weighed in on the endeavour, and interestingly, most members did so
from cities such as Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk. Kheit Kheit Allap II was
able, ideologically, to recruit Hurmiz Malik Chikko along with fifty of his
followers to join the armed uprising in the north.42 Chikko accepted on the
condition of monetary support, which he hoped would allow the Assyrian
resistance to be independent of the Kurdish parties, having his men receive
financial assistance directly rather than through the KDP.43 Chikko and his
men fought the regime for some time alongside the Kurds, earning him
notoriety within government circles for his battle prowess. Therefore, while
he garnered fame among the Assyrian peasants, Ba‘thists, much less forgiving
of what they considered non-Arab transgressions since the death of Qasim in
February 1963, followed Chikko closely.
Chikko increased his activities over the next two years until Ba‘thists,
along with foreign aid, cornered the military commander. He and six of his
soldiers were surrounded by Syrian military and killed in the battle of Aloka
on 2 December 1963.44 Some Assyrians were among those Syrian military
forces sent to stop Chikko. Most interviewees believe that the Syrian govern-
ment was well aware of the irony in the plan to send fellow Assyrians from
Syria to impede Chikko (without knowledge of who the target was), and did
so at the behest of the Iraqi regime to strike at the heart of any further native
resistance. According to accounts, when the Assyrians within the Syrian bat-
talion realised whom they had helped murder, they were unable to hold their
weapons, fell to their knees, and wept for their fallen brother and for their
participation in the foul act.45
Chikko was greatly admired by his allies. Mustafa Barzani once stated,
‘Should I have to put up a statue in Kurdistan, I would make one for the
martyr (Hurmiz Malik Chiko).’ Following his death, Barzani requested the
directors of Kheit Kheit Allap II to appoint a replacement. The leadership
then spoke with Talia Shino, a former Iraqi Levies officer, who accepted
under the condition that his kin be cared for and protected.46 But the damage
had been done. Soon after, as one founder recounts, ‘I and four of my com-
rades, members of the politburo, were arrested by Iraqi government agents
in September 1965, and the organisation ceased to exist.’47 The group mem-
bers were subject to both physical and psychological torture during their
imprisonment. Talia Shino himself was killed immediately following the

destruction and dissolution of Kheit Kheit Allap II, in early 1966.48
The political proximity of certain Assyrian tribes to the Barzani
Kurds is noteworthy. A popular view held by many Assyrians suggests that
the Barzanis were in fact former Nestorians who had converted to Islam in
the nineteenth century.49 Since the Assyrians and the Kurds have inhabited
roughly the same geographic area for centuries, certain ties and similarities
in culture are visible, especially between the Assyrians and the Kurds of the
Hakkâri region, which include a distinct tribal society that retained a strong
degree of independence during Ottoman rule. These tribal affiliations later
shifted to nationalist aspirations and sometimes to shared concerns within
the communist movement in Iraq. Tribal politics among Kurds and Assyrians
were not completely eliminated at this time, but rather adjusted to include a
sense of secularism, though still very much tied to tribal and religious struc-
tures. The involvement of actors such as Chikko and Ethniel Shleimon of
Dūre, the first martyr of the civil war (see Figure 14), in the uprising provokes
questions about its designation as a Kurdish movement.50
After the overthrow of the Qasim regime on 9 February 1963, ‘Abd as-
Salam ‘Arif took his position as President of Iraq. This period saw Iran begin a
campaign to weaken Iraq internally by aiding Kurds in their battle against the
state. It was also the zenith of the Cold War in the Middle East. In the midst
of the chaos following Qasim’s death and Cold War politics, certain events of
the civil war were marked by international powers. In July 1963, the USSR
accused Iraq of attempting to eliminate the Kurds and questioned the coun-
try’s military actions as genocide under international law.51 It is evident that at
the time in question, the USSR had begun to support the Kurds not out of any
sense of duty to them specifically but rather to indirectly aid the ICP, which
had become another component in the autonomous uprising. The interna-
tional community largely ignored this claim. Kurdish attempts to garner inter-
national recognition of the Iraqi government’s military actions against the
autonomist resistance were heard only by the Soviets and the socialist state
of Mongolia.52 The petition by these countries to the United Nations was
dismissed, as the state of Iraq had again been acquitted of any crimes.
In 1964, a schism within the Assyrian Church of the East occurred
and a new patriarch was installed in Baghdad for what was then named
Figure 14 Shrine to Ethniel Shleimon of Dūre, Barwar, honoured as the first martyr of the civil war in 1961.
The shrine stands today in ‘Amēdīyāh
the Ancient Church of the East. This move aimed to distinguish it from
the Church of the East under the exiled patriarch Mar Eshai Shimun, a
constant vocal opponent of the Iraqi state. This division, though on the
surface based on liturgical calendar issues, was assumed to be an attempt by
the post-Qasim regime to control a rogue element of the Assyrians, mostly
those of the Tiyari and Tkhuma tribes. The Iraqi regime had no immediate
control over Mar Shimun, who had been stirring up nationalist sentiment
among Assyrians in the West, particularly in the United States. If a political
manoeuvre, the installation of a new patriarch and the inevitable crevasse it
created was tactically brilliant, giving the Iraq regime almost total control
over all segments of Iraqi Assyrians through their highly influential religious
leaders.
In 1964 as Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, hoping to quell Arab
expansion, began supporting the Kurdish movement in earnest. Later that
year, ideological and political conflicts within the KDP, between Mustafa
Barzani and the party’s political bureau, led Xebat editor Ibrahim Ahmed
and Jalal Talabani, the future leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan,
to split from the party in July. In the early autumn, Barzani wrote numer-
ous letters to both the Iraqi President, ‘Abd as-Salam ‘Arif, and President
Gamal Abdel Nasser of the UAR stating the demands of the Kurds for
self-governance. By November Barzani and his allies had created an eleven-
member cabinet which included Talabani as well as a parliament, six mem-
bers of which were appointed specifically by Barzani. Among these six
appointees was Paul Bedari, a Catholic priest to represent the many Assyrian
supporters of the anti-government movement.53 Simultaneously, the Israeli
Defence Minister, Shimon Peres, met with Kumran Ali Bedr-Khan (of the
Bedr-Khan family of the Bohtan), who spied for the Israelis in the 1940s
and 1950s, and began discussions that led to ‘the first training course for
pêşmerge officers’, a three-month course first offered in August 1965.54 With
such support for the autonomist resistance, many Assyrians (particularly
those formerly of Hakkâri) further aligned themselves with Kurdish par-
ties, though not necessarily ideology of a greater Kurdistan. Debates on
whether the Assyrians fought for the Kurdish cause or alongside the Kurds
for their own freedom yield shaky distinctions. Moreover, most scholar-
ship states prematurely that Assyrians fought for the ‘Kurdish cause’, and
Assyrian fighter Margaret George of Dūre village in Barwar is often cited as

a pêşmerge fighter.55 Indeed, Assyrian leaders were invited to attend the same
council as Kurdish leaders, led by Barzani, in the 1960s. A few, like Franso
Toma Hariri, who had been a major personage in the Barzani household
for years becoming Mustafa Barzani’s chief bodyguard, worked unabashedly
for the KDP.56 Furthermore, many Assyrians waged war alongside Kurdish
pêşmerge in Assyrian-led and -soldiered battalions. Some directed their own
battalions, which contained as many as 2,000 fighters.57 Whether or not
these activities gave the central government the motivation, the Assyrians
soon became part of official documentation including the 1965 census forms
(see Figure 15).
Elsewhere, the diaspora had increased in influence. On 10 April 1968,
the Assyrian Universal Alliance (AUA) was created and held its first congress
in Pau, France to devise a more cohesive Assyrian front. The organisation was
described as ‘as a world-wide organization seeking to represent a powerful voice
for the Assyrians, committing itself to upholding the Assyrian culture around
the world, whilst working to secure the human and national rights of the
Assyrian people in their homeland and elsewhere’.58 Of special interest here is
the formation of the AUA from among various cultural groups, including the
Assyrian Youth and Cultural Society in Iran, during a time of Ba‘thification in
Iraq. It was hoped that the AUA would become a voice for the unrepresented
Assyrians in the Middle East, and especially Iraq, after Kheit Kheit Allap II
had been effectively neutralised in early 1966 making apparent the need for
external representation in order to survive and accost their grievances.
In the cities, cultural activities continued. Assyrian organisations thrived
in two major urban centres, namely Baghdad and Kirkuk. While many fami-
lies enjoyed relative peace and safety, members of suspect organisations came
under fire. On 17 July 1968, a Ba‘thist coup overthrew the third President
of Iraq, ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Arif, who had taken over following his brother’s
death in a helicopter crash. The new regime took control under Ahmed
Hassan al-Bakr, with Saddam Hussein becoming deputy chairman of the
new Revolutionary Command Council. As if in answer to growing fears
regarding the new government’s policies toward non-compliants, the Ba‘th
orchestrated the capture and subsequent imprisonment and torture of mem-
bers of the Assyrian Charity Society in Kirkuk that same year.59
Figure 15 A portion of the 1965 Iraqi census (Afram Rayis private archive)
The late 1960s saw an increase in fighting between the Iraqi govern-
ment and those agents of resistance. It was here the power of diaspora poli-
tics was needed. On 29 May 1969, talks between the US government and
Assyrian and Kurdish representatives took place in Washington, DC. There,
the Assyrians and Kurds, working in tandem, hoped to garner American
military and/or monetary support for their opposition struggle. One repre-
sentative stated the following: ‘Mr Andrews [Sam Andrews, secretary of the
Assyrian American National Federation] said that the Assyrians are fight-
ing the Iraqis alongside the Kurds. There is apparently complete confidence
between the Kurds and the Assyrians and some integration of their fighting
forces.’60
A letter sent by Mustafa Barzani himself addressing US Secretary of State
William Rogers outlines the joint Kurdish and Assyrian resistance during the
autonomist armed resistance as late as 1969. According to Barzani:
In addition to the threat which this war has aimed at the existence and
legitimate aspirations of our people, Kurds and Assyrians, it has brought
disaster and affliction upon all its victims, deprived the people of Kurdistan,
particularly the Assyrians and the Kurds, of education and health [needs],
and rendered tens of thousands of them refugees.61
It is likely that Assyrian involvement in the armed resistance would guarantee

future governmentire. Following that logic, it is not surprising that in the
same year as the US–Assyrian–Kurdish meetings, the Iraqi government
targeted the villagers of S.oriya in a massacre on 16 September 1969.
The S.oriya Massacre of 1969
The village of S.oriya is located on the banks of the Tigris and a dministratively
assigned to the sub-district of Bateel in Dohuk. According to the 1957 census,
S.oriya had a population of 102 people, and in 1969, the village had forty
families.62 At approximately 9.30 on the morning of Tuesday 16 September
1969, the village witnessed a massacre at the hands of Lieutenant Abdul
Karim al-Jahayshee from Mosul in response to a pêşmerge-planted mine was
detonated under a military car four kilometres away from the village.63 As for
the actual events of the massacre, the story of two survivors, Adam and Noah
Yonan, lays bare the vivid events. Noah Yonan recounts:
I was ten years old and I fell on the ground. A woman fell over me and her
blood covered me. Other children, too, were covered in blood and thought
dead. At the same time, the Iraqi Army soldiers in our village began spreading
out, shooting into houses and burning the houses . . . While we were running,
wounded people escaping with us died of their gunshot wounds, bleeding
to death. We were all running to the village of Bakhlogia, four kilometers
away, to hide. We got to Bakhlogia, but the villagers couldn’t give us refuge;
it was too dangerous. So, we ran to another Christian village, Avzarook.64
It appeared the military intended to find guerrillas hidden within the village.
Though the precise motivation behind the massacre of S.oriya remains
unknown, the results are certain. The callous measures taken by the Iraqi army
left forty-seven dead, including Rev. H.annā, the local priest, and twenty-two
wounded (see Table 8).65
This operation at S.oriya was an echo of Simele: from the government
and military announcements forbidding hospitals and medical facilities in
the Mosul and Dohuk regions from giving aid to survivors, to the promotion
of Abdul Karim al-Jahayshee.66 Praise for the military actions of al-Jahayshee
and the honours presented to Baqr Sidqi proved that these people were at the
mercy of a violent nationalist regime not so unlike its colonial predecessor.
Demographic Situation
The period of internal fighting between the Iraqi government and

anti-government groups including Kurdish, communist and Assyrian forces
reshaped the region of northern Iraq. The demography of this region, once
part of ancient Assyria, which offers some semblance of a homeland continu-
ously inhabited for more than 4,000 years, saw major transformation follow-
ing the armed struggles between the Iraqi government forces and autonomist
sympathisers.67 Around seventy towns and villages were destroyed and/or for-
cibly abandoned by their Assyrian inhabitants, as were more than 76 religious
structures and other material items of cultural s ignificance (see Table 9).
As many villagers had fled the region to bordering nations, two amnes-
ties were issued three years apart, one specifically for Kurds in 1963, and
one for all citizens in 1966.68 The initial amnesty was issued by the newly
formed ‘Abd as-Salam ‘Arif regime after the death of Qasim, and the second
Table 8 List of people killed in the S.oriya massacre on 16 September 1969
Name Sex Age Comments

1 Khamo Marogeh Shimun M Mayor. Shot immediately by Abdul
Karim Jahayshee
2 Kathryn Sargis Shimun F Wife of Khamo Marogeh Shimun
3 Laila Khamo Shimun F Almost succeeded in killing
Jahayshee
4 Mansour Ish.aq M
5 Kathryn Shimun Ish.aq F Wife of Mansour Ish.aq. Killed along
with three-month-old child
6 Misso Marogeh Shimun F
7 Hermiz Marogeh Shimun M
8 Goro Hermiz Shimun F Wife of Hermiz Marogeh Shimun
9 Antar Hermiz Shimun M 5
10 Othman Suleiman M
11 Amina Rajab Suleiman F Wife of Othman Suleiman. Killed
along with child
12 Nahida Othman Suleiman F
13 Sabiha Othman Suleiman F
14 Meho Hasan M
15 Miran Meho Hasan F
16 Ghariba Meho Hasan F
17 Mounir Yousif M
18 Firman Mounir Yousif F
19 Talan Mounir Yousif F
20 Eilo Youkhana M
21 Yaqu Eilo Youkhana M
22 Yalda Rasho M
23 Basima Yalda Rasho F
24 Giwargis Qoryakus M
25 Naji Giwargis Qoryakus F
26 Shabo Bazna M
27 Shoneh Bazna F Wife of Shabo Bazna. Their baby girl
later died in hospital
28 Samir Bazna M
29 Shawel Bazna M
30 Boutros Toma M
31 Yono Sliwa Toma F Wife of Boutros Toma
32 (child) Toma F 5
33 (child) Toma M 6
34 Alo Yousif M
35 Shirin Samo Yousif F
Name Sex Age Comments

36 Amina Alo Yousif F 7
37 Oraha Khamo M
38 Warina Oraha Khamo F 5
39 Rasho Warda M
40 Asmar Elias Warda F Wife of Rasho Warda
41 Rev. H.annā M Village priest
42 Guiliana Markus M
43 Husni M Driver from Zakho
44 Berro Husein M
45 Qamar Rasheed Husein F Wife of Berro Husein
46 Nadira Berro Husein F
47 Halima Husein F Mother of Berro Husein
was issued by Salam’s brother ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Arif, both supporters of the
pan-Arabist ideology of Gamal Abdel Nasser. A rationale behind two separate
amnesties was likely that the ‘Abd as-Salam ‘Arif regime hoped to win over
the Kurds to the cause of the new government, and likewise that in the midst
of the chaotic transfer of power in 1963, little information was known about
opposition parties besides the more infamous and charismatic Barzani.
In reference to the physical destruction, Assyrians encountered a second-
ary assault due to their minority ethnic, religious and cultural status both
within the government-controlled regions to some extent, and within the
opposition. In a strictly demographic sense, as many of the villages abandoned
by Assyrians following the 1961–3 fighting either remained empty or were
resettled by Kurdish groups, (including those fighting for the government)
the Assyrians were displaced once again. This situation would be furthered in
the late 1970s with the creation of the collective towns, a testament to loss
of homeland, creating a further dispossessed cultural entity.69 Beyond the
data, an underlying Arabisation and Ba‘thification influenced large numbers
of formerly independent villagers required to subsist in unfamiliar urban set-
tings. This urban assimilation would be a side-effect of the Assyrians’ attempt
to survive both economically and socially, and would later help solidify their
indoctrination into Arabism. In some cases of urbanisation, however, an
unforeseen consequence occurred – the desire for integration became linked
to high intellectual attainment and for some, the preservation and propaga-
tion of a revitalised ethno-cultural spirit.
Table 9 Assyrian village summary, 1960s
Name Province District Alt. name Schools Religious Comments

structures
Batase Arbil Harīr 1 Attacked and resettled by pro-government
militia
Darbandoke Arbil Harīr 1 Attacked and resettled by pro-government
militia 1960s
Diyana Arbil Harīr Diana 5 Attacked and resettled by pro-government
militia
Hanare Arbil Harīr Henare Attacked and resettled by pro-government
militia
Harīr Arbil Harīr 1 Attacked and resettled by pro-government
militia
Kalate Arbil Harīr Attacked and resettled by pro-government
militia
Hawdian Arbil Rowanduz Havdian 1 Attacked and resettled by pro-government
militia
‘Amēdīyāh Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1 2 Mass exodus
(city)
Arāden Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 2 4 Razed 1961
Argen Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Ergin, Hargin, 4
Argin
Ashawa Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1 Attacked and resettled by pro-government
militia
Badarrash Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Beth Darrash, 1
Beth Durashe
structures
Barzanke Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Resettled by Kurds
Baz Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Bas 2
Bebede Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Be Bede, Beth 2 Razed 1961 by Zebari Kurds; resettled by
Bede same tribe
Bekozanke Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Beth Kozanke Attacked and resettled by pro-government
militia
Blejanke Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Blejane 1
Dohuke Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Dahoki, 1
Dohoke
Es.sān Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh S.iyān 2
Havintka Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Hawintka Resettled by Zebari Kurds
Hayyis Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Hayis 2 Site of napalm attack, 1968
Komāne Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Kowane 1 5
Lish Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Lich
Meze Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 2
Rekan Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh
Sarsang (city) Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 2
S.awura Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh S.awra
Tazhikka Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh
Tirwanish Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Der Wanis 1
T.lanīthā Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Talaneetha, 2
Dewike
‘Aqra (city) Dohuk ‘Aqra ‘Aqra 2 Mass exodus of Assyrians beginning in
1961
Table 9 (continued)

structures
Ba-Mishmish Dohuk ‘Aqra Beth Shimsha 2 Attacked and resettled by pro-government
militia
Barak Dohuk ‘Aqra Barrake 1 Attacked and resettled by pro-government
militia
Belembase Dohuk ‘Aqra
Birmawa Dohuk ‘Aqra Birmava Attacked and resettled by pro-government
militia
Cham Chali Dohuk ‘Aqra
Dinārta Dohuk ‘Aqra Dinārta Attacked and resettled by pro-government
d’Nahla militia
Dodi Masih Dohuk ‘Aqra Beth Nura, 1 Attacked and resettled by pro-government
Beth Nuhra militia
Garbesh Dohuk ‘Aqra Girbish, Upper 1 Attacked and resettled by pro-government
& Lower militia
Gera Sor Dohuk ‘Aqra Sifra
Hasaniye Dohuk ‘Aqra
Hazarjot Dohuk ‘Aqra 1
Kashkawa Dohuk ‘Aqra 1 100 families displaced
Khalilani Dohuk ‘Aqra Kalilane
Khardis Dohuk ‘Aqra Khardes, 2 Attacked and resettled by pro-government
Khardez militia
Kharjawa Dohuk ‘Aqra H.arğāwa Attacked and resettled by pro-government
militia
structures
Khelafta Dohuk ‘Aqra Khaleptha, 1
Beth H.lāpe
Kherpa Dohuk ‘Aqra H.erpā, Kherpa 2 Attacked and resettled by pro-government
d’Malka militia
Nahawa Dohuk ‘Aqra Nūhāwā, 2 Attacked and resettled by pro-government
Nūwābā militia
Nerem Dohuk ‘Aqra Gundik, 2 Attacked and resettled by pro-government
dRa’awatha Gündük militia
Nergezwe Dohuk ‘Aqra Attacked and resettled by pro-government
militia
Ras al-‘Ain Dohuk ‘Aqra Resh ‘Aina, 1
Resha
Safra Zor Dohuk ‘Aqra
Sedar Dohuk ‘Aqra
Sharmin Dohuk ‘Aqra Shalmath 3
Shush Dohuk ‘Aqra Shush, 1
Shushan, Bā
Šōš
Sian Dohuk ‘Aqra Sanāyā, Sanāyā 2 Attacked and resettled by pro-government
d’Nahlā militia
Dawrīye Dohuk ‘Aqra Dūre, Deviry 1 Besieged 3 months, 35 (families) survived
Cham Kare Dohuk Dohuk
Kora-Dere Dohuk Dohuk
Malta Dohuk Dohuk Ma’althaye, Maltai 2
Table 9 (continued)

structures
Mangesh Dohuk Dohuk 2
(town)
Masike Dohuk Dohuk
Bāsifre Dohuk Sheikhan Be Sāpre, Beth
Sāpre
Bedul Dohuk Sheikhan Be Dole 1 Attacked and resettled by pro-government
militia
Betnare Dohuk Sheikhan Benarink, Be Attacked and resettled by pro-government
Naring militia
Billa Dohuk Sheikhan Billān, Bellan 3 Attacked and resettled by pro-government
militia
Birta Dohuk Sheikhan Birta, Bire 1 Attacked and resettled by pro-government
militia
Kanifalla Dohuk Sheikhan Kani Fala 1
Malla-Birwan Dohuk Sheikhan 1
Ishkavdal Dohuk Simele Shkafdal 1 20 families displaced
Kharab-Kulk Dohuk Simele H.arbai (?) 1
S.oriya Dohuk Simele 1 1 40 families before 1969 massacre
Bahnona Dohuk Zakho 30 families displaced
Dar Hozan Dohuk Zakho
Marzi-Khabur Dohuk Zakho
Prakh Dohuk Zakho
Alqosh Ninawa Telkeif numerous Attacked numerous times
Notes
1. ‘History’, Assyrian Levies RAF website, http://assyrianlevies.info/history.html
(accessed 14 July 2014). It is possible though largely speculative that a major
reason for the withdrawal of the levies was to assuage any fears Turkey or Iraq
may have had concerning still-armed Assyrians within their borders.
2. Isaac Isaac, Riyād.īyah fī bilād mā bayn al-nahrayn [‘Sports in the Land of
Mesopotamia’] (Chicago: Alpha Graphic, 2000), 364–90.
3. ‘Three Lions: The Birth of Asood Al-Rafidain’, http://iraqsport.wordpress.
com/2013/03/09/three-lions-the-birth-of-asood-al-rafidain (accessed 14 July
2014).
4. Isaac, Riyād.īyah fī bilād mā bayn al-nahrayn, 519–23.
5. Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett, Iraq since 1958: From Revolution to
Dictatorship (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001), 45.
6. Ibid., 80.
7. ‘The Emblem of the Iraqi Republic’, Law No. 57 of 1959, Weekly Gazette of the
Republic of Iraq, 18 November 1959, 900.
8. Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, Iraq since 1958, 80.
9. Ismail al-Arif, Iraq Reborn: A Firsthand Account of the July 1958 Revolution and
After (New York: Vantage Press, 1982), 86.
10. Also spelled as Baradost and Biradost.
11. Human Rights Watch, Iraq’s Crime of Genocide: The Anfal Campaign against the
Kurds (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 28. For a good discussion
on pro-government Kurdish forces, see David McDowall, A Modern History of
the Kurds, 3rd ed. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 354–6.
12. See list and photographs in Na‘aman Maher al-Kan‘ani, D.oh ‘alla Shimāl al-‘Irāq
[‘A Light in Northern Iraq’] (Baghdad, 1965), 26–110.
13. Human Rights Watch, Iraq’s Crime of Genocide, 29.
14. Edgar O’Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt 1961–1970 (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1973).
15. This large-scale change in demography continued to effect regional policy and
become specifically apparent during the creation of the Iraqi Kurdistan region
following the establishment of the no-fly zone in 1991 and in Iraqi internal
politics after the US invasion of 2003.
16. O’Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt, 81.
17. Uriel Dann, Iraq under Qassem: A Political History 1958–1963 (New York:
Praeger, 1969), 335. The Assyrian villages that were resettled by Zebari Kurds
after 1961 are discussed in further detail in the following pages.
18. Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East, 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC:
McFarland, 2002), 42.
19. Dann, Iraq under Qassem, 334–5.
20. Embassy Baghdad to Secretary of State, no subject, 16 November 1961, NA/
RG59/787.00/11-199.
21. Hirmis Aboona (Alqosh), interview with author, October 2007, Mississauga,
Ontario. The tradition that keeping a weapon as a means of defence of one’s
family is a matter of personal honour. Relinquishing that weapon was tanta-
mount to helplessness in the minds of the mountaineer Assyrians and also their
Kurdish neighbours.
22. Embassy Baghdad to Secretary of State, no subject, 16 November 1961, NA/
RG59/787.00/11-199.
23. Y.C. (Darbandoke-Baghdad), interview with author, 1 September 2006,
Chicago. The initial Kheit Kheit Allap was started in Habbaniyya by Ousta
Mushe Khoshaba in the 1940s.
24. Sargon Yousip Potros, ‘The Assyrian Rafidain Club in Basra City, Iraq’, Nineveh
22.3 (1999), 15–17; ‘Law No. 1 of 1960 for the Societies’, Weekly Gazette of the
Republic of Iraq, 23 August1961, 665.
25. K.S. (Dūre), interview with author, 24 February 2008, Toronto.
26. O’Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt, 74–5.
27. Avshalom H. Rubin, ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim and the Kurds of Iraq: Centralization,
Resistance and Revolt 1958–63’, Middle Eastern Studies 43.3 (2007), 369.
28. O’Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt, 81.
29. Baghdad to State, ‘Kurdish Revolt – Continued’, 22 January 1962, NA/
RG59/787.00/1-2262.
30. Baghdad to State, ‘Kurdish Rebel Activity in Dohuk Area’, 28 December 1961,
NA/RG59/787.00/12-2861.
31. Baghdad to State, ‘Kurdish Revolt – Continued; Government Pretends Kurds
Crushed; Reports Massacres in Christian Villages’, 10 January 1962, NA/
RG59/787.00/1-1062.
32. Baghdad to Foreign Office, 17 January 1962, BNA/FO/371/164231. See also
Rubin, ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim and the Kurds of Iraq’, 369–70.
33. An associated tribal system that solidified relations between tribes in times of
war in the Hakkâri region.
RG59/787.00/1-1062.
35. D.T. (Blejanke) and K.S. (Dūre), interviews with author, 24 February 2008,
Toronto. See also Baghdad to State, ‘Kurdish Rebel Activity in Dohuk Area’,
28 December 1961, NA/RG59/787.00/12-2861. According to the report, the
‘“Kurdish mercenaries” employed by the government have deserted and joined
with the rebels’.
36. Frederick A. Aprim, Assyrians: From Bedr Khan to Saddam Hussein – Driving into
Extinction the Last Aramaic Speakers (F. A. Aprim, 2006), 210.
37. In 1946 when Qadi Muhammad proclaimed an autonomous Kurdish region,
the Mahabad Republic in Iran, he was supported by Soviet troops in Azerbaijan.
The USSR did not begin to officially support the Kurds and Barzani in Iraq
until June 1963. Whether such Soviet support of the Kurds (through the ICP)
extended to Iraq in the 1960s is uncertain. See Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, Iraq
since 1958, 29.
38. Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East, 43.
39. Jean-Pierre Valognes, Vie et mort des chrétiens d’Orient: des origines à nos jours
(Paris: Fayard, 1994), 763; Dann, Iraq under Qassem, 335.
40. Hirmis Aboona (Alqosh), interview with author, 11 October 2007, Mississauga,
Ontario. Tomas, a native of Alqosh, was born in 1924, was enlisted in the
Iraq Levies as a young teenager, and became a major figure in the ICP in the
1960s. His memoirs recall his pride in his family’s role in protecting refugees
from the Simele massacres in 1933. For more information see Alda Benjamen,
‘Negotiating Assyrians in the Modern History of Iraq’ (PhD thesis, University
of Maryland, forthcoming).
41. Ibid.
42. Y.C. (Darbandoke-Baghdad), interview with author, 1 September 2006, Chicago.
43. Ibid.
44. D.T. (Blejanke), interview with author, 24 February 2008, Toronto.
45. Y.D. (Annūnē) and K.S. (Dūre), interviews with author, 24 February 2008,
Toronto. Like many Yezidis and Christian Assyrians, Chikko fought against an
oppressive regime during the armed autonomist movement. His body was taken
and buried in the Yezidi village of Sharia, where a monument was erected in his
honour.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Robert Brenton Betts, Christians in the Arab East: A Political Study (Athens:
Lycabettus Press, 1975), 179. This is also based on an oral tradition of some
Assyrians. Most Assyrians who converted to Islam adopted the culture/ethnicity

of the most numerous Muslim group in their region, whether Turkish, Kurdish,
Persian or Arab. Thus, the discussion of Assyrian Muslims is usually a moot
point, since converts to Islam (as many early Assyrian converts to Christianity
but in a more complete manner) lost a sense of their ancestral identity. One
exception is that of the Mh.almōyē (Mah.allmiyīn) community living in south-
east Turkey in the Turabdin region and in Mardin, some of who advocate an
Assyrian heritage.
50. Hirmis Aboona (Alqosh), interview with author, 11 October 2007, Mississauga,
Ontario.
51. See UN Economic and Social Council report, A/5429 36th session, 11 July
1963, 109; Edmund Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question in Iraq (New York: Syracuse
University Press, 1981), 68. Ghareeb does not mention the issue of genocide.
52. UN Economic and Social Council report, A/5429 36th session, 11 July 1963,
109.
53. Dana Adams Schmidt, ‘Kurds in Iraq set up “regime” after failing to sway
Baghdad’, New York Times, 12 November 1964, 4.
54. Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars: the Untold History of Israeli
Intelligence (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1991), 184.
55. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 310. George was later suspiciously
killed in her sleep in 1966 (see ibid., 381), though some reference her being
killed in 1969.
56. Hariri was assassinated in 2001 by Kurdish members of Ansar al-Islam. See
pictures of Hariri and Barzani at kurdistan-photolibrary.org.
57. Burchard Brentjes, The Armenians, Assyrians and Kurds: Three Nations, One Fate?
(Campbell, CA: Rishi, 1997), 65–6.
58. ‘Assyria’, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization website, http://
www.unpo.org/members/7859 (accessed 15 July 2014).
59. Aprim, Assyrians, 215.
60. ‘Kurdish Threat against Kirkuk Oil Installations; Iranian and Israeli Support
for Assyrians’, Memorandum of Conversation, Foreign Relations, 1969–1976,
Volume E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972, 29 May 1969. See also
‘Kurdish/Assyrian Appeal for U.S. Assistance’, Memorandum of Conversation,
Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq,
1969–1972, 13 June 1969.
61. ‘Kurdish Threat against Kirkuk Oil Installations; Iranian and Israeli Support for
Assyrians’.
General Conference website, http://www.assyriangc.com/magazine/eng1.pdf
(accessed 9 July 2014), 19.
63. Much of what is known about the S.oriya massacre is nebulous at best. Accounts
by human rights NGOs that reference it are vague, with no real original source
material (oral accounts) used. Fortunately, Michael Tucker presents some
groundwork in his interview with massacre survivors Adam and Noah Yonan.
See Michael Tucker, Hell Is Over: Voices of the Kurds after Saddam (Guilford, CT:
Lyons Press, 2004). The accuracy of the language used by Tucker is problematic
and reflects modern KDP and KRG Kurdification processes, whereby referring
to these people as Kurdish Chaldean Catholics is similar to the previous trend of
Arabisation. Also as a further note, the Yonan family originally hails from Harbol,
an Assyrian village in the Bohtan region of Turkey. Harbol almost entirely consists
of members of the Chaldean religious community who are referred to and refer to
themselves in French (most living in diaspora in France) as Assyro-Chaldean.
64. Tucker, Hell Is Over, 104. ‘Avzarook’ probably refers to Avzerok (Avzarook,
Avzarog) Shanno to the north, passing Baghluje (Bakhlogia), rather than
Avzerok Khamo, which lies twice the distance to the south of S.oriya. Avzerok
Shanno was later destroyed in 1975.
65. Though Table 8 is mostly based on Eshoo, ‘The Fate of Assyrian Villages
Annexed to Today’s Dohuk Governorate in Iraq and the Conditions in These
Villages Following the Establishment of the Iraqi State in 1921’, the original
work states only thirty-eight victims.
66. Tucker, Hell Is Over, 106.
67. Since the fall of the Neo-Assyrian Empire in the seventh century bc, many vil-
lages and cities in northern Mesopotamia and their names continue to reflect an
Assyrian character. Many cities in Iraq today retain some form of their ancient
name: Arbil (though Hawler in Kurdish) is Syriac Arbela and Akkadian Arbailu,
a centre for the worship of the goddess Ishtar and later a diocese of the Church of
the East in the second century ad; Kirkuk, ancient Arrapha and classical Syriac
˘
Karkā d-Beth Slōkh, was the metropolitan see of the Church of the East from
the fifth to the fourteenth centuries, the centre of the ecclesiastical region of Beth
Garmai. See Simo Parpola and Michael Porter, The Helsinki Atlas of the Near
East in the Neo-Assyrian Period (Helsinki: Neo-Assyrian Corpus Text Project,
2001), 20, 26. See also The Chronicle of Arbela, written by the sixth-century
writer Mshikha-zkha, and available in an English translation at http://www.

sasanika.org/wp-content/uploads/ChronicleofArbela.pdf (accessed 15 July
2014); Rubens Duval, Išoyahb Patriarchae III: Liber Epistularum (Leuven:
CSCO, 1962), 102, 106, J.-M. Fiey, ‘Pour un Oriens Christianus Novus; réper-
toire des diocèses syriaques orientaux et occidentaux’, Beiruter Texte und Studien
49 (1993), 63.
68. ‘General Amnesty for Those Taking Part in the Kurdish Military Uprising’, Law
No. 9 of 1963, Weekly Gazette of the Republic of Iraq (24 July 1963), 703; and
‘General Amnesty for Those Who Participated in the Events in the North’, Law
No. 65 of 1966, Weekly Gazette of the Republic of Iraq (21 December 1966), 18.
69. B.B. (Harīr), C.C. (Darbandoke), I.Y. (Diyana), P.W. (Diyana) and Elias
Haroon Bazi (Hejerke-Simele), interviews with author, 17 February 2008,
Toronto; D.T. (Blejanke), K.S. (Dūre), T.S. (Dūre), Y.D. (Annūnē), Y.G.
(Bebede) and Z.Y. (Annūnē), interviews with author, 24 February 2008,
Toronto; B.A. (Komāne), interview with author, 26 July 2008, Toronto.
5
Enduring Discord: Political Machinations
and Border Clearings
Perhaps the most significant moral characteristic of a nation is its hypocrisy.

Reinhold Niebuhr
I n March 1970, the Iraqi government and Kurdish parties agreed on a

peace accord that would grant the Kurds some semblance of autonomy and
end the ongoing armed autonomist movement. The 11 March manifesto
recognised Kurdish as an official language and amended the constitution to
state: ‘The Iraqi people are made up of two nationalities, the Arab nationality
and the Kurdish nationality.’ The Assyrians had been left out of the political
meetings, as the events of 1961–3 had decimated their northern villages.
Despite this detail, the Iraqi government was still wary of Assyrian–Kurdish
relations – so much so, that on 24 April 1970, Mar Eshai Shimun, exiled
Patriarch of the Church of the East, was personally invited to meet the Iraqi
President in Baghdad in a bid by the government to reconcile old differences.
The government restored his citizenship as he was greeted by thousands
of Iraqi Assyrians upon arrival. The patriarch lauded president al-Bakr and
gave a positive interview of that historic meeting to the Baghdad Observer on
30 April 1970. Iraqi officials began to play both sides against the middle. The
government used this invitation to garner ecclesiastic support and to attempt
to exert control over a portion of the Assyrian population by playing to its
religious leaders. The regime’s proposal was to fashion an Assyrian police
force (reminiscent of the levies) in order to buffer foreign advances. Indeed
the patriarch commented on the progressive steps of the Ba‘th government
under al-Bakr to grant the Kurds yet further concessions as evident in the
official 11 March 1970 manifesto. It appeared as though there would be
large-scale reconciliation.
Such attempts continued for a year while relations between the Kurds and
the Iraqi government deteriorated. In 1971, Mustafa Barzani began appealing
in earnest to the United States for aid. Because of these events, the Assyrians
saw an opportunity to emerge: when Baghdad granted the Kurds the option
of autonomy in Arbil and Sulaymaniyah, the Assyrians petitioned for an
autonomous region in Dohuk province. The so-called Assyrian Committee
(made up of Assyrians from various church denominations) began petition-
ing the Iraqi government through Malik Yaqo d’Malik Ismael.2 Further as
yet another step toward progress, on 16 April 1972 Baghdad offered ‘Syriac-
speaking nationals’ limited cultural rights through decree 251, as follows:
(a) The Syriac language shall be the teaching language in all primary schools
whose majority of pupils are from speakers in such language, and teach-
ing of Arabic language shall be compulsory in such schools.
(b) Syriac language shall be taught in intermediate and secondary schools
whose majority of pupils are from speakers in such language, and Arabic
language shall be the teaching language in such schools.
(c) Syriac language shall be taught in the College of Arts at the University
of Baghdad as one of the old languages.
(d) Special programmes in Syriac language shall be set up at the Broadcasting
Service of the Republic of Iraq and at Kirkuk and Nineveh TV stations.
(e) To issue a Syriac-language monthly magazine by the Ministry of
Information.
(f) To establish a society for Syriac speaking writers, and ensure their repre-
sentation in literary and cultural societies and the country.
(g) To help Syriac-speaking writers and translators morally and materially
by printing and publishing their cultural and literary works.
(h) To enable Syriac-speaking nationals to open cultural and artistic clubs
and formulate artistic and theatrical groups for reviving and evolving
their legacy and popular arts.
–Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr
Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council3
Despite this decree, the regime had ulterior plans. Immediately following a
surge in Assyrian cultural activities, the Ba‘thist regime once again began a
policy of suppression.4 Though the 1972 decree gave Assyrians a one-hour
enduri ng di scord | 171
radio broadcast in their native language, the programme was quickly usurped
by Ba‘thists and used for pro-party propaganda, and Assyrians deemed non-
compliant or in opposition to the party’s ideological views were promptly
removed.5 A cultural-linguistic association, the Syriac Academy, was created
and with it the publication of a literary and poetry journal entitled Qala
Suryaya. However, Ba‘thist supporters eventually infiltrated the associa-
tion and politicised the group’s academic and cultural activities. The decree
applied to all the private or parochial schools, including the al-Taqaddum
(Qasha Khando) School, quashing the Assyrians’ numerous efforts at pro-
moting their cultural legacy, something many also did through the avenue of
religious institutions.6
Other Assyrian communities retained a semblance of independence,
especially those in remote mountain villages. As head of the Assyrian
Committee, Yaqo Ismael (son of Malik Ismael), a respected former levy
commander and head of the Tiyari tribe, delivered the Assyrian National
Petition (arguments discussing the creation of an autonomous region for
Assyrians) to the Iraqi government in 1973.7 Meanwhile, the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) garnered international monetary support. Such
aid from foreign allies to the Kurds made many of the already frustrated
and tribally oriented Assyrians more likely to form a closer relationship with
Mustafa Barzani and his troops. This was seen unmistakably during the
summer of 1972, when both Iran and Israel intensified economic support
to Kurds in Iraq. Furthermore, the United States, under the instructions of
President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, funnelled
more than $16 million in CIA funds to the Kurds from 1972 to 1975.8
Much of this increase in aid followed the Iraqi–Soviet friendship treaty,
signed in April 1972, which also saw the Iraqi government’s slight change
in policy regarding their view on a previously treasonous ICP. The United
States regularly supported parties in opposition to Soviet control, and vice
versa. Thus, the age-old struggle of foreign colonial powers over the Middle
East would continue, but the previous positions of the French and British
had now been supplanted by the Soviet Union and the United States using
pawns to contend for control and authority over Iraq.
As a deterrent to potential Assyrian involvement in a rebellion, the Ba‘th
regime took various measures to ensure their neutrality as well as to pacify a
growing anti-government sentiment among Shiites in the south that remained

their immediate focus. The regime feared a fight on two fronts and concocted
a plan permitting them to control the centres of religious/cultural education.
They achieved this by nationalising all schools in Iraq, from predominantly
Shia establishments in the south to Christian parochial schools in large urban
areas and throughout the north.9 Most foreigners were deported, and priests
and nuns were forced to swear an oath of allegiance to the Ba‘th regime. The
nationalisation programme also succeeded in tempering the government-
feared increase of growing Assyrian intellectualism and nationalism in urban
areas (a counterbalance to the loss of land, language and culture during the
urbanisation process – and an unforeseen circumstance) by effectively elimi-
nating many religiously based Assyrian schools that had offered language,
history and cultural classes – notwithstanding sections (a) and (b) of decree
251, as shown above. Once all the schools were deemed public, Assyrians no
longer comprised a majority in their own parochial schools, effectively negat-
ing any benefit they might have drawn from those sections of the decree.
In addition, many years of urbanisation and compulsory Arabic, coupled
with socio-economic difficulties and institutionalised prejudice, led others to
adopt an assimilatory attitude.10
The 1970s witnessed the targeting of specific individuals for their politi-
cal leanings and influencial politics. Bishop Mar Youalah of Dūre, Barwar,
was poisoned in 1972, as was Archbishop Quryaqos Mushe of ‘Amēdīyāh
not long after.11 Elsewhere artists such as the Assyrian composer and singer
Shlimon Bet-Shmuel were imprisoned and beaten. Born on 24 April 1950,
Bet-Shmuel, a member of Nādi al-Thaqāfi al-Āthūrī (Assyrian Cultural
Club), had a deep passion for music expression. On 2 August 1973, during
a celebratory gathering for the third anniversary of the club, Bet-Shmuel
performed the ballad ‘Simele’, a commemoration of the 1933 massacres.
Due to increased government harassment and threat in response to promot-
ing what was deemed Assyrian nationalist sentiment, Bet-Shmuel soon fled
to Iran and eventually the United States.
As with Bet-Shmuel and others Ba‘thification practice analogously
besieged organisations. In 1974 the Baghdad athletic club Nādi al-Riyadhi
al-Āthūrī (Assyrian Sports Club), founded in 1955 and home of national
soccer hero Ammo Baba, had its name compulsorily altered to Nādi
al-Tamouz (July Club) in honour of the 1968 July revolution that saw the
rise to power of the Ba‘th Party.12 In true totalitarian fashion, the nation-
alisation process penetrated all aspects of life. Concurrently, due to decree
251 of 1972, the Assyrians were given the ability to publish and distribute
a variety of magazines within government-sponsored institutions like the
Syriac Academy and its journal along with the radio programme mentioned
above, which received strong support and won over many Christians even
those not self-identifying as Assyrian. While assimilated urbanites and some
proponents of Assyrianism took the programme at face value, others were
not long deceived. Writers continued their cultural promotions through
the magazine Mordinna Atouraya, an organ of Nādi al-Thaqāfi al-Āthūrī,
in 1974. The magazine became the intellectual nucleus of Assyrian thought
in the 1970s and was published in both Arabic and Assyrian. Mordinna
Atouraya, vastly more so than the Syriac Academy, fostered culture beyond
intellectualism for its own sake. Articles on language and social activities
provided the predominant content and engaged the living community.
Artists and writers such as Akhtiyar Benyamin Mushe (born in Mosul in
1940) wrote on the value of language for identity, Mushe remarking that it
was through the medium of language that people are known.13 Few political
matters were discussed in the magazine as it was monitored and printed by
the Ministry of Education. Some writers frequently utilised poetic meta-
phor to express social or political angst, yet others were unabashedly fear-
less in their longings.14 Furthermore, the Assyrian narratives were protected
and disseminated. Authors like Yousip Nimrud Canon told stories of the
community that painted a positive and progressive past rather than one of
failed strategies and promises. As early as 1928 drama groups and writers in
Baghdad flourished in a community classified as ‘a foreign and unassimilable
people’ even amid problems of resettlement.15 The reminder ignited feelings
of pride as well as astounding possibility.
As time progressed, privileges were reduced and funding curtailed, and
in some cases, organisations impaired by the influence of government sup-
porters embedded in the strata of the association.16 Notwithstanding this,
the powerful imagery influenced a younger generation to view prospects and
potential through the successes of the past, thus creating hope despite an
uncertain future.
Figure 16 A cover of Mordinna Atouraya from 1973
A Resumption of Violence
Regional players also asserted significant influence over Iraq. This was unmis-
takable following the Algiers Agreement, an accord between Iraq and Iran
in 1975 engendered in order to settle border disputes, when Iran’s support
for the Kurds had begun to diminish, at least on the surface – the involve-
ment of Iran’s secret service, SAVAK, on the other hand, continued. In
addition, Israel persuaded Mustafa Barzani to begin a new offensive against
the Iraqi army in 1973 – some sources believe, to keep the Kurds occupied
and unable to support the Syrian army on the Golan front.17 Violence was
renewed in earnest from Kirkuk to Sinjar. At Khanaqin on 18 August,
two Iraqi militarymen and ten paramilitory Kurds were killed in skirmishes
along the Iranian border.18 According to a telegram from US intelligence,
an intercepted telegram from the KDP politburo to the Revolutionary
Command Council (the ultimate decision-making body in Iraq) reported
that the fighting in Sinjar had worsened. The KDP promised repercussions
should attacks continue.19 The situation saw greater deterioration as the
months wore on with little hope of reconciliation and no end in sight.
Indeed further infighting occurred. On 11 November, using a pêşmerge force
2,000 strong, the KDP reportedly launched attacks against communist vil-
lages in Sulaymaniyah. The KDP in turn accused the communists of receiv-
ing arms and ammunitions from the Iraqi government and attacking the
KDP headquarters at Darbandikhan.20
In March 1974 the Iraqi government completed a draft autonomy agree-
ment and allotted two weeks for a KDP response. The organisation rejected
the agreement, which would have left the oilfields of Kirkuk under Iraqi gov-
ernment control. Some experts have speculated that a solution to the Kurdish
question in Iraq was greatly imperilled by ‘the increased Iranian–U.S.–Israeli
support for Barzani’.21 Israel’s Mossad continued close relations and col-
laborated further on issues concerning Iraqi Kurds through the mid-1970s,
at which time fighting resumed between the Barzani Kurds and the Iraqi
government, causing internal fighting and forced demographic displacement,
especially in the Zakho region.
In 1974, the Kurdish paramilitory movement was renewed. A new
committee was created known as the High Committee of Christian Affairs,
headed by Gewargis Chikko, brother of the late Hurmiz Malik Chikko.
Gewargis Chikko worked in concert with Barzani and the rest of the opposi-
tion movement, attempting to provide consistent aid to non-combatants in
the struggle as well as general aid for needy Assyrians. But for all his efforts,
the United States made it clear that as policy they would not intervene in the
internal issues of another country.22
Barzani, having at different times secured Israeli, US and Iranian back-
ing, made a play for greater power in the early 1970s.23 This backing, prob-
ably due to Barzani’s anti-communist tendencies at that particular moment
and the Ba‘th regime’s kinder treatment of the Communist Party in Iraq at
the time, allowed those Kurds involved in the struggle to once again take
up arms against the government. This support, most specifically from Iran,
ceased in 1975 immediately following the signing of the Algiers Agreement,
with the settling of border disputes and the beginning of what became known
in Iraq as the border clearings.
During this time of uncertainty and questioning of Barzani’s leadership

of the KDP, in June 1975 a former leading member of the KDP politburo,
Jalal Talabani, along with some Marxist and socialist-leaning members,
formed the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) while in Damascus.24 The
succeeding years would witness great friction between the newly formed
progressive PUK and the predominantly tribal Barzani-led KDP. As a con-
sequence, serious fighting erupted between KDP and PUK militia, which
affected Kurds and also those Assyrians caught in the crossfire.
To add to the rising frictions, atleast on the Assyrian front, Dawood Malik
Ismael assassinated Mar Eshai Shimun, patriarch of the Assyrian Church of
the East, in San Jose, California, on 6 November 1975.25 This blow to the
Church of the East, already in exile, left a deep impression on the community
that also coincided with a resumption of fighting and forced displacement in
Iraq, further cleansing Assyrians from their ancestral homeland. This contin-
ued demographic shifting produced two significant by-products. Firstly, their
initial relocation to Arab-dominated cities in southern Iraq severed the ‘natu-
ral tie between the people and their land’.26 Secondly, in many cases Assyrians
were removed alongside Kurds and forced into collective towns where they
once again became a minority to the more numerous Kurds. And further, the
so-called legal confiscation of their land indicated that any future settlement
could just as simply be repossessed by government officials.
Elsewhere in urban regions, pressures experienced by less compliant
members of the Assyrian community continued into the latter part of the
decade. The following account will serve as a case in point of the suffering
visited upon Assyrian individuals by the Iraqi government. In many cases, the
reason for their detention ranged from refusal to join the ruling Ba‘th Party
to performing Assyrian patriotic songs and poetry:
It was Wednesday, January 5, 1977, in the evening. As always (almost

every day), I left home on my way to the Assyrian Cultural Club. I got to
the main street and stood on the sidewalk. The next day I woke up in the
trauma hospital with my brother and a friend by my side. I asked where I
was and they told me that a pick-up truck hit me and I was in the hospital.
Because I was sedated I went back to sleep. Because I didn’t remember
anything about the accident, I thought it was really a normal car accident.
My brother told me that the truck knocked me into a steel electric pole
and the lights went off. He went out to see what happened and he saw me
and the driver. He caught the driver until the police came and took him.
A couple days later, an old man and an officer, in air force uniform, came
to visit me. The old man was in tears. He said that he was the father of the
driver who hit me. He asked me to drop the charges against him in order
to be released from jail. I said, ‘Not so fast.’ The officer said that he was the
brother of the boy. Three days later the officer came alone and said, ‘Do
you remember me? I’m the cousin of the driver. I came to ask you what is
your decision regarding the charges against my cousin.’ Although I was in
bad shape and in pain, I remembered that he previously said that he was the
driver’s brother. So I felt something fishy in this case. I told him, ‘I haven’t
made a decision yet.’
A couple days after that, the officer came to me again and said, ‘Listen,
Y., I am a friend of the family and if you want to get out of this hospital,
you better sign these papers to drop the charges.’ I immediately said, ‘Give
me the pen,’ and I signed the papers. There was a small biscuit factory next
to our house and on the main street. A while after the accident, the officer
said to my father, ‘I will tell you something, but you have to swear on the
Bible and on the lives of your children that you not tell a soul, including Y.’
My father swore. The man said that the factory was closed but he was in it,
and he saw the pick-up truck idling on the side street. ‘As soon as he saw Y.
the truck moved and hit your son.’ My father never talked about that, but
he decided to leave Iraq like many others were doing. I didn’t understand
because he was always against leaving Iraq. After I left Iraq, my father told
the story to my nephew on the day he was leaving Iraq. At that time, the
Ba‘th Party was ruling, but the President was Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and
Saddam Hussein was the Vice President. It was known by Iraqis that oppo-
nents were killed in accidents or would disappear mysteriously, including
the son of President al-Bakr, who was a candidate to replace him.27
As pressure mounted, spreading rapidly through the urban populace,

especially among the elite, most metropolitan Christians diffidently accepted
the ‘Arab’ appellation for various reasons involving socio-economic and
political survival. Yet not all conformed. ‘Abd Salam and Abu Sargon [of
the Syrian Catholic community] were arrested and tortured for identifying
themselves as “Assyrian” [Ashūri] in the 1977 Iraqi census.’28 On 19 October
1978, the Iraqi government ordered the imprisonment of five Assyrian sing-
ers, songwriters and artists, including David Esha, Sami Yako and Albert
Oscar Baba.29 To illustrate one example, Yako’s imprisonment and subse-
quent torture came from his singing of an Assyrian song. Yako, a playwright
and actor, was held between 1 and 23 November 1978, in solitary confine-
ment, in a cell measuring approximately one by two metres. Until the time of
his release, he was subject to mental and physical torment, including regular
beatings with various instruments, electric shocks and mental abuse. Fleeing
to Kuwait after his release, Yako left for England, where he was admitted as
a political refugee:
I didn’t leave Iraq because I wanted to. We left because I was put in prison
and badly tortured for a month for singing an Assyrian nationalistic song
at a party. Just before I was released, one of the Ba‘th officers in charge told
me that he would be expecting weekly communication from me detailing
the nationalistic activities of our community – in particular those who were
meeting in the Assyrian Culture Club (Nadi Al Thaqafi).30
Out of necessity and fear, as illustrated by the government reaction above,

acquiescence brought socio-economic benefit to some, being further swept
along within the rising tide of Iraqi-Arab nationalism, fostered initially by
the education system and print media, and later audio-visual media, con-
trolled by the Ba‘th Party.31 Such cultural repression became prominent in
cities; in other urban centres both men and women thrived. While these are
individual cases and should not be assumed to be monolithic rubrics for the
Assyrian experience, the policies of otherisation reverberated on a greater
scale as towns and villages were destroyed, ways of life altered, further con-
tributing to marginalisation within the Iraqi polity and indeed creating the
same within the Assyrian community itself.
The Border Clearings of 1977–8
The Barwari Bala region of northern Iraq contained around eighty vil-
lages. Of these, thirty-five are entirely inhabited by Assyrians were during
the 1970s. The region is principally mountainous, and many villages

remained inaccessible by most motorised vehicles at the time. The region
is bordered by Turkey to the north and the Sapna valley to the south,
and rests between the Greater Zab to the west and the river Khabur to
the east.32 This remoteness allowed the retention of a unique identity and
lifestyle distinct from families in urban center. Furthermore, the Barwar
region was an ancient Church of the East enclave, and its continuous
habitation and familial relations with Assyrian villages in modern Turkey
speaks to both the historic continuum and the artificiality of the modern
border.
The border clearings would devastate almost every village in the region,
along with the symbols of their cultural heritage. As reported by Human
Rights Watch (HRW), under the terms of the 1975 Algiers Agreement, Iraq
began to clear a cordon sanitaire along its northern borders, in particular
with Iran. HRW further reported, based on correspondence, that initially
a 5-kilometre-wide corridor was created, later expanded to 10, then 15 and
eventually 30 kilometres.33 Families were told they were to be removed from
the region to be settled with few belongings in collective towns farther south
while their villages and churches were dynamited and bulldozed.34 According
to the Ba‘th’s own sources, some 28,000 families were removed from their
villages in two months in 1978.35 Initially, this cordon sanitaire was fashioned
under the pretext of preventing further Iranian support to the Kurdish move-
ment in Iraq.
Following the large-scale upheavals at the end of 1978, the demograph-
ics of the country were drastically altered once again as the culmination of
the continuous displacement and eradication of ancestral villages and rural
communities by government decree, followed by the creation of process-
ing facilities, which became known as mujamma‘āt, or collective towns,
fostered the disappearance of the last vestiges of rural Assyrian life and cul-
ture (see Table 10).36 This second wave originated in a far more ideologi-
cally Arab Iraq, which had developed through a close connection with and
in tutorship from the great powers of the United States and the Soviet
Union. They waged a war of influence over Iraq, and each country’s funding
depended on which Iraqi faction could best stem the tide of influence from
the other.
Name Province District Alt. name Schools Religious Year(s) Comments

structures
Alih Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1978 Border clearings
Balūkā Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Bebālūk, Beth 1 1978, 1988 15 families displaced, site of chemical
Bālūk attack
Bāsh Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1 2 1977–8, Border clearings, 50 families displaced
1988
Bazif Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Ba Zibe, 1942, 1976
Ba Zive, Ba
Dibbe
Bequlke Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Beth Qulke 1 1 1978 Border clearings, 8 families displaced
Beshmīyaye Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Bishmiaye, 2 1978 Border clearings, 50 families displaced
Beth
Shmayaye
Betannūrē Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Beth Tannūrē 1 1978 Border clearings, 24 families displaced
Birka Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1977 Border clearings, 35 families displaced
Butara Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Botara 1 1978 Border clearings, 8 families displaced
Challik Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Challik Nasara 2 1933, 1978 Border clearings, 100 families
displaced in 1978
Cham Dostina Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1 1978 Border clearings, 5 families displaced
Chaqala (lower) Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Chaqala 1 1978 Border clearings, 20 families displaced
Khtetha
Chaqala (upper) Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Chaqala Letha 1978 Border clearings, 35 families displaced
structures
Deralok Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Deira d’Luqa 4 1933, 1978 and Anfal, used as collective
1978, town
1987–8
Derke Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Derka 1976
Dohuke Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Dahoki, 1 1933, 60 families displaced 1988
Dohoke 1962,
1977, 1988
Dūre Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 4 1978 Border clearings, 100 families
displaced
Hawsarek Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Avsarke 1977–8 Border clearings
Helwā Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Halwā, Helwā 1 1978 Border clearings, 60 families displaced
Nasara
Hīsh Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Hiche, Heesh 1 1 1978 Border clearings, 100 familes displaced
Iqri Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Aqri, Aqra, 2 1978 Border clearings, 35 families displaced
Keri
Istip Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Histip 1 1978 Border clearings, 35 families displaced
Iyyat Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Yate, Iyat 2 1978 Border clearings, 40 families displaced
Kaftumardina Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1976
Khwara Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1 1978 Border clearings, 16 families displaced
Komāne Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Kowane 1 5 1961, Became collective town in 1977
1965,
1977,
1987–8
Table 10 (continued)

structures
Lish Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Lich 1963, 1978 Affected by civil war and border
clearings
Maghribiya Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1 1978 Border clearings, 8 families displaced
Malākhta Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1 1978 Border clearings, 15 families displaced
Māyē Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Māyē Nasara 2 1978 Border clearings, 35 families displaced
Meydan Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Maydan 1 1978 25 families displaced
Nerwa (lower) Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Nerwa 1 1976, 60 families displaced, 1988
Khtetha, 1988
Lower Nerwa
Qārō Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Qarou, Karou 2 1977–8, Border clearings; Anfal, 50 families
1988 displaced
Rekan Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1963, 1978 Civil war, border clearings
Sardāshte Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1 1978 Border clearings, 90 families displaced
Sarsang (city) Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 2 1961, 1972–3 1972–3, Barzani and government
confiscated land
Spe Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1978 Border clearings
Tashish Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 2 1978, Destroyed during Anfal
1988
Tirwanish Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Der Wanis 1 1961, Mostly Kurdish by 1960s; border
1977–8 clearings
Wela Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Welah 2 1977, Border clearings; Anfal, 20 families
1988 displaced
structures
Zuinke Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1976
Hazarjot Dohuk ‘Aqra 1 1961,
1972,
1988
Badariyah Dohuk Sheikhan Badliyah 1933, Destroyed during Simele massacre;
1976 later Arabised by regime
Bebōze Dohuk Sheikhan Beth Bōzi 1976,
1987
Shkaft-Mara Dohuk Sheikhan Sharkaf, 1975 30 families displaced
Sarkafe
Avzerok Khammo Dohuk Simele Lower 1 1975 50 families
Avzerog
Avzerok Shanno Dohuk Simele Upper Avzerog 2 1975 60 families displaced
Bajidda-Barave Dohuk Simele 1975, 1976 30 families displaced in 1975;
Arabised 1976
Bajidda-Kandal Dohuk Simele 1975
Bakhluja Dohuk Simele Bachloudja 1975 8 families displaced
Dosteka Dohuk Simele 1933, Pillaged and destroyed in1933
1976 during Simele massacre
Gerqawa Dohuk Simele Gerkawa 1976
Hawresk Dohuk Simele Hawreski 1975 10 families displaced
Ishkavdal Dohuk Simele Shkafdal 1 1961, 20 families displaced
1975
Karrana Dohuk Simele 1933, Many fled to Syria in 1933 during
1976 Simele massacre

structures
Mar Yaqob Dohuk Simele Mar Yaco, 1 2 1976, Destroyed ancient monastery of
Mar Ya’aqub, 1988 the same name destroyed;
Qashafir 20 families displaced
Mavan Dohuk Simele Mawana 1933, 10 families displaced, removed for
1975 government poultry project
Muqble Dohuk Simele Moqoble 1933, Mostly Yezidi by 1976
1976
Reqawa Dohuk Simele Rekawa 1933,
1974–6
Salah.iya Dohuk Simele 1933, Pillaged and destroyed in 1933 during
1976 Simele massacre
Slevani Dohuk Simele Slewani 1976
S.oriya Dohuk Simele 1 1 1969, 40 families before 1969 massacre
1975–6
Alanish Dohuk Zakho Alanash 1 1975 40 families displaced
Avkani Dohuk Zakho Avgni, Avgani 1976 or
1978
Bahnona Dohuk Zakho 1961, 30 families displaced
1975
Bajuwa Dohuk Zakho 1976 5 families displaced
Bedār Dohuk Zakho Beth Dara 1 1975 130 families displaced
Behere Dohuk Zakho 1975
structures
Benakhre Dohuk Zakho Beth Nakhre 1975 10 families displaced
Bersive Dohuk Zakho Birsivi, Beth 2 1976, Transformed into a military camp and
Sawe 1988 collective town
Dashtnakh Dohuk Zakho Dashta 1975 15 families displaced
d’Nakh,
Dashtatakh
Dehere Dohuk Zakho Behere 1975 15 families displaced
Deirabūn Dohuk Zakho Deir Abuna 1 1976 Destroyed; resettled by Mosul Arabs
and Yezidis by government order
Derashīsh Dohuk Zakho ‘Umra, Ūmra 1975–6 50 families; resettled by Kurds
Shghisha
Feshkhābur Dohuk Zakho Pešabūr, Pesh 2 1976 Destroyed; resettled by Mosul Arabs
Khabur and Yezidis by government order
Istablan Dohuk Zakho Stablan 1 1975 20 families displaced
Pireka Dohuk Zakho 1978, 90 families displaced in 1978
1984
Qarawilla Dohuk Zakho Qarawola 1 1975–6 100 families, 70 homes before being
destroyed
Sanaat Dohuk Zakho Esnakh 2 1975 120 families displaced
Shuwadin Dohuk Zakho Shudin 1975 35 families displaced
Yarda Dohuk Zakho 2 1975 60 families displaced
Greapan Ninawa Girēpān 1976
Kandale Ninawa ‘Ain Sifni 1976 Predominantly Yezidi families
Mahara Ninawa ‘Ain Sifni 1976

structures
Mahate Ninawa ‘Ain Sifni 1976 Predominantly Yezidi families
Mahmouda Ninawa ‘Ain Sifni 1976 Predominantly Yezidi families
Mam Rachan Ninawa ‘Ain Sifni 1976 Predominantly Yezidi families
Baqasri Ninawa Sheikhan 1976 50 families displaced
Beristeke Ninawa Sheikhan Beristek 1976
‘Ain Helwa Ninawa Telkeif 1933, Assyrian Bohtan tribes
1976
Bendawaye Ninawa Telkeif Beth 1976 Arabised by regime
Handawaya
Jamboor Ninawa Telkeif Janbur 1976
Khercheniya Ninawa Telkeif Khershinya 1976
Khoshaba Ninawa Telkeif Khochaba 1976 Arabised by regime
Nās.erīyā Ninawa Telkeif 1976
Qasrune Ninawa Telkeif 1976
Ummairi Ninawa Telkeif 1976
Many Assyrian and Kurdish families, including those who had deserted
the army rather than take part in the wholesale destruction, became refu-
gees in Turkey. The Ba‘th regime under Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr enacted an
amnesty law that would allow for the return of refugees and those referred to
deserters. Under Article 1 of Law 108 of 1979, General Amnesty for Military
and Civil Kurds:
Iraqi Kurds who are related to the army, interior security forces and civil
deserters outside the country shall be exempted from all offences they have
committed because of Northern events and from all the substantive and
subsidiary penalties issued against them because of these events. Also they
shall be exempted from all the penalties provided for in the military Laws
consequent to their absence, desertion, default, and violation.37
The amnesty, according to the government, facilitated the return and integra-
tion of Kurds who had left their posts and abandoned their battalions into
their previous position with no harm and no change in salary or benefits.38
Subsequently, Law 109 was created to extend the amnesty to all military and
civilian deserters residing outside Iraq.39 Furthermore, the promulgation of Law
187 of 1978, First Amendment to the Law of Kurdish Culture and Publication
House No 29 of 1976, signified a crucial attempt by Ba‘th under al-Bakr to
pacify armed Kurds in the north who had begun obtaining foreign aid.40
Whereas concessions were made, at least in principle, to integrate and
negotiate the status and position of Iraqi Kurds during various periods of
Iraq’s political history, the same cannot be said of the Assyrian experience
during the same time periods. Contrarily, whereas the Kurds were granted
legal, political and cultural concessions, the Assyrians were recognised by
the regime as Syriac-speaking Arab Christians, ‘Arab-Messih.iyīn. Moreover,
referring to oneself as Ashūri was a penal offence carrying with it time in
prison.41 Moreover, arrests of individuals accused of treason for practising
cultural traditions such as performing folkloric and cultural songs further
contributed to a sense of disparity. Constant intimidation and imprisonment
became obstacles for any cultural advancement. The subsequent destruction
of over ninety-five villages, sixty religious structures and schools and over
1200 families displaced including the annihilation of their economic sustain-
ability through the destruction of their modes and ways of life from apple
orchards to agricultural fields from Barwar to Zakho foreshadowed the end

of any hope for pluralism in Iraq. The litmus test a failure.
Notes
1. Ashor Giwargis, ‘Until when? The Assyrian ethnicity persecuted and m arginalized
in its own homeland’, tr. Mary C., Zinda Magazine, 30 September 2002.
2. Vahram Petrosian, ‘Assyrians in Iraq’, Iran and the Caucasus 10.1 (2006), 134.
3. Iraq Ministry of Information, ‘Granting the Cultural Rights to the Turkman and
Syriac-speaking Nationals’, Information Series 58 (Baghdad: Al-Hurriya, 1974),
11–12. The formation of the Syriac Academy is dealt with on pages 21–30.
4. Iraq: Continuous and Silent Ethnic Cleansing – Displaced Persons in Iraqi
Kurdistan and Iraqi Refugees in Iran (Paris: FIDH/International Alliance for
Justice, 2003), 17.
6. Ibid.
7. Petrosian, ‘Assyrians in Iraq’, 134; see Annexes for US government document
attestations.
8. Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars: the Untold History of Israeli
Intelligence (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1991), 328.
9. Ray Mouawad, ‘Syria and Iraq: Repression – Disappearing Christians of the
Middle East’, Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2001.
10. The so-called Arab Christians of Mosul are a prime example of this assimilation
practice. In the case of many of these Christians, their socio-economic situation
was well above that of Muslims in the region, showing a discrepancy in the
solely anti-Christian argument for the conditions faced by the Assyrians in Iraq.
However, those Christians who identified as Ashūri (‘Assyrian’) were ridiculed
and ostracised by the Arabised Christian community, itself effectively accom-
plishing government policy.
11. Iraq: Continuous and Silent Ethnic Cleansing, 58. Any indication of who mur-
dered the bishops is still speculative. Most theories support Iraqi government
responsibility for the poisoning, due to the two bishops’ Assyrian-nationalist
stance. This was mentioned numerous times within the oral histories recorded.
This idea is coupled with or sometimes in opposition to speculation of possible
Kurdish KDP involvement to distance Assyrians from the government which
had began to grant concessions and possibly arms to buffer Kurdish advances.
12. It was changed back in 1987 due to continued protests from supporters and
fans.
13. Akhtiyar Benyamin Mushe, ‘Leshanā d-Yimmā’, Mordinna Atouraya 3.11

(1977), 41–3. Mushe was a prolific writer, also translating works such as The
Merchant of Venice into Assyrian.
14. This is beyond the scope of this work, but deserves attention since it illustrates
the paradox of ‘cultural rights’ as offered by the Ba‘th. See Khaziqaya Israel,
‘Freedom’, Mordinna Atouraya 1.3–4 (1974), 12–13.
15. Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements in Iraq
(London: Saqi, [1978] 2004), 869; Yousip Nimrud Canon, ‘Tash‘ītā’, Mordinna
Atouraya 1.1 (1973), 11–14.
Chicago.
17. Black and Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars, 329.
18. US Intelligence Baghdad, Iraq to Secretary of State, Washington, DC,
‘Deterioration of Government of Iraq–Kurdish Relations’, 26 August 1973,
WikiLeaks.
19. US Intelligence Baghdad, Iraq to Secretary of State, Washington, DC, ‘Kurdish
Conflict’, 28 August 1973, WikiLeaks.
20. US Intelligence Baghdad, Iraq to Secretary of State, Washington, DC, ‘Kurdish–
Communist Clashes’, 18 November 1973, WikiLeaks.
21. Black and Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars, 330.
22. Department of State to Iran Tehran, Lebanon Beirut, ‘Request for Aid to
Assyrians’, 9 May 1974, WikiLeaks.
23. George Black, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds (New
York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), 6.
24. Gareth R. V. Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent
Democracy (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 80.
25. See ‘Public Records of the Trial Proceedings of the Assassination of His Holiness
Mar Eshai Shimun XXIII’, Superior Court of the State of California (1975).
Chicago (includes follow-up email correspondence). See also Frederick A.
Aprim, Assyrians: From Bedr Khan to Saddam Hussein – Driving into Extinction
the Last Aramaic Speakers (F. A. Aprim, 2006), 233, for similar situations which
occurred during the 1980s.
28. ‘Northern Iraq Human Rights Field Mission’, Iraq Sustainable Democracy
Project, 2006, www.iraqdemocracyproject.org/pdf/Northern%20Iraq%20
Human%20Rights%20Field%20Mission.pdf (accessed 16 July 2014).
29. Amnesty International Report 1979 (London: Amnesty International, 1979),

158; Aprim, Assyrians, 232. See also ‘World Ignores Plight of Assyrians’, Assyrian
Sentinel, April 1979.
30. Tony Kasim, ‘An Interview with Sami Yako’, Nineveh 30.1–2 (2007), 23.
31. See Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements In Iraq,
40, 700, Tables A-27–A-29 (references to ‘Arabised Assyrians’ and ‘Arabised
Chaldeans’).
32. S.A. (Dūre), interview with author, 2 July 2007, Toronto.
33. Black, Genocide in Iraq, 37. Footnote 29 mentions the work of Dr Shorsh Haji
Resool (see Chapter 1, ‘Key Sources’). It is evident that HRW is dependent on
Resool’s work for most of its information concerning the Anfal campaign and
the 1978 border clearings.
35. Al-Thawra, 18 September 1978.
36. Pictures of the displacement of people and bulldozing of the villages are available
at http://www.barwar.net and more specifically http://www.barwar.net/view-
article-117.html (accessed 16 July 2014).
37. ‘General Amnesty for Military and Civil Kurds’, Law No. 108 of 1979, Alwaqai
Aliraqiya: The Official Gazette of the Republic of Iraq, 19 December 1979, p. 7.
38. Ibid.
39. ‘General Amnesty for Militarymen and Civilian Deserters outside Iraq’, Law
No. 109 of 1979, Alwaqai Aliraqiya: The Official Gazette of the Republic of Iraq,
1 September 1980, p. 2.
40. Alwaqai Aliraqiya: The Official Gazette of the Republic of Iraq, 1 March 1979,
p. 10.
41. As exemplified by the experience of Abu Ishtar, an urban-dwelling Syrian
Catholic by ecclesiastical background. See ‘Northern Iraq Human Rights Field
Mission’.
6
New Movements and War
on the Horizon
It is the constant fault and inseparable quality of ambition that it never

looks behind it.
Seneca
The Iran–Iraq War
W ith the accomplishments and setbacks of the late 1970s in hindsight,

the turn of the decade signalled yet another difficult situation for Iraq
and her Assyrian inhabitants.1 Following the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979
and further instability in the northern region, the Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) revived its alliance with Tehran. On 22 September 1980, Iraq, under
a fearful and power-motivated Saddam Hussein, went to war with Iran. In an
attempt to eliminate future threats and possible rebel elements, the military
drafted many Assyrian men and deployed them to the front lines. Many disap-
peared or were killed. Most of the combatants had little desire to fight in a war
for an oppressive regime, yet the war effort ‘involved the conscription of large
numbers of Assyrian soldiers, as some forty thousand of these unwilling recruits
were killed, wounded, imprisoned in Iran, or missing in action’.2 At least 266
Assyrians were held as prisoners of war in Iran, some for more than twenty
years.3 Overall, 200,000–300,000 people, predominantly Shia Arabs from the
southern regions of Iraq, were deported to Iran in 1980.4
It is not inconceivable that the positioning of Christians on the front lines
and in difficult military situations during the Iran–Iraq War was done with
malevolent purpose by the regime. Most Assyrians who survived spoke of
threats against their person from their fellow Muslim combatants. In essence,
it would not do for a Christian to kill a Muslim – an enemy Iranian or
otherwise. As Christians, Assyrians feared a religiously motivated backlash from
Iraqi soldiers for killing fellow Muslims.5 The Assyrians of Iranian origin in
Iraq included refugees from Urmia during the Baqubah refugee camp crisis
(see Chapter 2) who had lived in Iraq since the end of the First World War, as
well as those recent refugees following the 1978–9 Islamic revolution in Iran
and ousting of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.6 In the latter case, most families
were visited briefly by an army officer, told to retain only the clothes on their
person, packed into buses, and then driven to the border of Iran and forced
into exile in a inhospitable region.7 Thus, in most cases, the deportees lost all
of their material possessions, including homes and land. The demography of
Iraq in relation to the Assyrians was, thus, again altered during the early 1980s.
The Calm before the Storm
The destruction wrought by the war spanned various regions and ethnic
and religious groups, and affected the entirety of Iraq simultaneously. In its
midst and immediate aftermath the government made a conscious decision
to increase economic prosperity at the expense of cultural plurality. As such
during the early 1980s, Assyrians became an easy target for Ba‘thist scru-
tiny. Targeted as individuals and as groups, they were increasingly frustrated
with such government policies. Their frustration garnered a strong nationalist
reaction from kin living both in and outside Iraq, especially those involved
in political and cultural activities.8 It was here at the turn of the decade that
a grassroots opposition movement began. Among the Assyrian political and
cultural groups that most strongly supported the development of the Assyrian
Democratic Movement (ADM) was the predominantly diaspora-based (with
some Iranian-Assyrian links) Assyrian Universal Alliance (AUA). Due to the
assumed link between the ADM and the AUA, many Assyrians in Iraq came
under suspicion of working with foreign powers. Furthermore, the Iraqi gov-
ernment now employed a new level of espionage to record Assyrian activi-
ties in the United States, Europe and elsewhere. The government regularly
infiltrated Assyrian cultural centres and churches and influenced members
towards pro-Ba‘th sentiments, furthering discord, especially in regard to
influencing church officials:
Influence the clergy in the Assyrian community and use them in a manner
to cause damage to the activities of the group. Hire some clergy to infiltrate
ne w m ov ements a nd war on the h o r iz o n | 193
and have access to their precincts in order to gain information from the
families of those who have fled [deserters].9
Such influence would sow discord and fear within the ranks of those working
in political and cultural circles and as said fear escalated, many marginalised
fled Iraq willingly during this persecution, and in many cases, escaped to Iran.
For predominantly political reasons, an estimated 330 Assyrians fled to Iran
in 1984 alone, in an attempt to escape oppression.
Assyrians amid the opposition
Throughout the 1980s, many Christians who identified as Assyrians contin-

ued to face political, ethnic and socio-economic oppression. The decades of
government policies of acculturation and inculcation, which instilled fear
and desperation in the Assyrians through urbanisation (effectively Arabising
them), had an unforeseen consequence: an increase in the number of Assyrian
young men and women in higher education. This allowed for an intellectual
movement, despite the government’s attempts to eliminate possible dissident
ideas fostered by an isolated tribal system still prevalent in rural areas of Iraq,
especially in the northern and southern extremes. A few of these intellec-
tual movements gained ground, allowing for an armed resistance movement
during the 1960s alongside the Kurds, and the later establishment of the
ADM in 1979.
The Assyrian Democratic Movement, or Zowa‘a Demoqratāyā
Athorāyā (ADM/Zowaa), was established on 12 April 1979 from among
various smaller cultural-political and student groups, including Akhunwāthē
Athorāyē (Assyrian Brothers in 1969). Among these cultural groups, and
even among church and religious groups, especially in the Mosul region, a
national awakening was ignited.10 Interestingly, the ideology of the ADM
was heavily synthesised from an Assyrian cultural awareness that had devel-
oped much earlier in Urmia, Iran, and in Harput, Turkey, independently.
By this period in the development of Assyrian nationalist thought, both the
AUA, which existed mostly in diaspora with some members in Iran – and by
extension the Assyrian Democratic Organization (ADO) with strongholds in
Turkey, Syria and Europe – and the ADM resolutely supported an Iraq-based
Assyrian political movement. The general hope of all parties was reflected in
their defence of Assyrian ethnic, political and cultural rights within a country
known for its continued violations thereof.
It is most commonly believed that the ADM launched its opposition
in 1982, sending supporters to northern Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War. As
their supporters and numbers were not vast, and with the 1978 destruction of
‘Amēdīyāh still fresh in their minds, the ADM ‘militiamen’ were used defen-
sively, predominantly to protect villages in light of the consistent targeting
of their kin, rather than in any offensive manner (see Figures 17 and 18).
During that first year, the ADM launched its first official periodical, Bahra.
The ADM began its true push into the opposition and gained the support
of many Assyrians as well as the respect of the Kurdish and Communist par-
ties, from whom they had adapted their structural basis while in exile in the
northern mountains. Much of this growth led to the regime’s keen interest in
any mention of Assyrian cultural and political groups, the ADM in particular.
The Ba‘th’s physical retribution was silent and swift and focused on villages
and cultural edifices.11 On 14 July 1984, the Saddam regime attacked ADM
locations in Baghdad, arresting more than 150 members of the movement. Of
those arrested, twenty-two were sentenced to life imprisonment, and four were
sentenced to death.12 Not long after, the regime also attacked the villages of
Hejerke and Pireka, where militiamen died attempting to safeguard residents.
Other members of the opposition suffered analogously, and their families
marked by the regime. In some cases relatives of known or presumed dissidents
were imprisoned in Abu Ghraib, including elderly men and women, while
entire families were exiled to the Iran–Iraq border and stripped of citizenship.13
In the months following the Ba‘th devised an abiding plan to control the
ADM and other Assyrian parties believed to have questionable loyalties. ‘The
security agencies are charged to squash any organisation within the ranks of
the Assyrians and keep them from progressing, especially inside the cities.’14
Infiltrators were tasked to
prepare a list of all influential individuals within the ranks of Assyrians

in the church and among the general community. The list should be
updated on regular basis. The prominent individuals among them in the
community will be provided personal and financial help etc. [to become
Ba‘th informants].15
Figure 17 Assyrian Democratic Movement militia near Mar Mattai in 1987
(Courtesy of Hormuz Bobo and Nineveh Center for Research and Development,
Qaraqosh, Iraq)
To further their control Ba‘th was assiduous in its courting of individu-

als within religious organisations and would spend a good portion of its
resources on bribery. Further, it sought not only to penetrate but to initi-
ate inter- as well as intra-community conflict. The security services were
charged to ‘increase the personal conflict between the mentioned group and
the disloyal Kurdish Democratic Party. Seek all ways to create disunity and
disagreement among sides of the enemy.’16 That included infiltrating and
marking printing and distribution facilities: ‘Locate the printing facilities
of this Assyrian group, since their publishing style resembles the newspaper
published by the disloyal Communist Party.’17
The Assyrians made inroads with other opposition groups, but even
there they remained relegated to the margins. In the case of attempts by
Assyrian political parties to work towards a united front alongside the
Kurds in the 1980s, the failure of Assyrian nationalism in Iraq to mini-
mise or amalgamate tribal and religious components allowed the Kurds to
Figure 18 ADM militia in the ruins of an Assyrian village in Barwar during the
1980s (Courtesy of Hormuz Bobo)
dismiss their former allies or, from the perspective of Kurdish leader Idris
Barzani concerning Assyrian–Kurdish collaboration, to effectively subsume
them as part of the Kurdish forces in 1984. According to Iraqi government
correspondence:
The Beth Nahrain party agreed to take responsibilities of military functions

and mediate between the Assyrian National Front and the Democratic Front.
They also opened negotiations with the Kurdish Democratic Party in order to
work with each other, even though the AUA has previously requested from
the traitor Idris al-Barzani to fight under the Assyrian name. Idris replied that
if they wanted they could fight, but under the condition that they fight under
the Kurdish name and not under [an] Assyrian or any other front.18
This lack of political authority guaranteed the Assyrians a contin-

ued minor role in any opposition movement in the years that followed.
Moreover, the socio-economic, geographic and ethnic distinctions the Iraqi
regime placed on both Assyrians and Kurds – which, for the Assyrians,
included religious affiliation – gave the regime further excuse to ignore their
basic human rights in the midst of a project in state homogenisation. Since
the Assyrians were not acknowledged as a separate ethnic group, those in the
northern region were further disregarded as part of a troublesome Kurdish
element by a government wishing to create public animosity towards what
they perceived as a foreign element in an otherwise homogenous Iraq.
One of the many pitfalls of progress is the institutionalising of agency of
minority communities, where in effect one becomes the hegemonic power
(i.e. the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in post-1991 Iraq) they
aided to counter.19 Furthermore, many Assyrians, like Kurds, maintained
tribal and feudal relations despite integration into a larger nation-like
structure. Yet unlike Kurds, the geopolitical situation assured them a rela-
tively negligible role in the opposition movement, especially on the interna-
tional stage.20
To return to the opposition parties, while the Assyrians’ travails were
generally ignored by larger media outlets, they were recalled within their
own community. Some of those individual stories are recounted here; the
first among them concerns Jamil Matti, an ADM member, born in Baghdad
in 1953. Matti began political work in 1976 by working in an underground
Assyrian organisation in Baghdad. In 1982, he joined the ADM and became
active in its labours towards the recognition of Assyrian ethnic and cul-
tural rights in Iraq. Matti played an active role in both the political and
military affairs of the ADM, including various humanitarian aid missions to
regions under scrutiny by the Ba‘th regime. Along with Sheeba Hami, who
was born in 1956 in the village of Babilu, Dohuk province, and joined the
ADM in 1983, Matti led an operation to defend the populace of Hejerke
village in Simele against the Iraqi army in 1984. During the operation in
Hejerke, Matti was killed and Hami was severely wounded, later dying on
4 December 1984. Their operation reportedly saved the lives of twenty-six
Assyrian civilians.21
The conditions faced by those captured and accused of ‘traitorous acts’
are best illustrated by the arrest and torture of eighteen members of the
ADM (mostly from Baghdad and Kirkuk) during that same year. For the
first seven days, the individuals were placed in tiny cells of dimensions less
than 4 × 4 × 4 feet. While food was offered twice daily, the detainees suffered
beatings with wooden rods, having the arms tied at the wrists behind their
backs with a rope from which they were also suspended while beatings
occurred, and electric shocks to the genitals and other areas. Following the
initial seven-day period, the detainees were placed together in Baghdad for six
months in a cell that only allowed space for nine to sleep at a time.22
Of the traumas suffered by ADM members at the hands of the Ba‘th
regime, perhaps the most prominent and public was the February 1985
execution of: Yousef Toma Zibari, Youkhana Esho Shlimon and Youbert
Benyamin. The government itself confirmed these executions and accused
the three of ‘having committed the crime of creating a hostile and separatist
movement aimed at threatening the independence and unity of Iraq . . .
They transported weapons and carried out acts of sabotage.’23 Many of those
original eighteen not executed remained in detainment for the following ten
to fifteen years.
Few survived to tell the tale of their capture and imprisonment. One
survivor, born in September 1951 in Kirkuk, was among the eighteen indi-
viduals captured and imprisoned in 1984. After spending two years in Abu
Ghraib prison, where he was subjected to regular questioning and physical
and mental torture, the young man was released and eventually fled Iraq on
9 August 1991.24
The anecdotes mentioned above serve as an example of how Assyrian
political and cultural movements were viewed during the 1980s. This was
evident in previous decades, with attempts at infiltration and coercion in
both Kheit Kheit Allap I and II and Nādi al-Thaqāfi al-Āthūrī (Assyrian
Cultural Club). The case of the ADM illustrates the ongoing policies and
patterns of violence and marginalisation that the Assyrians faced in the
1980s.25 Even individuals considered apolitical, were targeted during this
period. In many cases the ruling regime found any Assyrian cultural activity
suspect and exploited the fear of a growing opposition as a pretext to arrest
persons judged a possible threat. As expected, targeting extended to intim-
idation and harassment of family members of suspected individuals. An
Amnesty International (AI) report mentions the case of the brothers Mirza
and Mardan Rasho, who were arrested in al-Sheikhan district in July 1985
aged six and thirteen, respectively. The motive for arrest was the accusation
that the two boys’ father was a member of the pêşmerge.26
Christian clergy members who remained outside Ba‘thist influence,

especially those with opposition propensities, were targeted for their feared
charisma or political views. In 1985, Younan Kena, a priest in the Church of
the East, was murdered by poisoned coffee in Kirkuk. Not long after, Father
Youh.anna Abdulahad Sher was assassinated in front of a church in the town
of Shaqlawa on Good Friday, 28 March 1986. Fellow cleric Archbishop
Stephanos Kacho of Zakho was pursued by a military vehicle and killed in
1986, again in peculiar circumstances. These attacks led to widespread fear
among Iraq’s Christian communities.27
Renewed International Interest in Iraq: the Anfal Campaign
Since 1963, consecutive Iraqi regimes, whose authoritarian and in some cases
totalitarian stance left little room for a pluralist state, targeted non-Arab citi-
zens and at times non-compliant Arabs such as Shiites and those with commu-
nist leanings. The politically Ba‘th-dominated governments utilised a policy of
acculturation through physical destruction (in the case of villages and cultural
sites) and socio-economic threat as well as compulsory urbanisation and over
time inculcation through educational and media-based propaganda. In more
recent memory, the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 by the Iraqi army and
the American counterattack some six months later marked a new page in the
history of Iraq and the Middle East. During the 1980s, despite regular plead-
ing from Iraqis and some international NGOs concerning widespread fear and
crimes against humanity in Iraq, the United States government was hesitant
to act against a country it was supplying with arms during its war with Iran
from 1980 to 1988. Immediately following the US-led attack on Iraqi forces
in Kuwait in 1991, news emerged and circulated evidence gross human rights
violations committed, especially against Iraq’s Kurdish and Shiite populations,
throughout the previous decade. Statistics on the gassing and bulldozing of
villages hit political and academic circles, and the general public was given
a glimpse of images from the gassing of a town, Halabja, near the Iranian
border, on 16 March 1988, which claimed over 3,200 lives.28
The Halabja gassing was part of the Anfal campaign, which took place
from 23 February 23 to 6 September 1988 and has been defined as ‘a cam-
paign by Saddam Hussein’s regime to eliminate the Kurds as a threat to the
government once and for all’.29 The reasons given for why this campaign was
carried out vary, though most suggest that in view of the collection of mate-
rial that supports Kurdish cooperation with Iran during the Iran–Iraq War,
it can be attributed to retribution for the Kurds’ rebellion against the Iraqi
state. The campaign was characterised by various atrocities and human rights
violations, including: mass executions and disappearances; chemical weapons
attacks on civilian populations; bulldozing villages; salting the earth; razing
crops; destroying cultural property, including dynamiting schools, churches,
monasteries and mosques; looting and land appropriation; forcibly displacing
hundreds of thousands of persons, including urbanising large populations of
rural dwellers; arbitrarily jailing suspect persons; and establishing ‘collective
towns’ and ‘prohibited zones’.30
It is well accepted that the term anfal, meaning ‘spoils’, is taken from
the eighth sura of the Koran, which discusses spoils of war in the conflict of
the believer versus the ‘unbeliever’.31 This sura promises that Allah will ‘cast
terror into the hearts of those who disbelieve. Therefore strike off their heads
and strike off every fingertip of them’ and it was evident modern political dis-
sidents equally fitted into the regime’s scheme for ‘military chastisement’.32
For most historians, Anfal is divided into eight major campaigns. The official
military operations are categorised as follows:
First Anfal: 23 February–19 March 1988 (Halabja attacked

16 March 1988)
Second Anfal: 22 March–1 April 1988 (Qara Dagh)
Third Anfal: 7–20 April 1988 (Germian village, Qader Karam)
Fourth Anfal: 3–8 May 1988 (Lesser Zab region)
Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Anfals: 15 May–26 August 1988 (Shaqlawa
and Rawanduz)
Final Anfal: 25 August–6 September 1988 (Bahdinan)33
Ali Hassan al-majid, secretary-general of the Ba‘th party’s northern region

beginning in March 1987, executed and enforced a military terror campaign
against its own citizens.
There were a reported 150 Assyrian Christian and Yezidi disappear-
ances in seven villages during the Final Anfal, which included the regions
of Sarsang, Doski, Barwar, Deralok and Nerwa/Rekan, alongside 632
Kurdish disappearances in thirty-six villages.34 In a January 2003 report, the

International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the International
Alliance for Justice (AIJ) included in their statistics a record of 115 Assyrians
who disappeared in August 1988, and 141 Muslims whose fate could not be
determined. Another list compiled by FIDH and the AIJ mentions thirty-five
villages destroyed in the Garmian region during the Anfal campaign.35 Most
Kurdish organisations and research cite the destruction of more than 4,000
villages and 182,000 victims.36
Dr Shorsh Haji Resool, a Kurdish researcher for Human Rights Watch
(HRW) who also served as a pêşmerge soldier, tallied 3,739 Kurdish villages
(‘any group of houses in a particular location . . . that had a name and was
known to local people as a village’) destroyed from 1963 to 1988, excluding
some villages in the Mosul and Dohuk regions, and 70,000 to 100,000 vic-
tims.37 Though Resool built on Iraqi documents and hundreds of interviews
he conducted, it is evident that all subsequent estimates of Kurdish village
destruction, including those done by human rights groups, are based on these
PUK statistics.38 Similarly, the documents concerning Assyrians have mostly
been compiled by the ADM but never studied or analysed. Despite their
attempts to remain apolitical, it is evident that in most cases, these very political
(nationalist) institutions have assembled the basic research on the Anfal. This
is reflected in the compilation of material in the FIDH and AIJ report, Iraq:
Continuous and Silent Ethnic Cleansing – Displaced Persons in Iraqi Kurdistan
and Iraqi Refugees in Iran’ as well as most of the work conducted by HRW.
While the demographic and cultural blow of the terror and devestation
wrought by the campaign itself was staggering, the terminologies utilised by
the regime and indeed collection of the data was and still is largely suspect.
The created timeline of Anfal events, for instance, neglects earlier programmes
from 1987 as well as those following in 1989. Another dilemma research
faced the extent of the destruction of the Anfal campaign – owing mostly to
appellative problems. In the Arab-controlled regions and up as far as Arbil
province, Assyrians were generally referred to as ‘Christian Arabs’, which
may explain the general lack of material specifically mentioning the term
Assyrians. Such a lack of distinction would allow the Ba‘th Party to exploit
the weakness of this minority. Similarly, Assyrians living in the northern
regions, in Iraqi Kurdistan and elsewhere, were generally termed ‘Christian
Kurds’ by both the Iraqi regime and the Kurdish authorities, which furthered
this problem.39 Kurds and Assyrians were certainly not the only victims of
the campaign. Many leftist Arab Iraqis, ICP members, and Ba‘th members
who detested the governmental initiatives and rule of the Saddam Hussein
regime were targeted for their alleged conspiracy and treason. It slowly
became discernible that the major motive behind the campaign was to stifle
any dissident movement in Iraq. The northern region, still home to Kurds
and Assyrians, was the chief target, being the primary area to which various
Iraqi government dissidents fled in the years leading up to the Anfal opera-
tions. In the case of the Kurds, collaboration with the Iranian government
during the Iran–Iraq War was tantamount to treason, as defined by most
governments. Consequently, the brunt of the Saddam-led Ba‘thist anger was
directed towards the Kurdish movement, which was supported both militar-
ily and financially by foreign powers.
Many Assyrian and Kurdish villages were destroyed beginning in 1987,
using various tactics including air raids and napalm attacks, and even more
met with forced evacuation during the period. The Ba‘th schema of the Anfal
operations destroyed more than eighty Assyrian villages during this period and
displaced thousands of families from their ancestral lands. The elimination of
Syriac liturgical and cultural material also increased during this period, and
its extent remains largely unknown. Furthermore, since a large percentage
of the villages targeted during the 1980s had also targeted been in the 1960s
and 1970s (some since 1933), this leaves little doubt that a continuous cam-
paign of both physical and cultural (spiritual) devastation. Whether the ruin
was consciously or subconsciously constructed, the effects on the Assyrians
remain (see Table 11).40
At the same time to the south, Shia Arabs suffered tremendously under
the Ba‘th regime and were also dramatically displaced in the 1980s. For the
Assyrians, despite the violence wreaked against thousands of civilians and
the destruction of various villages and between forty and fifity cultural and
historical sites, including ancient churches and monasteries, as well as some
2,000 reported deaths in the 1987–8 gas campaigns, few reports surfaced in
the mainstream media or in NGO publications.41 On 19 June 1992, a priest
of the Assyrian Church of the East from Dohuk spoke with HRW in an
interview about the April 1987 annihilation of Bakhitme:42

structures
Armota Arbil Armota, 1 1 1988 Dynamited and bulldozed
Armūt.ā, during Anfal; 50 families
Harmota displaced
Alolen Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1987
Annūnē Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh ‘Ain Nūnē, 1 2 1988 140 families displaced
Kani Masi
Arāden Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 2 4 1961, 1987–8 Razed 1961, 1987–8; 220
families displaced
Argen Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Ergin, Hargin, 4 1961, 1988 Destroyed during Anfal
Argin
Atrush Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Atrosh 4 1933, 1988 25 families displaced
Badarrash Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Beth Darrash, 1 1961, 1987
Beth Durashe
Balūkā Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Bebālūk, Beth 1 1978, 1988 15 families displaced, site of
Bālūk chemical attack
Banasora Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1987
Bāsh Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1 2 1977–8, 1988 Border clearings; 50 families
displaced
Baz Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Bas 2 1961, 1988 20 families displaced, 1988
Bebede Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Be Bede, Beth 2 1961, 1987–8 Razed and resettled in 1961
Bede by Zebari tribes; 75 families
displaced, 1987–8

structures
Benāta Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Benātha, Beth 1987
‘Ainātha
Blejanke Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Blejane 1 1961, 1987 28 families displaced, 1987
Bubawa Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Bibava 1987 32 families displaced
Chammike Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1988 4 families displaced
Dawodiya Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Daudiya 2 1988 Anfal, 82 families displaced
Dehe Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 3 1988 Anfal, 50 families displaced
Deralok Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Deira d’Luqa 4 1933, 1978, Used as collective town, 1978
1987–8 and Anfal
Dere Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1 2 1987 70 families displaced
Derigni Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Derigne, 1 1 1988 40 families displaced
Dirgin
Derishke Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Derishk 1 2 1988 Destroyed during Anfal;
50 families displaced
Dohuke Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Dahoki, 1 1933, 1962, 60 families displaced, 1988
Dohoke 1977, 1988
Es.sān Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh S.iyān 2 1961, 1987–8
Hamziya Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 2 1987 32 families displaced
Hayyis Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Hayis 2 1968, 1988 Site of napalm attack, 1968;
50 families displaced, Anfal
Inishke Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Inishk, Enishke 1986 Lands confiscated by
government, 1980s
structures
Jadide Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1 1988 13 families displaced during
Anfal
Kani Balav Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Kani Balaf 2 1988 70 families displaced
Komāne Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Kowane 1 5 1961, 1965, Became a collective town,
1977, 1987–8 1977
Madude Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Mahude 1988 8 families displaced
Meristak Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Meristeg 1987 5 families displaced
Merkajiya Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1988 1970, village headman
assassinated
Meze Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 2 1961, 1988
Musaka Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Mosaka 1 1988 35 families displaced
Nerwa Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Nerwa Khtetha, 1 1976, 1988 60 families displaced, 1988
(lower) Lower Nerwa
Qārō Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Qarou, Karou 2 1977–8, 1988 Border clearings, Anfal;
Sardarawa Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1 1987 30 families displaced
Sikrīne Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1987 37 families displaced
Tajika Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 1987
Tashish Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh 2 1988 Destroyed during Anfal
Ten Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Tin 1 1987 45 families displaced
Tuthe- Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Tishambik 1 1988 10 families displaced
Shemaya
Wela Dohuk ‘Amēdīyāh Welah 2 1977, 1988 Border clearings, Anfal;

structures
‘Aqra (city) Dohuk ‘Aqra 2 1961, 1988 Mass exodus of Assyrians
beginning in 1961
Bilmand Dohuk ‘Aqra Bilmandi 1987–8
Cham Dohuk ‘Aqra Cham Shirte 1 1933, 1988
‘Ashrat
Cham Chali Dohuk ‘Aqra 1961, 1988
Cham Dohuk ‘Aqra 1987 45 families displaced
Rabatke
Guhana Dohuk ‘Aqra 1986 45 families displaced
Hazarjot Dohuk ‘Aqra 1 1961, 1972,
1988
Hizane Dohuk ‘Aqra Hizane 1 1 1987–8 110 families displaced in total
(lower) (Khtetha), (upper, lower)
Hizanke
Hizane Dohuk ‘Aqra Hizane 1987–8 110 families displaced in total
(upper) (Eletha), (upper, lower)
Hizanke
Kalilane Dohuk ‘Aqra Khalilan, 1961, 1987
Khalilani
Kashkawa Dohuk ‘Aqra 1 1961, 1987 100 families displaced
Meroke Dohuk ‘Aqra Maroke, 1987 35 families displaced
Marogue, Mar
Ogin
structures
Suse Dohuk ‘Aqra Barraka 1 1988
d’Qaddisha
Turkaye Dohuk ‘Aqra Takhed 1987–8
Turkaye
Zouli Dohuk ‘Aqra Zuli 1987 34 families displaced
Gund Kosa Dohuk Dohuk 1 1933, 1988
Malta Dohuk Dohuk Ma‘althaye, 2 1961, 1987–8 Turned into a collective town
Maltai
Peda Dohuk Dohuk 1987
Armashe Dohuk Sheikhan Armash, 2 1987 55 families displaced
Harmache
Azakh Dohuk Sheikhan Adhekh 2 1987 50 families displaced
Bebōze Dohuk Sheikhan Beth Bōzi 1976, 1987
Deze Dohuk Sheikhan Dizze 1 1933, 1987 90 families displaced
Tilla Dohuk Sheikhan Tella, Tillan 1 3 1987
Badaliya Dohuk Simele 1 1983, 1987 60 families displaced
Bakhitme Dohuk Simele Beth Khatme, 3 1987 140 families displaced
Bekhitme
Hejerke Dohuk Simele Hizeerke 1 1933, 1984,
1987
Kharab- Dohuk Simele H.arbai(?) 1 1933, 1961,
Kulk 1987
Kherbasla Dohuk Simele 1987

structures
Mar Yaqob Dohuk Simele Mar Yaco, 1 2 1976, 1988 Destroyed Ancient monastery
Mar Ya’aqub, of the same name destroyed,
Qashafir 20 families displaced
Sheze Dohuk Simele Shiyoz 1 2 1987 80 families displaced
Surka Dohuk Simele Sorka 1 1987 Christians and Yezidis,
Bersive Dohuk Zakho Birsivi, Beth 2 1976, 1988 Transformed into a military
Sawe camp and collective town
Levo Dohuk Zakho 2 1988 140 families displaced
Mala ‘Arab Dohuk Zakho 1 1988 60 families displaced
Mergasūr Dohuk Zakho Margasūr 1988 60 families displaced
Nav-Kandal Dohuk Zakho Naf-Kandal 1 1988 110 families displaced
Pireka Dohuk Zakho 1978, 1984 90 families displaced, 1978
Sharanish Dohuk Zakho Sharanish 2 1987 80 families displaced
Nasara
Taftiya(n) Ninawa Sheikhan Totiyan 1988 5 families displaced
I was told that they would destroy Bakhtoma [sic] because they had already
destroyed most of the surrounding villages. It was around noon when I went
to the church of St George to remove the furniture, but the Iraqi army tanks
and bulldozers were already beginning to roll into the village. I was the last
one to pray in the church. After finishing my prayers, I removed the furniture
to take it with me to Dohuk. It was a very sad day. The Iraqi soldiers and army
engineers put the equivalent of one kilo of TNT at each corner of the church.
After five minutes, they blew up the building and then went on to demolish
every house in the village. Later they paid me compensation of 3,000 dinars. I
went to the head of the Ba‘th Party in Dohuk to ask why they were destroying
our villages. He replied, ‘You are Arabs, and we decide what you should do.
That is all there is to it.’ I left his office then. What could I say?43
As Assyrians were seen as Arabs or Kurds, the dearth of information concern-

ing them is evident. There are other conceivable reasons for the neglect of
Assyrians – their geopolitical insignificance, their ecclesiastical divisiveness,
general apathy within their community, or lack of information about them –
that could be used to justify their exclusion from human rights and academic
literature. Yet the question must be posed that if there is both physical and
oral evidence available, why have both scholarship and international NGO
work neglected these atrocities and the people who were subjected to them,
especially when AI itself has criticised the lack of attention concerning the
half-million Kurds and Assyrians who were forcibly relocated by the Iraqi
government?44 HRW’s criticism of the United States government’s failure
to act on certain issues that befell Iraq in the late 1980s (especially Halabja)
illustrates the plight of Iraqi minorities. However, it is remarkable that while
HRW points to the US government’s failure to acknowledge the atrocities
of the Anfal, the organisation refers to the September 1988 targeting of
Christians and Yezidis following an amnesty decree as a ‘brutal sideshow . . .
to the Kurdish genocide’.45 The term ‘sideshow’ insinuates others targeted
by the Ba‘th were somehow secondary, and by extension, so too was their
suffering.46
Some Assyrian-populated areas were targeted by the Ba‘th regime due to
their proximity to what were deemed Kurdish insurgent areas. Yet the target-
ing of specific Assyrian community leaders speaks to a goal of eliminating
explicitly ethno-cultural influence. Overall, more than a thousand Assyrians

were either abducted or disappeared under sometimes mysterious circum-
stances during the Anfal period.47 One individual example, Raphael Nano
(Esho), born in 1946 in the village of Blejanke in the province of Dohuk,
was a leading member of the ADM. One of the group’s top liaisons, Nano
found his house surrounded by military personnel and was subsequently
arrested in 1987, at the beginning of the Anfal campaign. He spent one
year in various prisons and was hanged on 7 January 1988 in Abu Ghraib
prison in Baghdad. His entire village was destroyed as a consequence of his
reportedly anti-government activities.48 As with Nano, ‘Abd al-Massih. Y.’
was marked for elimination by the regime for reportedly working with oppo-
sition parties and was specifically accused of being ‘agents of Iran’, for which
he was executed on 14 August 1988 in Arbil province. A secret police docu-
ment requesting the arrest of his nine family members was circulated among
government officials. In gaining information about his familial relations, the
officials were told to ‘take action and do what is necessary’ to ascertain their
whereabouts and arrest them.49 Members of the clergy were not immune to
malicious attacks during this period, as illustrated by the murders of Younan
Kena, Youh.anna Abdulahad Sher and Stephanos Kacho earlier in the decade.
During the Anfal campaign Curate Zaya Bobo Dobato fled to Iran after
numerous foiled attempts on his life, including the final incident involving a
car chase by military officials in the Mosul region. Dobato died in exile in the
Urmia region in 1989.
While some individuals and families made the trek to Iran, others crossed
the northern border. On 6 September 1988, the Iraqi government made a call
for a general amnesty to all refugees who had fled to Turkey during the Anfal
operations. Despite the seemingly positive nature of this government action,
Assyrians who returned along with Kurds were captured and later disappeared
while government forces coerced others into collective towns. The Ba‘th gov-
ernment used the amnesty to deprive the returnees of their civil and social
rights within the system.50 The reason for the arrest of the Assyrians was based
on the amnesty itself, which was addressed solely to Kurds and did not extend
to other ethnic groups. The story of ‘Isho’, the father of four brothers from
the Sarsang region, was recorded by HRW in Arbil in July 1992. Isho’s family
had fled their village just prior to the Anfal operations, and three of his four
sons had defected from military duty. All four brothers surrendered during
the grace period following the amnesty announcement and were taken to Fort
Nizarkeh in Dohuk. As with most Christians and Yezidis, the four detainees
disappeared during this period of amnesty. The story was more recently cor-
roborated by a string of letters from the sister-in-law of the brothers, who were
still missing after surrendering themselves in Dohuk on 10 September 1988.
‘The information provided by the central security committee stated that the
above mentioned people and the prisoners with them were transferred via mil-
itary vehicles and gathered to the fort of Dohuk-Mosul. They were relocated
to Darman fort on the path to Kirkuk and then to Topzawa fort.’51 Later a
response from the security forces stated that there was no record of these indi-
viduals. It became evident some of the actions taken during the amnesty were
not reported to the headquarters in Baghdad. Nevertheless, the whereabouts
of the four men, like hundreds of others, remains unknown.
Another example of the amnesty-spawned misfortune is reflected in the
story of a potter from the village of Komāne. Following their return from
Turkey in the wake of the general amnesty, the local potter’s son, daughter-
in-law and six grandchildren disappeared after they had surrendered them-
selves into the hands of the Iraqi authorities. The psychological and emotional
pain induced the man to become mute.52 There were a reported thirty-three
Assyrians who mysteriously disappeared during the official amnesties after
returning from refugee camps in Turkey and Iran in 1988 and 1989 and
numerous other reputed but never recorded.53 In addition, Vicar Shimon
Shlemon Zaya of Bersive was hanged in 1989 after returning from a refugee
camp in Diyarbekir during the general amnesty. In March 1990, another
general amnesty was declared for Kurds living abroad. In response to the
call, in April and June of that year, some 2,900 Iraqi Kurds, Assyrians and
Turkomans reportedly returned from Turkey to Iraq. Many were arrested
and later disappeared.54 Yet if the Assyrians were no threat, why then the need
for removal and extermination?
One plausible explanation is this: these obstinate minorities had refused

to be part of the national ranks, as defined by the Iraqi authorities. To
aggravate their crime, they also refused to accept the regime’s designation
of their ethnicity. Not only did they want to be treated as Kurds, they acted
as bad Arabs. Accordingly, they were considered traitors on two counts and
punished accordingly.55
The above statement, though conceivably a rational behind the governmental

policy as to the treatment of Assyrians in general, does not answer the ques-
tion of what happened to the hundreds of families, including women and
men, children and elders, who vanished, despite intense searches conducted
by their kith and kin. Furthermore, if they had been treated as Kurds as stipu-
lated by the amnesty then they (theoretically) would have been able to return
as Kurds, and not told, ‘You are Arabs and we decide what you should do.’56
Simply understood, the Ba‘th regime used the opportunity to further cleanse
the region of one possibly irritating component. It is perhaps interesting to
note that from an Assyrian perspective, Joseph Stalin’s 1945 amnesty in the
USSR, which released thousands of gulag prisoners, may have appeared more
honourable than the amnesty issued by the Ba‘th regime.57
Post-Anfal repercussions: end of a trend?
Ambitions for power and the violent policies driving them did not cease
following the Anfal campaign – neither in the areas under Kurdish control
above the 36th parallel nor in those under the central regime in post-1991
Iraq. As with the Iran–Iraq War, the Saddam Hussein-driven Iraq regime
continued a policy of conscripting Assyrians and other dissidents, who were
then forcibly stationed on the front lines of the invasion of Kuwait.58 Such
activities marked a continued trend of discrimination and of neglect for the
lives of those who served as fodder for a dispassionate Iraqi regime.
The year 1991 marked the division of the country into three sections,
following the implementation of the United Nations no-fly zones.59 Though
the details are beyond the scope of this research, it is of intrinsic importance
to illustrate the clear historical continuity of repression following the Anfal
campaign. That year saw the brutal deaths of more than 200,000 Shia Arabs
in the south. The marsh peoples specifically were also devastated and lost
perhaps 100,000 to direct action and more as a result of government policy,
not to mention the attempted destruction of the marshes themselves, one
of the most diverse ecosystems on the planet.60 As a result of the outbreak
of the Iraq-Kuwait War and the following Gulf War, an estimated 100,000
Assyrians fled to neighbouring countries during 1990 and 1991.61 This meant
not only persistent demographic shifting but also possible disappearances and
deaths during the exodus.62
Various non-governmental and US government agencies reported on the
Assyrians in the formative years after the first Gulf War:
In 1994, the Special Rapporteur stated that in late 1993 the Iraq regime
dismissed or expelled hundreds of Assyrian teachers and students from uni-
versities and public positions . . . Assyrians are an ethnic group as well as
a Christian Community and [have] a distinct language (Syriac). Public
instruction in Syriac, which was to have been allowed under a 1972 decree,
has never been implemented. The Special Rapporteur reported continued
discrimination against Assyrians throughout 1995. According to opposi-
tion reports, many Assyrian families were forced to leave Baghdad after
they had fled to that city for safety following the regime’s suppression of the
northern uprising in 1991.63
Concurrently, during 1992 and 1993, all Assyrian teachers and professors
whose families originated from modern Turkey (i.e. those whose families
originated in Hakkâri) were forced to retire, and some families faced deporta-
tion to Istanbul.64 Such discrimination strongly echoed the situation those
Iranian-born, as mentioned earlier.
Such conditions also persisted in the north, in Iraqi Kurdistan where
in some repects the KRG simply supplanted the Ba‘th party. Kurds from
Meristak and nearby villages confiscated land in the town of Dere after the
Assyrians fled, following the Anfal operations.65 In 1993, the KDP leader-
ship reportedly allowed the illegal building of 500 houses on the agricultural
lands east of Sarsang for Kurds from the Assyrian village of Chiya in the
Arbil province.66 In the following years, the continued displacement by the
newly formed Kurdish regime became reminiscent of the Iraqi regime of
previous years, from suborning local clergy to imposing discriminatory socio-
economic conditions. This is exemplified in the experience of an Assyrian
man, Abu Ishtar, who was hospitalised after being beaten for opposing the
KDP move to absorb the Nineveh Plain region of Mosul. ‘The Ba‘th, in a
program of cultural genocide, made it illegal to be an Assyrian. As the recent
beating and hospitalization of Abu Ishtar shows, very little has changed for
these people from 1977 to 2006.’67
The continuing cultural destruction and demographic upheaval follow-
ing the Anfal campaign is evident as well. It is estimated that the number
of Assyrians dwindled from over one million to 300,000–400,000 between
1961 and 1991.68 The 1991 Gulf War saw a dramatic increase in refugees
and asylum seekers in neighbouring countries. Furthermore, the new state-
building process in Iraqi Kurdistan created its share of enduring cultural
complications such as land expropriation, especially in relation to villages
forcibly abandoned in the previous three decades.
There are outstanding issues of Assyrian villages and lands, which were
vacated under Baghdad’s forced repatriations during the 1970s and ’80s . . .
Those issues had not been resolved when the Kurdish authorities took over
and they are a bone of contention between the two groups.69
Thus, reflective of the political climate in Iraqi Kurdistan, a new state- and
nation-building experiment had commenced. In recent years Assyrians living
in the larger cities of southern Iraq have been forced back to their former
territories in the northern region under both the central government and the
KRG, due to ethnic and more predominantly religious persecution. Thus, a
reverse demographic shifting took place following 2003, a situation and topic
in need of further study.
Notes
1. By distant extension another reminder of the callousness with which the
regime dealt with dissidents became frighteningly apparent in November 1978
at the convening Eleventh World Congress of the Assyrian Universal Alliance
(AUA) in Sydney. The five-member delegation attending from Iraq offered
Iraqi sweets to the other delegates, nine of whom suffered adverse physical
symptoms due to what Australian health officials later determined was poison.
See ‘City man is located after candy warning’, Assyrian Sentinel, December
1978.
2. Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East, 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC:
McFarland, 2002), 191.
3. For a partial list of 266 names see ‘Iraqi-Assyrian POW’s in Iran,’ Assyrian
Sentinel, April 1983. Much of the research data and hundreds of photographs
were collected from a mission to Iran by AUA representatives Atour Golani and
Afram Rayis.
4. Iraq: Continuous and Silent Ethnic Cleansing – Displaced Persons in Iraqi
Kurdistan and Iraqi Refugees in Iran (Paris: FIDH/International Alliance for
Justice, 2003), 7.
Chicago. It has been suggested that the Assyrians accepted military positions
with personal zeal since they wished to display their ‘fighting prowess’ for
their country. This assumption was not corroborated by any of this study’s
interviews with members of the Assyrian community, but it is possible that
it may have been true among a few individuals attempting to procure favour
from the regime. See Anthony O’Mahony, ‘The Chaldean Catholic Church:
The Politics of Church–State Relations in Modern Iraq’, Heythrop Journal 45.4
(2004), 443.
6. ‘Iranian-Assyrians banished from Iraq’, Assyrian Sentinel, June 1980.
7. More than 5,000 cases of such treatment had been reported: see Assyrian
Sentinel, June 1980. Similar treatment was meted out to many Shiite families
in Iraq as well.
8. Assyrians who had lost siblings during the war were especially disgusted with
the regime and led them further into the opposition movement. See (Figure 40)
concerning the ill treatment of an individual Assyrian which received attention
at the international level, ‘Dear Lawyer Helina’, UNHCR file no. 3284 (Afram
Rayis private archive).
9. See Security Major, Sulaymaniyah District Security Manager to all Administrative
Departments, ‘Assyrian National Front’, September 1984, ADM Archives,
Ba‘th Secret Files and Correspondence, Iraq.
10. R.B. (Kirkuk), interview with author, 16 January 2008, Toronto.
11. ‘Reign of terror sweeps Iraq’s Christian churches’, Assyrian Sentinel, February
1982.
12. Meghan Clyne, ‘Kana’s Iraq’, National Review Online, 19 May 2004, http://www.
nationalreview.com/articles/210717/kanas-iraq/meghan-clyne (accessed 16 July
2014).
13. P.D. (Dūre, Hayyis), interview with author, 26 July 2008, Toronto.
14. Security Major, Sulaymaniyah Security Directorate to all Security Divisions,
‘Assyrian Democratic Movement’, 14 October 1984, ADM Archives, Ba‘th
Secret Files and Correspondence, Iraq.
15. Ibid.
16. Security Major, Sulaymaniyah District Security Manager to all Administrative
17. Ibid.
18. Security Major, Sulaymaniya District Security Manager to all Administrative
19. The continuity of this thread, especially in a more basic bureaucratic fashion,
became more widely available post-2010. See Michael Rubin, ‘Kurdish officials
need a code of conduct’, Kurdistan Tribune, 28 December 2013, http://kurdis-
tantribune.com/2013/kurdish-officials-need-code-of-conduct (accessed 16 July
2014).
20. Scholars have recently spoken of parallels between Kurdish disregard towards
Assyrian travails, at least politically, and Armenian inattention to Greeks and
Assyrians in reference to the devastation of the First World War. See ‘Affirmation of
the United States Record on the Armenian Genocide Resolution’, House Resolution
252, 17 March 2009, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hres252ih/
pdf/BILLS-111hres252ih.pdf (accessed 16 July 2014). Armenian scholars and
laity have often promoted parallels with the Holocaust, while omitting shared
suffering during the First World War. See ibid., Findings, section 2(15). Into the
more recent decades, the Assyrians of Turkey remain unrecognised as a minority
and are sometimes referred to as ‘Semitic Turks’. See Mehlika Aktok Kaşgarlı,
Mardin ve yöresi halkından Turko-Semitler (Kayseri: Erciyes Üniversitesi, 1991),
7–9.
21. Personal notes and records of Afram Rayis and the AUA. Eshoo, ‘The Fate of
Assyrian Villages’, 24 has a variant date and marks the death of Hami in 1983.
22. R.B. (Kirkuk), interview with author, 16 January 2008, Toronto.
23. David Korn, Human Rights in Iraq (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1990), 58.
24. R.B. (Kirkuk), interview with author, 16 January 2008, Toronto. The ADM
also found itself at odds with the KDP following the establishment of the no-fly
zone in 1991. Iraq: Human Rights Abuses in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1991, Amnesty
International, February 1995, 90–6, for the story of ADM member Francis
Shabo, who was assassinated in May 1993 in Dohuk, according to AI most
probably by KDP First Liq assassins, for his labour on the issue of Assyrian vil-
lages in the Bahdinan region.
25. The treatment of ADM members in Iraq mirrors that of the Syrian government’s
handling of members of the ADO from 1960 to 1990.
259.
27. Iraq: Continuous and Silent Ethnic Cleansing, 58.
28. Human Rights Watch, Iraq’s Crime of Genocide (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1995), 72, 327 n35. This is based on the research of Kurdish
researcher Shorsh Resool.
29. Edmund A. Ghareeb, Historical Dictionary of Iraq (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow
Press, 2004), 13.
30. Adapted from Human Rights Watch, Iraq’s Crime of Genocide, 1–2.
31. Ibid., 1.
32. Qur’an 8:12, Electronic Text Center, University of Virginia Library, http://
etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/HolKora.html (accessed 17 July 2014).
33. Human Rights Watch, Iraq’s Crime of Genocide, 262–4.
34. Ibid., 267–8.
35. Iraq: Continuous and Silent Ethnic Cleansing, 47–57.
36. Kerim Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: Past, Present and Future, rev. ed. (London: Pluto
Press, 2007), 65–6; Human Rights Watch, Iraq’s Crime of Genocide, xv.
37. Personal correspondence, 3 July 2008. Most of the research by Resool was
published in a study entitled The Destruction of a Nation, released by the PUK
in 1990. See Joost Hiltermann, ‘Case Study: The 1988 Anfal Campaign in Iraqi
Kurdistan’, Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence, 3 February 2008, http://
www.massviolence.org/Article?id_article=98&artpage=10 (accessed 17 July
2014). Resool had worked in the media relations department of the PUK in
northern Iraq in the late 1980s, joining Human Rights Watch analysts who
examined the Iraqi state documents in the early 1990s. Resool most recently
served as chairman of the Goran Party in the Iraqi parliament.
38. General numbers given by human rights groups and scholarship concerning
Kurds speak of more than 4,000 villages destroyed from 1963 until the Anfal,
with more than 2,000 destroyed specifically in the 1980s. See Yildiz, The Kurds
in Iraq, 65–6; Human Rights Watch, Iraq’s Crime of Genocide, xv. Whether or
not these estimates include Assyrian villages remains unclear.
39. This may be the reason for the lack of material on the Assyrians during the Anfal,
as the majority of reports lump them among Kurdish statistics.
40. The villages are those reported by Assyrians as eliminated due to their historical
and cultural significance. According to official Ba‘th Party documents, between
25 April and 15 July 1987, Ali Hasan al-Majid reported the destruction of 1,441
prohibited villages and the forced expulsion of 26,399 families. While there is
no reference pertaining to the ethnic makeup of these villages, these reports
alongside Assyrian and Kurdish ones illustrate quite staggering devastation.
41. ‘The Chaldoassyrian Community in Today’s Iraq: Opportunities and
Challenges’, Human Rights Without Frontiers Mission Report, November
2003, http://www.aina.org/reports/hrwf.htm (accessed 17 July 2014), 4. In AI’s
annual reports from the 1980s, Assyrians are referred to briefly in the 1985
report, and glossed in the 1986 one, which briefly discusses opposition parties,
but nowhere else.
42. Assyrian towns/villages referred to by outside sources are frequently incorrectly
written, and some even inaccurately located. In this instance, Bakhitme is incor-
rectly referred to as ‘Bakhtoma.’
44. The US State Department made it clear that the US ambassador to Baghdad
discussed such issues with Iraqi officials in 1988 and 1989. See Korn, Human
Rights in Iraq, 107.
46. A conference entitled ‘The Genocide on Kurds in 1988’ was held on Thursday
2 April 2009 in the European Parliament. The event was organised by Olle
Schmidt, an MEP from the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats in Europe, and
the Kurdish Gulan association from Sweden. The aim of the conference was to
raise awareness about the Anfal. According to complaints raised at the meeting,
when the Assyria Council of Europe, also in attendance, spoke up that they,
too, were targeted and suffered during the Anfal, they were immediately ver-
bally assailed and their comments curtailed. Email correspondence with Assyria
Council of Europe, 3 April 2009.
47. For a preliminary list of 115 recorded Assyrians who were abducted or dis-
appeared during the Anfal operations see Iraq: Continuous and Silent Ethnic
Cleansing, 56–7.
48. Frederick A. Aprim, Assyrians: From Bedr Khan to Saddam Hussein – Driving into
Extinction the Last Aramaic Speakers (F. A. Aprim, 2006), 235.
49. Confidential Telegram to all Security Units of the Region, No. 4618,
Concerning the Whereabouts of Family Members of Executed Individual, 1
September 1988, ADM Archives, Secret Files and Correspondence, Iraq, also
found in the North Iraq Data Set of the Iraq Memorial Foundation collection at
the Hoover Institute.
50. Dina Rizk Khoury, Iraq in Wartime: Soldiering, Martyrdom, and Remembrance
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 120.
51. M.T., Baghdad to President Saddam Hussein, Concerning Relatives Missing
Following Returning under the Amnesty Decree, 16 February 1989, ADM
Archives, Ba‘th Secret Files and Correspondence; General, Presidential Palace
Security, Baghdad to General Intelligence Army Service, Northern Region
Intelligence Service, Concerning Relatives Missing Following Returning under
the Amnesty Decree, 16 February 1989, ADM Archives, Ba‘th Secret Files and
Correspondence; Captain, Northern Region Intelligence Service to General,
Presidential Palace Security, Baghdad, A Citizen’s Request, undated (between 8
and 12 March 1989), ADM Archives, Ba‘th Secret Files and Correspondence.
52. Conversation with Professor Amir Harrak, 10 February 2008.
123.
54. Ibid.
56. Ibid., 211.
57. According to the sentiments of several interviewees.
58. Stephen Zunes, ‘The US Obsession with Iraq and the Triumph of Militarism’,
in Tareq Y. Ismael and William W. Haddad (eds), Iraq: The Human Cost of
History (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 192.
59. Recall the similar division of the region into three provinces under the Ottomans:
Mosul, Baghdad and Basra.
63. Anthony H. Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim, Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 122, 118.
64. ‘Assyrian Human Rights Report’, Assyrian International News Agency, 1997,
http://www.aina.org/reports/ahrr.htm (accessed 17 July 2014).
65. Assyrian Academic Society, ‘Field Mission Iraq 2004’.
66. Ibid.
67. ‘Northern Iraq Human Rights Field Mission’, Iraq Sustainable Democracy
Project, 2006, www.iraqdemocracyproject.org/pdf/Northern%20Iraq%20
Human%20Rights%20Field%20Mission.pdf (accessed 16 July 2014)
68. Anthony O’Mahony cites a fall from one million to 150,000 between 1961 and
1995 (O’Mahony, ‘The Chaldean Catholic Church’, 438).
69. Hania Mufti of Human Rights Watch, quoted in Glen Chancy, ‘Christians
for Saddam?’, Orthodoxy Today, 2003, http:// www.orthodoxytoday.org/
articles/ChancyIraq.php (accessed 17 July 2014). See also Fred Aprim, ‘Kurdish
official denies Assyrian, Turkomen land claims’, Assyrian International News
Agency, 3 November 2007, http://www.aina.org/guesteds/20071103124836.
pdf (accessed 17 July 2014), for the more recent land issues.
7
State Formation,
State-building and
Contentious Pluralism
It may be that when we no longer know which way to go that we have

come to our real journey. The mind that is not baffled is not employed. The
impeded stream is the one that sings.
Wendell Berry
Evil does not arrive from outside of our civilization, from a separate realm
we are tempted to call ‘primitive’. Evil is generated by civilization itself.
Michael Mann
H ow and why violence is done is a critical question in the case of this

research and while violence can have multiple meanings, it is the idea
of injustice, or an unjust exercise of power, and how it may be remedied or
at least guarded against that defines the so what? of this book. Violence varies
in its forms both structurally and individually – physical, cultural, politi-
cal, academic, spiritual etc. – and includes less-considered emphases such as
harm to meaning, content or intent. Yet in every case it is initially a sense of
adverse otherisation and secondly a value assessment which leads to violence
in thought, word and deed. And while physical harm may be more discern-
ible, injury to meaning harms the spirit or nature of things and occasionally
holds a more sinister quality.
There are various determinants for why states and nations (whether
ethnic or civic) engage in violent and non-violent homogenisation during
the nation- and state-building process. Michael Mann cites nine motives
used by perpetrators of violent crimes (including states), most of which can
be extended to perpetrators of non-violent crimes: ideology, bigotry, violence
for its own sake, fear, careerism, materialism, discipline, comradeship and
bureaucracy.1 Since people are the true power behind the state, individual
and professional reasons for homogenisation often overlap through social
influence, creating perpetrator campaigns of both violent and non-violent
justification often spearheaded by nationalist elites. In many cases, when the
victim becomes involved in the nationalist thrust for recognition, they apply
similar motives for denying other victims, thus continuing the hierarchy of
marginalisation and suffering.
Such homogenisation is also a result of the age of democracy since the
notion of rule by the majority began to entwine the demos, ‘all the ordinary
people’, with the dominant ethnos or ethnic group.2 As Iraq became Arab
(as it arguably had been since the foundation of the Iraqi state) the Assyrian
ethnos could not compete with the dominant ethnos turned demos. On the
other hand, the Kurds were able to contend against this trend simply by
virtue of their numerical strength or critical mass.
Iraq was formed in a crucible of competing colonial powers and rising
ethno-nationalist sentiments. In the absence of an accurate account (which
in reality does not exist), ‘the fragments imagine the nation’, as Sami Zubaida
put it. In this case, however, the nation of Iraq, and studies concerning it,
unimagined one of its fragments – the Assyrians. It has been argued that they
have remained absent within academic and political literature due in large
part to internal matters, further contributing to subjugation, in some cases
self-subjugation. Yet, with the substantiation presented in this study, the
lacuna of critical attention towards this group can be explained by a three-
part structure. The first element is the traditional hostility created by ultra-
nationalism in the state- and nation-building process: ‘The necessity of using
force in the establishment of unity in a national community, and the inevi-
table selfish exploitation of the instruments of coercion by the groups who
wield them, adds to the selfishness of nations.’3 The second element is the
mendacity of the perpetrators and benefactors of the events that caused the
ethno-cultural, social and political ruination of this people. This deception is
exhibited by attempts to minimise the importance of the events by adjusting
the details with denialist political argot in order to protect interests in the
region. The final element is the silence surrounding or neglect of events in
which the Assyrians played a major role, such as the 1961 armed autonomist
ST AT E FORMATI ON a nd CONTENTI OUS P L UR A L IS M | 223
Table 12 Instances of internal violence against Iraqis by state, political party or
military, 1933–914
Event Target Year

Simele massacres Assyrians 1933
Farhud Jews 1941
Executions Communists 1949, 1959,
1963, 1966, 1978
Armed autonomist Kurds, Assyrians, 1961–3
movement Communists
Mass expulsion Shiite Arabs 1969–71
Armed autonomist Kurds, Assyrians 1974–5
movement (cont.)
Border clearings Assyrians, Kurds 1977–8
Anfal prelude Assyrians, Kurds, Yezidis 1987
Anfal Assyrians, Kurds, Yezidis 1988
Gassing of Halabja Kurds 1988
Massacre following intifada Shiite Arabs 1991
movement, the border clearings of the 1970s, and the Anfal period of the late
1980s (See Table 12). This stems from the acceptance or apathy towards the
mendacity as espoused by past literature (both academic and political)5 and
by more recent works.
Situating the Assyrian Experience
When understood, the Assyrian case in Iraq can also be employed to com-
prehend the similar struggles of the Iraqi Kurds (prior to 1991), Jews (prior
to 1948), Shiites (prior to 2003), Turkomans, Mandeans, Yezidis and others.
The dismissal or neglect of events in Kurdish history and the dismissal by the
international community of the Soviet–Mongolian accusation of genocide
by the Iraqis against the Kurds plays a similar role to the neglect of Simele
with one major exception – today the Anfal is generally treated as a Kurdish
genocide where Simele is, at best, infrequently memorialised, and in reality,
by no one other than the Assyrians themselves.6 Furthermore, had it not been
in the best geopolitical interests of Western powers to demonise Iraq in 1991,
Halabja too would barely be a footnote in history.7
Considering the roles performed by the Assyrians since the start of
the twentieth century, the question remains: why have they been relatively
neglected by most studies concerning these transformative periods of Iraq’s
history? Additionally, what role does acquiescence play? There are several
hypotheses for this silence, including one which purports that the oversight
of the Assyrian case is tied to British imperial guilt following Britain’s neg-
ligence in ensuring minority protection provisions after its withdrawal from
Iraq. The source of this British guilt would be the inaction concerning vio-
lence at Simele in particular, barely two decades after the onslaught against
Christians in eastern Anatolia.8 Was the Assyrian tragedy simply the outcome
of circumstance? Had the Assyrians become collateral damage in the pro-
gramme of a pro-British, independent Iraq whose unified national makeup
had to necessarily absorb, deny, eliminate or unimagine this relatively small
minority in order to allow the larger ethnic and religious groups to construct
a functioning and formidable nation-state?9
The disintegration and loss of the spirit of the Assyrian people has com-
plemented the scarcity of information concerning their trials within Iraq.
This process, beginning with the First World War, has subdued the Assyrians
and ensured their relative absence in documenting the destruction of their
people and culture, especially evident in Western scholarship.10 This trend,
whether malevolent or innocent, ensured that future generations would find
it difficult to substantiate their experiences and those transmitted by their
elders. Thus, denial would have a traumatic effect on the Assyrian psyche.
This continues to affect them, since as a numerical and political
minority they lack the power to impel scholars to document their trials. In
instances where Assyrians themselves have documented atrocities, they are
usually disregarded (for example, Yusuf Malek’s The British Betrayal of the
Assyrians), proving their undervalued position in scholarship. Furthermore,
there is also the tendency of using one’s own sufferings as justification for
reciprocity.11 While this trend has become more apparent in recent decades,
the unfortunate side-effect to such crimes against humanity (perhaps ‘crimes
against life’ would be better here) as a component in nation- and state-
building is the justification inevitability. This again stems from the basis of
‘might makes right’ inherent in the commodification and commoditisation
of peoples.
Agency, Failed Strategies and Transdenominationalism
There are numerous reasons for the Assyrians’ failure to elicit a positive
political response for their demands at Versailles in 1919 (where arguably,
they had the greatest chance for success), as well as in subsequent treaties and
conferences. They were plagued by internal disputes as much as by simple
dismissal by larger authorities, as religious and tribal adherence would add
to distrust and outright enmity. The Chaldean Assyrians, such as General
Petros Elia and Malik Kambar Warda of Jilu, were linked to France and
Rome; the Nestorian Assyrians, led by Patriarch Mar Eshai Shimun, his
aunt Surma and tribal chiefs, among them Malik Ismael of Upper Tiyari,
were linked closely to the British Crown, the Archbishop of Canterbury,
and the Church of England; the Jacobite Assyrians, from Abraham K.
Yoosuf to Archbishop Barsoum, occupied a more nebulous position; and
the Protestants, from Joel Werda to Malik Khoshaba of Lower Tiyari, were
linked to the American missions.12 While some of the delegations’ claims
and desires seemed far-fetched and ‘totally out of touch with the true state
of affairs’, the element of inclusivity with seemingly strong historical and
geographical veracity may be argued as progressive.13 For instance the inclu-
sion of Islamised Assyrians and the entreaty for territory that was shared by
said groups was arguably not only inter- or trans-ecclesiastical, which the
delegates themselves were, but inter- or trans-denominational in the sense
of inter or trans-religious as well.14 Additionally, and very much to the con-
trary of the conflicts mentioned above, General Petros Elia (Catholic) and
General David Shimun (Nestorian/Church of the East), brother of Patriarch
Benyamin, led the two flanks of the Assyrian Volunteers in the First World
War; Elia and Malik Khoshaba (Protestant) came to the aid of the besieged
Urmia plainsmen in February 1918; Kambar Warda (Catholic) was part of
the Patriarchal faction that supported Mar Eshai Shimun (Nestorian/Church
of the East) in 1933, despite his earlier apprehension concerning Surma
in 1919 when Eshai had just become Patriarch;15 and finally Archbishop
Barsoum (Jacobite) spoke for and proposed an Assyrian homeland in 1920,
adding his support to that of almost the entire Harput diaspora community
of Massachusetts (Jacobites) for Mar Eshai Shimun raising funds, to be sent
to the ‘patriotic leader for a new Assyria’ despite the terror that gripped the
Assyrian communities following the Simele massacres in 1933. These are

all evidence of and testament to the importance of situationalism in the
complex and indeed perplexing decades from the advent of the First World
War through the 1930s.16
Yet the Assyrian quandary was not without its external advocates. Raphael
Lemkin’s usage of the terms ‘crimes of barbarity’ and ‘crimes of vandalism’
as put forth in 1933 following the Simele massacres (and influenced by the
devastation during the First World War) inspired widespread work within
the international arena. For Lemkin such violence denoted a calculated effort,
involving
different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations

of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups
themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the
political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings,
religion, and the economic existence of such groups, and the destruction
of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of
the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against
the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed
against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the
national group.17
This definition would come to be used in its international form in the

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(1948). Article 2 of the convention defines genocide as
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in

part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group:
(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.18
Though there is a lack of consensus surrounding the convention’s definition,

particularly regarding its scope, it has been supplemented by v arious inter-
national mechanisms in the form of international treaty and customary law,
which will be referred to in the following passages.
Since its early introduction by Lemkin, the definition and scope of
genocide has been deeply rooted within the confines of the state as the key
actor and facilitator of genocidal campaigns and other related crimes against
humanity. This is evidenced by the emphasis placed on the state as the pri-
mary agent in the varying definitions found in major works on the sub-
ject, namely those of Helen Fein, Donald Horowitz, Vahakn Dadrian and
Jack Porter.19 A focus on the nation-building processes employed during the
emergence of newly formed states has been a prevalent theme within existing
discourse, as the state has been the focal point of analysis. For Eric Weitz, the
state is at the core of such violent marginalisation, and further its distinguish-
ing element becomes the pervasiveness of calculated, state-induced policies
perpetuated by nationalist elites, as seen during the waning of the Ottoman
Empire and the emergence of the Young Turks, Nazi Germany, the Khmer
Rouge in Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia, and the current Israeli treat-
ment of Palestinians. A point of differentiation from previous pogroms and
massacres that characterises Weitz’s theory in the twentieth century has been
the ability and capacity of the state to systematically devise and execute poli-
cies on an unprecedented scale, to ‘mobilize and unleash their bureaucrats,
armies, and loyal citizenry to carry out extreme acts of violence, which may
appear random at the moment they occur’.20 Thus, the state, with its capacity
to mobilise and utilise state resources, becomes the central actor and agency
that propagates and implements genocide within its structures and institu-
tions, often mobilising civilians and labelling perceived targets and threats.
Such an atmosphere sets the stage whereby the state, operating as the ultimate
sovereign, categorises perceived undesirables along social and racial lines,
resulting in the elimination of state laws protecting the weak in the name of
progress and evolution.21
Similarly, Arjun Appadurai claims that ‘the idea of a “national ethnos”’
is one of the most dangerous notions of, and indeed an innate element in, the
ideology of the modern nation-state. A ‘national ethnos’ feeds the notion that
the sovereignty of the state is built upon some form of ethnic genius.22 The
undesirable and the weak can be quickly incorporated into the vernacular of
justification and legitimisation of absolutist state polices that advocate purg-
ing and eliminating groups perceived as enemies during the nation-building
process, or at times of upheaval in already established states. The events of
the various violent campaigns in Iraq are a product of both the state-building
process and the development of a national ethnos.
Simele Revisited
They are to the majority of ‘Iraqis an alien race with an alien religion, bound
to ‘Iraq by no strong ties of patriotism or loyalty and having originally no
claim to the special consideration of the ‘Iraqi Government.23
George Antonius
The termination of the British mandate in Iraq in 1932 and the creation of
Iraq as a sovereign territory required the newly formed government to legiti-
mise its claim by asserting its sovereignty. Simele, thus, came to symbolise the
tenacious power and valour of the young Iraqi military to eliminate what they
perceived to be the last vestiges of European power.24 Indeed it epitomised
the requisite for social discipline steeped in an Arab nationalism generated
by Sāt.i‘ al- H.us.rī, who held ‘that general military service is one of the most
important means of teaching social education and increasing a spirit of unity
and discipline in the individuals of the nation’.25 The country had perceived
a foreign martial threat in the Assyrians and this military action against them
stirred a largely incoherent and fragmented Iraqi populace behind an instru-
ment of homogeneity and authority. Al-H.us.rī’s yearning was realised: the
military had done a service by massacring the Assyrians, and their rise to
supremacy as a tool for political control was recognised for future coups, as is
patently obvious in Iraq’s history.
Rebellions by the Kurds in the north from 1930 to 1932 and the Shia
majority in the south in 1920 and again in 1935 created an unstable politi-
cal environment, thus minimising the sphere of tolerance for dissidents and
minorities. For Michael Mann, such an environment provides the justifica-
tion for the state, as a factionalised, radicalised and unstable geopolitical
entity, to perpetuate ‘murderous cleansing . . . calling for tougher treatment
of perceived ethnic enemies’.26 The unbridled targeting of Assyrians in 1933
framed a clear linear development that would affect other minorities in the
newly created state. The overlooking of exterminatory military and govern-
mental tactics again created a rift in the understanding of the armed autono-
mist movement, border clearings and Anfal campaign in the decades that
followed. The use of the Iraqi military in the operations of the 1960s and
1970s has been dismissed by some scholars, who argue that the true destruc-
tion was the fault of the targeted, rather than shifting the focus and the blame
to the main culprit, the Iraqi state/military and its propaganda apparatus.27
This dismissal of the state’s violent actions towards its citizens as perceived
enemies of the state is a common justification for perpetrators and deniers of
mass violence.28
The systematic massacre of the male population of Simele village on
11 August 1933 ensured the silence of this already distraught native com-
munity.29 The Assyrians and in fact the very idea of Assyrian was portrayed as
the equivalent of British marionettes with teeth; tools which could be used to
destroy the new and independent Iraqi state which the British had time and
again opposed. Other Iraqis were incited by a large propaganda campaign,
which circulated reports that armed Assyrians returning from Syria had muti-
lated the bodies of Iraqi soldiers, despite contrary reports that the French
had disarmed the Assyrians. The accusations of them mutilating bodies of
fallen soldiers and the call by the Ikha al-Watani (National Brotherhood)
party in Mosul to eliminate all foreign elements are part and parcel of the
government’s marketing and its policies of violent authoritarianism and
totalitarianism.
The initial destruction and the killing of more than 300 unarmed indi-
viduals, the looting and razing of more than 100 villages and the eventual
death toll of up to 6,000 was one of the two sets of events within the lifetime
of a young Raphael Lemkin to influence his presentation to the League of
Nations in 1933 in Madrid, arguing that such events be considered a crime
according to international law.30 Due to the volatile nature of his argument
(at least relating to possible repercussions levelled at more powerful nations),
Lemkin was forced by the Polish Foreign Minister to resign from his post
as public prosecutor of the district court of Warsaw not long after, in 1934.
Thus, it is unambiguous that the international community was still unable or
unwilling to inquire into such acts of malice, though these acts would become
the foundation for the Genocide Convention, which was later adopted by
the newly established United Nations in 1948.
Even in the highest circles there was talk of the ‘rid me of this turbulent
priest’ order. ‘Let all the Assyrian men be killed,’ they cried, ‘but spare the
women and children as the eyes of the world are on us. Let the Arabs and
Kurds be raised against the Assyrians. Let trouble be stirred up in Syria
against the treacherous French.’31
Regardless of whether or not the highest circles issued a final decree in such
bold words (most bodies committing exterminatory acts rarely leave a con-
crete paper trail), the actions taken by the Iraqi army and the experience
of Assyrian civilians amount to the same. The data suggests these were not
simply words, but a premeditated plan created by the government and army
against Assyrians of the region. Whether the government feared the highly
trained and armed levies as a political threat, the data indicates certain ele-
ments of their identity were ameliorated during the period. The Assyrians
were targeted – otherised as both a Christian religious minority (with ties to
Western Christianity) and for being ethnic Assyrians. Elias Haroon Bazi’s
eyewitness observation, ‘either become Muslim or we will kill you’, is a vivid
reminder of the anti-Christian religious persecution, reverberating with an
ethnic anti-Assyrian sentiment, where ‘it was enough for them to be Assyrians
to be shot’ and ‘it was evident by now that the Army Command was quite
certain in its own mind [of] its decision to wipe out the Assyrians’.32 In
fact it was this anti-Assyrian sentiment that caused the various ecclesiastical
Christian sects to begin (forcibly and of their own volition) to detach them-
selves from their ethnic identity (since they were also in the process of being
persecuted for their religious beliefs) and as an alternative, to identify solely
with their religious denominations to avoid retribution.33
The effect of the Simele massacre and subsequent community fragmentation34
If, as a British diplomat, Gerald de Gaury stated that ‘it was enough for them
to be Assyrians to be shot’, what chance of survival did the community have
at its disposal?35 Such a statement by de Gaury, a major champion of the
Arabs and friend to the Saud family, carries a great deal of weight as he was
not lightly dismissing the maltreatment of the Assyrians. Yet it elucidates the
problem: Assyrians were being slain simply for being Assyrian. The answer
became palpably uncomplicated: stop being Assyrian – which is precisely
what many did. This identity denial was made more pronounced by intra-
religious enmity, which had been fostered by a longstanding Catholic hostil-
ity towards the Church of the East for its ‘Nestorian heresy’, one of the many
undying and ancient Christian enmities, and vice versa.36
Following the initial massacre, and perhaps under pressure from the Iraqi
regime, two Chaldean clerics (Mar Yousef VI Emmanuel II Thomas of the
Chaldean Church and Priest Wadisho of Alqosh) and one Syrian Orthodox
cleric (Athanasius Thoma Kassir, Bishop of Mosul) sent letters of support to
the Iraqi regime, as reported by al-Ikha al-Watani in Baghdad on 20 August
1933. The American resident minister, Paul Knabenshue, related to the US
Secretary of State that ‘the exaction of false testimonials from the various
Christian dignitaries, virtually at the point of the pistol, is a sad testimonial
to the integrity of the Iraq government’.37 Whether or not this duress was
genuine, the end result was as authoritative as it was flagrant. ‘Assyrian’ as an
identity and culture became increasingly identified with the Nestorians alone
(mostly due to the political involvement of Mar Eshai Shimun) and more so
as ‘those Nestorian foreigners’ brought into Iraq by the British rather than
the descendants of the ancient Assyrians whose history successive regimes in
Iraq (and Syria as well) would appropriate as part of a larger but vague Arab
ummah (nation) or sha‘b (people).
The Chaldean Church had been part of the Nestorian Church, or Church
of the East, until 1552/3. Most of its adherents in Iraq were descended from
people who had been converted in the 1800s by Dominicans. Now it began
in earnest to distance itself from the Nestorians, who were now seen as the
‘uncouth Assyrians’ as British parlance had sometimes referred to the tribal
society of the Hakkâri mountaineers. During this period, many members of
the Chaldean Church began to be identified and to identify themselves solely
by their religious community, and later as Iraqis, Iraqi Christians, or Arab
Christians, rather than part of a larger Assyrian community. This is also true of
the Syrian Orthodox Church, which, prior to the events, considered itself part
and parcel of a transnational and trans-ecclesiastical Assyrian heritage.38 The
Chaldean Church has generally had continuous positive relations with suc-
cessive governments of Iraq, in part because its members were predominantly
found in relative proximity to large, Arab-dominated cities. Migration from

rural northern villages to large cities in the central and southern regions was
part of an attempt by the Assyrians ‘to demonstrate their desire of integration
into the country and to adopt its agenda’.39 Such intentions (whether sincere
or otherwise) aided the Chaldean Church community to survive and at times
prosper, economically, socially and politically, within greater Iraqi Arab soci-
ety, with former vice president Tareq ‘Aziz as a example.
Furthermore, following the transfer of the patriarchal see of the Syrian
Orthodox Church to Homs, Syria, the Jacobite clergy also became influenced
by a rising tide of Syrian nationalism and Arabisation.40 The events at Simele
had repercussions for Syria, since some 1,350 armed Assyrians had crossed
the border and settled in the Khabur basin. Thus, the desire to seem distinct
from its militant brethren was an additional reason for the Syrian Orthodox
Church to further distance itself from its former identification as Assyrian. In
fact it was the former Bishop Severius who initiated the change in identity. He
became Patriarch Ignatius Afram Barsoum of the Jacobites in 1932, the year
the patriarchal residence was moved to Syria from Deir Za‘afaran in Mardin,
Turkey. Beginning first in 1933, following the tragedy of Simele, Barsoum
and the church adopted an increasingly anti-Assyrian stance as they dis-
tanced themselves from anything Assyrian-related. By the early 1960s, all the
Jacobite churches in the United States, previously bearing the official name
‘Assyrian Apostolic Church of Antioch’, had changed their names to ‘Syrian
Orthodox Church of Antioch’, with the exception of Paramus, New Jersey
and Worcester, Massachusetts.41 The fallout was immense and included
excommunications such as that of Farid Elias Nuzha, born in Hamah,
Syria in 1895. Nuzha, then living in Buenos Aires, was the head of Centro
Afremico Asirio and the publisher of al-al-Jam‘īah as-Siryanīyah (Asociación
Asiria). He demonstrated his disgust in an answer to a letter from a Jacobite
living in Iraq which asked him to modify or erase the Spanish name of the
magazine (Asiria) as it was reflective of a different people (i.e. the Assyrians
of Hakkâri) and further as it did not please the government of Iraq. Nuzha
responded by highlighting the problem in equating the Assyrian identity
solely with Nestorians rather than more properly to Jacobites and Chaldeans
as well.42 This concern or adaptation is not evident prior to 1933, illustrating
the blatant sectarianisation of the Assyrians, particularly in post-Simele Iraq.
On a broader scale, the official Iraqi yearbook of 1936 mentioned four

ethnic groups in Iraq: Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans and Persians, reflecting
(1) the tendencies of states to centralise and view exclusively numerically
and/or politically significant constituencies, and (2) a methodical political
indifference – a form of subtle assimilation, exacerbated by (3) actions on
the part of the churches, perhaps initially a method of self-preservation,
that marked the beginning of an unforeseen loss or unimagining of Assyrian
identity.43 Thus the Assyrians played an active role in the slow degrada-
tion of their own culture, becoming in some cases their own worst enemy.
Additionally, the political environment coupled with a general fear of the
Iraqi government exacerbated the ecclesiastical animosities. The propensity
for such tensions between the various churches speaks to a strong tie between
ecclesiastic organisations and larger cultural ones, especially in the Middle
Eastern/Islamic world context. State and non-state actors, including indi-
vidual Assyrians vying for power or indoctrinated by an appealing ideology,
exploited this tension to the detriment of the development of an integrated
and recognised Assyrian identity. While I concur that there are various layers
to identity, or to use the trendy term hybridised identities, there are objective
elements which create the subjective identity and those objective elements
are in many cases imposed by subjective notions of reality and so forth. The
problem of assigning culpability is one of the adage of contradiction: both
choice (subjective) and design (objective) exist simultaneously.44
As discussed above in great detail, 1933 was a watershed for the
contemporary sectarianisation of the Assyrians by ecclesiastical adherence. Yet
the Assyrian ethno-cultural identity has retained a trans-ecclesiastical or trans-
denominational nature; many individuals and organisations from among the
non-Nestorian/Church of the East (and, more to the point, the non-Mar
Shimun-related) denominations continued to provide succour for their kin
and remember the attacks on their community while the official hierarchies of
the Chaldean and Jacobite churches began the process of slow disassociation.
Immediately following the tragedy, Simele was remembered and recounted by
Assyrians around the world. Why is apparent, but how and by whom less so.
Despite the growing anti-Assyrianism of the Chaldean and Jacobite
churches and their clergy, also strongly linked with growing Arab nationalism
as well as country-specific nationalisms through the years, some lay and clergy
individuals in those churches retained ethno-cultural solidarity with their

brethren.45 The composer Gabriel Asaad (1907–97), born in Qamishli, Syria,
composed the song ‘Sohdē d-Ot_ur’ (‘Martyrs of Assyria’) in 1933 about the
victims of Simele after hearing the news while he was in Tabariya, Palestine.
Further confirmation of this is offered through the poetry of Paulos Bedari, a
Chaldean priest living in north Iraq who did not share the sentiments of his
hierarchy. Bedari wrote a poem titled Ūlītā l-gunkhā d-Simelē (‘Lamentation
on the Simele Massacre’) not long after the event had occurred. The first sec-
tion illustrates matters of fraternity and identity:46
Bkhī ya gani b-khasha w-dim‘é Weep, o my soul, in sorrow and
twira: tears and in shattered heart,
‘al parpasta d-umtan khqirta About the splintering of our
mart iqara. noble nation so honourable.
The heavens and earth weep
Shmaya w-ar‘a bkho ‘al gunkhā about a most bitter massacre:
chim marīra: Assyria, mother of lions and all
Npīlah Ātur yimma d-aryé the mighty, has fallen.
w-d-kul gabbara.
Bedari’s usage of ‘Assyria’ and reference to community or nation possessively
alludes to two axioms: that there continued to be individuals within the
church structure who did not adhere to a growing self-segregation from the
Assyrian identity, at least early on; and possibly that the public comments
made by Chaldean and Jacobite church leaders early in this chapter may have
reflected a mask of seeming; not being. Yet the consequences reaped for such
an action would shake the foundation of the Assyrian community and the
narratives generated around it would create a newly illusory record.
Though the religious and ethnic basis for external targeting is strongly
apparent, it was fear and the desire for self-preservation in a hostile environ-
ment, alongside more selfish aspirations, that motivated internal divisions:
You have seen what happened to the Assyrians just as soon as they ceased
to be of use to the British. You read how the English ministers stood up in
their Mejliss at Westminster and disowned any claims made by their fellow
Christians, pleading for their wives and children to be safe from rape and
slaughter.47
Years later, with fear remaining a motivating factor, many Assyrians became
embedded in the Arab mainstream (Kurdish, Persian and Turkish, as well),
and being Assyrian became as foreign to them as being Arab had been to their
parents and grandparents. This became a reality for a variety of reasons and can
be illuminated by another look at the terms emic (a native designation) and etic
(non-native designation) in identity formation and propagation. Despite the
simplified definition above, one must consider the fact that what academics
including historians and anthropologists view as emic terms today are in fact
created by etic power structures and later adopted by the community (making
vigilance against anachronism a must). This issue is related to the understand-
ing expressed by political scientist Alexander Wendt that identity is defined
by both the self and the other and is in fact propagated or sustained within
community structures, the most powerful of those structures being the state.48
Thus once the Assyrian community had become truly sectarianised within
the infrastructure and under the influence of the Iraqi state apparatus, new
counter-Assyrian identities would form and be transmitted to secondary and
tertiary generations. The mask would become the face of a new identity:
There’s a fundamental connection between seeming and being . . . We

understand how dangerous a mask can be. We all become what we pretend
to be . . . The truth is deeper than that. It’s like everyone tells a story about
themselves inside their head. Always. All the time. That story makes you
what you are. We build ourselves out of that story.49
Part of the Assyrian experience in Iraq is an intertwining of distinct campaigns

aimed at accomplishing a similar goal: the assimilation by acculturation
and indoctrination or the destruction of a distinct community, a benefit to
the indivisibility of the state. The state is portrayed as the totality and the
Assyrians as other: trespassers and aggressors.
As for the physical massacres, Iraqi governmental denial and redistribution
of the blame on the Assyrians is of note.50 The argument of wartime chaos could
feasibly make finding a true motivation tricky. Yet according to international
law, communities are also protected from such situations: ‘Individual or mass
forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied
territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other coun-
try, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.’51 Deportation
during armed conflict is classified as a crime against humanity in light of the

ethnic cleansing campaigns implemented in former Yugoslavia.52
In Drazen Petrovic’s study on the methodology concerning ethnic
cleansing, he defines the act simply as policies and practices aimed at achiev-
ing security through displacement of an ethnic group from a particular ter-
ritory which may or may not include violence.53 Additionally, Ilan Pappé
provides a pertinent paradigm of ethnic cleansing when analysing the impact
of Zionism on the resettlement of Palestine by Jewish settlers. For Pappé,
the ethnic cleansing of Palestine was not a cause and effect of war, but rather
a fundamental element of Jewish resettlement – which was ingrained in the
origins of Zionism as the ideological cause for the ethnic cleansing that took
place prior to the creation of the state of Israel in 1948.54
The atrocities of Simele certainly were not enacted under a war paradigm,
as ‘there was no war in sight in 1933 when the Assyrians were being martyred
because Britain feared for her oil in Mosul’.55 The data here would support
Pappé’s paradigm of ethnic cleansing, since in 1933 there was no justification
of wartime acts, no threat to the Iraqi state. To speak more of issues concern-
ing intentionality we return to the question of the regime’s blueprint both
pre- and post-massacre:
Here and there in the mountains they came up with fugitive Assyrians.
And every Assyrian they caught they shot out of hand. Clearly by now
the Army had decided that the Assyrians, as far as possible, were to be
exterminated. No pretence was made that these operations had any purely
military objective, for the Army Intelligence officers did not even take the
trouble to cross-question the captured Assyrians, who were simply shot as
they were rounded up . . . it was evident by now that the Army Command
was quite certain in its own mind that, in its decision to wipe out the
Assyrians, it would . . . be backed not only by Arab public opinion, but by
the Baghdad Government.56
Colonel Stafford’s narrative of events reveals that on 9 August, the Iraqi Air

Force bombed the Kurdish village of Ziwa, killing a woman under the false
pretence that Assyrians had attacked the village. After further investigation,
the Kurds stated that they had never seen an Assyrian in the village. Evidently
the possibility of eliminating Assyrians wherever they might be stirred the
Iraqi military into a lethal frenzy, as they never substantiated the reports prior
to attacking the village. Also, as the army had planned to continue the mas-
sacres with Alqosh and other non-Nestorian villages (as many in the region
of Alqosh were predominantly Chaldean), the entire event clearly spoke
of a frenzy of pan-Assyrian paranoia and desired state-sponsored destruc-
tion of the entire community, of which, despite attempts at dissection, the
Chaldeans, or at the very least Alqosh, were a part.57
An American missionary in Dohuk, Roger Cumberland, in a letter to
Paul Knabenshue, stated that Simele ushered in a variety of consequences:
One is that the reputation of the Assyrian warrior has vanished. Second,
the tribes have seen with their own eyes that the British armed forces,
whether land or air, took no part in the recent operations. Third, old
animosities between Muslims and Christians have been aroused and new
ones created in recent months. Fourth (of local significance in the Dohuk
district only, unless it should spread), two of the Kurdish tribes have quar-
relled over spoil, and it would take only a small incident to set them upon
each other. Fifth (a seemingly absurd thing, but nevertheless significant),
there is a shortage of eligible Kurdish girls at present; a good bride costs
about 300 dollars; and whether the young Kurds would consciously start
out to get brides by conquest or not, the situation does make them rest-
less. Sixth, the Semeil massacre and similar events have gone far to destroy
the confidence of the Assyrians and other minority groups, especially
Christians, in the good faith of the Government. Seventh, there seems
not to be the personal integrity in the government services to form a stable
administration. To be sure, we as Americans are not in a position to throw
stones; but the objective fact remains that corruption is the rule rather than
the exception in this country, and that it is not condemned by any body of
public opinion that is strong enough to check it.58
Cumberland’s first four points speak of what could be termed a gendercidal

campaign as Assyrian men of fighting age, the focus of the army, were simply
eliminated wherever they were found.59
The soldiers then remained in the village, remaining about to find any male
person and shoot him down. About evening they entered the places (i.e.,
the fort and other houses where the women and children had gathered
together). Among the women and children there were nearly about hun-
dred men and grown-up boys, who, being without arms to save themselves,
had put on women’s clothes. They were all discovered by the soldiers and
police (as every woman and other person in female dress was examined
by the soldiers and the police) and they were all killed. I saw the police-
sergeant also dashing the priest’s two children of 4 and 6 years of age against
the wall because they were clinging to their father and screaming after him
as he was being taken away. Qasha Ishmail was taken outside, where he
joined another priest, Qasha Irsanis [Arsanis], whom the police had found
in another house. They were both murdered just below the fort in front of
a house known as of Khishaba [Khoshaba]. Their beards were cut off and
their hair was dashed in their mouths.60
Regarding Cumberland’s fifth point, ‘whether the young Kurds

would consciously start out to get brides by conquest or not, the situa-
tion does make them restless’: if all the men in the Simele region were
eliminated and, further, if the women and children that remained feared
for their safety without the men, then they would be forced either to marry
Kurds (effectively making them Kurds themselves) especially amid a short-
age of Kurdish girls of marriageable age, or to leave the country since, as
expressed in Cumberland’s points six and seven, the ‘events have gone far to
destroy the confidence of the Assyrians and other minority groups, especially
Christians, in the good faith of the Government . . . there seems not to be
the personal integrity in the government services to form a stable adminis-
tration’. The Assyrians had no faith left in the British and far less in the Iraqi
government.61
Analogous international cases recognised
The internationally unrecognised massacres of Simele echo the internation-

ally recognised killing, during the Bosnian War, of more than 8,000 Bosnian
Muslims, mainly men and boys, in and around the town of Srebrenica
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by units of the Army of Republika Srpska
under the command of General Ratko Mladić. The event became known
as the Srebrenica genocide in July 1995. The massacre was described by the
secretary general of the United Nations as the worst crime on European

soil since the Second World War. An excerpt from the 2004 trial reads as
follows:
I consider that the alleged requirement for proof of intent to destroy the
group physically or biologically was met by the disastrous consequences for
the family structures on which the Srebrenica part of the Bosnian Muslim
group was based. The Trial Chamber was correct in finding that the Bosnian
Serb forces knew that their activities ‘would inevitably result in the physical
disappearance of the Bosnian Muslim population at Srebrenica’.62
As for the Assyrians, the official notes of Raphael Lemkin spoke of the atroci-
ties in detail, laying blame on the Iraq army for having carried out genocidal
acts. Further, the premeditated nature of the event was illustrated by the fact
that ten Arab families, living alongside the 100 Assyrians in Simele, were told
to leave prior to the massacre. In addition, the Assyrians were disarmed and
surrounding Kurdish tribesmen were given more than a thousand rifles by
the army to instil fear in those wishing to flee, effectively keeping them in
the village, increasing the terror factor and guaranteeing a high death toll.63
Through corroborating sources, the data validates Iraq attempted to solid-
ify its homogeneity as a nation through the purging of those Assyrians at Simele
and the surrounding districts, epitomising the complexity of a situation in
which the envisaged state-building could only progress via ‘nation-destroying’
of the Assyrians.64 Once the last vestiges of their physical power in the form
of the levies was stemmed, more subtle forms of homogenisation, such as
acculturation and assimilation, could be used in place of physical obliteration:
a proverbial ‘survival of the fittest’ paradigm as enacted by state policies where
the marginal group must be either eliminated or absorbed by the dominant
group for the sake of progress. Forced homogeneity in state- and nation-
building would continue with the subsequent maltreatment of minorities (in
a variety of manifestations) throughout Iraq’s tumultuous history.65
Development and Consequences of Urbanisation and Arabisation
Nebuchadnezzar stirs in me everything relating to pre-Islamic ancient his-

tory. And what is most important to me about Nebuchadnezzar is the link
between the Arabs’ abilities and the liberation of Palestine. Nebuchadnezzar
was, after all, an Arab from Iraq, albeit ancient Iraq.66

Saddam Hussein (1979)
The development and propagation of Iraqi nationalism (as a segment of

Arab nationalism) and Pan-Arabism had a lasting impact on the non-Arab
minorities in Iraq.67 Though Arab nationalism was intrinsically e mbedded within
Iraqi nationalism, the two did differ in some respects, especially in reference
to the reigning power. Whereas Qasim’s regime used ancient Mesopotamian
iconography, the Ba‘th Party furthered this process by combining it with Arab
symbolism, making the two virtually inseparable.68 Arguably even Qasim
Arabised Mesopotamian standards, evident in the usage of the ‘Arabic’ sun as
‘the emblem of Justice ancient Iraqis adopted before Christ’.69 This ideology,
though not problematic in and of itself, when imbedded into Iraqi educational
patterns became indoctrination. This combination overwhelmed Assyrian
cultural history, which became frailer with each new governmental policy
directed towards education and social status, and with each demographic shift,
starting with the disparity left following the Simele massacres.
The concepts of an alien race or alien religion and of savages, in accordance
with the Arab nationalist sentiment of George Antonius, also dominate mis-
sionary reports, as seen earlier, and colonial British commentaries concerning
the Assyrians formerly of the Hakkâri region living in Iraq following the First
World War.70 The arbitrary borders created by Western powers furthered
this alienness, despite thousands of years of Assyrian culture and religion in
the newly created Iraq – a Christianity built by the same ethnic Assyrians
who happened to fall ‘south of the border’, driving a wedge between the two
Assyrian factions. The promotion and propagation of such negative or biased
material concerning the Assyrians can be credited to Western- and Arab-
controlled media outlets, which normalised intra-ethnic and intra-religious
enmity. These normalised hatreds influenced socio-economic standing and
developed into an everyday deprecating vernacular, in which the Assyrians
were referred to as felleh.i (Arabic ‘farmer’ or ‘peasant’), a term applied to
them by their urbanised brethren.71
To say the ideologies of Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism in Iraq were
standard shows but a fraction of the picture. Early on, some radical writ-
ers demanded identification of pre-Arab, pre-Islamic civilisations with Iraq
and as part of its Arab heritage. Others, such as ‘Abd al-Rah.man al-Bazzaz,
President and Prime Minister of Iraq in the mid-1960s for a brief period and
a prolific writer, saw such early civilisations as part of the history and land
of Iraq, but certainly not part of the modern Iraqi Arab identity. The great-
est attempt to identify the pre-Islamic Mesopotamian cultures with modern
Iraqi Arab identity was done mostly by the regime itself, and more extensively
during the Iran–Iraq War, most likely to garner greater solidarity.72 Arab
nationalism and Arabisation used subtle ideas inserted in the educational
system to influence a populace that was both ethnically and culturally diverse.
Slogans of the Ba‘th Party became part and parcel of the system and the
forced indivisibility of Iraqi identity was blatantly evident: l’Umma ‘Arabiyya
Wāh.da, wd.āt Risāla Khālida (‘One Arab Nation, with an Eternal Message’).73
This occurred quite early in the formation of the Middle East:
This was done in the 1920s by postulating Arabia as the cradle of all the
Semites who had migrated over the centuries and paved the way for the
latest wave of Arab immigration, or by co-opting all pre-Islamic cultures of
the Near East into an evolving Arab identity.74
Thus, the ‘Semitic’ Assyrian cultural identity (including from the ancient
and Syriac Christian eras) was appropriated as part of a greater Arab iden-
tity, which defined Iraqi Arab nationalism. Nationalists, like Sāt.i‘ al-H.us.rī,
Director of General Education from 1922 to 1927, believed that that Arabic
language and common history had to be indoctrinated within the population
and ‘only by removing the child from the family and the village and subjugat-
ing him to a nationalist education and military training could his loyalty be
reoriented toward the nation’.75
Since various Arab intellectuals spoke of conflicting views concerning this
appropriation, the Arabism of the later government, an assimilatory Arabism,
won out over all others despite attempts to contain it. Under Qasim, secular
left-leaning Iraqi nationalism allowed for the inclusion of various cultures
as Iraqi, but not as Arab. To the non-Assyrian Iraqi populace, the Assyrians
were portrayed as foreign people. This ideology, taken a step further, gave
the events of Simele a facade of inevitability and necessity (though Antonius
himself never goes so far, and in fact condemns the violence and atrocities
that occurred). Such notions are prevalent in anti-indigenous literature of
colonial states. This otherisation, in essence a form of dehumanisation, is

echoed in L. Frank Baum’s comments concerning the Lakota in the United
States in the 1890s:
The pioneer has before declared that our safety depends upon the total
extermination of the Indians. Having wronged them for centuries, we had
better, in order to protect our civilization, follow it up by one more wrong
and wipe these untamed and untamable creatures from the face of the
earth . . . Otherwise, we may expect future years to be as full of trouble with
the redskins as those have been in the past.76
Baum’s words were received in a similar light to Antonius’s statement,

whether they were aptly a reflection of the author’s sentiments or of the
general attitude of the masses. While some may argue against the need for
such parallels, it seems evident that likening Eastern (sometimes ethnic)
state violence against its own local populations, including dictatorships, to
that committed by Western ‘civic democracies’, where ethnic ‘cleansing and
democratisation proceeded hand in hand’, is pertinent.77
As mentioned briefly, the Simele massacres bear an uncanny resemblance
to the Battle at Wounded Knee in South Dakota in December 1890, when
500 troops of the US 7th Cavalry surrounded and massacred a band of
Lakota Sioux for fear of a spiritual movement called the ghost dance. From
the broken land treaty, which angered the Lakota, to their later disarmament,
and finally to the initial number of casualties at around 300, the attacks
at Wounded Knee and Simele are methodically similar in their intent to
destroy the Sioux ghost dancers and mountaineer/warrior Assyrians respec-
tively. Furthermore, the reactions in the aftermath of the US government
and the Iraqi government are peculiarly analogous. The American cavalry
troops were venerated with eighteen Congressional Medals of Honor, parallel
to the parades held for the victoriously returning Iraqi troops following the
murders at Simele.78 In most cases, local Americans, already suspicious of
‘savage redskins’, saw the event through an ethno-religious lens – similar to
the local ‘Iraqi’ general distrust of these alien and rural community, which
was furthered by government and media propaganda. This idea of savagery
and rebellion was also promoted by the Iraqi government, as attested in a US
Department of State document which stated, ‘Rebels mutilated dead and
wounded, burned bodies [of] officers and killed some women and children,’
an almost identical tactic to Khaldun Husry’s attempt to subvert the blame
for the Assyrian massacre by creating tales of Assyrians mutilating the bodies
of Iraqi army officers.79 Similarly, the US military attempted to blame the
Lakota for the genocidal massacre. As some historians have attempted to
blame the Assyrian victims for the Iraqi military action at Simele, citing
premeditated rebellion (Husry being the most prominent), a similar case has
occurred regarding the Lakota and Wounded Knee:
Many historians have argued that the Sioux changed Wovoka’s originally
peaceful movement into a militant one, thus ultimately leading to the battle
at Wounded Knee, but Ostler flatly denies this and claims that the idea
originated in the army’s attempts to justify the suppression of the Ghost
Dance.80
The violence at Wounded Knee is rightfully interpreted as a colonialist action

by the government. ‘It was not the Lakota Ghost dancers who were becoming
hostile or threatening to use force . . . it was the United States.’81 One wonders
whether the fact that the Lakota and Assyrians were partially armed remains
a sufficient pretext for their near annihilation. To return to Baum, while the
intent with which he employed his remarks is highly contested,82 Barbara
Chiarello asserts that this white Anglo-Saxon Protestant American national-
ist ideology was unmistakably reflected by (and in many cases developed by)
American authorities, including President Theodore Roosevelt, who stated:
All men of sane and wholesome thought must dismiss with impatient
contempt the plea that these continents should be reserved for the use of
scattered savage tribes, whose life was but a few degrees less meaningless,
squalid, and ferocious than that of the wild beasts with whom they held
joint ownership . . . The most ultimately righteous of all wars is a war with
savages, though it is apt to be also the most terrible and inhuman. The rude,
fierce settler who drives the savage from the land lays all civilized mankind
under a debt to him. American and Indian, Boer and Zulu . . . in each case
the victor . . . has laid deep the foundations for the future greatness of a
mighty people.83
Roughly speaking, Iraq in the 1960s–1980s was in a similar position to the

United States in the 1890s. While the state had been formed, it had not
been totally consolidated. In order to become so, it began changing people’s
ways of life physically, whether through urbanisation or literally changing the
topography. As rural modes of living were eradicated, people were forced into
urban centres that would by default carry a stronger element of Arabisation.
State-sponsored Acculturation
The experience of the Iraqi Assyrians vis-à-vis state-solidifying in Iraq is best

conceptualised within the framework of state-sponsored acculturation. When
they had dissolved into general obscurity, with neither numerical nor politi-
cal strength, they became targeted by the Iraqi regime, as with other factional
groups, through a more subtle elimination of their distinct ethno-cultural
identity.
Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the
oppressed group; the other, imposition of the national pattern of the
oppressor. This imposition, in turn, may be made upon the oppressed
population which is allowed to remain, or upon the territory alone, after
removal of the population and the colonization of the area by the oppres-
sor’s own nationals.84
The propagation of Arabisation and Ba‘thification, which subsumed the

Assyrians as well as other communal groups into a monolithic identity,
resulted in the elimination of any modes of identification of these groups out-
side the acceptable norms of Ba‘thism and Arabism. For the Iraqi Assyrians,
this meant the state ceased to officially recognise them as an ethnic minority,
thereby eliminating them as a separate group. This is analogous to the assimi-
latory policies, with intent to purge, of various nations (both ethnic and civic)
against indigenous populations in settler states. Eliminating millennia-old
churches and monasteries, statues, inscriptions and books; burning apple,
walnut and almond orchards; and salting the earth were deliberate attempts
to destroy this people’s sustainability and way of life.
Therefore extermination, in its cultural shape, speaks to a social death,
when ‘one group begins to feel that the very existence of the other group is
a danger to its own survival’.85 Thus, logically extending the argument, one
may claim that the Iraqi government feared the Assyrian minority. The ques-
tion remains as to why. A likely answer reflects on the idea that ‘ethnocide
and ethnic cleansing are among the most significant markers or sources of
indigenous identity’.86 It is therefore probable that the Iraqi government’s
attempt to absorb the Assyrians into Iraqi Arab society, see them as outcasts
and label them as Kurds, or eliminate their ancestral ties to the land through
such policies of acculturation, solidified a policy of stabilising an insecure
national identity in order to consolidate and justify political, military and
economic control of the country. This includes the appellative issue of refer-
ring to them as Āthūri rather than Ashūri to sustain a distinction between
the alien ‘Nestorians’ and the ancient Assyrians, progenitors of an Iraq that
had begun to appropriate its historic navel. Being an ancient Assyrian (or
descendant thereof) granted almost nominal indigeneity to a troublesome
people, something the Iraqi government could not allow.
Since Iraqi Arab nationalism saw the Arabs as the inheritors of ancient
Mesopotamian civilisation (dogma most Iraqi nationalists also adhered to),
then Assyrians could not be an entity separate from the Arab identity, a
situation which left them simply as Christians. The type of Christian was
determined by their loyalty to Iraq and their geographic distribution: the
urban Arab Christian element in areas of ‘Arab’ Iraq on the one hand, and
those who were lumped geographically with the rural and ‘rebellious’ Kurds
and considered traitors to the regime. The hardening of Arabisation follow-
ing the Ba‘thist rise to power ensured that acculturation, both violent and
subtle, became part and parcel of successive government policies as tools and
mechanisms by which the government could suppress, assimilate and silence
its population without purging them physically, as they had done in 1933.
This building of a coerced collective ‘Iraqi’ identity, with all of its sub-texts,
would demonstrate the solidification of systematic and subsequent policies
of assimilation and homogenisation in an otherwise pluralistic society. This
attempt at ethno-cultural homogenisation ‘constituted the states system, for
it has been constructed in large measure on the exclusionary categories of
insider and outsider’.87
Thus, the usual rhetoric of the Assyrians as being ‘some forty thou-
sand persons who were brought to Iraq from Turkey’ has led to the view
of this people as ‘outsiders’ or non-Iraqis, which would contribute to the
justification of their massacre in 1933. The incessant labelling of these moun-

taineer Nestorians as ‘Assyrians’ (and as outsiders) furthered the rift between
Assyrians of various ecclesiastic sects, as many reinvented themselves as Iraqis
and as insiders rather than Assyrians, equivalent to foreigners. Cultural geno-
cide or ethnocide is an apt term for the continued denial of their existence
in Iraq as a distinct entity, sometimes furthered by modern scholarship in
questioning their distinctive culture, particularly when self-identification as
Assyrian (Ashūri or Āthūri in Arabic, in relation to descent from ancient
Assyria) results in imprisonment and torture. Through ideas of development
and progress according to its national and socialist principles, members of the
Ba‘th Party desired a public reinforcement of belief in God and knowledge
of Arabic and Islamic culture.88 In reality, this aided the ethnos/demos mud-
dling and indeed confused it even further.
A telltale result of the cultural-genocidal campaign within Iraq was evi-
dent in the fracture within the Assyrian community, with some showing
partiality toward the more Arabised segments of the populace and, in fact,
ridiculing the Assyrian identity as peasant oriented and abased. Thus, the
cultural chasm widened, and vocabulary such as felleh.i in Christian Arabic
became commonplace to refer to those who spoke some ancient language,
dressed strangely and retained notions of a distinct ethnic and cultural iden-
tity. At first in the period of 1920–50, especially in the wake of the atrocities
at Simele, those persons of Assyrian heritage who had no direct connection
to the Assyrians involved completely cut any possible ties, both publicly and
privately. They wore a mask of Arabism. They seemed as Iraqi and, by exten-
sion, as Arab as possible. ‘We understand how dangerous a mask can be. We
all become what we pretend to be.’89
The specific treatment of Assyrian asylum seekers returning from Turkey
to Iraq under amnesty decree no. 736 of 8 September 1988, illustrates the
original Clause 3 of the Genocide Convention as proposed by Lebanon,
which stated that ‘subjecting members of a group to such conditions as would
cause them to renounce their language, religion, or culture’ should be con-
sidered genocidal in scope.90 Though the total number of persons who went
missing during the aforementioned time period is unclear, from government
documents and oral estimates it can be surmised that thousands of Assyrians
disappeared following the Anfal campaign and that many more were forcibly
assimilated. Furthermore, it is probable that on being told that only Kurds

were subject to the amnesty, for survival purposes many Assyrians living in
Iraqi Kurdistan were forced to adopt a cover of a Kurdish identity. Thus, the
identity conundrum came full circle. Arab identification became commensu-
rate with strong socio-economic stature, forcibly attracting many Assyrians
and Kurds alike. Yet the drawback for Assyrians was twofold, because at
specific times and in particular locales, identifying as a Kurd guaranteed
even greater socio-economic prowess (in Iraqi Kurdistan) and was seemingly
(according to the government census) safer than being a non-Kurd. Also, the
unchecked and unreported Arabisation tactics faced by the Assyrians became
a precursor to some Kurdification processes under the Kurdistan Regional
Government, just as the relative silence surrounding Simele allowed the
Iraqi government to continue its suppression of other minorities, including
the Kurds.91
In addition to cultural destruction, it is beyond contestation that thou-
sands of Assyrians lost their lives during the period 1961–91, either physically
or spiritually or mentally (through forced assimilation), and that thousands
more were ethnically cleansed from their ancestral lands. Any assertion and/or
proliferation of Assyrian culture and identity, denied through policies, census
accounts and so forth, was punishable by imprisonment and torture. There
can be few cases of mental harm greater than the denial of one’s existence.
This process of ethnic cleansing, under a guise of integration, was first
used by the British on the highland Assyrians of Hakkâri, who had estab-
lished a cohesive settlement in the region of Diyana, then still under British
dominion. These Assyrians were ‘given orders to move from Di[y]ana’ and
‘moved to the lowlands well south of the Zab’ before the end of the mandate.92
Malik Ismael, the tribal leader of Upper Tiyari, in his response to the news
of the termination of the British mandate and Hakkâri Assyrians’ removal
yet again out of their cohesive settlement in the highlands stated, ‘Now we
have to meet death at long last,’ a reference to a social or identity death – a
death of being Assyrian. Such demographic shifting to unknown regions,
alongside the deliberate infliction of conditions of cultural degradation such
as the elimination of villages, churches, livestock and orchards, provided a
dramatic illustration of British policies.93 Such alterations would eventually
cause many cultural or lifestyle elements of this people, much dependent on
their geography and local environment, to wane. Of course, this was done
only in part, as not all Assyrians were physically eliminated by such policies –
with the exception of Simele, which, according to the data collected, was an
attempt to physically eliminate a portion of Assyrians from Iraq.
Such geopolitical plots assured the appropriation and redefinition of a
nascent Assyrian identity in Iraq by the state (and later internalised), owing in
part to the strength of Arab and Kurdish nationalisms and the relative weak-
ness of Assyrian nationalism. Their weaker political power was/is due not nec-
essarily to the Assyrian people’s unwillingness to absorb ethnic nationalism,
but rather to governmental policies, and the lack of external aid, as discussed
in the preceding chapters. Yet prior to the rise of modern Middle Eastern
nation-states, the Assyrians in diaspora, and even in the remoter regions of
the Ottoman Empire, were able to see and further develop a transnational and
transreligious/ecclesiastical Assyrian identity.94 In that sense, Joseph Yacoub’s
description of the Assyrian predicament as a dynamisme démographique is an
apt designation as it speaks to constant migration which in reality lead to
continuous fluctuation in identity.95
While at first glance they may seem out of place, some of the most
meaningful interpretations of ideas concerning sanctity of place come from
Patrick Curry, a scholar of ecological philosophy. In his conclusion to a book
on Middle-Earth and ecology entitled ‘Hope without Guarantees’, Curry
reminds the reader about the core connection of people to place and its
integral sanctity by alluding to the physical destruction in the wake of the
Bosnian war. He refers to the Old Bridge in Mostar, built in 1566, which
collapsed due to repeated shelling in 1993. Quoting Slavenka Drakulić, he
states, ‘The bridge is us.’96 By extension, such places need not be man made,
but even natural: forests, springs, rivers, mountain ranges etc., and those
non-human animals which dwell there are equally part of the sacredness of
place, which is undeniably linked to the community, ‘its modes of life and
[the] thought of a people who are different from those who carry out this
destructive enterprise’. Such destruction aimed at those elements of life inter-
connected to the human often ‘kills their spirit’.97
Likewise, the initial meeting of Assyrians with ‘the white man’ was
with those Western missionaries who desired to develop a simple language
and culture for the Assyrians in order to facilitate a speedy evangelisation
process. Furthermore, the benefits of what was too lightly termed integra-
tion were vastly overshadowed by the imminent assimilation of a political/
social/economic and numerical minority, which Malik Ismael could see after
a close look at his brethren who had lived for hundreds of years in metro-
politan centres and lost their cultural Assyrianness. Like all ‘progress’, it had
proved a double-edged sword. Demographic shifting and, thus, urbanisa-
tion produced the state and non-state actors’ desired effect on the Assyrians.
As a direct result of urbanisation, attributed to ethnic cleansing campaigns,
Assyrians were indoctrinated into the language, traditions, clothing, lifestyle
and names of Arab Iraq (and in some cases, Kurdish Iraq). The desired result
was accomplished through both direct and indirect Arabisation. It is of note
that more than one million Assyrians resided in northern Iraq prior to the
demographic shifting following 1961, a number that had declined to fewer
than 200,000 by the mid-1990s.98
The Iraqi state and its policies in the twentieth century can be explained
by closely examining the Assyrian minority. The policies directed against
the Assyrians are a microcosm of the larger situation, which affected various
political, cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities. The treatment
of the Assyrians initially by the British colonial government and then by the
new Iraqi government was the litmus test for nation- and state-building and
the international response thereto. The cost of the establishment of Iraq and
the attendant subordination of minorities to a Sunni Arab elite by the British
for strategic purposes guaranteed that the ‘identity chosen for Iraq was unrep-
resentative and exclusionary’.99
Cultural genocide/ethnocide, introduced by Lemkin as an act of vandal-
ism, is essential in examining the consequences of the Arabisation policies
on the Assyrian community in Iraq following the Ba‘th’s rise to power in the
1970s. According to UNESCO’s Declaration of San José, ‘Ethnocide means
that an ethnic group is denied the right to enjoy, develop, and transmit its
own culture and its own language, whether collectively or individually.’100
The declaration further stated, ‘Ethnocide, that is cultural genocide, is a
violation of international law equivalent to genocide.’101 Ethnocide is cre-
ated in a crucible of yearning for hegemonic control first evident in a state’s
push to secure a national identity; this yearning is evidenced by various poli-
cies of assimilation (as opposed to integration) designed to eradicate major
cultural distinctions such as language, dress, folklore, art and music, and by
‘rival claims to sovereignty that arise from first occupation of a territory. Its
goal is the elimination of knowledge of, and attachments to, distinct and
incontinent ways of life.’102 According to Human Rights Watch, the stress of
simply being Assyrian in Iraq forced large numbers of people to effectively
stop or deny being Assyrian for fear of physical or socio-economic retribution
or reprisal:
The teaching of the Assyrian language, even in churches, is forbidden, and

Assyrian Christians who identify themselves as such suffer official discrimi-
nation. However, other Christians and those Assyrians who identify them-
selves as ‘Arab’ seem to face no particular discrimination. In fact, many
Muslim Iraqis consider Christians to be a favored minority under the Ba‘th
regime.103
Such acts are imbedded in deeply rooted predilections that contain an inher-
ent link to each other. Lawrence Davidson lists them as:
Natural localism: People tend to classify or identify themselves in

geographical terms – by their everyday surroundings, and therefore
everyday activities in such a state are natural or normal. (Not
inherently problematic.)
Closed information environments: Because of such identification,
information that locals or inhabitants tap into (apparently even in
the internet age) usually comes from within that same defined region
and is cast and stereotyped based on it.
Thought collectives: And since the information which is filtered into
a specific population is generally closed off from ‘other’ knowledge
or experience networks then particular ways of thinking about
oneself and everyone and everything else becomes a product of an
incomplete and coloured lens.
A natural localism left to its own ignorance in fear or arrogance creates

closed information environments and leads to a restricted body of knowledge
referred to as thought collectives. In this work, one can think of a general
clash between competing localisms that ‘breed cultural paradigms’.104 The
powerful localism of the aggressive (or the predatory identity as argued

by Arjun Appaduri) versus the non-aggressive can be viewed in this work
in many ways including Arab/Assyrian, Kurdish/Assyrian, Iraqi/Assyrian,
Ba‘th/Assyrian among other relationships.105 Thus, this synthetic Iraqi iden-
tity as fostered and disseminated by the state through natural localisms and
enforced upon a multicultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious region
through closed information environments assured the violent nature of its
state formation as a likely consequence of authoritarian, and further, totali-
tarian and rigid thought collectives. It was ‘an imagined political community,
and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’.106 In actuality, this
imagined community also gave hope to non-Muslim religious communities
to become part of a larger secular community that would not discrimi-
nate on the basis of religious adherence. To urban Christians who in many
cases had but their Christianity as a matter of distinctiveness, it permitted
a semblance of equality with their Muslim neighbours in a land they had
inhabited for millennia.
In terms of framing the patterns of destruction, the villages discussed
throughout this study have been those with known historical and cultural
significance.107 Almost 200 Assyrian cultural sites – including ancient
churches and monasteries, schools, shrines and reliefs – were destroyed
between 1960 and 1980 as a result of political manoeuvring by majority
groups, including both state and non-state actors. As with the relatedness of
Simele and Wounded Knee, the scheme of the mujamma‘āt, the collective
towns and processing centres during the Iraqi government’s continuous
campaigns in the north, was not dissimilar ideologically to those created
by the German army (perhaps the first modern idea of a konzentration-
slager, or ‘concentration camp’) when dealing with the Herero people in
Namibia at the beginning of the twentieth century.108 The mujamma‘āt,
however, were probably more in line (treatment-wise) with the internment
camps, also known as ‘war relocation camps’ and ‘assembly centres’, that
the United States and Canadian governments used to detain citizens of
Japanese descent during the Second World War.109 In the cases of both East
and West, thanks to the ideology promoted by the ‘collective camps,’ the
negative stigma and socio-economic ramifications attached to being Kurdish
or Assyrian in Iraq, or Italian, German or Japanese in the United States
and Canada, became a social and economic deterrent that compelled many
people among these ethnic groups to distance themselves from their ethno-
cultural identity.
The specific trend of forced demographic shifting by both state and non-
state actors follows similar trends observed during the Second World War in
the United States. The Iraqi use of wartime powers, which created collective
towns and destroyed entire regions of Assyrian villages, have many well-
documented parallel situations in the United States, which are illustrated
by Executive Order 9066, signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on
19 February 1942, permitting authorised military commanders to designate
military areas within the United States at their discretion, ‘from which any
or all persons may be excluded’.110 Under this order, many US citizens of
German and Italian ancestry were targeted by the military for detainment.
This corresponds directly to the border clearings in Iraq during the 1970s.
Regions in which Assyrian villages predominated were dynamited and bull-
dozed as part of ‘security measures’ to protect the territorial integrity of Iraq
as the United States did with the military zones, again on the coast or border
regions. In the case of the Assyrians, most of the population was removed and
in most instances offered no compensation.
The effort in the United States and Canada was directed toward an
ethnic group within the country perceived as a possible threat by many
political leaders, in all likelihood to disguise a programme of ethnic cleans-
ing. The case of the Assyrians in Iraq followed this pattern as well, and did
further damage by identifying the Assyrians as Kurds (who were seen as
separatists) and rebellious Arabs. Thus, not only were they processed in such
camps, they were denied even their self-identification, something akin to
the experience of First Nations peoples in the United States and Canada.
The Assyrians experienced a social death under the guise of socio-economic
empowerment and integration similar to that of many First Nations peoples
in Canada, through residential schools only recently terminated in 1996.111
Decree 251 of 1972 under Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr depicted a cohesive image
of the country amid growing concerns illustrating the contrary. In actual-
ity, the decree eliminated all private Assyrian schools (including classes in
culture and history) and instruction in Aramaic or Syriac. Such assimilatory
practices disguised as progressive measures share their misfortune with the
treatment of other indigenous communities, such as those of Brazil, where

the ‘Service for the Protection of Indians was actually found to be destroying
them’.112
Ulterior motives, dwelling behind the facade of a cultural decree, are quite
common. The Iraqi regime, like a multitude of others, sometimes circum-
vented scrutiny following physical destruction or the targeting of individuals
(after its military actions early on in and around Simele) by e nacting policies
of acculturation intended to affect the social or spiritual life (identity) of
a community considered troublesome. The Iraqi government’s engagement
in village clearings, including destroying churches, monasteries, schools and
agricultural fields, and seizing livestock – attacking all means of a stable
livelihood – and expelling and resettling Assyrians into urban areas ensured
the forfeiture of the Assyrian way of life.113
Notes
1. Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 27–9.
2. Ibid., 3.
3. Rienhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and
Politics (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1960), 89.
4. It should be noted that while Sunni Arabs are not specifically mentioned
during these periods, they were targeted as part of the Communist Party.
5. In many cases there is little separation between the two.
6. Most Assyrians designate 7 August as a day of commemoration for the fallen.
7. More recent Kurdish political prowess (perhaps based largely on an eco-
nomic boom as well as the cultural and political development made possible
by their geopolitical significance) has remedied much of such past academic
negligence.
8. Elie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version, and Other Middle East Studies
(New York: Praeger, 1970), 3–4, 27–8.
9. The terms ‘imagined’ or ‘unimagined’ are based on Benedict Anderson’s con-
cept of nations/communities/identities being constructed and deconstructed.
In itself the term is not a value judgement. I use the term ‘unimagining’ in
reference to the Assyrians more in the secondary sense of the political attempt
to at first eliminate, then suppress and artificialise, and finally recreate their
identity through forced assimilation policies.
10. This, coupled with the erasure of the accounts of the Assyrian massacres from the
French translation of the ‘Blue Book’ presented to the Paris Peace Conference,
further distorted the historical record (Hannibal Travis, ‘“Native Christians
Massacred”: The Ottoman Genocide of the Assyrians during World War I’,
Genocide Studies and Prevention 1.3 (2006), 331). Furthermore, the original
title of the Blue Book (Papers and Documents on the Treatment of Armenians and
Assyrian Christians by the Turks, 1915–1916, in the Ottoman Empire and North-
West Persia), a ‘compilation of American and European eyewitness testimony
and documentation of the Armenian and Assyrian genocides’, was amended to
The Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915–1916. The record
was only set straight when the 2005 edition edited by Ara Sarafian, which
includes the information on the Assyrians, was republished under the altered
name The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915–16: Documents
Presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon by Viscount Bryce (Uncensored Edition)
(London: Gomidas Institute, 2005). This tension has reverberated in the lit-
erature surrounding the events in Iraq during the decades that followed. For
an excellent basic discussion on the overshadowing of the Assyrians in the First
World War see Samuel Totten and Paul R. Bartrop, A Dictionary of Genocide,
vol. I: A–L (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008), 25–26.
11. For a description of this trend see Idith Zertal, Israel’s Holocaust and the Politics
of Nationhood, tr. Chaya Galai (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
[2002] 2005).
12. See Aryo Makko, ‘The Historical Roots of Contemporary Controversies:
National Revival and the Assyrian “Concept of Unity”’, Journal of Assyrian
Academic Studies 24.1 (2010), 1–29 for a more focused discussion of the inter-
nal issues.
13. See John Joseph, The Modern Assyrians of the Middle East: Encounters
with Western Christian Missions, Archaeologists, and Colonial Powers
(Leiden: Brill, 2000), 157. Joseph, a student of Philip Hitti, was highly influ-
enced by the American Presbyterian schools as well as the American University
of Beirut, a bastion of Arab nationalism: see Betty S. Anderson, The American
University of Beirut: Arab Nationalism and Liberal Education (Austin: University
of Texas Press, 2011), 1–3.
14. Joel E. Werda, The Flickering Light of Asia or The Assyrian Nation and Church
(Joel E. Werda, 1924), 199–202, 205.
15. Malik Yaqo d’Malik Ismael, Aturayé w-tre plashe tībilayé [‘Assyrians and the
Two World Wars’] (Tehran: Assyrian Writers Board, 1964), 223.
16. See Sargon Donabed, ‘Neither Syriac-speaking nor Syrian Orthodox

Christians: (K)Harputli Assyrians in the United States as a Model for Ethnic
Self-Categorization and Expression’, in H. G. B. Teule, E. Keser-Kayaalp,
K. Akalin, N. Doru, N. and M. S. Toprak (eds), Syriac in its Multi-cultural
Context (Leuven: Peeters, forthcoming).
17. Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of
Government, Proposals for Redress (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 1944), 79.
18. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, http://www.
hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html (accessed 21 July 2014).
19. Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (London: Routledge,
2006), 19.
20. Eric Weitz, A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press. 2003), 7.
21. Ibid., 37.
22. Arjun Appadurai, Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 3.
23. George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National
Movement (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1939), 365. Despite this com-
ment, Antonius did condemn the actual violence. See also Special Report by
His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Progress of Iraq During the
Period 1920–1931, CO 58 (London, 1931), 266.
24. This is fascinating for a variety of reasons including that the Iraqi state and ele-
ments of it such as the royal family and the military were in and of themselves
‘vestiges of European power’. Similarly the evidence corroborates the assertion
that the Assyrians were neither a physical nor existential threat to Iraq with one
feasible exception: their existence as Assyrians on ancestral lands and possible
future claims.
25. Sāt.i‘ al-H.us.rī, ‘‘Al-Khidma al-‘Askariyya w-‘l-Tarbiya al-‘Amma’, speech
delivered in Baghdad in 1934, in Mudhakkirātī fi al-Iraq (Beirut: Dar al-
Taliah, 1967–8), vol. 2, 312–13, quoted in Phebe Marr, ‘The Development of
a Nationalist Ideology in Iraq 1920–1941’, Muslim World 75.2 (1985), 91.
26. Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy, 7.
27. See Sami Zubaida, ‘Contested Nations: Iraq and the Assyrians’, Nations and
Nationalism 6.3 (2000), 370. Though some local Arabs and Kurds continued
looting villages and killing Assyrians in the region, to assume that this was not
at the urging or in the least, under the watchful eye of the army and the govern-
ment would be insincere.
28. Jones, Genocide, 352.
29. Recall here Elias Haroon Bazi’s observation that young Assyrian men were
dressed and presented as young women to protect them from the campaign.
30. Richard Kleiner, ‘Lemkin’s 35-year crusade against genocide reaches successful
end’, La Crosse Tribune, La Crosse, WI, 22 September 1949.
1935), 162.
32. Ibid., 154.
33. Mark K. Tomass, ‘Religious Identity, Informal Institutions, and the
Nation-states of the Near East’, Journal of Economic Issues 46.3 (2012),

719. Tomass provides the most intricate discussion of identity-sharing and
resource-sharing groups. See also Sargon George Donabed and Shamiran
Mako, ‘Ethno-cultural and Religious Identity of Syrian Orthodox Christians’,
Chronos 19 (2009).
34. A portion of this section was originally presented in Sargon George Donabed,
‘Rethinking Nationalism and an Appellative Conundrum: Historiography and
Politics in Iraq’, National Identities 14.4 (2012), 407–31.
35. Gerald de Gaury, Three Kings in Baghdad: The Tragedy of Iraq’s Monarchy
(London: I. B. Tauris, [1961] 2008), 89.
36. Hirmis Aboona, Assyrians, Kurds, and Ottomans: Intercommunal Relations on
the Periphery of the Ottoman Empire (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2008), 279.
37. Paul Knabenshue, US ambassador to Iraq, to Secretary of State, ‘Christian
Religious Heads and Assyrian Massacres’ (no. 167), 23 August 1933,
890g.4016 Assyrians/84
38. Donabed and Mako, ‘Ethno-Cultural and Religious Identity of Syrian
Orthodox Christians’, 108.
39. Vahram Petrosian, ‘Assyrians in Iraq’, Iran and the Caucasus 10.1 (2006), 125.
40. Tomass, ‘Religious Identity, Informal Institutions, and the Nation-states of the
Near East’, 718.
41. Donabed and Mako, ‘Ethno-cultural and Religious Identity of Syrian Orthodox
Christians’, 78, 106–7.
42. See ibid., 78–9; Aprim Shapera, ‘A great message from a great Assyrian
man’, Zinda, 12 August 2002, http://www.zindamagazine.com/html/
archives/2002/8.12.02/index.php (accessed 21 July 2014).
43. Al-Dalīl al-‘Irāqī [‘The Official Directory of Iraq’] (Baghdad, 1936).
44. I am reminded of the explanation of all the events that had befallen Tanis
Half-Elven and his companions given by the god/wizard Paladine/Fizban: ‘I set
the stage, lad. I didn’t give you a script. The dialogue has been all yours.’ See
Margaret Weis and Tracy Hickman, Dragonlance Chronicles, vol. 3: Dragons of
Spring Dawning (Lake Geneva, WI: TSR, [1985] 1994), 372.
45. This is seen most clearly outside the Middle East or at the very least outside the
capitals and centres of conflicting nationalisms.
46. Paulos Bedari, ‘Lamentation on the Simele Massacre’, Nineveh 36.3–4 (2012).
In the 1960s Bedari was an advocate for the anti-government leanings of
Assyrian, Communist and Kurdish groups in the north of Iraq. See Gabriele
Yonan, Assyrer heute (Hamburg: Gesellschaft für Bedrohte Völker, 1978), 99.
Interestingly, he was one of two Chaldean priests, along with Father Akhikar,
who were known to be pro-Mar Shimun before the events of Simele and con-
sidered to be undesirable Assyrians (secret memorandum, serial no. 125 from
Special Service Officer, Mosul, to Air Staff (Intelligence), Air Headquarters, 5
August 1933, AIR 23/655).
47. Douglas V. Duff, Poor Knight’s Saddle (London: Herbert Jenkins, 1938), 150.
48. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1999), 225–35.
49. Patrick Rothfuss, The Name of the Wind (New York: DAW, 2007), 716.
50. See Iraq Times, 29 August 1933. Khaldun Husry remarks that the Assyrians
mutilated the bodies of Iraqi soldiers in Deirabun. In the following sentence
he contradicts this statement with a quote from R. S. Stafford, who admitted
freely that such accusations ‘may or may not have been true’ (Khaldun S.
Husry, ‘The Assyrian Affair of 1933 (I)’, International Journal of Middle East
Studies 5.2 (1974), 176).
51. Article 49, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War of 12 August 1949, http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/
publications/icrc-002-0173.pdf (accessed 22 July 2014).
52. Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, September 2009, http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/
Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf (accessed 22 July 2014); Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, July 1998, http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/
RomeStatutEng1.pdf (accessed 22 July 2014).
53. Drazen Petrovic, ‘Ethnic Cleansing: An Attempt at Methodology’, European
Journal of International Law 5.4 (1998), 2–3.
54. Ilan Pappé, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (Oxford: Oneworld, 2007), 7.
55. Ibid., 151.
57. Ibid., 155. See also secret report by Major C. J. Edmonds, Ministry of the
Interior, Baghdad to Mr G. A. D. Ogilvie-Forbes, British embassy, Baghdad,
24 August 1933, AIR 23/656.
Assyrians/110.
59. Daniel Silverfarb, Britain’s Informal Empire in the Middle East: A Case Study of
Iraq 1929–1941 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 42.
60. ‘Statement Made by Miryam, Wife of David Jindo, a Corporal in the Iraq
Nations’, League of Nations Official Journal 14 (1933), 1826.
61. Ibid. The evidence for this is abundant. See Carol Prunhuber, The Passion and
Death of Rahman the Kurd: Dreaming Kurdistan (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse,
2009), 141, 143, 146. The focus of the work is Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou,
a Kurdish nationalist with an Assyrian mother who was forcibly converted
to Islam (see pages 136 and 141), and took on a new name. Ghassemlou is a
prime example of what happens to succeeding generations in most intermar-
riages between Muslim Kurds and Christian Assyrians.
62. Prosecutor vs Krstić, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, case no. IT-98-
33, 19 April 2004, para. 33, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/acjug/en/
krs-aj040419e.pdf (accessed 22 July 2014).
63. Raphael Lemkin Collection, box 9, folder 2, Armenians and Assyrians,
undated, The Assyrian Case, notecards 40, 44, 45.
64. Zoë Preston, The Crystallization of the Iraqi State: Geopolitical Function and
Form (Bern: Peter Lang, 2003), 251.
65. The Simele massacres bear an uncanny resemblance to the massacre at Wounded
Knee Creek, South Dakota, in December 1890, when more than 300 Lakota
men, women and children were killed by the United States 7th Cavalry in
the midst of the ‘taming of the West’, yet another act of homogenisation and
consolidation.
66. Fu’ād Mat.ar, Saddam Hussein: A Biographical and Ideological
Account of His Leadership Style and Crisis Management (London: Highlight,
1990), 235.
67. The trend of Arabisation is perhaps succinctly illuminated by the Middle

Eastern historian Hanna Batatu in his descriptions of nationality (‘nation’),
based on the various data tables throughout his exhaustive study on Iraq.
The case of Iraqi Jews is difficult as the community outside northern Iraq was
predominantly Arabised. See Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the
Revolutionary Movements in Iraq (London: Saqi, [1978] 2004), 258. Batatu
refers to the Jews in the entirety of Iraq. Most Aramaic-speaking members
of the Jewish religious community living in the northern regions intermar-
ried regularly with Christians and had mostly identical language, customs and
traditions to those other Assyrians of the region.
68. Reeva Spector Simon, Iraq between the Two World Wars: The Militarist Origins
of Tyranny (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 160.
69. Law no. 57 of 1959, Weekly Gazette of the Republic of Iraq (November 1959),
900. Fascinatingly the reference to ‘before Christ’ leads one to assume there
would be a reference to Iraqi Christians and their link to ancient Mesopotamia
but there is not.
70. Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 365; Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a
Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1998), 267. This is also true of Winston Churchill’s
conception of the Kurds when he stated in 1919, ‘I am strongly in favour of
using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes,’ something he desired to do once
again against the Germans in 1944.
71. For earlier occurrences of this see Dina Rizk Khoury, State and Provincial
Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul 1540–1834 (Cambridge: Cambridge
72. Amatzia Baram, Culture, History, and Ideology in the Formation of Ba‘thist Iraq
1968–89 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), 28.
73. Joseph Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Ba‘th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 9.
74. Youssef M. Choueiri, Arab Nationalism: A History – Nation and State in the
Arab World (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 25.
75. Phebe Marr, ‘The Development of a Nationalist Ideology in Iraq’, 90–1.
76. Barbara Chiarello, ‘Deflected Missives: Zitkala-Ša’s Resistance and Its (Un)
Containment’, Studies in American Indian Literatures 17.3 (2005), 9, based
on Aberdeen Saturday Pioneer, 3 January 1891. See also Reneau H. Reneau,
Misanthropology: A Florilegium of Bahumbuggery (Inglewood, CA: Donlázaro
Translations, 2003), 161.
77. Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy, 4.

78. This is the most medals ever awarded in a single US military action. See Scott
L. Pratt, ‘Wounded Knee and the Prospect of Pluralism’, Journal of Speculative
Philosophy 19.2 (2005), 153.
79. See Husry, ‘The Assyrian Affair of 1933 (I),’ 168.
80. Francis Paul Prucha, ‘Wounded Knee through the Lens of Colonialism’,
Diplomatic History 29.4 (2005), 727. This article is a review of Jeffrey Ostler’s
The Plains Sioux and US Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). The ghost dance was a spir-
itual belief based on the prophetic vision of a Paiute elder Wovoka, which con-
tested that the white man would soon be removed from the land and it would
be given back to the native peoples. The idea gained strong backing among the
Lakota in the late 1800s. For more information see Pratt, ‘Wounded Knee and
the Prospect of Pluralism’, 151.
81. Jeffrey Ostler, The Plains Sioux and US Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to
Wounded Knee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 287–8.
82. Some scholars have pointed out to critics of Baum that they should remember
the intrinsic sarcasm and mockery in much of his writing.
83. Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 218. Also quoted in Chiarello,
‘Deflected Missives’, 10.
84. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, 79.
85. Appadurai, Fear of Small Numbers, 88–9.
86. Ibid., 56.
87. Heather Rae, State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 14 (original emphasis).
88. ‘Regulation No. 30 for the Year 1978 Primary Schools’, Alwaqai Aliraqiya: The
Official Gazette of the Republic of Iraq, 1 September 1980, p. 4.
89. Rothfuss, The Name of the Wind, 716.
90. Summary Record of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide,
UN ESCOR, Doc. E/AC.25/SR.14 (1948), 13.
91. See ‘Northern Iraq Human Rights Field Mission’, Iraq Sustainable
Democracy Project, 2006, www.iraqdemocracyproject.org/pdf/Northern%20
Iraq%20Human%20Rights%20Field%20Mission.pdf (accessed 16 July
2014)
new ed. (London: Faber & Faber, 1958), 217.
93. Article 2(c), Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide.
94. This refers back to the late 1800s in places of relative freedom, from Harput,
Urmia and Tbilisi to the United States.
95. Joseph Yacoub, Les Minorités dans le monde: faits et analyses (Paris: Desclée de
Brouwer, 1998), 691.
96. Patrick Curry, Defending Middle-Earth: Tolkien, Myth and Modernity (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 2004), 144.
97. Mario Sáenz, The Identity of Liberation in Latin American Thought: Latin
American Historicism and the Phenomenology of Leopoldo Zea (Lanham, MD:
Lexington, 1999), 18. See also Pierre Clastres, Society against the State: Essays in
Political Anthropology, tr. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone, 1988), 52.
98. Joseph Yacoub, Les Minorités: quelle protection? (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer,
1995), 241.
99. Preston, The Crystallization of the Iraqi State, 252.
100. ‘Unesco and the Struggle against Ethnocide’, Declaration of San José,
December 1981, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0004/000499/049951eo.
pdf (accessed 22 July 2014). It was first codified in Article 7 of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Draft Declaration on Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (1994). Following the adoption of the declaration in 2006,
the act was reworded to indirectly characterise it as part and parcel of genocide.
101. ‘Unesco and the Struggle against Ethnocide’.
102. Ronald Niezen, The Origins of Indigenism: Human Rights and the Politics of
Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 5, 55.
103. Middle East Watch, Human Rights in Iraq (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1990), 35.
104. Lawrence Davidson, Cultural Genocide (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
105. This can also be seen within the Assyrian peoples and could be structured in
terms of ecclesiastical or sectarian partitions.
106. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread
of Nationalism, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 1991), 6.
107. The coverage in this study is by no means exhaustive and future work must be
undertaken in Iraq including forensic research and a proper oral history of the
Assyrians.
108. Jones, Genocide, 81.
109. For the case of Canada see Franca Iacovetta, Roberto Perin and Angelo
Principe (eds), Enemies Within: Italian and Other Internees in Canada and
Abroad (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 11.
110. ‘Brief Overview of the World War II Enemy Alien Control Program’, National
Archives website (USA), http://www.archives.gov/research/immigration/
enemy-aliens-overview.html (accessed 22 July 2014)
111. ‘Residential schools apology too late, say survivors’, CBC Online, 11 June 2008,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/prince-edward-island/residential-schools-apo
logy-too-late-say-survivors-1.719268 (accessed 22 July 2014).
112. Vernon Van Dyke, Human Rights, Ethnicity, and Discrimination (Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), 81.
113. One way to counteract the inattention to the Assyrians in the vacuum cre-
ated by the political focus on the modern nation-state is to characterise and
group them as a transnational indigenous people. See Timo Koivurova, ‘Can
Saami Transnational Indigenous Peoples Exercise Their Self-determination in
a World of Sovereign States?’, in Nigel Bankes and Timo Koivurova (eds), The
Proposed Nordic Saami Convention: National and International Dimensions of
Indigenous Property Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2013).
8
Conclusion
As long as there are slaughterhouses, there will be battlefields.

Leo Tolstoy
We recall our terrible past so that we can deal with it, to forgive where
forgiveness is necessary, without forgetting; to ensure that never again will
such inhumanity tear us apart.
Nelson Mandela
No one is born hating another person because of the colour of his skin or
his background or his religion. People must learn to hate, and if they can
learn to hate, they can be taught to love, for love comes more naturally to
the human heart than its opposite.
Nelson Mandela
U ltimately, by highlighting the history of the Assyrians in twentieth-cen-

tury Iraq, this work hopes to create a model that can be used for analyses
of minorities across the region, where violence to marginalised communities is
aleviated by their inclusion in mainstream history. This creation, if successful,
was accomplished by demonstrating the importance of minorities to generally
accepted ‘major’ events, which in turn was achieved through the application of
(and in turn substantiated by) an inclusive paradigm where all experiences are
vital to and exist in symbiosis with all others in order to illuminate a reality (or
past) which is both holistic and intrinsically boundless and unknowable in its
entirety (panenhistoricism). This essential interdependence thereby safeguards
those experiences on the margins (i.e. the Assyrians and others) against sub-
sumption (subordinating narrativisation) by the mainstream (‘Iraqi history’)
through policies of acculturation tied to the destruction of place and ways of
life, the building blocks of identity and community.
This work simultaneously serves as an alternative narrative about Iraq in

the twentieth century as well as an Assyrian history of the region. It has looked
outside the prism of the state and attempted to use the Assyrian situation to
present another view of the historical events – a retelling of how and why they
occurred, and why such issues, from a minority perspective, are essential to a
panenhistorical reality or paradigm. It is a duty of scholarship to examine the
story left untold. Unfortunately many still appear to adhere to the sometimes-
subconscious view that ‘at best, history is a story of power, a history of those
who won’.1 There is the need for a shift in how we view reality and meaning
that would allow history to be seen as an ever-expanding puzzle with each
piece or narrative a distinct manifestation of historical truth vital to its totality.
Otherwise, the quandary of the inadequate material or lacunae concerning the
Assyrians in academia is simply dismissed as a scarcity of scholarly interest or
feigned ambivalence, likely manipulated by the political ambitions for author-
ity and supremacy in the modern nation-state, both Eastern and Western. This
includes the fears of powerful Western states to tackle the problem of crimes
against humanity (and perhaps broaden it to crimes against life) and the viola-
tions of minorities and indigenous peoples’ rights, which would in turn force
them to face their own gross human rights violations against minorities and
indigenous populations. I refer here to 1988, and the nearly forty years that it
took the United States to ratify the Genocide Convention bill.2 And still the
majority continues to steamroll the opposition in the name of progress.
More broadly this further reflects the reluctance of Western states to con-
front how authoritarian and totalitarian states in the Middle East treated their
own citizens in exchange for maintaining geostrategic interests in the region,
from the Anglo-Iraqi Agreement for oil through the neglect of and possible
British military succour in the massacre at Simele in 1933 to the blatant dis-
regard of the Shia uprisings in 1991. This setback has further contributed to
the lack of scholarly and political influence held by the Assyrians, which is a
matter embedded in a process of marginalisation beginning with both Eastern
and Western scholarship and political powers at the start of the 1900s. In
most cases, scholarship was (and is) embedded in the political ambitions and
processes of states. The same can be said for the Assyrian predicament in Iraq
in the twentieth century – a long tale that requires greater examination from
various perspectives.
conclusi on | 265
Moreover, the onus placed on marginalised groups in the Middle East

to research and write their own history in order to be heard is a scapegoat
for poor inquiry, abject neglect or both. It is a case of laying the burden for
animals sent to slaughter at their own feet – by virtue of their agreeable taste
they are regrettably doomed to become a meal for the higher species.3 It
becomes a detached commodification and commoditisation of life. In choos-
ing and attributing value based on larger groups’ assessment of the worth
of those considered lesser – be they plant, animal, human, land, water, air,
metal – all things become relegated to mere ‘resources.’ It is intriguing that
such unvoiced ideology is as rampant in the constructivist approach as in the
objectivist/positivist one. At core both have a normative claim that inevitably
sidelines select communities or individuals. What is more perplexing is the
fact that the way to circumvent the issue for the post-modernist scholar and
their paradigms is sometimes more damaging as in order to refrain from
nullifying their ontological worldview, they deconstruct minority communi-
ties and unauthenticate them as such, providing themselves an escape clause
from their ethical responsibility to the truth of existence and substantiation
of meaning.
Since pursuit of the academy was and still is to a large extent an elit-
ist endeavour embedded in the politics of nation-states, indigenous peo-
ples and minorities have traditionally lacked the means by which to
approach the echelons of academic authority. The entire system remains a
hegemonic institutional framework, is far from apolitical, and gives prior-
ity to certain dominant methods. Thus, people’s histories and self-histories
unquestionably must occur in greater magnitude as these numerically and
politically marginal groups will always bear the brunt of the burden and
responsibility for improving their present predicament. Over time, the
powerful grow more a uthoritative and those others less so. Others become
a roadblock to ‘progress’, a speed bump on the path to ‘development’ and
greater dominance. Desire for power and the illusion of control and indeed
arrogance of more significance, rooted in a learned idea or behaviour, are the
culprits of this global pandemic of violence against communities, places and
the land itself. Furthermore, rationalising criminal or malevolent acts does
not somehow make them virtuous and employing an extenuous vocabulary
does not make one objective. Neither does hiding behind perceived neutral
terms like ‘archives’ and ‘institutions’, which are essentially state apparatus
for telling its own version of history, and what it views as culture.
This is also a reflection on the interconnectivity of people and place.
Demographic displacement and dispossession are precursors to disconnec-
tion and hopelessness, which in turn distance people, in this case Assyrians,
from writing their own history, their own struggles. In the absence of politi-
cal, economic or social influence minorities and indigenous cultures rely
on various means of cultural resistance. Yet, without constant vigilance and
compassion outside commodities and resources, it may be, as the Lakota
ghost dancers came to comprehend, that ‘in the end, songs and dancers were
no match for dollars and guns’.4 Accordingly it should be the enduring role
of the academy to engage in unknown/marginal histories while realising that
those who take such steps may expose themselves to contempt and short
careers. In the words of Edward Said:
This role has an edge to it, and cannot be played without a sense of being
someone whose place it is publicly to raise embarrassing questions, to con-
front orthodoxy and dogma (rather than produce them), to be someone
who cannot easily be co-opted by governments or corporations, and whose
raison d’être is to represent all those people and issues that are routinely
forgotten or swept under the rug.5
Any event or act or thought can be justified – heinous and delightful are often
a matter of perspective – and feigning or assuming to be above perspective
is in and of itself grounded in perspective. Research on recent Iraqi state
formation is incomplete without a close examination of the significance of
the Assyrian case as both equal to and a catalyst for continued treatment of
those communities on the margins of history. To weave a historical narrative
devoid of an authentic appreciation for place is inadequate. Time and place
are inextricably interconnected: Assyrian villages and homes in Iraq as much
as the place of Assyrians in modern discourse on Iraq and the Middle East.
Furthermore, homogenisation, both overt and subtle, whether by national-
ist ideology or uncritically accepted American exceptionalism etc. codified
in museums and education systems and reinforced by mass media, or by
academic studies which intentionally or unintentionally unimagine or mar-
ginalise what are deemed societies and individuals of lesser significance,
conclusi on | 267
rob us of visible and invisible things which have meaning to us, they
devalue our longitudinal wisdom and erase the fragments from which to
piece together the stories of nature and history through which our human-
ity is fed. They stunt our sensibilities and starve our imagination.6
In summation, demonising peoples, cultures etc. is not the refrain of this

work. Rather reforging or reshaping history is. Furthermore, policies of
marginalisation, both violent and (seemingly) non-violent, are embedded
in a more basic unethical ambition for power, while the attainment of that
absolute control creates the paranoid fear of losing it to others, especially
those considered of lesser significance to the matter, be it trivial or ultimate.
As Patrick Curry notes:
The precise nature of that power – whether primarily economic, religious,
political, or whatever mixture of these – is entirely secondary to its intended
monism, universalism and homogeneity. The effects of such an enterprise,
regardless of the intentions of those who carry it out, are necessarily evil.7
A return to Tolstoy’s remark above reminds us that it is only after a further

look at this learned desire for control, based in fear, arrogance and lack of
reverence, that humanity may glimpse one of its fundamental flaws and
remedy it. While it may be an unpopular position in society, it must be
pursued. There is the need for a shift in how humans view reality, truth and
meaning. For if such adverse thoughts or behaviours, learned or instinc-
tual, whether by states or individuals, are inherent to knowledge lacking
wisdom, power lacking mercy and humility, then there is a solution: they
can be unlearned by people reimagining or reforging the fragments of
knowledge into wisdom. As Nelson Mandela movingly intoned, people
‘can be taught love, for love comes more naturally to the human heart’.
Insight is born of accepting an ever-growing and changing portrait of real-
ity, inclusive and interdependent, with each and every hue and thread (and
story and experience) essential to the grand tapestry. And wisdom appears
when finally it is acknowledged that this tapestry (or as much of it as can
be seen and experienced) is constrained only by the fact that it is a shadow,
a lesser reflection of that entity which it has aimed to capture – and yet
the reflection, the shadow, the individual stories have meaning in and
of themselves as they have the power to remind us of the unfathomable
whole which they represent. One might ask, ‘But where can one find
them?’
You find them where I found them, and they will be there forever, the race
of man, the part of man, of Assyria as much as of England, that cannot be
destroyed, the part that massacre does not destroy, the part that earthquake
and war and famine and madness and everything else cannot destroy.
This work is in tribute . . . to the race of man everywhere, to the dignity of
that race, the brotherhood of things alive . . . I am thinking of seventy thou-
sand Assyrians, one at a time, alive, a great race. I am thinking of Theodore
Badal, himself seventy thousand Assyrians and seventy million Assyrians,
himself Assyria, and man, standing in a barber shop, in San Francisco, in
1933, and being, still, himself, the whole race.8
Notes
1. Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1997), 5.
2. See ‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:
Declarations and Reservations’, United Nations Treaty Collection, website,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=
4&lang=en#EndDec (accessed 23 July 2014). The signing came with condi-
tions. Reservation one essentially stipulates that no party can bring charges
against the United States in an international court without its agreement.
3. In this case, the superior human community, culture or people.
4. Elaine Eastman, ‘The Ghost Dance War’, in Stephen Duncombe (ed.), Cultural
Resistance: A Reader (London: Verso, 2002), 194.
5. Edward Said, Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures
(London: Vintage, 1994), 9, as quoted in Giles Mohan and Gordon Wilson,
‘The Antagonistic Relevance of Development Studies’, Progress in Development
Studies 5.4 (2005), 264. Mohan and Wilson translate as ‘Said urges intellectuals
to retain their amateur status. That is, to maintain a critical distance from the
largely statist agendas of the research funders.’
6. Sue Clifford and Angela King, ‘Losing Your Place’, in Local Distinctiveness: Place,
Particularity and Identity, quoted in Patrick Curry, Defending Middle-Earth:
Tolkien, Myth and Modernity (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004), 145.
7. Curry, Defending Middle-Earth, 146.
8. William Saroyan, ‘Seventy Thousand Assyrians’ (1934).
Glossary
Chaldeans – An ecclesiastical sect of the Assyrian people. Former Nestorians (or

members of the Church of the East) who first began converting to Catholicism
in 1553. ‘Chaldean’ was synonymous with ‘Catholic’
Chatta (Turkish ‘militia’, also ‘robber’ or ‘thief’) – Term used by Kurds and Assyrians
living in northern Iraq to refer to the pro-government Kurdish irregulars
Fursan (Arabic mounted ‘knights’) – Term used by the regime to refer to the chatta
(see above), dubbing them fursan Salahadin, or the ‘knights of Saladin’
Gippa (Assyrian) – Cave, grotto
Jacobites – An ecclesiastical sect of the Assyrian people. Also known as members of
the Syrian/Syriac Orthodox Church Orthodox Church and its offshoot, the
Syrian/Syriac Catholic Church
Jah.sh (Arabic ‘foal/young donkey’) = chatta
Mar (Assyrian) – Saint (m)
Mart (Assyrian) – Saint (f)
Nas.ara (Arabic) – Literally ‘Nazarene’ or more simply ‘Christian’. Many villages in
northern Iraq are in fact split between Assyrian and Kurdish inhabitants. They
are sometimes designated as nas.ara (Christian Assyrian) and islami (Muslim
Kurdish). The term gained notoriety in the summer of 2014 as the Arabic letter
N was spray-painted by the Islamic State on the houses of Christians in Mosul
Nestorians – An ecclesiastical sect of the Assyrian people. Also known as members of
the Church of the East/East Syrian Church/Assyrian Church of the East and the
Ancient Church of the East
Pêşmerge (Kurdish) – ‘Those who face death’. A term for the fighters in resistance
against the Iraqi regime
Qasha (Assyrian) – Priest
Shamasha (Assyrian) – Deacon
Sūrayt/Sūreth – Assyrian-Aramaic; the language spoken by the Assyrians today.

Sometimes called Modern Assyrian Neo-Aramaic, Neo-Syriac, Modern Aramaic
Yezidis – A distinct ethno-religious community native to Jebel Sinjar in northern
Iraq and extending into southeastern Turkey with ties to Assyro-Mesopotamian
heritage through their religious beliefs, which include the seven greater angels
who were placed in charge of the earth by a divine being. The greatest of this
order of angels is known as Tawuse Melek and referred to in English frequently
as the Peacock Angel
Names
Adde – Thaddeus
Aprim – Ephraim
Gewargis – George
Luqa – Luke
Mari – Bartholomew
Maryam – Mary
Mattai – Matthew
Oraha (Auraha, Awraha) – Abraham
Quryaqos – Cyriacus
Yawsep – Joseph
Yonan – Jonah
Youh.annan/Youkhanna – John
Appendix A: Village Data1
Description of Villages Affected in the 1960s by Region
The following data illustrates the Assyrian villages affected by the autonomist
uprising of 1961–3, including notes on material and cultural significance,
and population statistics where known and applicable. Numbers of families
or persons reflect the native numbers in all cases (unless otherwise noted),
sometimes distinguishing between Nestorian/Assyrian Church of the East
and Chaldean/Catholic when known. The villages and towns affected are
listed below by province and district.2
Arbil Province3
Harīr District
Batase
The sister village of Harīr, Batase (sometimes Batas), located in the district
of the same name, was home to followers of Mar Shimun, mostly from the
Nochiya region, who fled there following the First World War. In 1938,
there were fifty-three families (303 persons), along with a variety of livestock
and agricultural equipment: 172 goats, 147 sheep, 85 oxen, 33 donkeys, 9
mules, 8 buffalo and 16 ploughs.4 Prior to its destruction, there were thirty
Assyrian households in Batase, with the ancient church of Mar Stephanos
as their religious centre. Though not built by its then resident Assyrians, the
old Church of the East edifice is testament to previous Assyrian presence
in the region. The villagers were attacked and forced out in 1963 by pro-
government Kurdish forces, who then resettled the area.5 Many fled to the
major cities or Iran during this time, but none returned.
Figure 19 Key to the Dominican map of Father Josephe Omez translated into
English. The legend displays Christian ecclesiastical communities in north Iraq.
Omez’s work recorded predominantly Chaldean and Nestorian villages, which are
the primary focus of this study. While not based on population, it is unclear why he
chose the order of ecclesiastical designations in the key
appendi x a | 273
Figure 20 Omez’s map showing northwestern Iraq – Dohuk, Simele and Zakho
Darbandoke
Most of the Christian inhabitants of Darbandoke or Derbandok (‘enclosed
place’ in Kurdish) are of the Nochiya tribe, though Assyrians of other regions
dwelled there as well, alongside a Kurdish population. The village is the birth-
place of the Patriarch of the Assyrian Church of the East, Mar Dinkha IV,
born in September 1935. It is also the birthplace of Emanuel Kamber PhD,
physicist and former secretary general of the Assyrian Universal Alliance
(AUA). In 1938, fifteen families totalling 108 people lived in the village,
Figure 21 Omez’s map showing the Barwari Bala, Sapna/Sarsang, Nerwa/Rekan and ‘Aqra/Nahla subdistricts
Figure 22 Omez’s map showing the Mosul region
along with a variety of livestock (and other animals) and agricultural tools,
including 100 sheep, 60 goats, 10 oxen, 5 horses and 5 ploughs.6 According
to most interviewees, the majority of Assyrians lived in relative peace in the
region prior to the uprising in the early 1960s. In 1963, the entire village’s
population, approximately fifteen households, either fled, never to return, or
was killed. Of those killed, five names are known: Shamoun, Hajji, Qusha,
Yoab and Iktu, who was killed in a government air raid.7 The church of Mar
Quryaqos was annihilated at the same time. The Assyrian quarter of the vil-
lage was resettled by pro-government Kurds.8
Diyana
Diyana (or Diana) was built by levy officers and their families under the
British administration. According to League of Nations statistics, the village
held 126 families (totalling 569 persons), along with 298 goats, 59 sheep and
20 ploughs.9 Prior to its destruction in 1963, Diyana contained more than
125 Assyrian households and the following churches: Mar Quryaqos, two
churches sacred to Mar Gewargis, and two older churches, Mart Maryam
and Mar Stephanos.10 Its population fled in 1963 while air and ground forces
attacked the region. Though some natives returned, their homecoming was
short lived, as the village was attacked again in 1974, whereupon its remain-
ing Assyrians inhabitants fled a second time.11
Hanare
Hanare (also Henare, Hanara) was home to twenty-two families (136 per-
sons) in 1938, along with a significant amount of livestock.12 It contained
twelve households prior to its destruction in 1963. The village and its inhab-
itants encountered the same fate as those of Batase, Darbandoke, Diyana,
Harīr and Kalate.13
Harīr
Harīr village was rebuilt by Nestorian-rite from Hakkâri following the
First World War. Included in the building process was the church of Mar
Yohanna. In 1938, Harīr had seventy-eight families (485 persons), twenty
manual ploughs and a large amount of livestock, including 672 goats, 374
sheep, 80 oxen, 12 horses, 6 buffalo, 6 mules and 2 donkeys.14 Prior to its
appendi x a | 277
destruction in 1963, the total number of Assyrian households numbered

above ninety.15 Little else is known of the village, although according to a
report from the Kurdish Center for Human Rights, on 18 February 2006 the
Kurdistan Regional Government’s Minister of Human Rights discussed the
uncovering of a mass grave in which some thirty-seven bodies were identified
as Assyrians originally from Harīr.16
Kalate
The village of Kalate (sometimes Qalana Soran in League of Nations reports)
was reported to have been home to ten Assyrian families (eighty-four persons),
along with 200 sheep, 106 goats, 10 oxen and 2 mules in 1938.17 The village
was attacked in 1963 by pro-government Kurdish forces and its Assyrian
inhabitants were forced to flee during the infighting. None returned, and
their homes were confiscated and resettled by pro-government militia.18 No
major cultural or religious structures are mentioned with respect to Kalate.
Rowanduz District
Hawdian
Hawdian (also Howdian, Havdian) is famous for its immediate proxim-
ity to≈the Shanidar Cave in northeastern Iraq. In 1938, twelve Assyrian
families (ninety persons) resided in the village, along with 105 goats and
25 head of cattle.19 Between 1957 and 1961, Ralph Solecki and a team
from Columbia University excavated the site, unearthing the first adult
Neanderthal skeletons in Iraq; the remains were dated to between 80,000
and 60,000 years bp. Also referred to as Zawi Chemi Shanidar, or to
Assyrians as Gippa d’Hawdian (the Cave of Hawdian), the cave was men-
tioned extensively by the British road engineer A. M. Hamilton in the early
1930s. Hamilton questioned, Yaqo Ismael, about what he knew of the cave’s
history:
You have heard little of what is said to be in the Baradost cave, sir, but
evidently you have not heard of the mill that grinds flour for ever and
never stops, yet with no man or woman to feed it; you have not heard of
the fire that burns eternally, nor of the secret vault that holds the treasure
of the ancient kings of Assyria, looted from enemies when ours was the
mightiest nation on earth, thousands of years ago, when men in Europe

and in England were mere savages in the forests. I am a descendant of those
ancient kings! The remnant of our nation that survived the war is now wan-
dering homeless in Iraq. Some of us serve you as British soldiers. Yet once
all these lands were ours, as the carvings at Batas, at Amadiyah and Nineveh
must prove to you.20
Of the findings from the excavations, the various ‘Christian ware’ ceramics,
along with a metal medallion from Constantinople dated ad 500 and a shal-
low stone-cut pool carved (most probably) by monks, speak to the history of
a continuous Christian settlement. The name Shanidar may partially reflect
the Assyrian-Aramaic term deyra (‘monastery’), which would lend further
evidence to the site as an Assyrian Christian settlement.21 The church of Mar
Oraha (Abraham) of the Church of the East was destroyed in 1963, along
with the rest of the village and its twenty households, by pro-government
militia.22
Dohuk Province
‘Amēdīyāh District
‘Amēdīyāh
The town, now city, of ‘Amēdīyāh is located east of the Barwari mountain
range, roughly 50 miles north of Mosul. The Encyclopedia Judaica reports
approximately 1,800 Jewish inhabitants as late as the 1930s.23 In 1835–6,
Syriac sources tell the tale of the besieging of ‘Amēdīyāh for seven years by
a Kurdish chief, Mira Kora.24 There were three Catholic families reported
in 1850.25 There once existed an old church dedicated to Mar Yozadek,
an Assyrian Christian saint, though until recently it remained in ruins.26
The city’s Dominican convent was destroyed and rebuilt more than once.27
‘Amēdīyāh is generally referred to as the site of the beginning of the Kurdish
autonomist struggle. Here, the Barzanis fought the Iraqi army, supported
by the Zebari, Surchi, Bradost and Herki Kurdish tribes.28 Though some
Assyrians fought alongside Kurdish guerrillas in Barwar – including the first
casualty in the struggle, Ethniel Shleimon of Dūre village – many remained
neutral. Following consistent fighting between the Barzani autonomists and
the pro-government forces from October through the winter of 1961, many
appendi x a | 279
of those neutral Assyrians began to flee. By January of 1962, 4,500 Assyrians

had been forced to flee to other parts of Iraq.29
Ashawa
Ashawa, located in the Sarsang sub-district, was settled most recently by
refugees from Hakkâri in the 1920s.30 According to the 1957 census, its
Assyrian population stood at 619. Though taken and resettled by pro-
government Kurdish irregulars during the uprising in 1961, Ashawa was
later bulldozed by the Ba‘th regime, and a presidential palace was erected
on its lands.31
Badarrash
Badarrash (also Badrashk), located about one mile north of Sarsang, was
settled by Nestorian and Chaldean refugees of the Baz tribe in the 1920s. In
1938, the village was home to twenty-seven families (eighty men and seventy-
two women), along with livestock: 100 goats and 50 sheep.32 Mar Gewargis
Chaldean Church, built in 1925, suffered ruination during the village raiding
in 1961, which also destroyed all the farms and apple orchards. Adherents of
both the Church of the East (Nestorian Church) and the Chaldean Church
occupied the village until many fled under threat during the civil war.
Badarrash was home to thirty households in 1961.33
Havintka
There are few references to Havintka (also spelled Hawintka) before the
settlement of refugees of the Lower Tiyari tribe in 1920. In 1957, there
were approximately sixty people in the village. Havintka was abandoned in
1961.34
Sarsang (city)
The city of Sarsang (also spelled Sarseng and Sarsank) was most recently set-
tled by 100 families (40 households) of refugees from the Tiyari tribe, adher-
ents of the Church of the East, in 1922.35 In 1933, the population shrank to
about 150. By 1938, fifty-five families (166 men and 135 women) resided
in the city, along with livestock: forty goats and twenty sheep.36 A church
dedicated to Mar Mattai was built in 1955 for the Assyrians in Sarsang. It is
also a popular tourist destination for people from throughout Iraq. In 1961,
the town numbered 150 families (80 households), totalling 700 people.37
Most of the Assyrian lands began to be confiscated in 1972 and 1973 by pro-
Barzani Kurdish villagers from Upper Arāden and Kani-Chinarke.38 Many
Assyrians fled following threats and attacks during that period.
S.awura
S.awura (sometimes spelled S.awra) was divided into upper and lower districts.
It is the well-known site of the school of Babai the Great, a Christian religious
figure, which served both the region and Eastern Christianity generally for
many years, producing scholars in theology and philosophy.39 It was settled
by Nestorians of Upper Tiyari from the village of Rumtha in the 1920s. The
then mukhtar (mayor) of the village was Mame Beth Semano.40 Following the
massacre at Simele in 1933, many villagers fled or were robbed and killed.41
In one particular case more than twenty Assyrians were killed.42 S.awura’s
population was forced out in 1961 and fled the region.43
Tazhikka
Tazhikka was resettled by refugees from Hakkâri in the 1920s. Its population
numbered 123 in 1957 and its villagers abandoned it under threat in 1961.44
T.lanīthā
The name T.lanīthā may be based on the Assyrian-Aramaic word for ‘shadow’
or ‘shade’, though the village is sometimes known as Dewike. In 1850 Badger
wrote the settlement name as T.alneetha; at the time it was home to between six
and twelve families, a priest and a church. T.lanitha was within the Church of
the East diocese of Mar Abraham of Gündük (Nerem), in the mountains south
of Jebel Gara.45 The village, along with the churches of Mart Shmuni and Mar
Quryaqos, was left in ruins after the rebellion of 1961 when Zebari tribesmen
ransacked it.46
‘Aqra District
‘Aqra
‘Aqra’s etymology may trace to an Assyrian-Aramaic word meaning ‘root’,
perhaps, in the case of the city, as the root or foot of the mountain. The
appendi x a | 281
city is mentioned in Neo-Assyrian sources as Kurbail.47 Many of its original

inhabitants were religliously Christians and Jews. Its people were known
as artisans – weavers and jewellers. Prior to the fourteenth century, the
region was part of the diocese of Margā and under the jurisdiction of the
Church of the East’s metropolitan see of Adiabene.48 Most villages in and
around ‘Aqra were Nestorian until the beginning of the nineteenth century.
Dominican proselytising during the mid-1800s caused a drastic decline in
the Nestorian community and a surge in Catholic converts. By 1913, the
Chaldean Church in the ‘Aqra district consisted of nineteen villages, ten
churches, sixteen priests, and approximately 2,400 people.49 The town itself
contained at least 250 Chaldean-rite families, with two priests, a church
and a school. The churches of Mart Maryam and Mar Gewargis illus-
trated the combined Chaldean/Jacobite/Nestorian character of the region.
Persons of Jewish faith left Iraq between 1948 and 1949, whereas the
Christians began their exodus after 1961, as a result of the pressure against
them by the Iraqi authorities and irregular Kurdish forces. ‘Aqra’s diocese
closed after its p
opulation had left the town. Nearby are the remnants of the
Mar Quryaqos Monastery, overlooking the Assyrian village of Birta, which
is located 20 kilometres from ‘Aqra. In the period of the timeline covered by
this research, most of the families of ‘Aqra became internally or externally
displaced.
Ba-Mishmish
Also known as Beth Shimsha or ‘House of the Sun’, this village is located
in the Nahla region northwest of Dawrīye. It is known from a book of
hymns and benedictions copied there by a priest named Bahrīn in or
around 1741.50 In 1850, it was home to between fifteen and twenty-two
families and one active church.51 Following the increase in Catholic missions
in the region, in 1913 there were 150 converts to Catholicism (Chaldeans)
with a church and chapel.52 By 1918, there were forty-nine Assyrians (twelve
households) left in total, with a Kurdish majority. The last Assyrians left
the village in 1961 during Kurdish and Iraqi government fighting, and at
that time, the church of Mart Maryam and the chapel to Mar Youh.annan
were left in a state of ruin. The village was also home to a shrine to Mar
Yawsep.
Barāk
Barāk, also spelled Barrāke, located southwest of Kharjawa and known for
its tobacco, was once settled by Assyrians. Following attacks on the village in
1961, which saw the destruction of the church of Mart Maryam, its inhabit-
ants fled, and Kurds subsequently resettled it.53
Dawrīye
Dawrīye, also referred to as Dūre (not to be confused with the Barwari
Bala region of the same name), has long been an Assyrian settlement in the
Nahla or Nahla d’Malka region of ‘Aqra. Early on, Thomas of Margā men-
tions it in his section concerning Youh.annan of Dēlūm,54 who worked as
keeper of a monastery situated in the village.55 In 1913, it was home to fifty
Chaldeans, with a priest serving one church.56 By 1918, there were only two
families (eleven people) left in the village. In 1922, refugees from Lower Tiyari
resettled Dawrīye, and by 1957, the village population totalled 134. Zebari
Kurdish irregulars employed by the government surrounded the village in
1961 and besieged it for three months. Four villagers were killed, including
Yacoub and Ishaq Yalda, and Khoshaba Kako, as well as a fourteen-year-old
girl. Thirty-five families survived, fleeing to Mosul and ‘Aqra following the
siege.57 The church of Mart Shmuni, in the centre of the upper part of the old
village, was damaged.58.
Dinārta
According to a League of Nations report, in 1933 Dinārta, or Dinārta d’Nahla,
was home to 113 people.59 The village was mixed Assyrian and Kurdish before
its Assyrian inhabitants abandoned it. In 1961 the remaining Assyrians fled
following attacks from both pro-government militia and neighbouring tribes.60
Dodi Masih
It is also referred to as Upper Dodi or by its ancient name, Beth Nura. In
1913, there were eighty people in the village, but by 1918 their number had
decreased to only twenty-three (three families), due to conflicts with the
Herki tribe of Kurdish origin.61 In 1957, the Assyrian population numbered
seventy-three. The village was forcibly abandoned in 1961, and its church,
dedicated to Mar Gewargis, destroyed.62
appendi x a | 283
Girbish
Girbish (spelled also as Garbesh and Garbish), an old settlement, was divided
into upper and lower districts. Just prior to the First World War, Girbish
had a mostly Catholic (Chaldean) makeup, alongside a Nestorian contin-
gent. In 1922, the tribe of Lower Tiyari settled Girbish.63 In early 1938,
approximately thirty Assyrian families of Church of the East ecclesiastical
background dwelled in the village, along with 229 sheep and 530 goats.64
Later that same year, their number decreased to twenty-six families (121
persons), most likely due to a widespread malaria outbreak.65 By 1957, the
village population totalled 374, with 182 in Upper Girbish and 192 in Lower
Girbish. In 1961, Zebari Kurdish irregulars surrounded and besieged the
village for months. At this time, the 210 families were forced to flee their
houses, numbering approximately seventy-five, which were in turn settled by
the besieging Zebaris. The church of Mart Shmuni (rebuilt in 1949 over its
older ruins) was also left in disrepair.66
Khardis
Khardis, or Khardas, is mentioned in a 1698 Syriac manuscript that attests
to its continued settlement and importance. A copy of the H.udra67 was
penned in the village not long after in 1715.68 In linear order, from the
northwest to the southeast of Khinnis/Bavian, the village lies fifth, following
Sharmin, Shush, Nerem and Sheikhi, and is followed by Resha and, finally,
Kherpa.69 In 1913, it was home to 120 Catholics, served by a priest and a
single chapel.70 By 1918, the population of Khardis had decreased to fifty-six
(ten families). Khardis suffered damage, as did the local churches, dedicated
to Mart Maryam and Mart Shmuni. Its population fled when Kurdish forces
attacked it in 1961.71 Villagers have also mentioned a monastery built inside
a cavern in the valley behind the village.72
Kharjawa
In 1918, there were thirty households (142 people) in the village of Kharjawa
(H.arğāwa), with a mud-brick church dedicated to Mar Youh.annan (St John
the Baptist). This church was rebuilt with stone in 1952. There was also a
shrine to Mar Pius. Though David Wilmshurst believes the village to have
had a Chaldean contingent at the end of the nineteenth century, Tfinkdji
does not mention it in his 1913 study.73 Wilmshurst does, however, men-
tion another church, dedicated to Mar Yawsep.74 Kharjawa’s entire Assyrian
population was forced to flee during the infighting in 1961. The village is
missing from the 1961 Omez map.
Khelafta
Khelafta, also Khaleptha or Beth H.lāpe, is mentioned in Thomas of Margā’s
Book of Governors and was located in the Sapsāpā or Shapshāpā ecclesi-
astical district, just west of the ‘Aqra region.75 It is mentioned as being
attacked by a certain ‘Amran bar-Muhammad hailing from Bebōze, who
also laid waste to Birta, Shush, Kherpa and other villages in the Sapsāpā
region.76 A few miles south of Khelafta are the ruins of the ancient monas-
tery of Rabban Bar ‘Edta. The village was destroyed in 1961 and resettled by
its attackers but never by Assyrians, as it is absent from the 1961 Dominican
map.77
Kherpa
Kherpa, also written H.erpā and Kharpa, was once an Assyrian settlement
and has an archaeological mound referred to as tella d’malka, ‘the King’s
hill’. In 1868, when Zebari Kurdish irregulars attempted to ransack the
village it had four priests, testament to a large population.78 In 1913, accord-
ing to Tfinkdji, the settlement was home to 200 Assyrian Catholics, with a
priest, church and school, but by 1918 its population had decreased to 114
(twenty-one families).79 The village was abandoned in 1961 and seized by
Zebari Kurd irregulars employed by the government.80 The church of Mart
Maryam (restored in 1952) was damaged as was the chapel of Mar Youh.-
annan, built around a cave shrine in 1918.
Nahawa
Located in the ‘Aqra region and the sub-district of Girdasin, Nahawa (also
Nūhāwā or Nūwābā) is an important Assyrian settlement. Wilmshurst men-
tions Nahawa as the location where three manuscripts were copied during
the second half of the nineteenth century.81 In 1913, Nahawa was home to
150 Chaldean-rite residents, with one priest serving one church.82 Many had
originated in the Urmia region of Iran and immigrated in the late eighteenth
appendi x a | 285
century. The church of Mart Maryam and a shrine to Mar Pius were severely
damaged during the 1961–3 period, when the entire village population was
forced into other regions of Iraq.83
Nerem
Nerem, or Nerem d-Ra’awatha, called Gundik or Gündük (Kurdish for
‘village’) by Badger, was an Assyrian village of great significance as the
location of a Church of the East bishopric in the mid-nineteenth century.
The then bishop, Mar Awrahem (Awraha or Auraha), had originally been
of Chaldean religious affiliation, but reportedly returned to Nestorianism
(Church of the East) around that time.84 In 1850, Nerem was home to
between twelve and eighteen Church of the East families, served by a priest
and one church.85 By 1913, there were more than 100 Catholic-rite families,
again with a single priest and church.86 The number who remained faithful
to the Mar Shimun Patriarchal line of the Church of the East at that time
remains unknown. By 1918, the Assyrian population of Nerem had decreased
to sixty-six (fourteen families), who made up about half the population of the
village, along with Kurds and a small number of adherents of Judaism with
their own synagogue. These Jews left during the expulsions of 1949–51, and
government militia forces drove the Christians out of Nerem in 1961.87
The ancient monastery of Mar ‘Abdisho‘ is located less than one mile
northwest of Nerem in the direction of Shush. Though the monastery’s
original date of construction is unknown, it is mentioned in a Syriac manu-
script dating from 1610. The monastery, with grottos dedicated to Ambusk
and Mar Youh.annan, was partially destroyed and fell into ruin following
the opposition movement and civil wars from 1961 to 1963. The grotto of
Mar Youh.annan is famed for possessing an ancient wall relief. As Badger
recounts:
To the left of the cave we discovered the object of our search, viz a rock tablet
bearing on its surface the representation of a man in the act of spearing a
wild sheep or ibex, and beneath this a procession of six figures standing in
various attitudes. The style is not unlike that of the sculptures dug up at
Nimrood, but the costume is different, and may be found to belong to a
distinct age and people.88
According to villagers, the early monastery of Mar Quprios is also located in

the vicinity, which is likely the case, since a monk by the name of Cyprian, a
disciple of Narsai, is extensively mentioned by Thomas of Margā as living in
the region and performing various deeds of note.89
Ras al-‘Ain
Ras al-‘Ain was known as Rēš-ēni during the Neo-Assyrian period and as Resh
‘Aina or Resha in Syriac sources.90 The village, situated close to Khelafta, is
mentioned in Thomas of Margā’s Book of Governors. In 1865, there were four
households in the village, which had been converted to Catholicism through
Dominican persuasion. In 1918, it was home to twenty-three Assyrians (five
families). Though Fiey mentions the lack of a Christian population from
1945 to 1955, some families resided in the area and regularly attempted
to rebuild their property until 1961, when those inhabitants were forcibly
expelled, most likely by pro-government militia, and the village not resettled,
as it is absent from the Dominican map of 1961.
Safra Zor
Safra Zor, or Sifra, was home to thirty-five people in 1933.91 In 1938, its
population numbered forty-seven, along with three sheep and thirty-eight
goats.92 Its residents were forced to flee in 1961 during the civil war.93
Sharmin
Sharmin, or Shalmath, is mentioned extensively by Thomas of Margā. It
dates back to the eighth century, and once housed a thirteenth-century
manuscript at one of its three churches.94 At one time, it was home to nearly
1,000 Assyrians. In 1850 there were between thirteen and twenty-one
families, Church of the East adherents, served by two priests, and in 1913
there were 250 villagers, with a priest and a school.95 It is unknown how
many of Sharmin’s inhabitants remained faithful to the Church of the East
(Nestorian) at that time. By 1918, only sixteen Assyrian families (sixty-two
people) were left in Sharmin, but their numbers were replenished by refu-
gees from Lower Tiyari in the 1920s. In 1961 (probably just prior to the
armed resistance), Fiey mentions ninety-six Assyrians (Chaldean-rite) and a
few Kurdish families, with an Assyrian village chief. The last Assyrians were
appendi x a | 287
forced out of Sharmin in the following year by Zebari Kurds, who reset-
tled the village. The church of Mar Ah.h.a survived for at least a few years,
as Fiey describes it as relatively intact.96 Fiey briefly mentions two ‘other’
churches, suggesting that the ruins of one were visible during his research and
that the second became the village mosque following the events of 1961.97
These churches, the first dedicated to Mar Sawa (previously unnamed) and
the second previously unknown, were no longer visible at the turn of the
millennium.98
Shush
Shush, also known as Shushan and Bā Šōš, is mentioned extensively by
Fiey in Assyrie chrétienne, though curiously it is left out of the Dominican
map of 1961, meaning it most likely was never resettled. Believed to have
been continuously inhabited from at least 720 onward, Shush was the site
of a school built by Rabban Babai.99 In 1850, it was home to between three
and five Christian families and more than 200 Aramaic-speaking Jewish
families, early Assyrian converts to Judaism.100 Fiey also mentions that, circa
1861, the then owners of much of the valley were the family of Ah.med
Mšīhāyā or Ah.med the Christian, an indication of the possible forced con-
version of many Shush Christians to Islam.101 The Assyrian population,
however, did increase over the decades. The fortified castle of Shush was
used as a protective fortress in 1914 during the period of massacres against
Assyrians, Greeks and others in the fading Ottoman Empire. The Jews of
the settlement fled between 1949 and 1951 during their exodus from Iraq,
and its Assyrian inhabitants abandoned it in 1961 when attacked by pro-
government militia.102
Sian
Sian is also known as Sanāyā or Sanāyā d’Nahlā. In 1913, Lower Sian con-
sisted of approximately 100 Chaldean-rite Assyrians, with one church served
by a priest.103 By 1918, there were only thirty-nine people (four households)
left in Lower Sian. Both Upper and Lower Sian were originally inhabited
by Assyrians, but it is unclear when they fled Upper Sian. The churches of
Mar Gewargis and Mar Zaya (fifth century) were left in ruins when the last
Assyrians were forced out in 1961.104
Dohuk District
Cham Kare
Little is known of Cham Kare’s early history other than the 1922 settlement
of Nestorian-rite Assyrians from Lower Tiyari. In 1933, the villagers moved
to another nearby village, Gund Kosa, where they repelled various attacks by
Baqr Sidqi and the Iraqi army. Most of the remaining villagers fled or were
killed around 1961.105
Kora-Dere
Though the village was destroyed in 1961, the etymology of the name Kora-
Dere, which contains the Assyrian-Aramaic term deyra, suggests it to be the
location of a monastery complex.106
Mangesh (town)
Mangesh has been the home of notable figures since the 1950s, such as
Francis Yousif Shabo (of the Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM)) and
Lazar Mikhael (of the Iraqi Communist Party), who were both assassinated
in 1993. In 1850, there were 150 families, served by three priests. In 1913,
there were 1,100 Chaldean-rite Assyrian, with four priests serving one church
and a school.107 By 1920, the number of households had risen to 230, and in
1947, the population numbered 1,195. In 1961, there were 600 families in
Mangesh, but many left due to the attacks on the village by both Barzani-led
pêşmerge and Iraqi government infighting, so that by 1965 the population
had shrunk to 959 people. In 1970, there were 1,390 people in Mangesh.108
The town’s religious structures include a church dedicated to Mar Gewargis,
which includes a manuscript library, and a shrine to Mart Shmuni. It is worth
noting that from 1950 to 1997 (when six men were killed), more than forty
individuals from Mangesh were assassinated, including mayor Rayis Hanna
in the late 1950s.
Masike
Masike was settled in 1920 by refugees from Baz in the Hakkâri Mountains.
In 1957, its population totalled 105, but it was abandoned in 1961 when its
inhabitants faced an onslaught from government forces.109
appendi x a | 289
Sheikhan District
Bāsifre
Bāsifre, also written Beth Sāpre, possibly meaning ‘place of books or scribes’,
is located east of Mosul, just southeast of Birta at the foot of mountainous
country once reportedly resplendent with gardens and vineyards.110 It is men-
tioned in Syriac manuscripts in 1685 as having a sizeable community and
three priests. According to Fiey, the inhabitants have found traces of a large
castle situated just in front of the church of Mar Youh.annan, which suffered
during the battles of 1961.111 Fiey also records that just north of Bāsifre lies a
village named Kalwaka, which may contain the ruins of a church dedicated to
Mar Abdisho’.112 In 1913 there were thirty individuals in the village.113 Little
is known about the Assyrians of the village following the armed autonomist
movement of 1961–3.
Bedul
Bedul, or Be-Dole, may derive from the Assyrian-Aramaic meaning ‘place of
buckets’. Mentioned by Badger, Bedul is located in the Mezuriyeh district
close to Meze and Deze, behind the Yezidi religious centre of Sheikh ‘Adi.
In 1850, it was home to between twenty and thirty Chaldean-rite families,
with a church.114 The last Assyrians were forced to flee the village during the
attacks of 1961–3.115
Billān
Billān, also known as Billa, is mentioned in Syriac manuscripts as early
as the ninth century and again in 1656.116 In 1913, Tfinkdji tallied 300
Chaldean (Catholic) converts, one priest serving the village church, and a
school.117 The last Assyrians were forced to abandon the village in 1963.118
The church of Mar Sawa was destroyed, along with the shrine of Mart
Shmuni. There was also an ancient monastery dedicated to Mar Gregorious
in a valley north of the village, which retains the place name Gali Dera, ‘the
valley of the m
onastery’. E. A. Wallis Budge mentions a shared connection
with the village of Tilla. Though it is tempting to assume an association
between Billa and Bar Bellī, mentioned by Wilmshurst, this is probably not
the case.119
Kanifalla
Kanifalla is mentioned as the home of Syriac manuscripts copied in 1713
and 1723. The village name finds its etymology in Kurdish as kani ‘spring’
or ‘source’ and fallah ‘Christian(s)’.120 The famous copyist and writer David
d’Barzane mentioned the hardships endured by his family and other villagers
during the period just prior to 1854, which he attributed to the injustices
of the Zebari tribesmen.121 In 1913, there were 120 inhabitants in the vil-
lage, with a priest.122 They were later joined by refugees from Lower Tiyari.
Kanifalla’s Assyrian residents were forced to flee the pro-government retribu-
tion, which became most evident after 1961. The old church of Mar Akha,
which was utilised by both Nestorian and Chaldean-rite villagers, was almost
completely destroyed; the village was resettled by Iraqi government militia
(fursan).123
Malla-Birwan
Prior to the First World War, Malla-Birwan was served by a single priest, with
a school, and was inhabited by 120 families.124 At that time, there were also
four Muslim and five Jewish households. Between 1920 and 1933, thirty-five
individuals from Jilu in Hakkâri were settled in Malla-Birwan.125 The old vil-
lage church, dedicated to Mar Sawa, was destroyed in 1963, and most of the
population forced to flee as it was resettled by pro-government militia.126
Zakho District
Dar Hozan
Though the 1957 census numbered Dar Hozan’s Assyrian population at 244,
the majority fled in 1961.127
Marzi-Khabur
Marzi-Khabur is located in the sub-district of Rizgari. Little is known about
the village, except that its Assyrian villagers fled under duress from 1961 to
1963.128
Prakh
According to the 1957 census, Prakh’s population totalled 139, but its
Assyrian inhabitants were forced out in 1961.129
appendi x a | 291
Ninawa Province
Telkeif District
Alqosh
The town of Alqosh is an ancient settlement located 30 to 40 kilometres
north of Mosul, in the Qardu mountain range. The etymology of Alqosh is
largely contested. Theories include tracings to the Turkish al ‘scarlet’ and kuş
‘bird’ and to the Akkadian elu ‘god’ and qushtu ‘bow’. The great monastery
of Rabban Hormizd was founded here in the sixth or seventh century and
became the patriarchal see for the Church of the East (Nestorians). It, as a
Christian hub, witnessed recurrent maltreatment over the centuries. In 1743,
it was pillaged by the Persian armies of Nādr Shāh.130 It suffered numerous
attacks during the nineteenth century, including in 1828 and 1832 by Mira
Kora, who, according to a Syriac colophon, ‘killed 172 local men, not count-
ing women, children and foreigners, and pillaged it’.131 The town was attacked
again in 1840 and 1842 by Isma‘il Pasha, who also assaulted the Rabban
Hormizd monastery.132 Following the massacres of Bedr Khan Beg between
1843 and 1846, many Nestorians took refuge in Alqosh, still the see of one of
the patriarchal lines of the Church of the East. It was at this time that many
were coerced into becoming Chaldeans (Catholic) by the Dominicans, who
aided only those willing to accept the supremacy of the Pope.133According to
Tfinkdji, approximately 7,000 Chaldean-rite Assyrians lived in Alqosh, with
six priests, three churches and two schools in 1913.134 In 1937, Father Estefan
Kaččo (later bishop) conducted a census of the town and recorded the popula-
tion at 8,475. In 1950, Father Raphael Bidawid (later Patriarch) conducted
another census, at the request of Bishop Estefan Kaččo, and reported the
population at 9,500. In 1961, Giwargis ‘Awwad put the population at 7,000.
Due to its pro-communist sympathies, It was attacked by pro-government
Kurdish fursan in 1961. Alqosh suffered attacks again in 1969.135
The 1977–8 Campaign
As reported by Human Rights Watch (HRW), under the terms of the 1975
Algiers Agreement, Iraq began to clear a cordon sanitaire along its northern
borders, in particular with Iran. Initially a 5-kilometre corridor was created,

later expanded to 10, then 15, and eventually 30 kilometres.136 Families were
told they were to be removed from the region. As they left with whatever they
could carry for collective towns farther south, their villages and churches were
dynamited and bulldozed.137 According to the Ba‘th’s own sources, some
28,000 families were removed from their villages in two months.138 Initially,
this ‘corridor’ was fashioned in the hopes of preventing further Iranian sup-
port to the Kurdish movement in Iraq. The question is why regions such as
Barwar, along the Turkish border and heavily Assyrian, were targeted.
Dohuk Province
Bazif
Bazif (also spelled Ba Zive, Ba Zibbe and Ba Dibbe) may derive from the
Assyrian-Aramaic ‘place of bears’, Bears are a common predator of the
Barwari livestock, which in Bazif in 1938 numbered 131 sheep and 42
goats.139 The village was first abandoned in 1942 due to pressure from other
local populations. This period saw the murder of four villagers during attacks
on the village.140 Bazif was then destroyed and confiscated in 1976 by pro-
government forces, who resettled the region.141 The village is absent from the
1961 Dominican map.
Bequlke
In 1850, Bequlke was home to five Assyrian families, adherents of the Church
of the East.142 By 1938, four families dwelled in the village with their live-
stock: forty-three goats and six sheep.143 In 1957, its residents numbered sev-
enty-four, including a few Kurdish families. The village was almost emptied
of its inhabitants during the 1960s uprising, but a few residents remained. In
1978, the village was home to eight families, who were forcibly deported by
the government as it was marked for demolition. Bequlke’s school and the
church of Mar Abraham were both destroyed during the process.144
Beshmīyaye
In 1850, Beshmīyaye (Beth Shmīyaye) was home to six families adher-
ents of the Church of the East, served by a priest, with one functioning
appendi x a | 293
church and a shrine dedicated to Mar Ephrem d-Aqrwé (St Ephraim of the
Scorpions).145 During the First World War, Beshmīyaye suffered signifi-
cantly, with half its population killed as a result of the fighting and mas-
sacres.146 In 1938, it is mentioned in the League of Nations documents
as Shamayila, having twenty-five Hakkâri Assyrians (among others), along
with considerable livestock.147 In 1957, the village population had reached
163. In 1961, there were sixty families in approximately thirty houses in
the village. By 1978, fifty families dwelled in Beshmīyaye, before they were
forcibly expelled during the border-clearing urbanisation policy of the Ba‘th
regime.148
Betannūrē
Betannūrē (also spelled Be-Tannūrē and Beth Tannūrē), meaning ‘place of
stone ovens’, is an ancient Assyrian stronghold containing the ruins of an
old fortress.149 Mentioned as a religiously Jewish village by Badger during his
travels in the mid-nineteenth century, Betannūrē is located east of Hayis on
the Bedu rivulet.150 In 1938, there were four Nestorian-rite families of the
Tiyari tribe (plus seventy-five goats and sixty-four sheep) in the village, along
with a number of Jewish inhabitants.151 Prior to 1949, when the Jews were
forced out of the country, it was home to fifteen Jewish families. The village
contained the remains of an ancient fort and a tenth-century synagogue.152
Many adherents of the Church of the East had lived alongside their Jewish
counterparts, and remained after 1949. In 1957, its population totalled
twenty-nine, and in 1961 there were fifteen families (five households) in the
village. Prior to being destroyed in 1978 by pro-government militia, it was
home to twenty-four families.153
Butara
Butara, or Botara, has long been an inhabited village in the Barwari
region. In 1938, one family resided in the village, along with twenty-five
goats.154 In 1957, its population totalled forty-three, and in 1961, there
were twelve Assyrian families (six households) in the village, as well as a
small number of Kurds. Prior to being destroyed along with the church of
Mar Gewargis in 1978 by the Ba‘th regime, it was home to eight Assyrian
families.155
Challik
Challik (also Tchallek, or Tcalluk, as referred to by Badger) is divided into
upper and lower districts and is located near Tashish in the western part of the
Barwar region. In 1850, it was home to between forty and sixty families, with
the church of Mar Mushe, served by a priest.156 Most of Challik’s residents
fled to Urmia for safety during 1915 and 1916, though half of its population
perished due to wounds and exposure.157 By 1933, there were approximately
200 inhabitants living in the village. By 1938, fifty-five families dwelled in
the village, along with their livestock: 564 goats and 290 sheep.158 In 1957, its
population totalled 519. In 1961, there were 400 families (200 households)
in the village, and prior to its destruction in 1978, around 100 families still
dwelled in the village, which had a school.159 The church of Mar Mushe (first
built in 1100 and restored in 1860) suffered heavy damage during the cam-
paigns and was mostly destroyed.
Cham Dostina
In 1961, there were three families dwelling in Cham Dostina at the onset of
the civil war. Though the village was affected during this period, little detailed
information remains. Just prior to its destruction in 1978 by the border clear-
ings, it was home to five families.160 The village is not mentioned on the 1961
Omez map.
Chaqala, Lower and Upper

Located east of Tashish, Chaqala (or Jaqala) is divided into an upper and
lower district. In 1938, fifteen families lived in the village, along with their
125 goats and 58 sheep.161 In 1957, the combined population of Upper and
Lower Chaqala totalled 103 individuals, and prior to its destruction in 1978
during the border clearings, Upper Chaqala was home to thirty-five Church
of the East-rite families and Lower Chaqala to twenty.162 Following the vil-
lage’s destruction, most of its inhabitants fled the region to Turkey, Iran and
other regions of Iraq.
Dūre
The village of Dūre lies along the border of Iraq and Turkey, not far from
the Lower Tiyari villages of Līzān and Zerni, with which it shares many
appendi x a | 295
ancestral ties. The region has many ancient sites, including the remains of a
fortress on the western mountain said to date from an earlier period, which
gives some insight into the probable etymology of the village name: it may be
Akkadian dūrum ‘fortress’. As early as Badger’s mid-nineteenth-century trips
to the region, there had been longstanding animosity between the Assyrians
and Kurds, which was voiced by the Barwar region’s then bishop, Yeshu‘yab.
The region had already been emptied of half its Nestorian population in the
1850s.163 It was quite apparent that the Dominican missions had caused a
negative situation, even in these remote regions, as Bishop Yeshu‘yab men-
tioned to an English missionary, Rev. F. N. Heazell. Thus, this period saw
a host of new religious problems brought in by the French-led Catholic
Church missions on the one hand, and the English-led Protestant missions
on the other. The internal divisions that these interventions fostered would
become unfavourable for the Assyrians internally, and create external con-
flicts with Kurds and others.164 The Church of the East bishop Mar Youalah
(Yab-Alaha) occupied his episcopal see in Dūre until the 1970s; the last
bishop to carry the name Youalah was poisoned in 1972.
In 1850, Dūre was home to between twenty and forty families with
four priests serving two ancient churches.165 Thirteen bishops sat on the
episcopal see of Dūre in recent history, making the village a significant reli-
gious centre of Eastern Christianity. During the First World War, Dūre was
home to about 200 inhabitants. During the war, thirty of its residents were
either killed or carried off (specifically women and children), and ninety
died in the vicinity of Urmia.166 By 1957, the village population totalled
296. Dūre has long been important as both a religious and a secular loca-
tion for Assyrians. In 1938, thirty-five families, along with 348 goats and
195 sheep, dwelled in the village.167 Due to its strategic importance, the
village took the brunt of a napalm attack in 1968, along with other Assyrian
villages of the Barwar region. Prior to its demolition on 8 August 1978,
100 families (seventy-five households) dwelled in Dūre.168 The village also
had a school and its two churches: Mar Gewargis (first built in 909) and
the fourth-century monastery of Mar Qayyoma, known also as the burial
place of nine bishops of the Church of the East. Some of the manuscripts
of the church have been preserved, including ‘The Usefulness of Aristotle’s
Writings’, dated to 1224, which speaks to the long cultural and intellectual
history of the region.169 Two shrines, to Mart Maryam and Mar Pius, and
four cemeteries were situated within the village. The churches, along with
all the houses, were first dynamited and then bulldozed by the Iraq regime
during the border clearings of the late 1970s. Simultaneously, the entirety
of the village’s farms and apple orchards were burned.170 This same fate was
faced by all the Assyrian villages of the Barwari Bala district between 1960
and the Anfal campaign. In some cases, villages faced destruction numerous
times during that thirty-year span.
Dūre is also home to the gippa d-miyya, ‘cave of water’, which is said to
contain ancient wall paintings, and the gippa d-dermana, ‘cave of medicinal
compounds’, named for its concentration of potassium nitrate and what is
probably sulphur, both key components in the production of gunpowder.171
Though some villagers were offered recompense for their homes after their
removal from the region, it was a paltry sum in comparison with the destruc-
tion. Many of the families were sent to the collective town (mujamma‘ )
or resettlement camp of Bat.ufa, further evidence of the ethnic cleansing
Figure 23 Ruins of Mar Qayyoma, Dūre (Courtesy of Yourem Mako)

appendi x a | 297
Figure 24 Mar Gewargis, Dūre, prior to destruction on 8 August 1978 (Courtesy
of Yourem Mako)
Figure 25 The last vesitges of Mar Gewargis following the border clearings of
1978 (Courtesy of the late Yacoub Khoshaba)
Figure 26 Ruins of houses in Dūre, 1978 (Courtesy of the late Yacoub Khoshaba)
campaign.172 The village was also the birthplace of the first personage to be
killed during the 1961 armed resistance movement, Ethniel Shleimon.
Hawsarek
Hawsarek, or Avsarke, in the vicinity of Annūnē (Kani Masi), was destroyed
by the Ba‘th government during the 1977–8 border clearings. The village is
absent from the 1961 Dominican map.
Helwā
In 1850, Helwā (also Halwā or Helwā Nas.ara) was home to between seven
and eleven families, with a church served by a priest of the Church of the
East.173 In 1938, twenty-five families lived in the village with their livestock:
348 goats and 305 sheep.174 By the census of 1957, its population numbered
194. At the time of the armed autonomist movement of 1961–3, researcher
Majed Eshoo reported forty families in the village.175 These residents suffered
appendi x a | 299
tremendously, causing some to flee the region. Before its elimination by the
Ba‘th regime in 1978, Helwā was home to the old church of Mar Yonan
(razed by the authorities), and its sixty families were forcibly relocated to
urban areas during the government’s ethnic cleansing campaign.176
Hīsh
Hīsh, or Heesh, is located on the border with Turkey. In 1850, between
ten and fifteen families, served by a priest, lived there. By 1876 one priest
served fifteen families in one church.177 In 1938, sixteen families dwelled
in the village with their livestock: 526 sheep, 244 goats, 15 oxen, 7 mules
and 2 donkeys.178 By 1957, the population numbered 286 individuals.179 By
1961, there were eighty families (twenty-two households), and prior to the
final evacuation of the village by the Ba‘th regime in 1978, there were 100
families and a school.180 The churches of Mar Bacchus, Mar Abraham and
Mar Khnana of the Church of the East still lie in ruins.
Iqri
Iqri (sometimes Kiri) has been an important village for many years, and was
the seat of Bishop Mar Yonan of Barwar (1820–1906) of the Church of the
East. Some of the village’s residents assert that their families originated in
the Arbil region but fled during a wave of persecution in the twelfth or thir-
teenth century. Local legend traces the etymology of the name to a modern
Assyrian word for ‘turtle’, a creature found in abundance in the river Zab. A
second etymology sees the village name derived from the Assyrian-Aramaic
word qaretha or qarra ‘gourd’, as the village was shaped like one. In 1850,
Iqri was home to between twenty and thirty families, served by a priest, with
one functioning church, according to Badger.181 Iqri suffered considerably
during the First World War, in 1915 and 1916. During that period, most of
its inhabitants were massacred or carried off by marauders.182 In 1938, twelve
families resided in the village with their livestock: 117 goats and 29 sheep.183
In 1961, the village was home to forty families (twenty-five households).
Preceding its demolition in 1978, thirty-five Assyrian families still called Iqri
home.184 The ancient churches of Mart Maryam and Mar Yonan were both
bulldozed during the government attempts to ethnically cleanse this rural
district of its Assyrians.
Istip
Istip, or Histip, is located on the border with Turkey. In 1850, between
twenty-five and thirty-eight families, with a priest, lived there. By 1876
Edward Cutts reported one priest serving eighteen families in one church.185
In 1961, there were forty-seven families (twenty-four households). Prior to
the final evacuation of the village in 1978, there were thirty-five families, with
a Church of the East church dedicated to Mart Shmuni.186
Iyyat
In 1850, Iyyat, or Yate, was home to between five and eight families, served
by a priest and a church.187 Half of Iyyat’s population was murdered during
1915 and 1916, amid the skirmishes of the First World War.188 In 1938,
twenty-five families resided in the village alongside their 136 goats and 77
sheep.189 By 1957, its population numbered 169. In 1961, there were thirty-
five families (twenty households) in Iyyat.190 During the border clearings in
1978, approximately forty families were residing in Iyyat at the time of its
destruction.191 Its entire population was forcibly uprooted and resettled in
urban centres.192 The church of Mar Gewargis, built in 920, was destroyed,
along with all the village’s dwellings.193
Khwara
In 1938, the League of Nations report cites fifteen families, along with
fifty-three goats and twenty-three sheep.194 According to the 1957 census,
Khwara’s population totalled ninety-two, and in 1961, the village had ten
households.195 Prior to being destroyed in 1978, it was home to sixteen fami-
lies of the Assyrian Church of the East religious community.196
Maghribiya
In 1957, Maghribiya’s population numbered approximately twenty Church
of the East-rite families. According to Majed Eshoo’s research, in 1961 only
five families dwelled there. The village suffered during the internal fighting
from 1961 to 1963, but some Assyrian villagers managed to remain. About
eight families resided in the village when it was finally eliminated by the
government border-clearing campaign in 1978.197 The village is absent from
the 1961 Dominican map.
appendi x a | 301
Malākhta
Malākhta is an old Assyrian settlement, famous for its numerous salt deposits,
which provide the etymology of the village name, ‘the salty one’. In 1850, it
was home to between five and eight families.198 Like Iqri, Malākhta suffered
damage during the First World War, seeing most of its inhabitants massacred
or taken by Kurdish tribes during the fighting.199 By 1938 eight families
dwelled in the village with their livestock: forty-eight goats and twenty-two
sheep.200 In 1957, its population totalled twenty-eight. In 1961, there were
five households in the village, and prior to being destroyed in 1978, it was
home to fifteen families, ecclesiastically belonging to the Church of the
East.201 The village was bulldozed and its ancient church of Mar Khananiya
was dynamited in 1978.
Māyē
In 1850, Māyē, or Māyē Nas.ara, probably Assyrian-Aramaic for ‘the waters’,
contained between fifteen and twenty-two families.202 By 1915, in the midst
of the First World War, eyewitness Rev. Shlemon reported that of Māyē’s
140 residents, 90 had been killed, with 50 managing to flee toward the
Assyrian region of Urmia in Iran.203 In 1938, fifteen families resided in the
village alongside 184 goats and 110 sheep.204 By the census count of 1957,
the village population was slowly recovering from its losses, and tallied eighty
residents, an indication of its inhabitants’ continued persecution. By 1961,
there were thirty families (fifteen households) in Māyē. The churches of
Mar Quryaqos and Mart Maryam of Church of the East jurisdiction were
destroyed in 1978, and Māyē’s thirty-five remaining families forcibly moved
to urban centres.205
Meydan
Meydan (or Maydan or Maldani, as it is referred to in League of Nations
documents) like Hīsh and Istip, it is located on the border with Turkey, and
is seven hours’ walk from the nearest road.206 In 1938, three families dwelled
in the village, along with their livestock: ninety-two goats, forty-one sheep,
nine oxen and seven mules.207 In 1957, according to the government census,
thirty-one individuals lived in the village. By 1961, there were nine families
(four households).208 During the border clearings of 1978, which affected the
entire Assyrian-populated regions of Nerwa and Rekan, there were twenty-

five families living in Maydan.209 The church of Mar Gewargis of Church of
the East distinction was destroyed along with the village in the same year.210
Sardāshte
Sardāshte accepted an influx of refugees from Lower Tiyari following the First
World War. The birthplace of bounty hunter Gewargis N’Belatha Benasimo,
the village is also home to the old church of Mar Youh.annan. According to
the 1957 census report, 250 individuals lived in Sardāshte. Approximately
forty families resided in the village prior to the resistance movement. In 1961,
Abdul-Wahid Hajji Malo, a tribal leader loyal to Mustafa Barzani, massa-
cred thirty-two of the village’s men, including the priest, during the Kurdish
armed autonomist movement.211 Its ninety families were displaced following
the border clearings and ethnic cleansing of the region.212
Tirwanish
Tirwanish, or Der Wanis, is named after a monastery dedicated to Mar
Iwanius. It also hosted six other monasteries or churches.213 Its land title
belongs to Malik Khoshaba Yosip of Lower Tiyari and to the brothers
Khammo and Sliwo Be-Zizo.214 Since the displacement of the late 1970s,
its Assyrian population has been discouraged from returning. The village is
absent from the Omez map of 1961.
Simele District
Avzerok Khammo
Avzerok (Avzerog) Khammo, also known as Lower Avzerok, was largely
Armenian. The village’s name is etymologically Kurdish, meaning ‘yellow
water’. According to the 1957 census, it had 176 inhabitants. Many of these
Armenians arrived as refugees from Turkey during the First World War. The
village was destroyed in 1975 along with its sister village, Upper Avzerok
(Avzerok Shano), and its fifty families were displaced.215 The government
allotted the village lands to Arab tribes during the Arabisation period of the
1970s. The village originally contained one church, dedicated to St Vartan,
and one school.
appendi x a | 303
Avzerok Shano
Avzerok (Avzerog) Shano, also known as Upper Avzerok, was entirely inhab-
ited by Assyrian in the period of this work. Before the government-sponsored
destruction of many villages in 1975, its population comprised sixty fami-
lies.216 The old church of Mar Gewargis, also known as Mar Mansour, was
targeted during the military operations. The government resettled the village
with an entirely Arab population.
Bajidda-Barave
Bajidda-Barave is located in the Slevani sub-district of Simele. The village
had both an Assyrian and a Kurdish population and a school within village
grounds. According to the census, its Assyrian inhabitants numbered 199 in
1957. In 1975, the village was attacked, and many houses were destroyed.
Some of its thirty remaining Assyrian families were forced to flee.217 In 1976,
the demography changed as the regime settled several Arab families in the
village.218
Bajidda-Kandal
In 1957, the Bajidda-Kandal Assyrian population numbered 127 per-
sons. The village was destroyed in 1975 along with its sister village,
Bajidda-Barave.
Bakhluja
The village of Bakhluja (or Bachloudja, according to the 1961 Dominican
map) is located east of S.oriya and southwest of Zakho, bypassing
Avzerok Shanno. In 1957, its population numbered 209 inhabitants, and
in 1975, it was home to eight families.219 In 1976 Arabs were settled in the
village as part of the government’s ethnic cleansing campaign of northern
Iraq.
Hawresk
Hawresk contained an Assyrian population with a tiny Armenian segment for
many years during the twentieth century. By 1957, its population included
238 Assyrians. Prior to its destruction in 1975, Hawresk was home to ten
families.220 It was known as the village of Leon Pasha al Armani, who had
accompanied the Assyrian leader (Agha) Petros Eliya in his battles with
Turkish forces during the First World War.221
Ishkavdal
Ishkavdal (mentioned in Assyrie chrétienne as Škafdalé) faced destruction on
numerous occasions, notably in 1961 and again in 1975, when the village’s
twenty remaining families were displaced.222 J. M. Fiey mentions the hamlet
briefly as seeing the return of some Assyrian families, most likely following a
ceasefire.223 Prior to its annihilation in 1975, the village was also the site of a
local school.224
Karrana
Karrana was settled by refugees of the Hakkâri Baz tribe in 1920. It was first
razed during the Simele genocide in 1933. Later, 110 people returned to
rebuild the village.225 Karrana was destroyed again in 1976, and its popula-
tion displaced.
Mavan
In recent history, Mavan (or Mawana) was settled by Nestorian-rite Assyrian
from the Tkhuma region and Rumta in Upper Tiyari, in 1920.226 Its inhabit-
ants fled to Syria after the 1933 massacres, but the village was later settled by
other Assyrian families. In 1957, its population totalled sixty-one. By 1975,
the remaining ten families who had managed to survive the various conflicts
in the region were forced to flee their village. Some returned following the
government-sponsored destruction, only to be forcibly removed again in
1984.227
Reqawa
Reqawa, or Rekawa, was most recently settled in 1920 by refugees, predomi-
nantly adherents of the Church of the East, from Baz, Nochiya and Mar Bishu
in Hakkâri. Most of these settlers fled again to the Khabur basin in Syria after
the 1933 massacres. Those who remained were finally forced out from 1974 to
1976 during an increase in government military activity and external threats.
The village was immediately resettled by Kurdish militia and their families.228
appendi x a | 305
Zakho District
Alanish
Alanish, sometimes Alanash, is located in the sub-district of Sindi. In 1913, it
was home to seventy Catholics, with a priest, a church and a small chapel.229
By 1957, the population had risen to 264 inhabitants. In 1975, govern-
ment forces targeted the village during the infighting between forces loyal to
Mustafa Barzani and those loyal to the government of Iraq. Alanish’s ancient
church, Mar Adde, and school were destroyed at this time. Its forty families
who escaped were never able to return.230
Avkani
Avkani’s name (also spelled Avgni and Avgani) is Kurdish, meaning ‘spring
water’. The village was destroyed in 1976 during the border clearings, and its
Assyrian inhabitants displaced. It is not mentioned on the 1961 Dominican
map.
Bahnona
Bahnona is located close to Alanish in the Sindi sub-district of Zakho.
Both Jews and Christians lived in the village until the expulsion of Jews
from Iraq in 1948. It was home to 111 inhabitants at the time of the
1957 census. In 1975, the village was destroyed, and its thirty families
displaced.231
Bajuwa
Bajuwa was mostly settled by Assyrians from the village of Yarda in the Zakho
region.232 In 1957, its population numbered seventy-nine, and in 1976, when
the village was finally sacked, it was home to five families.
Bedār
The village of Bedār, possibly Assyrian-Aramaic for ‘place of battle’ or ‘place
of the sheepfold’, is well known for being the birthplace of the Syriac scholar
Father Paulos Bedari.233 The village is located approximately 60 miles north
of Mosul within the Catholic diocese of Jezirah. In 1850, between four-
teen and twenty-one families dwelled in the territory, with one church.234
In 1913, its inhabitants numbered 400 Chaldean-rite villagers, with a
priest, church and school.235 By 1957, the population of Bedār had grown
to 508, and in 1961 it reached 868 (ninety-five families). Just before its
demolition in 1975 by the Iraqi regime, there were 130 Assyrian families in
Bedār.236 The old church of the Virgin Mary also suffered ruin during this
period.
Benakhre
Approximately ten families dwelled in the village of Benakhre prior to its
destruction in 1975, during the government-sponsored military offensives in
the region.237
Dashtnakh
The meaning of Dashtnakh (also spelled Dasht-Nakh and Dashtatakh) stems
from dashta d’Nakh, or the ‘field of Noah’, following the story that pieces
of a ship were found in the region that were later connected to the biblical
flood narrative. Such naming of villages is prevalent not only in Iraq, but
also in Turkey in the Jebel Cudi mountain range. Dashtnakh was settled
by Assyrians from nearby Esnakh (Sanaat), three miles to the east, and was
destroyed during the border clearings in 1975. Prior to that, it was home to
fifteen families.238
Deirabūn
Deirabūn, meaning ‘monastery of our Father’, is situated close to Feshkhābur
on the Iraqi border with Syria. The village became infamous during the
ethnic cleansing of the Assyrians in 1933. According to the 1957 census,
it had a population of 657 inhabitants. In 1976, Arabs forcibly resettled
Deirabūn, along Feshkhābur, three miles to the west. Though the village
was predominantly Christian Assyrian, the Arabisation tactics of the regime
transferred some Arabised Yezidi families into the region during that same
year.239
Derashīsh
Derashīsh, also known as ‘Ūmra and ‘Ūmra Shghisha, originally a Church of
the East enclave, is mentioned by Tfinkdji in 1913 as home to 200 Chaldean
converts, with a single church.240 By 1957, the population had increased
appendi x a | 307
to 361 but then decreased drastically in the years of the armed autonomist
movement from 1961 to 1963. By 1975, at the time of its destruction, the
village was home to fifty families, with a school and the ancient church of
Mar Ephrem.241
Feshkhābur
In the valley west of Zakho, Feshkhābur (also spelled Pešabūr) is located
on the river Tigris on the Iraqi border with Syria and Turkey, approxi-
mately 30 miles south of Jezirah. The village’s name may derive from the
Kurdish meaning ‘against the river Khabur’. During his journey to the
region, Badger mentions the village as part of the Jezirah diocese of the
Chaldean Church. At that time (1850), between sixty and ninety families
lived in the village, served by two priests and one active church.242 By 1913,
Tfinkdji reported 1,300 Catholic families in the town, with two priests serv-
ing one church and a school.243 During the First World War, Feshkhābur
was attacked on 11 July 1915 by the sons of Muhammad Agha Atroshi.244
Four days later, according to French Dominican missionary Father Jacques
Rhétoré, 900 people were killed when the Miran tribe sacked the town.245
Feshkhābur witnessed the passage of Malik Yako Ismael and his group from
the Tigris to Syria during the 1933 uprising. According to the 1957 census,
Feshkhābur had a population of 899 residents. It contained 175 homes, and
150 families were still living in the village after the remainder had fled in
the aftermath of the 1961 uprising. In 1963, the Syrian army entered the
village and Kurdish mercenaries, fursan, burned it down. In 1974, as a result
of the renewed tensions, its inhabitants fled to Syria, crossing the Tigris,
and remained there for six months. They returned to rebuild the village
a year later. However, in 1976 the village was evacuated and its inhabit-
ants forced to leave, due to its highly important military location near the
Turkey–Syria border. Immediately following this incident, Arab families
from Mosul were resettled in the region by the Iraqi regime. The village’s
cultural and r eligious structures suffered during the civil war and during the
relocation and destruction, including the fourteenth-century church of Mart
Maryam. A church dedicated to Mar Gewargis was built in 1964 after the
civil war.
Istablan
Istablan, or Stablan had a population of five Assyrian families in 1961, which
increased to twenty families by 1975.246 Following the destruction of numer-
ous border villages in the Zakho region in 1974–5, the village was destroyed,
and its church of Mar Addai was left severely damaged.
Qarawilla
Qarawilla, or Qarawola, lies on the river Khabur on the Turkish border. In
1957, 334 individuals dwelled in this village. The previous regime destroyed
it in 1975 and displaced its 100 families, destroying their seventy homes and
the church of Mart Maryam. The village was resettled by Yezidis, who were
displaced the to area by the Iraqi regime.
Sanaat
Esnakh, as Sanaat is referred to in the native Assyrian-Aramaic of the region,
probably finds its meaning in the phrase ‘wall of Noah’ (as it sits on the
mountainside), in reference to the biblical legends of Noah’s Ark found
throughout the region (compare the derivation of Dashtnakh above). In
1913, it was home to 600 Chaldean-rite (150 families), with a priest, church
and school.247 In 1957, the population totalled 585, and prior to its destruc-
tion in 1975 by the Ba‘th regime, it was home to 120 families, with a
school.248 The ancient churches of Mart Maryam and Mar Sahdona were
also destroyed. Due to its proximity to the border with Turkey, inhabitants
of Sanaat would regularly visit villages in the Bohtan region and would
traditionally marry people from the village of Harbol. This borderless image
of the region was commonplace to Assyrians before the Western colonial
division of the modern Middle East, showing that current borders are not
reflective of the continuous Assyrian settlements of northern Mesopotamia
and Anatolia.249
Shuwadin
Shuwadin, or Shudin, is located approximately 3.5 miles west of Bazif.
Approximately 120 inhabitants dwelled there in 1957. During the renewed
internal strife Shudin was destroyed in 1975, and thirty-five families forced
to flee.250
appendi x a | 309
Yarda
Yarda, its name Assyrian-Aramaic for ‘well’ or ‘tank’, is located in the sub-
district of Sindi. In 1913, it was home to 250 converts to the Chaldean
Church, with a priest and two churches.251 In 1957, the population totalled
280, and prior to its destruction in 1975 by the Ba‘th regime, it was home
to sixty families with a school.252 The ancient church of Mar Addai was
destroyed along with the village.
Ninawa Province
Telkeif District
Bendawaye
Bendawaye, or Beth Handawaya, is a small village three or four miles
west of Alqosh. The village is close to an Assyrian bas-relief known as
Šero Malakta, which is also the site of many monastic grottos.253 In 1913,
this village contained 100 Chaldean-rite villagers, with one priest serv-
ing one chapel.254 Though Tfinkdji seems only concerned with the Catholic
population, it is clear some Nestorians dwelled in the village, as well.
During the Simele genocide in 1933, 124 people dwelled in the village, in
thirty-six houses.255 By 1938, three families (numbering fifteen persons) of
the Ashita clan retuned to the village, alongside the largely Yezidi popula-
tion still living there.256 The church of Mar Gewargis once contained a
New Testament, written circa 1772. Arabs were resettled in the village in
1976.257
Nās.erīyā
In 1938, there were two, Church of the East-rite families of the Jilu tribe (ten
persons), along with some Catholics and Yezidis.258 Fiey briefly mentions
in his study that the village had three Catholic households and an ancient
church dedicated to Mar ‘Abdisho‘, most likely the same monk who had
given his name to the monastery of Nerem.259 The village was looted and
destroyed during the Simele massacres, when it contained forty-one people in
eighteen houses.260 Nās.erīyā met with a similar fate as that of its surrounding
villages from 1974 to 1975.
Arbil Province
Koy Sinjaq District

Armota
Armota, Armūt.ā or Harmota, lies just outside Koy Sinjaq, a two-hour drive
from Sulaymaniyah. The village is a remote farming settlement and part
of the Chaldean diocese of Kirkuk. In 1843 there were between twenty-
five and thirty-eight families, with a priest serving one church.261 In 1913,
Armota had around 100 Catholic adherents, with a priest who served the
village church.262 Yohānnan Hormizd had converted three villagers, ‘Ainkāwā
(‘Amkābā), Armota and Shaqlāwā, to Catholicism in 1779.263 The village’s
name is explained in the local Assyrian-Aramaic dialect as meaning ‘land of
death’. The etymology is based on a local legend of a plague that had once
slain all of the villagers, or on a large battle between Christians and Muslims
of the region. Another explanation may be a derivation ara‘ and nūt.ā (with
a shifting of ‘n’ to ‘m’), meaning ‘land of oil’. A fourth-century monastery,
located in the mountainous region overlooking the village,264 faced numerous
ravages including dynamiting during the Anfal campaign in 1988 while the
village was transformed into an army camp.265 There was also a local school
in the village. Villager Sabah Hana spent ten years in Abu Ghraib prison, and
his brother was executed during this period.266
Dohuk Province
Annūnē
Annūnē, or more specifically ‘Ain Nūnē – Assyrian-Aramaic for ‘source of
fish’, which is also reflected in its Kurdish name, Kani Masi – has been the
centre of the Barwari-Bala sub-district since 1934. In 1850 between twenty
and thirty families resided in the village, with one functioning church and
a priest.267 During the First World War, Annūnē had approximately 350
residents; some twenty were killed, ten women were taken, and another 120
died in the Urmia region during the winter of 1915–16.268 Iskharia Gewargis
was the town’s resident mukhtar in 1926–7, during the building of the first
school in the Dohuk region. The building began at the behest of Qasha
appendi x a | 311
Oraha Shlimun in 1924 and was completed in 1928. Classes were taught
in Assyrian, English and French. Since Arabic was not spoken by many
Assyrians in the north of Iraq, it was only added to the curriculum at a later
date when required by the Iraqi government. When that occurred schoolmas-
ter in Annūnē brought Rabi Hanna of Tel Esqof to instruct in Arabic. By the
mid-1930s, there were more than 300 students from the Barwari region and
two teachers, Qasha Dawid Toma and Gewargis Bikko.269 In 1938, seventy
families dwelled in the village, along with their livestock: 743 goats and 247
sheep.270 According to the 1957 census, the village population then stood at
approximately 400 individuals. As early as 1958, there were 612 students and
12 Assyrian teachers at the school in Annūnē.271
In 1961, during the onset of fighting in Iraq, Mustafa Barzani and 400
of his men requested permission to traverse the village toward Zakho and
Syria. The village elders allowed passage only near Hayyis, rather than directly
through the major Assyrian villages.272 Upon returning, Barzani’s numbers
had swollen to more than 3,000 fighters, who then attacked Annūnē and
killed every male above the age of fifteen, including two priests.273 The
Assyrians of numerous Barwari villages came to the aid of the besieged
Annūnē and repelled the attack from Barzani’s men, while the Iraqi govern-
ment officials remained safe in the village centre.274 In 1968 Annūnē suffered
napalm attacks by government forces.
Prior to its destruction by the regime on 27 February 1988, there were
180 families living in Annūnē (between 84 and 100 houses), with two
schools and the two churches of Mart Shmuni and Mar Sawa.275 Mar Sawa
dates from the tenth century with a restoration period in 1742. As with the
entire Barwari region of Assyrian villages, the fields were eliminated and the
apple orchards, the area’s greatest resource, burned indiscriminately. On one
occasion, an Assyrian interviewee had been told that his house and land were
to be confiscated and that he would be paid 30 dinars (approximately $90
US) for each of the 1,000-plus trees in his orchard. The man never received
the payment.276
Arāden
Arāden has always been a culturally significant village in the Sapna region, to
the south of Barwari Bala.277 The large village is located within the ‘Amēdīyāh
diocese of the Chaldean church, along with the regional villages of Mangesh,
Dawodiya, Ten and Inishke. Arāden is approximately 160 kilometres north
of Mosul.278 Locals believe the etymology of Arāden as being ’ar‘a d-a‘den, or
‘the land of Eden’. The village sits at an altitude of more than 1,100 metres
above sea level.279 In 1850, it was home to between fifty and seventy-five
families, with a priest serving one church.280 In 1913, there were approxi-
mately 650 Catholic converts, with two priests and two schools.281 Around
1933, there were 515 Assyrians in total in Arāden.282 The town’s population
in 1954 numbered 474 families, approximately 5,000 people.283 In 1957,
Arāden’s population totalled 1,049, and in 1961 there were 350 families,
around 3,000 inhabitants.284
Arāden is a pilgrimage hub for Assyrians of various denominations. There
are three Chaldean churches in the village: one dedicated to the third-century
saint Mart Shmuni, another to the fourth-century saint Sultan Mahdokht, and
the third to Mar Awda, also from the fourth century. The church of Sultan
Mahdokht is dedicated to a princess by the same name and her two brothers,
who were baptised by Mar Awda but later martyred. When the churches were
initially built is uncertain, but it is possible that one or all may be a millen-
nium old. A more recent church was built and dedicated to the Sacred Heart
of Jesus. Feast days in Arāden include the 15 May shera (‘vigil’) and the 12
January dookhrana (‘remembrance’) of Sultan Mahdokht. Some of Arāden’s
major personalities include Chaldean Bishop Francis, Chaldean Bishop Toma,
Rayis Hermiz Sana and the former AUA secretary general Afram Rayis.
In the 1960s, the village was first bombed and then razed by 700
government
forces; Kurdish irregulars under the leadership of Zabir
Muhammad Zebari murdered at least seven villagers, including Nona Daniel.285
Though Arāden was rebuilt over the years, continued targeting resulted in the
assassination of the Shimshun Elisha in 1974, and the murders of Sami Goriel
and Salem Dawood in 1975. Dinkha Eshaya, the village mukhtar, was later
assassinated in 1981.286 The Ba‘th regime destroyed the village again in 1987,
at which time it accommodated an estimated 220 families and two schools.287
Argen
Argen, alternately Argin or Hargin (or Ergin, as referred to by Badger),
is located in the mountainous region south of Jebel Gara near T.lanitha,
appendi x a | 313
Armashe and Meze. In 1850, between ten and fifteen families made the
village their home, with one operational church.288 By 1918, there were six
families who had converted to Catholicism, numbering forty-one people, and
seven families who remained faithful to the Church of the East (Nestorian).
According to a League of Nations report, two families (seven men and five
women) resided in the village along with their livestock: ninety-two goats and
twenty-two sheep.289 In 1957, the population of Argen totalled seventy-nine.
The village suffered much damage in the early 1960s, and though many of
its inhabitants fled, some remained to rebuild.290 The village was then elimi-
nated in 1988. Argen is of great importance as a cultural site due to its four
churches: Mar Gewargis, Mart Maryam, Mar Abraham and Mar Quryaqos,
which were all laid waste during the Anfal campaign.
At.ush
At.ush’s name is said to derive from a word meaning ‘spring of the mulberry
trees.’ As early as 1850, there were between eleven and sixteen families in the
village, with two functioning churches.291 In 1938, ten families (nine men
and five women) dwelled in the village along with their livestock: eighteen
goats and one sheep.292 By 1957, it was inhabited by seventy-five individuals.
Prior to its destruction in 1988, there were twenty-five families in At.ush. The
churches of Mar Gewargis, Mar Abraham, Mart Maryam, and Mart Shmuni
of the Church of the East all suffered complete destruction during the Anfal
campaign.
Balūkā
Bālūka, also known as Bebālūk or Beth Bālūk, lies near the Turkish border
and is not accessible by most vehicles. In 1850, it was home to between
ten and fifteen families, served by a Nestorian priest and one functioning
church.293 Around 1915, almost the entirety of Bālūka’s population was for-
cibly converted to Islam.294 By 1938, fourteen families lived in the village,
along with their livestock: 176 goats and 116 sheep.295 In the years leading
up to the census of 1957, some of its surviving Christian Assyrian residents
returned, numbering an estimated fifty individuals. According to Majed
Eshoo’s research, by 1961 there were twenty-five families (ten households) in
the village and during the chaos in the region its headman and some villagers
were killed in an air raid by the Iraqi army. Prior to its destruction in 1976–8
during the border clearings, Bālūka was home to fifteen families, who were
all forcibly removed from their homes.296 The church of Mart Maryam was
destroyed during the same period. Though the village was emptied, a few
families managed to return and attempted to rebuild until the Anfal opera-
tions. The air bombings took out the Bālūka Bridge and also left any strag-
glers to contend with a chemical cloud. The village was then taken over by
pro-government Kurdish militia.297
Bāsh
Bāsh is located on the Iraq–Turkey border. In 1850, there were between twelve
and eighteen families with a priest of the Church of the East.298 According to
League of Nations documentation from 1938, Bāsh had ten Assyrian fami-
lies of the Nestorian religious community (including approximately thirty
men299), along with a variety of domesticated animals: 335 goats, 95 sheep,
7 oxen and 2 donkeys.300 In 1957, there were 150 individuals living in the
village. By 1961, there were sixty Assyrian families (thirty-six households).301
Prior to the village’s initial destruction by the regime in 1977–8, there were
fifty families and a school. Bāsh was rebuilt in 1981 by twenty families who
had returned but was destroyed again in 1988.302 The churches of Mar Zakka
(seventh century) and Mar Dawūd were destroyed, along with the rest of the
village, and its inhabitants fled to Turkey. More than thirty-four villagers
surrendered and attempted to return to Bāsh after the announcement of a
general amnesty, but were never heard from again.303
Baz
Baz, or Bas, is located in the sub-district of ‘Amēdīyāh.304 In 1938, five
families called the village home, along with their 104 goats and 12 sheep.305
In 1957, it was home to 130 individuals, and in 1961 there were forty fami-
lies (twenty households) in the village. In 1961, the village suffered attacks
by pro-government troops, Kurds loyal to Mustafa Barzani and the armed
autonomist movement from the neighbouring village of Benaveh, which
took possession of the historic church of Mar Abraham and later converted
it into a mosque.306 The church of Mar Youhanna survived in ruined condi-
tion until 1988, when the entire village, then home to twenty families, was
appendi x a | 315
destroyed.307 At least five villagers from Baz were reported missing during the
Anfal campaign.308
Bebede
Bebede, or Beth Bede, lies at the foot of the city of ‘Amēdīyāh and is built
close to ruins of one of the most ancient Assyrian castles in the Sapna valley.
The people of Bebede, skilled in ceramics, refer to themselves as ‘as.laye, or
‘originators’, for having lived in the village for millennia, whereas many vil-
lages in the Sapna valley had been abandoned and resettled, some on numer-
ous occasions.309 Badger mentions the village as having twenty families, a
church and a priest, but he also says that the village was destroyed and emp-
tied of Assyrians during his travels.310 Whether the statistics given are pre- or
post-destruction is unknown. According to a League of Nations report, in
1933 there were approximately 250 individuals living in the village.311 In
1938, ten families (twelve men and twenty-four women), along with fifteen
goats and seven sheep, resided in the village.312 Bebede, which falls within the
old Nestorian diocese of Mar Yeshuyau of Barwar,313 also became the head-
quarters for Patriarch Mar Eshai Shimun following the migration from his
original home in Quchanis (Hakkâri) until 1933, when he was exiled with his
family to Cyprus. In 1957, the inhabitants of Bebede numbered 480, and in
1961, there were 100 families.314 The village was razed in 1961 by mercenar-
ies under the leadership of Muhammad Zebari.315 Some Assyrians returned
in 1963 and following years, but constant struggles with neighbouring Kurds
(mostly from Arāden Islam, Upper Arāden) left little room for stability and
development. In 1987, Bebede was destroyed, along with its school and
the sixth-century church of Mart Shmuni, and its seventy-five families were
displaced.316
Bebede’s notable personalities include Toma Yosip Toma, chairman of
the city council of ‘Amēdīyāh in 1914 and during the First World War.
According to Majed Eshoo, Toma was executed in Mosul by Ottoman
authorities, along with his companion Petto Rayis from Arāden.317 The vil-
lage attained a reputation for its school, which was established in 1908 by
the English missionary Rev. William Wigram. The school was destroyed by
the Ba‘th regime in 1988 and its foundation materials were appropriated for
building an army barracks.318
Benāta
Benāta (also spelled Beth ‘Ainātha), or ‘place of sources’, gets its Assyrian-
Aramaic name from the variety of water springs in the vicinity. The Book of
Governors describes the ninth-century village as being mentioned in a vision
of Maran-‘Ammeh.319 In 1913 it was home to approximately 150 Catholic-
rite Assyrians, with a priest and a chapel.320 Prior to 1961, there were still
sixty families (thirty households) in the village. Following 1988, Benāta was
emptied of Assyrians.
Blejanke
Blejanke (also Blejane) is well known among Assyrians as the home of
Yousif Toma Hermiz Zebari and Rafael Nanno, members of the ADM who
were later killed by the Iraqi regime. In its recent history, Church of the
East-rite Assyrians of the Tkhuma region in Hakkâri settled Blejanke in
the n ineteenth century. In 1850, it was home to between eight and twelve
families, with a Church of the East dedicated to Mar Gewargis.321 The vil-
lagers at that time came originally from Erdel (in Arbel province), which
also had a Church, a priest and fourteen families.322 Erdel was evacuated by
Agha Petros Elia when he sacked the nearby Kurdish stronghold of Barzan
during the First World War. By 1938, four families (eleven men and twelve
women) resided in Blejanke, along with their livestock: fifty-seven sheep and
thirty-nine goats.323 In 1957, Blejanke had 238 inhabitants. When the village
was attacked in 1961, there were approximately thirty houses.324 During
the initial raid on the village that year, two villagers were injured and three
killed; the remaining Assyrians fled to Sarsang. During this time, the govern-
ment forces also fired various rounds of ammunition at the nearby monas-
teries of Mar Qardagh and Mar ‘Abdyeshu‘, causing large-scale damage.325
Though some returned to the village, it was destroyed again in 1987 by
the Ba‘th regime, specifically for being the known home of several p rominent
nationalist leaders; its twenty-eight families were then displaced. 326
Bubawa
In 1938 Bubawa, also spelled Bibava, was home to nine families, adherents
of the Church of the East (thirty-two men and twenty-five women), along
with their livestock: 213 goats and 55 sheep.327 The village was more recently
appendi x a | 317
settled by the inhabitants of Daragale (located between Hayyis and Musake),

who were forced to flee their village in Barwari-Bala in 1950. At the time
of the 1957 census, eighty-five Assyrians resided in Bubawa. It was home
to thirty-two families (twelve households) in 1987, when the Iraqi military
destroyed it in order to build an artificial lake.328
Chammike
Chammike was resettled by displaced families from Lower Tiyari in 1920. By
1938, eight families resided in the village, along with eighty-one goats and
four sheep.329 In 1961, there were twenty families (ten households) in the vil-
lage, and prior to its destruction in 1988 by the Ba‘th regime, Chammike was
home to four families (two households).330 The village was abandoned due to
constant pressure from neighbouring tribes.
Dawodiya
Dawodiya, or Dawudiya, lies in the far west of the Sapna valley region and is
built on an archaeological mound dating to the fifth century bc. The name
of the village is said to derive from a monastery dedicated to Mar Daudo,
located an hour north of the present village on the Hasn Birka road.331 In
1840, an unknown military leader built a military barracks in the town.332 In
1850, between thirty and forty-five Chaldean-rite families called Dawodiya
home.333 By 1913, the population reached 300 people, with a school and a
church served by a single priest.334 According to a League of Nations report
following the 1933 massacres, 275 Assyrians lived in the village.335 In 1957,
there were eighty households, totalling 524 people, and in 1961, there were
150 families, in 120 households.336 The village was destroyed in 1987, at
which time there were eighty-two families and a school.337 The church of Mar
Youh.annan, originally built in the seventeenth century, was destroyed in
1987. There was also a shrine dedicated to Mart Shmuni, which was damaged
during the military campaign. Approximately five adults from Dawodiya
disappeared during the Anfal operations from August to October 1988.338
Dehe
Located in the Dohuk region and sub-district of Sarsang, Dehe, though
on the map of Father Josephe Omez, seems more a part of the Barwar
region and is shown as lying just southwest of Baz. As early as 1850, there
were between ten and fifteen families in Dehe, served by a priest.339 In
1920, an influx of Church of the East-rite families from the Upper Tiyari
tribe settled there. At the time of the Simele massacres in 1933, there were
140 Assyrians in the village.340 Five years later, only twenty-nine people
(both indigenous and non-indigenous) remained.341 By 1957 the population
had recovered to 292 residents; and prior to the war in 1961, there were
100 families (twenty-two households), totalling approximately 600 people.
The village, including its two schools, was destroyed in 1987, and the fifty
remaining families were forced to flee.342 Around the village, there are ruins
of churches dedicated to various saints, some from the tenth century. The
fifth-century church of Mart Shmuni also suffered ruin during the uproot-
ing process.343
Deralok
Deralok, or Deira d-Luqa, ‘monastery or church of St Luke’, is situated
on the Upper Zab River. The town’s name derives from the ruins of a
monastery dedicated to Mar Luqa located in the surrounding area. It was
settled by Nestorians of the Baz tribe in 1920 following their expulsion
from their villages in the Hakkâri region. Many fled to the Khabur basin in
Syria after the massacres of 1933. Prior to that, 130 individuals resided in
Deralok.344 The regime turned Deralok into a collective town (mujamma)
in 1978, settling there the displaced inhabitants of villages in the Nerwa
and Rekan sub-districts. The people originally hailed from Qārō (thirty
households), Lower Nerwa (five households) and Derigni (five households),
with the rest originating from Wela.345 Originally, forty-five houses were
built for Assyrians. A church dedicated to Mar Khnana was built in 1979.
During the Anfal operations, the village was once again turned into a col-
lective town.
Dere
The village of Dere (Assyrian for ‘monasteries’ or, more literally, ‘dwell-
ings’) lies quite close to its sister village, Komāne; they are often referred
to as a pair, Dere w-Komāne. Its etymology can most likely be traced
to the area’s status as the site of the Mar ‘Abdyešu‘ and Mar Qardagh
appendi x a | 319
monasteries. The fourth-century monastery of Mar ‘Abdyešu‘, at one

time served by forty-two monks living in the nearby caves, was report-
edly partially ruined during Badger’s initial visit in 1843. In 1850, how-
ever, Badger records that the villagers had restored it.346 In 1850, Badger
recorded between twelve and eighteen families residing there, with one
functioning church.347 In 1938, a League of Nations report cited forty-five
autochthonous Assyrian families (425 people) living in the village (owned
by them), along with livestock: 317 goats and 160 sheep.348 By the 1957
census, the population had grown to 323 residents. In 1961, there were
100 families (60 households) there, but many left the village due to the
autonomist movement.349 Mar ‘Abdyešu‘ was also destroyed.350 In 1987,
government soldiers destroyed Dere and the Mar ‘Abdyešu‘ monastery for
the second time in less than thirty years (after its restoration following the
1961 campaign), and its remaining seventy families were forced to flee yet
again.351 The majority of families who fled moved to nearby ‘Amēdīyāh,
but found that also to be unsafe. After Anfal, a Dutch researcher, J. C. J.
Sanders, recalls:
Figure 27 Mar ‘Abdyešu‘ monastery in Dere, 1991 (Courtesy of Hormuz Bobo)
I saw a new church with a white dome and a cross on top which had been
bombed [a result of the Anfal]. The roof hung down to the ground . . . The
church itself had two naves, the first sized ten by three and one-half meters,
devoted to Saint Qardagh, pupil of Mar Awdisho/Odisho [‘Abdyešu‘],
the one to whom the second nave, nine by four meters wide, was
devoted.352
Sanders also mentions the possible entrance to a cave-shrine or monastery in

the rock face of the mountain.
Derigni
The village of Derigni (also spelled Derigne and Dirgin) lies in the Sapna
plain, three miles east of Dere. In 1850, Derigni was home to between forty
and sixty Nestorian-rite families, with a single church and two priests.353 By
1938, twenty families (sixty men and fifty-seven women) resided in the vil-
lage with livestock: 288 goats and 55 sheep.354 In 1957, the village was home
to 130 Assyrians, and prior to its final destruction in 1988, there were forty
families (thirty households) in the village, with a school.355 During the Anfal
campaign, the ancient church of the Virgin Mary, built in 885, sustained
damage in the village destruction. At least twelve citizens from Derigni disap-
peared during the campaign, including a mother and her six children.356
Derishke
Derishke Nas.ara lies just west of ‘Ain-Nune, along with its Kurdish counter-
part, Derishke Islam. The etymology of the village name suggests a possible
monastic community in the region. This village was famous for its iron depos-
its, which were mined and used to forge agricultural tools and other neces-
sary implements. In 1850, it was home to between fifteen and twenty-two
families.357 In 1915, during the massacres of the First World War, only 30
of Derishke’s 130 residents survived.358 In 1938, fifteen families, along with
158 goats and 72 sheep, called the village home.359 By the 1957 census, the
village population had again risen to 167 persons. Prior to its destruction by
the Ba‘th regime in 1988, there were fifty families (thirty households), with
a school.360 The churches of Mar Youhanna (built in 1810) and Mar Shukh-
Alaha lie in ruins. Interestingly, although the Assyrian village of Derishke
appendi x a | 321
Nas.ara was destroyed by air raids in 1988, Derishke Islam, inhabited by

Kurds, was left unharmed.361
Dohuke
Following the Simele massacres, part of Dohuke’s population, of the Tkhuma
tribe, fled to Syria. In 1936, thirty families inhabited Dohoke.362 By 1938,
22 families (fifty-eight men and fifty-nine women) inhabited the village,
along with their livestock: 218 goats and 185 sheep.363 According to the 1957
census, roughly 120 people inhabited the village, and by 1961, approximately
sixty families resided there.364 The village was burned in 1962, but some of its
population returned to rebuild in 1964. The villagers were forced to flee again
in 1965, but returned once more following the 11 March 1970 peace agree-
ment, which briefly pacified anti-government forces. The fighting resumed
in the mid-1970s, when pro-government militia attacked and destroyed the
village from 1974 to 1977 and began confiscating its lands.365 Some villagers
managed to return, but were expelled once again during the Anfal opera-
tions in 1988, which destroyed the village yet again and saw its surviving 60
families displaced.366
Es.sān
Es.sān, or S.iyān, is the former home of no fewer than seven metropolitans.
The local church is dedicated to Mar Quryaqos. Another church, dedicated
to Mar Zaddiqa, lies at the summit of the Gara Mountains at an elevation of
more than 2,000 metres.367 According to Badger, in 1850 Es.sān had between
forty and sixty families and a church served by a single priest of the Church
of the East.368 By 1918, there were twelve families, numbering ninety people,
who had converted to Catholicism. In 1957, the population of Es.sān totalled
249, and in 1961, it was destroyed for the first time.369 The annihilation of
the village in 1987 and 1988 included the destruction of its two churches and
led to the displacement of its remaining population.
Hamziya
Hamziya had two churches, both dedicated to Mart Shmuni, built in the
sixth century and twentieth century respectively.370 As early as 1850, between
six and nine Nestorian-rite families lived in the village,371 and in 1913,
its population stood at 200, with a priest and a school.372 Around 1933,
there were only fifty individuals in the village.373 In 1957, the population
of Hamziya was approximately a hundred. In 1987, the then population of
thirty-two families fled when the village was targeted for being the known
home of dissidents, among them Youkhana Esho Shimon Jajo, one of the
founding members of the ADM, who was executed by the Iraqi regime in
Abu Ghraib prison in 1985.374
Hayyis
In 1850, Hayyis was reported as having between fifteen and twenty-two
Church of the East families and one church.375 During the First World War,
Hayyis fared better than many of the Barwari villages, as only one-third of
its population perished.376 In 1938, a League of Nations report mentioned
thirty-five families, along with 242 goats and 104 sheep, residing in the
village.377 By the time of the Iraqi census of 1957, its population was listed
at 194 individuals. In 1961, there were sixty families (thirty-five house-
holds). Hayyis was attacked in 1968, along with several other villages of
the region. The destruction was quite severe, due to the amount of napalm
dropped in the area. The village was not attacked in the 1977–8 border
clearings, since, besides being quite remote, it remained within the region
of Barwar under pro-Barzani pêşmerge control. In 1988, Hayyis, along with
the Assyrian villages of Merkajiya and Musake, was the site of a chemical
weapons attack. At the time of its destruction during the Anfal operations,
it was home to fifty families (twelve households), with a school and the
churches of Rabban Pithion and Mar Gewargis, which were levelled during
the devastation.378
Inishke
During G. P. Badger’s travels in 1850, Inishke (also Enishke) was home
to between twenty and thirty families, with a priest serving one church.379
In 1913, there were reportedly some 250 Chaldean-rite individuals,
with a priest serving one active church, and a school.380 By 1938, twenty
families were residing in the village, amounting to thirty men and forty
women, along with their livestock: fifty-five goats and forty sheep.381 In
1957, Inishke’s population numbered 333, according to the Iraqi census.
appendi x a | 323
Figure 28 Ruins of Hayyis, Barwar, destroyed in 1988 (Courtesy of the Nineveh
Center for Research and Development, Qaraqosh)
By 1961, it was home to 120 autochthonous Assyrian families (fifty house-

holds).382 The village was not completely destroyed by the Ba‘th regime, but
its lands were confiscated, and a presidential palace complex was built upon
them. The five churches in the village included the newer Mart Shmuni
church; the old Mart Shmuni church (last restored in 1885); Mar Gewargis
church (last restored in 1830); Mar Quryaqos monastery; and the tenth-
century ‘Red Monastery’ of Mar Yosip Busnaya on a nearby hilltop all left
in ruins.383
Jedide
In 1850, Jedide was home to between five and eight families adherent to
the Church of the East.384 In 1938, eight families resided in the village with
their livestock: 101 goats and 40 sheep.385 By 1961, there were 24 families
accounting for the village’s ten households, along with five Kurdish fami-
lies.386 Prior to its destruction in 1988 by the Ba‘th regime, it was home to
thirteen families.387
Kani Balav
As early as 1850, there were between twenty and thirty families in the village,
with an old church dedicated to the Virgin Mary. Around 1933, the village
population numbered 110 inhabitants, including a large number of newer
settlers from the town of Ashitha in Turkey.388 Twenty families resided in the
village in 1938, along with a number of livestock: 282 goats and 51 sheep.389
Prior to 1949, there were mentions of a tiny Jewish community in the village.
In 1957, there were 190 Assyrians in Kani Balav; in 1961, there were seventy
families residing in thirty-five houses.390 In 1988, the village was destroyed,
along with its school and church. The villagers were then deported.391
Komāne
The sister village of Dere, Komāne (also Kowane) had been a large settle-
ment. Its cultural and religious edifices included the church of Mar Ephrem
(Sassanid period), an eighth-century monastery dedicated to Mar Quryaqos,
and a perhaps fourth-century monastery to Mart Maryam. There is also an old
cave-shrine or grotto dedicated to Mar Sawa in the Gara mountains opposite
Komāne.392 In 1850, there were between thirteen and twenty families in the
village, with a priest and a church dedicated to the Virgin Mary that held alle-
giance to the Church of the East archdiocese of Mar Yeshu‘yab of Barwar.393
By 1913, most of the village had been converted to Catholicism, and Tfinkdji
counted sixty Chaldean-rite Assyrians, with a chapel to Our Lady of Light and
Life, while the number of Church of the East-rite individuals was unknown.394
By 1938, four families (nineteen people) resided in the village with their live-
stock: fifty-three goats and forty-one sheep.395 In 1957, Komāne had grown to
550 residents, and in 1961 contained about 150 families. In 1963, a primary
school was built but, lamentably, the village and many of its antique buildings
were looted and burned down by the pro-regime Zebari Kurds, led by Zubir
Muhammad Zebari, in 1965.396 In 1977, the Iraqi government built 100 new
houses in and around Komāne, turning it into a refugee collective town for
eighty Kurdish families and twenty Assyrian families who had been forced out
of their villages in the Nerwa region.397 A new church dedicated to the Virgin
Mary was built in 1978 for the Church of the East of Nerwa, from the village
of Wela, who also had their own priest. During the Anfal period, the village
was used once again as a collective town.398
Mahude
Little is known about Mahude, which is located near the Assyrian village of
Havintka. It was settled by displaced families of the Lower Tiyari tribe in
1920. In 1938, six families lived in the village, along with farm animals: 278
appendi x a | 325
goats and 102 sheep.399 There were around eight Assyrian families residing
there, along with several Kurdish families, at the time of its destruction in
1988.400
Merkajiya
Merkajiya is located in the Barwari Bala sub-district of ‘Amēdīyāh. In 1957,
it was home to forty-nine individuals. As with all the Barwari villages,
Merkajiya was not left unscathed by the events of the 1960s. It was the site
of napalm attacks in 1968. In 1970, the headman, Yukhanna Odisho Zaia,
was assassinated in order to intimidate the villagers into leaving. Prior to its
ruination in 1988 by the Iraqi military, twenty families residing in twelve
households called the village home.401 Merkajiya was also the site of a known
chemical attack during the Anfal offensive.402
Meze
Meze is located just south of the Gara Mountains in the old Church of the
East diocese of Mar Abraham of Nerem. As early as 1850, between thirty
and forty-five families (seven of them converts to Catholicism) resided in
Meze (‘Mezi’ in Badger), served by a priest of the Church of the East.403
By the time of Tfinkdji’s arrival in 1913, the number of Chaldeans had
increased to 100 individuals, including a priest.404 In 1957, Meze was
inhabited by 179 people, who fled in 1961. The Chaldean church of Mart
Shmuni and Mart Maryam of the Church of the East both lay in ruins fol-
lowing an attack by pro-government Zebari militiamen, who later squatted
on its lands.405 The village was reportedly attacked and destroyed again
in 1987.406
Musaka
Musaka is located in the Barwari Bala sub-district of ‘Amēdīyāh. In 1938,
nineteen families called the village home, alongside their 124 goats and 43
sheep.407 In 1957, it was home to 128 villagers. Little remains of the ancient
church dedicated to Mar Yosip, which was destroyed, along with the school
and the remainder of the village, in 1988, displacing its thirty-five families.408
Along with Hayyis and Merkajiya, Musaka was the site of a known chemical
attack.409
Figure 29 ADM figures among the ruins of a village in Nerwa
Nerwa (Lower)
Lower Nerwa is a five-hour walk from the nearest road.410 In 1938, it had
seven Church of the East families (including approximately twenty-five
men), along with a variety of domesticated animals: 144 goats, 73 sheep, 4
donkeys, 2 oxen and a mule.411According to the 1957 census, 149 Assyrians
lived in Lower Nerwa, and in 1961 there were thirty-two families (approxi-
mately twenty-five households).412 Prior to the final evacuation of the village
by the Saddam regime in 1978, there were sixty families living in Lower
Nerwa.413 During the border clearings, the seventh-century church of Mar
Khnana was eliminated along with the village. Many Assyrians from Lower
Nerwa who survived the destruction were forcibly moved to the collective
town of Deralok.
Qārō
In 1850, there were between ten and fifteen Church of the East-rite fami-
lies in Qārō, with one priest.414 In 1938, League of Nations documenta-
tion identifies nine Assyrian families of the Nestorian religious community
(including approximately forty men), along with a variety of domesticated
appendi x a | 327
animals: 397 goats, 83 sheep, 7 oxen, 2 donkeys and a mule.415 In 1961, there
were forty-two Assyrian families (eighteen households). Prior to Qārō’s first
destruction by the regime in 1977–8, there were fifty families and a school.416
In 1981, parts of the village were rebuilt by a small contingent of returnees.
The entire village was once again ruined in 1988, and the remaining families
were forced to flee. More than thirty-five Assyrians of the village had fled and
attempted to return during the general amnesty offered by the Iraqi govern-
ment, but none were seen or heard from again.417 Qārō’s three churches –
Mar Gewargis, originally built in the seventh century and last restored in
1810; Mar Quryaqos; and Mar Younan – still lie in ruins.
Sardarawa
Sardarawa (sometimes spelled Sardawara or Sirdarao) was resettled by
Assyrian refugees from Hakkâri after the First World War. In 1938, eight
families (fifteen men and fifteen women) dwelled in the village, alongside
nine goats.418 According to the 1957 Iraqi census, its inhabitants numbered
ninety-nine people. Sardarawa was destroyed by the Saddam regime in 1987,
along with its church. The thirty remaining families were forced to flee to
Assyrian areas elsewhere in Iraq. A presidential palace was later built on the
villagers’ land, further solidifying Sardarawa’s total destruction.419
Sikrīne
In 1920, Sikrīne (also Segrin) was settled predominantly by Assyrian refugees
of the Tkhuma tribe, who then fled to Syria after the 1933 massacres. In
1938, four families (ten men and seven women) resided in the village, along
with their livestock: ninety-eight goats and three sheep.420 Just prior to the
exodus from the village, the population numbered approximately sixty-five.
Other Assyrians later resettled Sikrīne, and in 1957, the population stood at
475. In 1987, the Ba‘th regime destroyed the village, along with its school,
and its thirty-seven families were displaced.421
Tāshish
In 1850, Tāshish, or Tārshish, was home to between twenty and thirty fami-
lies, served by a Church of the East priest and one functioning church.422 By
1938, sixty families dwelled in the village, alongside their 320 sheep and 122
goats.423 In 1957, its population totalled 163 individuals. In 1961, there were
sixty families (thirty households) in the village, and prior to being attacked
by the pro-regime militia during the Anfal operations, it was home to seventy
families, with a school.424 The church of Mar Quryaqos (restored in 1850)
and a shrine dedicated to Mart Shmuni were once part and parcel of the
village.
Ten
Referred to as Keni on some British topographical maps, Ten, or Tin, is a
fifteen-minute drive from the monastery of Abraham, which is ‘now a 100
meter by 50 ruin, called “House of the Painters”.’425 Ten has long been
inhabited and contains many markers of its cultural significance. In 1850,
between thirty and forty-five families and a priest serving one church dwelled
in the village.426 By 1913, the population of Ten had increased to 450, served
by two Chaldean-rite priests and a school.427 Following the 1933 massa-
cres, there were 200 Assyrians living in Ten.428 By 1938, thirty-three people
resided in the village with their livestock: ninety-three goats and forty-six
sheep.429 In 1957, the village population totalled 362, and in 1987, when
the Ba‘th regime destroyed it, there were forty-five families dwelling in the
area.430 The ancient church of Mart Shmuni was also eliminated at this time.
An hour’s drive from Ten, in Zawitha, west of the village of Bamarne, is the
famous monastery of Mar Abraham (‘Abraham the weeper’), dating back to
at least the tenth century, whose ruins were still visible as late as 1956.431 Two
Assyrians from Ten were abducted and disappeared during the Anfal opera-
tions from August to October 1988.432
Tuthe Shemaye
Tuthe Shemaye’s (written as ‘Toshambic’ in some League of Nations docu-
ments) etymology may be connected to an abundance of elana d’tuthe, or
mulberry trees, in the region. It was part of athran meetha, ‘our dead land’,
a term for the Assyrian region of Barwari Bala, which lost its tribal inde-
pendence and fell under the jurisdiction of various Kurdish aghas. During
G. P. Badger’s wanderings in Mesopotamia in 1850, he remarked that
between ten and fifteen Assyrian families lived in Tuthe Shemaye.433 In
1938, nineteen families, thirty-three sheep and thirty-three goats resided
appendi x a | 329
in the village.434 By 1957 its population totalled forty-five individuals. In

1961, there were fifteen Assyrian families (six households) living in the vil-
lage, as well as three Kurdish families.435 Prior to its destruction in 1988 by
the Ba‘th regime, it was home to ten Assyrian families and the old church
of Mar Gewargis, which met with the same fate as the rest of the village
structures.436
Wela
In 1850, Wela (also Welah) had between ten and fifteen families, with one
priest and one church.437 In 1938, there were seven families in Wela, consist-
ing of twenty-six males and an unknown number of females, along with a
variety of livestock including 145 goats, 87 sheep, 7 oxen, 1 donkey and
1 mule.438 By the 1957 census, there were fifty-nine individuals in Wela.
Later, in 1961, there were sixteen families (nine households), and prior to the
evacuation by the Ba‘th regime in 1977, twenty families resided in Wela.439
The churches of Mart Shmuni (perhaps seventh century) and Mart Maryam
were first destroyed at this time.440 The village met with devastation yet again
in 1987 and 1988 during the Anfal operations.
‘Aqra District
It may be of note to mention the Nahla d’Malka or ‘valley of the king’ sub-
district as having a longstanding and continuous Assyrian habitation. Though
much of it was abandoned for years due to persecution, the resettlement of
Hakkâri Assyrians was in a sense a remigration into the region.
Bilmand
The village of Bilmand was rebuilt by Assyrians from Lower Tiyari in 1920
following their exodus from Hakkâri. By 1938, ten families resided in the
village, comprising forty men and thirty-six women and children, along with
354 sheep and 333 goats.441 In 1957, the village population totalled ninety-
one. One of its residents, Odisho Iyut, saw his nearby lands in Korawa village
confiscated and occupied by neighbouring Kurds in 1959.442 There were
approximately 150 Assyrians living in the village in 1977.443 At the time of
its destruction in 1987, Bilmand was residence to 35–40 families, with a
school.444 The village is absent from the 1961 Dominican map.
Cham ‘Ashrat
Cham (also Chamme) ‘Ashrat was settled in 1922 by refugees from Upper
Tiyari. Numbering around seventy people, most of these settlers fled to Syria
and settled in the Khabur basin after fleeing the massacres at Simele and
surrounding villages in 1933.445 Cham ‘Ashrat was later settled by tribesmen
of Lower Tiyari, and by 1957, the village population totalled ninety-five,
approximately twenty-five families, living in thirteen homes.446 The village
was destroyed during the Anfal period in 1988, along with its one church
dedicated to Mar Ephrem, and its remaining twenty-five families were
displaced.447
Cham Chale
Cham Chale, located in the Nahla sub-district, was settled in 1922 by tribes-
men from Lower Tiyari. In 1938, it was home to thirteen families (twenty-
nine men and thirty-six women), along with their livestock: 168 goats and 90
sheep.448 According to the 1957 Iraq census, the village population numbered
fifty-one inhabitants. Cham Chale was initially plundered in 1963, and its
population fled following the civil war. The village was repopulated and in
1977 had sixty persons dwelling within it before it was destroyed yet again in
1988 as part of the Anfal operations.449
Cham Rabatke
The name of Cham Rabatke may derive from Kurdish for ‘river of the
monks’, speaking to a historic monastic community in the region.450
Through the centuries, people left and emigrated to and from the region.
More recently it was settled by refugees from Lower Tiyari in 1920.
Following the 1933 massacres, an estimated ninety Assyrians survived in
the village.451 In 1938, six families remained, with sixteen men and twenty-
six women and c hildren, along with 368 goats and 273 sheep.452 By 1977,
ninety-eight people resided in the village.453 Before being destroyed in 1987,
Cham Rabatke was home to forty-five families (thirty households).454 The
Assyrians of the former village were relocated to ‘Aqra and left there by
military and government forces to build dwellings from raw materials found
in the area. Most villagers lived months in tents with no forthcoming gov-
ernment aid.455
appendi x a | 331
Cham Sinne
In 1922, following the First World War, Assyrians from Lower Tiyari settled
Cham Sinne. A report by the League of Nations mentions forty families of
the Church of the East ecclesiastical background before a malaria outbreak
later that year which decreased their number to twenty-five (142 persons).456
By 1957, the village population numbered approximately 130 inhabitants.
When the village and church of Mar Ephrem were destroyed by the regime
in 1987, there were thirty families in Cham Sinne.457
Guhana
Some nine families were settled in Guhana (also Kohana) in 1938.458 Local
Assyrians purchased the land in 1955 from the Iraqi government, and by
1961 there were twenty families who called the village home.459 In 1986
Guhana was targeted and its thirty-five families were forced to flee.460
Hazarjot
The village of Hazarjot (also Hazarjift), as well as all the adjacent farm-
ing land, was purchased in 1925–6 under the supervision of the Chaldean
church for refugees from the village of Sat in Hakkâri. Between 1920 and
1933, Nestorian-rite families from Lower Tiyari in Hakkâri also settled
in Hazarjot.461 In 1938, Hazarjot included thirteen Assyrian families, ten
Jewish families and twenty Kurdish families. The non-human animals num-
bered ninety goats and fifty sheep.462 According to the 1957 census, the
population stood at 178 people. There were more than twenty-five families
living in the village when it was exposed to burning and plundering by
Zebari irregulars from 1961 to 1963.463 Though the majority of its popula-
tion remained, that tragedy was repeated in 1972, causing more residents to
flee. Much of Hazarjot’s population returned in 1975 and remained. The
village was destroyed again in 1988, along with the church of Mart Maryam.
Prior to the destruction of the Anfal campaign, Hazarjot was home to thirty-
five families, with a school.464
Hizane, Lower and Upper

Hizane (sometimes Hizanke), in the Nahla region, was resettled by Assyrians
from Lower Tiyari in 1920. By 1938 Lower Hizane had five families
comprising fifteen men and ten women and children, along with 251 sheep
and 187 goats, while Upper Hizane had twenty-eight families number-
ing seventy-seven men and seventy-eight women and children, along with
293 sheep and 281 goats as livestock.465 In 1957, the village’s popula-
tion numbered 254 inhabitants: 210 in Lower Hizane and 44 in Upper
Hizane. In 1961, there were forty-two households in Hizane. The village
was razed and burned in 1964 and 1969 by government irregulars.466 By
1977, Upper Hizane numbered twenty people and Lower Hizane 145.467 In
1987, it was home to 110 families, with a school.468 The old church of Mar
Gewargis (restored in the 1950s) was also destroyed by the Ba‘th regime.469
Some individuals of the village who were targeted include Yalda Eshoo
Zadoq, Toma Enwiya Toma, Eshoo Goriel Khoshaba and Mikhael Lazar
Mikhael.470
Kashkawa
Kashkawa was settled by families from Lower Tiyari in 1920 (along with
the majority of the Nahla region). In 1933, 134 inhabitants lived in the
Figure 30 Ruins of Mar Gewargis, Hizane (Courtesy of Hormuz Bobo)

appendi x a | 333
village.471 By 1938, there were twenty families (131 persons).472 According

to the 1957 census account, approximately 180 villagers dwelled within
Kashkawa. When attacked by pro-government Kurdish irregulars in
1963, its thirty households were burned and inhabitants forced to flee,
since the village was known to have significant sympathisers involved
in the anti-government activities of Assyrians, Kurds and others.473
Among those men singled out for elimination were Daniel Toma, Moshe
Zaia and Youkhana Shammas, who were all eventually killed. Some of its
population returned following the ceasefire on 11 March 1970, but were
soon to be threatened once again.474 Before being destroyed along with its
church Mart Shmuni again in 1987, Kashkawa was home to 100 families,
with a school.475
Khalilani
Khalilani is located in the sub-district of Nahla (or Nahla d’Malka). It
was settled by families from Lower Tiyari in 1920. In 1938, seven fami-
lies, amounting to twenty-four men and twenty women and children,
Figure 31 Ruins of Kashkawa, 1987 (Courtesy of Hormuz Bobo)

resided in the village, alongside 144 goats and 143 sheep.476 In 1957,
the
village
population was twenty-eight; by 1977, it had risen to
seventy-three. 477
The population increased further to twenty-five families
by the time of the village’s destruction in 1987 during the start of the Anfal
operations.478
Meroke
Meroke (also Merugee and Miroki), most likely a corruption of Mar Awgen
or ‘St Eugene’, was settled by Assyrians from Lower Tiyari in 1920. In 1938,
eight families dwelled in the village, amounting to twenty-six men and thirty
women and children, along with 219 sheep and 188 goats.479 In 1957, the
village held around seventy residents. Meroke was home to thirty-five fami-
lies (fifteen households), with a school, just prior to being bulldozed by the
military operations of 1987.480
Suse
Suse, the name probably derived from the Assyrian for ‘horses’, is also known
as Cham Suse and Barraka d’Qaddisha. It was home to a cultural structure
called gippa d-qaddisha, ‘the saint’s cave’. According to a League of Nations
report concerning the settlement of the Assyrians following the 1933 mas-
sacres, 200 people inhabited the village.481 It was destroyed during the Anfal
operations.
Zouli
Zouli, or Zhouli, was settled by families from Lower Tiyari in 1920, and
usually divided into upper and lower regions. In 1957 the village population
totalled eighty-eight. In 1977, Upper Zouli numbered thirty inhabitants and
Lower Zouli twenty-five.482 Before being destroyed in 1987, Zouli was home
to thirty-four families, who were forced to flee to Mosul and other regions
populated by Assyrians.483
Dohuk District
Babilo
Babilo was settled by the Baz tribe in the 1920s. Around 1933, they num-
bered sixty-five people. In 1957, the village population stood at 111, and in
appendi x a | 335
1961 there were twenty-five families (sixteen households). In 1988, Babilo

was destroyed as part of the Anfal campaign and its thirty-five families were
left homeless.484 There is reportedly an old grotto church dedicated to Mar
Yosip near Babilo.485
Chavrik
Chavrik, or Avrik, was divided into an upper and lower region, both settled
by Assyrians. The village was destroyed by the Hussein regime in 1987 during
the Anfal operations.
Der-Alush
Little is known of Der-Alush, though its name indicates that it may have been
the site of a monastery. The village was destroyed in 1987.
Gund Kosa
Gund Kosa, its name probably partially derived from the Kurdish word
for ‘village’, gündük, lies along the river Khabour in the sub-district of
Doski. In recent history, Gund Kosa and three nearby villages were
settled by Lower Tiyari tribesmen in 1922. After the events of 1933,
only 150 Assyrians remained in the village.486 The settlers of the four
villages
garnered some help from neighbouring Kurds in the village of
Akmala and managed to form a small militia that repelled various attacks
against the Assyrians in the region, thus saving Gund Kosa from the Doski
Kurdish tribe and granting refuge to numerous families fleeing the Simele
atrocities.487 The population of the v illage in 1938 consisted of twenty-eight
families and their livestock: 345 goats and 217 sheep.488 The population
of another village, Spindarok,489 who survived the Simele massacres fled to
and settled in Gund Kosa. More than 170 families dwelled in the v illage
then. At the time of the 1957 Iraqi census, 136 people resided in Gund
Kosa. It is the birthplace of curate Zaia Bobo Dobato of the Church of
the East, who was targeted by the government, including with various
assassination attempts. Dobato escaped to Urmia, and there worked to
bring the Assyrian predicament to the attention of various NGOs and
the international community.490 In 1988, Gund Kosa was home to eighty
families, with a school and church, when it was targeted during the Anfal
operations.491 At least thirty-three v illagers disappeared during the destruc-

tion of the village.492
Malta
Malta, or Ma‘althaye, is located west of the Rabban Hormizd monastery of
Alqosh, on the mountainous border. It is part of the Catholic d iocese of
‘Amēdīyāh. Its name comes from the Assyrian-Aramaic word m eaning
‘gateway’, as it is literally the gateway to the mountainous region
north of Nineveh. Above the village are four reliefs carved into the
mountain by the ancient Assyrian king Sennacherib, as well as a monastic
hermitage. According to Badger’s accounts, as early as 1850 there were
between twenty and thirty _families in Malta, with one active church.493
In 1957, there were thirty households (130 people) and in 1961, there
were seventy families.494 The village was destroyed again in 1986 along
with the churches of Mar Zaya and Mar Awda.495 Due to its proximity
to Dohuk, Malta was used as a collective town for hundreds of Kurdish
families brought from villages ruined by the Iraqi regime during the Anfal
campaign.496
Peda
Assyrians had lived in the area of Peda for many decades. Peda was destroyed
by the Ba‘th regime in 1987. The population at the time of expulsion is
unknown.
Sheikhan District
Armashe
Armashe, also spelled Harmash, possesses an ancient Assyrian stele carved
into the rock face nearby. In 1850, there were between fifteen and twenty-
two families and a church within the village, all under the Church of the East
diocese of Mar Abraham of Gündük (Nerem), in the mountainous region
south of Jebel Gara.497 Many of its villagers originated from the Tkhuma
region in Hakkâri. In 1913, there were 310 Chaldean converts, with a priest
serving one church.498 In 1957, the village population totalled 204 (thir-
teen households), and before being destroyed in 1987 by the Ba‘th regime,
Armashe was home to fifty-five families, with a school.499 Assyrian villagers of
appendi x a | 337
both Armashe and Azakh were resettled in Atrush, which had been set up as a
collective town.500 The church of Mart Theresa suffered some damage during
the Anfal period. There is also a small church to Mar Ephrem dating back to
the seventh century.
Azakh
In 1850, Azakh, or Adekh, contained between fifteen and twenty-two fami-
lies and a church. The village, like Armashe, Meze and T.lanitha, lay in the
mountains south of Jebel Gara.501 By 1913, there were 300 Chaldean-rite
individuals, with a priest and a school, though the number of Church of the
East adherents was unclear at that time.502 In 1957, the village population
totalled seventy-eight individuals, and before being destroyed in 1987, Azakh
was home to a total of fifty families (twenty households).503 The church of Mar
Gewargis, first built in 1535, and the grotto dedicated to Mar Abraham were
once part of the once-thriving town before being bulldozed during the Anfal.
Bebōze
Bebōze, or Beth Bōzi, is part of the region known as Shemkān. In 1850,
there were between ten and fifteen families and one church in the predomi-
nantly Catholic village.504 The village’s existence is also attested to in Syriac
manuscripts, as in 1888 a monk named Nicholas Nōfāl of Tel Keppe copied
a manuscript in the village for the monastery of Rabban Hormizd.505 By
Tfinkdji’s time in 1913, there were 120 Chaldean-rite villagers, with one
priest.506 Bebōze was first destroyed in 1976.507 The village was resettled but,
along with the thirteenth-century church of Mart Shmuni and the seven
shrines dedicated to her children, was devastated again in 1987 by the Iraqi
military.
Birta
Birta (sometimes Bire), a half-hour walk from Tilla, is located in the western
part of the old Church of the East ecclesiastical region of Margā.508 Birta’s
name derives from the Akkadian word birtu ‘fortress’ and the village is the
location of a burial complex belonging to an Akkadian king. This village is
but one of many sites referred to as Birta, due to the ruins of a fortress in
close proximity. In 1913, sixty people lived in the village.509 While under
attack during the armed resistance movement in 1961, Birta’s people aban-
doned the village, which was later settled by Iraqi government irregulars
from the Zebari tribe.510 The ancient monastery of Mar Gewargis and the
fifth-century hermitages around the village had been continually damaged
by military and paramilitary activity and fell into further disrepair after
1961.511
Deze
Deze, or Dizze, has had a longstanding Nestorian and Chaldean ecclesiasti-
cal presence. Located not far from the Yezidi shrine of Sheikh Adi, Deze
lies in the same region as Bedul, Beboze, and Meze, all part of the Chaldean
diocese of ‘Amēdīyāh. In 1850, it was home to between twenty and thirty
families.512 By 1913, there were eighty Chaldeans in the village, but the
number of Nestorian adherents was unknown.513 The original inhabitants
fled in 1933 because of the local persecution, and the ownership of the lands
passed into the hands of Kurdish landowner Ibrahim Haj-Malo Mizouri.514
In 1974, Assyrians from Shuwadin (near Zakho) settled in Deze to work its
fields. Prior to its destruction by the Ba‘th regime in 1987, there were ninety
families (thirty households) in Deze, with a school. The ancient stone church
of Mar Christopher was also destroyed.515
Tilla
Tilla, or Tella, walking distance from Birta, is mentioned quite early in
Syriac sources as the place of origin of a copy of the Book of Superiors,
dated to 1701, and a book of hymns dated to 1720.516 According to Georg
Hoffmann, Tilla was also referred to as ‘Tellā Bīrtā’, perhaps since both
Tella and Birta refer to various sites with ancient lineage in the region; Tilla
is one of many sites of the same name. In 1913, there were 340 Chaldean-
rite villagers in Tilla, with a priest serving one church, and a school.517 Tilla
was destroyed in 1987, along with its three churches; the third-century
church of Mar Ish.aq, and another dedicated to Mart Maryam, were among
those eliminated. A mound dedicated to Mart Shmuni (a remnant of an
older ancient religious site), from which Tilla’s etymology probably derives
(tella meaning ‘mound’ or ‘hill’), was also despoiled during the village’s
destruction.
appendi x a | 339
Simele District
Badaliya
Jilu tribesmen settled in Badaliya (or Badariyah or Badriyah) in 1920, but
fled to Syria after the 1933 massacres, and an Arab landowner, Muhammad
Beg, took ownership of the village. By 1938, fifteen families had returned to
the village, totalling seventy-five persons.518 By the 1957 census, its Assyrian
population stood at 234. Before the last Assyrians were evacuated in 1987 to
make way for a government-run poultry project, sixty families inhabited the
village, with a school.519
Bakhitme
Bakhitme, or Beth-Khatme, ‘the place of the seals’ (probably in reference
to a place where documents or deals were signed or agreed to), is famous
for being the location of the martyrdom of Mar Daniel, to whom a church
was later dedicated (rebuilt in 1984).520 In its more recent history, Nochiya
tribesmen settled Bakhitme in 1920, but fled to Syria after the massacres
Figure 32 Ruins of Mar Gewargis church, Bakhitme (Courtesy Father Emmanuel
Youkhanna)
Figure 33 Ruins of Bakhitme (Courtesy Father Emmanuel Youkhanna)
Figure 34 Ruins of Bakhitme (Courtesy Father Emmanuel Youkhanna)
of August 1933. The village was again settled by eighty Assyrian families in
1956. Bakhitme was purchased in 1957 from the Arab sheikhs who owned
it, giving its approximately 230 residents hope for continued growth.521
However, in April 1987, the village was entirely destroyed, including two
schools and three churches (Mart Maryam and Mar Gewargis), and its 140
Assyrian families deported.522
Gera-Gora
Gera-Gora is referred to as Kera-Gora by Eshoo. Some of its more
recent inhabitants hailed from Tkhuma and Rumta in Upper Tiyari and
settled in the village following the First World War.523 After the massacres
of 1933, many of the villagers fled to Syria, and the village was immedi-
ately r esettled by other Assyrians from the neighbouring towns. According
to the census account of 1957, approximately 200 villagers dwelled in
Gera-Gora. Most recently, according to information gleaned by the AAS
field mission in 2004, the village was forcibly abandoned in Badaliya in
1987.524
Hejerke
Hejerke (also Hizeerke and Hizirki), located just northwest of Sheze, was
settled by Baz tribesmen following the First World War. In 1933 there were
approximately eighty-five individuals in the village, and in 1938 the League
of Nations reported twenty-five families along with significant livestock:
572 goats and 180 sheep.525 By 1957, the population had been reduced
to forty-one.526 The Iraqi regime attacked the village in 1984, and later
destroyed it in 1987, when Hejerke’s remaining eight families were forced
to flee.
Kharab Kulk
Kharab Kulk can possibly be identified as the H.arbai mentioned in Syriac
sources. The monastery of Mar Isaac is located nearby.527 Kharab Kulk was set-
tled by Nestorian-rite Assyrians from the former patriarchal see of Qochanis
in Hakkâri following the massacres of Assyrians, Greeks and Armenians in
Asia Minor during the First World War.528 The village was first overrun in
1961 during the civil war, and again in 1987.
appendi x a | 343
Mar Yaqob
Mar Yaqob, or Mar Yaqo, is located east of Hejerke and northwest of Sheze.
According to Majed Eshoo, it sits just atop a mountain referred to by Assyrians
as Bakhira, or Beth Khira, loosely translated as ‘place of freedom’.529 Mar
Yaqob is known in Kurdish as Qashafir. During Badger’s journeys in 1850,
Mar Yaqob was home to between twenty-one and thirty-two families, with
a chapel and later a school, served by a priest.530 During Tfinkdji’s travels in
early 1913, he recorded 150 Chaldean-rite Assyrian villagers with a chapel and
a school but no priest.531 The Dominicans later built a large monastic academy
in the 1920s. A monumental grave was built for the Dominican Father Besson,
who died during an epidemic in the region.532 Mar Yaqob was damaged first
in 1976 and finally destroyed in 1988, at which time it was home to twenty
Assyrian families.533 The mausoleum of Father Besson was also destroyed.534
Sheze
Sheze, or Shiyoz, is located just north of the village of Simele. Like Malta
and Mar Yaqob, Sheze lies along the mountain range to the west of Rabban
Hormizd, within the ‘Amēdīyāh diocese. In 1850, between twenty and thirty
families lived in the village, but Badger does not mention a functional church,
quite peculiar for a village of approximately 150 people.535 In 1913, there
were approximately 210 villagers, with a Chaldean-rite priest serving the
Figure 35 Ruins of Sheze, circa 1987 (Courtesy the Nineveh Center for Research
and Development, Qaraqosh, Iraq)
church of Mar Gewargis, along with a school.536 In 1957, there were a total
of 417 Assyrians in Sheze, but in 1987 the village was destroyed, along with
its school and church. The eighty families that remained were forced to flee
to friendlier territory.537 The ruins of a monastery dedicated to Mar ‘Ishoyab
also lie near the village.
Surka
Surka was originally inhabited by both Christians and Yezidis. In 1957, the
village’s population totalled 196. In 1987, before its inhabitants were evacu-
ated to make way for a poultry project by the Iraqi government, there were
thirty families in the village, with a school.538
Zakho District
Bersive
The name Bersive may be rooted in the Assyrian bera d’sawa, or ‘old man’s
well’. The village was settled by refugee families from what is now Turkey,
descendants of Mamo, a priest in the fourteenth century.539 In 1913, there were
400 residents in the village, served by a Chaldean-rite priest and a church.540
In 1957, the census accounts estimated 786 inhabitants; in 1961, there were
a total of 240 families (220 households).541 Bersive was attacked numerous
times in the 1960s by passing warplanes. Some of its population fled and
later returned after a lessening of hostilities in the civil war. By 1976, the Iraqi
regime had turned Bersive into a c ollective town, settling 560 Kurdish and 40
Assyrian families who had been forced out of more than twenty v illages along
the border region with Turkey during the first border c learings in 1974–5.542
The Chaldean church of Mar Gewargis, dating from the twelfth century, lies
in the centre of the village. The church of Mar Ephrem of the Assyrian Church
of the East (Nestorian) was consecrated in 1970 and located on the village
outskirts.543 Bersive was utilised as a collective town again in 1988.544 In 1990,
on the eve of the Gulf War, there were 160 Assyrian families in Bersive.545
Hizawa
The village of Hizawa is located in the sub-district of Sindi. It was turned into
a collective town during the Anfal period, changing its demography.546 Little
is known about its two original ancient churches.
appendi x a | 345
Figure 36 Ruins of Levo following the Anfal operations, 1988 (Courtesy the
Nineveh Center for Research and Development)
Levo
According to the 1957 census, Levo had a population of 616 residents (350
families, 150 homes). During the rebellion in 1961, the village was targeted
by various air raid bombings. Levo continued to be targeted by raids, lootings
and bombings, by both state and non-state actors for the next twenty-seven
years, until 1988.547 Most physical structures suffered major damage or were
destroyed completely, including its Chaldean-rite church dedicated to Mar
Abraham. Three citizens were killed during the Anfal operations at Levo:
Sabriya Maroge Sliwa, Amira Odisho Khosho and Jibrael Odisho Khosho.
Another Assyrian, Saber Khayri Youkhana, disappeared.548 Levo’s 140 fami-
lies were displaced after the Anfal operations.
Mala ‘Arab
Mala ‘Arab was resettled in 1916 by refugees from Lower Tiyari, but a year
later they moved to Gund Kosa. In 1922, Mala ‘Arab was again settled by
Assyrians from the villages of the Margā region.549 At the time of the 1957
census, Mala ‘Arab’s population totalled 237 individuals, and by 1961 there
were approximately 120 families (fifty households) in the village.550 The vil-
lage was burned and razed by Zebari Kurds in 1963.551 In 1970, its popula-
tion returned following the 11 March ceasefire between the government and
Kurdish forces, and began rebuilding the village, including a school, until
1988 during the Anfal operations, when Mala ‘Arab was once again destroyed
and its sixty Assyrian households dispersed.552
Mergasūr
Mergasūr most likely finds its etymology in an Assyrian-Aramaic phrase
meaning ‘pasture of Ashur’. According to the 1957 census, it was home to
186 individuals, and by 1961, there were 170 families (eighty households)
in the village.553 Prior to its demolition by the Iraqi government in 1988,
Mergasūr was the dwelling place of 60 households, with a school.554
Nav-Kandal
Nav Kandal (Naf Kandal) is a remote village. In 1957, it was home to 240
individuals, and in 1961, there were 150 families (approximately sixty house-
holds). The old church dedicated to Mar Yawsep served as its cultural and
religious centre. Just prior to its purging in 1988, Nav Kandal was home to
110 families, with a school.555 The church of Mar Yawsep was destroyed along
with the village dwellings in the same year. There are 250 families from Nav-
Kandal elsewhere in Iraq and in the diaspora.556
Pireka
Pireka is located in the sub-district of Guli. According to the 1957 Iraqi census,
it was home to 108 individuals. The village was initially destroyed during the
border clearings in 1978, and at the time, was home to ninety Chaldean-rite
households (approximately thirty-five households) and a school.557 The village
was rebuilt over the next few years, but was destroyed again in 1984.
Sharanish
The birthplace of the Syriac scholar Alphonse Mingana, Sharanish (French
spelling Chéranésch) is possibly named after an ancient princess known as
Shiranoosh. In 1913, it was home to 600 townsfolk, with a Chaldean-rite
priest serving the two churches of Mart Shmuni and Mar Quryaqos.558 In
1957, the population reached 384, and in 1961 there were eighty households
when the village was destroyed and much of its lands confiscated by Zebari
Kurdish irregulars.559 Some villagers returned over time and rebuilt, and in
1978, Sharanish was home to a total of 160 Assyrian families (2,000 people),
appendi x a | 347
with a school.560 The village was targeted once again in 1987 and its remain-
ing eighty families displaced.561 The ancient churches of Mart Shmuni and
Mar Quryaqos were both destroyed during the devastation.
Ninawa Province
Sheikhan District
Haruna
Haruna was destroyed by the Ba‘th regime in 1987. It was home to a majority
of Yezidis, with a small Christian population.562
Notes
1. Much of this data can be seen in greater detail in Nicholas al-Jeloo,
‘Characteristics of Pre-19th Century Assyrian Christian Architecture East
of the Tigris River: An Evaluation and Analysis Based on the Study of 114
Examples from Across the Region’ (MA Thesis, Faculty of Theology, Leiden
University, 2006). This appendix is indebted to his meticulous study.
2. Numbers of people, churches, animals, schools etc. are given when possible.
Also for the majority of village data, the Assyrians are mentioned by their
ecclesiastical and tribal affiliations when known. The Dominican map served
as the initial source for geographic coordinates and aided in corroborating the
ethnographic data.
3. All the Assyrian villages of this region were privately owned by Sayid Taha and
the heirs of Ismail Beg, with the exception of Hawdian, which was owned by
Mulla Osa Agha of the Baliki tribe. The Assyrians cultivated the land and paid
tribute and had been doing so since 1921. Known crops were wheat, barley,
and a variety of fruits and vegetables, as well as tobacco. Note also that the
wording of the League of Nations report calls the Assyrians fellahs or ‘cultiva-
tors’. See League of Nations, Report on the Economic Conditions of the Assyrians
in the Northern Provinces in Iraq, 21. Similar to most Native American nations,
some Assyrians did not ‘own’ their land in the sense of having the acquired land
deeds associated with it. During the early years of the United States, the US
government regularly attempted to designate ‘land owners’ by written deed.
As this trait was not one followed by Native American/Aboriginal culture (i.e.,
a person owning land distinguished by a piece of parchment or paper), it is
generally not recognised as a legitimate marker of indigeneity. Also note this
region was not reproduced on Josephe Omez’s Dominican map of 1961.
4. League of Nations, Report on the Economic Conditions of the Assyrians in the

Northern Provinces in Iraq, 21.
5. C.C. (Darbandoke), interview with author, 17 February 2008, Toronto; Iraq:
Continuous and Silent Ethnic Cleansing – Displaced Persons in Iraqi Kurdistan
and Iraqi Refugees in Iran (Paris: FIDH/International Alliance for Justice,
2003), 42.
7. B.B. (Harīr), interview with author, 17 February 2008, Toronto.
8. Ibid.
10. P.W. (Diyana), interview with author, 17 February 2008, Toronto.
11. Though Diyana was destroyed again in 1974, very little information could be
found concerning that period, making its inclusion in this appendix more proper.
13. B.B. (Harīr), C.C. (Darbandoke), I.Y. (Diyana) and P.W. (Diyana), interviews
with author, 17 February 2008, Toronto; Iraq: Continuous and Silent Ethnic
Cleansing, 42.
15. B.B. (Harīr), interview, 17 February 2008, Toronto.
16. ‘Kurdish minister has no objection to Assyrian Christian administrative area’,
Assyrian International News Agency, 26 February 2006, http://www.aina.org/
news/20060225231434.htm (accessed 23 July 2014).
18. Ibid.
new ed. (London: Faber & Faber, 1958), 158–9.
21. Ralph Solecki, Shanidar: The First Flower People (New York: Knopf, 1971),
73–5.
22. B.B. (Harīr), C.C. (Darbandoke), I.Y. (Diyana) and P.W. (Diyana), interviews
with author, 17 February 2008, Toronto.
appendi x a | 349
23. ‘‘Amēdīyāh’, Encyclopedia Judaica, 2nd ed. (Farmington Hills, MI: Macmillan
Reference USA, 2007).
24. A nickname meaning ‘the blind prince’. Mira Kora, originally Muhammad
Pasha, was Kurdish chief of the Rawanduz region. See Amir Harrak, ‘Northern
Mesopotamia in a 19th Century Syriac Annalistic Source’, Le Muséon: revue
d’études orientales 119.3–4 (2006), 298–301.
25. George Percy Badger, The Nestorians and Their Rituals (London: Darf, [1852]
1987), vol. 2, 174.
26. J. C. J. Sanders, Assyrian-Chaldean Christians in Eastern Turkey and Iran: Their
Last Homeland Re-charted (Hernen, Netherlands: AA Brediusstichting, 1997),
63.
27. Ibid, 64.
28. American consulate in Tabriz to Secretary of State, 19 October 1961, NA/
RG59/787.00/10-1961; Tabriz to Secretary of State, 25 October 1961, NA/
RG59/787.00/10-2561; Tabriz to Secretary of State, 1 November 1961, NA/
RG59/787.00/10-161.
29. Avshalom H. Rubin, ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim and the Kurds of Iraq:
Centralization, Resistance and Revolt 1958–63’ Middle Eastern Studies 43.3
(2007), 369–70.
30. AAS, ‘Field Mission Iraq 2004’.
31. Ibid.; Eshoo, ‘The Fate of Assyrian Villages’, 11.
33. Eshoo, ‘The Fate of Assyrian Villages’, 9, D.T. (Blejanke), interview with
author, 24 February 2008, Toronto.
34. B.B. (Harīr), C.C. (Darbandoke) and I.Y. (Diyana), interviews with author, 17
February 2008, Toronto.
37. Eshoo, ‘The Fate of Assyrian Villages’, 8.
39. Budge, The Book of Governors, vol. 2, 633.
41. For a full account of the events which occurred at S.awura, see details as recounted
by Shabo ‘Aziz d’Baz in ‘Abdyešu‘ Barzana, Šinnē d-‘Asqūtā: Qrābā d-Dayrabūn
w-Gunh.ā d-Simele (Chicago: Assyrian Academic Society Press, 2003), 232–8.
42. R. S. Stafford, ‘Iraq and the Problem of the Assyrians’, International Affairs
13.2 (1934), 176.
46. D.T. (Blejanke), K.S. (Dūre), Y.D. (Annūnē), Y.G. (Bebede) and Z.Y.
(Annūnē), interviews with author, 24 February 2008, Toronto.
47. Simo Parpola and Michael Porter, The Helsinki Atlas of the Near East in
the Neo-Assyrian Period (Helsinki: Neo-Assyrian Corpus Text Project,
2001), 19.
48. J.-M. Fiey, Assyrie chrétienne (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1963), vol. 1,
225–35.
49. David Wilmshurst, The Ecclesiastical Organization of the Church of the East
(Leuven: Peeters, 2000), 362. Wilmshurst’s estimates are based on numbers
extracted from Joseph Tfinkdji, ‘L’Église chaldéene catholique autrefois et
aujourd’hui’, Annuaire pontifical catholique 1914 (Paris: Maison de la Bonne
Presse, 1913), 499, and elsewhere.
50. Fiey, Assyrie chrétienne, vol. 1, 305–6.
51. Badger, The Nestorians and their Rituals, vol. 2, 392.
52. Tfinkdji, ‘L’Église chaldéene catholique autrefois et aujourd’hui’, 499. Tfinkdji
fails to mention the chapel in his research notes.
53. Fiey, Assyrie chrétienne, vol. 1, 269.
54. It is mentioned also in Georg Hoffmann, Auszüge aus syrischen Akten persischer
Märtyrer (Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus, [1880] 1966), 207.
55. E. A. Wallis Budge, The Book of Governors: The Historia Monastica of Thomas
Bishop of Marga ad 840 (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1893), vol. 2,
226.
56. Tfinkdji, ‘L’Église chaldéene catholique autrefois et aujourd’hui’, 499.
General Conference website, http://www.assyriangc.com/magazine/eng1.pdf,
12 (accessed 9 July 2014).
58. Frederick A. Aprim, Assyrians: From Bedr Khan to Saddam Hussein – Driving
into Extinction the Last Aramaic Speakers (F. A. Aprim, 2006), 211.
59. League of Nations, Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, 0.69.1934.VII, Geneva,
18 January 1934, enclosure II, 9.
appendi x a | 351
61. Assyrian Academic Society (AAS), ‘Field Mission Iraq 2004’.
63. Ibid.
Northern Provinces in Iraq, C.296.M.172.1938.VII, Geneva, 10 September
1938, 17.
65. Ibid., 18.
67. A major liturgical work used by the Church of the East.
69. Hoffmann, Auszüge aus syrischen Akten persischer Märtyrer, 223–4.
February 2008, Toronto; AAS, ‘Field Mission Iraq 2004’.
73. Wilmshurst, The Ecclesiastical Organization of the Church of the East, 158–61.
74. Ibid., 161.
75. Budge, The Book of Governors, vol. 2, 296–7.
76. Ibid., 450–2.
81. Wilmshurst, The Ecclesiastical Organization of the Church of the East, 161. The
manuscripts can be found in MSS ‘Aqra (Voste) 17 and ‘Aqra (Habbi) 53, 91.
86. Tfinkdji, ‘L’Église chaldéene catholique autrefois et aujourd’hui,’ 499.
88. According to AAS, ‘Field Mission Iraq 2004’, the relief was dynamited by
treasure hunters at some time in the five years preceding the report. See also
Badger, The Nestorians and their Rituals, vol. 1, 390; Taufiq Wahby, ‘The Rock
Sculptures in Gunduk Cave’, Sumer 4.2 (1948).
89. Budge, The Book of Governors, vol. 2, 591–622.
90. Parpola and Porter, The Helsinki Atlas of the Near East in the Neo-Assyrian
Period, 15.
91. League of Nations, Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, enclosure II, 8.
94. Wilmshurst, The Ecclesiastical Organization of the Church of the East, 160.
95. Tfinkdji, ‘L’Église chaldéene catholique autrefois et aujourd’hui’, 499; Fiey,
Assyrie chrétienne, vol. 1, 262.
97. Ibid., 263.
100. Fiey believes Badger to have exaggerated the Jewish population greatly, which is
highly probable. See Fiey, Assyrie chrétienne, vol. 1, 259; Badger, The Nestorians
and Their Rituals, vol. 1, 389.
105. Ibid.
109. Ibid., 3.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
appendi x a | 353

115. Eshoo, ‘The Fate of Assyrian Villages’ mentions 1961 (p. 14), whereas Iraq:
Continuous and Silent Ethnic Cleansing mentions 1963 (p. 42).
120. Fallah is generally used in Kurdish to refer to Assyrian Christians, even in the
Tur Abdin, which would speak to its general usage in the Kurmanji dialect.
The term is most likely originally a borrowing from Arabic fallah., denoting
‘worker’ or ‘peasant’.
122. Tfinkdji. ‘L’Église chaldéene catholique autrefois et aujourd’hui’, 502.
123. K.S. (Dūre) and Y.D. (Annūnē), interviews with author, 24 February 2008,
Toronto. Fursan Salahaddin or the Knights of Saladin were a Kurdish merce-
nary group. For further information, see Habib Ishow, Les Structures sociales et
politiques de l’Irak contemporain: pourquoi un état en crise? (Paris: Harmattan,
2003), 89.
129. Ibid.
130. Wilmshurst, The Ecclesiastical Organization of the Church of the East,
263.
131. Harrak, ‘Northern Mesopotamia in a 19th Century Syriac Annalistic Source’,
301.
132. Ibid., 302.
133. Justin Perkins, A Residence of Eight Years in Persia among the Nestorian
Christians; with Notices of the Muhammedans (Andover, MA: Allen, Morrill &
Wardwell, 1843), 22–30.
135. Hirmis Aboona, interview with author, 11 October 2007, Mississauga, Ontario.
136. George Black, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds (New
York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), 37. Footnote 29 mentions Shorsh Haji
Resool again. It is evident that HRW is dependent on Resool’s work for most of
its information concerning the Anfal campaign and the 1978 border clearings.
138. Al-Thawra, 18 September 1978.
and Kurdistan (New York: American Committee for Armenian and Syrian
Relief, 1916), 54.
150. Badger, The Nestorians and Their Rituals, vol. 1, 380–1.
152. Majed Eshoo, ‘The Fate of Assyrian Villages’, 4; K.S. (Dūre), interview with
author, 24 February 2008, Toronto.
157. Rockwell, The Pitiful Plight of the Assyrian Christians in Persia and Kurdistan,
54.
159. Eshoo, ‘The Fate of Assyrian Villages’, 7; Iraq: Continuous and Silent Ethnic
Cleansing, 40.
appendi x a | 355
164. Rev. F. N. Heazell and Mrs Margoliouth, Kurds and Christians (London: Wells
Gardner Darton, 1913), 151–2. Such ‘Western’ work was as destructive of an
integrated Assyrian identity and progress as governmental policies in the later
Iraqi state.
54.
169. Sanders, Assyrian-Chaldean Christians in Eastern Turkey and Iran, 65.
170. Amir Odisho, ‘Dūrī’, al-Fikr al-Masihi, July–September 1996, 24–5.
171. K.S. (Dūre), Interview, 24 February 2008, Toronto.
172. Ibid.
177. Edward Lewes Cutts, Christians under the Crescent in Asia (London: Society for
Promoting Christian Knowledge / New York: Pott, Young, 1877), 354.
180. Eshoo, ‘The Fate of Assyrian Villages’, 24; and AAS, ‘Field Mission Iraq 2004’.
54.
185. Cutts, Christians under the Crescent in Asia, 354.

54.
197. Ibid.
54.
54.
211. Eshoo, ‘The Fate of Assyrian Villages’, 4; K.S. (Dūre), interview with author,
24 February 2008, Toronto.
appendi x a | 357
215. Ibid., 41.

216. Ibid.
217. Ibid.
222. AAS, ‘Field Mission Iraq 2004’; Eshoo, ‘The Fate of Assyrian Villages’, 21.
225. League of Nations, Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, enclosure IV, 11.
233. Father Paulos Bedari was a strong advocate of the anti-government movement
of the early 1960s. See photograph in Ismet Chériff Vanly, The Revolution of
Iraki Kurdistan, Part 1: September 1961 to December 1963 (Committee for the
Defense of the Kurdish People’s Rights, 1965), 27.
237. Ibid., 40.
238. Ibid., 41.
239. Ibid.
244. David Gaunt, Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim–Christian Relations in
Eastern Anatolia during World War I (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2006),
244.
245. Jacques Rhétoré, Les Chrétiens aux bêtes: souvenirs de la guerre sainte proclamée
par les Turcs contre les chrétiens en 1915 (Paris: Cerf, 2005), 321.

249. See Ephrem-Isa Yousif, Parfums d’enfance à Sanate: un village chrétien au
Kurdistan irakien (Paris: Harmattan, 1993), for a comprehensive look at the
village.
263. Badger, The Nestorians and Their Rituals, vol. 1, 152; Wilmshurst, The
Ecclesiastical Organization of the Church of the East, 168.
264. AAS, ‘Field Mission Iraq, 2004’.
266. Marcus Stern, ‘Worlds apart on Chaldean crisis’, San Diego Union Tribune, 12
March 2003.
267. Ibid., 393.
269. Y.D. (Annūnē), interview with author, 24 February 2008, Toronto.
272. Ibid.
RG59/787.00/1-1062.
appendi x a | 359

275. Eshoo, ‘The Fate of Assyrian Villages’, 3; Y.D. (Annūnē), interview with
author. Iraq: Continuous and Silent Ethnic Cleansing, 40, mentions a slight
discrepancy of 140 houses.
276. Z.Y. (Annūnē), interview with author, 24 February 2008, Toronto.
277. For a brief description of village life see Georg Krotkoff, A Neo-Aramaic Dialect
of Kurdistan: Texts, Grammar, and Vocabulary (New Haven, CT: American
Oriental Society, 1982).
278. Habib Ishow, ‘Un Village irakien, «Araden» en 1961’, Cahiers de l’Orient
contemporain (1966), 6–9.
279. Michel Chevalier, Les Montagnards chrétiens du Hakkâri et du Kurdistan
septentrional (Paris: Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1985), 112.
283. Afram Rayis, ‘Araden: A Living Village in Garbia’, Assyrian Star 55.1 (2003),
32.
285. Notes from the Rayis family personal collection. See also Ishow, ‘Un Village
irakien, «Araden» en 1961’, 6.
54.
297. Human Rights Watch, Iraq’s Crime of Genocide, 187, 264.
299. For some reason only the number of ‘males’ are mentioned in the report.
303. Ibid., 56–7.
306. Eshoo, ‘The Fate of Assyrian Villages’, 6–7.
307. AAS, ‘Field Mission Iraq 2004’; Iraq: Continuous and Silent Ethnic Cleansing,
40.
309. Y.G. (Bebede), interview with author, 24 February 2008, Toronto.
315. AAS, ‘Field Mission Iraq 2004’; Y.G. (Bebede), interview with author, 24
318. Y.G. (Bebede), interview with author, 24 February 2008, Toronto.
321. Badger, The Nestorians and Their Rituals, vol. 1, 393. Badger does not mention
a church in Blejanke.
322. Ibid., 392.
324. D.T. (Blejanke), interview with author, 24 February 2008, Toronto.
325. Ibid.
40.
appendi x a | 361
328. Iraq: Continuous and Silent Ethnic Cleansing, 40; AAS, ‘Field Mission Iraq
2004’.
Northern Provinces in Iraq, 10. Chammike is the only one of twenty-five
Barwari villages mentioned in the League of Nations report as being owned
by the government and occupied by ‘non-autochthonous’ (non-indigenous)
Assyrians – essentially settlers from Hakkâri.
332. Harrak, ‘Northern Mesopotamia in a 19th Century Syriac Annalistic Source’,
302.
338. Ibid., 56–7.
347. Ibid., 393.
349. Eshoo, ‘The Fate of Assyrian Villages’, 10; B.A. (Komāne) and K.D. (Komāne),
interviews with author, 26 July 2008, Toronto.
350. See photograph in Barzana, Šinnē d-‘asqūtā, 221.
351. Ibid.; Iraq: Continuous and Silent Ethnic Cleansing, 40, 55.
356. Ibid., 56–7.
54.
364. AAS, ‘Field Mission Iraq 2004’; Y.G. (Bebede), interview with author, 24
365. Ibid.
370. Ibid.
54.
appendi x a | 363
383. D.I. (Inishke), email correspondence, 10 January 2008.

Cleansing, 40.
392. The Gara mountain range is also identified with the region of Dasen – ‘which
rising near Da’udiya in the west extends along to the Upper Zab and away to the
east into Gebel Pir Hasan Beg’ (Budge, The Book of Governors, vol. 2, 67).
396. Eshoo, ‘The Fate of Assyrian Villages’, 10; B.A., D.Y. and K.D. (Komāne),
interviews with author, 26 July 2008, Toronto.
397. B.A. and K.D. (Komāne), interviews with author, 26 July 2008, Toronto;
AAS, ‘Field Mission Iraq 2004’.
401. Ibid.
40.

410. Ibid.
Cleansing, 40.
40.
436. AAS, ‘Field Mission Iraq 2004’; Iraq: Continuous and Silent Ethnic Cleansing, 40.
appendi x a | 365

442. Mikhael Benjamin, Nineveh Center for Research and Development (NCRD),
Qaraqosh, Iraq, email correspondence, 2 February 2007.
443. Leadership of Dohuk, leadership of the branch of al-Nasir division, unit leader,
to the leader of al-Nasir division, Response to Letter from Bishop concern-
ing Nahla, 15 October 1985 (1–2), ADM Archives, Ba‘th Secret Files and
Correspondence, Iraq.
to leader of al-Nasir division, Response to Letter from Bishop concerning Nahla,
15 October 1985 (1–2), ADM Archives, Ba‘th Secret Files and Correspondence,
Iraq. However, in Iraq: Continuous and Silent Ethnic Cleansing, 41, Cham Chale
is mentioned as having been destroyed in 1963 only.
453. Leadership of Dohuk, leadership of the branch of al-Nasir division, unit
leader, to leader of al-Nasir division, Response to Letter from Bishop concern-
ing Nahla, 15 October 1985 (1–2), ADM Archives, Ba‘th Secret Files and
Northern Provinces in Iraq, 17–18.
461. Ibid.
to leader of al-Nasir division, Response to Letter from Bishop Concerning
Nahla, 15 October 1985 (1–2), ADM Archives, Ba‘th Secret Files and
469. Bahra 2 (1988).
474. Ibid.
480. Y.D. (Annūnē), interview with author, 24 February 2008, Toronto; AAS,
‘Field Mission Iraq, 2004’; Eshoo, ‘The Fate of Assyrian Villages’, 13.
appendi x a | 367
489. The Assyrian villages destroyed during the Simele incident were mostly reset-
tled by neighbouring Kurds, as was the case in Spindarok. The village was also
the site of a chemical attack during the Anfal operations.
492. Ibid., 56.
496. Ibid.
508. The bastion of Assyrian (specifically Church of the East) Christianity from the
seventh to the ninth century, including much of northern Iraq from Zakho to
Nerem.

516. Fiey, Assyrie Chrétienne, vol. 1, 287.
520. Mikhael Benjamin, NCRD, email correspondence, 2 February 2007.
521. Eshoo, ‘The Fate of Assyrian Villages’, 20; Mikhael Benjamin, email corre-
spondence, 2 February 2007.
522. Mikhael Benjamin, email correspondence, 2 February 2007; Iraq: Continuous
and Silent Ethnic Cleansing, 41.
524. Ibid.
528. Royal Government of Iraq, Correspondence Relating to Assyrian Settlement from
13th July, 1932, to 5th August, 1933 (Baghdad, Government Press, 1933), 48.
529. Eshoo, ‘The Fate of Assyrian Villages’, 21–2.
532. Professor Amir Harrak, conversation with author, 10 February 2008.
533. AAS, ‘Field Mission Iraq 2004’; Eshoo, ‘The Fate of Assyrian Villages’, 22.
534. Professor Amir Harrak, conversation with author, 10 February 2008.
538. Ibid.; AAS, ‘Field Mission Iraq 2004’.
539. Eshoo, ‘The Fate of Assyrian Villages’,’ 16.
542. Ibid.
appendi x a | 369

548. Ibid.
550. Ibid.
555. Ibid.
560. Ibid.
Appendix B: Documents Concerning
Cultural and Political Organisations
Figure 37 Security major, Sulaymaniyah district security manager to all

administrative departments, ‘Assyrian National Front’, September 1984. ADM
Archives, Ba‘th Secret Files and Correspondence, p. 1
a ppendi x b | 371
Figure 38 Security major, Sulaymaniyah district security manager to all

administrative departments, ‘Assyrian National Front’, September 1984. ADM
Archives, Ba‘th Secret Files and Correspondence, p. 2
Number: 45768 Highly Confidential

Date: 9/1984 To: All Administrative Departments
Subject: Assyrian National Front
We have the following information regarding what they call the Assyrian
National Front. Please review and provide us with useful information.
Security Major
Sulaymaniyah District Security Manager,
First, at the end of 1983 the traitorous Assyrian Universal Alliance

and Beth Nahrain Party had many meetings to find a way to unite and
strengthen their position among their people and strengthen opposition
activity against the country [Iraq]. As a result of those meetings both sides
signed a treaty agreement called the Assyrian National Front. This treaty
shows the highlights of how the Assyrians will oppose the country [Iraq],
by leaving the door open to other opposing Assyrian organisation to join
this alliance.
Second, even thought both parties have conflicts between them they
declared their agreement. This proves that there is pressure on both leaders
of the two parties to declare their front. It is assumed that the disloyal
Syrian regime and the Zionist [Israel] and Imperialist [United States]
agencies play a role in this through the Assyrians, since this front did not
make any advancement until recent times due to conflicts between them.
This front seeks to put forward the Assyrian cause before international
organisations but there is a disagreement in regards to who will represent
the Assyrians. An Assyrian man by the name of Ivan Kakovich of Iranian
Russian origins residing currently in the USA was previously a diplomat in
the Soviet Government. He attempted to form an Assyrian government with
both parties to be represented before the United Nations, but his proposal
did not receive an approval from any Assyrian party since he refused to
represent the name of any of the parties, he did not believe that any of
the Assyrian political parties could fulfill this goal because the Assyrian
political parties can not agree on a united political agenda.
The Assyrian front hosted a meeting in Chicago between 22/6/1984 until
21/6/1984 and a formation of a committee of six people was formed, three
people from each party. The Assyrian United Alliance was presented by
Afram, Gewargis Malik Chikko and Geras Awador. The Beth Nahrain party
was represented by Giliana Younan, Ewan Gewargis and Faroq Al-Bazi.
The meeting contained the following:
a) Foreign Affairs:
First: an agreement that the AUA acts politically to create awareness
regarding the Assyrian cause by doing general advertisements as well as
a ppendi x b | 373
within Congress. The Assyrian Alliance has associations with political

figures in the United States and Congress.
Second: an agreement to propose the cause before the United Nations
and plea for an administrative region for the Assyrians. This plea will be
proposed under the name of both parties. The Beth Nahrain party is well
connected with international lawyers that have opposed the control of the
Iraqi Ministry of Religion over Iraqi churches.
b) Military Affairs:
The Beth Nahrain party agreed to take responsibility of military functions
and mediate between the Assyrian National Front and the Democratic
Front. They also opened negotiations with the Kurdish Democratic Party
in order to work with each other even though the AUA has previously
requested from the traitor Idris al-Barzani to fight under the Assyrian name.
Idris replied that if they [Assyrians] wanted they could fight but under the
condition that they fight under the Kurdish name and not under Assyrian or
any other front.
The Beth Nahrian party had previously requested the same thing, but they
[Kurds] rejected at first, and then they agreed under the condition that the
Beth Nahrain party would promote them [Kurdish Democratic Party] in
America and Europe.
c) Religious Affairs:
They agreed to not discuss it [religious denominations] in politics and
separated it completely for the sake of uniting all Assyrians.
d) Financial Affairs:
They agreed to form a financial account in the name of the Front, receive
donations for it and agreed to propose these issues at the annual Assyrian
Convention meeting in Chicago that takes place during the end of August.
The case proposed in the agenda of the meetings should be granted by an
agreement of the caucus of both parties before approving them.
Figure 39 Translation of ‘Assyrian National Front’

Figure 40 Security major, Sulaymaniyah Security Directorate to all security

divisions, ‘Assyrian Democratic Movement’, 14 October 1984. ADM Archives,
Ba‘th Secret Files and Correspondence
a ppendi x b | 375
In the name of God the merciful and compassionate

Suleimaniyeh Security Directorate
Number: 54648
Date: 1984/10/14
Top Secret and personal and to be opened by the addressee

To: all Security Divisions
Subject: Assyrian Democratic Movement
The autonomy security directorate, through its letter, number 26846, dated
1984/10/06, has informed us that the following was ordered:
1. The security agencies are charged to squash any organisation within the
ranks of the Assyrians and keep them from progressing, especially inside cities.
2. Prepare a list of all influential individuals within the ranks of Assyrians in

the church and among the general community. The list should be updated on
regular basis. The prominent individuals among them in the community will
be provided personal and financial help etc. [To become Ba‘th informants]
3. Identify the individuals who are not likely to reform. [Those who resisted
in becoming loyal Ba‘th party supporters]. Provide us with their names and
information about them and what is recommended in each individual case.
Give this subject the utmost attention and keep us informed.
[Signature]
Major, Security
For/ Security Directorate/Suleimaniyeh Governorate
Figure 41 Translation of ‘Assyrian Democratic Movement’

Figure 42 Document concerning the ill treatment of an individual Assyrian which
received attention at the international level. UNHCR file no. 3284 (Afram Rayis
private archive)
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Index
1958 Coup, 139–54 Aloka massacre, 108

Alqosh, 2, 57, 146, 237, 291
Abraham, Mar Shimun XVII, 57 ‘Amēdīyāh, 76, 144, 278
Abu Ghraib, 194 Andrewos (Andrious), Malik, 97, 104
Ada massacre, 62 Andrews, Sam, 154
Adana, 58 anfal (spoils), 200
agency, 31 Anfal campaigns, 5, 20, 199–214
Ahmed, Ibrahim, 150 Assyrian villages destroyed, 203–8
‘Ain Diwar, 104–5 eight major campaigns, 200
Akhunwāthē Athorāyē, 193 Final Anfal, 200
Alanish (Alanash), 305 reports on victims, 201
al-Bakr, Ahmed Hassan, 151, 169, 187 seen as Kurdish genocide, 223
al-Bazzaz, ‘Abd al-Rahman, 241 victims labeled ‘Christian’ versus
al-Gaylani, Rashid Ali, 35, 99, 124 ‘Assyrian’, 201–2
Pan-Arab agenda, 124 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, 94, 107
al-Hashimi, Yasin, 35 Annūnē (‘Ain Nūnē, Kani Masi) massacre,
al-Husri, Sati, 19, 36, 228, 241 144, 310
pan-Arabism, 77 anti-Christian sentiments, 56, 117
al-Jahayshee, Lieutenant Abdul Karim, Appadurai, Arjun, 227
154 theory of ‘national ethos’, 227–8
massacre at S.oriya, 154–5 ‘Aqra, 74, 280
al-Majid, Ali Hassan, 200 ‘Aqra district, 280, 329
terror campaign, 200 Arab and Kurdish Levies, 73
al-Muthanna Club, 124 Arāden, 311
al-Sabbagh, Salah al-Din, 124–5 Arbil, 42, 54, 271
al-Said, Nuri, 35, 140 Arbil province, 310
al-Sherbiti, Mekki Beg, 99, 101 archives and key sources, 42–9
al-Tuwaisa, 144 Argen (Argin, Hargin, Ergin), 312
Albaq, 61 ‘Arif, ‘Abd as-Salam, 140, 148, 150
Algiers Agreement, 174 president of Iraq, 148
i ndex | 405
‘Arif, al-Rahman Assyrian tribes, 55, 59–60, 78, 100,

third president of Iraq, 151 112–13
Armashe, 336 Baz (tribe of Hakkâri Mountains), 98,
Armūt.ā (Armūt.ā, Harota), 310 108; massacre of, 108
Arsanis, Benyamin, 75 Diz (tribe of Hakkâri Mountains), 110
Asaad, Gabriel, 234 Jilu (tribe of Hakkâri Mountains), 60
‘Martyrs of Assyria’, 234 Tiyari (tribe of Hakkâri Mountains),
Ashawa, 279 77, 150
Assyrian Academic Society (AAS), 46 Tkhuma (tribe of Hakkâri Mountains),
Assyrian Benevolent Association, 68 59, 62, 150
Assyrian Charity Society, 151 Assyrian Universal Alliance (AUA), 151,
Assyrian Church of the East, 3, 54 192
Nestorian, 3, 38 Assyrians, 3
Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM), ‘4th world identity issues,’ 10
29, 192–4 Arabisation of, 249
arrests and torture of, 197–8 as transnational community, 38
Bahra, 194 Assyrian Question, 27–49
Assyrian Democratic Organization Athuri vs Ashuri, 245
(ADO), 193 British betrayal of, 35, 72, 74, 94, 100,
Assyrian Mercy Society, 144 107–8, 123, 224, 238
Assyrian Nation, 96 British support for/use of, 60–1, 72–3,
Assyrian National Petition, 171 78, 93
Assyrian religious sects, 38, 43–4, 58, 69, conscripted to fight against Iran, 191
225, 230 crossing to Syria, 105–6
Ancient Church of the East, 150 deaths in First World War, 58, 69, 79
Assyrian Apostolic Church of Antioch, demography, 1–2, 54–5, 58–9, 61, 68,
3; sectarianism of, 232 78, 100, 157–62, 179, 180–6, 192,
Chaldean (ecclesiastical sect of Roman 212–13, 247
Catholic rite also former Assyrian enduring culture, 3, 265
Church of the East members), 3, 40, felleh.i, 240
57, 225, 231 fragmentation of, 19, 40–1, 55, 64, 78,
Church of the East see Nestorian 179, 209, 222, 230
Jacobite (ecclesiastical sect) 3, 40, 54, framing the Assyrian narrative, 37–8,
232 41, 54–81, 245, 265
Nestorian (ecclesiastical sect also French betrayal of, 106
Assyrian Church of the East/Church French support of, 57, 65, 73
of the East), 38, 42, 54, 56, 148, 231 importance in Iraq, 5, 15–6, 27–49
Syrian Orthodox Church, 3, 231 indigenous, 19, 40, 44
transdenominationalism, 225–8, 233 Kurds, joint resistance, 143, 145, 154
Assyrian Socialist Party, 75 loss of spirit, 224, 247–8
Assyrians (continued) Bahnona, 305

marginalised as ‘Other’, 11, 76, 171, Baiji massacre, 109
241–2, 245–6, 267 Baik, Majid, 104
national awakening, 193 Bajidda-Barave, 303
pawns in the Cold War battlefield, 75 Bajidda-Kandal, 303
post-exile villages, 124–5 Bajuwa, 305
processing facilities (mujamma‘at), 179 Bakhitme (Beth-Khatme), 202–3, 339
recounting their own history, 27–9, 45, Bakhlogia, 155
48, 173, 265 Bakhluja, 303
resettlement, 76–81, 100 Balūkā (Bebālūk, Beth Bālūk), 313
role in the Levies, 71–4 Ba-Mishmish, 281
state-sponsored acculturation, 244–53 Baqubah refugee camp, 36, 64, 73
targets of massacre, 93–4, 108–24, Barāk (Barrāke), 282
202–9 Barro, Father Paul, 65
unimagined from the Middle East, 3, Barsoum, Bishop Servius Afram, 69, 70
16, 46, 126, 222, 248 anti-Assyrian stance, 232
Atra (Country), 34 name change, 232
At.ush, 313 Barwar, 200
Austin, Brigadier General H. H., 64 Barwari Bala region, 179
Avkani (Avgni, Avgani), 305 border clearings of, 179–88
Avzarook, 155 Barzan, 142
Avzerok Khammo (Avzerog, Lower Barzana, Abdyesu, 37–8
Avzerok), 302 Years of Hardship: The Battle of
Avzerok Shano (Upper Avzerok), 303 Dayrabun and Massacre of Simele, 37
Aziz, Douglas, 138 Barzani, Mustafa, 141, 154, 170, 175
Azmi, Khalil, 102 Barzani uprising, 20, 43, 139–54; see also
Kurdish–Iraqi War
Baba, Albert Oscar, 178 Barzinji, General Abdul-Jabar, 74
Baban, Jalal, 35 Barzinji, Sheikh Mahmud, 73
Babilo, 334 Bāsh, 314
Badaliya (Badariyah, Badriyah), 339 Bāsifre (Beth Sāpre), 289
Badarrash (Badrashk), 279 Batase (Batas), 271
Badawi, Malik Loko Shlimon d’bit, Batatu, Hanna, 31
37–8 Ba‘th Party, 139
Assyrian Struggle for National Survival in Ba‘th regime, 47, 195
the 20th and 21st Centuries, 37 ‘amnesty’ ploy, 210, 245
Badger, George Percy, 42, 44, 56, 59 Anfal campaign, 199–214
Badi massacre, 111 anti-Shiite, 172, 202, 212
Baghdad, 151 human rights violations, 199, 212
Baghdad Pact, 138 marginalising Assyrians, 172, 213, 241
i ndex | 407
policy of suppression, 170 Bou-Nacklie, N. E., 38

torture of Assyrians, 197–8 Brest-Litovsk Treaty, 63
Battle of Ctesiphon, 36 Bubawa (Bibava), 316
Battle of Wounded Knee, 242–3 Burnett, Air Vice Marshal C. S., 107
Baum, L. Frank, 242 Butara (Botara), 293
Baz, 314
Bazi, Elias Haroon, 230 Canon, Yousip Nimrud, 173
Bazif (Ba Zive, Ba Zibbe, Ba Dibbe), 292 Cemiyeti, Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i-
bazikke tribal system, 145 Hikuk, 70
Bebede (Beth Bede), 315 Central Treaty Organisation, 138
Bebōze (Beth Bōzi), 337 Challik (Tchallek, Tcalluk), 294
Bedār, 305 Cham ‘Ashrat, 330
Bedari, Paul, 150, 234 Cham Chale, 330
‘Lamentation on the Simile Massacre’, Cham Dostina, 294
234 Cham Kare, 288
Bedr-Khan, Kumran Ali, 150 Cham Rabtke, 330
Bedul (Be-Dole), 289 Cham Sinne, 331
Beg, Bedr Khan, 44, 55 Chammike, 317
massacre of Assyrians, 44, 55 Chaqala (Jaqala), Lower and Upper, 294
Benakhre, 306 Chavrik (Avrik), 335
Benāta (Benātha, Beth ‘Ainatha), 316 Chiarello, Barbara, 243
Bendawaye (Beth Handawaya), 309 Chikko, Gewargis, 175
Benyamin, Youbert, 198 Chikko, Hurmiz Malik, 147
Bequlke, 292 Christian population in Iraq, 1–2, 38
Bersive, 344 Church of England, 42
Beshmīyaye (Beth Shmayaye), 292 commodification of peoples, 8
Betannūrē (Be-Tannure, Beth Tannūrē), communism, 75
293 Constitution of Iraq, Preamble (2005), 1
Bet-Avraham, Dr Fraidon (Aturaya), 65, Convention on the Prevention and
75 Punishment of the Crime of
Urmia Manifesto, 75 Genocide (UNGC), 124, 128
Bet-Shmuel, Shlimon 172 Cope, Matthew, 94
Billān (Billa), 289 Cumberland, Robert, 94–5
Bilmand, 329 consequences of Simile, 237
Birta (Bire), 337 gendercidal campaign against Assyrians,
Blejanke (Blejane), 316 237
Bohtan, 44, 55 Cunliff-Owen, Colonel F., 36
massacres, 63 Curry, Patrick, 248, 267
Bolsheviks, 63 sanctity of place, 248
border clearings, 20, 169–87 Cutts, Edward Lewes, 42, 56
Dadrian, Vahakn, 227 Doski, 200

Darbandoke (Derbandok), 273 Drakulic, Slavenka, 248
Dar-Hozan, 290 ‘The bridge is us’, 248
Dashtazi, 99 Dūre, 294
Dashtnakh (Dasht0Nakh, Dashtatakh),
306 Eadie, John Ingliss, 72
David, Edison, 138 Eastern Anatolia massacres, 128
Davidson, Lawrence, 250 Elia, General Petros, 63, 71
closed information environments, Enver Pasha, 61
250–1 Esha, David, 178
natural localisms, 250–1 Eshoo, Majed, 44
thought collectives, 250–1 Es.sān (S.iyān), 321
Dawaid, Rab Khayla Tremma, 38 ethnic cleansing, 20, 45
Dawodiya (Dawudiya), 317 ethnocide/cultural genocide, 222,
Dawrīye (Dure), 282 249
Dawud, Emmanuael ‘Ammo’ Baba, 138 ethnos, 222
Dayrabun, 38, 106–9
de Gaury, Gerald, 94, 111, 230 farhud, 124
de Kelaita, Qasha Joseph (Yosip), 76 Farouk-Sluglett, Marion, 31
decree 251, 170, 172 Fein, Helen 227
Dehe, 317 Feshkhabur, 105, 106–9, 307
Deirabun, 306 Fieldhouse, D. K., 79
demos, 222 Fiey, Father Jean-Maurice, 42
Deralok (Deira d-Luqa), 200, 318 Christian Assyria, 4
Der-Alush, 335 Final Anfal see Anfal campaigns
Derashish (Umra, Umra Shghisha), 306 First World War, 61–7
Dere, 318
Derigni (Derigne, Dirgin), 320 Ganja, Shlimon, 68
Derishke, 320 genocide, definition of, 226–7
Deze (Dizze), 338 George, Lazar, 68
Dinārta, 282 George, Margaret, 151
Diyana (Diana), 276 Gera-Gora (Kera-Gora), 342
Dobato, Curate Zaya Bobo, 210 Girbish (Garbesh, Garbish), 283
Dodi Masih (Upper Dodi, Beth Nura), 282 Gouraud, Henri Joseph Eugene, 65
Dohuk, 54, 110–11, 154–62, 278 Grand National Assembly (GNA), 70
petition for autonomous region, 170 Grant, Asahel, 56
Dohuk district, 288, 310, 334 Guhana (Kohana), 331
Dohuke, 321 Gulpashan massacre, 62
Dominicans, 42, 57 Gund Kosa, 335
conversion of Nestorians, 42 Gundiktha, 62
i ndex | 409
Haidar, Rustam, 35 emic history, 13, 33, 235

Hakkâri, 38, 44, 54, 59, 61, 71, 79, 117, etic history, 13, 33, 235
126, 231 fact and fancy, 30
eviction from homeland, 55, 71, 78–9, fact and Truth, 30
100 hegemonic, 33
highlanders, 59, 62, 71, 78, 247 hiding truth, 6
massacre, 44, 55, 117 holistic approach, 9
request to return, 71, 79 including Assyrian story, 8, 29
similarities to Kurds, 148 intent, 12
Halabja massacre, 199, 223 interdependency of narratives, 18
Hami, Sheeba, 197 ‘majority equals truth,’ 48
Hamilton, Archibald, 98, 100 marginalised, 7
Hamziya, 321 master narrative, 38, 40
Hanare (Henare, Hanara), 276 meaning in, 13
Harīr, 276 metanarrative, 14
Hariri, Franso Toma, 151 native sources, 34, 45
Harput, 58 objectivist worldview, 12
Haruna, 347 oral memory, 48
Havintka (Hawintka), 279 packaged in state records, 32
Hawdian (Howdian, Havdian), 277 parts make the whole, 13–4
Hawresk, 303 positivist worldview, 10, 12
Hawsarek (Avsarke), 298 structuralism, 11, 12
Hayyis, 322 time dimension, 12
Hazarjot (Hazarjift), 331 understanding of, 12–3
hegemonic discourse, 33 written by the victor, 46
Hejerke (Hizeerke, Hizirki), 194, 342 see also panenhistoricism, subordinating
Helwā (Halwa, Halwā Nasara), 298 narrativisation
heterogeneity of Iraq, 32 Hizane (Lower and Upper, Hizanke),
hierarchies of suffering, 19 331
High Committee of Christian Affairs, Hizawa, 344
175 Hizb al-Ikha al-Watani, 99
Hīsh (Heesh), 299 Hizb al-Istiqlal al-Iraqi, 139
historical narratives Holt, Captain V., 35
as active or passive, 17 homogenisation, 222, 239, 245
history, 13–19 Horowitz, Donald, 227
a process, 6 human reality, 12
an infinitely faceted gem, 13 Human Rights Watch (HRW), 45
Assyrians as an afterthought, 9 Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 30
constructivist worldview, 11, 12 On the Historian’s Task, 31
deconstruction, 14 Humphrys, Sir Francis, 79, 94, 123
Husry, Khaldun, 19, 36–7 Kurds and Arabs only, 169

Hussein, Saddam, 151, 191, 240 nation-state, 93–128
war with Iran, 191 Iraqi–Soviet friendship treaty, 171
Ishkavdal, 304
identity fragmentation, 42 Ishtar, Abu, 213
Ikha al-Watani (National Brotherhood), Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/Syria
107, 229 (ISIL/ISIS/IS), 2
indigenous populations, 45–6 Islamic tax (jizya), 2
ingrained hatred, 28 Ismael, Daniel, 74
Inishke (Enishke), 322 Ismael, Dawood Malik, 176
Inönü, Ismet, 71 Ismael, Malik Yaqo d’Malik, 37, 78, 97,
Iqri (Kiri) 299 170, 247
Iran–Iraq War, 20, 191–9 Assyrians and the Two World Wars,
Iraq demography, 32 37
heterogeneous, 32 Ismael, Tareq and Jacqueline, 38–9
homogeneity, 32 Ismael, Yaqo, 54, 78, 99, 100, 104, 108,
Iraq Memory Foundation (IMF), 47 171
Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), 109 Ismail, Simko, 64, 93
attack on Baiji, 109 Istablan (Stablan), 308
Iraqi Agrarian Reform Law, 141 Istip, 300
Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), 76, 127 Iyyat (Yate), 300
Assyrians large percentage, 127
Iraqi government Jatou of Dohuk, 117
anti-Assyrian fervor, 101, 106–7, Jebel Bekhair, 106
228–39 Jedide, 323
calling for Assyrian massacres, 93, 99,
236 Kacho, Archbishop Stephanos, 199
calling for Christian massacres, 93 Kalate, 277
denial of Assyrian massacres, 118, Kani Balav, 323
235 Kanifalla, 290
‘gendercide’ of Assyrians, 238–9 Karamles, 2
pitting Kurds against Assyrians, 93 Karrana, 304
see also Iraqi nationalism Kashkawa, 332
Iraqi history/narratives, 11 Kemal, Mustafa (Atatürk), 70
Iraqi Levies, 72–4 Kena, Father Younan, 199
dissolution of, 138 Khabur basin, 104
Iraqi nationalism, 173, 240 Khalilani, 333
campaign against Assyrians, 99, Khammo, Malik, 97
106–7 Khan, Rafael, 62
cordon sanitaire, 179 Khanaqin, 174
i ndex | 411
Kharab Kulk, 342 Kurdish uprising, 43

Khardis (Khardas), 283 ‘amnesty’, 187
Kharjawa (Hargawa), 283 granted concessions, 187
Kheit Kheit Allap, 127, 147 Kurdish villages destroyed, 201
Kheit Kheit Allap II, 143, 147, 148 Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), 141,
Khelafta (Khaleptha, Beth Hlape), 284 171, 175
Kherpa (Herpa, Kharpa), 284 alliance with Tehran, 191
Khnanisho, Mar Yosep, 97, 104 support from Massad, 175
Khoshaba, Malik Yosip, 63, 101 support from USA, 171
bought by promises, 101 Kut al-Amara, 36
Khoshaba, Mushe (Ousta Mushe),
127 Lakota Sioux, 242–3
Khoy massacre, 64 language, 6, 173
Khubbā w-Khuyada Ātūrayā, 127 power of, 6, 75, 173
Khuyada w-Kheirūta Ātūraytā (Assyrian Layard, Sir Austin Henry, 42
Unity and Freedom), 143 League of Nations, 77, 79
Khwara, 300 failure to support Assyrian homeland,
King Faisal, 37, 98–9 77, 97
denial of Assyrian massacres, 118 Permanent Mandates Commission, 94
King Faisal II, 127 Lemkin, Raphael, 9, 123, 128, 226, 229
execution of, 140 coined term ‘genocide’, 128
King, Martin Luther Jr, 27, 29 ‘crimes of barbarity’, 226
Kingdom of Iraq, 97 ‘crimes of vanalism’, 226
Admitted to League of Nations, 97 detailed atrocities against Assyrians, 239
Kirkuk, 3, 42, 54, 151 ‘ethnocide’, 128
Knabenshue, Paul, 122, 231 speaking to League of Nations, 229
Komāne (Kowane), 211, 324 Levo, 345
Kora-Dere, 288 liwas, 71
Koy Sinjaq district, 310 aqd.iyah (qadaa), 71
Kurdish–Iraqi War, 20, 43, 139–154 mudir, 71
peace accord, 169 mutasarrif, 71
support of Mossad for Kurds, 150 nawāh.ī (nāh.iyah), 71
Kurdish nationalists, 140 qaimaqam, 71
Kurdish tribes, 141–2 Longrigg, Stephen Hemley, 74
Bardost, 141–2 Lorde, Audre, 10
Barzani, 141–2 Lorenz, Chris, 30
Herki, 141–2 Wissenschaft, 30
Lolani, 141, 144
Surchi, 141–2 Ma‘althaya, 117
Zebari, 141–2, 144, 146 Madrashtā Ātūraytā, 76
Maghribiya, 300 Mosul, 54, 72,

Mahdi, Sayyid Abdul, 35 assassinations, 94
Mahmud, General Nur al-Din, 127 attempted Turkish invasion, 77
Mahude, 324 mujamma‘āt, 251
Mala ‘Arab, 345 Musaka, 325
Malākhta, 301 Mushe, Akhtiyar Benyamin, 173
Malatiya, 58 Mushe, Archbishop Quryaqos, 172
Malek, Yusuf, 34–6, 93, 98, 102
The British Betrayal of the Assyrians, Nabi Yunis/the Prophet Jonah, 2, 74
35–6, 224 Nādi al-Riyadhi al-Āthūrī (Assyrian Sports
list of officials responsible for Simile, 35 Club), 138
Malla-Birwan, 290 name compulsorily altered, 172
Malta (Ma‘althaye), 336 Nādi al-Thaqāfi al-Āthūrī (Assyrian
Mangesh, 288 Cultural Club), 138, 172, 178
Mann, Michael, 221–2, 228–9 Nahawa (Nuhawa, Nuwaba), 284
nine motives for violence, 222 Namik, S. Antoine, 70
Mar Mattai, 117 Nano, Raphael (Esho), 210
Mar Yaqob (Mar Yaqo), 343 Nās.erīyā, 309
Marogil, Malik, 97 Nasser, President Gamal Abdel, 150,
Mart Maryam, 143 157
Marzi-Khabur, 290 nation-building, 61, 93–128, 221–53
Masike, 288 National Democratic Party, 139
Matti, Jamil, 197 nationalism, 75
Mavan, 304 in nation-state building, 222
Māyē (Māyē Nasara), 301 marginalisation of minorities, 227
Mazra, 62 more profitable than oil, 93
McCarthy, Colonel J. J., 36 native sources, 34–42
McDonald, British Prime Minister Nav-Kandal (Naf Kandal), 346
Ramsay, 108 Nedjib, R. Louis, 70
Mehmed VI, Sultan, 70 Nerem (Nerem d-Ra’awatha, Gundik,
Mergasūr, 346 Gündük), 285
Merkajiya, 325 Nerwa/Rekan, 200, 326
Meroke, 334 Ninawa province, 291, 309, 347
Mesopotamia (ancient Assyria), 1 Nineveh Center for Research and
Mesopotamian Aramaic, 3 Development (NCRD), 44
Meydan, 301 non-violent resistance, 29
Meze, 325 Nuzha, Farid Elias, 232
Mindan refugee camp, 36, 73
Mladić, General Ratko, 238–9 Ohiyesa, 14; see also Charles Alexander
Mordinna Atouraya, 173 Eastman, 14
i ndex | 413
Omez, Father Josephe, 42–3 Qārō, 326

map of Christian villages, 42–3 Qasha Irsanis (Arsanis), 238
oppression response, 28 Qasha Ishmail, 238
acquiescence, 28 Qasha Sada, Badal of Kharab Kulki,
non-violent resistance, 29 108
physical violence, 28 Qasha Shmiwal, 110
Ordo Praedicatorum (Roman Catholic Qasim, Abdul Karim (Abd al-Karim), 20,
Dominican Order), 42; see also 140
Dominicans overthrow, 139–54
pan-Arabism, 77, 240, Rabban Hormizd, 57

pan-Assyrian nationalism, 75 Rafidain Club (Assyrian Club), 144
panenhistoricism, 14, 16, 27, 30–42, 263 Raqa raqa (the Flight, Escape), 64
Pappé, Ilan, 236 Ras al-‘Ain (Res-eni, Resh ‘Aina, Resha),
ethnic cleansing of Palestine, 236 286
Parhad, Baba Pet, 75 Rasho, Mirza and Mardan, 198
Paris Peace Conference, 68 Rassam, Anthony Hormuzd, 94–5
exclusion of Assyrians, 69–70 Rassam, Hormud, 94
patriarch and temporal authority, 94–109 Rawanduz, 94
pro- and anti-patriarchal factions, 103 rayis, 98
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), 176 Rayis, Afram, 46
Peda, 336 Rayis Talo or Baz, 108
Peres, Shimon, 150 reality, 12
pêşmerge (opposition fighters), 2, 144, 146, soul or spirit of, 13
150, 151, 154, 175, 198, 201, 269, Rehana, Rev. Isaac, 81
288, 322 Reqawa (Rekawa), 304
Petrovic, Drazen, 236 Resool, Shorsh Haji, 45, 201
ethnic cleansing, 236 Revolutionary Command Council, 151
Pireka, 194, 346 Rogers, William, 154
Porter, Jack, 227 Roman Catholic Church, 57
Prakh, 290 as mark of affluence, 58
Prince ‘Abdallah, 124, 140 French-Catholic connection, 58
ruling for Faisal II, 124 Roosevelt, President Theodore, 243
Prince Ghazi, 117, 124 Rowanduz district, 277
order to eliminate Assyrians, 117 Russia, 61–2
printing presses, 75 Bolshevik revolution, 63
as tools of ostracisation, 75 courting of Assyrians, 61
Qaraqosh/Baghdede, 2 Sab‘awi, Yunis, 124

Qarawilla (Qarawola) 308 Safra Zor, 286
Said, Edward, 10, 266 Shush (Shushan, Bā Šōš), 287

Orientalism, 10 Shuwadin (Shudin), 308
Sanaat (Esnakh), 308 Sian (Sanaya, Sanaya d’Nahla), 287
Sardarawa (Sardawara, Sidarao), 327 Sidqi, Baqr, 117–18, 122
Sardāshte, 302 Sikrīne, 327
Sargis, Mar Zaya, 97, 102 Simile district, 302, 339
Sarikamish, 61 Simele massacre, 5, 9, 10, 19–20, 35, 38,
Sarsang (Sarseng, Sarsank), 200, 279 46, 108–24, 228–39
Satow, Sir Harold, 34 aftermath, 122–3
S.awura (S.awra), 280 glossed over in history, 5, 46, 223
schools, 74 Malek history, 34–6
indoctrination of Arab ideology, 75 villages destroyed, 112–16
sectarianism, 38 Sinjar Mountains, 2
settlement plans, 76–81 Sluglett, Peter, 31
Severius, Bishop, 232 Smith, Linda Tuhiwai, 48
Patriarch Ignatius Afram Barsoum, 232 S.oriya massacre, 154–5
Shamizdin, Zaya M., 97 wounded, 156–7
Sharanish (Cheranesch), 346 sources, key, 42–9
Sharmin (Shalmath), 286 Srebrenica genocide, 238–9
Shedd, Mary Lewis, 63, 64 Stafford, Colonel Ronald Semphill, 36,
Shedd, William Ambrose, 64 100, 118, 236
Sheikhan district, 289, 336, 347 state apologias, 33
Sher, Father Youhanna Abdulahad, 199 state-sponsored acculturation, 244–53
Sheze (Shiyoz), 343 subaltern, 4
Shikak, Agha Simko Ismail, 63 subordinating narrativisation, 4, 38, 263;
Shimun, Goriel (Gabriel), 110 see also Assyrians
Shimun, Hormuzd, 62 Sulayman, Hikmat, 35, 99, 105, 118
Shimun, Mar Eshai, 34, 38, 94, 97, 104, Surka, 344
122, 150, 169 Surma d’Mar Shimun, Lady, 38, 70,
assassination of, 176 ‘We will be kings or we will be killed’, 95
letter to Mandates Commission, Suse, 334
95–6
deportation, 99 Tal massacre, 62
restored to Iraqi citizenship, 169 Talabani, Jalal, 150, 176
Shimun, Patriarch Mar Benyamin XXI, 62 Tāshish (Tārshish), 327
assassination, 63, 93 Tazhikka, 280
Shino, Talia, 147–8 Tbilisi, 65
Shleimon, Ethniel, 148 Telkeif district, 291, 309
Shlimon, Malik Loko, 103–4 Tel Keppe (Telkaif, town), 2
Shlimon, Youkhana Esho, 198 Ten (village), 328
i ndex | 415
Tfinkdji, Father Joseph, 44 Wadisho, Priest, 231

Thomas, Mar Yousef VI Emmanuel II, Wali of Julamerk, 61
231 Warda, Malik Kambar, 65, 71
Thompson, Major Douglas B., 35, 99–100 Wednt, Alexander, 235
Tilla (Tella), 338 Weitz, Eric, 227
Tirwanish (Der Wanis), 301 theory of violence, 227
Tkhuma battle, 62 Wela, 182, 205, 318, 324, 329
Tlanita, 280 Werda, Rev. Joel (Yoel), 68
Tolkien, J. R. R., 15 Western Christian missionary enterprise,
myth for the modern world, 15 41
Tomas, Toma, 146è White, Benjamin, 40
Toynbee, Arthur, 72 Wigram, William Ainger, 35, 73
transdenominationalism, 225–8 Wilson, Lieutenant Colonel A. T., 36,
Travis, Hannibal, 61 72
Treaty of Lausanne, 71 Wilson, Major W. C. F. A., 35,
Treaty of Sèvres, 70 99
Treaty of Versailles, 70 Wilson, Woodrow, 68
tribal factions, 101–3 Fourteen Points, 68
anti-patriarchal, 103
pro-patriarchal, 103 Xebat (‘Struggle’), 141
Tripp, Charles, 31
Tur Abdin, 72 Yacoboff, Lazar, 68
inaccurately called Jebel Tur, 72 Yacoub, Joseph, 248
Turkey, 55, 61–8, 71, 77 dynamisme démographique, 248
courting of Assyrians, 61 Yako, Sami, 178
evicting of Assyrians, 78 Yale, William, 123
Tuthe Shemaye (Toshambic), 328 Yaqo, Rab Tremme, 98
Yarda, 309
Ubiad, Msgr Petros, 65 Yohannan, Abraham, 68
ultra-nationalism, 128 Yokhana I, Rab-Khamsi Yosuf, 74
umma, 231 Yonan, Adam and Noah, 154
UN Genocide Convention (UNGC) of account of massacre, 155
1948, 9, 124, 226 Yoosuf, Captain Abraham K., 68
Urmia, 40, 56, 61, 63 Balkan Wars, 68
massacre, 62 Founding of Assyrian Benevolent
Ushnu, 63 Association, 68
The Religion of Mohammed and Christian
Vasili, Pyotr (Petros), 76 Suffering, 68
villages affected by region, 291–347 Yosep, Khoshaba M., 97
violence, 221 Youalah, Bishop Mar, 172
Young Turk regime, 105, 117 Zebouni, Dr Jean, 70

Yusuf, Yusuf Salman (Fahd, ‘Panther’), Zibari, Yousef Toma, 198
127 Zionism, 236
Ziwa, 108, 239
Z Plan, 79 Zouli, 334
Zakho region, 54, 106, 111, 142, 175, Zowa‘a Demoqratāyā Athorāyā (Zowaa)
290, 305, 344 see Assyrian Democratic Movement
Zaki, Muhammed Amin, 35 (ADM)
Zaya, Vicar Shimon Shlemon, 211 Zubaida, Sami, 31, 40, 222

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How does the book describe the Assyrian demographic situation in the late 19th and early 20th century?

How does the book describe the Assyrian demographic situation in the late 19th and early 20th century?

What massacre is discussed on pages 108-124?

What massacre is discussed on pages 108-124?

Reforging a Forgotten History

Reforging a Forgotten History

Edinburgh University Press Ltd

Typeset in 11/15 Adobe Garamond by

ISBN 978 0 7486 8602 5 (hardback)

The right of Sargon George Donabed to be identified as author of

Published with the support of the Edinburgh University Scholarly

List of Figures viii

1 Integrating the Assyrian Question 27

General Settlement Plans 76

Appendix A: Village Data  271

1 Map of Iraq  xvi

21 Omez’s map showing the Barwari Bala, Sapna/Sarsang, Nerwa/

1 Assyrian population statistics in Van and Hakkâri 59

AAS Assyrian Academic Society

I am indebted to a variety of people for their support and kindness. Firstly,

Figure 1 Map of Iraq

Constitution of Iraq (2005)

Half of writing history is hiding the truth.

Captain Malcolm Reynolds, Serenity (2005)

An unnamed song is like an unnamed child, it has no identity.

Robyn Hitchcock, musician

whether in the context of their diaspora, Iraq or the Middle East in

Geographically, Assyrians are a transnational population indigenous to

and ­mislabelled these people with designations including Iraqi Christians,

History is a story, a memory of a memory and in some fashion a quest for

seventy million Assyrians, himself Assyria, and man, standing in a barber

1. Did/do Assyrians play an active role in the history of Iraq? If so,

communities in the nation-building schema and the continued struggle for

both Western and non-Western scholars (who operate in a similar framework

A New Approach to Meaning

1. there is a totality to history, and

4. there is an infinite number of parts, which are borderless and ever

I would like to propose the concept of panenhistoricism for this view. It is

ancestors ascended to God in wordless adoration. It was solitary, because

If meaning then is accepted as immeasurable or unquantifiable and the

Moving Forward with Purpose

Figure 3 Granting agency: this chart represents an Assyrian narrative of their

their identity including physical place in Iraqi nation-building from the

purging that utilises immediate physical power to accomplish said goal. In

Figure 5 This diagram demonstrates the interdependency and interconnectivity of

The first chapter discusses methodology while conceptualising the Assyrian

of Nations archive. Furthermore, the American documents from the period

phenomenon and will be discussed further. If ‘numerical’ is linked to quantity

Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.

T o return to the tripartite inquiries of the introduction in reverse, a

Acquiescence: the oppressed resign themselves to their doom. They

Acquiescence is embedded in the Assyrian community in different forms,

Physical violence and corroding hatred: Violence often brings about

Some resort to violent confrontation with their oppressors. As an exam-

civilisation.2 While the Assyrians fought in the armed anti-government strug-

Non-violent Resistance. Like the synthesis in Hegelian philosophy, the prin-

A Historiography of Historiography and a Theoretical Framework

Different parts of the picture highlight the same frame

List of Figures viii

1 Integrating the Assyrian Question 27

General Settlement Plans 76

Appendix A: Village Data 271

1 Map of Iraq xvi

21 Omez’s map showing the Barwari Bala, Sapna/Sarsang, Nerwa/

1 Assyrian population statistics in Van and Hakkâri 59

and mislabelled these people with designations including Iraqi Christians,

1. The notion of the heterogeneity of Iraqi society is another theme

community began to build itself a home where it was able, as illustrated in

We preferred our own way of living. We were no expense to the government.

During the late 1920s, Assyrians had been targeted by central-