EN BANC RELATION TO THE VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT

[G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000] (VFA), respondents.

BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a JUNK VFA MOVEMENT, DECISION
BISHOP TOMAS MILLAMENA (Iglesia Filipina Independiente), BISHOP BUENA, J.:
ELMER BOLOCAN (United Church of Christ of the Phil.), DR. Confronting the Court for resolution in the instant consolidated
REYNALDO LEGASCA, MD, KILUSANG MAMBUBUKID NG petitions for certiorari and prohibition are issues relating to, and borne by, an
PILIPINAS, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, GABRIELA, PROLABOR, and agreement forged in the turn of the last century between the Republic of the
the PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER, petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE Philippines and the United States of America -the Visiting Forces Agreement.
SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS The antecedents unfold.
SECRETARY DOMINGO SIAZON, DEFENSE SECRETARY
ORLANDO MERCADO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America
SENATE PRESIDENT MARCELO FERNAN, SENATOR FRANKLIN forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of
DRILON, SENATOR BLAS OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO BIAZON, and installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. To
SENATOR FRANCISCO TATAD, respondents. further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the
[G.R. No. 138572. October 10, 2000] United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC.(PHILCONSA), the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their
EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA, AMADOGAT INCIONG, CAMILO L. SABIO, territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft.[1]
AND RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioners, vs. HON. RONALDO B.
ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary, HON. ORLANDO MERCADO, as In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases
Secretary of National Defense, and HON. DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR., as Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, respondents. possible extension of the military bases agreement. On September 16, 1991, the
[G.R. No. 138587. October 10, 2000] Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship,
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., RAUL S. ROCO, and SERGIO R. Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of
OSMEA III, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, RONALDO B. US military bases in the Philippines.[2] With the expiration of the RP-US
ZAMORA, DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR., ORLANDO B. MERCADO, Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military exercises conducted between
MARCELO B. FERNAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, BLAS F. OPLE and the two countries were held in abeyance. Notwithstanding, the defense and
RODOLFO G. BIAZON, respondents. security relationship between the Philippines and the United States of America
[G.R. No. 138680. October 10, 2000] continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by its National
President, Jose Aguila Grapilon, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH EJERCITO On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense
ESTRADA, in his capacity as President, Republic of the Philippines, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the
HON. DOMINGO SIAZON, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino
Affairs,respondents. Jr., to exchange notes on the complementing strategic interests of the United
[G.R. No. 138698. October 10, 2000] States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides discussed,
JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO TAADA, ZENAIDA QUEZON- among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces
AVENCEA, ROLANDO SIMBULAN, PABLITO V. SANIDAD, MA. Agreement (VFA for brevity). Negotiations by both panels on the VFA led to a
SOCORRO I. DIOKNO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, JOKER P. ARROYO, consolidated draft text, which in turn resulted to a final series of conferences and
FRANCISCO C. RIVERA JR., RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, KILOSBAYAN, negotiations[3] that culminated in Manila on January 12 and 13, 1998.
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was
AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on February 10, 1998.
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, SENATE PRESIDENT
MARCELO B. FERNAN, SENATOR BLAS F. OPLE, SENATOR On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent
RODOLFO G. BIAZON, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING THEIR Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA.[4]
CONTROL, SUPERVISION, DIRECTION, AND INSTRUCTION IN
 On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Article III
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Entry and Departure
Philippines,[5] the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President[6] and the 1. The Government of the Philippines shall facilitate the admission of United
VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 States personnel and their departure from the Philippines in connection with
Constitution. The Senate, in turn, referred the VFA to its Committee on Foreign activities covered by this agreement.
Relations, chaired by Senator Blas F. Ople, and its Committee on National 2. United States military personnel shall be exempt from passport and visa
Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo G. Biazon, for their joint regulations upon entering and departing the Philippines.
consideration and recommendation. Thereafter, joint public hearings were held 3. The following documents only, which shall be presented on demand, shall be
by the two Committees.[7] required in respect of United States military personnel who enter the
Philippines:
On May 3, 1999, the Committees submitted Proposed Senate (a) personal identity card issued by the appropriate United States authority
Resolution No. 443[8] recommending the concurrence of the Senate to the VFA showing full name, date of birth, rank or grade and service number (if any),
and the creation of a Legislative Oversight Committee to oversee its branch of service and photograph;
implementation. Debates then ensued. (b) individual or collective document issued by the appropriate United States
authority, authorizing the travel or visit and identifying the individual or group
On May 27, 1999, Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 was approved as United States military personnel; and
by the Senate, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote[9] of its members. Senate Resolution (c) the commanding officer of a military aircraft or vessel shall present a
No. 443 was then re-numbered as Senate Resolution No. 18.[10] declaration of health, and when required by the cognizant representative of the
On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of Government of the Philippines, shall conduct a quarantine inspection and will
Notes between respondent Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador certify that the aircraft or vessel is free from quarantinable diseases. Any
Hubbard. quarantine inspection of United States aircraft or United States vessels or
The VFA, which consists of a Preamble and nine (9) Articles, provides cargoes thereon shall be conducted by the United States commanding officer in
for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions under which accordance with the international health regulations as promulgated by the
US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines, and World Health Organization, and mutually agreed procedures.
is quoted in its full text, hereunder: 4. United States civilian personnel shall be exempt from visa requirements but
Article I shall present, upon demand, valid passports upon entry and departure of the
Definitions Philippines.
As used in this Agreement, United States personnel means United 5. If the Government of the Philippines has requested the removal of any United
States military and civilian personnel temporarily in the Philippines in States personnel from its territory, the United States authorities shall be
connection with activities approved by the Philippine Government. responsible for receiving the person concerned within its own territory or
Within this definition: otherwise disposing of said person outside of the Philippines.
1. The term military personnel refers to military members of the United States
Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard. Article IV
2. The term civilian personnel refers to individuals who are neither nationals of, Driving and Vehicle Registration
nor ordinary residents in the Philippines and who are employed by the United 1. Philippine authorities shall accept as valid, without test or fee, a driving
States armed forces or who are accompanying the United States armed forces, permit or license issued by the appropriate United States authority to United
such as employees of the American Red Cross and the United Services States personnel for the operation of military or official vehicles.
Organization. 2. Vehicles owned by the Government of the United States need not be
Article II registered, but shall have appropriate markings.
Respect for Law
It is the duty of the United States personnel to respect the laws of the Article V
Republic of the Philippines and to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the Criminal Jurisdiction
spirit of this agreement, and, in particular, from any political activity in the 1. Subject to the provisions of this article:
Philippines. The Government of the United States shall take all measures within (a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over United States personnel
its authority to ensure that this is done. with respect to offenses committed within the Philippines and punishable under
the law of the Philippines.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the review of the duty certificate, United States military authorities and Philippine
Philippines all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the authorities shall consult immediately. Philippine authorities at the highest levels
military law of the United States over United States personnel in the Philippines. may also present any information bearing on its validity. United States military
2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States authorities shall take full account of the Philippine position. Where appropriate,
personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of United States military authorities will take disciplinary or other action against
the Philippines, punishable under the laws of the Philippines, but not under the offenders in official duty cases, and notify the Government of the Philippines of
laws of the United States. the actions taken.
(b) United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States (f) If the government having the primary right does not exercise jurisdiction, it
personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of shall notify the authorities of the other government as soon as possible.
the United States, punishable under the laws of the United States, but not under (g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall notify each
the laws of the Philippines. other of the disposition of all cases in which both the authorities of the
(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3 of this article, an offense Philippines and the United States have the right to exercise jurisdiction.
relating to security means: 4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the authorities of the Philippines
(1) treason; and United States shall assist each other in the arrest of United States personnel
(2) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to national defense. in the Philippines and in handling them over to authorities who are to exercise
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this article.
rules shall apply: 5. United States military authorities shall promptly notify Philippine authorities
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction of the arrest or detention of United States personnel who are subject of
over all offenses committed by United States personnel, except in cases Philippine primary or exclusive jurisdiction. Philippine authorities shall
provided for in paragraphs 1(b), 2 (b), and 3 (b) of this Article. promptly notify United States military authorities of the arrest or detention of
(b) United States military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise any United States personnel.
jurisdiction over United States personnel subject to the military law of the 6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to
United States in relation to. exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United States military
(1) offenses solely against the property or security of the United States or authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense until
offenses solely against the property or person of United States personnel; and completion of all judicial proceedings. United States military authorities shall,
(2) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in performance of official upon formal notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay, make
duty. such personnel available to those authorities in time for any investigative or
(c) The authorities of either government may request the authorities of the other judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which the person has been
government to waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction in a particular charged in extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall present its
case. position to the United States Government regarding custody, which the United
(d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States military authorities to States Government shall take into full account. In the event Philippine judicial
maintain good order and discipline among their forces, Philippine authorities proceedings are not completed within one year, the United States shall be
will, upon request by the United States, waive their primary right to exercise relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one-year period will not
jurisdiction except in cases of particular importance to the Philippines. If the include the time necessary to appeal. Also, the one-year period will not include
Government of the Philippines determines that the case is of particular any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United
importance, it shall communicate such determination to the United States States authorities, after timely notification by Philippine authorities to arrange
authorities within twenty (20) days after the Philippine authorities receive the for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.
United States request. 7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States and Philippine
(e) When the United States military commander determines that an offense authorities shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary
charged by authorities of the Philippines against United states personnel arises investigation into offenses and shall cooperate in providing for the attendance of
out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty, the witnesses and in the collection and production of evidence, including seizure
commander will issue a certificate setting forth such determination. This and, in proper cases, the delivery of objects connected with an offense.
certificate will be transmitted to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines 8. When United States personnel have been tried in accordance with the
and will constitute sufficient proof of performance of official duty for the provisions of this Article and have been acquitted or have been convicted and
purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2) of this Article. In those cases where the are serving, or have served their sentence, or have had their sentence remitted or
Government of the Philippines believes the circumstances of the case require a suspended, or have been pardoned, they may not be tried again for the same
offense in the Philippines. Nothing in this paragraph, however, shall prevent Article VII
United States military authorities from trying United States personnel for any Importation and Exportation
violation of rules of discipline arising from the act or omission which constituted 1. United States Government equipment, materials, supplies, and other property
an offense for which they were tried by Philippine authorities. imported into or acquired in the Philippines by or on behalf of the United States
9. When United States personnel are detained, taken into custody, or prosecuted armed forces in connection with activities to which this agreement applies, shall
by Philippine authorities, they shall be accorded all procedural safeguards be free of all Philippine duties, taxes and other similar charges. Title to such
established by the law of the Philippines. At the minimum, United States property shall remain with the United States, which may remove such property
personnel shall be entitled: from the Philippines at any time, free from export duties, taxes, and other similar
(a) To a prompt and speedy trial; charges. The exemptions provided in this paragraph shall also extend to any
(b) To be informed in advance of trial of the specific charge or charges made duty, tax, or other similar charges which would otherwise be assessed upon such
against them and to have reasonable time to prepare a defense; property after importation into, or acquisition within, the Philippines. Such
(c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to cross examine such property may be removed from the Philippines, or disposed of therein, provided
witnesses; that disposition of such property in the Philippines to persons or entities not
(d) To present evidence in their defense and to have compulsory process for entitled to exemption from applicable taxes and duties shall be subject to
obtaining witnesses; payment of such taxes, and duties and prior approval of the Philippine
(e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their own choice on the Government.
same basis as nationals of the Philippines; 2. Reasonable quantities of personal baggage, personal effects, and other
(f) To have the service of a competent interpreter; and property for the personal use of United States personnel may be imported into
(g) To communicate promptly with and to be visited regularly by United States and used in the Philippines free of all duties, taxes and other similar charges
authorities, and to have such authorities present at all judicial proceedings. during the period of their temporary stay in the Philippines. Transfers to persons
These proceedings shall be public unless the court, in accordance with or entities in the Philippines not entitled to import privileges may only be made
Philippine laws, excludes persons who have no role in the proceedings. upon prior approval of the appropriate Philippine authorities including payment
10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States by the recipient of applicable duties and taxes imposed in accordance with the
personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippine laws of the Philippines. The exportation of such property and of property
and United States authorities. United States Personnel serving sentences in the acquired in the Philippines by United States personnel shall be free of all
Philippines shall have the right to visits and material assistance. Philippine duties, taxes, and other similar charges.
11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial only in Philippine courts of
ordinary jurisdiction, and shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine Article VIII
military or religious courts. Movement of Vessels and Aircraft
Article VI 1. Aircraft operated by or for the United States armed forces may enter the
Claims Philippines upon approval of the Government of the Philippines in accordance
1. Except for contractual arrangements, including United States foreign military with procedures stipulated in implementing arrangements.
sales letters of offer and acceptance and leases of military equipment, both 2. Vessels operated by or for the United States armed forces may enter the
governments waive any and all claims against each other for damage, loss or Philippines upon approval of the Government of the Philippines. The movement
destruction to property of each others armed forces or for death or injury to their of vessels shall be in accordance with international custom and practice
military and civilian personnel arising from activities to which this agreement governing such vessels, and such agreed implementing arrangements as
applies. necessary.
2. For claims against the United States, other than contractual claims and those 3. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft operated by or for the United States armed
to which paragraph 1 applies, the United States Government, in accordance with forces shall not be subject to the payment of landing or port fees, navigation or
United States law regarding foreign claims, will pay just and reasonable over flight charges, or tolls or other use charges, including light and harbor dues,
compensation in settlement of meritorious claims for damage, loss, personal while in the Philippines. Aircraft operated by or for the United States armed
injury or death, caused by acts or omissions of United States personnel, or forces shall observe local air traffic control regulations while in the Philippines.
otherwise incident to the non-combat activities of the United States forces. Vessels owned or operated by the United States solely on United States
Government non-commercial service shall not be subject to compulsory pilotage
at Philippine ports.
 Article IX right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be
Duration and Termination subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of. [14]
This agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the parties have In the case before us, petitioners failed to show, to the satisfaction of this Court,
notified each other in writing through the diplomatic channel that they have that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a
completed their constitutional requirements for entry into force. This agreement result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not
shall remain in force until the expiration of 180 days from the date on which established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or
either party gives the other party notice in writing that it desires to terminate the spending powers.[15] On this point, it bears stressing that a taxpayers suit refers
agreement. to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement
Via these consolidated[11] petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners - as of public funds derived from taxation.[16] Thus, in Bugnay Const. &
legislators, non-governmental organizations, citizens and taxpayers - assail the Development Corp. vs. Laron[17], we held:
constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein respondents grave abuse of x x x it is exigent that the taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently show that he would be
discretion in ratifying the agreement. benefited or injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real
We have simplified the issues raised by the petitioners into the following: party in interest. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, he must
I specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
Do petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury
legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA? as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not
II sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section public.
25, Article XVIII of the Constitution? Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are involved in
III this case, and in the absence of any allegation by petitioners that public funds
Does the VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty? are being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal
a. Are Philippine courts deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses standing to assail the legality of the VFA.
committed by US military personnel?
b. Is the Supreme Court deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by Similarly, Representatives Wigberto Taada, Agapito Aquino and Joker
reclusion perpetua or higher? Arroyo, as petitioners-legislators, do not possess the requisite locus standi to
IV maintain the present suit. While this Court, in Phil. Constitution Association vs.
Does the VFA violate: Hon. Salvador Enriquez,[18] sustained the legal standing of a member of the
a. the equal protection clause under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution? Senate and the House of Representatives to question the validity of a
b. the Prohibition against nuclear weapons under Article II, Section 8? presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bull, we
c. Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution granting the exemption from cannot, at this instance, similarly uphold petitioners standing as members of
taxes and duties for the equipment, materials supplies and other properties Congress, in the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person
imported into or acquired in the Philippines by, or on behalf, of the US Armed or to the institution to which they belong.
Forces?
Beyond this, the allegations of impairment of legislative power, such as
LOCUS STANDI the delegation of the power of Congress to grant tax exemptions, are more
At the outset, respondents challenge petitioners standing to sue, on the apparent than real. While it may be true that petitioners pointed to provisions of
ground that the latter have not shown any interest in the case, and that the VFA which allegedly impair their legislative powers, petitioners failed
petitioners failed to substantiate that they have sustained, or will sustain direct however to sufficiently show that they have in fact suffered direct injury.
injury as a result of the operation of the VFA. [12] Petitioners, on the other hand, In the same vein, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is stripped of
counter that the validity or invalidity of the VFA is a matter of transcendental standing in these cases. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, the IBP
importance which justifies their standing.[13] lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the absence of a board resolution
A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or from its Board of Governors authorizing its National President to commence the
statute must show not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained present action.[19]
or in is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the
indefinite way. He must show that he has been, or is about to be, denied some constitutional significance of the issues raised in the petitions, this Court, in the
exercise of its sound discretion, brushes aside the procedural barrier and takes Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:
cognizance of the petitions, as we have done in the early Emergency Powers After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of
Cases,[20] where we had occasion to rule: the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases,
x x x ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino except under a treaty duly concurred in by the senate and, when the Congress so
although they were involving only an indirect and general interest shared in requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
proper parties and ruled that transcendental importance to the public of these contracting State.
cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements
if we must, technicalities of procedure. We have since then applied the in general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the
exception in many other cases. (Association of Small Landowners in the Members of the Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or international
Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343). (Underscoring agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. This provision lays
Supplied) down the general rule on treatise or international agreements and applies to any
This principle was reiterated in the subsequent cases of Gonzales vs. form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not limited to,
COMELEC,[21] Daza vs. Singson,[22] and Basco vs. Phil. Amusement and extradition or tax treatise or those economic in nature. All treaties or
Gaming Corporation,[23] where we emphatically held: international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the
keeping with the Courts duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.
or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the
limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies
discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or
and has taken cognizance of this petition. x x x facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate
Again, in the more recent case of Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional
Jr.,[24] thisCourt ruled that in cases of transcendental importance, the Court requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines.Section
may relax the standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper even where 25, Article XVIII further requires that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by
Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held
on the doctrine of separation of powers, which enjoins upon the departments of for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other
the government a becoming respect for each others acts, [25] this Court contracting state.
nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant petitions.
It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
contradicting each other, actually share some common ground. These
One focal point of inquiry in this controversy is the determination of constitutional provisions both embody phrases in the negative and thus, are
which provision of the Constitution applies, with regard to the exercise by the deemed prohibitory in mandate and character. In particular, Section 21 opens
senate of its constitutional power to concur with the VFA. Petitioners argue that with the clause No treaty x x x, and Section 25 contains the phrase shall not be
Section 25, Article XVIII is applicable considering that the VFA has for its allowed. Additionally, in both instances, the concurrence of the Senate is
subject the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines.Respondents, indispensable to render the treaty or international agreement valid and effective.
on the contrary, maintain that Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as To our mind, the fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under
the VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement which involves merely Section 21, Article VII, and that the Senate extended its concurrence under the
the temporary visits of United States personnel engaged in joint military same provision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21,
exercises. Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict
concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. Section 21, constitutional requirements.
Article VII, which herein respondents invoke, reads:
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. United States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the established. The clause does not refer to foreign military bases,
rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of troops, or facilities collectively but treats them as separate and independent
criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and subjects. The use of comma and the disjunctive word or clearly signifies
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. disassociation and independence of one thing from the others included in the
enumeration,[28]such that, the provision contemplates three different situations -
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b)
treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities - any of the three standing alone places it
instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.
of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for
the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid To this end, the intention of the framers of the Charter, as manifested
concurrence of the Senate, as will be further discussed hereunder. during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is consistent
It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special provision with this interpretation:
or law prevails over a general one. Lex specialis derogat generali. Thus, where MR. MAAMBONG. I just want to address a question or two to Commissioner
there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which, Bernas.
in its most comprehensive sense, would include what is embraced in the former, This formulation speaks of three things: foreign military bases, troops
the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be or facilities. My first question is: If the country does enter into such kind of a
taken to affect only such cases within its general language which are not within treaty, must it cover the three-bases, troops or facilities-or could the treaty
the provision of the particular enactment.[26] entered into cover only one or two?
FR. BERNAS. Definitely, it can cover only one. Whether it covers only one
In Leveriza vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,[27] we enunciated: or it covers three, the requirement will be the same.
x x x that another basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the Philippine government can enter
legislation must give way to a special legislation on the same subject, and into a treaty covering not bases but merely troops?
generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special FR. BERNAS. Yes.
provisions are not applicable (Sto. Domingo vs. de los Angeles, 96 SCRA 139), MR. MAAMBONG. I cannot find any reason why the government can enter
that a specific statute prevails over a general statute (De Jesus vs. People, 120 into a treaty covering only troops.
SCRA 760) and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a FR. BERNAS. Why not? Probably if we stretch our imagination a little bit more,
particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail (Wil we will find some. We just want to cover everything.[29] (Underscoring
Wilhensen Inc. vs. Baluyot, 83 SCRA 38). Supplied)
Moreover, military bases established within the territory of another
Moreover, it is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is state is no longer viable because of the alternatives offered by new means and
inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the reason that there is no weapons of warfare such as nuclear weapons, guided missiles as well as huge
permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a military base. On this sea vessels that can stay afloat in the sea even for months and years without
score, the Constitution makes no distinction between transient and returning to their home country. These military warships are actually used as
permanent. Certainly, we find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires substitutes for a land-home base not only of military aircraft but also of military
foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the personnel and facilities. Besides, vessels are mobile as compared to a land-based
Philippines. military headquarters.
It is a rudiment in legal hermenuetics that when no distinction is made At this juncture, we shall then resolve the issue of whether or not the
by law, the Court should not distinguish- Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos requirements of Section 25 were complied with when the Senate gave its
distinguire debemos. concurrence to the VFA.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or
In like manner, we do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25, facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently
Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in
foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. Notably, a perusal of said by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the
constitutional provision reveals that the proscription covers foreign military votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a
bases, troops, or facilities. Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to treaty by the other contracting state.
the entry of troops and facilities without any foreign bases being
 There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the Petitioners content that the phrase recognized as a treaty, embodied in
case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. section 25, Article XVIII, means that the VFA should have the advice and
18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, whether under the consent of the United States Senate pursuant to its own constitutional process,
general requirement in Section 21, Article VII, or the specific mandate and that it should not be considered merely an executive agreement by the
mentioned in Section 25, Article XVIII, the provision in the latter article United States.
requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum In opposition, respondents argue that the letter of United States
being unnecessary since Congress has not required it. Ambassador Hubbard stating that the VFA is binding on the United States
Government is conclusive, on the point that the VFA is recognized as a treaty by
As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly requires the United States of America. According to respondents, the VFA, to be binding,
that a treaty or international agreement, to be valid and effective, must must only be accepted as a treaty by the United States.
be concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. On
the other hand, Section 25, Article XVIII simply provides that the treaty be duly This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a
concurred in by the Senate. treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the
agreement as a treaty.[32] To require the other contracting state, the United States
Applying the foregoing constitutional provisions, a two-thirds vote of of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for
all the members of the Senate is clearly required so that the concurrence concurrence pursuant to its Constitution,[33] is to accord strict meaning to the
contemplated by law may be validly obtained and deemed present. While it is phrase.
true that Section 25, Article XVIII requires, among other things, that the treaty- Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution
the VFA, in the instant case-be duly concurred in by the Senate, it is very true are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
however that said provision must be related and viewed in light of the clear employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its
mandate embodied in Section 21, Article VII, which in more specific terms, language should be understood in the sense they have in common use. [34]
requires that the concurrence of a treaty, or international agreement, be made by Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as
a two -thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. Indeed, Section 25, Article an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive
XVIII must not be treated in isolation to section 21, Article, VII. agreement is as binding as a treaty.[35] To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses
the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be
As noted, the concurrence requirement under Section 25, Article XVIII taken equally as a treaty.
must be construed in relation to the provisions of Section 21, Article VII. In a
more particular language, the concurrence of the Senate contemplated under A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
Section 25, Article XVIII means that at least two-thirds of all the members of is an international instrument concluded between States in written form and
the Senate favorably vote to concur with the treaty-the VFA in the instant case. governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in
Under these circumstances, the charter provides that the Senate shall be two or more related instruments, and whatever its particular
composed of twenty-four (24) Senators.[30] Without a tinge of doubt, two-thirds designation.[36] There are many other terms used for a treaty or international
(2/3) of this figure, or not less than sixteen (16) members, favorably acting on agreement, some of which are: act, protocol, agreement, compromis d arbitrage,
the proposal is an unquestionable compliance with the requisite number of votes concordat, convention, declaration, exchange of notes, pact, statute, charter
mentioned in Section 21 of Article VII. The fact that there were actually twenty- and modus vivendi. All writers, from Hugo Grotius onward, have pointed out
three (23) incumbent Senators at the time the voting was made, [31] will not alter that the names or titles of international agreements included under the general
in any significant way the circumstance that more than two-thirds of the term treaty have little or no legal significance. Certain terms are useful, but they
members of the Senate concurred with the proposed VFA, even if the two-thirds furnish little more than mere description.[37]
vote requirement is based on this figure of actual members (23). In this regard,
the fundamental law is clear that two-thirds of the 24 Senators, or at least 16 Article 2(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that the provisions of
favorable votes, suffice so as to render compliance with the strict constitutional paragraph 1 regarding the use of terms in the present Convention are without
mandate of giving concurrence to the subject treaty. prejudice to the use of those terms, or to the meanings which may be given to
them in the internal law of the State.
Having resolved that the first two requisites prescribed in Section 25,
Article XVIII are present, we shall now pass upon and delve on the requirement Thus, in international law, there is no difference between treaties and
that the VFA should be recognized as a treaty by the United States of America. executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as
the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers.[38] International Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the
law continues to make no distinction between treaties and executive agreements: head of the state or of the government, as the case may be, through which the
they are equally binding obligations upon nations.[39] formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed.[43] A State may provide in its
domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of the
In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when: (a) the treaty
agreements even without the concurrence of the Senate or provides for such ratification, (b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating
Congress. In Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading,[40] we had States agreed that ratification should be required, (c) the representative of the
occasion to pronounce: State has signed the treaty subject to ratification, or (d) the intention of the State
x x x the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its
necessity of subsequent congressional approval has been confirmed by long representative, or was expressed during the negotiation. [44]
usage. From the earliest days of our history we have entered into executive
agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most- In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not,
favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only
and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. [45]
has never been seriously questioned by our courts. With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and
xxxxxxxxx with the exchange of notes between the Philippines and the United States of
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has expressly America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the
recognized the validity and constitutionality of executive agreements entered principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus,
into without Senate approval. (39 Columbia Law Review, pp. 753-754) (See, no less than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, [46]declares that the
also, U.S. vs. Curtis Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 81 L. ed. Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
255; U.S. vs. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 81 L. ed. 1134; U.S. vs. Pink, 315 U.S. of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
203, 86 L. ed. 796; Ozanic vs. U.S. 188 F. 2d. 288; Yale Law Journal, Vol. 15 freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.
pp. 1905-1906; California Law Review, Vol. 25, pp. 670-675; Hyde on
International Law [revised Edition], Vol. 2, pp. 1405, 1416-1418; As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be
willoughby on the U.S. Constitution Law, Vol. I [2d ed.], pp. 537-540; bound by generally accepted rules for the conduct of its international
Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 210-218; Hackworth, relations. While the international obligation devolves upon the state and not
International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 390-407). (Italics Supplied) (Emphasis upon any particular branch, institution, or individual member of its government,
Ours) the Philippines is nonetheless responsible for violations committed by any
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission which drafted the branch or subdivision of its government or any official thereof. As an integral
1987 Constitution is enlightening and highly-instructive: part of the community of nations, we are responsible to assure that our
MR. MAAMBONG. Of course it goes without saying that as far as ratification government, Constitution and laws will carry out our international
of the other state is concerned, that is entirely their concern under their own obligation.[47] Hence, we cannot readily plead the Constitution as a convenient
laws. excuse for non-compliance with our obligations, duties and responsibilities
FR. BERNAS. Yes, but we will accept whatever they say. If they say that we under international law.
have done everything to make it a treaty, then as far as we are concerned, we
will accept it as a treaty.[41] Beyond this, Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of
The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador States adopted by the International Law Commission in 1949 provides: Every
Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties
committed to living up to the terms of the VFA.[42] For as long as the united and other sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its
States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty. [48]
further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked
compliance with the mandate of the Constitution. Equally important is Article 26 of the convention which provides that
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by
concurrence of the Senate should be taken as a clear an unequivocal expression them in good faith. This is known as the principle of pacta sunt servanda which
of our nations consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to preserves the sanctity of treaties and have been one of the most fundamental
uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder.
principles of positive international law, supported by the jurisprudence of aforementioned provision. Certainly, no abuse of discretion, much less a grave,
international tribunals.[49] patent and whimsical abuse of judgment, may be imputed to the President in his
act of ratifying the VFA and referring the same to the Senate for the purpose of
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
complying with the concurrence requirement embodied in the fundamental
In the instant controversy, the President, in effect, is heavily faulted for law. In doing so, the President merely performed a constitutional task and
exercising a power and performing a task conferred upon him by the exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the functions of his office. Even
Constitution-the power to enter into and ratify treaties. Through the expediency if he erred in submitting the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the
of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioners in these consolidated cases provisions of Section 21 of Article VII, instead of Section 25 of Article XVIII of
impute grave abuse of discretion on the part of the chief Executive in ratifying the Constitution, still, the President may not be faulted or scarred, much less be
the VFA, and referring the same to the Senate pursuant to the provisions of adjudged guilty of committing an abuse of discretion in some patent, gross, and
Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution. capricious manner.
For while it is conceded that Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution
On this particular matter, grave abuse of discretion implies such has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of political departments to decide, such as those relating to national security, it has
jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner not altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as the field of foreign relations.[54] The High Tribunals function, as sanctioned by
to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in Article VIII, Section 1, is merely (to) check whether or not the governmental
contemplation of law.[50] branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction,
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing (of) grave
President, as head of State, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the
of the country. In many ways, the President is the chief architect of the nations Court to exercise its corrective powerIt has no power to look into what it thinks
foreign policy; his dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then) is apparent error.[55]
conceded.[51] Wielding vast powers an influence, his conduct in the external As to the power to concur with treaties, the constitution lodges the
affairs of the nation, as Jefferson describes, is executive altogether."[52] same with the Senate alone. Thus, once the Senate[56] performs that power, or
exercises its prerogative within the boundaries prescribed by the Constitution,
As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the concurrence cannot, in like manner, be viewed to constitute an abuse of
the Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence power, much less grave abuse thereof. Corollarily, the Senate, in the exercise of
of at least two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light, the its discretion and acting within the limits of such power, may not be similarly
negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are faulted for having simply performed a task conferred and sanctioned by no less
exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his than the fundamental law.
vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the
fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, For the role of the Senate in relation to treaties is essentially legislative
and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.[53] Consequently, the acts or in character;[57] the Senate, as an independent body possessed of its own erudite
judgment calls of the President involving the VFA-specifically the acts of mind, has the prerogative to either accept or reject the proposed agreement, and
ratification and entering into a treaty and those necessary or incidental to the whatever action it takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, pertains
exercise of such principal acts - squarely fall within the sphere of his to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act. In this sense, the Senate
constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck down, much less partakes a principal, yet delicate, role in keeping the principles of separation of
calibrated by this Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of powers and of checks and balances alive and vigilantly ensures that these
power or discretion. cherished rudiments remain true to their form in a democratic government such
as ours. The Constitution thus animates, through this treaty-concurring power of
It is the Courts considered view that the President, in ratifying the VFA the Senate, a healthy system of checks and balances indispensable toward our
and in submitting the same to the Senate for concurrence, acted within the nations pursuit of political maturity and growth. True enough, rudimentary is the
confines and limits of the powers vested in him by the Constitution. It is of no principle that matters pertaining to the wisdom of a legislative act are beyond
moment that the President, in the exercise of his wide latitude of discretion and the ambit and province of the courts to inquire.
in the honest belief that the VFA falls within the ambit of Section 21, Article VII
of the Constitution, referred the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the
 In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the BAYAN vs. Zamora G.R. No. 138570 October 10, 2000
part of respondents, this Court- as the final arbiter of legal controversies and July 11, 2009 at 9:51 am (1)
staunch sentinel of the rights of the people - is then without power to conduct an (https://angelcapacio.wordpress.com/2009/07/11/bayan-vs-zamora-g-r-no-
incursion and meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative in 138570-october-10-2000/)
character and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the distinct
boundaries and limits the metes and bounds within which each of the three FACTS: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America
political branches of government may exercise the powers exclusively and forged a military bases agreement which formalized, among others, the use of
essentially conferred to it by law. installations in the Philippine territory by the US military personnel. To further
strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the US
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petitions are entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the
hereby DISMISSED. parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed
SO ORDERED. forces, public vessels and aircraft.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Gonzaga- In 1991, with the expiration of RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the
Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. periodic military exercises between the two countries were held in abeyance.
Melo, and Vitug, JJ., join the dissent of J. Puno. However, the defence and security relationship continued pursuant to the Mutual
Puno, J., see dissenting opinion. Defense Treaty. On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed,
Mendoza, J., in the result. among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement
Panganiban, J., no part due to close personal and former professional relations (VFA). Negotiations by both panels on VFA led to a consolitdated draft text and
with a petitioner, Sen. J.R. Salonga. a series of conferences. Eventually, President Fidel V. Ramos approved the
VFA.
On October 5, 1998 President Joseph E. Estrada ratified the VFA thru
respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs. On October 6, 1998, the President,
acting thru Executive Secretary Zamora officially transmitted to the Senate, the
Instrument of Ratification, letter of the President and the VFA for approval. It
was approved by the Senate by a 2/3 vote of its members. On June 1, 1999, the
VFA officially entered into force after an exchange of notes between Secretary
Siazon and US Ambassador Hubbard.

The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances
and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be
present in the Philippines. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition,
assailing the constitutionality of the VFA and imputing grave abuse of discretion
to respondents in ratifying the agreement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the VFA is unconstitutional.

RULING: Petition is dismissed.

The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the
concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. Sec. 21 Art.
VII, which respondent invokes, reads: “No treaty or international agreement
shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the
Members of the Senate. Sec. 25 Art. XVIII provides : “After the expiration in
1991 of the Agreement between the RP and the US concerning Military Bases,
foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in and when the Congress so requires,
ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum held
for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the Senateby the other contracting EN BANC
state”. [G. R. No. 140835. August 14, 2000]
The first cited provision applies to any form of treaties and international RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDRES R. NARVASA, as
agreements in general with a wide variety of subject matter. All treaties and Chairman, PREPARATORY COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL
international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject REFORMS; HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary;
matter, coverage or particular designation requires the concurrence of the Senate COMMISSION ON AUDIT; ROBERTO AVENTAJADO, as Presidential
to be valid and effective. Consultant on Council of Economic Advisers/Economic Affairs;
In contrast, the second cited provision applies to treaties which involve presence ANGELITO C. BANAYO, as Presidential Adviser for/on Political Affairs;
of foreign military bases, troops and facilities in the Philippines. Both VERONICA IGNACIO-JONES, as Presidential Assistant/ Appointment
constitutional provisions share some common ground. The fact that the Secretary (In charge of appointments), respondents.
President referred the VFA to the Senate under Sec. 21 Art. VII, and that Senate
extended its concurrence under the same provision is immaterial. DECISION
Undoubtedly, Sec. 25 Art. XVIII which specifically deals with treaties involving GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
foreign military bases and troops should apply in the instant case. Hence, for In this petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9,
VFA to be constitutional it must sufficiently meet the following requisites : 1999, petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer,
a) it must be under a treaty assails the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on
b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate, and when so required by Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants,
Congress, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national advisers and assistants. Petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR and the
referendum presidential consultants, advisers and assistants from acting as such, and to
c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State enjoin Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora from enforcing their advice and
There is no dispute in the presence of the first two requisites. The third requisite recommendations. In addition, petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commission on
implies that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential
as a treaty. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA only consultants, advisers and assistants. Finally, petitioner prays for an order
as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner with information on certain
agreement is as binding as a treaty. They are equally binding obligations upon matters.
nations. Therefore, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the On January 28, 2000, respondent Hon. Andres R. Narvasa, impleaded
constitution. in his capacity as Chairman of the PCCR, filed his Comment to the Petition. The
The court also finds that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the rest of the respondents, who are being represented in this case by the Solicitor
executive department as to their power to ratify the VFA. General, filed their Comment with this Court on March 7, 2000. Petitioner then
filed a Consolidated Reply on April 24, 2000, whereupon this case was
considered submitted for decision.

I. Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform

The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was
created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive
Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to study and recommend proposed
amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of
implementing the same.[1] Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR
on two grounds. First, he contends that it is a public office which only the
legislature can create by way of a law.[2] Secondly, petitioner asserts that by
creating such a body the President is intervening in a process from which he is
totally excluded by the Constitution the amendment of the fundamental
charter.[3]
It is alleged by respondents that, with respect to the PCCR, this case
has become moot and academic. We agree.
 An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable (3) minor children. But nowhere in his petition does petitioner claim that his
controversy because the issues involved have become academic or rights and privileges as a lawyer or citizen have been directly and personally
dead.[4] Under E.O. No. 43, the PCCR was instructed to complete its task on or injured by the operation of the Instant Sweepstakes. The interest of the person
before June 30, 1999.[5] However, on February 19, 1999, the President issued assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must
Executive Order No. 70 (E.O. No. 70), which extended the time frame for the be able to show, not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or
completion of the commissions work, viz in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
SECTION 6. Section 8 is hereby amended to read as follows: enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It
Time Frame. The Commission shall commence its work on 01 January 1999 and must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some
complete the same on or before 31 December 1999. The Commission shall right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
submit its report and recommendations to the President within fifteen (15) subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.
working days from 31 December 1999.
We apprehend no difference between the petitioner in Valmonte and the
The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on present petitioners. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest
December 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same day. It had they have for bringing this suit. It does not detract from the high regard for
likewise spent the funds allotted to it.[6]Thus, the PCCR has ceased to exist, petitioners as civic leaders to say that their interest falls short of that required to
having lost its raison detre. Subsequent events have overtaken the petition and maintain an action under Rule 3, d 2.
the Court has nothing left to resolve.
Coming now to the instant case, petitioner has not shown that he has
The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the
impossibility of granting the relief prayed for by petitioner. Basically, petitioner creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can
asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR from acting as such. [7] Clearly, prohibition is claim any injury in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has
an inappropriate remedy since the body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. It encroached upon the legislatures powers to create a public office and to propose
is well established that prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no
restrain an act that is already fait accompli.[8] At this point, any ruling regarding direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or
the PCCR would simply be in the nature of an advisory opinion, which is privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be
definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial power. subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly,
In addition to the mootness of the issue, petitioners lack of standing constitutes petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek
another obstacle to the successful invocation of judicial power insofar as the judicial redress as a citizen.
PCCR is concerned.
A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue
The question in standing is whether a party has alleged such a personal when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness contravention of the law or the Constitution.[13], Thus payers action is properly
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. [9] In assailing the power.[14] This was our ruling in a recent case wherein petitioners
constitutionality of E.O. Nos. 43 and 70, petitioner asserts his interest as a Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines (TELEBAP)
citizen and taxpayer.[10] A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that and GMA Network, Inc. questioned the validity of section 92 of B.P. No. 881
he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly (otherwise knows as the Omnibus Election Code) requiring radio and television
illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged stations to give free air time to the Commission on Elections during the
action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable campaign period.[15] The Court held that petitioner TELEBAP did not have any
action.[11] In Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,[12]we denied standing to interest as a taxpayer since the assailed law did not involve the taxing or
petitioners who were assailing a lease agreement between the Philippine Charity spending power of Congress.[16]
Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation,
stating that, in Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, G.R. No. Many other rulings have premised the grant or denial of standing to
78716, Sept. 22, 1987, standing was denied to a petitioner who sought to declare taxpayers upon whether or not the case involved a disbursement of public funds
a form of lottery known as Instant Sweepstakes invalid because, as the Court by the legislature. In Sanidad v. Commission on Elections,[17] the petitioners
held, Valmonte brings the suit as a citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of three therein were allowed to bring a taxpayers suit to question several presidential
decrees promulgated by then President Marcos in his legislative capacity calling accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Additional amounts shall be
for a national referendum, with the Court explaining that released to the Commission upon submission of requirements for expenditures.
...[i]t is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute Presidential
Decrees are of such nature may be contested by one who will sustain a direct The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not
injury as a result of its enforcement.At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing by Congress. In fact, there was no an appropriation at all. In a strict
for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the
executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to the act of the legislature
breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries an appropriation of Five Million setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the
Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes. Presidential Decree No. payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors. [21] The funds used for the
1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions. The PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the
interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of exercise of the Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to section 25
these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to (5) of article VI of the Constitution.
litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds.
In the final analysis, it must be stressed that the Court retains the power
In still another case, the Court held that petitioners the Philippine to decide whether or not it will entertain a taxpayers suit. [22] In the case at bar,
Constitution Association, Inc., a non-profit civic organization - had standing as there being no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power, petitioner
taxpayers to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836 insofar as it cannot be allowed to question the creation of the PCCR in his capacity as a
provides for retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leaves to taxpayer, but rather, he must establish that he has a personal and substantial
Senators and Representatives and to the elective officials of both houses of interest in the case and that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
Congress.[18] And in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works,[19] the Court allowed result of its enforcement.[23] In other words, petitioner must show that he is a real
petitioner to maintain a taxpayers suit assailing the constitutional soundness of party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or
Republic Act No. 920 appropriating P85,000 for the construction, repair and that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit.[24] Nowhere in his pleadings does
improvement of feeder roads within private property. All these cases involved petitioner presume to make such a representation.
the disbursement of public funds by means of a law.
II. Presidential Consultants, Advisers, Assistants
Meanwhile, in Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation v. The second issue raised by petitioner concerns the presidential
Laron,[20] the Court declared that the trial court was wrong in allowing consultants. Petitioner alleges that in 1995 and 1996, the President created
respondent Ravanzo to bring an action for injunction in his capacity as a seventy (70) positions in the Office of the President and appointed to said
taxpayer in order to question the legality of the contract of lease covering the positions twenty (20) presidential consultants, twenty-two (22) presidential
public market entered into between the City of Dagupan and petitioner. The advisers, and twenty-eight (28) presidential assistants.[25] Petitioner asserts that,
Court declared that Ravanzo did not possess the requisite standing to bring such as in the case of the PCCR, the President does not have the power to create these
taxpayers suit since [o]n its face, and there is no evidence to the contrary, the positions.[26]
lease contract entered into between petitioner and the City shows that no public Consistent with the abovementioned discussion on standing, petitioner
funds have been or will be used in the construction of the market building. does not have the personality to raise this issue before the Court. First of all, he
has not proven that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any injury as a
Coming now to the instant case, it is readily apparent that there is no result of the appointment of such presidential advisers. Secondly, petitioner has
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he
the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under possesses a taxpayers interest in this particular issue. Unlike the PCCR which
section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is appropriated for its was created by virtue of an executive order, petitioner does not allege by what
operational expenses to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President. official act, whether it be by means of an executive order, administrative order,
memorandum order, or otherwise, the President attempted to create the positions
The relevant provision states - of presidential advisers, consultants and assistants. Thus, it is unclear what act of
Appropriations. The initial amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) is the President petitioner is assailing. In support of his allegation, petitioner
hereby appropriated for the operational expenses of the Commission to be merely annexed a copy of the Philippine Government Directory (Annex C)
sourced from funds of the Office of the President, subject to the usual listing the names and positions of such presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants to his petition. However, appointment is obviously not synonymous basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or
with creation. It would be improvident for this Court to entertain this issue given affects the public.[32]
the insufficient nature of the allegations in the Petition.
Thus, we agree with petitioner that respondent Zamora, in his official
III. Right to Information capacity as Executive Secretary, has a constitutional and statutory duty to
Finally, petitioner asks us to issue a writ of mandamus ordering answer petitioners letter dealing with matters which are unquestionably of public
Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora to answer his letter (Annex D) dated concern that is, appointments made to public offices and the utilization of public
October 4, 1999 requesting for the names of executive officials holding multiple property. With regard to petitioners request for copies of the appointment papers
positions in government, copies of their appointments, and a list of the recipients of certain officials, respondent Zamora is obliged to allow the inspection and
of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to copying of the same subject to the reasonable limitations required for the orderly
Malacanang.[27] conduct of official business.[33]
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent
The right to information is enshrined in Section 7 of the Bill of Rights Zamora is ordered to furnish petitioner with the information requested.
which provides that The right of the people to information on matters of public SO ORDERED.
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be Bellosillo, J., abroad, on official business.
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Puno, J., vote to dismiss on the ground that the case is moot.
Under both the 1973[28] and 1987 Constitution, this is a self-executory provision
which can be invoked by any citizen before the courts. This was our ruling
in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,[29] wherein the Court classified the right
to information as a public right and when a [m]andamus proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the
mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public
which possesses the right. However, Congress may provide for reasonable
conditions upon the access to information. Such limitations were embodied in
Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise knows as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which took effect on March 25,
1989. This law provides that, in the performance of their duties, all public
officials and employees are obliged to respond to letters sent by the public
within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof and to ensure the
accessibility of all public documents for inspection by the public within
reasonable working hours, subject to the reasonable claims of confidentiality. [30]
Elaborating on the significance of the right to information, the Court said
in Baldoza v. Dimaano[31] that [t]he incorporation of this right in the
Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of
information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public
of the nations problems, nor a meaningful democratic decisionmaking if they are
denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable
the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. The
information to which the public is entitled to are those concerning matters of
public concern, a term which embrace[s] a broad spectrum of subjects which the
public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary
citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case
 GONZALES VS. NARVASA EN BANC
G.R. No. 140835, August 14 2000 G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994
(http://whateverinfos.blogspot.com/2013/07/gonzales-vs-narvasa.html) HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, Petitioner,v. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE
FACTS: Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and L. ATIENZA, CITY TREASURER ANTHONY ACEVEDO,
taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD AND THE CITY OF
1999, assailing theconstitutionality of the creation of the MANILA,Respondents.
Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions The City Legal Officer for petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library
of presidential consultants, advisers andassistants. The Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for Caltex (Phils.).chanrobles
Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created virtual law library
by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive OrderNo. 43 Joseph Lopez for Sangguniang Panglunsod of Manila.chanrobles virtual law
(E.O. No. 43) in order “to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or library
revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.” L.A. Maglaya for Petron Corporation.
Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds that it CRUZ, J.:
is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law. The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of
the Local Government Code reading as follows:
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue
the constitutionality ofExecutive Order No. 43 Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. - The procedure for approval of local
tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions
HELD: The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose
can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised
the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of
a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of
in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the
PCCR. If at all, it is onlyCongress, not petitioner, which can claim any “injury” effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment
in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30)
legislature’s powers to createa public office and to propose amendments to the days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the
Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file
indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or
burdens as a result of the PCCR’s activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four
establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen. oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as
the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed
Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain
issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged provisions contrary to law and public policy. 1chanrobles virtual law library
contravention of the law or the Constitution. It is readily apparent that there is
no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional
created by thePresident by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the
Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is “appropriated” for ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been
its operational expenses “to be sourced from the funds of the Office of observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government
the President.” Being that case, petitioner must show that he is a real party in Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the
interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local
will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein
presume to make such a representation. conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over
local governments. 2chanrobles virtual law library
 The present petition would have us reverse that decision. The Secretary In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187
argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural of the Local Government Code unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the
requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances and, inferentially, to annul them.
Government Code had indeed not been observed. He cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being
"the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer
Parenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the Court for had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
non-compliance with Circular 1-88, the Solicitor General having failed to former for the latter," while the second is "the power of a superior officer to see
submit a certified true copy of the challenged decision. 3However, on motion for to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law." 6His
reconsideration with the required certified true copy of the decision attached, the conclusion was that the challenged section gave to the Secretary the power of
petition was reinstated in view of the importance of the issues raised therein. control and not of supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President
of the Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation not only of Article X,
We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider specifically Section 4 thereof, 7and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of local
the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general governments, 8and the policy of local autonomy in general.
definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws
by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 We do not share that view. The lower court was rather hasty in
vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the invalidating the provision.
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, 4even as the Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it
constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax
taken against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the
Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did
jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own
the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment
or regulation is in question. it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in
reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for
the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control
separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the but of mere supervision. w library
legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such
courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they
this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by
thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not
majority of those who participated in its discussion. 5chanrobles virtual law cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the
library rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he
It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he
with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules.
on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no
the legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the
fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less
presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.
that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a
conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the The case of Taule v. Santos 9cited in the decision has no application
discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck here because the jurisdiction claimed by the Secretary of Local Governments
down. over election contests in the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay was held to belong to
the Commission on Elections by constitutional provision. The conflict was over prominent places in the city in accordance with Sec. 511(a) of the Local
jurisdiction, not supervision or control. Government Code. Finally, the Manila Revenue Code was not translated into
Pilipino or Tagalog and disseminated among the people for their information
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local and guidance, conformably to Sec. 59(b) of the
Autonomy Act, which provided in its Section 2 as follows: Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its
passage, unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise: Provided, however, That Judge Palattao found otherwise. He declared that all the procedural
the Secretary of Finance shall have authority to suspend the effectivity of any requirements had been observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code
ordinance within one hundred and twenty days after receipt by him of a copy and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before
thereof, if, in his opinion, the tax or fee therein levied or imposed is unjust, the Secretary only because he had given it only five days within which to gather
excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is contrary to declared national and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to
economy policy, and when the said Secretary exercises this authority the the trial court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
effectivity of such ordinance shall be suspended, either in part or as a whole, for
a period of thirty days within which period the local legislative body may either To get to the bottom of this question, the Court acceded to the motion
modify the tax ordinance to meet the objections thereto, or file an appeal with a of the respondents and called for the elevation to it of the said exhibits. We have
court of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax ordinance or the part or parts carefully examined every one of these exhibits and agree with the trial court that
thereof declared suspended, shall be considered as revoked. Thereafter, the local the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public
legislative body may not reimpose the same tax or fee until such time as the hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced by Exhibits G-1 to 17. The
grounds for the suspension thereof shall have ceased to exist. minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B
and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in theBalita and the
That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved
of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and
involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of Q-3. brary
whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but
hence, it would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power was this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three
never questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process.
given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain It has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and
the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare disseminated, but this requirement applies to the approval of local development
that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no plans and public investment programs of the local government unit and not to
discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue tax ordinances.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra
vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its We make no ruling on the substantive provisions of the Manila
enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom Revenue Code as their validity has not been raised in issue in the present
or reasonableness, of the tax measure.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
virtual law library
The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the
enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another matter. law library challenged decision of the Regional Trial Court insofar as it declared Section
187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its
In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue
notices of public hearings on the proposed Manila Revenue Code that were sent Code have been observed. No pronouncement as to
to interested parties as required by Art. 276(b) of the Implementing Rules of the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Local Government Code nor were copies of the proposed ordinance published in SO ORDERED.
three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Art. Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
276(a). No minutes were submitted to show that the obligatory public hearings Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
had been held. Neither were copies of the measure as approved posted in
 his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
EN BANC misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004] Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners;
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was
JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting,
ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
FORNIER, respondents. transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004] of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a
POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent. certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004] no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON year after the birth of respondent.
ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004,
FERNANDO POE JR., respondents. petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a
DECISION copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit
VITUG, J.: executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes for bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after
are deserving of the privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well as an discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English
inestimable acquisition,[1]that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of
those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it. birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record
question of profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered
brought up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of
highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of the Court the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available
with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of information could be found in the files of the National Archives regarding the
the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not? birth of Allan F. Poe.
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence,
colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law the more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M.
traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared
be no less than distinctly Filipino. to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry
of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-
Antecedent Case Settings Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives that no available
information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of
known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the
for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No.
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of
elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract between
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil
"Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the
to be Manila. said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. destroyed during World War II.
Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of
Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for
January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the
Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of
the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that
injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
the COMELEC resolutions. be established by law which power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, or instrumentality of the Government.
entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly
Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully
Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to
on the case. occupy the highest government post in the land.
Jurisdiction of the Court In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
In G. R. No. 161824 Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634,
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took
alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take
citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision
Omnibus Election Code cited reads:
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- "The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the
false 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare,
of the Omnibus Election Code - in Lopez vs. Roxas,[4] as not (being) justiciable controversies or disputes
Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or
the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957,
shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent
relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the
honest elections - Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793
authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to
certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate. be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have
Supreme Court per Rule 64[2] in an action for certiorari under Rule 65[3] of the implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless,
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
Constitution also reads 1987 Constitution.
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-
or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the
by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the
1992, would support this premise - 18th century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which
Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice- property, personal liberty and justice.[9] Its meaning expanded during the 19th
President of the Philippines. century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an participate in the exercise of political power.[10] The 20th century saw the next
election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice- stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right
President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A of the citizen to economic well-being and social security.[11] The idea of
petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest. citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with
Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of
number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, citizenship.[12]
as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential The Local Setting - from Spanish
Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner. Times to the Present
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice- "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."[13] In church records, the natives were
President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice- called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the
President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th
against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive
public office.[5] In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to
post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees. [14]
received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima
protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario. Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases among experts;[15] however, three royal decrees were undisputably made
directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held. August 1841,[16] the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. political status of children born in the Philippine Islands,[17] and finally, the Ley
Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable
Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.[18]
dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands
The Citizenship Issue because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical provisions of the Ultramaramong which this country was included, would be
background on the concept of citizenship. governed by special laws.[19]
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18
who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who December 1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who
shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office. [6] Aristotle were Spanish citizens. -
saw its significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State," which (a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
he described as being composed of such persons who would be adequate in (b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of
number to achieve a self-sufficient existence.[7] The concept grew to include one Spain,
who would both govern and be governed, for which qualifications like (c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal (d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of
with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, any town of the Monarchy.[20]
on the other.[8] In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the
fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest of state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in
society. the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle
of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11
abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant
which would remain virtually intact. in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also
the United States.[21] Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and
status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that
be determined by its Congress - period.[25] More about this later.
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following
Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights "Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by
of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives
and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to of other insular possession of the United States, and such other persons residing
foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under
to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the laws of the United States, if residing therein." [26]
the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine
decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by
be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he
in which they reside. initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In
Thus 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act
hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress." [22] of Congress in 1912 -
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on
Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided
Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed
however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have
passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
protection of the United States. provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others
Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the
of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for
on the Philippines - the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the
who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if residing
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve therein."
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain
tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight." [23] on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an date, not a citizen of some other country.
inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11 th day of April While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus
1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an
inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus
obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. [24] sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the "No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines - Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
of this Constitution immediately preceding such election."
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
Islands. perfect their Philippine citizenship."[27]
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of
age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. sanguinis[28] had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.Jus
civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women would soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs[29] (1912), did not last long. With the
automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.
husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the Secretary of Labor[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now
women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo
as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of
to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death certificate,
Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns - however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan,
Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate
Philippines: of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta
Constitution. Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an uncertified copy of a supposed certificate
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five. marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to
citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an
renounced her citizenship." American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the
Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his
situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution. parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides: from the documents would be that -
The following are citizens of the Philippines: 1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this 2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
Constitution. 3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September,
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. 1940;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect 4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and 5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. old.
The Case Of FPJ Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses: is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the
Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely
documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had
the proceedings before the COMELEC. complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit Proof of Paternity and Filiation
"3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley Under Civil Law.
was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil
Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two status of the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil
documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an
particularly in reference to the facts which they purported to show, i.e., the illegitimate son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must
marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie be used.
Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08
September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of
had utilized those material statements in his argument. All three documents were the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation
certified true copies of the originals. or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that - voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done
Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document. [32] Complementary to
original document itself, except in the following cases: the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section
xxxxxxxxx 5 thereof, that -
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to
recorded in a public office. jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any
FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the information by which such father could be identified.
Rules of Court provides: In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be
his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the
of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.[33] In Mendoza
stated. vs. Mella,[34] the Court ruled -
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made "Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the
therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is
the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient
duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our
publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents,
might have occurred.[31] there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it
September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus was not even they or either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the
be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature
Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also
was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 be made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case,
considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes the
Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show child as his or her own."
that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in
certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will
Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to apparently executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan
F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this Court defined what could except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
constitute such a document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment: which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the
those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, code reads:
and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office. The "Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice
public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
recognition may be made belongs to the first class." laws.
Let us leave it at that for the moment. Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,[36] the Court has ruled:
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of "We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be
illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of
was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take
before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of
place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given
recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could retroactive effect."
be demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or
prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the
lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships
action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The
lifetime of the presumed parent. provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil
writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his
simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be
include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of private
other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his. relations, the domain of civil law; particularly -
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and "Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the
Article 175 provide: organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been]
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations of
following: assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and those
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or which exist among members of a society for the protection of private
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private interests."[37]
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held:
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved "In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating
by: to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and
or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the rules
minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the
five years within which to institute the action. classification of their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter,
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the the authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and
death of either or both of the parties. divorce upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are questions that are
x x x x x x x x x. governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified
same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children. in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be
living abroad" - accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children
Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -
civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code, [39] such as on "I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in
successional rights and family relations.[40] In adoption, for instance, an adopted Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do
child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the hereby declare that:
same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to 1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
define his rights under civil law[41] and not his political status. 2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This 3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more
discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws, popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of members of the 4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital,
family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate Magdalena Street, Manila.
children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance xxxxxxxxx
of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep 7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they
these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount. were students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish 8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, 9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth,
however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our
unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law. family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship of Manila in 1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.
status should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with 10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more
that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code children after Ronald Allan Poe.
provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have xxxxxxxxx
preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary 18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald
rules on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the matter about Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of
pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or Fernando Poe, Sr.
Family Code provisions. Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides - Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, Declarant
or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by DNA Testing
birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish
controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes
other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the
family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation
these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court has acknowledged the
family history intimately connected with pedigree. strong weight of DNA testing -
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is "Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
(c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The
(d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI)
relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using
must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the
DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the
other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about
are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific invidious jus sanguinis.
technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated case. The case was about
as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and
results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from
since to reject said result is to deny progress." Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof
Petitioners Argument For that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore
Jurisprudential Conclusiveness concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino
could not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an but was not even a Filipino.
illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter
Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were
making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This
an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely
between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply
documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents xxxxxxxxx
showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an "Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual
American mother who were married to each other a year later, or on 16 foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause
September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate
child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it
citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a
on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,[43] citing Chiongbian vs. de Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
Leon[44] and Serra vs. Republic.[45] The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, by People vs. Cayat.[47] I would grant that the distinction between legitimate
SJ, is most convincing; he states - children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may
the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.
pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public
decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an
pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child
establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases. that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from
father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his
Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither
followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the
sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather. equal protection clause and must be reprobated.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this
a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have
Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to expressed similar views.The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on
Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here. pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship
Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino
mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption
that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty
to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
discriminate against him. violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935 Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their
of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs.
Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. There utterly COMELEC,[48] must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
clearly are none provided. 1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio,
In Sum Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R.
jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan
relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in 2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position of Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of
President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-
committed material representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing 003.
himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. No Costs.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the SO ORDERED.
petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly Davide, Jr., C.J., see separate opinion, concurring.
elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a Puno, J., on leave but was allowed to vote; see separate opinion.
presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the Panganiban, J., on official leave; allowed to vote but did not send his vote on
Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be the matter.
invoked only after, not before, the elections are held. Quisumbing, J., joins the dissent of Justices Tinga and Morales; case should
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has have been remanded.
been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of Ynares-Santiago, J., concurs and also with J. Punos separate opinion.
whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., concurs, please see separate opinion.
on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged Austria-Martinez, J., concurs, please see separate opinion.
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino Corona, J., joins the dissenting opinion of Justice Morales.
citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Carpio-Morales, J., see dissenting opinion.
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in Callejo, Sr., J., please see concurring opinion.
1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, Azcuna, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, Tinga, J., dissents per separate opinion.
his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if
acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent
FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first
light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand
still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty
G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004 The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, respondent’s birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines
JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."

G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004 Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ evidenced by the latter’s death certificate was identified as a Filipino
Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that having
G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004 died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1980. In
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo’s place of residence upon his
ELECTIONS and FPJ death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death,
such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
(http://lapadiday.blogspot.com/2012/11/case-digest-tecson-vs- Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so,
comelec.html) Lorenzo’s citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---
respondent’s father.
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though
presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts an American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation
in his (Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural as evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution
Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or
dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and
Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed marriage
the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article had no bearing on respondent’s citizenship in view of the established
VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution. paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented.

Issue: But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction. respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen. cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section
Ruling: 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding
“qualification of a candidate” for the presidency or vice-presidency
before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section
4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-
President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take
cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President
before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a
Filipino Citizen.
Tecson vs. COMELEC (Digest) respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his
Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004 putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo
Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954
DISCLAIMER: Contents herein are based on my consolidated at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year
research to other sources, please refer to REFERENCES section. 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence
(http://comp.lex.ph/2013/07/tecson-vs-comelec.html) of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
FACTS: Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his
to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution,
candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in
during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners;
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence
subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the
cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section
allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first,
74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior
2) No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year
the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the
after the birth of respondent.
Supreme Court on April 1992 categorically speak of the jurisdiction of
the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
Petitioners also questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines,
cognizance of and deciding the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe
and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
Jr. They asserted that under Section 4(7), Article VII of the 1987
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who
Constituition, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the case.
such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election
scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have
received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an
ISSUES:
election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario. It
1) Whether or not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen?
is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by
2) Whether or not the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases
qualifications of presidential candidates?
directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate
for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
RULING:
1) It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ
is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the
father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino
citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of