Nibbàna

Nibbàna
The Mind Stilled
Venerable
Bhikkhu Katukurunde ¥àõananda
Study Edition
Theravada Tipitaka Press

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Dedicated to My Upajjhàya,
The late Venerable
Matara Sri ¥àõàràma Mahàthera
of Meetirigala Nissarana Vanaya
Forest Hermitage,
Sri Lanka
About Nibbàna Ý The Mind Stilled
“Bikkhu Katukurunde Nanananda is one of Sri Lanka's foremost
meditative monks. He aparently lives in a little rock 'kuti' with a little
rock bed like the arahanths of the past in Sri Lanka. He entertains
guests very little and spends most of his time in seclusion. He does give
meditation instructions for those who are serious and I know monks and
nuns from all over Sri Lanka who visit him for instructions. He spent
many years in quiet seclusion until one day his teacher invited him to
talk on nibbana. This was followed by the 'nibbana' sermons which blew
everyone away. He has another series known as the 'pahankanuwa
sermons' denoting the place they were delivered from. He is the
epitome of monkhood for his practice, renunciation, humbleness, faith
and wisdom.”
www.dhammawheel.com
“...out in the jungle living beneath a huge boulder in a tin corrugated

hut with a skeleton and a few bookcases of dhamma books was
Nanananda. I can say of all the monks I met in Sri Lanka he made the
greatest impression, in his devotion to practice, his command of Pali
(which he was a lecturer in), and his very modern ... views of Dhamma.
Truly a remarkable man following the path... I encountered a monk
capable of imparting the power and complexity of the dhamma simply
and succintly.”
E.Spellman
“...profound, comprehensive and enlightening. no other series of

Dhamma talks in Sri Lanka had (and still has) such an influence on
Buddhists and Vipassana practioners as this series of 33 Dhamma talks
given by the Venerable Katukurunde Nyanananda, one of Sri Lanka’s
most renowned Dhamma teachers. Sparked by the improper
understanding of high ranking Buddhist monks on key Buddhist concepts
and insights, the Venerable Nyanananda, with his unmatched knowledge
of the Tipitaka worked him and his audience through - as it seems - all
dark, difficult and mysterious explanations of the Buddha leaving only
clarity, understanding and wisdom behind - a clear roadmap to what
insight meditation is all about, what the Buddha’s Dhamma tries to
achieve and how the goal itself, Nibbana, is to be properly understood.”
Bhikkhu Isidatta,
www.nibbanam.com
About the Author
The venerable author of this compendium of sermons on
Nibbàna was born in 1940. He graduated from the University
of Peradeniya in 1962 and served as an Assistant Lecturer in
Pàli at the same University for a brief period. Impelled by a
deep understanding of the teachings of the Buddha, he
renounced his post in 1967 to enter the Order of Buddhist
monks under the name Katukurunde ¥àõananda in the forest
monastic tradition of Sri Lanka.
The 33 sermons on Nibbàna, of which the 25 are translated
into English and are presented in this edition, were originally
delivered by the venerable author to his fellow monks at the
behest of his revered preceptor, the late venerable Matara Sri
¥àõàràma Mahàthera, the chief incumbent of Meetirigala
Hermitage (Meetirigala Nissarana Vanaya) and an illustrious
exponent of Insight Meditation in Sri Lanka. The meeting of
these two eminent disciples of the Buddha in a teacherÝpupil
relationship for nearly two decades, led to an outstanding
seminal contribution to the understanding of the Dhamma in
its correct perspective.
The reader of these pages will no doubt find unmistakable
evidence of the author's exposure to the methods of critical
examination in the understanding of exegetical treatises
during his university days. The mode of presentation, howev-
er, reveals a penetrative understanding of the deeper aspects
of the Buddha's teaching blossoming into a harmonious
blend of academic erudition with practical application of that
intensive learning process afforded by the contemplative life
of a forest monk.
5
6 Nibbàna Ý The Mind Stilled
Readers familiar with the author's Concept and Reality,

Ideal Solitude, and Magic of the Mind will find that the
present set of sermons draws upon some of the doctrinal
points outlined in those books for deeper analysis. Indeed
these sermons exhibit a salutary orientation towards the
practical aspects of the Buddha's teaching Ý a tendency
already evident in the author's Towards Calm and Insight,
and Seeing Through.
ÞMr. G.T. Bandara

The Settler, D.G.M.B
Royal Institute, 191, Havelock Road,
Colombo Ý 05.
Sri Lanka
Contents
About the Author ............................................................... 5
Contents ............................................................................. 7
Abbreviations ..................................................................... 9
Introduction ...................................................................... 11
Nibbāna Sermon 1............................................................ 15
Nibbāna Sermon 2............................................................ 41
Nibbāna Sermon 3............................................................ 69
Nibbāna Sermon 4............................................................ 99
Nibbāna Sermon 5.......................................................... 125
Nibbāna Sermon 6.......................................................... 151
Nibbāna Sermon 7.......................................................... 177
Nibbāna Sermon 8.......................................................... 203
Nibbāna Sermon 9.......................................................... 233
Nibbāna Sermon 10........................................................ 263
Nibbāna Sermon 11........................................................ 289
Nibbāna Sermon 12........................................................ 313
Nibbāna Sermon 13........................................................ 337
Nibbāna Sermon 14........................................................ 363
Nibbāna Sermon 15........................................................ 389
Nibbāna Sermon 16........................................................ 415
Nibbāna Sermon 17........................................................ 441
Nibbāna Sermon 18........................................................ 467
Nibbāna Sermon 19........................................................ 491
7
Nibbāna Sermon 20 ........................................................515

Nibbāna Sermon 21 ........................................................541
Nibbāna Sermon 22 ........................................................567
Nibbāna Sermon 23 ........................................................595
Nibbāna Sermon 24 ........................................................623
Nibbāna Sermon 25 ........................................................649
By the Same Author........................................................677
The Heretic Sage ....................................................... .... 679
Abbreviations
A Aïguttara Nikàya
Abhidh-av Abhidhammàvatàra
Abhidh-s Abhidhammatthasaïgaha
As Atthasàlinã (Comy on the Dhammasaïgaõã)
It Itivuttaka
Ud Udāna
Ud-a Paramatthadãpanã (Comy on the Udāna)
Ja Jàtaka
Th Theragàthà
Th-a Theragàthà Aññhakathà
Thã Therãgàthà
D Dãgha Nikàya
Dhp Dhammapada
Dhp-a Dhammapada Aññhakathà
Khp Khuddhakapàñha
Nett Nettippakaraõa
Nid I Mahàniddesa
Nid II Cåëaniddesa
Pañis Pañisambhidàmagga
Peñ Peñakopadesa
Pj I Paramatthajotikà (comy on Khp)
Pj II Paramatthajotikà (comy on Sn)
Ps Papa¤casådani (comy on M)
M Majjhima Nikàya
Mil Milindapa¤ha
Mp Manorathapåraõã (Comy on A)
Vibh-a Sammohavinodanã (Comy on Vibhaïga)
Vin Vinaya
Vism Visuddhimagga
S Saüyutta Nikàya
Sn Sutta Nipàta
Spk Sàratthappakàsinã (Comy on S)
Sp-t Sàratthadãpanã (Subcomy on Vin)
Sv Sumaïgalavilàsinã (Comy on D)
Sv-pñ Sumaïgalavilàsinã-puràõa-ñikà (Subcomy on D)
9
Introduction
ßNibbànaû Ý the ultimate goal of the Buddhist, has been variously
understood and interpreted in the history of Buddhist thought. One
who earnestly takes up the practice of the Noble Eightfold Path for
the attainment of this goal, might sometimes be dismayed to find
this medley of views confronting him. Right View, as the first
factor of that path, has always to be in the vanguard in one's
practice. In the interest of this Right View, which one has to
progressively `straighten-up,' a need for clarification before
purification might sometimes be strongly felt. It was in such a
context that the present series of 33 sermons on Nibbàna came to
be delivered.
The invitation for this series of sermons came from my revered
teacher, the late Venerable Matara Sri ¥àõàràma Mahàthera, who
was the resident meditation teacher of Meetirigala Nissaran
Vanaya Meditation Center. Under his inspiring patronage these
sermons were delivered once every fortnight before the group of
resident monks of Nissarana Vanaya, during the period of Dec. 12th
1988ÝJan. 30th, 1991. The sermons, which were originally circulat-
ed on cassettes, began issuing in book form only in 1997, when the
first volume of the Sinhala series titled Nivane Niveema came out,
published by the Dharma Grantha Mudrana Bhāraya or `Dhamma
Publication Trust' set up for the purpose in the Department of
Public Trustee, Sri Lanka. The series is scheduled to comprise
eleven volumes of which 9 have come out.1 The entire series is for
free distribution as Dhammadàna Ý `the gift of truth that excels all
1 This introduction is from the Venerable ¥àõananda's first print of the Nibbàna
sermons. This current edition contains 25 of the 33 sermons currently available in
English.
11
other gifts.' The sister series to come out in English will comprise
7 volumes in 5 sermons each, which will likewise be strictly for
free distribution since Dhamma is priceless.2
In these sermons I have attempted to trace the original meaning
and significance of the Pàli term Nibbàna (Skt. Nirvàna) based on
the evidence from the discourses of the Pàli Canon. This led to a
detailed analysis and a re-appraisal of some of the most controver-
sial suttas on Nibbàna often quoted by scholars in support of their
interpretations. The findings, however, were not presented as dry
scholastic exposition of mere academic interest. Since the sermons
were addressed to a meditative audience keen on realizing
Nibbàna, edifying similes, metaphors and illustrations had their
place in the discussion. The gamut of 33 sermons afforded
sufficient scope for dealing with almost all the salient teachings in
Buddhism from a practical point of view.
The present translation, in so far as it is faithful to the original,
will reflect the same pragmatic outlook. While the findings could
be of interest even to the scholar bent on theorizing Nibbàna, it is
hoped that the mode of presentation will have a special appeal for
those who are keen on realizing it.
I would like to follow up these few prefatory remarks with due
acknowledgments to all those who gave their help and encourage-
ment for bringing out this translation:
To the venerable Anàlayo of Lewella Meditation Centre, Kandy,

for the meticulous care and patience with which he traced the
parallel footnote references from English Editions and for many
helpful suggestions on presentation and formatting.
To Mr. U. Mapa, presently the Ambassador of Sri Lanka in

Myanmar, for his yeoman service in taking the necessary steps to
2 Please note the copyfree notice on the first page of this book. This book is not for
commercial resale.
Introduction 13
establish the Dhamma Publications Trust in his former capacity as

the Public Trustee of Sri Lanka.
To Mr. G.T. Bandara, Director, Royal Institute, for taking the lead
in this Dhammadàna movement with his initial donation and for
his devoted services as the Settler of the Trust.
To Mrs. Yukie Sirimane for making available this translation as

well as our other publications to the world through the Internet
under her website, www.beyondthenet.net.
And last but not least to Mr. Hideo Chihashi, Director, Green Hill
Meditation Institute, Tokyo, Japan and his group of relatives,
friends and pupils for their munificence in sponsoring the publica-
tion of the first volume of Nibbāna Ý The Mind Stilled.
Nibbànam paramam sukham

Nibbàna is the supreme bliss.
ÞBhikkhu K. ¥àõananda
Potgulgal Aranya
`Pahankanuwa'
Kandegedara
Dewalegama
Sri Lanka
August 2002 (B.E. 2548)
Nibbàna Sermon 1
Namo tassa Bhagavato Arahato Sammàsambuddhassa
Etaü santaü, etaü paõãtaü, yadidaü sabbasaïkhàrasamatho

sabbåpadhipañinissaggo taõhakkhayo viràgo nirodho nibbànaü.1
ßThis is peaceful, this is excellent, namely the stilling of all

preparations, the relinquishment of all assets, the destruction of
craving, detachment, cessation, extinction.û
With the permission of the Most Venerable Great Preceptor and

the assembly of the venerable meditative monks.
Recently we have had an occasion to listen to a series of ser-
mons on Nibbàna and there have been differences of opinion
regarding the interpretation of some deep suttas on Nibbàna in
those sermons. And so the venerable Great Preceptor suggested to
me that it would be useful to this group if I would give a set of
sermons on Nibbàna, touching on those controversial points.
At first, for many reasons, I hesitated to accept this invitation
for a serious task, but then, as the venerable Great Preceptor
repeatedly encouraged me on this, I gave some thought as to how
best I could set about doing it. And it occurred to me that it would
be best if I could address these sermons directly to the task before
us in this Nissarana Vanaya, and that is meditative attention, rather
1 M I 436, MahàMàlunkyasutta.
15
16 Nibbàna Ý The Mind Stilled ~ Sermon 1
than dealing with those deep controversial suttas in academic

isolation. And that is why I have selected the above quotation as
the theme for the entire set of sermons, hoping that it would help
create the correct atmosphere of meditative attention.
Etaü santaü etaü paõãtaü, yadidaü sabbasaïkhàrasamatho
sabbåpadhipañinissaggo taõhakkhayo viràgo nirodho nibbànaü.
This in fact is a meditation subject in itself, a kammaññhàna.
This is the reflection on the peace of Nibbàna, upasamànussati. So
if we can successfully make use of this as both the heading and the
theme of these sermons, we would be in a position to understand
those six qualities of the Dhamma. We are told that the Dhamma is
svàkkhàta, that it is well-proclaimed, sandiññhika, can be seen here
and now, akàlika, timeless, ehipassika, inviting one to come and
see, opanayika, leading one onwards, paccattaü veditabbo
vi¤¤åhi, that it can be understood by the wise each one by him-
self.2
This set of sermons would have fulfilled its purpose if it drives
home the true significance of these six qualities of the Dhamma.
Now at the very outset I would like to say a few things by way
of preparing the background and I do hope that this assembly
would bear with me for saying certain things that I will be com-
pelled to say in this concern. By way of background something has
to be said as to why there are so many complications with regard
to the meaning of some of the deep suttas on Nibbàna.
There is a popular belief that the commentaries are finally
traceable to a miscellany of the Buddha word scattered here and
there, as pakiõõakadesanà. But the true state of affairs seems to be
rather different. Very often the commentaries are unable to say
something conclusive regarding the meaning of deep suttas. So
2 D II 93, MahàParinibbànasutta.
Bhikkhu K. ¥àõananda 17
they simply give some possible interpretations and the reader finds
himself at a loss to choose the correct one. Sometimes the com-
mentaries go at a tangent and miss the correct interpretation. Why
the commentaries are silent on some deep suttas is also a problem
to modern day scholars. There are some historical reasons leading
to this state of affairs in the commentaries.
In the âõisutta of the Nidànavagga in the Saüyutta Nikàya we
find the Buddha making certain prophetic utterances regarding the
dangers that will befall the Sàsana in the future. It is said that in
times to come, monks will lose interest in those deep suttas which
deal with matters transcendental, that they would not listen to
those suttas that have to do with the idea of emptiness, su¤¤atà.
They would not think it even worthwhile learning or pondering
over the meanings of those suttas:
Ye te suttantà tathàgatabhàsità gambhãrà gambhãratthà

lokuttarà su¤¤atappañisaüyuttà, tesu bha¤¤amànesu na
sussåssisanti na sotaü odahissanti na a¤¤à cittaü
upaññhàpessanti na te dhamme uggahetabbaü pariyà-
puõitabbaü ma¤¤issanti.3
There is also another historical reason that can be adduced. An

idea got deeply rooted at a certain stage in the Sàsana history that
what is contained in the Sutta Piñaka is simply the conventional
teaching and so it came to imply that there is nothing so deep in
these suttas. This notion also had its share in the present lack of
interest in these suttas. According to Manorathapåraõã, the
Aïguttara commentary, already at an early stage in the Sàsana
history of Sri Lanka, there had been a debate between those who
upheld the precept and those who stood for realization.4 And it is
said that those who upheld the precept won the day. The final
3 S II 267, âõisutta.
4 Mp I 92.
conclusion was that, for the continuity of the Sàsana, precept itself
is enough, not so much the realization.
Of course the efforts of the reciter monks of old for the preser-
vation of the precept in the midst of droughts and famines and
other calamitous situations are certainly praiseworthy. But the
unfortunate thing about it was this: the basket of the Buddha word
came to be passed on from hand to hand in the dark, so much so
that there was the risk of some valuable things slipping out in the
process.
Also there have been certain semantic developments in the
commentarial period, and this will be obvious to anyone searching
for the genuine Dhamma. It seems that there had been a tendency
in the commentarial period to elaborate even on some lucid words
in the suttas, simply as a commentarial requirement, and this led to
the inclusion of many complicated ideas. By too much over
drawing in the commentaries, the deeper meanings of the Dhamma
got obscured. As a matter of fact, the depth of the Dhamma has to
be seen through lucidity, just as much as one sees the bottom of a
tank only when the water is lucid.
Dve nàma kiü?

Nàma¤ca råpa¤ca.5
ßWhat is the `two'?û

ßName and form.û
This is the second out of the ten questions Buddha had put to the
Venerable sàmanera Sopàka who had attained Arahant-ship at the
age of seven. It is like asking a child: ßCan you count up to ten?û
All the ten questions were deep, the tenth being on Arahant-ship.
But of course Venerable Sopàka gave the right answer each time.
Now it is the second question and its answer that we are concerned
5 Khp 2.
with here: nàma¤ca råpa¤ca. In fact, this is a basic teaching in

insight training.
It is obvious that nàma means `name,' and in the suttas also,
nàma, when used by itself, means `name.' However when we
come to the commentaries we find some kind of hesitation to
recognize this obvious meaning. Even in the present context, the
commentary, Paramatthajotikà, explains the word `name' so as to
mean `bending.' It says that all immaterial states are called nàma,
in the sense that they bend towards their respective objects and
also because the mind has the nature of inclination: ârammaõà-
bhimukhaü namanato, cittassa ca natihetuto sabbampi aråpaü
`nàman'ti vuccati.6
And this is the standard definition of nàma in Abhidhamma
compendiums and commentaries. The idea of bending towards an
object is brought in to explain the word nàma. It may be that they
thought it too simple an interpretation to explain nàma with
reference to `name,' particularly because it is a term that has to do
with deep insight. However as far as the teachings in the suttas are
concerned, nàma still has a great depth even when it is understood
in the sense of `name.'
Nàmaü sabbaü anvabhavi,

nàmà bhiyyo na vijjati,
nàmassa ekadhammassa,
sabbeva vasam anvagå.7
ßName has conquered everything,

There is nothing greater than name,
All have gone under the sway
Of this one thing called name.û
6 Pj I 78.
7 S I 39, Nàmasutta.
Also there is another verse of the same type, but unfortunately its
original meaning is often ignored by the present day commenta-
tors:
Akkheyyasa¤¤ino sattà,
akkheyyasmiü patiññhità,
akkheyyaü apari¤¤àya,
yogam àyanti maccuno.8
ßBeings are conscious of what can be named,

They are established on the nameable,
By not comprehending the nameable things,
They come under the yoke of death.û
All this shows that the word nàma has a deep significance even
when it is taken in the sense of `name.'
But now let us see whether there is something wrong in render-
ing nàma by `name' in the case of the term nàma-råpa. To begin
with, let us turn to the definition of nàma-råpa as given by the
Venerable Sàriputta in the Sammàdiññhisutta of the Majjhima
Nikàya:
Vedanà, sa¤¤à, cetanà, phasso, manasikàro Ý idaü

vuccatàvuso, nàmaü; cattàri ca mahàbhåtàni, catunna¤ca
mahàbhåtànaü upàdàyaråpaü Ý idaü vuccatàvuso,
råpaü. Iti ida¤ca nàmaü ida¤ca råpaü Ý idam vucca-
tàvuso nàmaråpaü.9
ßFeeling, perception, intention, contact, attention Ý this,

friend, is called `name.' The four great primaries and form
dependent on the four great primaries Ý this, friend, is
8 S I 11, Samiddhisutta.
9 M I 53, Sammàdiññhisutta.
called `form.' So this is `name' and this is `form' Ý this,

friend, is called `name-and-form.'û
Well, this seems lucid enough as a definition but let us see,

whether there is any justification for regarding feeling, perception,
intention, contact and attention as `name.' Suppose there is a little
child, a toddler, who is still unable to speak or understand lan-
guage. Someone gives him a rubber ball and the child has seen it
for the first time. If the child is told that it is a rubber ball, he
might not understand it. How does he get to know that object? He
smells it, feels it, and tries to eat it, and finally rolls it on the floor.
At last he understands that it is a plaything. Now the child has
recognized the rubber ball not by the name that the world has
given it, but by those factors included under `name' in nàma-råpa,
namely feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention.
This shows that the definition of nàma in nàma-råpa takes us
back to the most fundamental notion of `name,' to something like
its prototype. The world gives a name to an object for purposes of
easy communication. When it gets the sanction of others, it
becomes a convention.
While commenting on the verse just quoted, the commentator
also brings in a bright idea. As an illustration of the sweeping
power of name, he points out that if any tree happens to have no
name attached to it by the world, it would at least be known as the
`nameless tree.'10 Now as for the child, even such a usage is not
possible. So it gets to know an object by the aforesaid method.
And the factors involved there, are the most elementary constitu-
ents of name.
Now it is this elementary name-and-form world that a meditator
also has to understand, however much he may be conversant with
the conventional world. But if a meditator wants to understand this
name-and-form world, he has to come back to the state of a child,
10 Spk I 95 commenting on S I 39.

at least from one point of view. Of course in this case the equa-
nimity should be accompanied by knowledge and not by igno-
rance. And that is why a meditator makes use of mindfulness and
full awareness, satisam paja¤¤a, in his attempt to understand
name-and-form.
Even though he is able to recognize objects by their conven-
tional names, for the purpose of comprehending name-and-form, a
meditator makes use of those factors that are included under
`name': feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention. All
these have a specific value to each individual and that is why the
Dhamma has to be understood each one by himself Ý paccattaü
veditabbo. This Dhamma has to be realized by oneself. One has to
understand one's own world of name-and-form by oneself. No one
else can do it for him. Nor can it be defined or denoted by tech-
nical terms.
Now it is in this world of name-and-form that suffering is
found. According to the Buddha, suffering is not out there in the
conventional world of worldly philosophers. It is to be found in
this very name-and-form world. So the ultimate aim of a meditator
is to cut off the craving in this name-and-form. As it is said:
acchecchi taõhaü idha nàmaråpe.11
Now if we are to bring in a simile to clarify this point, the Bud-
dha is called the incomparable surgeon, sallakatto anuttaro.12 Also
he is sometimes called taõhàsallassa hantàraü, one who re moves
the dart of craving.13 So the Buddha is the incomparable surgeon
who pulls out the poison-tipped arrow of craving.
We may say therefore that, according to the Dhamma, nàma-
råpa, or name-and-form, is like the wound in which the arrow is
embedded. When one is wounded by a poison-tipped arrow, the
bandage has to be put, not on the archer or on his bowstring, but
11 S I 12, Samiddhisutta.
12 Sn 560, Selasutta.
13 S I 192, Pavàraõàsutta.
on the wound itself. First of all the wound has to be well located
and cleaned up. Similarly, the comprehension of name-and-form is
the preliminary step in the treatment of the wound caused by the
poison-tipped arrow of craving.
And it is for that purpose that a meditator has to pay special
attention to those basic components of `name' Ý feeling, percep-
tion, intention, contact and attention Ý however much he may be
proficient in words found in worldly usage. It may even appear as
a process of unlearning down to childlike simplicity. But of
course, the equanimity implied there, is not based on ignorance but
on knowledge.
We find ourselves in a similar situation with regard to the sig-
nificance of råpa in nàma-råpa. Here too we have something
deep, but many take nàma-råpa to mean `mind and matter.' Like
materialists, they think there is a contrast between mind and
matter. But according to the Dhamma there is no such rigid
distinction. It is a pair that is interrelated and taken together it
forms an important link in the chain of pañicca samuppàda.
Råpa exists in relation to `name' and that is to say that form is
known with the help of `name.' As we saw above, that child got a
firsthand knowledge of the rubber ball with the help of contact,
feeling, perception, intention and attention. Now in the definition
of `form' as cattàri ca mahàbhåtàni, catunna¤ca mahàbhåtànaü
upàdàya råpaü the four great primaries are mentioned because
they constitute the most primary notion of `form.' Just as much as
feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention represent the
most primary notion of `name,' conventionally so called, even so
the four great primaries form the basis for the primary notion of
`form,' as the world understands it.
It is not an easy matter to recognize these primaries. They are
evasive like ghosts. But out of their interplay we get the perception
of form, råpasa¤¤à. In fact what is called råpa in this context is
råpasa¤¤à. It is with reference to the behaviour of the four great
elements that the world builds up its concept of form. Its percep-
tion, recognition and designation of form is in terms of that
behaviour. And that behaviour can be known with the help of

those members representing name.
The earth element is recognized through the qualities of hard-
ness and softness, the water element through the qualities of
cohesiveness and dissolution, the fire element through hotness and
coolness, and the wind element through motion and inflation. In
this way one gets acquainted with the nature of the four great
primaries. And the perception of form, råpasa¤¤à, that one has at
the back of one's mind, is the net result of that acquaintance. So
this is nàma-råpa. This is one's world. The relationship between
råpa and råpasa¤¤à will be clear from the following verse:
Yattha nàma¤ca råpa¤ca,

asesaü uparujjhati,
pañighaü råpasa¤¤à ca,
etthesà chijjate jañà.
This is a verse found in the Jañàsutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya.14 In

that sutta we find a deity putting a riddle before the Buddha for
solution:
Anto jañà bahi jañà,

jañàya jañità pajà,
taü taü Gotama pucchàmi,
ko imaü vijañaye jañaü.
ßThere is a tangle within, and a tangle without,

The world is entangled with a tangle.
About that, oh Gotama, I ask you,
Who can disentangle this tangle?û
14 S I 13, Jañàsutta.
The Buddha answers the riddle in three verses, the first of which is
fairly well known, because it happens to be the opening verse of
the Visuddhimagga:
Sãle patiññhàya naro sapa¤¤o,

cittaü pa¤¤a¤ca bhàvayaü,
àtàpã nipako bhikkhu,
so imaü vijañaye jataü.
This means that a wise monk, established in virtue, developing

concentration and wisdom, being ardent and prudent, is able to
disentangle this tangle. Now this is the second verse:
Yesaü ràgo ca doso ca,

avijjà ca viràjità,
khãõàsavà arahanto,
tesaü vijañità jañà.
ßIn whom lust, hate

And ignorance have faded away,
Those influx-free Arahants,
It is in them that the tangle is disentangled.û
It is the third verse that is relevant to our topic:

ßWhere name and form

As well as resistance and the perception of form
Are completely cut off,
It is there that the tangle gets snapped.û
The reference here is to Nibbàna. It is there that the tangle is

disentangled.
The coupling of name-and-form with pañigha and råpasa¤¤à in
this context, is significant. Here pañigha does not mean `repug-
nance,' but `resistance.' It is the resistance which comes as a
reaction to inert matter. For instance, when one knocks against
something in passing, one turns back to recognize it. Sense
reaction is something like that.
The Buddha has said that the worldling is blind until at least the
Dhamma-eye arises in him. So the blind worldling recognizes an
object by the very resistance he experiences in knocking against
that object.
Pañigha and råpasa¤¤à form a pair. Pañigha is that experience
of resistance which comes by the knocking against an object, and
råpasa¤¤à, as perception of form, is the resulting recognition of
that object. The perception is in terms of what is hard, soft, hot or
cold. Out of such perceptions common to the blind worldlings,
arises the conventional reality, the basis of which is the world.
Knowledge and understanding are very often associated with
words and concepts, so much so that if one knows the name of a
thing, one is supposed to know it. Because of this misconception
the world is in a tangle. Names and concepts, particularly the
nouns, perpetuate the ignorance in the world. Therefore insight is
the only path of release. And that is why a meditator practically
comes down to the level of a child in order to understand name
and form. He may even have to pretend to be a patient in slowing
down his movements for the sake of developing mindfulness and
full awareness.
So we see that there is something really deep in nàma-råpa,
even if we render it as `name-and-form.' There is an implicit
connection with `name' as conventionally so called, but unfortu-
nately this connection is ignored in the commentaries, when they
bring in the idea of `bending' to explain the word `name.' So we
need not hesitate to render nàma-råpa by `name-and-form.'
Simple as it may appear, it goes deeper than the worldly concepts
of name and form.
Now if we are to summarise all what we have said in this con-

nection, we may say: `name' in `name-and-form' is a formal
name. It is an apparent name. `Form' in `name-and-form' is a
nominal form. It is a form only in name.
We have to make a similar comment on the meaning of the
word Nibbàna. Here too one can see some unusual semantic
developments in the commentarial period. It is very common these
days to explain the etymology of the word Nibbàna with the help
of a phrase like: Vànasaïkhàtàya taõhàya nikkhantattà.15 And that
is to say that Nibbàna is so called because it is an exit from
craving which is a form of weaving.
To take the element vàna in the word to mean a form of weav-
ing is as good as taking nàma in nàma-råpa as some kind of
bending. It is said that craving is a kind of weaving in the sense
that it connects up one form of existence with another and the
prefix ni is said to signify the exit from that weaving.
But nowhere in the suttas do we get this sort of etymology and
interpretation. On the other hand it is obvious that the suttas use
the word Nibbàna in the sense of èxtinguishing' or èxtinction.'
In fact this is the sense that brings out the true essence of the
Dhamma.
For instance the Ratanasutta, which is so often chanted as a
paritta, says that the Arahants go out like a lamp: Nibbanti dhãrà
yathàyaü padãpo.16 ßThose wise ones get extinguished even like
this lamp.û
The simile of a lamp getting extinguished is also found in the
Dhàtuvibhaïgasutta of the Majjhima Nikàya.17 Sometimes it is the
figure of a torch going out: Pajjotass'eva nibbànaü, vi mokho
15 Abhidh-s VI ¡ 30.
16 Sn 235, Ratanasutta.
17 M III 245, Dhàtuvibhaïgasutta.
cetaso ahu, ßthe mind's release was like the extinguishing of a

torch.û18
The simile of the extinction of a fire is very often brought in as
an illustration of Nibbàna and in the Aggivacchagottasutta of the
Majjhima Nikàya we find the Buddha presenting it as a sustained
simile, giving it a deeper philosophical dimension.19 Now when a
fire burns, it does so with the help of firewood. When a fire is
burning, if someone were to ask us: ßWhat is burning?û Ý what
shall we say as a reply? Is it the wood that is burning or the fire
that is burning? The truth of the matter is that the wood burns
because of the fire and the fire burns because of the wood. So it
seems we already have here a case of relatedness of this to that,
idappaccayatà. This itself shows that there is a very deep signifi-
cance in the fire simile.
Nibbàna as a term for the ultimate aim of this Dhamma is
equally significant because of its allusion to the going out of a fire.
In the Asaïkhatasaüyutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya as many as
thirty-three terms are listed to denote this ultimate aim.20 But out of
all these epithets, Nibbàna became the most widely used, probably
because of its significant allusion to the fire. The fire simile holds
the answer to many questions relating to the ultimate goal.
The wandering ascetic Vacchagotta, as well as many others,
accused the Buddha of teaching a doctrine of annihilation: Sato
sattassa ucchedaü vinàsaü vibhavaü pa¤¤àpeti.21 Their accusa-
tion was that the Buddha proclaims the annihilation, destruction
and nonexistence of a being that is existent. And the Buddha
answered them fairly and squarely with the fire simile.
ßNow if a fire is burning in front of you dependent on grass and
twigs as fuel, you would know that it is burning dependently and
19 M I 487, Aggivacchagottasutta.
20 S IV 368-373.
21 M I 140, Alagaddåpamasutta.
not independently, that there is no fire in the abstract. And when

the fire goes out, with the exhaustion of that fuel, you would know
that it has gone out because the conditions for its existence are no
more.û
As a sidelight to the depth of this argument it may be mentioned
that the Pàli word upàdàna used in such contexts has the sense of
both `fuel' as well as `grasping,' and in fact, fuel is something that
the fire grasps for its burning. Upàdànapaccayà bhavo, ßdepend-
ent on grasping is existence.û22 These are two very important links
in the doctrine of dependent arising, pañicca samuppàda.
The eternalists, overcome by the craving for existence, thought
that there is some permanent essence in existence as a reality. But
what had the Buddha to say about existence? He said that what is
true for the fire is true for existence as well. That is to say that
existence is dependent on grasping. So long as there is a grasping,
there is an existence. As we saw above, the firewood is called
upàdàna because it catches fire. The fire catches hold of the wood,
and the wood catches hold of the fire. And so we call it firewood.
This is a case of a relation of this to that, idappaccayatà. Now it is
the same with what is called èxistence,' which is not an absolute
reality.
Even in the Vedic period there was the dilemma between `be-
ing' and `non-being.' They wondered whether being came out of
non-being, or non-being came out of being. Katham asataþ sat
jàyeta, ßHow could being come out of non-being?û23 In the face of
this dilemma regarding the first beginnings, they were sometimes
forced to conclude that there was neither non-being nor being at
the start, nàsadàsãt no sadàsãt tadànãm.24 Or else in the confusion
they would sometimes leave the matter unsolved, saying that
perhaps only the creator knew about it.
22 D II 57, MahàNidànasutta.
23 Chàndogya-Upaniùad 6.2.1,2.
24 ègveda X.129, Nàsadãya Såkta.
All this shows what a lot of confusion these two words sat and
asat, being and non-being, had created for the philosophers. It was
only the Buddha who presented a perfect solution, after a complete
reappraisal of the whole problem of existence. He pointed out that
existence is a fire kept up by the fuel of grasping, so much so that,
when grasping ceases, existence ceases as well.
In fact the fire simile holds the answer to the tetralemma includ-
ed among the ten unexplained points very often found mentioned
in the suttas. It concerns the state of the Tathàgata after death,
whether he exists, does not exist, both or neither. The presumption
of the questioner is that one or the other of these four must be and
could be answered in the affirmative.
The Buddha solves or dissolves this presumptuous tetralemma
by bringing in the fire simile. He points out that when a fire goes
out with the exhaustion of the fuel, it is absurd to ask in which
direction the fire has gone. All that one can say about it, is that the
fire has gone out: Nibbuto tveva saïkhaü gacchati, ßIt comes to
be reckoned as `gone out.'û25
It is just a reckoning, an idiom, a worldly usage, which is not to
be taken too literally. So this illustration through the fire simile
drives home to the worldling the absurdity of his presumptuous
tetralemma of the Tathàgata.
In the Upasãvasutta of the Pàràyaõavagga of the Sutta Nipàta
we find the lines:
Accã yathà vàtavegena khitto,

atthaü paleti na upeti saïkhaü,
ßLike the flame thrown out by the force of the wind

Reaches its end, it cannot be reckoned.û26
26 1074, Upasãvamàõavapucchà.
Here the reckoning is to be understood in terms of the four

propositions of the tetralemma. Such reckonings are based on a
total misconception of the phenomenon of fire.
It seems that the deeper connotations of the word Nibbàna in
the context of pañicca samuppàda were not fully appreciated by
the commentators. And that is why they went in search of a new
etymology. They were too shy of the implications of the word
èxtinction.' Probably to avoid the charge of nihilism they felt
compelled to reinterpret certain key passages on Nibbàna. They
conceived Nibbàna as something existing out there in its own
right. They would not say where, but sometimes they would even
say that it is everywhere. With an undue grammatical emphasis
they would say that it is on coming to that Nibbàna that lust and
other defilements are abandoned: Nibbànaü àgamma ràgàdayo
khãõàti ekameva nibbànaü ràgakkhayo dosakkhayo mohakkhayo ti
vuccati.27
But what do we find in the joyous utterances of the theras and
therãs who had realized Nibbàna? As recorded in such texts as
Thera- and Therã-gàthà they would say: Sãtibhåto'smi nibbuto, ßI
am grown cool, extinguished as I am.û28 The words sãtibhåta and
nibbuta had a cooling effect even to the listener, though later
scholars found them inadequate.
Extinction is something that occurs within an individual and it
brings with it a unique bliss of appeasement. As the Ratanasutta
says: Laddhà mudhà nibbutiü bhu¤jamànà, ßThey experience the
bliss of appeasement, won free of charge.û29 Normally, appease-
ment is won at a cost, but here we have an appeasement that
comes gratis.
From the worldly point of view èxtinction' means annihilation.
It has connotations of a precipice that is much dreaded. That is
27 Vibh-a 53.
28 Th 298, Ràhula Thera.
why the commentators conceived of it as something out there, on

reaching which the defilements are abandoned, nibbànaü àgamma
ràgàdayo khãõàti. Sometimes they would say that it is on seeing
Nibbàna that craving is destroyed.
There seems to be some contradiction in the commentarial
definitions of Nibbàna. On the one hand we have the definition of
Nibbàna as the exit from craving, which is called a `weaving.'
And on the other it is said that it is on seeing Nibbàna that craving
is destroyed. To project Nibbàna into a distance and to hope that
craving will be destroyed only on seeing it, is something like
trying to build a staircase to a palace one cannot yet see. In fact
this is a simile which the Buddha had used in his criticism of the
Brahmin's point of view.30
In the Dhammacakkappavattanasutta we have a very clear
statement of the third noble truth. Having first said that the second
noble truth is craving, the Buddha goes on to define the third noble
truth in these words: Tassàyeva taõhàya asesaviràganirodho càgo
pañinissaggo mutti anàlayo.31
This is to say that the third noble truth is the complete fading
away, cessation, giving up, relinquishment of that very craving.
That it is the release from and non-attachment to that very craving.
In other words it is the destruction of this very mass of suffering
which is just before us.
In the suttas the term taõhakkhayo, the destruction of craving, is
very often used as a term for Nibbàna.32 But the commentator says
that destruction alone is not Nibbàna: Khayamattaü na nibbà-
naü.33 But the destruction of craving itself is called the highest
bliss in the following verse of the Udàna:
30 E.g. at D I 194, Poññhapàdasutta.

31 E.g. at S V 421, Dhammacakkappavattanasutta.
32 E.g. at It 88, Aggappasàdasutta.
33 Abhidh-av 138.
Ya¤ca kàmasukhaü loke,

yaü c'idaü diviyaü sukhaü,
taõhakkhaya sukhass'ete,
kalaü n'agghanti soëasiü.34
ßWhatever bliss from sense-desires there is in the

world,
Whatever divine bliss there is,
All these are not worth one-sixteenth
Of the bliss of the destruction of craving.û
Many of the verses found in the Udàna are extremely deep and
this is understandable, since udàna means a `joyous utterance.'
Generally a joyous utterance comes from the very depths of one's
heart, like a sigh of relief. As a matter of fact one often finds that
the concluding verse goes far deeper in its implications than the
narrative concerned. For instance, in the Udapàna sutta, we get the
following joyous utterance, coming from the Buddha himself:
Kiü kayirà udapànena,

àpà ce sabbadà siyuü,
taõhàya målato chetvà,
kissa pariyesanaü care.35
ßWhat is the use of a well,

If water is there all the time,
Having cut craving at the root,
In search of what should one wander?û
This shows that the destruction of craving is not a mere destruc-

tion.
34 Ud 11, Ràjasutta.
35 Ud 79, Udapànasutta.
Craving is a form of thirst and that is why Nibbàna is some-

times called pipàsavinayo, the dispelling of the thirst.36 To think
that the destruction of craving is not sufficient is like trying to give
water to one who has already quenched his thirst. But the destruc-
tion of craving has been called the highest bliss. One who has
quenched his thirst for good, is aware of that blissful experience.
When he sees the world running here and there in search of water,
he looks within and sees the wellspring of his bliss.
However to most of our scholars the term taõhakkhaya ap-
peared totally negative and that is why they hesitated to recognize
its value. In such conventional usages as Nibbànaü àgamma they
found a grammatical excuse to separate that term from Nibbàna.
According to the Buddha the cessation of existence is Nibbàna
and that means Nibbàna is the realization of the cessation of
existence. Existence is said to be an eleven-fold fire. So the entire
existence is a raging fire. Lust, hate, delusion Ý all these are fires.
Therefore Nibbàna may be best rendered by the word èxtinction.'
When once the fires are extinguished, what more is needed?
But unfortunately Venerable Buddhaghosa was not prepared to
appreciate this point of view. In his Visuddhimagga as well as in
the commentaries Sàratthappakàsinã and Sammohavinodanã, he
gives a long discussion on Nibbàna in the form of an argument
with an imaginary heretic.37 Some of his arguments are not in
keeping with either the letter or the spirit of the Dhamma.
First of all he gets the heretic to put forward the idea that the
destruction of lust, hate and delusion is Nibbàna. Actually the
heretic is simply quoting the Buddha's word, for in the Nibbàna
sutta of the Asaïkhatasaüyutta the destruction of lust, hate and
delusion is called Nibbàna: Ràgakkhayo, dosakkhayo, mohak-
khayo Ý idaü vuccati nibbànaü.38
36 A II 34, Aggappasàdasutta.
37 Vism 508; Spk III 88; Vibh-a 51.
38 S IV 371, Nibbànasutta.
The words ràgakkhaya, dosakkhaya and mohakkhaya together

form a synonym of Nibbàna, but the commentator interprets it as
three synonyms. Then he argues out with the imaginary heretic
that if Nibbàna is the extinguishing of lust it is something common
even to the animals, for they also extinguish their fires of lust
through enjoyment of the corresponding objects of sense.39 This
argument ignores the deeper sense of the word extinction, as it is
found in the Dhamma.
In the Màgaõóiyasutta of the Majjhima Nikàya the Buddha
gives the simile of a man with a skin disease sitting beside a pit of
hot embers to explain the position of lustful beings in the world.40
That man is simply trying to assuage his pains by the heat of the
fire. It is an attempt to warm up, not to cool down. Similarly what
the lustful beings in the world are doing in the face of the fires of
lust is a warming up. It can in no way be compared to the extinc-
tion and the cooling down of the Arahants.
As the phrase nibbutiü bhu¤jamànà implies, that extinction is a
blissful experience for the Arahants. It leaves a permanent effect
on the Arahant, so much so that upon reflection he sees that his
influxes are extinct, just as a man with his hands and feet cut off,
knows upon reflection that his limbs are gone.41 It seems that the
deeper implications of the word Nibbàna have been obscured by a
set of arguments which are rather misleading.
In fact I came forward to give these sermons for three reasons:
Firstly because the venerable Great Preceptor invited me to do so.
Secondly in the hope that it will be of some benefit to my co-
dwellers in the Dhamma. And thirdly because I myself felt rather
concerned about the inadequacy of the existing interpretations.
What we have said so far is just about the word Nibbàna as
such. Quite a number of suttas on Nibbàna will be taken up for
39 Vibh-a 53.
40 M I 507, Màgaõóiyasutta.
41 M I 523, Saõóakasutta.
discussion. This is just a preamble to show that the word Nibbàna

in the sense of èxtinction' has a deeper dimension, which has
some relevance to the law of dependent arising, pañicca sam-
uppàda.
By bringing in an etymology based on the element vàna, much
of the original significance of the word Nibbàna came to be
undermined. On quite a number of occasions the Buddha has
declared that the cessation of suffering is Nibbàna, or else that the
destruction of craving is Nibbàna. Terms like dukkhanirodho and
taõhakkhayo have been used as synonyms. If they are synonyms,
there is no need to make any discrimination with regard to some of
them, by insisting on a periphrastic usage like àgamma.
Yet another important aspect of the problem is the relation of
Nibbàna to the holy life or brahmacariya. It is said that when the
holy life is lived out to the full, it culminates in Nibbàna.
In the Ràdhasaüyutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya we find the
Venerable Ràdha putting a series of questions to the Buddha to get
an explanation.42 First of all he asks: Sammàdassanaü pana,
bhante, kimatthiyaü? ßFor what purpose is right vision?û And the
Buddha gives the answer: Sammàdassanaü kho, Ràdha, nibbidat-
thaü, ßRàdha, right vision is for purposes of disgust or dejection.û
And that is to say, disgust for saüsàra.
The next question is: for what purpose is disgust? And the
Buddha answers: disgust is for dispassion. What is the purpose of
dispassion? The purpose of dispassion is release. What is the
purpose of release? The purpose of release is Nibbàna. Last of all
Venerable Ràdha puts the question:
Nibbànaü pana, bhante, kimatthiyaü? ßFor what purpose is
Nibbàna?û And the Buddha gives this answer: Accasarà, Ràdha,
pa¤haü, nàsakkhi pa¤hassa pariyantaü gahetuü. Nibbàno-
gadha¤hi, Ràdha, brahmacariyaü vussati, nibbànaparàyanaü
nibbànapariyosànaü. ßRàdha, you have gone beyond the scope of
42 S III 189, Màrasutta.

your questions, you are unable to grasp the limit of your questions.
For, Ràdha, the holy life is merged in Nibbàna, its consummation
is Nibbàna, its culmination is Nibbàna.û
This shows that the holy life gets merged in Nibbàna, just as
rivers get merged in the sea. In other words, where the holy life is
lived out to the full, Nibbàna is right there. That is why Venerable
Nanda, who earnestly took up the holy life encouraged by the
Buddha's promise of heavenly nymphs, attained Arahant-hood
almost in spite of himself. At last he approached the Buddha and
begged to relieve him of the onus of his promise. This shows that
when one completes the training in the Holy Life, one is already in
Nibbàna. Only when the training is incomplete, can one go to
heaven.
Here, then, is a result which comes of its own accord. So there
is no justification for a periphrastic usage like, ßon reaching
Nibbàna.û No glimpse of a distant object is necessary. At whatev-
er moment the Noble Eightfold Path is perfected, one attains
Nibbàna then and there. Now, in the case of an examination, after
answering the question paper, one has to wait for the results Ý to
get a pass.
Here it is different. As soon as you have answered the paper
correctly, you have passed immediately and the certificate is
already there. This is the significance of the term a¤¤à used in
such contexts. A¤¤à stands for full certitude of the experience of
Nibbàna.
The experience of the fruit of Arahant-ship gives him the final
certificate of his attainment, a¤¤àphalo.43 That is why Nibbàna is
called something to be realized. One gets the certitude that birth is
extinct and that the holy life is lived out to the full, khãõà jàti,
vusitaü brahmacariyaü.44
43 The term a¤¤àphalo occurs at A IV 428, ânandasutta.

44 E.g. at D I 84, Sàma¤¤aphalasutta.
Of course there are some who still go on asking: what is the

purpose of Nibbàna? And it is to answer this type of question that
many scholars go on hair splitting. Normally in the world, whatev-
er one does has some purpose or other. All occupations, all trades
and businesses, are for gain and profit. Thieves and burglars also
have some purpose in mind. But what is the purpose of trying to
attain Nibbàna? What is the purpose of Nibbàna? Why should one
attain Nibbàna?
It is to give an answer to this question that scholars brought in
such phrases as Nibbànaü pana àgamma, òn reaching Nibbàna.'
They would say that òn reaching Nibbàna,' craving would be
destroyed. On closer analysis it would appear that there is some
fallacy in this question. For if there is any aim or purpose in
attaining Nibbàna, Nibbàna would not be the ultimate aim. In
other words, if Nibbàna is the ultimate aim, there should be no aim
in attaining Nibbàna. Though it may well sound a tautology, one
has to say that Nibbàna is the ultimate aim for the simple reason
that there is no aim beyond it.
However, this might need more explanation. Now as far as
craving is concerned, it has the nature of projection or inclination.
It is something bent forward, with a forward view, and that is why
it is called bhavanetti, the leader in becoming.45 It leads one on and
on in existence, like the carrot before the donkey. So that is why
all objects presented by craving have some object or purpose as a
projection. Craving is an inclination.
But what is the position if one makes the destruction of craving
itself one's object? Now craving because of its inclining nature is
always bent forward, so much so that we get an infinite progres-
sion. This is for that, and that is for the other. As the phrase taõhà
ponobhavikà implies, craving brings up existence again and
again.46
46 E.g. at S V 421, Dhammacakkappavattanasutta.
But this is not the case when one makes the destruction of crav-
ing one's aim. When that aim is attained, there is nothing more to
be done. So this brings us to the conclusion that the term
taõhakkhayo, destruction of craving, is a full-fledged synonym of
Nibbàna.
Well, this much is enough for today. Time permitting and life
permitting, I hope to continue with these sermons. I suppose the
most Venerable Great Preceptor made this invitation with the idea
of seeing one of his children at play. For good or for bad, I have
taken up the invitation. Let the future of the Sàsana be the final
judge of its merits.
Nibbàna Sermon 2



The second sermon on Nibbàna has come up for today. To-
wards the end of our sermon the other day we raised the point:
Why is it improper to ask such questions as: `What is the purpose
of Nibbàna? Why should one attain Nibbàna?'2 Our explanation
was that since the holy life or the Noble Eightfold Path has
Nibbàna as its ultimate aim, since it gets merged in Nibbàna, any
questions as to the ultimate purpose of Nibbàna would be inappro-
priate.
In fact at some places in the canon we find the phrase anuttara
brahmacariyapariyosàna used with reference to Nibbàna.3 It
2 See sermon 1.
3 D I 203, Poññhapàdasutta.
41
means that Nibbàna is the supreme consummation of the holy life.

The following standard phrase announcing a new Arahant is very
often found in the suttas:
Yassatthàya kulaputtà sammadeva agàrasmà anagàriyaü

pabbajanti, tadanuttaraü brahmcariyapariyosànaü diñ-
ñheva dhamme sayaü abhi¤¤à sacchikatvà upasampajja
vihàsi.4
ß
In this very life he realized by his own higher knowledge
and attained to that supreme consummation of the holy life
for the purpose of which clansmen of good family rightly
go forth from home to homelessness.û
Now what is the justification for saying that one attains to Nibbàna
by the very completion of the holy life? This Noble Eightfold Path
is a straight path: Ujuko nàma so maggo, abhayà nàma sà disà.5
ß
This path is called the `straight' and the direction it goes is called
the `fearless.'û In the Itivuttaka we come across a verse which
expresses this idea more vividly:
Sekhassa sikkha mànassa,

ujumaggànusàrino,
khayasmiü pañhamaü ¤àõaü,
tato a¤¤à anantarà.6
ßTo the learner, learning

In pursuit of the straight path,
First comes the knowledge of destruction
And then immediately the certitude.û
4 D I 177, Kassapasãhanàdasutta.
5 S I 33, Accharàsutta.
6 It 53, Indriyasutta.
It is the fruit of Arahant-ship which gives him the certitude of the

attainment of Nibbàna.
Here the word anantarà has been used. That concentration
proper to the fruit of Arahant-ship is called ànantarikà samàdhi.7
This means that the attainment of the fruit is immediate.
Though it may be so in the case of the Arahant, what about the
stream-winner, the sotàpanna, one may ask. There is a general
belief that in the case of a sotàpanna the vision of Nibbàna is like
a glimpse of a distant lamp on a road with many bends and the
sotàpanna has just negotiated the first bend.
But in accordance with the Dhamma it may be said that the
norm of immediacy is applicable even to the knowledge of the first
path. One who attains to the fruit of stream-winning may be a
beggar, an illiterate person, or a seven year old child. It may be
that he has heard the Dhamma for the first time. All the same, a
long line of epithets is used with reference to him in the suttas as
his qualifications: Diññhadhammo pattadhammo viditadhammo
pariyogàëhadhammo tiõõavicikiccho vigatakathaükatho vesàraj-
jappatto aparappaccayo satthusàsane.8
Diññhadhammo, he is one who has seen the Dhamma, the truth
of Nibbàna. It is said in the Ratanasutta that along with the vision
of the first path, three fetters are abandoned, namely sakkàyadiññhi,
the self-hood view, vicikicchà, sceptical doubt, and sãlabbata-
paràmàsa, attachment to holy vows and ascetic practices.9 Some
might argue that only these fetters are abandoned at this stage,
because it is a glimpse of Nibbàna from a distance. But then there
is this second epithet, pattadhammo, which means that he has
reached the Dhamma, that he has arrived at Nibbàna. Not only
that, he is viditadhammo, he is one who has understood the
Dhamma, which is Nibbàna. He is pariyogàëhadhammo, he has
7 Peñ 188.
8 D I 110, Ambaññhasutta.
plunged into the Dhamma, he has dived into the Dhamma, which
is Nibbàna. He is tiõõavicikiccho, he has crossed over doubts.
Vigatakathaükatho, his waverings are gone. Vesàrajjappatto, he
has attained to proficiency. Aparappaccayo satthusàsane, in
regard to the dispensation of the teacher he is not dependent on
others. And that is to say that he could attain to Nibbàna even
without another's help, though of course with the teacher's help he
would attain it sooner.
So this string of epithets testifies to the efficacy of the realiza-
tion by the first path. It is not a mere glimpse of Nibbàna from a
distance. It is a reaching, an arrival or a plunge into Nibbàna. For
purposes of illustration we may bring in a legend connected with
the history of Sri Lanka. It is said that when King Gajabàhu
invaded India, one of his soldiers, Nãla, who had Herculean
strength, parted the seawater with a huge iron bar in order to make
way for the king and the army. Now when the supramundane path
arises in the mind the power of thought is as mighty as the blow of
Nãla with his iron bar. Even with the first blow the seawater
parted, so that one could see the bottom. Similarly the sweeping
influxes are parted for a moment when the transcendental path
arises in a mind, enabling one to see the very bottom Ý Nibbàna. In
other words, all preparations (saïkhàras) are stilled for a moment,
enabling one to see the cessation of preparations.
We have just given a simile by way of illustration, but inciden-
tally there is a Dhammapada verse which comes closer to it:
Chinda sotaü parakkamma,

kàme panuda bràhmaõa,
saïkhàrànaü khayaü ¤atvà,
akata¤¤å'si bràhmaõa.10
ßStrive forth and cut off the stream,

Discard, oh Brahmin, sense-desires,
10 Dhp 383, Bràhmaõavagga.
Having known the destruction of preparations, oh

Brahmin,
Become a knower of the un-made.û
So this verse clearly indicates what the knowledge of the path does
when it arises. Just as one leaps forward and cuts off a stream of
water, so it cuts off, even for a moment, the preparations connect-
ed with craving. Thereby one realizes the destruction of prepara-
tions Ý saïkhàrànaü khayaü ¤atvà.
Like the sea water parted by the blow of the iron bar, prepara-
tions part for a moment to reveal the very bottom which is ùnpre-
pared,' the asaïkhata. Akata, or the un-made, is the same as
asaïkhata, the unprepared. So one has had a momentary vision of
the sea bottom, which is free from preparations. Of course, after
that experience, influxes flow in again. But one kind of influxes,
namely diññhàsavà, influxes of views, is gone for good and will
never flow in again.
Now how was it that some with keen wisdom like Bàhiya at-
tained Arahant-ship even while listening to a short sermon from
the Buddha? They had dealt four powerful blows in quick succes-
sion with the iron bar of the path-knowledge to clear away all
possible influxes.
What is called akata or asaïkhata, the un-made or the un-
prepared, is not something out there in a distance, as an object of
thought. It is not a sign to be grasped by one who wants to attain
Nibbàna.
Language encourages us to think in terms of signs. Very often
we find it difficult to get rid of this habit. The worldlings with
their defilements have to communicate with each other and the
structure of the language has to answer their needs. So the subject-
object relationship has become a very significant feature in a
language. It always carries the implication that there is a thing to
be grasped and that there is someone who grasps, that there is a
doer and a thing done. So it is almost impossible to avoid such
usages as: Ì want to see Nibbàna, I want to attain Nibbàna.' We
are made to think in terms of getting and attaining.
However sometimes the Buddha reminds us that this is only a

conventional usage and that these worldly usages are not to be
taken too seriously. We come across such an instance in the
Sagàthavagga of the Saüyutta Nikàya where the Buddha retorts to
some questions put by a certain deity.11 The deity named Kakudha
asks the Buddha: ßDo you rejoice, oh recluse?û And the Buddha
retorts: ßOn getting what, friend?û Then the deity asks: ßThen,
recluse, do you grieve?û And the Buddha quips back: ßOn losing
what, friend?û So the deity concludes: ßWell then, recluse, you
neither rejoice nor grieve!û And the Buddha replies: ßThat is so,
friend.û
It seems, then, that though we say we àttain' Nibbàna there is
nothing to gain and nothing to lose. If anything Ý what is lost is an
ignorance that there is something, and a craving that there is
not enough Ý and that is all one loses.
Now there are quite a number of synonyms for Nibbàna, such
as akata and asaïkhata. As already mentioned, there is even a list
of thirty-three such epithets, out of which one is dãpa.12 Now dãpa
means an island. When we are told that Nibbàna is an island, we
tend to imagine some sort of existence in a beautiful island. But in
the Pàràyanavagga of the Sutta Nipàta the Buddha gives a good
corrective to that kind of imagining in his reply to a question put
by the Brahmin youth Kappa, a pupil of Bàvarã. Kappa puts his
question in the following impressive verse:
Majjhe sarasmiü tiññhataü,

oghe jàte mahabbhaye,
jaràmaccuparetànaü,
dãpaü pabråhi màrisa,
tva¤ca me dãpam akkhàhi,
yathayidaü nàparaü siyà.13
11 S I 54, Kakudhosutta.
12 S IV 372.
13 Sn 1092, Kappamàõavapucchà.
ßUnto them that stand midstream,

When the frightful floods flow forth,
To them in decay-and-death forlorn,
An island, sire, may you proclaim.
An island which none else excels,
Yea, such an isle, pray tell me sire.û
And the Buddha gives his answer in two inspiring verses:
Majjhe sarasmiü tiññhataü,

oghe jàte mahabbhaye,
jaràmaccuparetànaü,
dãpaü pabråmi Kappa te.
Aki¤canaü anàdànaü,
etaü dãpaü anàparaü,
nibbànaü iti naü bråmi,
jaràmaccuparikkhayaü.
ßUnto them that stand midstream,

To them in decay-and-death forlorn,
An island, Kappa, I shall proclaim.
ßOwning naught, grasping naught,

The isle is this, none else besides.
Nibbàna, that is how I call that isle,
Wherein is decay decayed and death is dead.û
Aki¤canaü means òwning nothing,' anàdànaü means `grasping

nothing.' Etaü dãpaü anàparaü, this is the island, nothing else.
Nibbànaü iti naü bråmi, jaràmaccuparikkhayaü, ßand that I call
Nibbàna, which is the extinction of decay-and-death.û
From this also we can infer that words like akata, asaïkhata
and sabba-saïkhàrà-samatha are full fledged synonyms of
Nibbàna. Nibbàna is not some mysterious state quite apart from
them. It is not something to be projected into a distance.
Some are in the habit of getting down to a discussion on

Nibbàna by putting saïkhata on one side and asaïkhata on the
other side. They start by saying that saïkhata, or the `prepared,' is
anicca, or impermanent. If saïkhata is anicca, they conclude that
asaïkhata must be nicca, that is the unprepared must be perma-
nent. Following the same line of argument they argue that since
saïkhata is dukkha, asaïkhata must be sukha. But when they
come to the third step, they get into difficulties. If saïkhata is
anattà, or not-self, then surely asaïkhata must be attà, or self. At
this point they have to admit that their argument is too facile and
so they end up by saying that after all Nibbàna is something to be
realized.
All this confusion arises due to a lack of understanding of the
law of Dependent Arising, pañicca samuppàda. Therefore, first of
all, we have to say something about the doctrine of pañicca
samuppàda.
According to the Ariyapariyesanasutta of the Majjhima Nikàya,
the Buddha, soon after his enlightenment, reflected on the profun-
dity of the Dhamma and was rather disinclined to preach it. He
saw two points in the doctrine that are difficult for the world to see
or grasp. One was pañicca samuppàda: Duddasaü idaü ñhànaü
yadidaü idappaccayatà pañiccasamuppàdo.14 ßHard to see is this
point, namely dependent arising which is a relatedness of this to
that.û
And the second point was Nibbàna: Idampi kho ñhànaü dudda-
saü yadidaü sabbasaïkhàrasamatho sabbåpadhipañinissaggo
taõhakkhayo viràgo nirodho nibbànaü. ßAnd this point, too, is
difficult to see, namely the stilling of all preparations, the relin-
quishment of all assets, the destruction of craving, detachment,
cessation, extinction.û
From this context we can gather that if there is any term we can
use to define pañicca samuppàda, a term that comes closer to it in
14 M I 167, Ariyapariyesanasutta.
meaning, it is idappaccayatà. The Buddha himself has described

pañicca samuppàda in this context as a relatedness of this to that,
idappaccayatà. As a matter of fact the basic principle which forms
the noble norm of this doctrine of dependent arising is this
idappaccayatà. Let us now try to get at its meaning by examining
the doctrine of pañicca samuppàda.
In quite a number of contexts, such as the Bahudhàtukasutta of
the Majjhima Nikàya and the Bodhivagga of the Udàna the law of
pañicca samuppàda is set out in the following manner:
Iti imasmiü sati idaü hoti,

imassuppàdà idaü uppajjati
imasmiü asati idaü na hoti,
imassa nirodhà idaü nirujjhati Ý
yadidaü avijjàpaccayà saïkhàrà, saïkhàrapaccayà

vi¤¤àõaü, vi¤¤àõapaccayà nàmaråpaü, nàmaråpa-
paccayà saëàyatanaü, saëàyatanapaccayà phasso, phas-
sapaccayà vedanà, vedanàpaccayà taõhà, taõhàpaccayà
upàdànaü, upàdànapaccayà bhavo, bhavapaccayà jàti,
jàtipaccayà jaràmaraõaü sokaparidevaduk-
khadomanassåpàyàsà sambhavanti. Evametassa kevalassa
dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.
Avijjàyatveva asesaviràganirodhà saïkhàranirodho,

saïkhàranirodhà vi¤¤àõanirodho, vi¤¤àõanirodhà
nàmaråpanirodho, nàmaråpanirodhà saëàyatananirodho,
saëàyatananirodhà phassanirodho, phassanirodhà
vedanànirodho, vedanànirodhà taõhànirodho, taõhà-
nirodhà upàdànanirodho, upàdànanirodhà bhavanirodho,
bhavanirodhà jàtinirodho, jàtinirodhà jaràmaraõaü
sokaparidevadukkhadomanassåpàyàsà nirujjhanti. Eva-

metassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa nirodho hoti.15
ßThus: This being Ý this comes to be,

With the arising of this Ý this arises.
This not being Ý this does not come to be,
With the cessation of this Ý this ceases.
ßThat is to say, dependent on ignorance, preparations

come to be; dependent on preparations, consciousness;
dependent on consciousness, name-and-form; dependent
on name-and-form, the six sense-bases; dependent on the
six sense-bases, contact; dependent on contact, feeling;
dependent on feeling, craving; dependent on craving,
grasping; dependent on grasping, becoming; dependent on
becoming, birth; dependent on birth, decay-and-death, sor-
row, lamentation, pain, grief and despair come to be. Thus
is the arising of this entire mass of suffering.
ßBut with the complete fading away and cessation of igno-

rance, comes the cessation of preparations; with the cessa-
tion of preparations, the cessation of consciousness; with
the cessation of consciousness, the cessation of name-and-
form; with the cessation of name-and-form, the cessation
of the six sense-bases; with the cessation of the six sense-
bases, the cessation of contact; with the cessation of con-
tact, the cessation of feeling; with the cessation of feeling,
the cessation of craving; with the cessation of craving, the
cessation of grasping; with the cessation of grasping, the
cessation of becoming; with the cessation of becoming,
the cessation of birth; with the cessation of birth, the ces-
sation of decay-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief
15 M III 63, Bahudhàtukasutta, and Ud 1, the Bodhisuttas.

and despair cease to be. Thus is the cessation of this entire

mass of suffering.û
This is the thematic statement of the law of pañicca samuppàda. It

is set out here in the form of a fundamental principle. Imasmiü
sati idaü hoti, ßThis being, this comes to be.û Imassuppàdà idaü
uppajjati, ßWith the arising of this, this arises.û Imasmiü asati
idaü na hoti, ßThis not being, this does not come to be.û Imassa
nirodhà idaü nirujjhati, ßWith the cessation of this, this ceases.û It
resembles an algebraical formula.
And then we have the conjunctive yadidaü, which means
ßnamely thisû or ßthat is to say.û This shows that the foregoing
statement is axiomatic and implies that what follows is an illustra-
tion. So the twelve linked formula beginning with the words
avijjàpaccayà saïkhàrà is that illustration. No doubt the twelve-
linked formula is impressive enough. But the important thing here
is the basic principle involved, and that is the fourfold statement
beginning with imasmiü sati.
This fact is very clearly brought out in a certain sutta in the
Nidànavagga of the Saüyutta Nikàya. There the Buddha addresses
the monks and says: Pañiccasamuppàda¤ca vo, bhikkhave,
desessàmi pañiccasamuppanne ca dhamme.16 ßMonks, I will teach
you dependent arising and things that are dependently arisen.û
In this particular context the Buddha makes a distinction be-
tween dependent arising and things that are dependently arisen. In
order to explain what is meant by dependent arising, or pañicca
samuppàda, he takes up the last two links in the formula, in the
words: jàtipaccayà, bhikkhave, jaràmaraõaü, ßMonks, dependent
on birth is decay-and-death.û Then he draws attention to the
importance of the basic principle involved: Uppàdà và
Tathàgatànaü anuppàdà và Tathàgatànaü, ñhità va sà dhàtu
16 S II 25, Paccayasutta.
dhammaññhitatà dhammaniyàmatà idappaccayatà. (Etc.) Out of

the long exhortation given there, this is the part relevant to us here.
Jàtipaccayà, bhikkhave, jaràmaraõaü, ßDependent on birth, oh
monks, is decay-and-death,û and that is to say that decay-and-
death has birth as its condition. Uppàdà và Tathàgatànaü
anuppàdà và Tathàgatànaü, ßWhether there be an arising of the
Tathàgatàs or whether there be no such arising.û òhità va sà dhàtu
dhammaññhitatà dhammaniyàmatà idappaccayatà, ßThat elemen-
tary nature, that orderliness of the Dhamma, that norm of the
Dhamma, the relatedness of this to that does stand as it is.û
So from this it is clear that the underlying principle could be
understood even with the help of a couple of links. But the
commentary seems to have ignored this fact in its definition of the
term idappaccayatà. It says: Imesaü jaràmaraõàdãnaü paccayà
idappaccayà, idappaccayàva idappaccayatà.17 The word imesaü
is in the plural and this indicates that the commentator has taken
the dependence in a collective sense. But it is because of the fact
that even two links are sufficient to illustrate the law, that the
Buddha follows it up with the declaration that this is the pañicca
samuppàda. And then he goes on to explain what is meant by
`things dependently arisen':
Katame ca, bhikkhave, pañiccasamuppannà dhammà? Jarà-
maraõaü, bhikkhave, aniccaü saõkhataü pañiccasamuppannaü
khayadhammaü vayadhammaü viràgadhammaü nirodha-
dhammaü.
ßWhat, monks, are things dependently arisen?û And then, taking
up just one of the last links, he declares: ßDecay-and-death,
monks, is impermanent, prepared, dependently arisen, of a nature
to get destroyed, to pass away, fade away and cease.û
By the way, the word viràga usually means detachment or dis-
passion. But in such contexts as avijjàviràgà and pãtiyà ca viràgà
one has to render it by words like `fading away.' So that avij-
17 Spk II 40.
jàviràga could be rendered as: `by the fading away of ignorance,'

and pãtiyà viràgà would mean `by the fading away of joy.'
It seems, then, that decay-and-death themselves are imperma-
nent, that they are prepared or made up, that they are dependently
arisen. Decay-and-death themselves can get destroyed and pass
away. Decay as well as death can fade away and cease.
Then the Buddha takes up the preceding link jàti, or birth. And
that too is given the same qualifications. In the same manner he
takes up each of the preceding links up to and including ignorance,
avijjà, and applies to them the above qualifications. It is signifi-
cant that every one of the twelve links, even ignorance, is said to
be dependently arisen.
Let us try to understand how, for instance, decay-and-death
themselves can get destroyed or pass away. Taking the idappac-
cayatà formula as a paradigm, we can illustrate the relationship
between the two links birth and decay-and-death. Instead of
saying: this being, that comes to be (and so forth), now we have to
say: birth being, decay-and-death comes to be. With the arising of
birth, decay-and-death arises. Birth not being, decay-and-death
does not come to be. With the cessation of birth, decay-and-death
ceases.
Now birth itself is an arising. But here we can't help saying that
birth àrises.' It is like saying that birth is born. How can birth get
born? Similarly death is a passing away. But here we have to say
that death itself `passes away.' How can death pass away?
Perhaps, as we proceed, we might get the answers to these ques-
tions.
Now at this point let us take up for discussion a certain signifi-
cant passage in the MahàNidànasutta of the Dãgha Nikàya. In the
course of an exposition of the law of pañicca samuppàda, ad-
dressed to Venerable ânanda, the Buddha makes the following
statement:
Ettàvatà kho, ânanda, jàyetha và jãyetha và mãyetha và

cavetha và upapajjetha và. Ettàvatà adhivacanapatho,
ettàvatà niruttipatho, ettàvatà pa¤¤attipatho, ettàvatà
pa¤¤àvacaraü, ettàvatà vaññaü vattati itthattaü pa¤¤à-

panàya yadidaü nàmaråpaü saha vi¤¤àõena.18
ßIn so far only, ânanda, can one be born, or grow old, or

die, or pass away, or reappear, in so far only is there any
pathway for verbal expression, in so far only is there any
pathway for terminology, in so far only is there any path-
way for designation, in so far only is the range of wisdom,
in so far only is the round kept going for there to be a des-
ignation as the this-ness, that is to say: name-and-form
together with consciousness.û
We have rendered the term itthatta by `this-ness,' and what it

means will become clear as we go on. In the above quotation the
word ettàvatà, which means ìn so far only,' has as its point of
reference the concluding phrase yadidaü nàmaråpaü saha
vi¤¤àõena, ßthat is to say: name-and-form together with con-
sciousness.û So the statement, as it is, expresses a complete idea.
But some editions have an additional phrase: a¤¤ama¤¤a-
paccayatà pavattati, ßexists in a mutual relationship.û This phrase
is obviously superfluous and is probably a commentarial addition.
What is meant by the Buddha's statement is that name-and-form
together with consciousness is the rallying point for all concepts of
birth, decay, death and rebirth. All pathways for verbal expression,
terminology and designation converge on name-and-form together
with consciousness. The range of wisdom extends only up to the
relationship between these two. And it is between these two that
there is a whirling round so that one may point out a this-ness. In
short, the secret of the entire saüsàric existence is to be found in
this whirlpool.
Vañña and àvañña are words used for a whirlpool. We shall be
bringing up quotations in support of that meaning. It seems,
however, that this meaning has got obscured in the course of time.
In the commentaries and in some modern translations there is quite
a lot of confusion with regard to the meaning of the phrase vaññaü
vattati. In fact one Sinhala translation renders it as `saüsàric rain.'
What rain has to do with saüsàra is a matter for conjecture. What
is actually meant by vaññaü vattati is a whirling round, and
saüsàra, even literally, is that. Here we are told that there is a
whirling round between name-and-form and consciousness, and
this is the saüsàric whirlpool to which all the aforesaid things are
traceable.
Already in the first sermon we tried to show that name in name-
and-form has to do with names and concepts. Now from this
context it becomes clear that all pathways for verbal expression,
terminology and designation converge on this whirlpool between
name-and-form and consciousness.
Now that we have attached so much significance to a whirlpool,
let us try to understand how a whirlpool is formed. Let us try to get
at the natural laws underlying its formation. How does a whirlpool
come to be?
Suppose a river is flowing downward. To flow downward is in
the nature of a river. But a certain current of water thinks: ßI can
and must move upstream.û And so it pushes on against the main
stream. But at a certain point its progress is checked by the main
stream and is thrust aside, only to come round and make a fresh
attempt, again and again. All these obstinate and unsuccessful
attempts gradually lead to a whirling round. As time goes on, the
run-away current understands, as it were, that it cannot move
forward. But it does not give up. It finds an alternative aim in
moving towards the bottom. So it spirals downward, funnel-like,
digging deeper and deeper towards the bottom, until an abyss is
formed. Here then we have a whirlpool.
While all this is going on, there is a crying need to fill up the
chasm, and the whirlpool develops the necessary force of attrac-
tion to cater to it. It attracts and grasps everything that comes
within its reach and sends it whirling down, funnel like, into the
chasm. The whirling goes on at a tremendous speed, while the
circumference grows larger and larger. At last the whirlpool

becomes a centre of a tremendous amount of activity.
While this kind of activity is going on in a river or a sea, there is
a possibility for us to point it out as `that place' or `this place.'
Why? Because there is an activity going on. Usually, in the world,
the place where an activity is going on is known as a ùnit,' a
`centre,' or an ìnstitution.' Since the whirlpool is also a centre of
activity, we may designate it as a `here' or `there.' We may even
personify it. With reference to it, we can open up pathways for
verbal expression, terminology and designation.
But if we are to consider the form of activity that is going on
here, what is it after all? It is only a perversion. That obstinate
current thought to itself, out of delusion and ignorance: I can and
must move upstream. And so it tried and failed, but turned round
only to make the same vain attempt again and again. Ironically
enough, even its progress towards the bottom is a stagnation.
So here we have ignorance on one side and craving on the other,
as a result of the abyss formed by the whirlpool. In order to satisfy
this craving there is that power of attraction: grasping. Where there
is grasping, there is existence, or bhava. The entire whirlpool
now appears as a centre of activity.
Now the basic principle underlying this whirlpool is to be found
in our bodies. What we call `breathing' is a continuous process of
emptying and filling up. So even the so-called `life-principle' is
not much different from the activity of a whirlpool. The function-
ing of the lungs and the heart is based on the same principle and
the blood circulation is in fact a whirling round. This kind of
activity is very often known as àutomatic,' a word which has
connotations of self-sufficiency. But at the root of it there is a
perversion, as we saw in the case of the whirlpool. All these
activities are based on a conflict between two opposite forces.
In fact existence in its entirety is not much different from the
conflict of that obstinate current of water with the main stream.
This characteristic of conflict is so pervasive that it can be seen
even in the basic laws governing the existence of a society. In our
social life, rights and responsibilities go hand in hand. We can
enjoy certain privileges, provided we fulfill our duties. So here too

we have a tangle within and a tangle without.19
Now this is about the existence of the society as such. And what
about the field of economics? There too the basic principles show
the same weakness. Production is governed by laws of supply and
demand. There will be a supply so long as there is a demand.
Between them there is a conflict. It leads to many complications.
The price mechanism is on a precarious balance and that is why
some wealthy countries are forced to the ridiculous position of
dumping their surplus into the sea.
All this shows that existence is basically in a precarious posi-
tion. To illustrate this, let us take the case of two snakes of the
same size, trying to swallow up each other. Each of them tries to
swallow up the other from the tail upwards and when they are half
way through the meal, what do we find? A snake cycle. This
snake cycle goes round and round, trying to swallow up each
other. But will it ever be successful?
The precarious position illustrated by the snake cycle, we find
in our own bodies in the form of respiration, blood circulation and
so forth. What appears as the stability in the society and in the
economy, is similarly precarious. It is because of this conflict, this
unsatisfactoriness, that the Buddha concluded that the whole of
existence is suffering.
When the arising aspect is taken too seriously, to the neglect of
the cessation aspect, instead of a conflict or an unsatisfactoriness
one tends to see something automatic everywhere. This body as
well as machines such as water pumps and electrical appliances
seem to work on an automatic principle. But in truth there is only a
conflict between two opposing forces. When one comes to think of
it, there is no àuto'-ness even in the automatic.
All that is there, is a bearing up with difficulty. And this in fact
is the meaning of the word dukkha. Duþ stands for `difficulty' and
19 S I 13, Jañàsutta.
kha for `bearing up.' Even with difficulty one bears it up, and
though one bears it up, it is difficult.
Now regarding the question of existence we happened to men-
tion that because of a whirlpool's activity, one can point out a
`here' with reference to it. We can now come back to the word
itthattaü, which we left out without comment in the quotation
ettàvatà vaññaü vattati itthattaü pa¤¤àpanàya, ßin so far only
does the whirlpool whirl for the designation of an itthatta.û Now
what is this itthatta? Ittha means `this,' so itthattaü would mean
`this-ness.' The whirling of a whirlpool qualifies itself for a
designation as a `this.'
There are a couple of verses in the Dvayatànupassanàsutta of
the Sutta Nipàta which bring out the meaning of this word more
clearly:
Jàti maraõa saüsàraü,

ye vajanti punappunaü,
itthabhàva¤¤athàbhàvaü,
avijjàyeva sà gati.20
Taõhà dutiyo puriso,

dãgham addhàna saüsàraü,
saüsàraü nàtivattati.21
Ye jàti maraõa saüsàraü punappunaü vajanti, ßthey that go on

again and again the round of birth and death.û Itthabhàva¤¤athà-
bhàvaü, ßwhich is a this-ness and an otherwise-ness,û or ßwhich is
an alternation between a this-ness and an otherwise-ness.û Sà gati
avijjàya eva, ßthat going of them, that faring of them, is only a
journey of ignorance.û Taõhà dutiyo puriso, ßthe man with craving
20 Sn 729, Dvayatànupassanàsutta.
as his second,û (or his companion). Dãgham addhàna saüsàraü,

ßfaring on for a long time in saüsàra.û Itthabhàva¤¤athàbhàvaü,
saüsàraü nàtivattati, ßdoes not get away from the round which is
a this-ness and an otherwise-ness,û or ßwhich is an alternation
between a this-ness and an otherwise-ness.û What is meant by it, is
the transcendence of saüsàra.
We saw above how the concept of a `here' arose with the birth
of a whirlpool. In fact one's birth is at the same time the birth of a
`here' or `this place.' And that is what is meant by itthabhàva in
the two verses quoted above. Itthabhàva and itthatta both mean
`this-ness.' In both verses this `this-ness' is coupled with an
otherwise-ness, a¤¤athàbhàva. Here too we see a conflict between
two things, this-ness and otherwise-ness. The cycle of saüsàra,
represented by birth and death, jàti maraõa saüsàraü, is equiva-
lent to an alternation between this-ness and otherwise-ness,
itthabhàva¤¤athàbhàva. And as the first verse says, this recurrent
alternation between this-ness and otherwise-ness is nothing but a
journey of ignorance itself.
Though we have given so much significance to the two terms
itthabhàva and a¤¤athàbhàva, the commentary to the Sutta Nipàta
treats them lightly. It explains itthabhàvaü as imaü manussa-
bhàvaü, which means ßthis state as a human being,û and a¤¤athà-
bhàvaü as ito avasesa a¤¤anikàyabhàvaü, ßany state of being
other than this.û22 This explanation misses the deeper significance
of the word itthatta.
In support of this we may refer to the Pàñikasutta of the Dãgha
Nikàya. There we are told that when the world system gets
destroyed at the end of an aeon, some being or other gets reborn in
an empty Brahma mansion, and after being there for a long time,
thinks, out of a feeling of loneliness: Aho vata a¤¤epi sattà
itthattaü àgaccheyyuü.23 ßHow nice it would be if other beings
22 Pj II 505.
23 D III 29, Pàñikasutta.
also come to this state.û In this context the word itthatta refers to
the Brahma world and not the human world. From the point of
view of the Brahmas, itthatta refers to the Brahma world and only
for us here, it means the human world.
However this is just a narrow meaning of the word itthatta.
When the reference is to the entire round of existence or saüsàra,
itthatta does not necessarily mean `this human world.' The two
terms have a generic sense, because they represent some basic
principle. As in the case of a whirlpool, this-ness is to be seen
together with an otherwise-ness. This illustrates the conflict
characteristic of existence. Wherever a this-ness arises, a possibil-
ity for an otherwise-ness comes in. Itthabhàva and a¤¤athàbhàva
go together.
Aniccatà, or impermanence, is very often explained with the
help of the phrase vipariõàma¤¤athàbhàva.24 Now here too we
have the word a¤¤athàbhàva. Here the word preceding it, gives a
clue to its true significance. Vipariõàma is quite suggestive of a
process of evolution. Strictly speaking, pariõàma is evolution, and
pariõata is the fully evolved or mature stage. The prefix vi stands
for the anti-climax. The evolution is over, now it is becoming
other. Ironically enough, this state of `becoming-other' is known
as otherwise-ness, a¤¤athàbhàva. And so this twin, itthabhàva and
a¤¤athàbhàva, tell us the nature of the world. Between them, they
explain for us the law of impermanence.
In the section of the Threes in the Aïguttara Nikàya the three
characteristics of a saïkhata are explained in this order: Uppàdo
pa¤¤àyati, vayo pa¤¤àyati, ñhitassa a¤¤athattaü pa¤¤àyati,25 ßAn
arising is manifest, a passing away is manifest and an otherwise-
ness in the persisting is manifest.û
This implies that the persistence is only apparent and that is
why it is mentioned last. There is an otherwise-ness even in this
24 E.g. at M II 110, Piyajàtikasutta.

25 A I 152, Saïkhatalakkhaõasutta.
apparently persistent. But later scholars preferred to speak of three

stages asuppàda, ñhiti, bhaïga,26 ßarising, persistence, and break-
ing up.û However the law of impermanence could be sufficiently
understood even with the help of two words, itthabhàva and
a¤¤athàbhàva, this-ness and otherwise-ness. Very often we find
the Buddha summing up the law of impermanence in the two
words samudaya and vaya, ßarisingû and ßpassing away.û27
There is an apparent contradiction in the phrase ñhitassa
a¤¤athatta, but it reminds us of the fact that what the world takes
as static or persisting is actually not so. The so-called `static' is
from beginning to end an otherwise-ness. Now if we are to relate
this to the two links jàti and jaràmaraõaü in pañicca samuppàda,
we may say that as soon as one is born the process of otherwise-
ness sets in. Wherever there is birth, there is death. One of the
traditional Pàli verses on the reflections on death has the following
meaningful lines:
Uppattiyà sahevedaü, maraõam àgataü sadà,28 ßAlways death
has come, even with the birth itself.û Just as in a conjoined pair,
when one is drawn the other follows, even so when birth is drawn
in, decay-and-death follow as a matter of course.
Before the advent of the Buddha, the world believed in the
possibility of a birth devoid of decay-and-death. It believed in a
form of existence devoid of grasping. Because of its ignorance of
the pair-wise relatedness of this-to-that, idappaccayatà, it went on
with its deluded search. And that was the reason for all the conflict
in the world.
According to the teaching of the Buddha, the concept of birth is
equivalent to the concept of a `here.' As a matter of fact, this birth
of a `here' is like the first peg driven for the measurement of a
26 E.g. at Ps IV 88.
27 E.g. at M I 56, Satipaññhànasutta.
28 This is found in the set of verses on maraõasati among the caturàrakkhàgàthà
(four protective kamaññhànas) in standard Paritta books.
world. Because of the pair-wise relationship, the very first `birth-

day-present' that one gets as soon as one is born, is Ý death. The
inevitable death that he is entitled to. This way we can understand
the deeper significance of the two words itthabhàva and
a¤¤athàbhàva, this-ness and otherwise-ness.
We have to say the same thing with regard to the whirlpool.
Apparently it has the power to control, to hold sway. Seen from a
distance, the whirlpool is a centre of activity with some controlling
power. Now, one of the basic meanings of the concept of self is
the ability to control, to hold sway. And a whirlpool too, as seen
from a distance, seems to have this ability. Just as it appears
automatic, so also it seems to have some power to control.
But on deeper analysis it reveals its not-self nature. What we
have here is simply the conflict between the main stream and a
run-away current. It is the outcome of the conflict between two
forces and not the work of just one force. It is a case of relatedness
of this-to-that, idappaccayatà. As one verse in the Bàlavagga of
the Dhammapada puts it: Attà hi attano natthi,29 ßEven oneself is
not one's own.û
So even a whirlpool is not its own, there is nothing really
automatic about it. This then is the dukkha, the suffering, the
conflict, the unsatisfactoriness. What the world holds on to as
existence is just a process of otherwise-ness, as the Buddha vividly
portrays for us in the following verses of the Nandavagga of the
Udàna.
Ayaü loko santàpajàto, phassapareto

rogaü vadati attato,
yena yena hi ma¤¤ati,
tato taü hoti a¤¤athà.
A¤¤athàbhàvã bhavasatto loko,
bhavapareto bhavam evàbhinandati,
29 Dhp 62, Bàlavagga.

yad'abhinandati taü bhayaü,

yassa bhàyati taü dukkhaü,
bhava vippahànàya kho panidaü
brahmacariyaü vussati.30
ßThis anguished world, fully given

to contact,
Speaks of a disease as self.
In whatever terms it conceives of,
Even thereby it turns otherwise.
The world, attached to becoming,
Given fully to becoming,
Though becoming otherwise,
Yet delights in becoming.
What it delights in is a fear
What it fears from
Is a suffering.
But then this holy life is lived for the
abandoning of that very becoming.û
Just a few lines Ý but how deep they go! The world is in anguish
and is enslaved by contact. What it calls self is nothing but a
disease. Ma¤¤ati is a word of deeper significance. Ma¤¤anà is
conceiving under the influence of craving, conceit and views.
Whatever becomes an object of that conceiving, by that very
conception it becomes otherwise. That is to say that an opportunity
arises for an otherwise-ness, even as `death' has come together
with `birth.'
So conceiving, or conception, is itself the reason for otherwise-
ness. Before a `thing' becomes òtherwise,' it has to become a
`thing.' And it becomes a `thing' only when attention is focused
on it under the influence of craving, conceit and views and it is
30 Ud 32, Lokasutta.
separated from the whole world and grasped as a `thing.' And that
is why it is said:
Yaü ya¤hi lokasmim upàdiyanti,

teneva Màro anveti jantuü.31
ßWhatever one grasps in the world,

By that itself Màra pursues a being.û
The world is attached to becoming and is fully given to becoming.

Therefore its very nature is otherwise-ness, a¤¤athàbhàvã. And
then the Buddha declares the inevitable outcome of this contradic-
tory position: yad abhinandati taü bhayaü, whatever one delights
in, that is a fear, that is a danger. What one delights in, is `becom-
ing' and that is a source of fear. And yassa bhàyati taü dukkhaü,
what one fears, or is afraid of, that is suffering. And of what is one
afraid? One is afraid of the otherwise-ness of the thing that one
holds on to as existing. So the otherwise-ness is the suffering and
the thing grasped is a source of fear.
For instance, when one is walking through a town with one's
pockets full of gems, one is afraid because of the valuables in
one's pockets. Even so, the existence that one delights in is a
source of fear. What one fears is change or otherwise-ness, and
that is suffering. Therefore it is that this holy life is lived for the
abandonment of that very becoming or existence.
So from this quotation it becomes clear that the nature of exist-
ence is òtherwise-ness.' It is the insight into this nature that is
basic in the understanding of idappaccayatà. What is known as the
arising of the Dhamma-eye is the understanding of this predica-
ment in worldly existence. But that Dhamma-eye arises together
with a solution for this predicament: Yaü ki¤ci samudaya-
31 Sn 1103, Bhadràvudhamàõavapucchà.
dhammaü sabbaü taü nirodhadhammaü.32 ßWhatever is of a

nature to arise, all that is of a nature to cease.û
As far as the arising aspect is concerned, this whirlpool is
formed due to the grasping through craving, conceit and views.
Once this saüsàric whirlpool is formed, it keeps on attracting all
that is in the world, all that is within its reach, in the form of
craving and grasping. But there is a cessation to this process. It is
possible to make it cease. Why? Because it is something arisen
due to causes and conditions. Because it is a process based on two
things, without a self to hold sway. That is why we have men-
tioned at the very outset that every thing is impermanent, prepared
and dependently arisen, aniccaü, saïkhataü, pañicca samup-
pannaü.
Everyone of the twelve links in the formula, including igno-
rance, is dependently arisen. They are all arisen due to causes and
conditions, they are not permanent, aniccaü. They are only made
up or prepared, saïkhataü. The word saïkhataü is explained in
various ways. But in short it means something that is made up,
prepared, or concocted by way of intention. Pañicca samuppannaü
means conditionally arisen and therefore it is of a nature to get
destroyed, khayadhamma. It is of a nature to pass away, vaya-
dhamma. It is of a nature to fade away, viràgadhamma. It is of a
nature to cease, nirodhadhamma.
It seems that even the colour or shade of decay-and-death can
fade away and that is why we have pointed out their relevance to
the question of concepts. This nature of fading away is understood
by one who has had an insight into the law of arising and cessa-
tion.
Saüsàra is a whirlpool as far as the ordinary beings caught up
in it are concerned. Now what about the Arahants? How is the idea
of this whirlpool presented in the case of the Arahants? It is
simply said that for them there is no whirling round for there to be
32 S V 423, Dhammacakkapavattanasutta.
a designation: vaññaü tesaü natthi pa¤¤àpanàya.33 So in their case,

there is no whirling round to justify a designation.
This, then, is something deeper than the whirlpool itself. The
whirlpool can be pointed out because of its activity. But not so
easily the emancipated ones and that is why there is so much
controversy regarding the nature of the Tathàgatha. The image of
the whirlpool in its relation to the emancipated ones is beautifully
presented in the following verse from the Cåëavagga of the
Udàna:
Acchecchi vaññaü byagà niràsaü,

visukkhà sarità na sandati,
chinnaü vaññaü na vattati,
es' ev' anto dukkhassa.34
ßHe has cut off the whirlpool

And reached desirelessness,
The stream dried up now no longer flows.
The whirlpool cut off whirls no more.
This, even this, is suffering's end.û
What has the Arahant done? He has cut off the whirlpool. He has
breached it and has reached the desireless state. The stream of
craving is dried up and flows no more. The whirlpool cut off at the
root, no more whirls. And this is the end of suffering. The cutting
off of the whirlpool is the realization of cessation, which is
Arahant-hood.
It is because of the accent on the arising aspect that the current
tries to move against the main stream. When that attempt is given
up, the rest happens as a matter of course. This idea is even more
clearly brought out by the following two verses in the Sagàtha-
34 Ud 75, DutiyaLakuõóakabhaddiyasutta.
vagga of the Saüyutta Nikàya. They are in the form of a dialogue

between a deity and the Buddha. The deity asks:
Kuto sarà nivattanti,

kattha vaññaü na vattati,
kattha nàma¤ca råpa¤ca
asesaü uparujjhati?35
ßFrom where do currents turn back,

Where whirls no more the whirlpool,
Where is it that name-and-form
Is held in check in a way complete?û
The Buddha gives the answer in the following verse:
Yattha àpo ca pañhavã,

tejo vàyo na gàdhati,
ato sarà nivattanti,
ettha vaññaü na vattati,
ettha nàma¤ca råpa¤ca,
asesaü uparujjhati.
ßWhere earth and water, fire and wind no

footing find,
From there it is that currents turn back.
There the whirlpool whirls no more
And there it is that name-and-form
Is held in check in a way complete.û
The reference here is to Nibbàna. Whether it is called sabbasaï-

khàrasamatha, the stilling of all preparations, or asaïkhatadhàtu,
the unprepared element, it means the state of cessation. And when
35 S I 15, Sarasutta.
the Arahant's mind is in that state, the four elements, which are
like ghosts, do not haunt him. They do not get a `footing' in that
consciousness. When they fade away, due to detachment, those
currents do not flow and the whirlpool whirls no more. Name and
form are fully held in check there.
Now as far as the meaning of råpa in nàma-råpa in this refer-
ence is concerned, its definition as cattàri ca mahàbhåtàni,
catunna¤ca mahàbhåtànaü upàdàyaråpaü is quite significant.36 It
draws attention to the fact that the four great primaries underlie the
concept of form. This is something unique, since before the advent
of the Buddha the world thought that in order to get away from
råpa one has to grasp aråpa. But the irony of the situation is that,
even in aråpa, råpa is implicit in a subtle form. Or in other words,
aråpa takes råpa for granted.
Supposing someone, walking in the darkness of the night, has a
hallucination of a devil and runs away to escape from it. He thinks
he is running away from the devil, but he is taking the devil with
him. The devil is in his mind, it is something imagined. Similarly,
until the Buddha came into the scene, the worldlings grasped
aråpa in order to get away from råpa. But because of the dichot-
omy between råpa and aråpa, even when they swung as far as the
highest formless realms, they were still in bondage to saïkhàras,
or preparations. As soon as the momentum of their swing of
saïkhàras got fully spent, they swung back to råpa. So here too
we see the question of duality and dichotomy.
This sermon has served its purpose if it has drawn attention to
the importance of the questions of duality, dichotomy and the
relatedness of this to that, idappaccayatà. So this is enough for
today.
Nibbàna Sermon 3



Today we have before us the third sermon on Nibbàna. The
other day, with the help of the simile of a whirlpool, we attempted
an explanation of the terms saüsàra on the one hand, and Nibbàna
on the other, that is to say `going round,' or saüsaraõa, and `going
out,' or nissaraõa.2 We also cited suttas to illustrate both the
arising (samudaya) and cessation (nirodha) aspects of the law of
dependent arising.
As regards this whirlpool, to show a parallel development with
the links of the law of dependent arising, by way of a sustained
simile, we may say that the ignorance in presuming that it is
possible to go against the main stream of the three signata Ý
2 See sermon 2.
69
impermanence, suffering and not-self Ý is the place of its origin.

That heap of preparations impelled by ignorance, which takes the
current forward, may be regarded as saïkhàras. And where the
current in its progress clashes with the main stream to become a
whirlpool, that pushing forward against the main stream is vi¤¤àõa
or consciousness.
The outcome of the clash is nàma-råpa, or name-and-form, with
its formal name and nominal form. That link in the formula of
dependent arising called saëàyatana, or six sense-bases, could be
regarded as the outgrowth of this name-and-form. We can under-
stand that link, too, in relation to the simile of the whirlpool. As
the whirlpool goes on for a long time, an abyss is formed, the
functioning of which could be compared to the six sense-bases.
As a matter of fact, bodily pains are comparable to an abyss. In
a certain sutta in the Saüyutta Nikàya the Buddha says: Sàrã-
rikànaü kho etaü bhikkhave dukkhànaü vedanànaü adhivaca-
naü, yadidaü pàtàlo'ti.3 ßMonks, abyss is a synonym for painful
bodily feelings.û
When one comes to think about that statement, it would appear
that the thirst of craving arises in beings in various forms of
existence because of painful feeling. The Sallattenasutta adds to
this by stating that the uninstructed worldling, on being touched by
painful feeling, delights in sense pleasures, because he knows no
way out of painful feeling other than the sense pleasures.4
In the light of that statement it seems that the abyss is the end-
less barrage of painful feelings. The force of attraction that arises
from the abyss is like the thirst to quell those painful feelings. The
grasping that follows is the functioning of the same force of
attraction. It attracts all the flotsam and jetsam around it, as things
organically appropriated, upàdinna, to put up a show of existence,
or bhava. That is, a spot that can be pointed out with the help of
3 S IV 206, Pàtàlasutta.
4 S IV 208, Sallattenasutta.
things thus grasped by the whirlpool. So this whirlpool or vortex

simile gives us some idea of the law of dependent arising.
The insight into the basic principle of dependent arising, is in
fact regarded as the arising of the èye of Dhamma.' About the
stream-winner it is said that the dustless stainless eye of Dhamma
has arisen in him. The following phrase, which sums up the
significance of that Dhamma-eye, comes up quite often in the
discourses: Yaü ki¤ci samudayadhammaü sabbaü taü nirodha-
dhammaü.5 ßWhatever is of a nature to arise, all that is of a nature
to cease.û
Sometimes it is briefly alluded to with the couple of terms
samudaya and nirodha, as samudayo samudayo and nirodho
nirodho.6 It is as if the experience of that insight has found
expression as an exclamation: ßArising, arising! Ceasing, ceas-
ing!û The above phrase only connects up the two aspects of that
experience.
It seems then that what is called the `Dhamma-eye,' is the abil-
ity to see the Nibbànic solution in the very vortex of the samsàric
problem. That way of analysis which puts samsàra and Nibbàna
far apart, into two watertight compartments, as it were, gives rise
to interminable problems. But here we see that, just as much as
one could realize Nibbàna by discovering the cause of suffering
and following the path to its cessation, which in effect is the
understanding of the four noble truths, one could also put an end to
this vortex by understanding its cause and applying the correct
means for its cessation.
In the previous sermon we happened to quote some Canonical
verses, which declared that the vortex does not exist for an
arahant.7 Now as regards the condition after the cessation of the
5 D I 110, D I 148, D II 41, D II 288, M I 380, M I 501, M II 145, M III 280, S IV

47, S IV 107, S IV 192, S V 423, A IV 186, A IV 210, A IV 213, Ud 49.
6 D II 33, S II 7, S II 105.
7 See sermon 2.
vortex, if someone asks where the vortex or the whirlpool has

gone, what sort of answer can we give? It is the same difficulty
that comes up in answering the question: ßWhere has the fire gone
after it has gone out?û Because here too, what we call the whirl-
pool is that current of water which went against the main stream. It
also consists of water, like the body of water outside it. So we
cannot say that they united, nor can we say that it went and hid
somewhere.
Here we find ourselves in a queer situation. All we can say in
fairness to truth is that there had been a certain form of activity, a
certain state of unrest, due to certain causes and conditions.
Because of that activity that was going on there, it was possible to
designate it, to give it a name. By worldly convention one could
refer to it as ßthat placeû or ßthis place.û
The entire field of activity was called a whirlpool by worldly
convention. But now, the so-called whirlpool is no more. The
worldly convention is no more applicable as in the case of an
extinguished fire. The word ßfireû was introduced, the concept of
ßfireû was created, to designate a certain state of affairs that arose
due to causes and conditions, due to graspings. So from this also
we can see that it is in concepts that ignorance finds a camouflage.
Being unaware of it the world goes on amassing concepts and
even expects to see them in Nibbàna. There are some who fondly
hope to get a vision of their lists of concepts when they realize
Nibbàna. But that wisdom penetrates through even the concepts
and that is why it is called udayatthagàminã pa¤¤à ariyà nibbe-
dhikà,8 ßthe ariyan penetrative wisdom that sees the rise and fall.û
The idea of penetration is already implicit in the phrase yaü
ki¤ci samudayadhammaü sabbaü taü nirodhadhammaü, ßwhat-
ever is of a nature to arise, all that is of a nature to cease.û If
anything has the nature to arise, by that very nature it is bound to
come to its end. And that is why the wandering ascetic Upatissa,
8 E.g. at D III 237, Sangãtisutta.

who was to become Venerable Sàriputta later, attained the fruit of

a stream-winner even on hearing the first two lines of the verse
uttered by Venerable Assaji:
Ye dhammà hetuppabhavà,
tesaü hetuü tathàgato àha.9
ßOf things that arise from a cause,

their cause the Tathàgata has told.û
When a wise man hears that something has arisen due to causes
and conditions, he immediately understands that it could be made
to cease by the removal of those conditions, even with out further
explanation. It is the dustless stainless Dhamma-eye that enables
one to see the Nibbànic solution in the very structure of the
saüsàric problem.
In our quotation from the MahàNidànasutta it was said that all
pathways for verbal expression, terminology and designation exist
so long as the vortex of saüsàra is kept going.10 The implication,
therefore, is that they have no existence beyond it. This is the
significance of the word ettàvatà, ßin so far only.û
Ettàvatà jàyetha và jãyetha và mãyetha và cavetha và upapajj-
etha và.11 ßIn so far only can one be born, or grow old, or die, or
pass away, or reappear.û
So the concepts of birth, decay-and-death, passing away and
reappearing, are meaningful only in the context of the saüsàric
vortex between consciousness and name-and-form. If somehow or
other this interrelation could be broken, this saüsàric vortex, the
whirlpool, could be stopped, then, after that, nothing remains to be
9 Vin I 40.
10 See sermon 2.
said, nothing remains to be predicated. And as it is said in the

Upasãvasutta of the Sutta Nipàta:
Yena naü vajju, taü tassa natthi,12 ßThat by which they would
speak of him, that for him exists not.û
There are a number of Canonical passages that show us the
relevance of this vortex simile to the understanding of the doctrine
of pañicca samuppàda. In the MahàPadànasutta of the Dãgha
Nikàya we find a lengthy description of the manner in which the
bodhisatta Vipassã got an insight into pañicca samuppàda. We are
told that his mode of approach was one of radical reflection, or
yoniso manasikàra, literally: ßattention by way of the matrix.û One
might as well say that it is an attention by way of the vortex. It is
as if a man with keen vision, sitting under a tree by a river, were to
watch how a fallen leaf gets carried away by the water current,
only to get whirled up and disappear in a vortex.
It is clearly stated in the case of Vipassã bodhisatta that his
understanding through wisdom came as a result of `radical
reflection,' yoniso manasikàrà ahu pa¤¤àya abhisamayo.13 So his
insight into pañicca samuppàda was definitely not due to recollec-
tion of past lives. Yoni means the `matrix,' or the `place of origin.'
So in yoniso manasikàra always the attention has to turn towards
the place of origin.
So, true to this method, we find the bodhisatta Vipassã starting
his reasoning from the very end of the pañicca samuppàda formu-
la: Kimhi nu kho sati jaràmaraõaü hoti, kiü paccayà
jaràmaraõaü? ßGiven what, does decay-and-death come to be,
from which condition comes decay-and-death?û And to this
question, the following answer occurred to him:
Jàtiyà kho sati jaràmaraõaü hoti, jàtipaccayà jaràmaraõaü.
ßGiven birth, does decay-and-death come to be, from birth as
condition comes decay-and-death.û In the same manner, taking
12 Sn 1076, Upasãvamàõavapucchà.
13 D II 31, MahàPadànasutta.
pair by pair, he went on reasoning progressively. For instance his

next question was:
Kimhi nu kho sati jàti hoti, kiü paccayà jàti? ßGiven what, does
birth come to be, from which condition comes birth?û And the
answer to it was:
Bhave kho sati jàti hoti, bhavapaccayà jàti. ßGiven becoming,
birth comes to be, from becoming as condition comes birth.û He
went on reasoning like this up to and including name-and-form.
But when he came to consciousness, he had to turn back. When he
searched for the condition of consciousness, he found that name-
and-form itself is the condition, whereby he understood their
interdependence, and then he gave expression to the significance
of this discovery in the following words:
Paccudàvattati kho idaü vi¤¤àõaü nàmaråpamhà,

nàparaü gacchati. Ettàvatà jàyetha và jãyetha và mãye-
tha và cavetha và upapajjetha và, yadidaü nàma-
råpapaccayà vi¤¤àõaü, vi¤¤àõapaccayà nàmaråpaü,
nàmaråpapaccayà saëàyatanaü, saëàyatanapaccayà phas-
so, phassapaccayà vedanà, vedanàpaccayà taõhà,
taõhàpaccayà upàdànaü, upàdànapaccayà bhavo, bha-
vapaccayà jàti, jàtipaccayà jaràmaraõaü sokapari-
devadukkhadomanassåpàyàsà sambhavanti. Evametassa
kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.
By means of radical reflection the bodhisatta Vipassã understood

that all concepts of birth, decay-and-death converge on the
relationship between consciousness and name-and-form:
ßThis consciousness turns back from name-and-form, it

does not go beyond. In so far can one be born, or grow
old, or die, or pass away, or reappear, in so far as this is,
namely: consciousness is dependent on name-and-form,
and name-and-form on consciousness; dependent on
name-and-form, the six sense-bases; dependent on the six
sense-bases, contact; dependent on contact, feeling;
dependent on feeling, craving; dependent on craving,

grasping; dependent on grasping, becoming; dependent on
becoming, birth; and dependent on birth, decay-and-death,
sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair come to be.
Thus is the arising of this entire mass of suffering.û
The fact that this understanding of pañicca samuppàda signified

the arising of the Dhamma-eye in Vipassã bodhisatta is stated in
the following words:
Samudayo samudayo'ti kho, bhikkhave, Vipassissa bodhi-

sattassa pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhum uda-
pàdi, ¤àõaü udapàdi, pa¤¤à udapàdi, vijjà udapàdi, àloko
udapàdi.
ßÀrising, arising,' thus, O! monks, in regard to things un-

heard of before, there arose in the bodhisatta Vipassã the
eye, the knowledge, the wisdom, the science, the light.û
In the same way, it is said that the bodhisatta clarified for himself
the cessation aspect through radical reflection:
Kimhi nu kho asati jaràmaraõaü na hoti, kissa nirodhà
jaràmaraõaü nirodho? ßIn the absence of what, will decay-and-
death not be, with the cessation of what, is the cessation of decay-
and-death?û And as the answer to it, the following thought
occurred to him:
Jàtiyà kho asati jaràmaraõaü na hoti, jàtinirodhà jaràma-
raõaünirodho. ßIn the absence of birth, there is no decay-and-
death, with the cessation of birth is the cessation of decay-and-
death.û Likewise he went on reflecting progressively, until he
reached the link between name-and-form and consciousness, and
then it occurred to him:
Nàmaråpanirodhà vi¤¤àõanirodho, vi¤¤àõanirodhà nàma-
råpanirodho. ßFrom the cessation of name-and-form comes the
cessation of consciousness, from the cessation of consciousness
comes the cessation of name-and-form.û
Once this vital link is broken, that is, when consciousness ceas-
es with the cessation of name-and-form, and name-and-form
ceases with the cessation of consciousness, then all the other links
following name-and-form, such as the six sense-bases, contact and
feeling, come to cease immediately.
The MahàPadànasutta goes on to say that the bodhisatta
Vipassã continued to dwell seeing the arising and passing away of
the five grasping groups and that before long his mind was fully
emancipated from the influxes and that he attained to full enlight-
enment. It is also said in the sutta in this connection that the
bodhisatta followed this mode of reflection, because he under-
stood that it is the way of insight leading to awakening: Adhigato
kho myàyaü vipassanà maggo bodhàya. ßI have found this path of
insight to awakening, to enlightenment.û
And as we saw above the most important point, the pivotal
point, in this path of insight, is the relationship between name-and-
form and consciousness. The commentary raises the question, why
the bodhisatta Vipassã makes no mention of the first two links,
avijjà and saïkhàrà, and gives the explanation that he could not
see them, as they belong to the past.14
But this is not the reason. The very ignorance regarding the
relationship between name-and-form and consciousness Ý is avij-
jà. And what accounts for the continuity of this relationship Ý is
saïkhàrà. It is because of these preparations that the vortical
interplay between consciousness and name-and-form is kept
going.
Simply because the first two links are not mentioned in the
sutta, the commentators give the explanation that they belong to
the past. But it should be clear that the bodhisatta Vipassã could
not have aroused the Dhamma-eye without those two links. Why
they are not specially mentioned here is because they are in the
background. It is true that there is a mode of exposition, in which
14 Sv II 459.
avijjà, or ignorance, takes precedence. But what we have here is a

different mode of exposition, according to which one has to stop
short at the interrelation between consciousness and name-and-
form.
As to the cause of this mutual relationship, we have to go back
to the vortex simile. Usually, the progress of a current of water is
visible at some distance away from the vortex. In this case, the
current of water forgets its own impermanent, suffering and not-
self nature, and goes ahead in search of a permanent, pleasurable
and self nature. And this itself Ý is avijjà, or ignorance. This very
tendency of the narrow water current to push on against the main
body of water, is itself what is called consciousness.
Similarly, in the context of the saüsàric individual, what forms
the background for the interplay between consciousness and name-
and-form, is the non-understanding that the net result of the
interplay is suffering, that it only leads to suffering. In other
words, it is the tendency to go ahead in search of a state of
permanence, pleasure and self, ignoring the three characteristics of
impermanence, suffering and not-self.
The heap of preparations or efforts arising out of that tendency
are the saïkhàràs. It is on these very preparations or efforts that
consciousness depends, and then we have name-and-form existing
in relation to it. On the side of name-and-form, or beyond it, we
have all the other links of the pañicca samuppàda. So in this way
we can form a mental picture of the formula of pañicca samuppàda
by some sort of a pictorial explanation. It seems, then, that this
discourse is further proof of the statements found in the
MahàNidànasutta.
There is yet another discourse, one preached by Venerable
Sàriputta, which supports our conclusions. It is found in the
Nidànasaüyutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya. There Venerable
Sàriputta brings out a simile that is even simpler than the vortex
simile. He compares consciousness and name-and-form to two
bundles of reeds. When two bundles of reeds stand, one supporting
the other, if one of those is drawn out, the other would fall down.
And if the latter is drawn out, the former will fall down: Ekaü
àkaóóheyya, ekà papateyya, aparaü ce àkaóóheyya, aparà

papateyya.15
The mutual interrelation between consciousness and name-and-
form is like that of two bundles of reeds, mutually supporting each
other. Having given this simile, Venerable Sàriputta goes on to
mention the other links of the pañicca samuppàda formula, as in
the case of the bodhisatta Vipassã's insight. It runs: ßDependent on
name-and-form, the six sense-bases; dependent on the six sense-
bases, contact; dependent on contact, feelingsû (and so on). And
then the cessation aspect of these links is also given.
By way of illustration, let us suppose that the consciousness
bundle of reeds is standing on the left side, and the name-and-form
bundle is on the right. Then we have a number of other bundles,
such as the six sense-bases, contact and feeling, all leaning on to
the name-and-form bundle of reeds. These are all dependent on the
name-and-form bundle.
Now, as soon as the consciousness bundle is drawn out, all the
others on the right side fall down immediately. There is no
interval. True to the qualities of the Dhamma, summed up in the
terms sandiññhika, akàlika and ehipassika, that is, to be seen here
and now, not involving time, and inviting to come and see, the
entire mass of saüsàric suffering ceases immediately. So, this
discourse is further proof of the fact that we have here quite a
different state of affairs, than what is commonly believed to be the
significance of the pañicca samuppàda formula.
That is why we have pointed out that the concepts of birth,
decay-and-death are of the nature of fading away. That is also why
decay-and-death have been described as impermanent, made up,
dependently arisen, of a nature to wither away, pass away, fade
away and cease: Aniccaü saïkhataü pañiccasamuppannaü
khayadhammaü vayadhammaü viràgadhammaü nirodha-
dhammaü.16
15 S II 114, Naëakalàpãsutta.
When one comes to think of it, one may find it difficult to un-
derstand why decay-and-death are called impermanent and
withering or decaying. But the reason is that all concepts, in so far
as they are leaning on to the name-and-form bundle, have to fall
down when the opposite bundle of reeds is drawn out. That is to
say that the entire mass of saüsàric suffering ceases immediately,
and the whirlpool of saüsàra comes to an end.
This, then, seems to be the most plausible conclusion. Accord-
ing to the interpretation we have adopted, in the MahàHatthipado-
pamasutta of the Majjhima Nikàya Venerable Sàriputta brings out
as a quotation a certain statement of the Buddha on pañicca
samuppàda. It runs:
Yo pañiccasamuppàdaü passati so dhammaü passati; yo
dhammaü passati so pañiccasamuppàdaü passati.17 ßHe who sees
the law of dependent arising, sees the Dhamma; he who sees the
Dhamma, sees the law of dependent arising.û
This shows that the quintessence of the Dhamma is in fact the
law of dependent arising itself. Now there are these six qualities of
the Dhamma, summed up in the well known formula, which every
Buddhist believes in. This Dhamma is well-preached, svàkkhàto. It
can be seen here and now, sandiññhiko, that is, one can see it by
oneself here in this very world. It is timeless, akàliko. It invites
one to come and see, ehipassiko. It leads one on, opanayiko. It can
be realized by the wise each one by him self, paccattaü veditabbo
vi¤¤åhi.18
Though we all have faith in these qualities of the Dhamma, let
us see whether the traditionally accepted interpretation of pañicca
samuppàda is faithful to these qualities, particularly to the two
qualities sandiññhiko and akàliko.
According to that accepted interpretation, presented by the
venerable author of the Visuddhimagga, the first two links of the
17 M I 190, MahàHatthipadopamasutta.
formula belong to the past, and the last two links belong to the
future. The remaining eight links in the middle are taken to
represent the present.19 That means, we have here the three periods
of time. So it is not Ý timeless.
And that is why they explained that the bodhisatta Vipassã did
not see the first two links. Perhaps, the presumption is, that since
these two links belong to the past, they can be seen only by the
knowledge of the recollection of past lives. But on the other hand,
the suttas tell us that even the stream-winner has a clear under-
standing of pañicca samuppàda: Ariyo c'assa ¤àyo pa¤¤àya
sudiññho hoti suppañividdho.20 ßBy him the Noble Norm is well
seen and well penetrated through with wisdom.û
The `noble norm' is none other than the law of dependent
arising, and the stream-winner has seen it well, penetrated into it
well with wisdom. The prefix su- implies the clarity of that vision.
The question, then, is how a stream-winner, who has no
knowledge of the recollection of past lives, can get this insight.
Whatever it may be, the accepted interpretation, as already
mentioned, puts the first two links into the past. That is to say,
ignorance and preparations are referred to the past. Birth, decay-
and-death are referred to the future. The eight links in between are
explained with reference to the present. Thus the formula is
divided into three periods.
Not only that, in the attempt to interpret the formula as referring
to three stages in the saüsàric journey of an individual, additional
links had to be interposed to prop up the interpretation.21 Igno-
rance, preparations, craving, grasping and becoming are regarded
as the past causes. Depending on these past causes, consciousness,
name-and-form, six sense-bases, contact and feeling are said to
arise as results in the present. And again, with ignorance, prepara-
19 Vism 578.
20 S II 68, Pa¤caverabhayàsutta.
21 Pañis I 52, Vism 579.
tions, craving, grasping and becoming as present causes, con-

sciousness, name-and-form, six sense-bases, contact and feeling
arise as results in the future.
This kind of interpretation is also advanced. But this interpreta-
tion in terms of pentads violates the interrelatedness between the
twelve links in the formula. We have already drawn attention to
the fact of interrelation between the two links in each pair. In fact,
that itself has to be taken as the law of dependent arising. That is
the basic principle itself: Because of one, the other arises. With its
cessation, the other ceases. There is this mode of analysis, but then
it is disrupted by the attempt to smuggle in additional links into the
formula.
Furthermore, according to this accepted commentarial exegesis,
even the term bhava, or becoming, is given a twofold interpreta-
tion. As kamma-process-becoming and rebirth-process-becoming.
In the context upàdànapaccaya bhavo, dependent on grasping is
becoming, it is explained as rebirth-process-becoming, while in
the case of the other context, bhavapaccaya jàti, dependent on
becoming is birth, it is taken to mean kamma-process-becoming.
So the same term is explained in two ways. Similarly, the term
jàti, which generally means birth, is said to imply rebirth in the
context of the formula of dependent arising.
There are many such weak points in the accepted interpretation.
Quite a number of authoritative modern scholars have pointed this
out. Now all these short-comings could be side-tracked, if we
grant the fact, as already mentioned, that the secret of the entire
saüsàric vortex is traceable to the two links consciousness and
name-and-form. As a matter of fact, the purpose of the formula of
dependent arising is to show the way of arising and cessation of
the entire mass of suffering, and not to illustrate three stages in the
saüsaric journey of an individual.
The distinctive feature of this law of dependent arising is its
demonstrability in the present, as suggested by the terms `to be
seen here and now' and `timeless,' even as the bodhisatta Vipassã
discovered it, through radical reflection itself. The salient charac-
teristic of the teaching of the Buddha is its visibility here and now
and timelessness. This fact is well revealed by the Hemakasutta of

the Sutta Nipàta. The brahmin youth Hemaka sings praise of the
Buddha in the following verses:
Ye me pubbe viyàkaüsu,
huraü Gotamasàsanà,
iccàsi iti bhavissati,
sabbaü taü itihãtihaü,
sabbaü taü takkavaóóhanaü,
nàhaü tattha abhiramiü.
Tva¤ca me dhammam akkhàhi,
taõhà nigghàtanaü muni,
yaü viditvà sato caraü,
tare loke visattikaü.22
ßThose who explained to me before,

Outside the dispensation of Gotama,
All of them said: `so it was, and so it will be,'
But all that is `so and so' talk,
All that is productive of logic,
I did not delight therein.
But now to me, O! sage,
Proclaim your Dhamma,
That is destructive of craving,
By knowing which and mindfully faring along,
One might get beyond the world's viscosity.û
Now, to paraphrase: Whatever teachers explained to me their

teachings outside your dispensation, used to bring in the past and
the future in their explanations, saying: ßSo it was, and so it will
be.û That is, they were always referring to a past and a future. But
all that can be summed up as `so and so' talk.
22 Sn 1084-1085, Hemakamàõavapucchà.
By the way, the term itihãtiha had already become a technical

term for `hearsay' among the ascetics. Such teachings based on
hearsay were productive of logic, as for instance testified by the
Sabbàsavasutta of the Majjhima Nikàya: ßWas I in the past, was I
not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past?
Having been what, what did I become in the past? Shall I be in the
future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future?
How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I
become in the future?û (And so on.)23
ßBut, I was not pleased with such teachings,û says Hemaka, ßIt
is only you, O! sage, who teaches the Dhamma that destroys the
craving in the present, understanding which, and mindfully
following it accordingly, one could go beyond the sticky craving
in the world.û Hemaka's praise of the Buddha was inspired by this
most distinctive feature in the Dhamma.
We have already stated that by `Dhamma' is meant the law of
dependent arising. This is further proof that the basic principle
underlying the formula of dependent arising could be traced to the
constant relationship between consciousness and name-and-form,
already present in one's mental continuum, without running into
the past or leaping towards the future.
We know that, in order to ascertain whether a banana trunk is
pith-less, it is not necessary to go on removing its bark, layer after
layer, from top to bottom. We only have to take a sharp sword and
cut the trunk in the middle, so that the cross-section will reveal to
us its pith-less nature. Similarly, if we cut in the middle the banana
trunk of preparations with the sharp sword of wisdom,
pa¤¤àmayaü tikhiõamasiü gahetvà,24 its internal structure as
revealed by the cross-section will convince us of the essence-less
nature of the group of preparations.
23 M I 8, Sabbàsavasutta.
24 Th 1094, Tàlapuña Thera.
Whatever existence there was in the past, that too had the same
essence-less nature. And whatever existence there will be in the
future, will have this same essencelessness. And I see it now, in
my own mental continuum, as something visible here and now, not
involving time. It is with such a conviction that the noble disciple
utters the words: ßArising, arising! Cessation, cessation!û That is
how he arrives at the realization summed up in the phrase: Yaü
ki¤ci samudayadhammaü, sabbaü taü nirodhadhammaü.25
ßWhatever is of the nature to arise, all that is of the nature to
cease.û All this goes to show that the accepted interpretation has
certain short-comings.
To take up another simile, we have already alluded to the fact
that the Buddha has been compared to a physician.26 Though this
might well sound a modernism, we may say that a specialist doctor
today needs only a drop of blood or blood tissue for a full diagno-
sis of a patient's disease. When seen under the microscope, that
blood tissue reveals the pathological condition of the patient. Even
the patient himself could be invited to see for him self the result of
the blood test.
But once the disease has been cured, the doctor could invite the
patient again to undergo a blood test, if he likes to assure himself
of the fact that that disease has been effectively treated. The
Buddha's teaching has a similar `here and now' and timeless
quality. What is noteworthy is that this quality is found in the law
of dependent arising.
Then there is another question that crops up out of this tradi-
tional interpretation of the formula of dependent arising. That is,
the reason why the two links, ignorance and preparations, are
referred to the past.
In some discourses, like the MahàNidànasutta, there is a discus-
sion about a descent of consciousness into a mother's womb.27
25 See above footnote 4.
26 See sermon 1.
Simply because there is such a discussion, one might think that the
law of dependent arising has reference to a period beyond one's
conception in a mother's womb.
But if we carefully examine the trend of this discussion and
analyse its purpose, such a conclusion will appear to be ground-
less. The point which the Buddha was trying to drive home into
Venerable ânanda by his catechism, is that the constant interrela-
tion that exists between consciousness and name-and-form is
present even during one's life in the mother's womb. This cate-
chism can be analysed into four parts. The first question is:
Vi¤¤àõaü va hi, ânanda, màtukucchismiü na okkamissatha,
api nu kho nàmaråpaü màtukucchismiü samuccissatha? And
Venerable ânanda's answer is: No h'etaü, bhante. ßIf, ânanda,
consciousness were not to descend into a mother's womb, would
name-and-form remain there?û ßIt would not, Lord.û
The Buddha is asking whether name-and-form can persist in
remaining inside the mother's womb, if consciousness refuses to
descend into it, so to say. The word samuccissatha presents a
difficulty as regards etymology. But it is quite likely that it has to
do with the idea of remaining, as it has an affinity to the word
ucciññha, leftover, remnant.
So the point raised here is that, in the event of a non-descent of
consciousness into the mother's womb, name-and-form will not be
left remaining there. Name-and-form has to have the support of
consciousness. However, in this interrelation, it is consciousness
that decides the issue. If consciousness does not descend, name-
and-form will not remain there.
So even if, at the moment of death, one has a thought of some
mother's womb, if consciousness does not descend in the proper
manner, name-and-form cannot stay there. Name-and-form has
always to be understood in relation to consciousness. It is not
something that is to be found in trees and rocks. It always goes
hand in hand with consciousness. So, the upshot of the above
discussion is that name-and-form will not remain there without the
support of consciousness.
Venerable ânanda's response to the first question, then, is:

ßThat indeed is not the case, O! Lord.û Then the Buddha asks:
Vi¤¤àõaü va hi, ânanda, màtukucchismiü okkamitvà vokkamis-
satha, api nu kho nàmaråpaü itthattàya abhinibbattissatha? ßIf,
ânanda, consciousness, having descended into the mother's
womb, were to slip out of it, would name-and-form be born into
this state of existence?û Venerable ânanda's reply to it is again:
ßThat indeed is not the case, Lord.û
Now the question is: ânanda, if for some reason or other, con-
sciousness, having descended into the mother's womb, slips out of
it, will name-and-form secure birth as a this-ness, or itthatta. We
have mentioned above that itthatta is a term with some special
significance.28 That is, how a `there' becomes a `here,' when a
person takes birth in a particular form of existence. In short, what
it implies, is that a person comes to be born.
In other words, if consciousness, having descended into the
mother's womb, slips out of it, that name-and-form will not
mature into a this-ness and be born into a this-ness. There is no
possibility of the this-ness coming into being. For there to be a
this-ness, both consciousness and name-and-form must be there.
We can understand, then, why Venerable ânanda replied in the
negative.
The next question the Buddha puts, is this: Vi¤¤àõaü va hi,
ânanda, daharasseva sato vocchijjissatha kumàrakassa và
kumàrikàya và, api nu kho nàmaråpaü vuddhiü viråëhiü ve-
pullaü àpajjissatha? ßIf, ânanda, the consciousness of a boy or a
girl were cut off when he or she is still young, will name-and-form
come to growth and maturity?û To that question too, Venerable
ânanda replies: ßThat indeed is not the case, Lord.û
Now that the preliminary questions have been correctly an-
swered, the Buddha then comes out with the following conclusion,
since the necessary premises are complete:
28 See sermon 2.
Tasmàtih' ânanda, es' eva hetu etaü nidànaü esa samudayo

esa paccayo nàmaråpassa, yadidaü vi¤¤àõaü. ßTherefore,
ânanda, this itself is the cause, this is the reason, origin and
condition for name-and-form, namely consciousness.û
What is emphasized here, is the importance of consciousness.
Out of the two, namely consciousness and name-and-form, what
carries more weight with it, is consciousness, even if there be a
trace of name-and-form. What the above questionnaire makes
clear, is that name-and-form arises in a mother's womb because of
consciousness. But that name-and-form will not remain there, if
consciousness does not properly descend into the womb.
Also, if consciousness, after its descent, were to slip out, name-
and-form will not reach the state of a this-ness. So much so that,
even after one's birth as a boy or girl, if consciousness gets cut off
in some way or other, name-and-form will not reach growth and
maturity. So from all this, it is clear that consciousness is an
essential condition for there to be name-and-form. Then the
Buddha introduces the fourth step:
Vi¤¤àõaü va hi, ânanda, nàmaråpe patiñthaü na labhissatha,
api no kho àyatiü jàtijaràmaraõaü dukkhasamudayasambhavo
pa¤¤àyetha? ßIf, ânanda, consciousness were not to find a
footing, or get established in, name-and-form, would there be an
arising or origin of birth, decay, death and suffering in the future?û
ßNo indeed, Lord,û says Venerable ânanda.
Now this fourth point is extremely important. What it implies is
that, though the aforesaid is the normal state of affairs in saüsàra,
if for some reason or other consciousness does not get established
on name-and-form, if at all such a contrivance were possible, there
will not be any saüsàric suffering again. And this position, too,
Venerable ânanda grants.
So from this discussion, too, it is obvious that, simply because
there is a reference to a mother's womb in it, we cannot conclude
that ignorance and preparations are past causes. It only highlights
the mutual relationship between consciousness and name-and-
form.
Now the question that comes up next is: ßHow does conscious-
ness not get established on name-and-form? In what respects does
it not get established, and how?û
The consciousness of a saüsàric individual is always an estab-
lished consciousness. It is in the nature of this consciousness to
find a footing on name-and-form. These two go together. That is
why in the Sampasàdanãyasutta of the Dãgha Nikàya it is men-
tioned in the discussion on the attainments to vision, das-
sanasamàpatti, that a person with such an attainment sees a man's
stream of consciousness that is not cut off on either side, estab-
lished in this world and in the next: Purisassa ca vi¤¤àõasotaü
pajànàti, ubhayato abbocchinnaü idha loke patiññhita¤ca para
loke patiññhita¤ca.29 What is implied here is the established nature
of consciousness. The consciousness of a saüsàric individual is
established both in this world and in the next.
Another attainment of vision, mentioned in the sutta, concerns
the seeing of a man's stream of consciousness not cut off on either
side, and not established in this world or in the next. And that is a
reference to the consciousness of an arahant. So an arahant's
consciousness is an unestablished consciousness, whereas the
consciousness of the saüsàric individual is an established con-
sciousness.
That is precisely why in the Sagàthavagga of the Saüyutta
Nikàya and in the Sàratthapakàsinã, where the episode of
Venerable Godhika's suicide is mentioned, it is said that, though
he cut his own neck intending to commit suicide, he was able to
attain parinibbàna as an arahant by radically attending to the
deadly pain.30 But Màra took him to be an ordinary person and
hovered around in search of his consciousness Ý in vain. The
Buddha, on the other hand, declared that Venerable Godhika
passed away with an unestablished consciousness:
29 D III 105, Sampasàdanãyasutta.

30 Spk I 183 commenting on S I 121.
Appatiññhitena ca, bhikkhave, vi¤¤àõena Godhiko kulaputto

parinibbuto.31 ßO! monks, the clansman Godhika passed away
with an unestablished consciousness.û
The consciousness of an ordinary saüsàric individual is always
established. The above mentioned relationship is always there. Be
cause of this we can say that there is always a knot in the con-
sciousness of the saüsàric individual. For him, this world and the
next world are tied together in a knot. In this case, what is needed,
is only the untying of the knot. There is no need of a fresh tying
up, as the knot is already there.
But the term pañisandhi vi¤¤àõa, or rebirth-linking-
consciousness, is now so widely used that we cannot help making
use of it, even in relating a Jàtaka story. The idea is that, after the
death-consciousness, there occurs a rebirth-linking-consciousness.
However, some scholars even raise the question, why a term
considered so important is not to be found in the discourses. On
many an occasion the Buddha speaks about the descent into a
womb. But apart from using such terms as okkanti,32 descent,
gabbhassa avakkanti,33 descent into a womb, and uppatti,34 arising,
he does not seem to have used the term pañisandhi.
What is meant by this term pañisandhi? It seems to imply a
tying up of two existences. After death there is a `relinking.' We
have mentioned above, in connection with the simile of the
bundles of reeds that, when the consciousness bundle of reeds is
drawn, the name-and-form bundle of reeds falls. And when the
name-and-form bundle of reeds is drawn, the consciousness
bundle of reeds falls. And that there is a relationship of mutuality
condition between them.
31 S I 122, Godhikasutta.
32 D II 305, M I 50, M I 62, M III 249, S II 3.
33 M II 156, Ghoñamukhasutta.
34 A II 133, Saüyojanasutta.
The question, then, is why a tying up is brought in, while grant-

ing the relationship by mutuality condition. Because, going by the
same simile, it would be tantamount to saying that rebirth-linking-
consciousness straightens up when death-consciousness falls, as if,
when one bundle of reeds is drawn, the other straightens up. This
contradicts the nature of mutuality condition. There is no timeless-
ness here. Therefore pañisandhi is a term that needs critical
scrutiny.
The mental continuum of a saüsàric being is always knotted
with a tangle within and a tangle without.35 And it is already
implicit in the relationship between consciousness and name-and-
form. What happens at the dying moment is usually posed as a
deep problem. But if we carefully examine the situation in the
light of Canonical discourses, we could see here an illustration of
the law of dependent arising itself.
Now as far as this established consciousness and the unestab-
lished consciousness are concerned, we have already drawn
attention to the relationship between a `here' and a `there.' We
came across the term itthatta, otherwise called itthabhàva. As a
rendering for it, we have used the term `this-ness.' And then we
have already pointed out that this itthabhàva, or this-ness, goes
hand in hand with a¤¤atthàbhàva, or otherwise-ness. That is to
say, wherever a this-ness arises, wherever a concept of a some-
thing arises, as a rule that itself is the setting in of transformation
or change.
This-ness and otherwise-ness are therefore to be found in a pair-
wise combination. Wherever there is a this-ness, there itself is an
otherwise-ness. So in this way, because of the fact that, due to this
this-ness itself, wherever this-ness arises, otherwise-ness arises,
together with it, wherever there is a `there,' there is always a
`here.' This, then, is how the consciousness of the saüsàric being
functions.
35 S I 13, Jañàsutta, see sermon 1.

As far as one's everyday life is concerned, what is called the

conscious body, is the body with consciousness. Generally we
regard this body as something really our own. Not only that, we
can also objectify things outside us, beyond our range of vision,
things that are objects of thought or are imagined. That is what is
meant by the Canonical phrase:
Imasmi¤ca savi¤¤àõake kàye bahiddhà ca sabbanimittesu
ahaükàra mamaükàra mànànusayà na honti.36 ßThere are no
latencies to conceit by way of I-making and mine-making regard-
ing this conscious body and all outside signs.û
What it implies, is that one can have latencies to conceit by way
of I-making and mine-making regarding this conscious body as
well as all outside signs. Now, if we consider the deeper implica-
tions of this statement, we can get at some new perspective for
understanding the nature of the relationship between conscious-
ness and name-and-form.
If someone, deeply attached to a person who is not near him,
but living somewhere far far away, is heavily immersed in some
deep thought, then, even if there is some painful contact, such as
the prick of a fly, or the bite of a mosquito, or even if another
comes and shakes him by the shoulder, he might not feel it,
because he is so immersed in the thought.
Now, why is that? Normally, the rightful place for conscious-
ness is this body. But what has happened now, is that it has gone
away temporarily and united with the name-and-form out side,
with that object far away. But it can be awakened. This is the way
the mind travels.
It is due to a lack of clear understanding about the journey of
the mind, that the concept of a relinking-consciousness was found
to be necessary. The way the mind travels is quite different from
the way the body travels. The journey of the body is a case of
leaving one place to go to another. But the mind's journey is not
36 M III 18, MahàPuõõamasutta.

like that. It is a sort of whirling or turning round, as in the case of a

whirlpool or a vortex.
That is to say, just as in the case of a rubber-band which could
be stretched lengthwise or crosswise, there is a certain whirling
round going on between consciousness and name-and-form. It is
because of that whirling motion, which could either be circular or
oval shaped, that consciousness and name-and-form could either
get drawn apart, or drawn in, as they go round and round in a kind
of vortical interplay.
So in a situation like the one mentioned above, for that person,
the distant has become near. At the start, when he fell to thinking,
it was a `there' for him. Then it became a `here.' And the here
became a `there.' This brings out, in a subtle way, the relevance of
these concepts to the question of understanding such teachings as
the law of dependent arising.
Concepts of a here and a there are in a way relative. They pre-
suppose each other. Itthabhàva, this-ness, and a¤¤athàbhàva,
otherwise-ness, referred to above, mean the same thing. Itthabhàva
goes hand in hand with a¤¤athàbhàva. They are bound in a pair-
wise combination. When you drag in one, the other follows of
necessity. It is the same in the case of the relationship between
birth on the one hand, and decay-and-death on the other, as already
mentioned.
Also, consciousness and name-and-form always move in an
orbit. It is not something like the journey of the body. Thought
goes, but it rests on consciousness, it gravitates towards con-
sciousness. It is because consciousness also has gone there that we
say someone is ìmmersed' or èngrossed' in some thought. It is
consciousness that carries more weight.
This is sufficiently clear even from the Dhamma discussion of
the Buddha, quoted above. If consciousness does not descend into
a mother's womb, name-and-form will not remain there. If
consciousness does not join in to provide the opportunity, it will
not grow. This is the nature of the relationship between them.
Though not well authenticated, cases have been reported of
persons, on the verge of death, going through such unusual
experiences as visualizing their own body from some outside

standpoint. Taking into consideration the above mentioned
relationship, this is quite understandable. That external standpoint
might not be a place which has the ability to sustain that con-
sciousness, or which is capable of creating a new body out of the
four primary elements. All the same, it temporarily escapes and
goes there and is now wavering to decide, whether or not to come
back to the body, as it were. It is on such occasions that one
visualizes one's own body from outside.
So here we have the norm of the mind's behaviour. Seen in this
way, there is no need for a fresh tying up, or relinking, because it
is the same vortex that is going on all the time. In the context of
this saüsàric vortex, the `there' becomes a `here,' and a `here'
becomes a `there.' The distant becomes a near, and a near becomes
a distant.
It is owing to this state of affairs that the consciousness of the
saüsàric individual is said to be always established. There is a
certain twin character about it. Whenever consciousness leaves
this body for good, it goes and rests on a name-and-form object
which it had already taken up. In other words, this is why the
Buddha did not find it necessary to coin a new term to express the
idea of conception in some mother's womb.
Consciousness has as its object name-and-form. It is precisely
because of consciousness that one can speak of it as a name-and-
form. It is like the shadow that falls on consciousness. Name-and-
form is like an image.
Now in taking a photograph, there is a similar turn of events.
Even if one does not pose for the photograph with so much make-
up, even if one turns one's back to the camera, at least a shade of
his shape will be photographed as an image, if not his form.
Similarly, in the case of the saüsàric individual, even if he does
not entertain an intention or thought construct, if he has at least the
latency, anusaya, that is enough for him to be reborn in some form
of existence or other.
That is why the Buddha has preached such an important dis-

course as the Cetanàsutta of the Nidàna Saüyutta in the Saüyutta
Nikàya. It runs:
Ya¤ca, bhikkhave, ceteti ya¤ca pakappeti ya¤ca anuseti,

àrammaõam etaü hoti vi¤¤àõassa ñhitiyà. ârammaõe sati
patiññhà vi¤¤àõassa hoti. Tasmiü patiññhite vi¤¤àõe
viråëhe nàmaråpassa avakkanti hoti. Nàmaråpapaccayà
saëàyatanaü, saëàyatanapaccayà phasso, phassapaccayà
vedanà, vedanàpaccayà taõhà, taõhàpaccayà upàdànaü,
upàdànapaccayà bhavo, bhavapaccayà jàti, jàtipaccayà
jaràmaraõaü sokaparidevadukkhadomanassåpàyàsà
sambhavanti. Evametassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa
samudayo hoti.37
ßMonks, whatever one intends, whatever one mentally

constructs, whatever lies latent, that becomes an object for
the stationing of consciousness. There being an object,
there comes to be an establishment of consciousness.
When that consciousness is established and grown, there is
the descent of name-and-form. Dependent on name-and-
form the six sense-bases come to be; dependent on the six
sense-bases arises contact; and dependent on contact arises
feeling; dependent on feeling, craving; dependent on crav-
ing, grasping; dependent on grasping, becoming; depend-
ent on becoming, birth; dependent on birth, decay-and-
death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair come to
be. Such is the arising of this entire mass of suffering.û
Then comes the second instance:
37 II 66, Cetanàsutta.
No ce, bhikkhave, ceteti no ce pakappeti, atha ce anuseti,

àrammaõam etaü hoti vi¤¤àõassa ñhitiyà. ârammaõe sati
patiññhà vi¤¤àõassa hoti. Tasmiü patiññhite vi¤¤àõe
viråëhe nàmaråpassa avakkanti hoti. Nàmaråpapaccayà
saëàyatanaü, saëàyatanapaccayà phasso, phassapaccayà
samudayo hoti.
ßMonks, even if one does not intend or construct mentally,

but has a latency, that becomes an object for the stationing
of consciousness. There being an object, there comes to be
the establishment of consciousness. When that conscious-
ness is established and grown, there is the descent of
name-and-form. Dependent on name-and-form the six
sense-bases come to be; dependent on the six sense-bases
arises contact; and dependent on contact, feeling; depend-
ent on feeling, craving; dependent on craving, grasping;
dependent on grasping, becoming; dependent on becom-
ing, birth; dependent on birth, decay-and-death, sorrow,
lamentation, pain, grief and despair come to be. Such is
the arising of this entire mass of suffering.û
The significance of this second paragraph is that it speaks of a

person who, at the time of death, has no intentions or thought
constructs as such. But he has the latency. This itself is sufficient
as an object for the stationing of consciousness. It is as if he has
turned his back to the camera, but got photographed all the same,
due to his very presence there. Now comes the third instance:
Yato ca kho, bhikkhave, no ceva ceteti no ca pakappeti no

ca anuseti, àrammaõam etaü na hoti vi¤¤àõassa ñhitiyà.
ârammaõe asati patiñthà vi¤¤àõassa na hoti. Tadappatiñ-
ñhite vi¤¤àõe aviråëhe nàmaråpassa avakkanti na hoti.
Nàmaråpanirodhà saëàyatananirodho, saëàyatananirodhà

phassanirodho, phassanirodhà vedanànirodho, vedanà-
nirodhà taõhànirodho, taõhànirodhà upàdànanirodho,
upàdànanirodhà bhavanirodho, bhavanirodhà jàtinirod-
ho, jàtinirodhà jaràmaraõaü sokaparidevadukkha-
domanassåpàyàsà nirujjhanti. Evametassa kevalassa duk-
khakkhandhassa nirodho hoti.
ßBut, monks, when one neither intends, nor constructs

mentally, and has no latency either, then there is not that
object for the stationing of consciousness. There being no
object, there is no establishment of consciousness. When
consciousness is not established and not grown up, there is
no descent of name-and-form, and with the cessation of
name-and-form, there comes to be the cessation of the six
sense-bases; with the cessation of the six sense-bases, the
cessation of contact; with the cessation of contact, the ces-
sation of feeling; with the cessation of feeling, the cessa-
tion of craving; with the cessation of craving, the cessation
of grasping; with the cessation of grasping, the cessation
of becoming; with the cessation of becoming, the cessa-
tion of birth; with the cessation of birth, the cessation of
decay-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and des-
pair come to cease. Thus is the cessation of this entire
mass of suffering.û
This third instance is the most significant. In the first instance,

there were the intentions, thought constructs and latency. In the
second instance, that person had no intentions or thought con-
structs, but only latency was there. In this third instances, there is
neither an intention, nor a thought construct, and not even a
latency.
It is then that there comes to be no object for the stationing of
consciousness. There being no object, there is no establishment of
consciousness, and when consciousness is unestablished and not
grown, there is no descent of name-and-form. Where there is no
descent of name-and-form, there at last comes to be that cessation

of name-and-form with which the six sense-bases, and all the rest
of it, down to the entire mass of saüsàric suffering, cease alto-
gether then and there.
Nibbàna Sermon 4



Towards the end of the last sermon, we were trying to explain
how the process of the saüsàric journey of beings could be
understood even with the couple of terms itthabhàva and
a¤¤atthàbhàva, or this-ness and otherwise-ness.2 On an earlier
occasion, we happened to quote the following verse in the Sutta
Nipàta:
Taõhà dutiyo puriso,

dãghamaddhàna saüsàraü,
saüsàraü nàtivattati.3
1 M I 436, Mahàmàlunkyasutta.
2 See sermon 3.
3 Sn 740, Dvayatànupassanàsutta; (see sermon 2, footnote 22).
99
It means: ßThe man with craving as his second,û (or às his
companion,') ßfaring on for a long time in saüsàra, does not
transcend the round, which is of the nature of a this-ness and an
otherwise-ness.û
This is further proof that the two terms imply a circuit. It is a
circuit between a `here' and a `there,' or a `this-ness' and an
òtherwise-ness.' It is a turning round, an alternation or a circui-
tous journey. It is like a rotation on the spot. It is an ambivalence
between a here and a there.
It is the relationship between this this-ness and otherwise-ness
that we tried to illustrate with quotations from the suttas. We
mentioned in particular that consciousness, when it leaves this
body and gets well established on a preconceived object, which in
fact is its name-and-form object, that name-and-form attains
growth and maturity there itself.4 Obviously, therefore, name-and-
form is a necessary condition for the sustenance and growth of
consciousness in a mother's womb.
It should be clearly understood that the passage of conscious-
ness from here to a mother's womb is not a movement from one
place to another, as in the case of the body. In reality, it is only a
difference of point of view, and not a transmigration of a soul. In
other words, when consciousness leaves this body and comes to
stay in a mother's womb, when it is fully established there, `that'
place becomes a `this' place. From the point of view of that
consciousness, the `there' becomes a `here.' Consequently, from
the new point of view, what was earlier a `here,' becomes a
`there.' What was formerly `that place' has now become `this
place' and vice versa. That way, what actually is involved here, is
a change of point of view. So it does not mean completely leaving
one place and going to another, as is usually meant by the journey
of an individual.
4 See sermon 3.
The process, then, is a sort of going round and round. This is all
the more clear by the Buddha's statement that even consciousness
is dependently arisen. There are instances in which the view that
this selfsame consciousness fares on in saüsàra by itself, tadevi-
daü vi¤¤àõaü sandhàvati saüsarati, ana¤¤aü, is refuted as a
wrong view.5
On the one hand, for the sustenance and growth of name-and-
form in a mother's womb, consciousness is necessary. On the
other hand, consciousness necessarily requires an object for its
stability. It could be sometimes an intention, or else a thought
construct. In the least, it needs a trace of latency, or anusaya. This
fact is clear enough from the sutta quotations we brought up
towards the end of the previous sermon. From the Cetanàsutta, we
happened to quote on an earlier occasion, it is obvious that at least
a trace of latency is necessary for the sustenance of conscious-
ness.6
When consciousness gets established in a mother's womb, with
this condition in the least, name-and-form begins to grow. It
grows, at it were, with a flush of branches, in the form of the six
sense bases, to produce a fresh tree of suffering. It is this idea that
is voiced by the following well known verse in the Dhammapada:
Yathàpi måle anupaddave daëhe

chinno pi rukkho punareva råhati
evam pi taõhànusaye anåhate
nibbattati dukkham idaü punappunaü.7
ßJust as a tree, so long as its root is unharmed and firm,

Though once cut down, will none the less grow up
again,
5 M I 256, Mahàtaõhàsaïkhayasutta.
6 See sermon 3.
7 Dhp 338, Taõhàvagga.
Even so, when craving's latency is not yet rooted out,

This suffering gets reborn again and again.û
It is clear from this verse too that the latency to craving holds a
very significant place in the context of the saüsàric journey of a
being. In the Aïguttara Nikàya one comes across the following
statement by the Buddha: Kammaü khettaü, vi¤¤àõaü bãjaü,
taõhà sineho.8 ßKamma is the field, consciousness is the seed,
craving is the moisture.û This, in effect, means that consciousness
grows in the field of kamma with craving as the moisture.
It is in accordance with this idea and in the context of this par-
ticular simile that we have to interpret the reply of Selà Therã to a
question raised by Màra. In the Sagàtha Vagga of the Saüyutta
Nikàya one comes across the following riddle put by Màra to the
arahant nun Selà:
Ken'idaü pakataü bimbaü,

ko nu bimbassa kàrako,
kvannu bimbaü samuppannaü,
kvannu bimbaü nirujjhati?9
ßBy whom was this image wrought,

Who is the maker of this image,
Where has this image arisen,
And where does the image cease?û
The image meant here is one's body, or one's outward appearance

which, for the conventional world, is name-and-form. Selà Therã
gives her answer in three verses:
Nayidaü attakataü bimbaü,

nayidaü parakataü aghaü,
8 A I 223, Pañhamabhavasutta.
9 S I 134, Selàsutta.
hetuü pañicca sambhåtaü,

hetubhaïgà nirujjhati.
Yathà a¤¤ataraü bãjaü,

khette vuttaü viråhati,
pathavãrasa¤càgamma,
sineha¤ca tadåbhayaü.
Evaü khandhà ca dhàtuyo,

cha ca àyatanà ime,
hetuü pañicca sambhåtà,
hetubhaïgà nirujjhare.
ßNeither self-wrought is this image,

Nor yet other-wrought is this misery,
By reason of a cause, it came to be,
By breaking up the cause, it ceases to be.
ßJust as in the case of a certain seed,

Which when sown on the field would feed
On the taste of the earth and moisture,
And by these two would grow.
ßEven so, all these aggregates

Elements and bases six,
By reason of a cause have come to be,
By breaking up the cause will cease to be.û
The first verse negates the idea of creation and expresses the
conditionally arisen nature of this body. The simile given in the
second verse illustrates this law of dependent arising. It may be
pointed out that this simile is not one chosen at random. It echoes
the idea behind the Buddha's statement already quoted, kammaü
khettaü, vi¤¤àõaü bãjaü, taõhà sineho. Kamma is the field,
consciousness the seed, and craving the moisture.
Here the venerable Therã is replying from the point of view of
Dhamma, which takes into account the mental aspect as well. It is
not simply the outward visible image, as commonly understood by

nàma-råpa, but that image which falls on consciousness as its
object. The reason for the arising and growth of nàma-råpa is
therefore the seed of consciousness. That consciousness seed
grows in the field of kamma, with craving as the moisture. The
outgrowth is in terms of aggregates, elements and bases. The
cessation of consciousness is none other than Nibbàna.
Some seem to think that the cessation of consciousness occurs
in an arahant only at the moment of his parinibbàna, at the end of
his lifespan. But this is not the case. Very often, the deeper
meanings of important suttas have been obliterated by the tenden-
cy to interpret the references to consciousness in such contexts as
the final occurrence of consciousness in an arahant's life Ý
carimaka vi¤¤àõa.10
What is called the cessation of consciousness has a deeper sense
here. It means the cessation of the specifically prepared con-
sciousness, abhisaïkhata vi¤¤àõa. An arahant's experience of the
cessation of consciousness is at the same time the experience of
the cessation of name-and-form. Therefore, we can attribute a
deeper significance to the above verses.
In support of this interpretation, we can quote the following
verse in the Munisutta of the Sutta Nipàta:
Saïkhàya vatthåni pamàya bãjaü,

sineham assa nànuppavecche,
sa ve munã jàtikhayantadassã,
takkaü pahàya na upeti saïkhaü.11
ßHaving surveyed the field and measured the seed,

He waters it not for moisture,
That sage in full view of birth's end,
Lets go of logic and comes not within reckoning.û
10 E.g. at Sv-pñ I 513.
11 Sn 209, Munisutta.
By virtue of his masterly knowledge of the fields and his estimate

of the seed of consciousness, he does not moisten it with craving.
Thereby he sees the end of birth and transcends logic and worldly
convention. This too shows that the deeper implications of the
MahàNidànasutta, concerning the descent of consciousness into
the mother's womb, have not been sufficiently appreciated so far.
Anusaya, or latency, is a word of special significance. What is
responsible for rebirth, or punabbhava, is craving, which very
often has the epithet ponobhavikà attached to it. The latency to
craving is particularly instrumental in giving one yet another birth
to fare on in saüsàra. There is also a tendency to ignorance, which
forms the basis of the latency to craving. It is the tendency to get
attached to worldly concepts, without understanding them for what
they are. That tendency is a result of ignorance in the worldlings
and it is in itself a latency. In the sutta terminology the word
nissaya is often used to denote it. The cognate word nissita is also
used alongside. It means òne who associates something,' while
nissaya means àssociation.'
As a matter of fact, here it does not have the same sense as the
word has in its common usage. It goes deeper, to convey the idea
of `leaning on' something. Leaning on is also a form of associa-
tion. Worldlings have a tendency to tenaciously grasp the concepts
in worldly usage, to cling to them dogmatically and lean on them.
They believe that the words they use have a reality of their own,
that they are categorically true in their own right. Their attitude
towards concepts is tinctured by craving, conceit and views.
We come across this word nissita in quite a number of im-
portant suttas. It almost sounds like a topic of meditation. In the
Channovàdasutta of the Majjhima Nikàya there is a cryptic
passage, which at a glance looks more or less like a riddle:
Nissitassa calitaü, anissitassa calitaü natthi. Calite asati

passaddhi, passaddhiyà sati nati na hoti, natiyà asati
àgatigati na hoti, àgatigatiyà asati cutåpapàto na hoti,
cutåpapàte asati nev'idha na huraü na ubhayamantare.

Es' ev' anto dukhassa.12
ßTo the one attached, there is wavering. To the unattached

one, there is no wavering. When there is no wavering,
there is calm. When there is calm, there is no inclination.
When there is no inclination, there is no coming and go-
ing. When there is no coming and going, there is no death
and birth. When there is no death and birth, there is neither
a `here' nor a `there' nor a `between the two.' This itself is
the end of suffering.û
It looks as if the ending of suffering is easy enough. On the face of

it, the passage seems to convey this much. To the one who leans
on something, there is wavering or movement. He is perturbable.
Though the first sentence speaks about the one attached, the rest of
the passage is about the unattached one. That is to say, the one
released. So here we see the distinction between the two. The one
attached is movable, whereas the unattached one is not. When
there is no wavering or perturbation, there is calm. When there is
calm, there is no inclination. The word nati usually means `bend-
ing.' So when there is calm, there is no bending or inclination.
When there is no bending or inclination, there is no coming and
going. When there is no coming and going, there is no passing
away or reappearing. When there is neither a passing away nor a
reappearing, there is neither a `here,' nor a `there,' nor any
position in between. This itself is the end of suffering.
The sutta passage, at a glance, appears like a jumble of words. It
starts by saying something about the one attached, nissita. It is
limited to just one sentence: `To one attached, there is wavering.'
But we can infer that, due to his wavering and unsteadiness or
restlessness, there is inclination, nati. The key word of the passage
12 M III 266, Channovàdasutta.

is nati. Because of that inclination or bent, there is a coming and

going. Given the twin concept of coming and going, there is the
dichotomy between passing away and reappearing, cuti/uppatti.
When these two are there, the two concepts `here' and `there' also
come in. And there is a `between the two' as well. Wherever there
are two ends, there is also a middle. So it seems that in this
particular context the word nati has a special significance.
The person who is attached is quite unlike the released person.
Because he is not released, he always has a forward bent or
inclination. In fact, this is the nature of craving. It bends one
forward. In some suttas dealing with the question of rebirth, such
as the Kutåhalasàlàsutta, craving itself is sometimes called the
grasping, upàdàna.13 So it is due to this very inclination or bent
that the two concepts of coming and going, come in. Then, in
accordance with them, the two concepts of passing away and
reappearing, fall into place.
The idea of a journey, when viewed in the context of saüsàra,
gives rise to the idea of passing away and reappearing. Going and
coming are similar to passing away and reappearing. So then, there
is the implication of two places, all this indicates an attachment.
There is a certain dichotomy about the terms here and there, and
passing away and reappearing. Due to that dichotomous nature of
the concepts, which beings tenaciously hold on to, the journeying
in saüsàra takes place in accordance with craving. As we have
mentioned above, an alternation or transition occurs.
As for the released person, about whom the passage is specially
concerned, his mind is free from all those conditions. To the
unattached, there is no wavering. Since he has no wavering or
unsteadiness, he has no inclination. As he has no inclination, there
is no coming and going for him. As there is no coming and going,
he has no passing away or reappearing. There being no passing
13 S IV 400, Kuthåhalasàlàsutta: `taõhupàdàna.'

away or reappearing, there is neither a here, nor a there, nor any in

between. That itself is the end of suffering.
The Udàna version of the above passage has something signifi-
cant about it. There the entire sutta consists of these few sentences.
But the introductory part of it says that the Buddha was instruct-
ing, inciting and gladdening the monks with a Dhamma talk
connected with Nibbàna: Tena kho pana samayena Bhagavà
bhikkhå nibbànapañisaüyuttàya dhammiyà kathàya sandasseti
samàdapeti samuttejeti sampahaüseti.14 This is a pointer to the
fact that this sermon is on Nibbàna. So the implication is that in
Nibbàna the arahant's mind is free from any attachments.
There is a discourse in the Nidàna section of the Saüyutta
Nikàya, which affords us a deeper insight into the meaning of the
word nissaya. It is the Kaccàyanagottasutta, which is also signifi-
cant for its deeper analysis of right view. This is how the Buddha
introduces the sermon:
Dvayanissito khvàyaü, Kaccàyana, loko yebhuyyena: at-

thita¤ceva natthita¤ca. Lokasamudayaü kho, Kaccàyana,
yathàbhåtaü sammappa¤¤àya passato yà loke natthità sà
na hoti. Lokanirodhaü kho, Kaccàyana, yathàbhåtaü
sammappa¤¤àya passato yà loke atthità sà na hoti.15
ßThis world, Kaccàyana, for the most part, bases its views
on two things: on existence and non-existence. Now,
Kaccàyana, to one who with right wisdom sees the arising
of the world as it is, the view of non-existence regarding
the world does not occur. And to one who with right wis-
dom sees the cessation of the world as it really is, the view
of existence regarding the world does not occur.û
14 Ud 81, Catutthanibbànapañisaüyuttasutta.
15 S II 17, Kaccàyanagottasutta.
The Buddha comes out with this discourse in answer to the

following question raised by the brahmin Kaccàyana: Sammà
diññhi, sammà diññhã'ti, bhante, vuccati. Kittàvatà nu kho, bhante,
sammà diññhi hoti? ßLord, `right view,' `right view,' they say. But
how far, Lord, is there `right view?'û
In his answer, the Buddha first points out that the worldlings
mostly base themselves on a duality, the two conflicting views of
existence and non-existence, or ìs' and ìs not.' They would either
hold on to the dogmatic view of eternalism, or would cling to
nihilism. Now as to the right view of the noble disciple, it takes
into account the process of arising as well as the process of
cessation, and thereby avoids both extremes. This is the insight
that illuminates the middle path.
Then the Buddha goes on to give a more detailed explanation of
right view:
Upayupàdànàbhinivesavinibandho khvàyaü, Kaccàyana,

loko yebhuyyena. Ta¤càyaü upayupàdànaü cetaso
adhiññhànaü abhinivesànusayaü na upeti na upàdiyati
nàdhiññhàti: àttà me'ti. `Dukkham eva uppajjamànaü up-
pajjati, dukkhaü nirujjhamànaü nirujjhatã'ti na kaïkhati
na vicikicchati aparapaccayà ¤àõam ev' assa ettha hoti.
Ettàvatà kho, Kaccàyana, sammà diññhi hoti.
ßThe world, Kaccàyana, for the most part, is given to ap-

proaching, grasping, entering into and getting entangled as
regards views. Whoever does not approach, grasp, and
take his stand upon that proclivity towards approaching
and grasping, that mental standpoint, namely the idea:
`This is my soul,' he knows that what arises is just suffer-
ing and what ceases is just suffering. Thus, he is not in
doubt, is not perplexed, and herein he has the knowledge
that is not dependent on another. Thus far, Kaccàyana, he
has right view.û
The passage starts with a string of terms which has a deep philo-
sophical significance. Upaya means àpproaching,' upàdàna is
`grasping,' abhinivesa is èntering into,' and vinibandha is the
consequent entanglement. The implication is that the worldling is
prone to dogmatic involvement in concepts through the stages
mentioned above in an ascending order.
The attitude of the noble disciple is then outlined in contrast to
the above dogmatic approach, and what follows after it. As for
him, he does not approach, grasp, or take up the standpoint of a
self. The word anusaya, latency or `lying dormant,' is also brought
in here to show that even the proclivity towards such a dogmatic
involvement with a soul or self, is not there in the noble disciple.
But what, then, is his point of view? What arises and ceases is
nothing but suffering. There is no soul or self to lose, it is only a
question of arising and ceasing of suffering. This, then, is the right
view.
Thereafter the Buddha summarizes the discourse and brings it to
a climax with an impressive declaration of his via media, the
middle path based on the formula of dependent arising:
`Sabbam atthã'ti kho, Kaccàyana, ayam eko anto. `Sab-

baü natthã'ti ayaü dutiyo anto. Ete te, Kaccàyana, ubho
ante anupagamma majjhena Tathàgato Dhammaü deseti:
Avijjàpaccayà saïkhàrà, saïkhàrapaccayà vi¤¤àõaü,

vi¤¤àõapaccayà nàmaråpaü, nàmaråpapaccayà saëà-
yatanaü, saëàyatanapaccayà phasso, phassapaccayà
samudayo hoti.
Avijjàya tveva asesaviràganirodhà saïkhàranirodho,

saïkharanirodhà vi¤¤àõanirodho, vi¤¤àõanirodhà
nàmaråpanirodho, nàmaråpanirodhà saëàyatananirodho,
saëàyatananirodhà phassanirodho, phassanirodhà veda-

nànirodho, vedanànirodhà taõhànirodho, taõhànirodhà
upàdànanirodho, upàdànanirodhà bhavanirodho, bha-
vanirodhà jàtinirodho, jàtinirodhà jaràmaraõaü sokapa-
ridevadukkhadomanassåpàyàsà nirujjhanti. Evametassa
kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa nirodho hoti.
ßÈverything exists,' Kaccàyana, is one extreme. `Nothing

exists' is the other extreme. Not approaching either of
those extremes, Kaccàyana, the Tathàgata teaches the
Dhamma by the middle way:
ßFrom ignorance as condition, preparations come to be;

from preparations as condition, consciousness comes to
be; from consciousness as condition, name-and-form
comes to be; from name-and-form as condition, the six
sense-bases come to be; from the six sense-bases as condi-
tion, contact comes to be; from contact as condition, feel-
ing comes to be; from feeling as condition, craving comes
to be; from craving as condition, grasping comes to be;
from grasping as condition, becoming comes to be; from
becoming as condition, birth comes to be; and from birth
as condition, decay-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain,
grief and despair come to be. Such is the arising of this en-
tire mass of suffering.
ßFrom the complete fading away and cessation of that

very ignorance, there comes to be the cessation of prepara-
tions; from the cessation of preparations, there comes to
be the cessation of consciousness; from the cessation of
consciousness, there comes to be the cessation of name-
and-form; from the cessation of name-and-form, there
comes to be the cessation of the six sense-bases; from the
cessation of the six sense-bases, there comes to be the ces-
sation of contact; from the cessation of contact, there
comes to be the cessation of feeling; from the cessation of
feeling, there comes to be the cessation of craving; from

the cessation of craving, there comes to be the cessation of
grasping; from the cessation of grasping, there comes to
be the cessation of becoming; from the cessation of be-
coming, there comes to be the cessation of birth; and from
the cessation of birth, there comes to be the cessation of
decay-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and
despair. Such is the cessation of this entire mass of
suffering.û
It is clear from this declaration that in this context the law of

dependent arising itself is called the middle path. Some prefer to
call this the Buddha's metaphysical middle path, as it avoids both
extremes of ìs' and ìs not.' The philosophical implications of the
above passage lead to the conclusion that the law of dependent
arising enshrines a certain pragmatic principle, which dissolves the
antinomian conflict in the world.
It is the insight into this principle that basically distinguishes the
noble disciple, who sums it up in the two words samudayo,
arising, and nirodho, ceasing. The arising and ceasing of the world
is for him a fact of experience, a knowledge. It is in this light that
we have to understand the phrase aparappaccayà ¤àõam ev'assa
ettha hoti, ßherein he has a knowledge that is not dependent on
another.û In other words, he is not believing in it out of faith in
someone, but has understood it experientially. The noble disciple
sees the arising and the cessation of the world through his own six
sense bases.
In the Saüyutta Nikàya there is a verse which presents this idea
in a striking manner:
Chasu loko samuppanno,

chasu kubbati santhavaü,
channam eva upàdàya,

chasu loko viha¤¤ati.16
ßIn the six the world arose,

In the six it holds concourse,
On the six themselves depending,
In the six it has its woes.û
The verse seems to say that the world has arisen in the six, that it
has associations in the six, and that depending on those very six,
the world comes to grief. Though the commentators advance an
interpretation of this six, it does not seem to get the sanction of the
sutta as it is. According to them, the first line speaks of the six
internal sense bases, such as the eye, ear and nose.17 The world is
said to arise in these six internal sense bases. The second line is
supposed to refer to the six external sense bases. Again the third
line is interpreted with reference to the six internal sense bases,
and the fourth line is said to refer to the six external sense bases. In
other words, the implication is that the world arises in the six
internal sense bases and associates with the six external sense
bases, and that it holds on to the six internal sense bases and
comes to grief in the six external sense bases.
This interpretation seems to miss the point. Even the grammar
does not allow it, for if it is a case of associating `with' the
external sense bases, the instrumental case would have been used
instead of the locative case, that is, chahi instead of chasu. On the
other hand, the locative chasu occurs in all the three lines in
question. This makes it implausible that the first two lines are
referring to two different groups of sixes. It is more plausible to
conclude that the reference is to the six sense bases of contact,
phassàyatana, which include both the internal and the external. In
16 S I 41, Lokasutta.
17 Spk I 96.
fact, at least two are necessary for something to be dependently

arisen. The world does not arise in the six internal bases in
isolation. It is precisely in this fact that the depth of this Dhamma
is to be seen.
In the Samudayasutta of the Saëàyatana section in the Saüyutta
Nikàya this aspect of dependent arising is clearly brought out:
Cakkhu¤ca pañicca råpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvi¤¤àõaü,

tiõõaü saïgati phasso, phassapaccayà vedanà, vedanà-
paccayà taõhà, taõhàpaccayà upàdànaü, upàdànapac-
cayà bhavo, bhavapaccayà jàti, jàtipaccayà jaràmaraõaü
sokaparidevadukkhadomanassåpàyàsà sambhavanti. Eva-
metassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.18
ßDependent on the eye and forms arises eye conscious-

ness; the coming together of the three is contact; with con-
tact as condition, arises feeling; conditioned by feeling,
craving; conditioned by craving, grasping; conditioned by
grasping, becoming; conditioned by becoming, birth; and
conditioned by birth, decay-and-death, sorrow, lamenta-
tion, pain, grief and despair. Thus is the arising of this en-
tire mass of suffering.û
Here the sutta starts with the arising of contact and branches off
towards the standard formula of pañicca samuppàda. Eye con-
sciousness arises dependent on, pañicca, two things, namely eye
and forms. And the concurrence of the three is contact. This shows
that two are necessary for a thing to be dependently arisen.
So in fairness to the sutta version, we have to conclude that the
reference in all the four lines is to the bases of contact, comprising
both the internal and the external. That is to say, we cannot
discriminate between them and assert that the first line refers to
18 S IV 86, Dukkhasutta.
one set of six, and the second line refers to another. We are forced
to such a conclusion in fairness to the sutta.
So from this verse also we can see that according to the usage of
the noble ones the world arises in the six sense bases. This fact is
quite often expressed by the phrase ariyassa vinaye loko, the world
in the noble one's discipline.19 According to this noble usage, the
world is always defined in terms of the six sense bases, as if the
world arises because of these six sense bases. This is a very deep
idea. All other teachings in this Dhamma will get obscured, if one
fails to understand this basic fact, namely how the concept of the
world is defined in this mode of noble usage.
This noble usage reveals to us the implications of the expression
udayatthagàminã pa¤¤à, the wisdom that sees the rise and fall.
About the noble disciple it is said that he is endowed with the
noble penetrative wisdom of seeing the rise and fall, udayat-
thagàminiyà pa¤¤àya sammanàgato ariyàya nibbhedikàya.20 The
implication is that this noble wisdom has a penetrative quality
about it. This penetration is through the rigidly grasped almost
impenetrable encrustation of the two dogmatic views in the world,
existence and non-existence.
Now, how does that penetration come about? As already stated
in the above quoted Kaccàyanasutta, when one sees the arising
aspect of the world, one finds it impossible to hold the view that
nothing exists in the world. His mind does not incline towards a
dogmatic involvement with that view. Similarly, when he sees the
cessation of the world through his own six sense bases, he sees no
possibility to go to the other extreme view in the world: Èvery-
thing exists.'
The most basic feature of this principle of dependent arising,
with its penetrative quality, is the breaking down of the power of
the above concepts. It is the very inability to grasp these views
19 S IV 95, Lokakàmaguõasutta.
20 E.g. at D III 237, Sangãtisutta.
dogmatically that is spoken of as the abandonment of the person-

ality view, sakkàyadiññhi. The ordinary worldling is under the
impression that things exist in truth and fact, but the noble disci-
ple, because of his insight into the norm of arising and cessation,
understands the arising and ceasing nature of concepts and their
essencelessness or insubstantiality.
Another aspect of the same thing, in addition to what has
already been said about nissaya, is the understanding of the
relatedness of this to that, idappaccayatà, implicit in the law of
dependent arising. In fact, we began our discussion by highlighting
the significance of the term idappaccayatà.21 The basic principle
involved, is itself often called pañicca samuppàda. ßThis being,
this comes to be, with the arising of this, this arises. This not
being, this does not come to be. With the cessation of this, this
ceases.û
This insight penetrates through those extreme views. It resolves
the conflict between them. But how? By removing the very
premise on which it rested, and that is that there are two things.
Though logicians might come out with the law of identity and the
like, according to right view, the very bifurcation itself is the
outcome of a wrong view. That is to say, this is only a conjoined
pair. In other words, it resolves that conflict by accepting the
worldly norm.
Now this is a point well worth considering. In the case of the
twelve links of the formula of dependent arising, discovered by the
Buddha, there is a relatedness of this to that, idappaccayatà. As
for instance already illustrated above by the two links birth and
decay-and-death.22 When birth is there, decay-and-death come to
be, with the arising of birth, decay-and-death arise (and so on).
The fact that this relatedness itself is the eternal law, is clearly
21 See sermon 1.
22 See sermon 3.
revealed by the following statement of the Buddha in the

Nidànasaüyutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya:
Avijjàpaccayà, bhikkhave, saïkhàrà. Ya tatra tathatà

avitathatà ana¤¤athatà idappaccayatà, ayaü vuccati,
bhikkhave, pañiccasamuppàdo.23
ßFrom ignorance as condition, preparations come to be.

That suchness therein, the invariability, the not-
otherwiseness, the relatedness of this to that, this, monks,
is called dependent arising.û
Here the first two links have been taken up to illustrate the
principle governing their direct relation. Now let us examine the
meaning of the terms used to express that relation. Tathà means
`such' or `thus,' and is suggestive of the term yathàbhåta-
¤àõadassana, the knowledge and vision of things as they are. The
correlatives yathà and tathà express between them the idea of
faithfulness to the nature of the world. So tathatà asserts the
validity of the law of dependent arising, as a norm in accordance
with nature. Avitathatà, with its double negative, reaffirms that
validity to the degree of invariability. Ana¤¤athatà, or not-
otherwiseness, makes it unchallengeable, as it were. It is a norm
beyond contradiction.
When a conjoined pair is accepted as such, there is no conflict
between the two. But since this idea can well appear as some sort
of a puzzle, we shall try to illustrate it with a simile. Suppose two
bulls, a black one and a white one, are bound together at the neck
and allowed to graze in the field as a pair. This is sometimes done
to prevent them from straying far afield. Now out of the pair, if the
white bull pulls towards the stream, while the black one is pulling
towards the field, there is a conflict. The conflict is not due to the
bondage, at least not necessarily due to the bondage. It is because

the two are pulling in two directions. Supposing the two bulls,
somehow, accept the fact that they are in bondage and behave
amicably. When then the white bull pulls towards the stream, the
black one keeps him company with equanimity, though he is not in
need of a drink. And when the black bull is grazing, the white bull
follows him along with equanimity, though he is not inclined to
eat.
Similarly, in this case too, the conflict is resolved by accepting
the pair-wise combination as a conjoined pair. That is how the
Buddha solved this problem. But still the point of this simile might
not be clear enough. So let us come back to the two links, birth
and decay-and-death, which we so often dragged in for purposes
of clarification. So long as one does not accept the fact that these
two links, birth and decay-and-death, are a conjoined pair, one
would see between them a conflict. Why? Because one grasps
birth as one end, and tries to remove the other end, which one does
not like, namely decay-and-death. One is trying to separate birth
from decay-and-death. But this happens to be a conjoined pair.
ßConditioned by birth, monks, is decay-and-death.û This is the
word of the Buddha. Birth and decay-and-death are related to each
other.
The word jarà, or decay, on analysis would make this clear.
Usually by jarà we mean old age. The word has connotations of
senility and decrepitude, but the word implies both growth and
decay, as it sets in from the moment of one's birth itself. Only,
there is a possible distinction according to the standpoint taken.
This question of a standpoint or a point of view is very important
at this juncture. This is something one should assimilate with a
meditative attention. Let us bring up a simile to make this clear.
Now, for instance, there could be a person who makes his living
by selling the leaves of a particular kind of tree. Suppose another
man sells the flowers of the same tree, to make his living. And yet
another sells the fruits, while a fourth sells the timber. If we line
them up and put to them the question, pointing to that tree: Ìs this
tree mature enough?,' we might sometimes get different answers.
Why? Each would voice his own commercial point of view

regarding the degree of maturity of the tree. For instance, one who
sells flowers would say that the tree is too old, if the flowering
stage of the tree is past.
Similarly, the concept of decay or old age can change according
to the standpoint taken up. From beginning to end, it is a process
of decay. But we create an artificial boundary between youth and
old age. This again shows that the two are a pair mutually con-
joined. Generally, the worldlings are engaged in an attempt to
separate the two in this conjoined pair. Before the Buddha came
into the scene, all religious teachers were trying to hold on to birth,
while rejecting decay-and-death. But it was a vain struggle. It is
like the attempt of the miserly millionaire Kosiya to eat rice-cakes
alone, to cite another simile.
According to that instructive story, the millionaire Kosiya, an
extreme miser, once developed a strong desire to eat rice-cakes.24
As he did not wish to share them with anyone else, he climbed up
to the topmost story of his mansion with his wife and got her to
cook rice-cakes for him. To teach him a lesson, Venerable
MahàMoggallàna, who excelled in psychic powers, went through
the air and appeared at the window as if he is on his alms round.
Kosiya, wishing to dismiss this intruder with a tiny rice-cake,
asked his wife to put a little bit of cake dough into the pan. She did
so, but it became a big rice-cake through the venerable Thera's
psychic power. Further attempts to make tinier rice-cakes ended
up in producing ever bigger and bigger ones. In the end, Kosiya
thought of dismissing the monk with just one cake, but to his utter
dismay, all the cakes got joined to each other to form a string of
cakes. The couple then started pulling this string of cakes in either
direction with all their might, to separate just one from it. But
without success. At last they decided to let go and give up, and
offered the entire string of cakes to the venerable Thera.
24 Dhp-a I 367.
The Buddha's solution to the above problem is a similar let go-

ism and giving up. It is a case of giving up all assets, sabbåpad-
hipañinissagga. You cannot separate these links from one another.
Birth and decay-and-death are intertwined. This is a conjoined
pair. So the solution here, is to let go. All those problems are due
to taking up a standpoint. Therefore the kind of view sanctioned in
this case, is one that leads to detachment and dispassion, one that
goes against the tendency to grasp and hold on. It is by grasping
and holding on that one comes into conflict with Màra.
Now going by the story of the millionaire Kosiya, one might
think that the Buddha was defeated by Màra. But the truth of the
matter is that it is Màra who suffered defeat by this sort of giving
up. It is a very subtle point. Màra's forte lies in seizing and
grabbing. He is always out to challenge. Sometimes he takes
delight in hiding himself to take one by surprise, to drive terror
and cause horripilation. So when Màra comes round to grab, if we
can find some means of foiling his attempt, or make it impossible
for him to grab, then Màra will have to accept defeat.
Now let us examine the Buddha's solution to this question.
There are in the world various means of preventing others from
grabbing something we possess. We can either hide our property
in an inaccessible place, or adopt security measures, or else we can
come to terms and sign a treaty with the enemy. But all these
measures can sometimes fail. However, there is one unfailing
method, which in principle is bound to succeed. A method that
prevents all possibilities of grabbing. And that is Ý letting go,
giving up. When one lets go, there is nothing to grab. In a tug-of-
war, when someone is pulling at one end with all his might, if the
other suddenly lets go of its hold, one can well imagine the extent
of the former's discomfiture, let alone victory. It was such a
discomfiture that fell to Màra's lot, when the Buddha applied this
extraordinary solution. All this goes to show the importance of
such terms as nissaya and idappaccayatà in understanding this
Dhamma.
We have already taken up the word nissaya for comment.
Another aspect of its significance is revealed by the Satipaññhàna-
sutta. Some parts of this sutta, though well known, are wonderful-
ly deep. There is a certain thematic paragraph, which occurs at the
end of each subsection in the Satipaññhànasutta. For instance, in
the section on the contemplation relating to body,
kàyànupasssanà, we find the following paragraph:
Iti ajjhattaü và kàye kàyànupassã viharati, bahiddhà và

kàye kàyànupassã viharati, ajjhattabahiddhà và kàye
kàyànupassã viharati; samudayadhammànupassã và
kàyasmiü viharati, vayadhammànupassã và kàyasmiü
viharati, samudayavayadhammànupassã và kàyasmiü
viharati; àtthi kàyo'ti và pan'assa sati paccupaññhità
hoti, yàvadeva ¤àõamattàya pañissatimattàya; anissito ca
viharati, na ca ki¤ci loke upàdiyati.25
ßIn this way he abides contemplating the body as a body

internally, or he abides contemplating the body as a body
externally, or he abides contemplating the body as a body
internally and externally. Or else he abides contemplating
the arising nature in the body, or he abides contemplating
the dissolving nature in the body, or he abides contemplat-
ing the arising and dissolving nature in the body. Or else
the mindfulness that `there is a body' is established in him
only to the extent necessary for just knowledge and further
mindfulness. And he abides independent and does not
cling to anything in the world.û
A similar paragraph occurs throughout the sutta under all the four
contemplations, body, feeling, mind and mind objects. As a matter
of fact, it is this paragraph that is called satipaññhàna bhàvanà, or
meditation on the foundation of mindfulness.26 The preamble to
25 M I 56, Satipaññhànasutta.
26 S V 183, Vibhaïgasutta.
this paragraph introduces the foundation itself, or the setting up of

mindfulness as such. The above paragraph, on the other hand,
deals with what pertains to insight. It is the field of insight proper.
If we examine this paragraph, here too we will find a set of
conjoined or twin terms:
ßIn this way he abides contemplating the body as a body inter-
nally, or he abides contemplating the body externally,û and then:
ßhe abides contemplating the body both internally and externally.û
Similarly: ßHe abides contemplating the arising nature in the body,
or he abides contemplating the dissolving nature in the body,û and
then: ßhe abides contemplating both the arising and dissolving
nature in the body.û
ßOr else the mindfulness that `there is a body' is established in
him only to the extent necessary for knowledge and remem-
brance.û This means that for the meditator even the idea `there is a
body,' that remembrance, is there just for the purpose of further
development of knowledge and mindfulness.
ßAnd he abides independent and does not cling to anything in
the world.û Here too, the word used is anissita, independent, or not
leaning towards anything. He does not cling to anything in the
world. The word nissaya says something more than grasping. It
means `leaning on' or àssociating.'
This particular thematic paragraph in the Satipaññhànasutta is of
paramount importance for insight meditation. Here, too, there is
the mention of internal, ajjhatta, and external, bahiddhà. When
one directs one's attention to one's own body and another's body
separately, one might sometimes take these two concepts, internal
and external, too seriously with a dogmatic attitude. One might
think that there is actually something that could be called one's
own or another's. But then the mode of attention next mentioned
unifies the two, as internal-external, ajjhattabahiddhà, and
presents them like the conjoined pair of bulls. And what does it
signify? These two are not to be viewed as two extremes, they are
related to each other.
Now let us go a little deeper into this interrelation. The farthest
limit of the internal is the nearest limit of the external. The farthest
limit of the external is the nearest limit of the internal. More

strictly rendered, ajjhatta means inward and bahiddhà means
outward. So here we have the duality of an inside and an outside.
One might think that the word ajjhattika refers to whatever is
organic. Nowadays many people take in artificial parts into their
bodies. But once acquired, they too become internal. That is why,
in this context ajjhattika has a deeper significance than its usual
rendering as òne's own.'
Whatever it may be, the farthest limit of the ajjhatta remains the
nearest limit of the bahiddhà. Whatever portion one demarcates as
one's own, just adjoining it and at its very gate is bahiddhà. And
from the point of view of bahiddhà, its farthest limit and at its
periphery is ajjhatta. This is a conjoined pair. These two are
interrelated. So the implication is that these two are not op posed
to each other. That is why, by attending to them both together, as
ajjhattabahiddhà, that dogmatic involvement with a view is
abandoned. Here we have an element of reconciliation, which
prevents adherence to a view. This is what fosters the attitude of
anissita, unattached.
So the two, ajjhatta and bahiddhà, are neighbours. Inside and
outside as concepts are neighbours to each other. It is the same as
in the case of arising and ceasing, mentioned above. This fact has
already been revealed to some extent by the Kaccàyanagottasutta.
Now if we go for an illustration, we have the word udaya at
hand in samudaya. Quite often this word is contrasted with
atthagama, going down, in the expression udayatthagaminã pa¤¤à,
the wisdom that sees the rise and fall. We can regard these two as
words borrowed from everyday life. Udaya means sunrise, and
atthagama is sunset. If we take this itself as an illustration, the
farthest limit of the forenoon is the nearest limit of the afternoon.
The farthest limit of the afternoon is the nearest limit of the
forenoon. And here again we see a case of neighbourhood. When
one understands the neighbourly nature of the terms udaya and
atthagama, or samudaya and vaya, and regards them as interrelat-
ed by the principle of idappaccayatà, one penetrates them both by
that mode of contemplating the rise and fall of the body together,
samudayavayadhammànupassã và kàyasmiü viharati, and devel-

ops a penetrative insight.
What comes next in the satipaññhàna passage, is the outcome or
net result of that insight. ßThe mindfulness that `there is a body' is
established in him only to the extent necessary for pure knowledge
and further mindfulness,û atthi kàyo'ti và pan'assa sati
pacupaññhità hoti, yàvadeva ¤àõamattàya pañissatimattàya. At that
moment one does not take even the concept of body seriously.
Even the mindfulness that `there is a body' is established in that
meditator only for the sake of yavadeva, clarity of knowledge and
accomplishment of mindfulness. The last sentence brings out the
net result of that way of developing insight: ßHe abides independ-
ent and does not cling to anything in the world.û
Not only in the section on the contemplation of the body, but
also in the sections on feelings, mind, and mind objects in the
Satipaññhànasutta, we find this mode of insight development.
None of the objects, taken up for the foundation of mindfulness, is
to be grasped tenaciously. Only their rise and fall is discerned. So
it seems that, what is found in the Satipaññhànasutta, is a group of
concepts. These concepts serve only as a scaffolding for the
systematic development of mindfulness and knowledge. The
Buddha often compared his Dhamma to a raft: nittharaõatthàya no
gahaõatthàya, ßfor crossing over and not for holding on to.û27
Accordingly, what we have here are so many scaffoldings for the
up-building of mindfulness and knowledge.
Probably due to the lack of understanding of this deep philoso-
phy enshrined in the Satipaññhànasutta, many sects of Buddhism
took up these concepts in a spirit of dogmatic adherence. That
dogmatic attitude of clinging on is like the attempt to cling on to
the scaffoldings and to live on in them. So with reference to the
Satipaññhànasutta also, we can understand the importance of the
term nissaya.
Nibbàna Sermon 5



Towards the end of our last sermon, we discussed, to some
extent, a special mode of attention, regarding the four objects of
contemplation in the Satipaññhànasutta Ý body, feelings, mind, and
mind-objects.2 That discussion might have revealed a certain
middle path indicated by the Buddha.
We drew attention to a thematic paragraph, occurring through
out the Satipaññhànasutta, which outlines a method of using
objects and concepts for satipaññhàna meditation without dogmatic
involvement. This leads the meditator to a particular kind of
attitude, summed up by the concluding phrase: ßHe abides
2 See sermon 4.
125
independent and does not cling to anything in the world,û anissito

ca viharati, na ca ki¤ci loke upàdiyati.3
By way of clarification, we brought in the simile of a scaffold-
ing for a building, that here the concepts only serve as a scaffold-
ing for building up mindfulness and knowledge.4 Talking about the
scaffolding, we are reminded of two different attitudes, namely,
the attitude of leaning onto and dwelling in the scaffolding itself,
and the enlightened attitude of merely utilizing it for the purpose
of erecting a building.
For further explanation of this technique, we may take up the
two terms paràmasana and sammasana. It might be better to
distinguish the meanings of these two terms also with the help of a
simile. As for a simile, let us take up the razor, which is such a
useful requisite in our meditative life. There is a certain special
way in sharpening a razor. With the idea of sharpening the razor, if
one grabs it tightly and rubs it on the sharpening stone, it will only
become blunt. Paràmasana, grasping, grabbing, is something like
that.
What then is the alternative? A more refined and softer ap-
proach is required as meant by the term sammasana. There is a
proper mode of doing it. One has to hold the razor in a relaxed
way, as if one is going to throw it away. One holds it lightly, ready
to let go of it at any time. But, of course, with mindfulness. The
wrist, also, is not rigid, but relaxed. Hand is supple at the joints
and easy to swing. Then with that readiness, one sharpens the
razor, sliding it smoothly on the stone. First: up, up, up, then:
down, down, down, and then: up down, up down, up down. The
third combined movement ensures that those parts of the blade still
untouched by the stone will also get duly sharpened.
It is in the same manner that the razor of insight wisdom has to
be whetted on the sharpening stone of the Satipaññhànasutta.
4 See sermon 4.
Inward, inward, inward Ý outward, outward, outward Ý inward

outward, inward outward. Or else: arising, arising, arising Ý
ceasing, ceasing, ceasing Ý arising ceasing, arising ceasing.
This is an illustration for the method of reflection, or sammasa-
na, introduced by the Buddha in the Satipaññhànasutta. Words and
concepts have to be made use of, for attaining Nibbàna. But here
the aim is only the up-building of mindfulness and knowledge.
Once their purpose is served, they can be dismantled without being
a bother to the mind. This is the significance of the concluding
phrase ßHe abides independent and does not cling to anything in
the world.û5
There is another sutta in which the Buddha has touched upon
this same point in particular. It is the Samudayasutta in the
Satipaññhànasaüyutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya.6 In that sutta, the
Buddha has proclaimed the arising and the going down of the four
foundations of mindfulness. He begins by saying: ßMonks, I shall
teach you the arising and the going down of the four foundations
of mindfulness.û Catunnaü, bhikkhave, satipaññhànànaü
samudaya¤ca atthagama¤ca desessàmi.
He goes on to say: ßWhat, monks, is the arising of the body?
With the arising of nutriment is the arising of the body and with
the cessation of the nutriment is the going down of the body.û Ko
ca, bhikkhave, kàyassa samudayo? âhàrasamudayà kàyassa
samudayo, àhàranirodhà kàyassa atthagamo.
Similarly: ßWith the arising of contact is the arising of feeling,
and with the cessation of contact is the going down of feeling.û
Phassasamudayà vedanànaü samudayo, phassanirodhà veda-
nànaü atthagamo.
And then: ßWith the arising of name-and-form is the arising of
the mind, and with the cessation of name-and-form is the going
6 S V 184, Samudayasutta.
down of the mind.û Nàmaråpasamudayà cittassa samudayo,

nàmaråpanirodhà cittassa atthagamo.
And lastly: ßWith the arising of attention is the arising of mind-
objects, and with the ceasing of attention is the going down of
mind-objects.û Manasikàrasamudayà dhammànaü samudayo,
manasikàranirodhà dhammànaü atthagamo.
This, too, is an important discourse, well worth remembering,
because here the Buddha is dealing with the arising and cessation,
or arising and going down, of the four objects used for establishing
mindfulness.
As we know, the concept of nutriment in this Dhamma is much
broader than the worldly concept of food. It does not imply merely
the ordinary food, for which the term used is kabaliïkàràhàra, or
material food. Taken in a deeper sense, it includes the other three
kinds of nutriment as well, namely phassa, or contact, mano-
sa¤cetanà, or volition, and vi¤¤àõa, or consciousness. These four
together account for the concept of body as such. Therefore, due to
these four there comes to be a body, and with their cessation the
body ends. So also in the case of feeling. We all know that the
arising of feeling is due to contact.
The reference to name-and-form in this context might not be
clear enough at once, due to various definitions of name-and-form,
or nàma-råpa. Here, the reason for the arising of the mind is said
to be name-and-form. Mind is said to arise because of name-and-
form, and it is supposed to go down with the cessation of name-
and-form.
The fact that the mind-objects arise due to attention is note
worthy. All the mind-objects mentioned in the fourth section of
contemplation arise when there is attention. And they go down
when attention is not there. In other words, attending makes
objects out of them. This way, we are reminded that, apart from
making use of these words and concepts for the purpose of
attaining Nibbàna, there is nothing worth holding on to or clinging
to dogmatically. So if a meditator works with this aim in mind, he
will be assured of a state of mind that is independent and clinging-
free, anissita, anupàdàna.
One marvelous quality of the Buddha's teaching emerges from

this discussion. A mind-object is something that the mind hangs on
to as the connotations of the word àrammaõa (cp. àlambhana)
suggest. But because of the mode of insight wisdom outlined here,
because of the middle path approach, even the tendency to `hang-
on' is finally done away with and the object is penetrated through.
Despite the above connotations of 'hanging on' (àrammaõa), the
object is transcended. Transcendence in its highest sense is not a
case of surpassing, as is ordinarily understood. Instead of leaving
behind, it penetrates through. Here then, we have a transcendence
that is in itself a penetration.
So the terms anissita and anupàdàna seem to have a signifi-
cance of their own. More of it comes to light in quite a number of
other suttas. Particularly in the Dvayatànupassanàsutta of the
Sutta Nipàta we come across the following two verses, which
throw more light on these two terms:
Anissito na calati,
nissito ca upàdiyaü,
saüsàraü nàtivattati.
Etam àdãnavaü ¤atvà,

nissayesu mahabbhayaü,
anissito anupàdàno,
sato bhikkhu paribbaje.7
ßThe unattached one wavers not, but the one attached,

clinging on, does not get beyond saüsàra, which is an
alternation between a this-ness and an otherwise-ness
(itthabhàva¤¤athàbhàva).
7 Sn 752-753, Dvayatànupassanàsutta.
ßKnowing this peril, the great danger, in attachments or

supports (nissayesu), let the monk fare along mindfully,
resting on nothing, clinging to nothing.û
Caught up in the dichotomy of saüsàric existence, which alter-

nates between this-ness and otherwise-ness, one is unable to
transcend it, so long as there is attachment and clinging. Nissayas
are the supports that encourage clinging in the form of dogmatic
adherence to views. Seeing the peril and the danger in them, a
mindful monk has no recourse to them. This gives one an idea of
the attitude of an arahant. His mind is free from enslavement to
the conjoined pairs of relative concepts.
This fact is borne out by certain Canonical statements, which at
first sight might appear as riddles. The two last sections of the
Sutta Nipàta, the Aññhakavagga and the Pàràyanavagga in
particular, contain verses which are extremely deep. In the
Aññhakavagga, one often comes across apparently contradictory
pairs of terms, side by side. About the arahant it is said that: ßHe
neither grasps nor gives up,û nàdeti na nirassati.8 ßThere is
nothing taken up or rejected by him,û attaü nirattaü na hi tassa
atthi.9
By the way, the word attaü in this context is derived from
àdàtta (à + dà), by syncopation. It should not be mistaken as a
reference to attà, or soul. Similarly, niratta is from as, to throw,
nirasta, conveying the idea of giving up or putting down.
There is nothing taken up or given up by the arahant. Other
such references to the arahant's attitude are: Na ràgaràgã na
viràgaratto, ßHe is neither attached to attachment, nor attached to
8 Sn 954, Attadaõóasutta.
9 Sn 787, Duññhaññhakasutta.
detachment.û10 Na hi so rajjati no virajjati, ßHe is neither attached

nor detached.û11
It is in order to explain why such references are used that we
took all this trouble to discuss at length the significance of such
terms as nissaya.12 Probably due to a lack of understanding in this
respect, the deeper meanings of such suttas have got obscured. Not
only that, even textual corruption through distorted variant
readings has set in, because they appeared like riddles. However,
the deeper sense of these suttas sometimes emerges from certain
strikingly strange statements like the following found in the
Khajjanãyasutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya. The reference here is to
the arahant:
Ayaü vuccati, bhikkhave, bhikkhu neva àcinàti na

apacinàti, apacinitvà ñhito neva pajahati na upàdiyati,
pajahitvà ñhito neva viseneti na usseneti, visenetvà ñhito
neva vidhåpeti na sandhåpeti.13
ßMonks, such a monk is called one who neither amasses

nor diminishes; already diminished as he is, he neither
gives up nor grasps; already given up as he is, he neither
disbands nor binds together; already disbanded as he is, he
neither exorcizes nor proficiates.û
Even to one who does not understand the language, the above
quotation would sound enigmatic. Even the rendering of the terms
used here is not an easy matter, because of the nuances they seem
to convey. We could perhaps say that such a monk neither amasses
or accumulates, nor diminishes. Since he is already diminished,
10 Sn 795, Suddhaññhakasutta.
11 Sn 813, Jaràsutta.
12 See sermon 4.
13 S III 90, Khajjaniyasutta.
presumably as regards the five aggregates, he neither abandons nor

grasps anew. Since the giving up is complete, he neither binds
together or enlists (note the word sena, army), nor disbands.
Disbanding (if not `disarmament'), being complete, there is neither
exorcizing or smoking out, nor proficiating or inviting. The
coupling of these terms and their peculiar employment is sugges-
tive of the arahant's freedom from the dichotomy.
In the Bràhmaõavagga of the Dhammapada too, we come
across a similar enigmatic verse:
Yassa pàraü apàraü và,

pàràpàraü na vijjati,
vãtaddaraü visaüyuttaü,
tam ahaü bråmi bràhmaõaü.14
ßFor whom there is neither a farther shore,

Nor a hither shore, nor both,
Who is undistressed and unfettered,
Him I call a Brahmin.û
In this context the word bràhmaõa refers to the arahant. Here too,
it is said that the arahant has neither a farther shore, nor a hither
shore, nor both. This might sometimes appear as a problem. Our
usual concept of an arahant is of one who has crossed over the
ocean of saüsàra and is standing on the other shore. But here is
something enigmatic.
We come across a similar sutta in the Sutta Nipàta also, namely
its very first, the Uragasutta. The extraordinary feature of this
sutta is the recurrence of the same refrain throughout its seventeen
verses. The refrain is:

So bhikkhu jahàti orapàraü,

urago jiõõamiva tacaü puràõaü.15
ßThat monk forsakes the hither and the tither,

Like a snake its slough that doth wither.û
This simile of the slough, or the worn-out skin of the snake, is

highly significant. To quote one instance:
Yo nàjjhagamà bhavesu sàraü,

vicinaü pupphamiva udumbaresu,
so bhikkhu jahàti orapàraü,
ßThat monk who sees no essence in existence,

Like one seeking flowers in Udumbara trees,
Will give up the hither as well as the thither,
Like the snake its slough that doth wither.û
The arahant has abandoned his attachment to existence. As such,

he is free from the bondage of those conjoined terms in worldly
usage. So the arahant looks at the worldly usage in the same way
as a snake would turn back and look at the worn-out skin he has
sloughed off. Sometimes we see a snake moving about with a
remnant of its slough hanging on. We might even think that the
snake is carrying its slough around. It is the same in the case of the
arahants.
Now there is this term sa-upàdisesa Nibbànadhàtu. Taking the
term at its face value, some might think that the clinging is not yet
over for the arahants Ý that there is still a little bit left. The
arahant, though he has attained release and realized Nibbàna, so
15 Sn 1-17 , Uragasutta.
16 Sn 5, Uragasutta.
long as he is living in the world, has to relate to the external

objects in the world somehow through his five senses, making use
of them. Seeing it, some might conclude that it is because of some
residual clinging. But we have to understand this in the light of the
simile of the worn-out skin. In the case of the arahant, too, the
sloughed off skin is still hanging on.
As a sidelight we may cite a remark of Venerable Sàriputta:
Iminà påtikàyena aññiyàmi haràyàmi jigucchàmi,17 ßI am harassed
and repelled by this body, I am ashamed of it.û This is because the
body is for him something already abandoned. All this goes to
show that the arahant has an unattached, unclinging attitude.
Linguistic usage, which is a special feature of existence, is
enlivened by the cravings, conceits, and views with which it is
grasped. Worldlings thrive on it, whereas the arahants are free
from it. This is the upshot of the above discussion on the terms
anusaya and nissaya.18
Yet another important term that should receive attention in any
discussion on Nibbàna is àsava. This is because the arahant is
often called a khãõàsava, one whose àsavas are extinct.19
âsavakkhayo, extinction of àsavas, is an epithet of Nibbàna.20 So
the distinct feature of an arahant is his extinction of àsavas.
Now, what does àsava mean? In ordinary life, this word is used
to denote fermentation or liquor that has got fermented for a long
time.21 If there is even a dreg of ferment in a vessel, it is enough to
cause fermentation for any suitable raw material put into it. So
also are the àsavas. They are like the residual dregs of the ebul-
lient mass of defilements in beings, which have under gone
fermentation for a long, long time in saüsàra.
17 A IV 377, Sãhanàdasutta.
18 See sermon 4.
19 E.g. at D III 83, Agga¤¤asutta.
20 E.g. at Dhp 253, Malavagga.
21 E.g. the pupphàsava, phalàsava, madhvàsava, guëàsava at Sv III 944.
Very often, àsavas are said to be of three kinds, as kàmàsavà,

bhavàsavà, and avijjàsavà. The term àsava in this context is
usually rendered as ìnfluxes.' We may understand them as certain
intoxicating influences, which create a world of sense-desires, a
stupor that gives a notion of existence and leads to ignorance.
These influxes are often said to have the nature of infiltrating into
the mind. Some times a fourth type of influxes, diññhàsavà, is also
mentioned. But this can conveniently be subsumed under avij-
jàsavà.
The extinction of influxes becomes a distinctive characteristic
of an arahant, as it ensures complete freedom. One could be said
to have attained complete freedom only if one's mind is free from
these influxes. It is because these influxes are capable of creating
intoxication again and again.
The immense importance of the extinction of influxes, and how
it accounts for the worthiness of an arahant, is sometimes clearly
brought out. The ultimate aim of the Buddha's teaching is one that
in other systems of thought is generally regarded as attainable only
after death. The Buddha, on the other hand, showed a way to its
realization here and now.
As a matter of fact, even brahmins like Pokkharasàti went about
saying that it is impossible for a human being to attain something
supramundane: Katham'hi nàma manussabhåto uttarimanussa-
dhammà alamariya¤àõadassanavisesaü ¤assati và dakkhati và
sacchi và karissati?22 ßHow can one as a human being know or see
or realize a supramundane state, an extraordinary knowledge and
vision befitting the noble ones?û They thought that such a realiza-
tion is possible only after death. Immortality, in other systems of
thought, is always an after death experience.
Now the realization of the extinction of influxes, on the other
hand, gives a certain assurance about the future. It is by this
extinction of influxes that one wins to the certitude that there is no
22 M II 200, Subhasutta.
more birth after this. Khãõà jàti,23 extinct is birth! Certitude about
something comes only with realization. In fact, the term sacchi-
kiriya implies a seeing with one's own eyes, as the word for eye,
ak÷i, is implicit in it.
However, everything cannot be verified by seeing with one's
own eyes. The Buddha has pointed out that there are four ways of
realization or verification:
Cattàro me, bhikkhave, sacchikaraõãyà dhammà. Katame

cattaro? Atthi, bhikkhave, dhammà kàyena sacchika-
raõãyà; atthi, bhikkhave, dhammà satiyà sacchikaraõãyà;
atthi, bhikkhave, dhammà cakkhunà sacchikaraõãyà; atthi,
bhikkhave, dhammà pa¤¤àya sacchikaraõãyà.24
ßMonks, there are these four realizable things. What four?

There are things, monks, that are realizable through the
body; there are things, monks, that are realizable through
memory; there are things, monks, that are realizable
through the eye; there are things, monks, that are realiza-
ble through wisdom.û
By way of explanation, the Buddha says that the things realiz-

able through the body are the eight deliverances, the things real-
izable through memory are one's former habitations, the things
realizable through the eye are the death and rebirth of beings, and
what is realizable through wisdom, is the extinction of influxes.
One's former lives cannot be seen with one's own eyes by run-
ning into the past. It is possible only by purifying one's memory
and directing it backwards. Similarly, the death and rebirth of
beings can be seen, as if with one's fleshly eye, by the divine eye,
by those who have developed it. So also the fact of extirpating all
23 E.g. at D I 84, Sàma¤¤aphalasutta.

24 A II 182, Sacchikaraõãyasutta.
influxes is to be realized by wisdom, and not by any other means.

The fact that the influxes of sensuality, existence, ignorance, and
views, will not flow in again, can be verified only by wisdom.
That is why special mention is made of Nibbàna as something
realizable.25
Because Nibbàna is said to be something realizable, some are of
the opinion that nothing should be predicated about it. What is the
reason for this special emphasis on its realizability? It is to bring
into sharp relief the point of divergence, since the Buddha taught a
way of realizing here and now something that in other religions
was considered impossible.
What was it that they regarded impossible to be realized? The
cessation of existence, or bhavanirodha. How can one be certain
here and now that this existence has ceased? This might some-
times appear as a big puzzle. But all the same, the arahant
experiences the cessation of existence as a realization. That is why
he even gives expression to it as: Bhavanirodho Nibbànaü,26
ßcessation of existence is Nibbàna.û
It comes about by this extinction of influxes. The very existence
of èxistence' is especially due to the flowing in of influxes of
existence. What is called èxistence' is not the apparent process of
existing visible to others. It is something that pertains to one's own
mental continuum.
For instance, when it is said that some person is in the world of
sense desires, one might sometimes imagine it as living surround-
ed by objects of sense pleasure. But that is not always the case. It
is the existence in a world of sense desires, built up by sensuous
thoughts. It is the same with the realms of form and formless
realms. Even those realms can be experienced and attained while
living in this world itself.
25 A I 159, Nibbutasutta.
26 A V 9, Sàriputtasutta.
Similarly, it is possible for one to realize the complete cessation

of this existence while living in this very world. It is accomplished
by winning to the realization that the influxes of sense desires,
existence, and ignorance, no longer influence one's mind.
So all this goes to show the high degree of importance attached
to the word àsava. The Sammàdiññhisutta of the Majjhima Nikàya
seems to pose a problem regarding the significance of this term. At
one place in the sutta it is said that the arising of ignorance is due
to the arising of influxes and that the cessation of ignorance is due
to the cessation of influxes: âsavasamudayà avijjàsamudayo,
àsavanirodhà avijjànirodho.27
If the sutta says only this much, it will not be such a problem,
because it appears as a puzzle to many nowadays, why ignorance
is placed first. Various reasons are adduced and arguments put
forward as to why it is stated first out of the twelve factors. The
fact that there is still something to precede it could therefore be
some consolation.
But then, a little way off, in the selfsame sutta, we read: Avijjà-
samudayà àsavasamudayo, avijjanirodhà àsavanirodho,28 ßWith
the arising of ignorance is the arising of influxes, with the cessa-
tion of ignorance is the cessation of influxes.û Apparently this
contradicts the previous statement. The preacher of this discourse,
Venerable Sàriputta, is not one who contradicts himself. So most
probably there is some deep reason behind this.
Another problem crops up, since ignorance is also counted
among the different kinds of influxes. This makes our puzzle all
the more deep. But this state of affairs could best be understood
with the help of an illustration. It is in order to explain a certain
fascinating behaviour of the mind that even arahants of great
wisdom had to make seemingly contradictory statements.
We have to draw in at this juncture a very important discourse

in the Saüyutta Nikàya, which is a marvel in itself. It comes in the
section on the aggregates, Khandhasaüyutta, as the second
Gaddulasutta. Here the Buddha makes the following impressive
declaration:
`Diññhaü vo, bhikkhave, caraõaü nàma cittan'ti?' Èvaü,

bhante.' `Tampi kho, bhikkhave, caraõaü nàma cittaü
citteneva cintitaü. Tenapi kho, bhikkhave, caraõena cit-
tena citta¤¤eva cittataraü. Tasmàtiha, bhikkhave, abhik-
khaõaü sakaü cittaü paccavekkhitabbaü: Dãgharattam
idaü cittaü saükiliññhaü ràgena dosena mohenà'ti. Cit-
tasaükilesà, bhikkhave, sattà saükilissanti, cittavodànà
sattà visujjhanti.
`Nàhaü, bhikkhave, a¤¤aü ekanikàyampi samanupassàmi

evaü cittaü, yathayidaü, bhikkhave, tiracchànagatà
pàõà. Tepi kho, bhikkhave, tiracchànagatà pàõà citteneva
cintità. Tehipi kho, bhikkhave, tiracchànagatehi pàõehi
citta¤¤eva cittataraü. Tasmàtiha, bhikkhave, bhikkhunà
abhikkhaõaü sakaü cittaü paccavekkhitabbaü: Dãgha-
rattam idaü cittaü saükiliññhaü ràgena dosena mohe-
nà'ti. Cittasaükilesà, bhikkhave, sattà saükilissanti,
cittavodànà sattà visujjhanti.'29
ß`Monks, have you seen a picture called a movie

(caraõa)?' `Yes, Lord.' `Monks, even that picture called a
movie is something thought out by the mind. But this
mind, monks, is more picturesque than that picture called
a movie. Therefore, monks, you should reflect moment to
moment on your own mind with the thought: For a long
time has this mind been defiled by lust, hate, and delusion.
29 S III 151, Gaddulasutta.

By the defilement of the mind, monks, are beings defiled.

By the purification of the mind, are beings purified.
ß`Monks, I do not see any other class of beings as pictur-

esque as beings in the animal realm. But those beings in
the animal realm, monks, are also thought out by the mind.
And the mind, monks, is far more picturesque than those
beings in the animal realm. Therefore, monks, should a
monk reflect moment to moment on one's own mind with
the thought: For a long time has this mind been defiled by
lust, hate, and delusion. By the defilement of the mind,
monks, are beings defiled. By the purification of the mind,
are beings purified.'û
Here the Buddha gives two illustrations to show how marvelous

this mind is. First he asks the monks whether they have seen a
picture called caraõa. Though the word may be rendered by
movie, it is not a motion picture of the sort we have today.
According to the commentary, it is some kind of variegated
painting done on a mobile canvas-chamber, illustrative of the
results of good and evil karma.30 Whatever it may be, it seems to
have been something marvelous. But far more marvelous, accord-
ing to the Buddha, is this mind. The reason given is that even such
a picture is something thought out by the mind.
Then, by way of an advice to the monks, says the Buddha:
`Therefore, monks, you should reflect on your mind moment to
moment with the thought: For a long time this mind has been
defiled by lust, hate, and delusion.' The moral drawn is that beings
are defiled by the defilement of their minds and that they are
purified by the purification of their minds. This is the illustration
by the simile of the picture.
30 Spk II 327.
And then the Buddha goes on to make another significant decla-

ration: `Monks, I do not see any other class of beings as pictur-
esque as beings in the animal realm.' But since those beings also
are thought out by the mind, he declares that the mind is far more
picturesque than them. Based on this conclusion, he repeats the
same advice as before.
At first sight the sutta, when it refers to a picture, seems to be
speaking about the man who drew it. But there is something
deeper than that. When the Buddha says that the picture called
caraõa is also something thought out by the mind, he is not simply
stating the fact that the artist drew it after thinking it out with his
mind. The reference is rather to the mind of the one who sees it.
He, who sees it, regards it as something marvelous. He creates a
picture out of it. He imagines something picturesque in it.
In fact, the allusion is not to the artist's mind, but to the specta-
tor's mind. It is on account of the three defilements lust, hate, and
delusion, nurtured in his mind for a long time, that he is able to
appreciate and enjoy that picture. Such is the nature of those
influxes.
That is why the Buddha declared that this mind is far more
picturesque than the picture in question. So if one turns back to
look at one's own mind, in accordance with the Buddha's advice,
it will be a wonderful experience, like watching a movie. Why?
Because reflection reveals the most marvelous sight in the world.
But usually one does not like to reflect, because one has to turn
back to do so. One is generally inclined to look at the thing in
front. However, the Buddha advises us to turn back and look at
one's own mind every moment. Why? Because the mind is more
marvelous than that picture called caraõa, or movie.
It is the same declaration that he makes with reference to the
beings in the animal realm. When one comes to think about it,
there is even less room for doubt here, than in the case of the
picture. First of all, the Buddha declares that there is no class of
beings more picturesque than those in the animal realm. But he
follows it up with the statement that even those beings are thought
out by the mind, to draw the conclusion that as such the mind is
more picturesque than those beings of the animal realm.
Let us try to sort out the point of this declaration. Generally, we
may agree that beings in the animal realm are the most pictur-
esque. We sometimes say that the butterfly is beautiful. But we
might hesitate to call a blue fly beautiful. The tiger is fierce, but
the cat is not. Here one's personal attitude accounts much for the
concepts of beauty, ugliness, fierceness, and innocence of animals.
It is because of the defiling influence of influxes, such as igno-
rance, that the world around us appears so picturesque.
Based on this particular sutta, with its reference to the caraõa
picture as a prototype, we may take a peep at the modern day's
movie film, by way of an analogy. It might facilitate the under-
standing of the teachings on pañicca samuppàda and Nibbàna in a
way that is closer to our everyday life. The principles governing
the film and the drama are part and parcel of the life outside
cinema and the theatre. But since it is generally difficult to grasp
them in the context of the life outside, we shall now try to eluci-
date them with reference to the cinema and the theatre.
Usually a film or a drama is shown at night. The reason for it is
the presence of darkness. This darkness helps to bring out the
darkness of ignorance that dwells in the minds of beings. So the
film as well as the drama is presented to the public within a
framework of darkness. If a film is shown at day time, as a
matinee show, it necessitates closed windows and dark curtains. In
this way, films and dramas are shown within a curtained enclo-
sure.
There is another strange thing about these films and dramas.
One goes to the cinema or the theatre saying: ßI am going to see a
film show, I am going to see a drama.û And one returns saying: ßI
have seen a film show, I have seen a drama.û But while the film
show or the drama is going on, one forgets that one is seeing a
show or a drama.
Such a strange spell of delusion takes over. This is due to the
intoxicating influence of influxes. If one wishes to enjoy a film
show or a drama, one should be prepared to get intoxicated by it.

Otherwise it will cease to be a film show or a drama for him.
What do the film producers and dramatists do? They prepare the
background for eliciting the influxes of ignorance, latent in the
minds of the audience. That is why such shows and performances
are held at night, or else dark curtains are employed. They have an
intricate job to do. Within the framework of darkness, they have to
create a delusion in the minds of their audience, so as to enact
some story in a realistic manner.
To be successful, a film or a drama has to be given a touch of
realism. Though fictitious, it should be apparently real for the
audience. There is an element of deception involved, a hoodwink.
For this touch of realism, quite a lot of make-up on the part of
actors and actresses is necessary. As a matter of fact, in the ancient
Indian society, one of the primary senses of the word saïkhàra
was the make-up done by actors and actresses.
Now in the present context, saïkhàra can include not only this
make-up in personal appearance, but also the acting itself, the
delineation of character, stage-craft, etc. In this way, the film
producers and dramatists create a suitable environment, making
use of the darkness and the make-up contrivances. These are the
saïkhàras, or the `preparations.'
However, to be more precise, it is the audience that make prepa-
rations, in the last analysis. Here too, as before, we are compelled
to make a statement that might appear strange: So far not a single
cinema has held a film show and not a single theatre has staged a
drama.
And yet, those who had gone to the cinema and the theatre had
seen film shows and dramas. Now, how can that be? Usually, we
think that it is the film producer who produced the film and that it
is the dramatist who made the drama.
But if we are to understand the deeper implications of what the
Buddha declared, with reference to the picture caraõa, a film show
or drama is produced, in the last analysis, by the spectator himself.
When he goes to the cinema and the theatre, he takes with him the
spices needed to concoct a film or a drama, and that is: the
influxes, or àsavas. Whatever technical defects and shortcomings

there are in them, he makes good with his influxes.
As we know, in a drama there is a certain interval between two
scenes. But the average audience is able to appreciate even such a
drama, because they are influenced by the influxes of sense desire,
existence, and ignorance.
With the progress in science and technology, scenes are made to
fall on the screen with extreme rapidity. All the same, the element
of delusion is still there. The purpose is to create the necessary
environment for arousing delusion in the minds of the audience.
Whatever preparations others may make, if the audience does not
respond with their own preparations along the same lines, the
drama will not be a success. But in general, the worldlings have a
tendency to prepare and concoct, so they would make up for any
shortcomings in the film or the drama with their own preparations
and enjoy them.
Now, for instance, let us think of an occasion when a film show
is going on within the framework of darkness. In the case of a
matinee show, doors and windows will have to be closed. Suppos-
ing the doors are suddenly flung open, while a vivid technicolour
scene is flashing on the screen, what happens then? The spectators
will find themselves suddenly thrown out of the cinema world they
had created for themselves. Why? Because the scene in technicol-
our has now lost its colour. It has faded away. The result is
dejection, disenchantment. The film show loses its significance.
That film show owed its existence to the dark framework of
ignorance and the force of preparations. But now that the frame-
work has broken down, such a vast change has come over,
resulting in a disenchantment. Now the word ràga has a nuance
suggestive of colour, so viràga, dispassion, can also literally mean
a fading away or a decolouration. Here we have a possible
instance of nibbidà viràga, disenchantment, dispassion, at least in
a limited sense.
A door suddenly flung open can push aside the delusion, at least
temporarily. Let us consider the implications of this little event.
The film show, in this case, ceases to be a film show because of a
flash of light coming from outside. Now, what would have

happened if this flash of light had come from within Ý from within
one's mind? Then also something similar would have happened. If
the light of wisdom dawns on one's mind while watching a film
show or a drama, one would even wonder whether it is actually a
film or a drama, while others are enjoying it.
Speaking about the film show, we mentioned above that the
spectator has entered into a world of his own creation. If we are to
analyse this situation according to the law of dependent origina-
tion, we may add that in fact he has a consciousness and a name-
and-form in line with the events of the story, based on the prepara-
tions in the midst of the darkness of ignorance. With all his
experiences in seeing the film show, he is building up his five
aggregates.
Therefore, when the light of wisdom comes and dispels the
darkness of ignorance, a similar event can occur. One will come
out of that plane of existence. One will step out of the world of
sense desires, at least temporarily.
Now, with regard to the arahants, too, the same trend of events
holds good. When their ignorance ceases, leaving no residue,
avijjàya tveva asesaviràganirodhà, exhausting the influxes as
well, preparations also cease. Why? Because the preparations owe
their existence to ignorance. They have the ability to prepare so
long as there is ignorance. Saïkhàra generally means preparations.
It is the make-up and the make-believe which accounted for the
delusion. The darkness of ignorance provided the setting for it. If
somehow or other, the light of wisdom enters the scene, those
preparations, saïkhàra, became no-preparations, visaïkhàra, and
the prepared, saïkhata, becomes a non-prepared, asaïkhata.
So what was true with regard to the film show, is also true, in a
deeper sense, with regard to the events leading up to the attain-
ment of arahant-hood. With the dawn of that light of wisdom, the
preparations, or saïkhàra, lose their significance and become
visaïkhàra.
Though for the world outside they appear as preparations, for
the arahant they are not preparations, because they do not pre-
pare a bhava, or existence, for him. They are made ineffective.

Similarly, the prepared or the made-up, when it is understood as
something prepared or made-up, becomes an un-prepared or an
un-made. There is a subtle principle of un-doing involved in this.
Sometimes, this might be regarded as a modernistic interpreta-
tion. But there is Canonical evidence in support of such an
interpretation. For instance, in the Dvayatànupassanàsutta of the
Sutta Nipàta, we come across the following verse:
Nivutànaü tamo hoti,

andhakàro apassataü,
sata¤ca vivañaü hoti,
àloko passatàmiva,
santike na vijànanti,
magà dhammassa akovidà.31
ßMurk it is to those enveloped,

As darkness unto the undiscerning,
But to the good wide ope' it is,
As light is unto those discerning,
So near, and yet they know not,
Fools, unskilled in the Norm.û
It is all murky to those enveloped by the hindrance of ignorance,

like the darkness for those who are unable to see. But for the noble
ones, it is visible like an open space, even as the light to those with
vision. Though it is near at hand, fools, inexpert in the Dhamma,
do not understand. This same impression of the Buddha comes up
again in the following verse in the Udàna:
Mohasambandhano loko,
bhabbaråpo va dissati,
upadhibandhano bàlo,
tamasà parivàrito,
sassatoriva khàyati,
passato n'atthi ki¤canaü.32
ßThe world, enfettered to delusion,

Feigns a promising mien,
The fool, to his assets bound,
Sees only darkness around,
It looks as though it would last,
But to him who sees there is naught.û
The world appears as real to one who is fettered to delusion. He

imagines it to be reliable. And so the fool, relying on his assets, is
encompassed by the darkness. To him the world appears as
eternal. But the one who has the right vision, knows that in reality
there is nothing.
All this goes to show that the life outside is not much different
from what goes on within the four walls of the cinema and the
theatre. Just as, in the latter case, an enjoyable story is created out
of a multitude of scenes, relayed at varying degrees of rapidity,
backed by the delusive make-up of actors and actresses, so that
one may lose oneself in a world of fantasy, even so, according to
the point of view of Dhamma, the lifestyle outside is something
made up and concocted.
However, the darkness within is much thicker than the darkness
outside. The darkness outside may be dispelled even by a door
flung open, as we saw above. But not so easily the darkness
within. That is why, in the psalms of the Theras and Therãs, it is
said that they split or burst asunder the mass of delusion,
32 Ud 79, Udenasutta.
tamokkhandhaü padàliya, tamokkhandhaü padàlayiü.33 The

pitchy black darkness of ignorance in the world is one that is thick
enough to be split up and burst asunder. So it seems, the darkness
within is almost tangibly thick. But the first incision on this thick
curtain of darkness is made by the path knowledge of the Stream-
winner.
As a side-light, we may cite an episode from the lives of the
Venerables Sàriputta and Mahà Moggalàna, the two chief disciples
of the Buddha. Formerly, as brahmin youths, they were known as
Upatissa and Kolita. These two young men once went to see a
hilltop festival, called giraggasamajja.34 Since by then, their
discerning wisdom was already matured, they suddenly developed
a dejection about the entertainment going on. The hilltop festival,
as it were, lost its festivity for them. They understood the vanity of
it and could no longer enjoy it as before.
They may have already had a distant glimpse of the similarity
between the two levels of experience, mentioned above. But they
on their own could not get at the principles underlying the delusion
involved.
Much later, as a wandering ascetic, when Upatissa met the
Venerable Assaji Thera on his alms-round, he begged the latter to
preach the Dhamma to him. Venerable Assaji said: ßI know only a
little.û Upatissa also assured him: ßI need only a little.û Venerable
Assaji preached à little' and Upatissa, too, heard à little,' but
since there was much in it, the latter attained the Fruit of Stream-
winning even on hearing the first two lines of the following verse:
Ye dhammà hetuppabhavà,
tesam hetuü Tathàgato àha,
33 Th 627, Sunãto Thero; Thã 3, Puõõà Therã; Thã 28, Città Therã; Thã 44, Uttamà
Therã; Thã 120, Tiüsamattà Therã; Thã 173-174, Vijayà Therã; Thã 180, Uttarà
Therã.
34 Dhp-a I 88.
tesa¤ca yo nirodho,
evaü vàdi mahàsamaõo.35
ßOf things that proceed from a cause,

Their cause the Tathàgata has told,
And also their cessation,
Thus teaches the great ascetic.û
The verse gives in a nutshell the law of dependent arising. From it,
Upatissa got the clue to his riddle of life.
Some interpret the word hetu, cause, in this verse, as avijjà, or
ignorance, the first link. But that is not the case. It refers to the
basic principle known as idappaccayatà, the relatedness of this to
that.36 Hetuppabhavà dhammà is a reference to things dependently
arisen. In point of fact, it is said about a Stream-winner that he has
seen well the cause as well as the things arisen from a cause: Hetu
ca sudiññho, hetusamuppanà ca dhammà.37 That means that he has
seen the law of dependent arising as also the dependently arisen
phenomena.
We have already discussed the significance of these two terms.38
What is called pañicca samuppàda is the basic principle itself. It is
said that the wandering ascetic Upatissa was able to arouse the
path of Stream-winning on hearing just the first two lines,39 and
these state the basic principle as such.
The word tesaü, plural, clearly implies that the reference is to
all the twelve factors, inclusive of ignorance. The cessation, also,
is of those twelve, as for instance it is said in the Udàna: Khayaü
35 Vin I 40.
36 Idappaccayatà is discussed in detail above, see sermon 2.
37 A III 440, CatutthaAbhabbaññhànasutta.
38 See sermon 2.
39 Sp-ñ III 226 (Burmese ed.)
paccayànaü avedi,40 ßunderstood the cessation of conditions,û

since all the twelve are conditions.
To sum up: Whatever phenomena that arise from a cause, their
cause is idappaccayatà, or the law of relatedness of this to that.
This being, this exists,

With the arising of this, this arises.
This not being, this does not exist,
With the cessation of this, this ceases.
And then the cessation of things arisen from a cause is ultimately

Nibbàna itself. That is the implication of the oft recurrent phrase
avijjàya tveva asesaviràganirodhà,41 ßwith the complete fading
away and cessation of that very ignorance.û
So then, from this discussion it should be clear that our illustra-
tion with the help of the simile of the cinema and the theatre is of
much relevance to an understanding of the law of dependent
arising. With this much, we shall wind up today.
40 Ud 2, DutiyaBodhisutta.
41 M I 263, MahàTaõhàsaïkhayasutta.
Nibbàna Sermon 6



In our last sermon, we happened to discuss how the concept of
existence built up with the help of ignorance and influxes, comes
to cease with the cessation of ignorance and influxes.2 We ex-
plained it by means of similes and illustrations, based on the film
show and the drama. As the starting point, we took up the simile of
the picture called caraõa, which the Buddha had made use of in
the Gaddulasutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya.3 With reference to a
picture called caraõa, popular in contemporary India, the Buddha
has declared that the mind is more picturesque than that caraõa
picture. As an adaptation of that caraõa picture for the modern
2 See sermon 5.
3 S III 151, see sermon 5.
151
day, we referred to the movie film and the drama in connection

with our discussion of saïkhàras in particular and pañicca sam-
uppàda in general. Today, let us try to move a little forward in the
same direction.
In the latter part of the same Gaddulasutta of the Saüyutta
Nikàya, Khandhasaüyutta, the Buddha gives a simile of a painter.4
Translated it would read as follows: ßJust as a dyer or a painter
would fashion the likeness of a woman or of a man, complete in
all its major and minor parts, on a well planed board, or a wall, or
on a strip of cloth, with dye or lac or turmeric or indigo or madder,
even so the untaught worldling creates, as it were, his own form,
feelings, perceptions, preparations, and consciousness.û
What the Buddha wants to convey to us by this comparison of
the five grasping groups to an artefact done by a painter, is the
insubstantiality and the vanity of those five groups. It brings out
their compound and made-up nature. This essencelessness and
emptiness is more clearly expressed in the Pheõapiõóåpamasutta
of the Khandhasaüyutta. The summary verse at the end of that
discourse would suffice for the present:
Pheõapiõóåpamaü råpaü,
vedanà bubbuëåpamà,
marãcikåpamà sa¤¤à,
saïkhàrà kadalåpamà,
màyåpama¤ca vi¤¤àõaü,
dãpitàdiccabandhunà.5
It says that the Buddha, the kinsman of the sun, has compared
form to a mass of foam, feeling to a water bubble, perception to a
mirage, preparations to a banana trunk, and consciousness to a
magic show. These five similes bring out the insubstantiality of the
4 S III 152, Gaddulasutta.

5 S III 142, Pheõapiõóåpamasutta.
five grasping groups. Their simulating and deceptive nature is

indicated by the similes. Not only the magic show, but even the
other similes, like the mass of foam, are suggestive of simulation,
in giving a false notion of compactness. They all convey the idea
of insubstantiality and deceptiveness. Consciousness in particular,
is described in that context as a conjurer's trick.
In the course of our discussion we happened to touch upon the
significance of saïkhàras, or preparations. As far as their rele-
vance to films and dramas is concerned, they impart an appearance
of reality to `parts' and àcts' which make up a film or a drama.
Realism, in the context of art and drama, amounts to an apparent
reality. It connotes the skill in deceiving the audience. It is, in fact,
only a show of reality. The successful drama is one that effectively
hoodwinks an audience. So realism, in that context, means
appearing as real. It therefore has a nuance of deception.
Now what supports this deceptive and delusive quality of prepa-
rations is ignorance. All this àcting' that is going on in the world
is kept up by ignorance, which provides the background for it. Just
as, in a drama, such preparations as change of dress, make-up
contrivances, character portrayal, and stage-craft, create an
atmosphere of delusion, so also are the saïkhàras, or preparations,
instrumental in building up these five grasping groups. So all this
goes to show that the term saõkhàra has the sense of preparing or
producing. The realistic appearance of a film or a drama is capable
of creating a delusion in an audience. Similarly, the apparent
reality of the animate and inanimate objects in the world, creates
delusion in the worldlings.
Now to hark back to two lines of a verse we had quoted earlier,
mohasambandhano loko, bhabbaråpo va dissati,6 ßThe world
appears as real to one who is fettered to delusion.û This means that
the world has an apparent reality, that it merely gives the impres-
sion of something real to one who is deluded. It is clear, therefore,
6 Ud 79, Udenasutta, see sermon 5.

that saïkhàras are responsible for some sort of preparation or

concoction. What serves as the background for it, is the darkness
of ignorance. This preparation, this concoction goes on, behind the
veil of ignorance.
We come across a discourse in the Saüyutta Nikàya, in which
this primary sense of preparation in the word saïkhàra is explicit-
ly stated, namely the Khajjanãyasutta. In that discourse, each of
the five grasping groups is defined, and the term saïkhàra is
defined as follows:
Ki¤ca, bhikkhave, saïkhàre vadetha? Saïkhatam abhi-

saïkharontã'ti kho, bhikkhave, tasmà `saïkhàrà'ti vuc-
canti. Ki¤ca saïkhatam abhisaïkharonti? Råpaü
råpattàya saïkhatam abhisaïkharonti, vedanaü vedanat-
tàya saïkhatam abhisaïkharonti, sa¤¤aü sa¤¤attàya
saïkhatam abhisaïkharonti, saïkhàre saïkhàrattàya
saïkhatam abhisaïkharonti, vi¤¤àõaü vi¤¤àõattàya
saïkhatam abhisaïkharonti. Saïkhatam abhisaïkha-
rontã'ti kho, bhikkhave, tasmà `saïkhàrà'ti vuccanti.7
ßAnd what, monks, would you say are `preparations?'

They prepare the prepared Ý that, monks, is why they are
called preparations. And what is the prepared that they
prepare? They prepare, as a prepared, form into the state
of form, they prepare, as a prepared, feeling into the state
of feeling, they prepare, as a prepared, perception into the
state of perception, they prepare, as a prepared, prepara-
tions into the state of preparations, they prepare, as a pre-
pared, consciousness into the state of consciousness. They
prepare the prepared, so, that is why, monks, they are
called preparations.û
7 S III 87, Khajjanãyasutta.

This explains why saïkhàras are so called. That is to say, the

sense in which they are called saïkhàras. They prepare the
prepared, saïkhata, into that state. And the prepared is form,
feeling, perception, preparations, and consciousness. Saïkhàras
are therefore instrumental in building up each of these grasping
groups. The most intriguing statement is that even the saïkhàras
are built up by saïkhàras. They play the part of preparing a sort of
make-believe activity. In this sense it is associated with the idea of
intention, as being produced by intention.
The two terms abhisaïkhataü abhisa¤cetayitaü are often found
in juxtaposition, as if they are synonymous.8 Abhisaïkhata means
`specially prepared,' and abhisa¤cetayitaü means `thought out' or
ìntended.' Here we see the relationship of saïkhàras to intention.
The preparation is done by means of intentions. The two words
ceteti pakappeti are also found used together.9 Intention and
imagination play their part in this matter of preparation. So in the
last analysis, it is something constructed by imagination. All of
these five groups are thought-constructs. As suggested by the
similes of the picture and the painter, these five groups, in the final
reckoning, turn out to be the products of imagination.
As far as the nature of these preparations is concerned, there are
these three kinds of preparations mentioned in the Dhamma,
namely kàyasaïkhàra, vacãsaïkhàra, and manosaïkhàra, bodily
preparations, verbal preparations, and mental preparations.10 These
terms have to do with merit and demerit. They are cited in connec-
tion with kamma, implying that beings accumulate kamma by
means of body, word and mind.
What supports this heaping up of preparations is ignorance.
Ignorance provides the background, as in the case of the drama
and the movie. This relationship between ignorance and prepara-
8 E.g. at M I 350, Aññhakanàgarasutta.

9 E.g. at S II 65, Cetanàsutta.
10 E.g. at A I 122, Saïkhàrasutta.
tions is clearly brought out in the Cetanàsutta of the

Sa¤cetaniyavagga of the Aïguttara Nikàya.11 According to that
sutta, the world attributes an activity to something by regarding it
as a unit Ý by perceiving it as a compact unit. In other words, it is
the way of the world to superimpose the concept of a unit or self-
agency to wherever there appears to be some sort of activity. As
we mentioned in connection with the simile of the whirlpool,
viewed from a distance, the whirlpool appears as a centre or a
base.12 In the same way, wherever there appears to be some form
of activity, we tend to bring in the concept of a unit.
Now it is this very ignorance, this ìgnoring,' that becomes the
seed-bed for preparations. The basic presumption of this ignorance
is that preparations must originate from a unitary centre. And the
Buddha also points out, in the Cetanàsutta of the Sa¤cetaniya-
vagga, that the root cause of bodily, verbal, and mental prepara-
tions, is ignorance.13 Since the discourse is rather lengthy, we
propose to analyse it in three sections, for facility of understand-
ing.
Kàye và, bhikkhave, sati kàyasa¤cetanàhetu uppajjati

ajjhattaü sukhadukkhaü. Vàcàya và, bhikkhave, sati
vàcãsa¤cetanàhetu uppajjati ajjhattaü sukhadukkhaü.
Mane và, bhikkhave, sati manosa¤cetanàhetu uppajjati
ajjhattaü sukhadukkhaü avijjàpaccayà va.
ßMonks, when the body is there, due to bodily intention,

there arises inward pleasure and pain. Monks, when
speech is there, due to verbal intention, there arises inward
pleasure and pain. Monks, when mind is there, due to
11 A II 157, Cetanàsutta.
12 See sermon 2.
mental intention, there arises inward pleasure and pain, all

conditioned by ignorance.û
Now let us take this as the first section and try to get at its mean-
ing. Given the concept of a body, due to intentions based on that
concept of a body, there arises inwardly pleasure and pain. That is,
when one imagines that there is a body, due to thoughts which take
body as their object, one experiences pleasure and pain. What is
called `the body,' is a huge mass of activity, something like a big
workshop or a factory. But because of ignorance, if one takes it as
one thing, that is as a unit, then there is room for bodily intention
to come in. One can objectify the body and arouse thoughts of the
body. Thereby one experiences pleasure and pain. This is the
implication of the above statement.
Similarly, in the case of speech, it may be said that language is a
conglomeration of letters and words. But when speech is taken as
a real unit, one can form intentions about speech and inwardly
experience pleasure and pain. So also in the case of the mind. It is
not an entity by itself, like a soul, as postulated by other religions.
It is again only a heap of thoughts. But if one grants that there is a
mind, due to that very presumption, one experiences inwardly
pleasure and pain with mind as its object. The concluding phrase
of that paragraph is particularly significant. It says that all this is
conditioned by ignorance.
Let us now take up the second part:
Sàmaü và taü, bhikkhave, kàyasaïkhàraü abhisaïkha-

roti, yaü paccayàssa taü uppajjati ajjhattaü sukha-
dukkhaü. Pare vàssa taü, bhikkhave, kàyasaïkhàraü
abhisaïkharonti, yaü paccayàssa taü uppajjati ajjhattaü
sukhadukkhaü. Sampajàno và taü, bhikkhave, kàyasaï-
khàraü abhisaïkharoti, yaü paccayàssa taü uppajjati
ajjhattaü sukhadukkhaü. Asampajàno và taü, bhikkhave,
kàyasaïkhàraü abhisaïkharoti, yaü paccayàssa taü up-
pajjati ajjhattaü sukhadukkhaü.
ßEither he himself prepares that bodily preparation, owing

to which there would be that inward pleasure and pain. Or
else others prepare for him that bodily preparation, owing
to which there would be for him inward pleasure and pain.
Either he, being fully aware, prepares that bodily prepara-
tion, owing to which there would be for him inward pleas-
ure and pain. Or else he, being fully unaware, prepares
that bodily preparation, owing to which there would be for
him that inward pleasure and pain.û
The substance of this paragraph seems to be that one by oneself

prepares the bodily preparation that brings one pleasure or pain
inwardly and that others also prepare for him such a bodily
preparation. It is also said that the bodily preparation can occur
either with or without awareness. About the verbal and mental
preparations too, a similar specification is made. This is the
summary of the second section.
The third and final section is the most significant:
Imesu, bhikkhave, dhammesu avijjà anupatità. Avijjàya

tveva asesaviràganirodhà so kàyo na hoti yaü paccayàssa
taü uppajjati ajjhattaü sukhadukkhaü, sà vàcà na hoti
yaü paccayàssa taü uppajjati ajjhattaü sukhadukkhaü,
so mano na hoti yaü paccayàssa taü uppajjati ajjhattaü
sukhadukkhaü, khettaü taü na hoti, vatthum taü na hoti,
àyatanaü taü na hoti, adhikaraõaü taü na hoti, yaü
paccayàssa taü uppajjati ajjhattaü sukhadukkhaü.
ßMonks, in all these cases, ignorance hangs on. But with

the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance,
that body is not there, owing to which there can arise for
him inward pleasure or pain, that speech is not there, ow-
ing to which there can arise for him inward pleasure and
pain, that mind is not there, owing to which there can arise
for him inward pleasure and pain. That field is not there,
that site is not there, that base is not there, that reason is
not there, owing to which there can arise for him inward
pleasure or pain.û
Since all the instances mentioned earlier are accompanied by

ignorance, the utter fading away and cessation of that very
ignorance prevents, as it were, the crystallization of that body,
speech, and mind, due to which inward pleasure and pain can
arise. In other words, it removes the field, the ground, the base and
the provenance for the arising of inward pleasure and pain.
This shows that, once the existence of a body is granted, with
that concept of a body as its object, bodily preparations come to be
built up. Or, in other words, given the concept of a body, and due
to bodily intention, that is by treating it as a real unit, one experi-
ences inwardly pleasure and pain because of thoughts concerning
the body.
So also in regard to speech and mind. It is emphatically stated
that all this occurs because of ignorance. What confers on them all
the status of a unit, through the perception of the compact, is this
very ignorance. As for the second paragraph, what it says is simply
that those bodily preparations and the like can be made by oneself
as well as by others, and that too either being aware or unaware.
Now all these are related to ignorance. Therefore, at whatever
point of time this ignorance ceases completely in someone, then
for him there is no consciousness of a body, though from an
outside point of view he appears to have a body. He may use
words, he may speak, but for him there is nothing substantial in
linguistic usage. He seems to be making use of a mind, mind-
objects also come up, but he does not regard it as a unit. Therefore,
inwardly, no pleasures and pains come up.
With the cessation of ignorance comes the cessation of prepara-
tions. Thereby all pleasures and pains cease. This, in other words,
is the state of Nibbàna. It appears, then, that this discourse gives us
a clue to the state of Nibbàna. It says something about bodily,
verbal, and mental preparations.
If we try to understand its message in relation to the analogy of
the film show and the drama, mentioned earlier, we may offer the
following explanation: Now in the case of a film show or a drama,

the preparations remain as preparations so long as there is that
darkness of ignorance. The realism or the realistic appearance of
the acting of actors and actresses, or the roles and guises they
assume in dress and speech, depends on the veil of ignorance that
conceals their true nature.
Similarly, here too, the implication is that it is ignorance which
invests these preparations with the realistic appearance. If at any
point of time that ignorance happens to cease, then there will be no
pleasure or displeasure for the audience, however much make-up
and pretension there is.
It is such a situation of non-enjoyment that we happened to
mention in the previous sermon with reference to the witnessing of
a hilltop festival by Upatissa and Kolita.14 They had a flash of
insight due to the light of wisdom that came from within, not due
to any illumination from outside. Because of it, those preparations
ceased to be preparations. From this we can understand that the
term saïkhàra becomes meaningful only against the background
of ignorance.
To move a step further, it is against the background of both
ignorance and preparations that all the subsequent links in the
formula become meaningful. As far as the interrelation between
consciousness and name-and-form is concerned, all what we have
said above regarding the reflection of name-and-form on con-
sciousness,15 becomes meaningful only so long as the reality of
preparations is granted, that is, only so far as their deceptive nature
is maintained. But that deceptive nature owes its existence to
ignorance. This way we can unravel one aspect of the essential
significance of the term saïkhàra.
Then there is another point worth considering in this respect.
Saïkhàra as the second link in the pañicca samuppàda formula is
14 See sermon 5.
15 See sermon 1.
defined by the Buddha in the Vibhaïgasutta in the Nidànasaüyut-

ta not in terms of kàyasaïkhàra, vacãsaïkhàra, and
manosaïkhàra, but as kàyasaïkhàro, vacãsaïkhàro, and cittasaï-
khàro.16 This might seem rather intriguing. Katame ca, bhikkhave,
saïkhàrà? Tayome, bhikkhave, saïkhàrà Ý kàyasaïkhàro, vacã-
saïkhàro, cittasaïkhàro. ßWhat, monks, are preparations? Monks,
there are these three preparations Ý body-preparation, speech-
preparation, and mind-preparation.û
Also, it is noteworthy that here the term is given in the singular.
In the majority of instances it is found in the plural number, but
here in the definition of the term the singular is used as kàyasaï-
khàro, vacãsaïkhàro and cittasaïkhàro. The significance of this
usage is explained for us by the Cåëavedallasutta, in the Dhamma
discussion between the arahant nun Dhammadinnà and the lay
disciple Visàkha. There the venerable Therã, in answer to a
question raised by the lay disciple, comes out with a definition of
these three terms: Assàsapassàsà kho, àvuso Visàkha, kàyikà, ete
dhammà kàyappañibaddhà, tasmà assàsapassàsà kàyasaïkhàro.17
ßFriend Visàkha, in-breaths and out-breaths are bodily, these
things are bound up with the body, that is why in-breaths and out-
breaths are a body-preparation.û
According to this interpretation, in-breathing and out-breathing
are a body-preparation in the sense that their activity is connected
with the body. There is no explicit mention of karma here.
Then the definition of vacãsaïkhàro is as follows: Pubbe kho,
àvuso Visàkha, vitakketvà vicàretvà pacchà vàcaü bhindati, tasmà
vitakkavicàrà vacãsaïkhàro. ßFriend Visàkha, first having thought
and pondered one breaks into speech, that is why thinking and
pondering are a speech-preparation.û Here vacãsaïkhàra is defined
as thinking and pondering, not in terms of karma such as abusive
speech and the like.
16 S II 4, Vibhaïgasutta.
17 M I 301, Cåëavedallasutta.
Then, as the third, cittasaïkhàro is given the following defini-

tion: Sa¤¤à ca vedanà ca cetasikà ete dhammà cittappañibaddhà,
tasmà sa¤¤à ca vedanà ca cittasaïkhàro. ßPerception and feeling
are mental, they are bound up with the mind, that is why percep-
tion and feeling are a mind-preparation.û Perception and feeling
are called a mind-preparation because they are mental and have to
do with the mind.
According to this definition it appears, then, that what the
Buddha had indicated as the second link of the formula of depend-
ent arising, is in-breathing and out-breathing, thinking and
pondering, and perception and feeling. The mode of interpretation,
we have adopted, shows us that the word saïkhàra, in the context
of a drama, for instance, can mean preparations or some sort of
preliminary arrangement or fashioning.
Now this sense of preparation is applicable to in-breaths and
out-breaths too. As we know, in all our bodily activities, particu-
larly in lifting some weight and the like, or when exerting our
selves, we sometimes take a deep breath, almost impulsively. That
is to say, the most basic activity of this body is in-breathing and
out-breathing.
Moreover, in the definition of vacãsaïkhàro it is clearly stated
that one speaks out having first thought out and pondered. This is a
clear instance of the role of saïkhàra as a `preparation' or a
preliminary activity. Now the word `rehearsal' is in common use
in the society. Sometimes, the day before a drama is staged for the
society, a sort of trial performance is held. Similarly, before
breaking out into speech, one thinks and ponders. That is why
sometimes we find words issuing out before we can be aware of it.
Thinking and pondering is called vacãsaïkhàro, because they
`prepare' speech. The sense of `preparation' is therefore quite apt.
Then there is perception and feeling, for which the term cit-
tasaïkhàro is used here, instead of manosaïkhàra. The reason for
it is that what we reckon as manosaïkhàra is actually the more
prominent level represented by intentions and the like. The
background for those intentions, the subliminal preparatory stage,
is to be found in perception and feeling. It is perception and
feeling that give the impetus for the arising of the more prominent
stage of intention. They provide the necessary mental condition for
doing evil or good deeds. This way, we can get at the subtle
nuances of the term saïkhàra. Just as in the case of an iceberg
floating in the ocean, the greater part is submerged and only a
fraction of it shows above the surface, so also the deeper nuances
of this term are rather imperceptible.
Beneath our heap of body actions, verbal actions and mental
acts of willing or intentions lies a huge mountain of activities.
Breathing in and breathing out is the most basic activity in one's
life. It is, in fact, the criterion for judging whether one is alive or
dead. For instance, when someone falls in a swoon, we examine
him to see whether he is still breathing, whether this basic activity
is still there in him. Also, in such a case, we try to see whether he
can speak and feel, whether perception and feeling are still there in
him. So in this way we can understand how these basic forms of
activity decide the criterion for judging whether life is present or
extinct in a person.
That activity is something internal. But even at that level, de-
filements lie dormant, because ignorance is hiding there too. In
fact, that is precisely why they are reckoned as saïkhàra. Usually,
one thinks in terms of Ì' and `mine,' as: ßI breathe,û ßI speak,û ßI
see,û and ßI feel.û So, like the submerged portion of an iceberg,
these subtler layers of preparations also have ignorance hidden
within them. That is why the attempt of pre-Buddhistic ascetics to
solve this saüsàric riddle by tranquility alone met with failure.
Pre-Buddhistic ascetics, and even âlàra Kàlàma and Uddaka
Ràmaputta, thought that they can get out of this saüsàra by
tranquillizing the bodily activities, the verbal activities, and the
mental activities. But they did not understand that all these are
saïkhàras, or preparations, therefore they were confronted with a
certain dilemma. They went on calming down the bodily activities
to subtler and subtler levels. They calmed down the in-breaths and
out-breaths, they managed to suppress thinking and pondering by
concentration exercises, but without proper understanding. It was
only a temporary calming down.
However, once they reached the level of neither-perception-nor-

non-perception, they had to face a certain problem. In fact, the
very designation of that level of attainment betrays the dilemma
they were in. It means that one is at a loss to say definitely whether
there is some perception or not. The Pa¤cattayasutta clearly
reveals this fact. It gives expression to the problem facing those
ascetics in the following significant statement:
Sa¤¤à rogo sa¤¤à gaõóo sa¤¤à sallaü, asa¤¤à sammoho, etaü
santaü etaü paõãtaü yadidaü nevasa¤¤ànàsa¤¤aü.18 ßPerception
is a disease, perception is a boil, perception is a dart, but not to
have perception is to be deluded; this is peaceful, this is excellent,
that is, neither-perception-nor-non-perception.û
They understood to some extent that this perception is a disease,
a trouble, a tumour, or a wound, or else a thorn, they wanted to be
free from perception. But then, on the other hand, they feared that
to be totally free from perception is to be in a deluded state.
Therefore they concluded: `This is peaceful, this is excellent, that
is neither-perception-nor-non-perception,' and came to a halt
there. That is why the Buddha rejected even âlàra Kàlàma and
Uddaka Ràmaputta and went in search of the stilling of all prepa-
rations.
So the kind of tranquility meditation followed by the pre-
Buddhistic ascetics, through various higher knowledges and
meditative attainments, could never bring about a stilling of all
preparations. Why? Because the ignorance underlying those
preparations were not discernible to their level of wisdom. In the
least, they could not even recognize their saïkhàra nature. They
thought that these are only states of a soul. Therefore, like the
present day Hindu Yogins following the philosophy of the
Upani÷ads, they thought that breathing is just one layer of the self,
it is one of the outer rinds of the soul.
18 M II 231, Pa¤cattayasutta.
In fact, the `kernel' of self was supposed to have around it the

four rinds, annamaya, pràõamaya, saüj¤amaya, and vij¤àõamaya.
That is to say, made out of food, breath, perception, and con-
sciousness, respectively. Apart from treating them as states of a
self, they were not able to understand that all these activities are
saïkhàras and that ignorance is the spring-board for them.
In view of the fact that Nibbàna is called the stilling of all prep-
arations, sabbasaïkhàrasamatha, one might sometimes conclude
that the attainment of the cessation of perceptions and feeling,
sa¤¤àvedayitanirodha, is in itself Nibbàna. But it is on rising from
that attainment, which is like a deep freeze, that one makes contact
with the three deliverances, the signless, animitta, the desireless,
appaõihita, and the void, su¤¤ata.
According to the Buddhist outlook, it is wisdom that decides the
issue, and not tranquility. Therefore, in the last analysis, prepara-
tions cease to be preparations when the tendency to grasp the sign
in the preparations is got rid of and signlessness is experienced.
The `sign' stands for the notion of permanence and it accounts for
the deceptive nature of preparations, as in the case of an actor's
make-up and stage-craft. It is the sign of permanence that leads to
a desire for something, to expectations and aspirations.
So that sign has to leave together with the desire, for the
Desireless Deliverance to come about. Then one has to see all this
as essenceless and void. It is just because of desire that we regard
something as èssence-tial.' We ask for the purpose of something,
when we have desire. Now it is through this unique vision of the
Signless, the Desireless, and the Void, that the Buddha arrived at
the state of stilling of all preparations.
We resort to the simile of the film show and the drama not out
of disregard for the precept concerning abstention from such
diversions, but because the Buddha has called dancing a form of
mad behaviour. Ummattakam idaü, bhikkhave, ariyassa vinaye
yadidaü naccaü.19 ßThis, monks, is a form of madness according

to the noble one's discipline, namely dancing.û Now what is the
nature of a madman? He is jumpy. From the standpoint of
Dhamma, dancing is a form of jumpiness. In fact, all preparations
are that. It shows a nervous stress as well as a nervous release. It is
an endless series of winding and unwinding.
What makes this problem of saüsàra such a knotty one to
solve? We go on heaping up karmic actions, but when the time
comes to experience their consequences, we do not regard them as
mere results of karma, but superimpose an Ì' on that experience.
So we act with the notion of an Ì' and react to the consequences
again with the notion of an Ì.' Because of that egoistic reaction,
we heap up fresh karma. So here is a case of stress and release, of
winding and rewinding.
This is like a tangled skein. Sometimes, when an unskilled
person tries to disentangle a tangled skein while disentangling one
end, the other end gets entangled. So it is, in the case of this
saüsàric ball of thread. While doing a karma, one is conscious of
it as ßI am doing it.û And when it is the turn to suffer for it, one
does not think it as a result of that karma. Consequently one
accumulates fresh karma through various attachments and con-
flicts arising out of it. Here too we see some sort of a drama.
Now if one can get the opportunity to see either a rehearsal or
the backstage preparations for a drama, which however is not
usually accessible to the public, one would be able to see through
the drama. If one can steal a peep into the backstage make-up
contrivances of actors and actresses, one would see how ugly
persons can become comely and the wretched can appear regal.
One would then see what a `poor show' it is.
In the same way there is something dramatic in these basic
preparations, namely Ý in-breathing and out-breathing, thinking
and pondering, perception and feeling. If one sees these backstage
19 A I 261, Ruõõasutta.
preparations with wisdom, one would be disenchanted. What

tranquility meditation does, is to temporarily calm them down and
derive some sort of happiness. That too is necessary from the point
of view of concentration, to do away with restlessness and the like,
but it does not dispel ignorance. That is why, in insight meditation,
one tries to understand preparations for what they are by dispelling
ignorance.
The more one sees preparations as preparations, ignorance is
dispelled, and the more one dispels ignorance, the preparations
lose their significance as preparations. Then one sees the nature of
preparations with wisdom as signless, desireless, and void. So
much so that, in effect, preparations cease to be preparations.
This is something of a marvel. If we now hark back to the two
words `winding' and `rewinding,' the entire world, or saüsàric
existence in its entirety, is a process of winding and rewinding.
Where the winding ends and the rewinding begins is a matter
beyond our comprehension. But one thing is clear Ý all these
comes to cease when craving and grasping are abandoned. It is
towards such an objective that our minds turn by recognizing
preparations for what they are, as a result of a deeper analysis of
their nature.
The relation of saïkhàras to ignorance is somewhat similar to
the relation a drama has to its backstage preparations. It seems,
then, that from the standpoint of Dhamma the entire saüsàra is a
product of specifically prepared intentions, even like the drama
with its backstage preparations.
Let us return to the simile of the cinema again. The average
man, when he says that he has seen a film show, what he has
actually seen is just one scene flashing on the screen at a time. As
we happened to mention in an earlier sermon, people go to the
cinema and to the theatre saying: ßWe are going to see a film
show, we are going to see a drama.û20 And they return saying: ßWe
20 See sermon 5.
have seen a film show, we have seen a drama.û But actually, they
have neither seen a film nor a drama completely.
What really has happened? How did they see a film show? Just
as much as one creates a name-and-form on one's screen of
consciousness with the help of preparations, the film-goer has
created a story by putting together the series of scenes falling on
the screen.
What we mean to say is this: Now supposing the series of con-
secutive frames, which make up a motion picture, is made to
appear on the scene when there is no spectator in the cinema hall Ý
will there be a film at all? While such an experiment is going on, if
a film-goer steps in late, halfway through, he would not be able to
gather that portion of the film already gone. It is gone, gone, gone
forever. Those preparations are irrevocably past.
A film show actually becomes a film show thanks to that glue
used by the audience Ý the glue of craving. The Buddha has
preached that this craving has three characteristics, namely:
ponobhavika, nandiràgasahagata, and tatratatràbhinandi.21 Pono-
bhavika as a characteristic of craving means, in its broader sense,
that it leads to re-becoming. One might think that by `re-
becoming' only the connecting up of one existence in saüsàra
with another is meant. But that is not all. It is craving that connects
up one moment of existence with another.
One who is seeing a film show, for instance, connects up the
first scene with the second, in order to understand the latter. And
that is how one `sees' a film show and comes back and says: ßI
have seen a film show.û All the scenes do not fall on the screen at
once, but a connecting-up goes on. That is the idea behind the term
ponobhavika. In this connecting up of one scene with another there
is an element of re-becoming or re-generation.
Then there is the term nandiràgasahagata. This is the other
additive which should be there for one to enjoy the film show. It
21 S V 421, Dhammacakkappavattanasutta.
means the nature of delighting and getting attached. Craving in

particular is like a glue. In fact, a synonym for it is lepa, which
means a `glue.'22 Another synonym is visattika, an àdhesive' or a
`sticky substance.'23 Even the word ràga, or attachment, already
conveys this sense. So craving, or desire, glues the scenes togeth-
er.
Then comes the term tatratatràbhinandi, the nature of delight-
ing, in particular now here, now there. It is, in effect, the associa-
tion of one scene with another in order to make up a story out of it.
That is why we made the statement: `So far not a single cinema
has held a film show and not a single theatre has staged a drama.'24
But all the same, those who went to the cinema and the theatre
witnessed a show and a drama. How? They produced them, or
prepared them, with their `sticky' defilements on their own.
Now in the same way, worldly beings create a film show of
name-and-form on the screen of consciousness with the help of
preparations, or saïkhàras. Name-and-form is a product of imagi-
nation. What insight meditators often refer to as reflection on
`name-and-form preparations,' amounts to this. Is there something
real in name-and-form? In our very first sermon we happened to
say something on this point.25
In the Dvayatànupassanàsutta of the Sutta Nipàta the Buddha
gives utterance to the following verse:
Anattani attamàniü,
passa lokaü sadevakaü,
niviññhaü nàmaråpasmiü,
idaü saccan'ti ma¤¤ati.26
22 E.g. at Nid I 54: taõhàlepo.

23 Dhp 335: taõhà loke visattikà, (Taõhàvagga).
24 See sermon 5.
25 See sermon 1.
ßJust see the world, with all its gods,

Fancying a self where none exists,
Entrenched in name-and-form it holds
The conceit that this is real.û
It is as if the Buddha is pinpointing the illusory and deceptive

nature of name-and-form. As we mentioned before, scenes fall on
the cinema screen only one at a time. Because of the rapidity of
the movie film, it is difficult for one to be aware of this fact. Now,
in the case of a drama, the curtain goes down between acts and the
audience waits for the curtain to go up. But they wait, ready with
their glue to connect the previous act with the one to come, to
construct a drama. By the time a certain scene falls on the cinema
screen, the previous one is gone for good. Scenes to follow have
not yet come. Whatever scene falls on the screen, now, will not
stay there. So what we have here, is something illusory, a decep-
tive phenomenon.
Let us now consider an instance like this: Sometimes we see a
dog, crossing a plank over a stream, stopping halfway through to
gaze at the water below. It wags its tail, or growls, or keeps on
looking at and away from the water, again and again. Why does it
do so? Seeing its own image in the water, it imagines that to be
another dog. So it either wags its tail in a friendly way, or growls
angrily, or else it keeps on stealing glances out of curiosity Ý love,
hate, and delusion.
In this case, the dogs thinks that it is looking because it sees a
dog. But what is really happening? It is just because it is looking
that it sees a dog. If the dog had not looked down, it would not
have seen a dog looking up at it from below, that is to say Ý its
own image. Now it is precisely this sort of illusion that is going on
with regard to this name-and-form, the preparations, and sense-
perception. Here lies the secret of Dependent Arising.
As a flash-back to our film show, it may be added that if a film
reel is played at a time when there is no spectator, no film show
will be registered anywhere, because there is no mind to put
together. It merely flashed on the screen. But if someone had been
there to receive it, to contact with his sense-bases, that is, to see
with his eyes, hear with his ears, and make mental contact with
desire, then there comes to be a film show. And so also in the case
of a drama.
Film producers and dramatists think that the production of the
film and the drama is solely their work. But in the last analysis, it
is the audience that gives the film and the drama the finishing
touch, to make them finished products. Similarly, we tend to think
that every object in the world exists in its own right. But then this
is what is called sakkàyadiññhi, the `personality view,' which
carries with it the self-bias.
It is such a view that made the dog imagine that there is another
dog in the water. It imagined that the dog is there, even when it is
not looking. It may have thought: ßI am looking because a dog
appears there.û But the fact is that the dog appears there because it
cares to look. Here, then, we have a case of dependent arising, or
pañicca samuppàda.
The word pañicca has a very deep meaning. The Buddha bor-
rowed many words from the existing philosophical tradition in
India. Sometimes he infused new meanings into them and adopted
them to his terminology. But the term pañicca samuppàda is not to
be found in any other philosophical system. The special signifi-
cance of the term lies in the word pañicca.
On a certain occasion, the Buddha himself gave a definition to
this term pañicca samuppàda. Now it is fairly well known that the
Buddha declared that all this suffering is dependently arisen. What
then is to be understood by the word dukkha, or `suffering?' He
defines it in terms of the five grasping groups, or the five aggre-
gates of clinging, as it is said: saïkhittena pa¤cupàdànakkhandhà
dukkhà,27 ßIn short, the five grasping groups are suffering.û So
then suffering, or the five grasping groups, is something de-
pendently arisen.
In one discourse in the Nidànasaüyutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya

we find the Buddha making the following significant statement:
Pañiccasamuppannaü kho, Upavàõa, dukkhaü vuttaü mayà. Kiü
pañicca? Phassaü pañicca.28 ßUpavàõa, I have declared that
suffering is dependently arisen. Dependent on what? Dependent
on contact.û So from this statement, also, it is clear that the five
groups of grasping arise because of contact, that is by contacting
through the six bases.
Considered in this way, a thing is called dependently arisen
because it arises on being touched by the six sense-bases. That is
why it is called anicca, or impermanent. The film show, for
instance, was not something already made, or `ready made.' It
arose due to contact. The phrase saïkhataü pañiccasamup-
pannaü,29 `prepared and dependently arisen,' suggests that the
prepared nature is also due to that contact. What may be called
abhisaïkhata vi¤¤àõa,30 `specifically prepared consciousness,' is
that sort of consciousness which gets attached to name-and-form.
When one sees a film show, one interprets a scene appearing on
the screen according to one's likes and dislikes. It becomes a thing
of experience for him. Similarly, by imagining a self in name-and-
form, consciousness gets attached to it. It is such a consciousness,
which is established on name-and-form, that can be called abhi-
saïkhata vi¤¤àõa.
Then could there be also a consciousness which does not reflect
a name-and-form? Yes, there could be. That is what is known as
anidassana vi¤¤àõa,31 or `non-manifestative consciousness.' This
brings us to an extremely abstruse topic in this Dhamma.
28 S II 41, Upavàõasutta.
29 E.g. at M III 299, Indriyabhàvanàsutta.
30 S III 58, Udànasutta (cf. vi¤¤àõaü . . . anabhisaïkhacca vimuttaü).
31 E.g. at M I 329, Brahmanimantanikasutta.
There is a very deep verse occurring at the end of the Kev-

aóóhasutta of the Dãgha Nikàya which has been variously inter-
preted by scholars both eastern and western. It runs:
Vi¤¤àõaü anidassanaü,
anantaü sabbato pabhaü,
ettha àpo ca pañhavã,
ettha dãgha¤ca rassa¤ca,
aõuü thålaü subhàsubhaü,
vi¤¤àõassa nirodhena,
etth'etaü uparujjhati.32
The commentary advances several interpretations to this verse.33

Being unable to give one definite meaning, it suggests several.
However, since we have developed a certain mode of interpreta-
tion so far, we propose to give preference to it before getting down
to the commentarial interpretation. Now let us see whether our
mode of interpretation can make this verse meaningful.
First of all, we have to trace the circumstances which provide
the setting for this verse in the Kevaóóhasutta. The Buddha brings
out a past episode, relating to the company of monks. A certain
monk conceived the riddle: `Where do these four great primaries,
earth, water, fire, and air, cease altogether?' He did not approach
the Buddha with his problem, probably because he thought that
somewhere in this world-system those four elements could cease.
So what did he do? As he had psychic powers he went from
heaven to heaven and Brahma realm to Brahma realm, asking the
gods and Brahmas this question: `Where do these four primaries
32 D I 223, Kevaóóhasutta.
33 Sv II 393.
cease?' None among the gods and Brahmas could answer. In the
end, Mahà Brahma himself asked him, why he took the trouble to
come all the way there, when he could have easily consulted the
Buddha. Then that monk approached the Buddha and put the
riddle to him.
But before answering the riddle, the Buddha recommended a
restatement of it, saying: `Monk, that is not the way you should
put it. You should have worded it differently.' Now that means
that the question is wrongly put. It is incorrect to ask where the
four great primaries cease. There is a particular way of wording it.
And this is how the Buddha reformulated that riddle:
Kattha àpo ca pañhavã,

kattha dãgha¤ca rassa¤ca,
kattha nàma¤ca råpa¤ca,
asesaü uparujjhati?
ßWhere do earth and water,

Fire and wind no footing find,
Where is it that long and short,
Fine and coarse, pleasant, unpleasant,
As well as name-and-form,
Are held in check in a way complete?û
Here the Buddha introduces a phrase of special significance: na

gàdhati, `does not find a footing.' So the question, as restated,
means: ßWhere do the four primaries not get a footing?û The
question, then, is not about a cessation of the four primaries, it is
not a question of their cessation somewhere in the world or in the
world system. The correct way to put it, is to ask where the four
great primaries do not find a footing. The Buddha adds that it may
also be asked where long and short, fine and coarse, pleasant and
unpleasant, as well as name-and-form are held in check complete-
ly. The word uparujjhati means `holding in check.'
Having first reformulated the question, the Buddha gave the

answer to it in the verse previously quoted. Let us now try to get at
the meaning of this verse. We shall not translate, at the very outset,
the first two lines of the verse, vi¤¤àõaü anidassanaü, anantaü
sabbato pabhaü. These two lines convey a very deep meaning.
Therefore, to start with, we shall take the expression as it is, and
explain its relation to what follows.
It is in this consciousness, which is qualified by the terms ani-
dassanaü, anantaü, and sabbato pabhaü, that earth, water, fire,
and air do not find a footing. Also, it is in this consciousness that
long and short, fine and coarse, and pleasant and unpleasant, as
well as name-and-form, are kept in check. It is by the cessation of
consciousness that all these are held in check.
Nibbàna Sermon 7



Towards the end of the last sermon we happened to quote a
certain verse from the Kevaóóhasutta of the Dãgha Nikàya. The
verse runs as follows:
ettha dãgha¤ca rassa¤ca,
177
The other day, we could give only a general idea of the meaning of
this verse in brief, because of the question of time. Today, we
propose to attempt a detailed explanation of it. To start with, we
purposely avoid rendering the first two lines, which appear as the
crux of the whole verse. Taking those two lines as they are, we
could paraphrase the verse as follows:
It is in a consciousness, that is anidassana, ananta, and sabbato
pabha, that earth, water, fire, and air do not find a footing. It is in
this consciousness that long and short, fine and coarse, and
pleasant and unpleasant, as well as name-and-form, are kept in
check. It is by the cessation of consciousness that all these are held
in check.
Let us now try to sort out the meaning of the difficult words in
the first two lines. First of all, in the expression vi¤¤àõaü anidas-
sanaü, there is the term anidassana. The meaning of the word
nidassana is fairly well known. It means ìllustration.' Something
that `throws light on' or `makes clear' is called nidassana. This is
the basic sense.
We find an instance of the use of this word, even in this basic
sense, in the first Kosalasutta among the Tens of the Aïguttara
Nikàya. It is in connection with the description of abhibhàyatanà,
bases of mastery, where there is a reference to contemplation
devices known as kasiõa. It is said that even the flax flower can be
used initially as a sign for kasiõa meditation. A flax flower is
described in the following words: Umàpupphaü nãlaü nãlavaõõaü
nãlanidassanaü nãlanibhàsaü,3 which may be rendered as: ßThe
flax flower, blue, blue-coloured, manifesting blue, shining blue.û
Nãlanidassanaü suggests that the flax flower is an illustration of
3 A V 61, Kosalasutta.
blue colour, or that it is a manifestation of blue. Anidassana could

therefore be said to refer to whatever does not manifest anything.
In fact, we have a very good example in support of this suggest-
ed sense in the Kakacåpamasutta of the Majjhima Nikàya. There
we find the Buddha putting a certain question to the monks in
order to bring out a simile: ßMonks, suppose a man comes with
crimson, turmeric, indigo, or carmine and says: Ì shall draw
pictures and make pictures appear on the sky!' What do you think,
monks, could that man draw pictures and make pictures appear
there?û Then the monks reply: Aya¤hi, bhante, àkàso aråpã
anidassano. Tattha na sukaraü råpaü likhituü, råpapàtubhàvaü
kàtuü.4 ßThis sky, Lord, is immaterial and non-illustrative. It is
not easy to draw a picture there or make manifest pictures there.û
Here we have the words in support of the above suggested
meaning. The sky is said to be aråpã anidassano, immaterial and
non-illustrative. That is why one cannot draw pictures there or
make pictures appear there. There is nothing material in the sky to
make manifest pictures. That is, the sense in which it is called
anidassano in this context.
Let us now see how meaningful that word is, when used with
reference to consciousness as vi¤¤àõaü anidassanaü. Why the
sky is said to be non-manifestative we could easily understand by
the simile. But how can consciousness become non-manifestative?
First and foremost we can remind ourselves of the fact that our
consciousness has in it the ability to reflect. That ability is called
paccavekkhana, `looking back.' Sometimes the Buddha has given
the simile of the mirror with reference to this ability, as for
instance in the AmbalatthikàRàhulovàdasutta of the Majjhima
Nikàya.5 In the ânandasutta of the Khandhasaüyutta, also, he has
used the simile of the mirror.6 In the former sutta preached to
4 M I 127, Kakacåpamasutta.
5 M I 415, AmbalatthikàRàhulovàdasutta.
6 S III 105, ânandasutta.
Venerable Ràhula the Buddha uses the simile of the mirror to

stress the importance of reflection in regard to bodily, verbal, and
mental action.
In our last sermon, we gave a simile of a dog crossing a plank
over a stream and looking at its own reflection in the water.7 That,
too, is a kind of reflection. But from that we can deduce a certain
principle with regard to the question of reflection, namely, that the
word stands for a mode of becoming deluded as well as a mode of
getting rid of the delusion. What creates a delusion is the way that
dog is repeatedly looking down from his own point of view on the
plank to see a dog in the water. That is unwise reflection born of
non-radical attention, ayoniso manasikàra. Under the influence of
the personality view, sakkàyadiññhi, it goes on looking at its own
image, wagging its tail and growling. But wise reflection born of
radical attention, yoniso manasikàra, is what is recommended in
the AmbalatthikàRàhulovàdasutta with its thematic repetitive
phrase paccavekkhitvà, paccavekkhitvà,8 ßreflecting again and
again.û
Wise reflection inculcates the Dhamma point of view. Reflec-
tion based on right view, sammà diññhi, leads to deliverance. So
this is the twin aspect of reflection. But this we mention by the
way. The point we wish to stress is that consciousness has in it the
nature of reflecting something, like a mirror.
Now vi¤¤àõaü anidassanaü is a reference to the nature of the
released consciousness of an arahant. It does not reflect anything.
To be more precise, it does not reflect a nàma-råpa, or name-and-
form. An ordinary individual sees a nàma-råpa, when he reflects,
which he calls Ì' and `mine.' It is like the reflection of that dog,
which sees its own delusive reflection in the water. A non-
arahant, upon reflection, sees name-and-form, which however he
mistakes to be his self. With the notion of Ì' and `mine' he falls
7 See sermon 6.
8 M I 415, AmbalatthikàRàhulovàdasutta.
into delusion with regard to it. But the arahant's consciousness is

an unestablished consciousness.
We have already mentioned in previous sermons about the
established consciousness and the unestablished consciousness.9 A
non-arahant's consciousness is established on name-and-form.
The unestablished consciousness is that which is free from name-
and-form and is unestablished on name-and-form. The established
consciousness, upon reflection, reflects name-and-form, on which
it is established, whereas the unestablished consciousness does not
find a name-and-form as a reality. The arahant has no attachments
or entanglements in regard to name-and-form. In short, it is a sort
of penetration of name-and-form, without getting entangled in it.
This is how we have to unravel the meaning of the expression
anidassana vi¤¤àõa.
By way of further clarification of this sense of anidassana, we
may remind ourselves of the fact that manifestation requires
something material. That is obvious even from that simile picked
up at random from the Kakacåpamasutta. As for the consciousness
of the arahant, the verse in question makes it clear that earth,
water, fire, and air do not find a footing there. It is because of
these four great primaries that one gets a perception of form. They
are said to be the cause and condition for the designation of the
aggregate of form: Cattàro kho, bhikkhu, mahàbhåtà hetu, cattàro
mahàbhåtà paccayo råpakkhandhassa pa¤¤àpanàya.10 ßThe four
great primaries, monk, are the cause and condition for the designa-
tion of the form group.û
Now the arahant has freed his mind from these four elements.
As it is said in the Dhàtuvibhaïgasutta: Pañhavãdhàtuyà cittaü
viràjeti,11 ßHe makes his mind dispassionate with regard to the
earth-element.û âpodhàtuyà cittaü viràjeti, ßHe makes his mind
9 See sermon 3 and 4.

10 M III 17, MahàPuõõamasutta.
dispassionate with regard to the water-element.û As he has freed

his mind from the four elements through disenchantment, which
makes them fade away, the arahant's reflection does not engender
a perception of form. As the verse in question puts it rather
rhetorically, ettha àpo ca pañhavã, tejo vàyo na gàdhati, ßHerein
water and earth, fire and air find no footing.û
Here the word gàdhati is particularly significant. When, for
instance, we want to plumb the depth of a deep well, we lower
something material as a plumb into the well. Where it comes to
stay, we take as the bottom. In the consciousness of the arahant,
the material elements cannot find such a footing. They cannot
manifest themselves in that unplumbed depth of the arahant's
consciousness.
tejo vàyo na gàdhati.
ßConsciousness, which is non-manifestative,

Endless and lustrous on all sides,
It is here that water, earth,
Fire, and air no footing find.û
It is precisely because the material elements cannot make them-

selves manifest in it, that this consciousness is called `non-
manifestative.' In the same connection we may add that such
distinctions as long and short, fine and coarse, and pleasant and
unpleasant are not registered in that consciousness, because they
pertain to things material. When the consciousness is freed from
the four elements, it is also free from the relative distinctions,
which are but the standards of measurements proper to those
elements.
Let us now consider the implications of the term anantaü Ý
èndless,' ìnfinite.' We have already said something about the
plumbing of the depth of waters. Since the material elements have
faded away in that consciousness, they are unable to plumb its

depth. They no longer serve as an ìndex' to that consciousness.
Therefore, that consciousness is endless or infinite.
It is endless also in another sense. With regard to such distinc-
tions as `long' and `short' we used the word `relative.' These are
relative concepts. We even refer to them as conjoined pairs of
terms. In worldly usage they are found conjoined as `long and
short,' `fine and coarse,' `pleasant and unpleasant.' There is a
dichotomy about these concepts, there is a bifurcation. It is as if
they are put within a rigid framework.
When, for instance, we go searching for a piece of wood for
some purpose or other, we may say: ßThis piece of wood is too
long.û Why do we say so? Because we are in need of a shorter
one. Instead of saying that it is not `sufficiently' short, we say it is
too long. When we say it is too short, what we mean is that it is
not sufficiently long. So then, long and short are relevant within
one framework. As a matter of fact, all measurements are relative
to some scale or other. They are meaningful within some frame-
work of a scale.
In this sense, too, the worldling's way of thinking has a tenden-
cy to go to extremes. It goes to one extreme or the other. When it
was said that the world, for the most part, rests on a dichotomy,
such as that between the two views Ìs' and Ìs not,'12 this idea of a
framework is already implicit. The worldling's ways of thought
ènd-up' in one extreme or the other within this framework. The
arahant transcends it, his consciousness is, therefore, endless,
ananta.
There is a verse in the Pàñaligàmiyavagga of the Udàna, which
clearly brings out this fact. Most of the discourses in that section
of the Udàna deal with Nibbàna Ý Nibbànapañisaüyutta Ý and the
following verse, too, is found in such a discourse:
12 S II 17, Kaccàyanagottasutta, see sermon 4.

Duddasaü anantaü nàma,

na hi saccaü sudassanaü,
pañividdhà taõhà jànato,
passato natthi ki¤canaü.13
This verse, like many other deep ones, seems to have puzzled the
commentators. Let alone the meaning, even the variant readings
had posed them a problem, so much so that they end up giving the
reader a choice between alternate interpretations. But let us try to
get at the general trend of its meaning.
Duddasaü anantaü nàma, ßHard to see is the endlessû Ý what-
ever that èndless' be. Na hi saccaü sudassanaü, ßThe truth is not
easily seen,û which in effect is an emphatic assertion of the same
idea. One could easily guess that this èndless' is the truth and that
it refers to Nibbàna. Pañividdhà taõhà means that ßcraving has
been penetrated through.û This penetration is through knowledge
and wisdom, the outcome of which is stated in the last line. Janato
passato natthi ki¤canaü, ßto one who know and sees there is
NOTHING.û The idea is that when craving is penetrated through
with knowledge and wisdom, one realizes the voidness of the
world. Obviously, the reference here is to Nibbàna.
The entire verse may now be rendered as follows:
ßHard to see is the Endless,

Not easy `tis to see the truth,
Pierced through is craving,
And naught for him who knows and sees.û
The commentator, however, is at a loss to determine whether the

correct reading is anataü or anantaü and leaves the question
open. He gives one interpretation in favour of the reading ana-
taü.14 To show its justifiability he says that natà is a synonym for
13 Ud 80, DutiyaNibbànapañisaüyuttasutta.
14 Ud-a 393.
taõhà, or craving, and that anataü is a term for Nibbàna, in the

sense that there is no craving in it. It must be pointed out that it is
nati and not natà that is used as a synonym for taõhà.
Anyway, after adducing reasons for the acceptability of the
reading anataü, he goes on to say that there is a variant reading,
anantaü, and gives an interpretation in support of it too. In fact, he
interprets the word anantaü in more than one sense. Firstly,
because Nibbàna is permanent, it has no end. And secondly it is
endless because it is immeasurable, or appamàõa.
In our interpretation of the word anantaü we have not taken it
in the sense of permanence or everlastingness. The word appa-
màõa, or immeasurable, can have various nuances. But the one we
have stressed is the transcendence of relative concepts, limited by
their dichotomous nature. We have also alluded to the unplumbed
depth of the arahant's consciousness, in which the four elements
do not find a footing.
In the Buddhavagga of the Dhammapada we come across an-
other verse which highlights the extraordinary significance of the
word anantaü:
Yassa jàlinã visattikà,

taõhà natthi kuhi¤ci netave,
taü Buddham anantagocaraü,
apadaü kena padena nessatha?15
Before attempting a translation of this verse, some of the words in

it have to be commented upon. Yassa jàlinã visattikà. Jàlinã is a
synonym for craving. It means one who has a net or one who goes
netting. Visattikà refers to the agglutinative character of craving.
It keeps worldlings glued to objects of sense. The verse may be
rendered as follows:
15 Dhp 180, Buddhavagga.

ßHe who has no craving, with nets in and agglutinates to

lead him somewhere Ý by what track could that Awakened
One of infinite range be led Ý trackless as he is?û
Because the Buddha is of infinite range, he is trackless. His path

cannot be traced. Craving wields the net of name-and-form with its
glue when it goes ranging. But since the Awakened One has the
èndless' as his range, there is no track to trace him by.
The term anantagocaraü means one whose range has no end or
limit. If, for instance, one chases a deer, to catch it, one might
succeed at least at the end of the pasture. But the Buddha's range
is endless and his `ranging' leaves no track.
The commentators seem to interpret this term as a reference to
the Buddha's omniscience Ý to his ability to attend to an infinite
number of objects.16 But this is not the sense in which we interpret
the term here. The very fact that there is `no object' makes the
Buddha's range endless and untraceable. Had there been an object,
craving could have netted him in. In support of this interpretation,
we may allude to the following couple of verses in the Arahanta-
vagga of the Dhammapada:
Yesaü sannicayo natthi,

ye pari¤¤àta bhojanà,
su¤¤ato animitto ca,
vimokkho yesa gocaro,
àkàse va sakuntànaü,
gati tesaü durannayà.
Yassàsavà parikkhãõà,
àhàre ca anissito,
su¤¤àto animitto ca,
vimokkho yassa gocaro,
16 Dhp-a III 197.

padaü tassa durannayaü.17
Both verses express more or less the same idea. Let us examine the
meaning of the first verse. The first two lines are: Yesaü san-
nicayo natthi, ye pari¤¤àta bhojanà. ßThose who have no accumu-
lation and who have comprehended their food.û The words used
here are charged with deep meanings. Verses in the Dhammapada
are very often rich in imagery. The Buddha has on many occasions
presented the Dhamma through deep similes and metaphors. If the
metaphorical sense of a term is ignored, one can easily miss the
point.
For instance, the word sannicaya, in this context, which we
have rendered as àccumulation,' is suggestive of the heaping up
of the five aggregates. The word upacaya is sometimes used with
reference to this process of heaping up that goes on in the minds of
the worldlings.18 Now this heaping up, as well as the accumulation
of kamma, is not there in the case of an arahant. Also, they have
comprehended their food. The comprehension of food does not
mean simply the usual reflection on food in terms of elements. Nor
does it imply just one kind of food, but all the four nutriments
mentioned in the Dhamma, namely kabaëiïkàràhàra, material
food, phassa, contact, manosa¤cetanà, volition, and vi¤¤àõa,
consciousness.19
The next two lines tell us what the true range or pasture of the
arahants is. It is an echo of the idea of comprehension of food as
well as the absence of accumulation. Su¤¤ato animitto ca,
vimokkho yesa gocaro, ßWhose range is the deliverance of the
void and the signless.û When the arahants are in their attainment
to the fruit of arahant-hood, their minds turn towards the void and
17 Dhp 92 - 93, Arahantavagga.

18 E.g. at M III 287, MahàSaëàyatanikasutta.
19 E.g. at S II 101, Atthiràgasutta.
the signless. When they are on this feeding-ground, neither Màra

nor craving can catch them with their nets. They are trackless Ý
hence the last two lines àkàse va sakuntànaü, gati tesa duran-
nayà, ßTheir track is hard to trace, like that of birds in the sky.û
The word gati in this last line is interpreted by the commenta-
tors as a reference to the `whereabouts' of the arahants after their
parinibbàna.20 It has dubious associations of some place as a
destination. But in this context, gati does not lend itself to such an
interpretation. It only refers to their mental compass, which is
untraceable, because of their deliverance trough the void and the
signless.
The next verse also bring out this idea. Yassàsavà parikkhãõà,
àhàre ca anissito, ßWhose influxes are extinct and who is unat-
tached in regard to nutriment.û Su¤¤àto animitto ca, vimokkho
yassa gocaro, ßWhose range is the void and the signless.û âkàse
va sakuntànaü, padaü tassa durannayaü, ßHis path is hard to
trace, like that of birds in the sky.û This reminds us of the last line
of the verse quoted earlier, apadaü kena padena nessatha, ßBy
what track could one lead him, who is trackless?û21 These two
verses, then, throw more light on the meaning of the expression
anantagocara Ý of infinite range Ý used as an epithet for the
Awakened One.
Let us now get at the meaning of the term sabbato pabham, in
the context vi¤¤àõaü anidassanaü, anantaü sabbato pabhaü.22
In our discussion of the significance of the drama and the cinema
we mentioned that it is the darkness in the background which
keeps the audience entranced in a way that they identify them-
selves with the characters and react accordingly.23 The darkness in
20 Dhp -a II 173.
23 See sermon 5.
the background throws a spell of delusion. That is what makes for

ènjoyment.'
Of course, there is some sort of light in the cinema hall. But that
is very limited. Some times it is only a beam of light, directed on
the screen. In a previous sermon we happened to mention that
even in the case of a matinee show, dark curtains and closed doors
and windows ensure the necessary dark background.24 Here, in this
simile, we have a clue to the meaning sabbato pabhaü, luminous
or lustrous on all sides. Suppose a matinee show is going on and
one is enjoying it, entranced and deluded by it. Suddenly doors
and windows are flung open and the dark curtains are removed.
Then immediately one slips out of the cinema world. The film may
go on, but because of the light coming from all sides, the limited
illumination on the screen fades away, before the total illumina-
tion. The film thereby loses its enjoyable quality.
As far as consciousness, or vi¤¤àõa, is concerned, it is not
something completely different from wisdom, pa¤¤à, as it is
defined in the Mahàvedallasutta. However, there is also a differ-
ence between them, pa¤¤à bhàvetabbà, vi¤¤àõaü pari¤¤eyyaü,
ßWisdom is to be developed, consciousness is to be comprehend-
ed.û25 Here it is said that one has to comprehend the nature of
consciousness.
Then one may ask: `We are understanding everything with
consciousness, so how can one understand consciousness?' But the
Buddha has shown us the way of doing it. Wisdom, when it is
developed, enables one to comprehend consciousness. In short,
consciousness is as narrow as that beam of light falling on the
cinema screen. That is to say, the specifically prepared conscious-
ness, or the consciousness crammed up in name-and-form, as in
the case of the non-arahant. It is as narrow as the perspective of
24 See sermon 5.
25 M I 293, MahàVedallasutta.
the audience glued to the screen. The consciousness of the ordi-

nary worldling is likewise limited and committed.
Now what happens when it is fully illuminated on all sides with
wisdom? It becomes sabbato pabhaü, lustrous on all sides. In that
lustre, which comes from all sides, the framework of ignorance
fades away. It is that released consciousness, free from the dark
framework of ignorance, that is called the consciousness which is
lustrous on all sides, in that cryptic verse in question. This lustre,
associated with wisdom, has a special significance according to
the discourses. In the Catukkanipàta of the Aïguttara Nikàya we
come across the following sutta:
Catasso imà, bhikkhave, pabhà. Katamà catasso? Can-

dappabhà, suriyappabhà, aggippabhà, pa¤¤àpabhà. Imà
kho, bhikkhave, catasso pabhà. Etad aggaü, bhikkhave,
imàsaü catunnaü pabhànaü yadidaü pa¤¤àpabhà.26
ßMonks, there are these four lustres. Which four? The lus-
tre of the moon, the lustre of the sun, the lustre of fire, and
the lustre of wisdom. These, monks, are the four lustres.
This, monks, is the highest among these four lustres,
namely the lustre of wisdom.û
Another important discourse, quoted quite often, though not

always correctly interpreted, is the following:
Pabhassaram idaü, bhikkhave, cittaü. Ta¤ca kho

àgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliññhaü. Taü assutavà pu-
thujjano yathàbhåtaü nappajànàti. Tasmà assutavato
puthujjanassa citta bhàvanà natthã'ti vadàmi.
Pabhassaram idaü, bhikkhave, cittaü. Ta¤ca kho

àgantukehi upakkilesehi vippamuttaü. Taü sutavà ari-
26 A II 139, Pabhàsutta.
yasàvako yathàbhåtaü pajànàti. Tasmà sutavato ari-

yasàvakassa citta bhàvanà atthã'ti vadàmi.27
ßThis mind, monks, is luminous, but it is defiled by extra-

neous defilements. That, the uninstructed ordinary man
does not understand as it is. Therefore, there is no mind
development for the ordinary man, I declare.
ßThis mind, monks, is luminous, but it is released from ex-

traneous defilements. That, the instructed noble disciple
understands as it is. Therefore, there is mind development
for the instructed noble disciple, I declare.û
It is sufficiently clear, then, that the allusion is to the luminous

mind, the consciousness of the arahant, which is non-
manifestative, infinite, and all lustrous. To revert to the analogy of
the cinema which, at least in a limited sense, helps us to form an
idea about it, we have spoken about the stilling of all prepara-
tions.28 Now in the case of the film, too, there is a stilling of
preparations. That is to say, the preparations which go to make it a
`movie' film are `stilled.' The multicoloured dresses of actors and
actresses become colourless before that illumination, even in the
case of a technicolour film. The scenes on the screen get blurred
before the light that suddenly envelops them.
And what is the outcome of it? The preparations going on in the
minds of the audience, whether induced by the film producers or
aroused from within, are calmed down at least temporarily. This
symbolizes, in a limited sense, the significance of the phrase
sabbasaïkhàrasamatha, the stilling of all preparations.
Then what about the relinquishment of all assets, sabbåpad-
hipañinissagga? In the context of the film show, it is the bundle of
27 A I 10, Accharàsaïghàtavagga.
28 See sermon 5.
experiences coming out of one's `vested-interests' in the marvel-

ous cinema world. These assets are relinquished at least for the
moment. Destruction of craving, taõhakkhayo, is momentarily
experienced with regard to the blurred scenes on the screen.
As to the term viràga, we have already shown that it can be
understood in two senses, that is, dispassion as well as the fading
away which brings about the dispassion.29 Now in this case, too,
the fading away occurred, not by any other means, but by the very
fact that the limited narrow beam of consciousness got superseded
by the unlimited light of wisdom.
Nirodha means cessation, and the film has now ceased to be a
film, though the machines are still active. We have already
mentioned that in the last analysis a film is produced by the
audience.30 So its cessation, too, is a matter for the audience. This,
then, is the cessation of the film.
Now comes Nibbàna, extinction, or extinguishment. Whatever
heated emotions and delirious excitements that arose out of the
film show cooled down, at least momentarily, when the illumina-
tion takes over. This way we can form some idea, somewhat
inferentially, about the meaning and significance of the term
sabbato pabhaü, with the help of this illustration based on the
film show.
So now we have tackled most of the difficulties to the interpre-
tation of this verse. In fact, it is the few words occurring in the first
two lines that has posed an insoluble problem to scholars both
eastern and western. We have not yet given the commentarial
interpretation, and that, not out of disrespect for the venerable
commentators. It is because their interpretation is rather hazy and
inconclusive. However, we shall be presenting that interpretation
at the end of this discussion, so as to give the reader an opportuni-
ty to compare it with ours.
29 See sermon 5.
30 See sermon 5.
But for the present, let us proceed to say something about the
last two lines as well. Vi¤¤àõassa nirodhena, etth'etaü uparuj-
jhati. As we saw above, for all practical purposes, name-and-form
seem to cease, even like the fading away of the scenes on the
cinema screen. Then what is meant by this phrase vi¤¤àõassa
nirodhena, with the cessation of consciousness? The reference
here is to that abhisaïkhata vi¤¤àõa, or the specifically prepared
consciousness. It is the cessation of that concocted type of con-
sciousness which was formerly there, like the one directed on the
cinema screen by the audience. With the cessation of that specifi-
cally prepared consciousness, all constituents of name-and-form
are said to be held in check, uparujjhati.
Here, too, we have a little problem. Generally, nirujjhati and
uparujjhati are regarded as synonymous. The way these two verbs
are used in some suttas would even suggest that they mean the
same thing. As a matter of fact, even the CåëaNiddesa, which is a
very old commentary, paraphrases uparujjhati by nirujjhati: upa-
rujjhatã'ti nirujjhati.31
Nevertheless, in the context of this particular verse, there seems
to be something deep involved in the distinction between these
two verbs. Even at a glance, the two lines in question are sugges-
tive of some distinction between them. Vi¤¤àõassa nirodhena,
etth'etaü uparujjhati, the nirodha of consciousness is said to
result in the uparodha of whatever constitutes name-and-form.
This is intriguing enough.
But that is not all. By way of preparing the background for the
discussion, we have already made a brief allusion to the circum-
stances in which the Buddha uttered this verse.32 What provided
the context for its utterance was a riddle that occurred to a certain
monk in a moment of fancy. The riddle was: `Where do these four
great primaries cease altogether?' There the verb used is niruj-
31 Nid II 110.
32 See sermon 6.
jhanti.33 So in order to find where they cease, he whimsically went

from heaven to heaven and from Brahma-world to Brahma-world.
As we mentioned earlier, too, it was when the Mahà Brahma
directed that monk to the Buddha, saying, ßWhy òn earth' did you
come all this way when the Buddha is there to ask?,û that the
Buddha reworded the question. He pointed out that the question
was incorrectly worded and revised it as follows, before venturing
to answer it:
Kattha àpo ca pañhavã,

kattha dãgha¤ca rassa¤ca,
kattha nàma¤ca råpa¤ca,
asesaü uparujjhati?34
The word used by the Buddha in this revised version is uparujjhati

and not nirujjhati. Yet another innovation is the use of the term na
gàdhati. Where do water, earth, fire, and air find no footing? Or
where do they not get established? In short, here is a word sugges-
tive of plumbing the depth of a reservoir. We may hark back to the
simile given earlier, concerning the plumbing of the consciousness
with the perception of form. Where do the four elements not find a
footing? Also, where are such relative distinctions as long and
short, subtle and gross, pleasant and unpleasant, as well as name-
and-form, completely held in check?
In this restatement of the riddle, the Buddha has purposely
avoided the use of the verb nirujjhati. Instead, he had recourse to
such terms as na gàdhati, `does not find a footing,' `does not
plumb,' and uparujjhati, ìs held in check,' or ìs cut off.' This is
evidence enough to infer that there is a subtle distinction between
the nuances associated with the two verbs nirujjhati and uparuj-
jhati.
What is the secret behind this peculiar usage? The problem that
occurred to this monk is actually of the type that the materialists of
today conceive of. It is, in itself, a fallacy. To say that the four
elements cease somewhere in the world, or in the universe, is a
contradiction in terms. Why? Because the very question: `Where
do they cease?,' presupposes an answer in terms of those elements,
by way of defining that place. This is the kind of uncouth question
an ordinary materially inclined person would ask.
That is why the Buddha reformulated the question, saying:
`Monk, that is not the way to put the question. You should not ask
`where' the four great primaries cease, but rather where they, as
well as the concepts of long and short, subtle and gross, pleasant
and unpleasant, and name-and-form, are held in check.' The
question proper is not where the four great primaries cease, but
where they do not get established and where all their accompani-
ments are held in check.
Here, then, we see the Buddha relating the concept of matter,
which the world takes for granted, to the perception of form
arising in the mind. The four great primaries haunt the minds of
the worldlings like ghosts, so they have to be exorcised from their
minds. It is not a question of expelling them from this world, or
from any heavenly realm, or the entire world-system. That
exorcism should take place in this very consciousness, so as to put
an end to this haunting.
Before the light of wisdom those ghosts, namely the four great
primaries, become ineffective. It is in the darkness of ignorance
that these ghosts haunt the worldlings with the perception of form.
They keep the minds of the worldlings bound, glued, committed
and limited. What happens now is that the specifically prepared
consciousness, which was bound, glued, commit ted and limited,
becomes fully released, due to the light of wisdom, to become
non-manifestative, endless, and lustrous on all sides. So, to sum
up, we may render the verse in question as follows:

Endless, lustrous on all sides,
Here it is that earth and water,
Fire and air no footing find,
Here it is that long and short,
And name-and-form,
Are cut off without exception,
When consciousness has surceased,
These are held in check herein.û
Though we ventured to translate the verse, we have not yet given

the commentarial interpretation of it. Since this might seem a short
coming, we shall now present what the commentator has to say on
this verse.
Venerable Buddhaghosa, before coming to this verse in his
commentary to the Kevaóóhasutta, gives an explanation as to why
the Buddha reformulated the original question of that monk.
According to him, the question: `Where do the four great primaries
cease?,' implied both the organic and the inorganic aspects of
matter, and in revising it, the Buddha limited its scope to the
organic. In other words, Venerable Buddhaghosa presumes that
the revised version has to be interpreted with reference to this
human body. Hence he explains such words as `long' and `short,'
occurring in the verse, in a limited sense as referring to the body's
stature. How facile this interpretation turns out to be, one can
easily discern as we go on.
Venerable Buddhaghosa keeps on reminding the reader that the
questions are relevant only to the organic realm, upàdinnaü yeva
sandhàya pucchati.35 So he interprets the terms dãgha¤ca ras-
sa¤ca, long and short, as relative distinctions of a person's height,
that is tallness and shortness. Similarly, the words aõuü thålaü,
35 Sv II 393.
subtle and gross, are said to mean the small and big in the size of
the body. Likewise subha and asubhaü are taken to refer to the
comely and the ugly in terms of body's appearance.
The explanation given to the phrase nàma¤ca råpa¤ca is the
most astounding of all. Nàma is said to be the name of the person
and råpa is his form or shape. All this goes to show that the
commentator has gone off at a tangent, even in the interpretation
of this verse, which is more or less the prologue to such an
intricate verse as the one in question. He has blundered at the very
outset in limiting the scope of those relative terms to the organic,
thereby obscuring the meaning of that deep verse.
The significance of these relative terms, from the linguistic
point of view, has been overlooked. Words like dãghaü/rassaü
and aõuü/thålaü do not refer to the stature and size of some
person. What they convey is the dichotomous nature of concepts in
the world. All those deeper implications are obscured by the
reference to a person's outward appearance. The confusion
becomes worse confounded, when nàma¤ca råpa¤ca is interpreted
as the name and the shape of a person. So the stage is already set
for a shallow interpretation, even before presenting the verse
beginning with vi¤¤àõaü anidassanaü.
It is on such an unsound premise that the commentator bases his
interpretation of the verse in question. We shall try to do justice to
that exposition, too. It might necessitate a fair amount of quota-
tions, though it is difficult to be comprehensive in this respect.
The commentator begins his exposition with the word vi¤¤àõaü
itself. He comes out with a peculiar etymology: Vi¤¤àõan'ti tattha
vi¤¤àtabbanti vi¤¤àõaü nibbànassa nàmaü, which means that the
word vi¤¤àõa, or consciousness, is in this context a synonym for
Nibbàna, in the sense that it is `to be known,' vi¤¤àtabbaü. This
forced etymology is far from convincing, since such a usage is not
attested elsewhere. Moreover, we come across a long list of
epithets for Nibbàna, as many as thirty-three, in the
Asaïkhatasaüyutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya, but vi¤¤àõa is not

counted as one.36 In fact, nowhere in the discourses is vi¤¤àõa
used as a synonym for Nibbàna.
Next, he takes up the word anidassana, and makes the follow-
ing comment: Tad etaü nidassanàbhàvato anidassanaü, that
Nibbàna is called anidassana because no illustration for it could
be given. The idea is that it has nothing to compare with. Then
comes the explanation of the word anantaü. According to the
commentator Nibbàna is called ananta, endless, because it has
neither the arising-end, uppàdanto, nor the falling-end, vayanto,
nor the otherwiseness of the persisting-end, ñhitassa a¤¤athatta.
Strangely enough, even the last mentioned middle-state is counted
as an ènd' in the commentator's concept of three ends. So this is
the substance of his commentary to the first three words vi¤¤àõaü,
anidassanaü, anantaü.
The commentarial interpretation of the term sabbato pabhaü is
even more confusing. The word pabhà is explained as a synonym
for papa, meaning `ford.' The bha element in the word, he
explains, is a result of consonantal interchange with the original pa
in papa. Pakàrassa pana bhakàro kato. The idea is that the
original form of this particular term for Nibbàna is sabbato
papaü. The meaning attributed to it is `with fords on all sides.'
Nibbàna is supposed to be metaphorically conceived as the ocean,
to get down into which there are fords on all sides, namely the
thirty-eight topics of meditation. This interpretation seems rather
far-fetched. It is as if the commentator has resorted to this simile
of a ford, because he is already ìn deep waters'! The word pabhà,
as it is, clearly means light, or radiance, and its association with
wisdom is also well attested in the canon.
Though in his commentary to the Dãgha Nikàya Venerable
Buddhaghosa advances the above interpretation, in his commen-
tary to the Majjhima Nikàya he seems to have had second thoughts
36 S IV 359, Asaïkhatasaüyutta.
on the problem. In the Brahmanimantanikasutta of the Majjhima

Nikàya, also, the first two lines of the verse, vi¤¤àõaü anidassan-
aü, anantaü sabbato pabhaü, occur.37 But here the commentator
follows a different line of interpretation. Whereas in his commen-
tary to the Kevaóóhasutta he explains anidassanaü as an epithet
of Nibbàna, in the sense of having nothing to compare with, here
he takes it in the sense of not being visible to the eye. Cakkhu-
vi¤¤àõassa àpàthaü anupagamanato anidassanaü nàma,38 ßIt is
called anidassana because it does not come within the range of
eye-consciousness.û
In explaining the term sabbato pabhaü, he suggests several
alternative interpretations. In the first interpretation, he takes
pabhà to mean light, or lustre. Sabbato pabhan'ti sabbato pabhà-
sampannaü. Nibbànato hi a¤¤o dhammo sappabhataro và joti-
vantataro và parisuddhataro và paõóarataro và natthi. ßSabbato
pabhaü means more lustrous than anything else. For there is
nothing more lustrous or luminous or purer or whiter than
Nibbàna.û In this interpretation Nibbàna is even regarded as
something white in colour!
The etymology of the term sabbato pabhaü has been given a
twist, for the word sabbato is taken in a comparative sense, `more
lustrous than anything.' As we have pointed out, the term actually
means `lustrous on all sides.' Then a second interpretation is
given, bringing in the word pabhå, `lord' or `chief.' Sabbato và
pabhå, that is to say more prominent than anything else. In support
of it he says: Asukadisàya nàma nibbànaü natthã'ti na vattabbaü,
ßIt should not be said that in such and such a direction Nibbàna is
not to be found.û He says that it is called pabhå, or lord, because it
is to be found in all directions. Only as the third interpretation he
cites his simile of the ford already given in his commentary to the
Kevaóóhasutta.
37 M I 329, Brahmanimantanikasutta.
38 Ps II 413.
What is the reason for giving so many figurative interpretations

as alternatives to such a significant verse? Surely the Buddha
would not have intended the verse to convey so many conflicting
meanings, when he preached it.
No doubt the commentators have made a great effort to preserve
the Dhamma, but due to some unfortunate historical circumstanc-
es, most of the deep discourses dealing with the subject of
Nibbàna have been handed down without even a clue to the
correct version among variant readings. This has left the commen-
tators nonplussed, so much so that they had to give us several
vague and alternative interpretations to choose from. It is up to us
to decide, whether we should accept this position as it is, or try to
improve on it by exploring any other possible means of explana-
tion.
We had occasion to mention in our very first sermon that the
Buddha himself has prophesied that those discourse which deal
with voidness would, in time to come, go into disuse, with their
deeper meanings obscured.39 The interpretations just quoted go to
show that already the prediction has come true to a great extent.
The phrase we quoted from the Brahmanimantanikasutta with
its reference to anidassana vi¤¤àõa occurs in a context which has
a significance of its own. The relevant paragraph, therefore,
deserves some attention. It runs as follows:
Vi¤¤ànaü anidassanaü anantaü sabbato pabhaü, taü

pañhaviyà pañhavittena ananubhåtaü, àpassa àpattena
ananubhåtaü, tejassa tejattena ananubhåtaü, vàyassa
vàyattena ananubhåtaü, bhåtànaü bhåtattena ananu-
bhåtaü, devànaü devattena ananubhåtaü, pajàpatissa
pajàpatittena ananubhåtaü, brahmànaü brahmattena
ananubhåtaü, àbhassarànaü àbhassarattena ananu-
bhåtaü, subhakiõhànaü subhakiõhattena ananubhåtaü,
39 S II 267, âõisutta; see sermon 1.

vehapphalànaü vehapphalatte ananubhåtaü, abhibhussa

abhibhuttena ananubhåtaü, sabbassa sabbattena ananu-
bhåtaü.40
ßConsciousness which makes nothing manifest, infinite

and all lustrous, it does not partake of the earthiness of
earth, the wateriness of water, the fieriness of fire, the air-
iness of air, the creature-hood of creatures, the deva-hood
of devas, the Pajàpati-hood of Pajàpati, the Brahma-hood
of Brahma, the radiance of the Radiant Ones, the Sub-
hakiõha-hood of the Subhakiõha Brahmas, the Vehappha-
la-hood of the Vehapphala Brahmas, the overlord-ship of
the overlord, and the all-ness of the all.û
This peculiar paragraph, listing thirteen concepts, seems to convey

something deep about the nature of the non-manifestative con-
sciousness. That consciousness does not partake of the earthiness
of earth, the wateriness of water, the fieriness of fire, and the
airiness of air. That is to say, the nature of the four elements does
not inhere in this consciousness, they do not manifest themselves
in it. Similarly, the other concepts, like deva-hood, Brahma-hood,
etc., which the worldlings take seriously as real, have no applica-
bility or validity here.
The special significance of this assertion lies in the context in
which the Buddha declared it. It is to dispel a wrong view that
Baka the Brahma conceived, in regarding his Brahma status as
permanent, everlasting and eternal, that the Buddha made this
declaration before that Brahma himself in the Brahma world. The
whole point of the discourse, then, is to challenge the wrong view
of the Brahma, by asserting that the non-manifestative conscious-
ness of the arahant is above the worldly concepts of elements and
divinity and the questionable reality attributed to them. In other
words, they do not manifest themselves in it. They are

transcended.
Nibbàna Sermon 8



The other day we ended our sermon by discussing how far the
Brahmanimantanikasutta of the Majjhima Nikàya helps us to
understand what anidassana vi¤¤àõa is. We quoted a certain
paragraph from that discourse as a starting point for our discus-
sion. Let us now remind ourselves of it:
Vi¤¤ànaü anidassanaü anantaü sabbato pabhaü, taü

pañhaviyà pañhavittena ananubhåtaü, àpassa àpattena
ananubhåtaü, tejassa tejattena ananubhåtaü, vàyassa
vàyattena ananubhåtaü, bhåtànaü bhåtattena ananu-
bhåtaü, devànaü devattena ananubhåtaü, pajàpatissa
pajàpatittena ananubhåtaü, brahmànaü brahmattena
203
ananubhåtaü, àbhassarànaü àbhassarattena ananu-

bhåtaü, subhakiõhànaü subhakiõhattena ananubhåtaü,
vehapphalànaü vehapphalattena ananubhåtaü, abhi-
bhussa abhibhuttena ananubhåtaü, sabbassa sabbattena
ananubhåtaü.2
ßConsciousness which makes nothing manifest, infinite

and all lustrous. It does not partake of the earthiness of
earth, the wateriness of water, the fieriness of fire, the air-
iness of air, the creature-hood of creatures, the deva-hood
of devas, the Pajàpati-hood of Pajàpati, the Brahma-hood
of Brahma, the radiance of the Radiant Ones, the Sub-
hakiõha-hood of the Subhakiõha Brahmas, the Vehappha-
la-hood of the Vehapphala Brahmas, the overlord-ship of
the overlord, and the all-ness of the all.û
The gist of this paragraph is that the non-manifestative conscious-

ness which is infinite and all lustrous, is free from the qualities
associated with any of the concepts in the list, such as the earthi-
ness of earth and the wateriness of water. That is to say it is not
under their influence, it does not partake of them, ananubhåtaü.
Whatever nature the world attributes to these concepts, whatever
reality they invest it with, that is not registered in this non-
manifestative consciousness. That is why this consciousness is
said to be uninfluenced by them.
Usually, the worldlings attribute a certain degree of reality to
concepts in everyday usage. These may be reckoned as mind-
objects, things that the mind attends to. The word dhamma also
means à thing,' so the worldling thinks that there is some-`thing'
in each of these concepts. Or, in other words, they believe that
there is something as an inherent nature or essence in these objects
of the mind.
But the quotation in question seems to imply that this so-called

nature is not registered in the arahant's mind. It is extremely
necessary for the worldling to think that there is some real nature
in these mind-objects. Why? Because in order to think of them as
objects they have to have some essence, at least they must be
invested with an essence, and so the worldlings do invest them
with some sort of an essence, and that is the earthiness of earth, the
wateriness of water, etc. Likewise there is a being-hood in beings,
a deva-hood in devas, a Pajàpati-hood in Pajàpati, a Brahma-
hood in Brahma, so much so that even in the concept of all, there
is an all-ness Ý and this is the worldlings' standpoint.
Attributing a reality to whatever concept that comes up, the
worldlings create for themselves perceptions of permanence,
perceptions of the beautiful, and perceptions of self. In other
words, they objectify these concepts in terms of craving, conceit
and views. That objectification takes the form of some inherent
nature attributed to them, such as earthiness, deva-hood etc.
But as for the non-manifestative consciousness, it is free from
the so-called natures that delude the worldlings. In the conscious-
ness of the arahants, there is not that infatuation with regard to the
mass of concepts which the worldlings imagine as real, in order to
keep going this drama of existence. This fact is clearly borne out
by another statement in the Brahmanimantanikasutta. The Buddha
makes the following declaration, to break the conceit of Baka the
Brahma, who conceived the idea of permanence regarding his
status as a Brahma:
Pañhaviü kho ahaü, brahme, pañhavito abhi¤¤àya yàvatà
pañhaviyà pañhavittena ananubhåtaü tadabhi¤¤àya pañhaviü
nàhosim, pañhaviyà nàhosiü, pañhavito nàhosiü, pañhaviü me'ti
nàhosiü, pañhaviü nàbhivadiü.3
ßHaving understood through higher knowledge earth as earth, O
Brahma,û (that is to say having understood by means of a special
3 ibid.
kind of knowledge, and not by means of the ordinary sense-

perception), ßand having understood through higher knowledge
whatever that does not partake of the earthiness of earth,û (the
reference here is to that non-manifestative consciousness, which is
to be described in the passage to follow), ßI did not claim to be
earth,û pañhaviü nàhosim, ßI did not claim to be on earth,û
pañhaviyà nàhosiü, ßI did not claim to be from earth,û pañhavito
nàhosiü, ßI did not claim earth as mine,û pañhaviü me'ti nàhosiü,
ßI did not assert earth,û pañhaviü nàbhivadiü.
The declensional forms given here are also suggestive of the
fact that once the worldlings attribute some inherent nature to
those concepts in terms of a `ness,' as in earthy-ness, and make
them amenable to their cravings, conceits and views, declensional
forms come into usage, a few instances of which have been
mentioned here. So, with regard to this earth, one can conceive of
it as `my earth,' or as Ì am on earth,' or Ì who am on the earth,'
or `from the earth.' By holding on tenaciously to these declension-
al forms of one's own creation, one is only asserting one's ego.
Now, for instance, we all know that what is called à flower' is
something that can fade away. But when one conceives of it as
`The-flower-I-saw,' and thereby appropriates it into the concept of
an I, it gets invested with the nature of permanence, since it can be
`re-called.' A perception of permanence which enables one to
think about it again, arises out of it. This is the idea behind the
above reference.
It is in the nature of the released mind not to take these concepts
seriously. It does not have a tenacious grasp on these declensional
forms. It is convinced of the fact that they are mere conventions in
ordinary usage. Due to that conviction itself, it is not subject to
them. ßI did not claim to be earth, I did not claim to be on earth, I
did not claim to be from earth, I did not claim earth as mine, I did
not assert earth,û pañhaviü nàbhivadiü.
Here the word abhivadiü is suggestive of conceit. The three

terms abhinandati, abhivadati and ajjhosàya tiññhati are often
mentioned together in the discourses.4 Abhinandati means delight-
ing in particular, which is suggestive of craving. Abhivadati means
an assertion by way of conceit Ý an assertion which implies à
taking up' of something. Ajjhosàya tiññhati stands for dogmatic
involvement regarding views. Thus abhinandati, abhivadati, and
ajjhosàya tiññhati correspond to the three terms taõhà, craving,
màna, conceit, and diññhi, views, respectively.
Now out of these, what we find here is abhivadati Ý pañhaviü
nàbhivadiü, ßI did not assert earthû Ý I did not make any assertion
about earth by way of conceit. From this, too, we can infer that the
ordinary man in this world takes his perception of the earth
seriously, and by conceiving of it as èarth is mine,' Ì am on the
earth,' etc., invests the concepts with a permanent nature. But this
is a kind of device the worldlings adopt in order to perpetuate the
drama of existence. However, everyone of these elements is void.
In this particular context, the four elements earth, water, fire and
air, are mentioned at the very outset. The Buddha, having under-
stood the emptiness and impermanence of these elements, does not
cling to them. The ordinary worldling, on the other hand, clings to
the perception of earth in a piece of ice because of its hardness.
But as we know, when we heat it up to a certain degree, its watery
quality reveals itself. Further heating would bring up its fiery
nature. Continuous heating will convert it into vapour, revealing
its air quality.
Thus these four great primaries, which the world clings to, also
have the nature of impermanence about them. The emancipated
one, who rightly understands this impermanence through his
higher knowledge, does not get upset by their ghostly configura-
tions. His consciousness is not subject to them. This is the import
of the above paragraph.
4 E.g. at M I 266, MahàTaõhàsaïkhayasutta.

The same holds true with regard to the other concepts. Saüsàric
beings have their conventional usages. One might think of oneself
as a god among gods. Now Baka the Brahma had the conceit Ì am
a Brahma.' But even his Brahma-status gets melted away like that
piece of ice, at least after some aeons. So even Brahma-hood is
subject to `liquidation,' like an ice-cube.
In this way, the released consciousness of the arahant does not
register a perception of permanence with regard to the concepts
which masquerade as real in the worldling's drama of existence.
That is why it is called `non-manifestative' consciousness. That
non-manifestative consciousness is free from those concepts.
By way of further explanation of the nature of this released
mind, we may drop a hint through the analogy of the film and the
drama, which we have employed throughout. Now, for instance, in
order to produce a tragic scene on the screen, the film producers
adopt subtle devices and camera tricks. Sometimes an awe-
inspiring scene of conflagration or ruthless arson, which drives
terror into the hearts of the audience, is produced with the help of
cardboard houses. Cardboard houses are set on fire, but the
audience is hoodwinked into thinking that a huge mansion is on
fire. Similarly, terrific traffic accidents are displayed on the screen
with the help of a few toys.
In this drama of existence, too, there are similar tragic scenes.
Now, in spite of their tragic quality, if any member of the audience
truly understands at that moment that these are cardboard houses
and toys toppled from hill tops, he sees something comic in the
apparently tragic. Likewise, in this drama of existence, there is a
tragic aspect as well as a comic aspect.
As a matter of fact, both these words, tragic and comic, can be
accommodated within the highly significant term saüvega,
anguish, sense of urgency. In trying to arouse saüvega with regard
to saïkhàras, or preparations, we could bring in both these
attitudes. The ordinary worldling sees only the tragic side of the
drama of existence, and that is because of his ignorance. But the
arahant, the emancipated one, sees in this drama of existence a
comic side as well.
As an illustration we may allude to those occasions in which the

Buddha himself and those disciples with psychic powers like
Venerable MahàMoggalàna, are said to have shown a faint smile,
situppàda, on seeing how beings in saüsàra are reborn in high and
low realms according to their deeds, as in a puppet show.5 Of
course, that spontaneous smile has nothing sarcastic or unkind
about it. But all the same, it gives us a certain hint. This spontane-
ous smile seems to be the outcome of an insight into the comic
aspect of this existential drama. The faint smile is aroused by the
conviction of the utter futility and insubstantiality of the existential
drama, seeing how beings who enjoyed high positions come down
to the level of hungry ghosts, petas, or even to lower realms in
their very next birth. It is somewhat like the response of one who
has correctly understood the impermanence and the illusory nature
of things shown on a film screen.
When one comes to think of this drama of existence, saüsàric
beings appear like puppets drawn upwards by the five higher
fetters, uddhambhàgiya saüyojana, and drawn downwards by the
five lower fetters, orambhàgiya saüyojana. They reappear more
or less like puppets, manipulated up and down by strings, which
are but the results of their own deeds.
The wherewithal for the drama of existence is supplied by the
four great primaries Ý the four basic elements of earth, water, fire
and air. In the case of a film or a drama, sometimes the same
object can be improvised in a number of ways, to produce various
scenes and acts. What in one scene serves as a sitting-stool, could
be improvised as a footstool in another scene, and as a table in yet
another. Similarly, there is something called double-acting in
films. The same actor can delineate two characters and appear in
different guises in two scenes.
A similar state of affairs is to be found in this drama of exist-
ence. In fact, the Buddha has declared that there is not a single
5 M II 45, M II 74, S I 24, S II 254-258, A III 214.

being in saüsàra who has not been one of our relations at some
time or other.6 We are in the habit of putting down such relations
to a distant past, in order to avoid a rift in our picture of the world
by upsetting social conventions. But when one comes to think of it
in accordance with the Dhamma, and also on the strength of
certain well attested facts, sometimes the male or the female baby
cuddled by a mother could turn out to be her own dead father or
mother.
Such a strangely ludicrous position is to be found in the acts of
this drama of existence. Usually the world is unaware of such
happenings. Though ludicrous, the world cannot afford to laugh at
it. Rather, it should be regarded as a sufficient reason for arousing
an anguished sense of urgency: `What a pity that we are subject to
such a state of affairs! What a pity that we do not understand it
because of the power of influxes and latencies and thereby heap up
defilements!'
Such an awareness of the emptiness of all this can give rise to
anguish. One can get some understanding on the lines of the
signless, the unsatisfactory, and the void, by contemplating these
facts. One can also contemplate on the four elements, how they are
at the beginning of a world period, and how they get destroyed at
the end of a world period, in the conflagration at the end of an
aeon. Likewise, when one comes to think of the state of persons or
beings in general, in accordance with this fact of relationship,
there is much room for anguish and a sense of urgency.
It is because of all this that the Buddha sometimes declares, as
in the discourse on the rising of seven suns, Sattasuriyasutta, that
this is ßenough to get disenchanted with all preparations, enough
to get detached from them, enough to get released from them,û
alameva sabbasaïkhàresu nibbindituü alaü virajjituü alaü
vimuccituü.7
6 S II 189-190, Anamataggasaüyutta.
7 A IV 100, Sattasuriyasutta.
We have been drawing upon a particular nuance of the term

saïkhàra throughout, that is, as things comparable to those
instruments, temporarily improvised in a dramatic performance
just for the purpose of producing various acts on the stage. It is the
same with persons, who are like actors playing their parts.
Beings, who are born in accordance with their karma, entertain
the conceit Ì am a god,' Ì am a Brahma.' Once their karma is
spent up, they get destroyed and are reborn somewhere or other. It
is the same with those items used in a drama, such as the stool and
the footstool. But the intriguing fact is that those in the audience,
watching each of those acts, grasp as such whatever objects they
see on the stage when they produce their individual dramas.
We have already mentioned at the very outset that the final
stage in the production of a drama is a matter for the audience and
not for the theatricians. Each member of the audience creates a
drama in his own mind, putting together all preparations. What
serves as a stool in one act of the drama, may be used as a foot-
stool in the next. In the first instance it sinks into the minds of the
audience as a stool, and in the next as a footstool. It is the same in
the case of beings and their relationships.
It must have been due to this state of affairs in the drama of
existence, which arouses anguish, that the Buddha makes the
declaration in quite a number of discourses dealing with the topic
of impermanence, including those which describe the destruction
of the aeon: `This is enough, monks, to get disenchanted with all
preparations, to get detached from them, to get released from
them.'
These preparations are comparable to a film reel, which is the
basic requirement for the film of name-and-form shown on the
screen of consciousness of beings in this world. As the world is
regarded as a sort of stage, trees, beings and objects in our envi-
ronment are like objects on the stage. But the intriguing fact about
it is that the ordinary man in the world is unaware of their `pre-
pared' nature as a frame work.
When one is watching a film, one becomes unaware of the fact
that it is just something shown on the screen. At that moment it
appears as something real and life-like. It is about this apparent

reality that the Buddha speaks when he utters the following lines
in the Itivuttaka: Jàtaü bhåtaü samuppannaü, kataü
saïkhatamaddhuvaü;8 ßBorn, become, arisen, made up, prepared,
unstable.û Whatever appears as real in this world, is actually made
and prepared by saïkhàras. It is their insubstantial nature, their
impermanent, unsatisfactory and not-self nature, that is hinted at
by these lines.
The term saïkhàra is suggestive of some artificiality about this
world. Everything that goes to `make-it-up' is a saïkhàra. The
non-manifestative consciousness, which is aware of its imperma-
nent nature, is therefore free from these preparations. It is free
from those concepts which the worldlings cling to. It remains
unshaken by their ghostly transfigurations. We come across four
wonderful verses in the Adhimutta Theragàthà which, though
extremely simple, give us a deep insight into this freedom in the
arahant's mind.
The story of Venerable Adhimutta is a marvelous one.9 While
going through a forest Venerable Adhimutta got caught to a band
of robbers, who were just getting ready to offer a human sacrifice
to the gods. So they got hold of this arahant as their victim. But
the latter showed no consternation. There was no fear or terror in
his face. The bandit chief asked him why he is unmoved. Then the
Venerable Adhimutta uttered a set of verses in reply. Out of them,
we may quote the following four significant verses:
Natthi cetasikaü dukkhaü,

anapekkhassa gàmani,
atikkantà bhayà sabbe,
khãõasaüyojanassa ve.10
8 It 37, Ajàtasutta.
9 Th-a III 12.
10 Th 707, Adhimutta Theragàthà.
ßThere is no mental pain

To one with no expectations, oh headman,
All fears have been transcended
By one whose fetters are extinct.û
Na me hoti àhosin'ti,
`bhavissan'ti na hoti me,
saïkhàrà vibhavissanti,
tattha kà paridevanà?11
ßIt does not occur to me Ì was,'

Nor does it occur to me Ì will be,'
Mere preparations get destroyed,
What is there to lament?û
Suddhaü dhammasamuppàdaü,
suddhaü saïkhàrasantatiü,
passantassa yathàbhåtaü,
na bhayaü hoti gàmani.12
ßTo one who sees as it is,

The arising of pure dhammas
And the sequence of pure preparations,
There is no fear, oh headman.û
Tiõakaññhasamaü lokaü,
yadà pa¤¤àya passati,
mamattaü so asaüvindaü,
`natthi me'ti na socati.13
11 Th 715, ibid.
12 Th 716, ibid.
13 Th 717, ibid.
ßWhen one sees with wisdom,

This world as comparable to grass and twigs,
Not finding anything worthwhile holding on as mine,
One does not grieve: Ò! I have nothing!'û
At least a fraction of the gist of these four verses has already come
up in some form or other in the sermons given so far. Now as for
the first verse, addressed to the bandit chief, the first two lines say
that there is no mental pain to one who has no expectations,
cravings, or desire. The next two lines state that one whose fetters
are destroyed has transcended fears.
To begin with, let us get at the meaning of this verse. Here it is
said that there is no mental pain, natthi cetasikaü dukkhaü. In an
earlier sermon based on the Cetanàsutta we happened to mention
that for one who does not take body, word, and mind as real, there
is no inward pleasure and pain, ajjhattaü sukhadukkhaü.14 The
relevant quotation is:
Avijjàya tveva asesaviràganirodhà so kàyo na hoti, yaü

paccayàssa taü uppajjati ajjhattaü sukhadukkhaü . . . sà
vàcà na hoti . . . so mano na hoti . . . khettaü taü na hoti,
vatthum taü na hoti, àyatanaü taü na hoti, adhikaraõaü
taü na hoti, yaü paccayàssa taü uppajjati ajjhattaü su-
khadukkhaü.15
With the complete fading away and cessation of ignorance, the

arahant has no notion of a body. That is, he does not have a
perception of a body, like that of a worldling, who takes it as such,
due to his perception of the compact, ghanasa¤¤à. Likewise that
speech is not there, sà vàcà na hoti. The basic reason for speech-
preparation is the reality attributed to words and linguistic usages.
14 See sermon 6.
When, for instance, someone scolds us, we are displeased at it

because of the reality given to those words. Similarly, that mind is
not there, so mano na hoti. It is only the collocation of prepara-
tions which arise and cease that is conceived as `my mind.'
Therefore, whatever field, site, base or reason, owing to which
there can arise inward pleasure or pain, is no longer there. If the
bandits had actually killed him, he would not have had any mental
pain, because he lets go before Màra comes to grab. This is the
idea expressed in the first verse.
As for the second verse, there too the idea of voidness is well
expressed. The thought Ì was,' does not occur to me. The idea Ì
am' is not in me. Nor do I entertain the idea Ì will be.' That is to
say, it does not occur to me that I had a past or that I will have a
future. It only occurs to me that preparations get destroyed. That
was what happened in the past and will happen in the future. So
what is there to lament?
A very important idea emerges from these verses. Now this
series of sermons is on the subject of Nibbàna. We thought of
giving these sermons because of the existing variety of conflicting
views on Nibbàna. There is no clear idea even about our goal, not
only among non-Buddhists, but even among Buddhists them-
selves. From these verses we can glean some important facts. Here
the reference is to existence. This arahant must have had numer-
ous births as pretas, Brahmas, gods, and human beings. But he is
not saying something false here. What is really meant by saying
that it does not occur to me Ì was?'
Ordinary worldlings, or even those with higher psychic powers,
when they see their past lives think of it as Ì was so and so in such
and such a birth.' Sometimes one entertains a conceit at the
thought Ì was a god,' Ì was a Brahma.' If he had been an animal
or a preta, he is somewhat displeased. Such is not the case with
this arahant. He sees that what was in the past is a mere heap of
preparations, and what will be in the future is again a heap of
preparations. It is like the case of that cinema goer who under-
stands that whatever comes up in the film is artificially got up. It is
a state of mind aroused by wisdom. `So what is there to lament,' is

the attitude resulting from it.
On an earlier occasion, we happened to compare these prepara-
tions to a heap of windings and unwindings in existence.16 Now as
to this process of winding and unwinding, we may take as an
illustration the case of a rope. There is a winding and an unwind-
ing in it. We can form an idea about the nature of this existence
even with the help of a simple illustration.
Nibbàna has been defined as the cessation of existence.17 The
Buddha says that when he is preaching about the cessation of
existence, some people, particularly the brahmins who cling to a
soul theory, bring up the charge of nihilism against him.18 Not only
those brahmins and heretics believing in a soul theory, but even
some Buddhist scholars are scared of the term bhavanirodha,
fearing that it leads to a nihilistic interpretation of Nibbàna. That is
why they try to mystify Nibbàna in various ways. What is the
secret behind this attitude? It is simply the lack of a clear under-
standing of the unique philosophy made known by the Buddha.
Before the advent of the Buddha, the world conceived of exist-
ence in terms of a perdurable essence as `being,' sat. So the idea of
destroying that essence of being was regarded as annihilationism.
It was some state of a soul conceived as Ì' and `mine.' But
according to the law of dependent arising made known by the
Buddha, existence is something that depends on grasping,
upàdànapaccayà bhavo. It is due to grasping that there comes to
be an existence. This is the pivotal point in this teaching.
In the case of the footstool, referred to earlier, it became a foot-
stool when it was used as such. If in the next act it is used to sit on,
it becomes a stool. When it serves as a table, it becomes a table.
Similarly in a drama, the same piece of wood, which in one act
16 See sermon 6.
17 E.g. at S II 117, Kosambisutta.
serves as a walking stick to lean on, could be seized as a stick to

beat with, in the next act.
In the same way, there is no essential thing-hood in the things
taken as real by the world. They appear as things due to cravings,
conceits and views. They are conditioned by the mind, but these
psychological causes are ignored by the world, once concepts and
designations are superimposed on them. Then they are treated as
real objects and made amenable to grammar and syntax, so as to
entertain such conceits and imaginings as, for instance, ìn the
chair,' òn the chair,' `chair is mine,' and so on.
Such a tendency is not there in the released mind of the arahant.
He has understood the fact that existence is due to grasping,
upàdànapaccayà bhavo. Generally, in the explanation of the law
of dependent arising, the statement `dependent on grasping,
becoming' is supposed to imply that one's next life is due to one's
grasping in this life. But this becoming is something that goes on
from moment to moment. Now, for instance, what I am now
holding in my hand has become a fan because I am using it as a
fan. Even if it is made out of some other material, it will still be
called a fan. But if it were used for some other purpose, it could
become something else. This way we can understand how exist-
ence is dependent on grasping.
We began our discussion with the statement that existence is a
heap of windings and unwindings. Let us now think of a simple
illustration. Suppose a rope or a cord is being made up by winding
some strands from either end by two persons. For the strands to
gather the necessary tension, the two persons have to go on
winding in opposite directions. But for the sake of an illustration,
let us imagine a situation in which a third person catches hold of
the strands in the middle, just before the other two start their
winding. Oddly enough, by mistake, those two start winding in the
same direction. Both are unaware of the fact that their winding is
at the same time an unwinding. The one in the middle, too, is
ignorant that it is his tight grasp in the middle which is the cause
of stress and tension.
To all appearance, a cord is being made up which may be taken

as two cords on either side of the one who has his hold on the
middle. However, viewed from a distance, for all practical
purposes it is just one cord that is being winded up.
To introduce a note of discord into this picture, let us suppose
that the man in the middle suddenly lets go of his hold with a
`twang.' Now what happens to the cord? The windings in the same
direction from both ends, which made it a cord, immediately get
neutralized and the cord ceases to be a cord! Something like the
stilling of all preparations and the abandonment of all assets
happens at that moment. One realizes, às-it-is,' that no real cord
existed at all.
The same state of affairs prevails in this world. The imperma-
nence of this world, according to the Buddha, does not affect us so
long as there is no grasping on our part. All windings in this world
get unwinded immediately. This is the nature of the world. This is
what is meant by udayabbaya, or rise and fall.
Now what happens if there is no grasping in the middle while
the winding is going on in the same direction from both ends? No
cord at all is made up, even if the two at either end go on winding
for aeons and aeons. Why? Simply because they are winding in the
same direction.
It is the same in the case of the world. The impermanence we
see around us in this world does not affect us by itself. We are
affected only when we grasp. It is the grasp in the middle that
accounts for the cord, or rather, for whatever has the semblance
of a cord. In fact, this is what the worldlings call `the world.' This
is what they take as real. Now what is the consequence of taking it
to be real? If it is real and permanent, whatever is contrary to it, is
annihilation, the destruction of a real world.
Keeping in mind the meaning of the Buddha's dictum `depend-
ent on grasping is existence,' upàdànapaccayà bhavo, if one cares
to reflect on this little illustration, one would realize that there is
actually nothing real to get destroyed. There is no self or soul at all
to get destroyed.
As a matter of fact, the impermanence of the world is a process

of momentary arisings and ceasings. Given the grasping in the
middle, that is to say, `dependent on grasping is becoming,' the
other links follow suit, namely `dependent on becoming, birth;
dependent on birth, decay-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain,
grief and despair arise,' bhavapaccayà jàti, jàtipaccayà
jaràmaraõaü sokaparidevadukkhadomanassåpàyàsà sam-
bhavanti.
It is somewhat like the unpleasant tension caused by the wind-
ing, in the person who has a grasp at the middle. We have already
referred to a short aphorism which sums up the content of the
insight of those who realize the fruits of the path, like that of a
stream-winner, namely, yaü ki¤ci samudayadhammaü, sabbaü
taü nirodhadhammaü, ßWhatever is of a nature to arise, all that is
of a nature to cease.û19
It does not seem to say anything significant, on the face of it.
But it succinctly expresses the plainest conviction a stream-winner
gets of the innocent process of arising and ceasing in the world. It
is as if the one who had his grasp in the middle lets go of his hold
for a while, through the power of the path moment.
It is in the nature of the ordinary worldling to hold on, and to
hang on. That is why the man who grasped the cord in the middle
refuses to let go of his hold in the midst of windings and unwind-
ings, however much hardship he has to undergo in terms of
sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair. For him, it is ex-
tremely difficult to let go. Until a Buddha arises in the world and
proclaims the Dhamma, the world stubbornly refuses to let go.
Now if one gives up the tendency to grasp, at least for a short
while by developing the noble eightfold path at its supramundane
level, and lets go even for one moment, then one understands as
one grasps again that now there is less stress and tension. Person-
ality view, doubt and dogmatic adherence to rules and observanc-
19 See sermon 2.
es, sakkàyadiññhi, vicikicchà, sãlabbataparàmàsa, are gone. An

unwinding has occurred to some extent. The strands of the cord
are less taut now.
One also understands, at the moment of arising from that su-
pramundane experience, that one comes back to èxistence'
because of grasping, because of the tendency to hold on. That this
tendency to hold on persists due to influxes and latencies Ý due to
unabandoned defilements Ý is also evident to him. This, in effect,
is the immediate understanding of the law of dependent arising. It
seems, then, that we have here in this simile of the cord, a clue to
an understanding of the nature of this existence.
Worldlings in general, whether they call themselves Buddhist or
non-Buddhist, conceive of existence in terms of a perdurable
essence as `being,' somewhat along the lines of the view of
heretics. Nibbàna is something that drives terror into the world-
lings, so long as there is no purification of view. The cessation of
existence is much dreaded by them.
Even the commentators, when they get down to defining
Nibbàna, give a wrong interpretation of the word dhuva. They
sometimes make use of the word sassata in defining Nibbàna.20
This is a word that should never be brought in to explain the term
Nibbàna. According to them, Nibbàna is a permanent and eternal
state. Only, you must not ask us, what precisely it is. For, if we are
more articulate, we would be betraying our proximity to such
views as Brahmanirvàna.
What is the secret behind this anomalous situation? It is the
difficulty in interpreting the term dhuva, which the Buddha uses as
a synonym for Nibbàna.21 The true significance of this synonym
has not been understood. It means stable or immovable. Of course,
we do come across this term in such contexts as niccaü, dhuvaü,
20 E.g. at Dhp-a III 320 when explaining accutaü ñhànaü of Dhp 225.
sassataü, acavanadhammaü,22 ßpermanent, stable, eternal, not

liable to passing away,û when Brahma gives expression to his
conceit of eternal existence. But that is because these terms are
more or less related to each other in sense.
Then, in which sense is Nibbàna called dhuva? In the sense that
the experience of Nibbàna is irreversible. That is why it is referred
to as acalaü sukhaü,23 ßunshakeable bliss.û The term akuppà
cetovimutti, ßunshakeable deliverance of the mind,û expresses the
same idea. Sometimes the Buddha refers to Nibbàna as akuppà
cetovimutti.24 All other such deliverances are shakeable, or
irritable. As the expression kuppapañicca santi, ßpeace dependent
on irritability,û25 implies, they are irritable and shakeable.
Even if they are unshaken during one's lifetime, they get shaken
up at death. The final winning post is the pain of death. That is the
critical moment at which one can judge one's own victory or
defeat. Before the pain of death, all other deliverances of the mind
fall back defeated. But this deliverance, this unshakeable deliver-
ance with its `let go' strategy at the approach of death, gets never
shaken. It is unshakeable. That is why it is called the bliss unshak-
en, acalaü sukhaü. That is why it is called stable, dhuvaü. It
seems, then, that some of the terms used by the Buddha as epithets
or synonyms of Nibbàna have not been correctly understood.
Sometimes the Buddha employs words, used by heretics, in a
different sense. In fact, there are many such instances. Now, if one
interprets such instances in the same sense as heretics use those
words, it will amount to a distortion of the Dhamma. Here, too, we
have such an instance. Unfortunately the commentators have used
the term sassata to define Nibbàna, taking it to be something
eternal.
22 E.g. at M I 326, Brahmanimantanikasutta.

23 Ud 93, DutiyaDabbasutta; Th 264, Vimala Thera.
24 M I 197, MahàSàropamasutta.
The main reason behind this is the misconception regarding

existence Ý that there is an existence in truth and fact. There is this
term asmimàna, which implies that there is the conceit àm' in this
world. All other religious teachers were concerned with the
salvation of a real Ì.' Or, in other words, to confer immortality on
this Ì.' The Buddha, on the contrary, declared that what actually
ìs' there, is a conceit Ý the conceit àm.' All what is necessary is
the dispelling of this conceit. That is why we sometimes come
across such references to Nibbàna as sammà mànàbhisamayà
antam akàsi dukkhassa,26 ßby rightly understanding conceit, he
made an end of suffering,û or asmimànasamugghàtaü pàpuõàti
diññheva dhamme Nibbànaü,27 ßOne arrives at the eradication of
the conceit àm' which in itself is the attainment of Nibbàna here
and now.û
Some seem to think that the eradication of the conceit àm' is
one thing, and Nibbàna another. But along with the eradication of
the conceit àm,' comes extinction. Why? Because one has been
winding all this time imagining this to be a real cord or rope. One
remains ignorant of the true state of affairs, due to one's grasp in
the middle. But the moment one lets go, one understands.
It is the insight into this secret that serves as the criterion in
designating the ariyan according to the number of births he has yet
to take in saüsàra. Thus, the stream-winner is called sattakkhat-
tuparamo,28 `seven-times-at-the-most.' With the sudden unwind-
ing, which reduces the tension, one understands the secret that the
noble eightfold path is the way to unwinding.
One hangs on, because one is afraid to let go. One thinks that to
let go is to get destroyed. The Buddha declares that the heaviness
of one's burden is due to one's grasping.29 What accounts for its
26 M I 12, Sabbàsavasutta.
27 A IV 353, Sambodhisutta.
28 S II 185, Puggalasutta.
29 S III 25, Bhàrasutta.
weight is the very tenacity with which one clings to it. This the
worldlings do not understand. So they cling on to the rope, for fear
of getting destroyed. But if one lets go of one's hold, even for a
moment, one would see that the tensed strands will get relaxed at
least for that moment Ý that there is an immediate unwinding. Full
understanding of that unwinding will come when one `lets-go'
completely. Then all influxes and latencies are destroyed.
So this little verse gives us a deep insight into the problem.
What is there to lament? Because there are no notions like Ì was'
or Ì am.' There is only a destruction of preparations.
The term vibhava is used in this context in a different sense. It
refers here to the destruction of preparations. When using the two
terms bhava and vibhava, some conceive of bhava, or existence, as
a real perdurable essence, like a soul, and vibhava as its destruc-
tion. But here the word vibhava, in vibhavissanti, refers to the
destructions of preparations. There is nothing lamentable about it.
In the context of a drama, they are the paraphernalia improvised to
stage an act, like the stool and the footstool. When one comes to
think of individuals, they are no better than a multitude of puppets
manipulated by fetters of existence in accordance with karma.
Even in the delivering of this sermon, there is a trace of a pup-
pet show. The sermon is inspired by the audience. If there is no
audience, there is no sermon. We are all enacting a drama. Though
for us, this particular act of the drama is so important, there might
be similar dramatic acts a few meters away from here in the
jungle. A swarm of black ants might be busily hauling away an
earthworm reeling in pain. That is one act in their own drama of
life. All our activities are like that.
It is our unawareness of this framework that constitutes igno-
rance. If at any time one sees this framework of ignorance, free
from influxes and latencies, one gets an unobstructed vision of the
world. It is as if the doors of the cinema hall are suddenly flung
open. The scene on the screen fades away completely then and
there, as we have described above.30 Let us now come to the third

verse:
Suddhaü dhammasamuppàdaü,
suddhaü saïkhàrasantatiü,
passantassa yathàbhåtaü,
na bhayaü hoti gàmani.31
ßTo one who sees the arising of pure phenomena and the sequence
of pure preparations as it is, there is no fear, oh headman.û This
verse, too, has a depth of meaning, which we shall now try to
elucidate.
Why are the phenomena qualified by the word pure, suddha
dhamma, in this context? Because the mind-objects, which are
generally regarded as dhamma by the world, are impure. Why are
they impure? Because they are ìnfluenced' by influxes. Now here
we have ùn-influenced' or influx-free phenomena. To the ara-
hant's mind the objects of the world occur free of influxes. That is
to say, they do not go to build up a prepared, saïkhata. They are
quasi-preparations. They do not go to build up a film show.
If, for instance, one who is seeing a film show, has the full
awareness of the artificiality of those library-shots which go to
depict a tragic scene on the screen, without being carried away by
the latency to ignorance, one will not be able to ènjoy' the film
show. In fact, the film show does not exist for him. The film show
has `ceased' for him.
Similarly, the arahant sees phenomena as pure phenomena.
Those mind-objects arise only to cease, that is all. They are merely
a series of preparations, suddhaü saïkhàrasantatiü. `The film reel
is just being played' Ý that is the way it occurs to him. Therefore,
ßto one who sees all this, there is no fear, oh headman.û
30 See sermon 5.
Let us try to give an illustration for this, too, by way of an anal-

ogy. As we know, when a sewing machine goes into action, it
sews up two folds of cloth together. But supposing suddenly the
shuttle runs out of its load of cotton. What happens then? One
might even mistake the folds to be actually sewn up, until one
discovers that they are separable. This is because the conditions
for a perfect stitch are lacking. For a perfect stitch, the shuttle has
to hasten and put a knot every time the needle goes down.
Now, for the arahant, the shuttle refuses to put in the knot. For
him, preparations, or saïkhàras, are ineffective in producing a
prepared, or saïkhata. He has no cravings, conceits and views. For
knots of existence to occur, there has to be an attachment in the
form of craving, a loop in the form of conceit, and a tightening in
the form of views. So, then, the arahant's mind works like a
sewing machine with the shuttle run out of its load of cotton.
Though referred to as `functional consciousness,' its function is
not to build up a prepared, since it is influx-free. The phenomena
merely come up to go down, just like the needle.
Why is ignorance given as the first link in the formula of de-
pendent arising? It is because the entire series is dependent on
ignorance. It is not a temporal sequence. It does not involve time.
That is why the Dhamma is called timeless, akàlika. It is the
stereotype interpretation of the formula of dependent arising in
terms of three lives that has undermined the immediate and
timeless quality of the Dhamma. Since ignorance is the root cause
of all other conditions, inclusive of becoming, bhava, birth, jàti,
and decay-and-death, jaràmaraõaü, that state of affairs immedi-
ately ceases with the cessation of ignorance. This, then, is the
reason for the last line, na bhayaü hoti gàmani, ßthere is no fear,
oh headman.û
Deathlessness, amata, means the absence of the fear of death.
The fear that the world has about death is something obsessional.
It is like the obsessional dread aroused by the sight of an anthill

due to its association with a cobra.
As a matter of fact, this body has been compared to an anthill in
the Vammikasutta of the Majjhima Nikàya.32 This bodily frame,
made up of the four elements, procreated by parents and built up
with food and drink, is metaphorically conceived as an anthill. The
discourse says: ßTake the knife, oh wise one, and dig in.û The
world has the obsession that there is a real cobra of a self inside
this anthill. But once it is dug up, what does one find? One
discovers an arahant, who has realized selflessness, a selfless
cobra, worthy of honour. Of course, this might sound as a post-
script on Vammikasutta, but the metaphor is so pregnant with
meaning, that it can well accommodate this interpretation, too.
The world has a `perception-of-the-compact,' ghanasa¤¤à, with
regard to this body made up of the four elements. Because of that
very perception or notion of compactness, there is a fear of death.
There is birth, because there is existence. Now this might, on
analysis, give us an insight into the law of dependent arising. The
term jàti, or birth, generally calls to mind the form of a child
coming out of the mother's womb. But in this context the Buddha
uses the term in relation to bhava, or existence, which in its turn is
related to upàdàna, or grasping. It is at the time we use something
as a foot stool that a footstool is `born.' When it has ceased to
serve that purpose, the footstool is `dead.'
It is in this sense that all assets, upadhi, are said to be of a na-
ture to be born, jàtidhammà hete, bhikkhave, upadhayo,33 ßAll
these assets, monks, are of the nature to be born.û Not only the
animate objects, like wife and children, men and women slaves,
etc., but even gold and silver are mentioned there as of a nature to
be born. Now let us ponder over this statement. How can gold and
silver be born? How can they grow old? They are born because of
32 M I 144, Vammikasutta.
craving, conceit and views. They come into existence. They are
born. Because of birth, they grow old. Therefore they become
objects for sorrow, lamentation and the like to arise.
For one who looks upon them as pure preparations, all those
objects do not crystallize into `things.' The description of the non-
manifestative consciousness in the Brahmanimantanikasutta looks
like a riddle in the form of a jumble of negative terms like
pañhaviü nàhosim, pañhaviyà nàhosiü, pañhavito nàhosiü, etc., ßI
did not claim to be earth, I did not claim to be in earth, I did not
claim to be from earth.û
But what is the general idea conveyed by these expressions?
The implication is that the arahant looks upon all those concepts,
which the worldlings make use of to make up an existence and to
assert the reality of this drama of existence, as mere pretensions.
He is convinced of their vanity and insubstantiality. As we have
already explained with the simile of the sewing machine, an
existence does not get stitched up or knitted up. The cessation of
existence is experienced then and there.
Some seem to think that the arahant experiences the Nibbànic
bliss only after his death. But the cessation of existence is experi-
enced here and now, diññheva dhamme. This is something marvel-
ous and unknown to any other religious system. It is just at the
moment that the shuttle of the sewing machine runs out of its load
of cotton that the cessation of existence is experienced. It is then
that the latencies are uprooted and all influxes are destroyed.
Cravings, conceits and views refuse to play their part, with the
result that mere preparations come up and go down. This is the
ambrosial deathless. It is said that the arahants partake of ambro-
sial deathlessness, amataü paribhu¤janti.34
What actually happened in the case of the Venerable arahant
Adhimutta was that the bandit chief understood the Dhamma and
set him free, instead of killing him, and even got ordained under
34 A I 45, Amatavagga.
him. But even if he had killed him, Venerable Adhimutta would

have passed away, experiencing the ambrosial deathless. Why?
Because he can let go before Màra comes to grab. He is, therefore,
fearless. The obsessional fear of death common to worldlings has
vanished. This, then, is the ambrosia. It is not some medicine or
delicious drink for the possession of which gods and demons battle
with each other. It is that bliss of deliverance, the freedom from
the fear of death. Needless to say that it requires no seal of
everlastingness.
As we once pointed out, in tune with the two lines of the fol-
lowing canonical verse, kiü kayirà udapànena, àpà ce sabbadà
siyuü,35 ßWhat is the use of a well, if water is there all the time?û
Once the thirst is quenched forever, why should one go in search
of a well? Let us now take up the next verse.
yadà pa¤¤àya passati,
mamattaü so asaüvindaü,
`natthi me'ti na socati.36
Now all these verses are eloquent expressions of voidness,

su¤¤atà. When one sees with wisdom the entire world, that is both
the internal and external world, as comparable to grass and twigs
in point of worthlessness, one does not entertain the conceit `mine'
and therefore does not lament, saying: Òh, I have nothing.' One is
not scared of the term bhavanirodha, or cessation of existence.
Why? Because all these are worthless things.
Here too, we may add something more by way of explanation,
that is as to how things become `things' in this world Ý though this
may seem obvious enough. Since we have been so concerned with
dramas, let us take up a dramatic situation from the world.
35 Ud 79, Udapànasutta; see sermon 1.

A man is hastily walking along a jungle path. Suddenly his foot

strikes against a stone. Òh, it is so painful!' He kicks the stone
with a curse. A few more steps, and another stone trips him. This
time it is even more painful. He turns round, quietly, picks up the
stone, cleans it carefully, looking around, wraps it up in his
handkerchief and slips it into his pocket. Both were stones. But
why this special treatment? The first one was a mere pebble, but
the second one turned out to be a gem!
The world esteems a gem stone as valuable because of craving,
conceits and views. So the first accident was a mishap, but the
second Ý a stroke of luck. Now, had all these mishaps and haps
been filmed, it would have become something of a comedy.
Everything in our environment, even our precious possessions like
gold, silver, pearls, and gems, appear like the paraphernalia
improvised for a dramatic performance on the world stage. Once
they come on the stage, from backstage, they appear as real things.
Not only do they appear as real, relative to the acts of the drama,
but they get deposited in our minds as such.
It is such `deposits' that become our aggregates of grasping, or
àssets,' which we take along with us in this saüsàra in the form
of likes and dislikes. Loves and hates contracted in the past largely
decide our behaviour in the present with some sort of subcon-
scious acquiescence, so much so that we often form attachments
and revengeful aversions in accordance with them. When one
comes to think of it, there is something dramatic about it. When
something serves as a footstool in a particular act, it is `really' a
footstool. When it is improvised to serve as some other thing in the
next act, one is unaware of the fact that it is the same object. One
is not aware of the hoodwink involved in it. Such a state of affairs
prevails over the nature of preparations, saïkhàras.
Being ignorant of the fact that these are purely preparations, the
worldlings take concepts too seriously, to come to conclusions
such as Ì was so and so in such and such a birth,' thereby clinging
on to all the animate and inanimate objects in the world. They are
actually comparable to things temporarily improvised to depict a
particular scene in a drama or a film show. That is why we
compared the four elements to ghosts.37 Deluded by their ghostly

transfigurations, the worldlings create for themselves a perception
of form. The verse in question gives us an insight into this particu-
lar aspect of the drama of existence.
A meditator can get at least an inkling of the emptiness and
insubstantiality of this drama of existence, when he trains himself
in keeping the four postures with mindfulness and full awareness.
By practising it, he gets an opportunity to witness a monodrama,
free of charge. And this is the drama: When walking, he under-
stands: Ì am walking'; when standing, he understands: Ì am
standing'; when sitting, he understands: Ì am sitting'; when lying
down, he understands: Ì am lying down.'38 While keeping one's
postures in this manner, one sees in outline one's own form as if
one were acting in a monodrama.
When the basis of the factors of the form group is removed,
those in the name group are reduced to purposeless activations.
Earth, water, fire and air constitute the basis of form. When a
meditator becomes dispassionate with regard to these four ele-
ments, when they begin to fade away for him, the factors in the
name group assume a ghostly character. He feels as if he is
performing a drama with non-existing objects. He opens a non-
existing door, sits on a non-existing chair, and so on.
Now if we try to understand this in terms of an analogy of a
drama, as we have been doing throughout, we may compare it to a
mime or a dumb show. In a dumb show, one might see such acts
as follows: An actor rides a no-bike, climbs a no-hill, meets a no-
friend and has a no-chat with him. Or else he may sit on a no-chair
by a no-table and writes a no-letter with a no-pen. What we mean
by the no-nos here is the fact that on the stage there is neither a
bicycle, nor a hill, nor another person, nor any other object like a
chair, a table or a pen. All these are merely suggested by his
37 See sermon 1.
acting. This kind of dumb show has a comic effect on the audi-
ence.
An insight meditator, too, goes through a similar experience
when he contemplates on name-and-form, seeing the four elements
as empty and void of essence, which will give him at least an iota
of the conviction that this drama of existence is empty and
insubstantial. He will realize that, as in the case of the dumb show,
he is involved with things that do not really exist. This amounts to
an understanding that the factors of the name group are dependent
on the form group, and vice versa.
Seeing the reciprocal relationship between name-and-form, he
is disinclined to dabble in concepts or gulp down a dose of
prescriptions. If form is dependent on name, and name is depend-
ent on form, both are void of essence. What is essential here, is the
very understanding of essencelessness. If one sits down to draw up
lists of concepts and prescribe them, it would only lead to a mental
constipation. Instead of release there will be entanglement. Such a
predicament is not unlikely.
Nibbàna Sermon 9



This is the ninth sermon in the series of sermons given on the
topic of Nibbàna. In our last sermon we discussed, to some extent,
how the insubstantiality and the vanity of the comic acts enacted
by saüsàric beings in this drama of existence gradually become
clear to a meditator as he keeps his postures according to the
Satipaññhànasutta. We mentioned how the fact that name is only a
shadow of form is revealed to the meditator when he is attending
to his postures seeing the elements constituting the basis of form
as empty.
By way of analogy we brought in the simile of a mime or a
dumb show. What characterizes that kind of drama is the comic
nature of the acts which depict scenes suggestive of animate or
233
inanimate objects not actually present on the stage. A meditator

becomes aware, while attending to his postures, that he is merely
enacting a dumb show. He comes to understand how far name is
dependent on form, and the four elements appear to him as empty.
In the Satipaññhànasutta we find the following instruction in
regard to the keeping of postures: Yathà yathà và pan'assa kàyo
paõihito hoti tathà tathà naü pajànàti,2 ßIn whatever way his
body is disposed, so he understands it.û This is suggestive of the
attempt of a spectator to understand the mimicry of an actor or an
actress in a pantomime. While attending to one's postures one
feels as if one is watching a one-man dumb show. One gets an
opportunity to watch it even more keenly when one comes to the
section on full awareness, sampaja¤¤apabba, dealing with the
minor postures, khuddaka iriyàpatha.
The worldlings are in the habit of creating material objects in
accordance with the factors on the name side in an extremely
subtle manner, by grasping the four elements under the influence
of the personality view, sakkàyadiññhi. The material objects around
us are recognized as such by grasping the four elements. The
definition of the form aspect in name-and-form points to such a
conclusion: cattàro ca mahàbhåtà catunna¤ca mahàbhåtànaü
upàdàya råpaü,3 ßthe four great primaries and form dependent on
those four primaries.û
The word upàdàya in this context has a special connotation of
relativity. So in this way, material objects are created with the help
of factors in the name group. This reveals a certain principle of
relativity. In this relativity one sees the emptiness of both name
and form. This same principle of relativity is implicit in some
other statements of the Buddha, but they are rather neglected for a
lack of recognition of their significance. We come across such a
discourse with a high degree of importance in the Saëàyatana-
vagga of the Saüyutta Nikàya. There the Buddha states that

principle of relativity with the help of an illustration:
Hatthesu, bhikkhave, sati àdànanikkhepanaü pa¤¤àyati,

pàdesu sati abhikkamapañikkamo pa¤¤àyati, pabbesu sati
sammi¤janapasàraõaü pa¤¤àyati, kucchismiü sati
jighacchà pipàsà pa¤¤àyati.4
ßWhen there are hands, monks, a taking up and putting

down is apparent; when there are feet, a going forward and
coming back is apparent; when there are joints, a bending
and stretching is apparent; when there is a belly, hunger
and thirst is apparent.û
Then the contrary of this situation is also given:
Hatthesu, bhikkhave, asati àdànanikkhepanaü na pa¤¤à-

yati, pàdesu asati abhikkamapañikkamo na pa¤¤àyati,
pabbesu asati sammi¤janapasàraõaü na pa¤¤àyati,
kucchismiü asati jighacchà pipàsà na pa¤¤àyati.
ßWhen there are no hands, a taking up and putting down is

not apparent; when there are no feet, a going forward and
coming back is not apparent; when there are no joints, a
bending and stretching is not apparent; when there is no
belly, hunger and thirst are not apparent.û
What is implied by all this is that basic principle of relativity.

Some meditators, engaged in satipaññhàna meditation, might think
that materiality does not really exist and only mentality is there. In
other words, there are no hands, only a taking up and putting down
is there. There are no feet, only a going and coming is there. That
4 S IV 171, Hatthapàdopamasutta.
way, they might dogmatically take the bare activity as real and
subject it to an analysis. But what is important here is the under-
standing of the relativity between the two, which reveals the
emptiness of both. If, on the other hand, one of them is taken too
seriously as real, it ends up in a dogmatic standpoint. It will not
lead to a deeper understanding of the emptiness of name and form.
Now in the case of a pantomime, as already mentioned, a spec-
tator has to imagine persons and things not found on the stage as if
they are present, in order to make sense out of an act. Here too we
have a similar situation. Name and form exist in relation to each
other. What one sees through this interrelation is the emptiness or
insubstantiality of both.
We brought up all these analogies of dramas and film shows
just to give an idea of the impermanence of saïkhàras, or prepara-
tions. In fact, the term saïkhàra, is very apt in the context of
dramas and film shows. It is suggestive of a pretence sustained
with some sort of effort. It clearly brings out their false and unreal
nature.
The purpose of the perception of impermanence, with regard to
this drama of existence, is the dispelling of the perception of
permanence about the things that go to make up the drama. With
the dispelling of the perception of permanence, the tendency to
grasp a sign or catch a theme is removed. It is due to the percep-
tion of permanence that one grasps a sign in accordance with
perceptual data. When one neither takes a sign nor gets carried
away by its details, there is no aspiration, expectation, or objective
by way of craving. When there is no aspiration, one cannot see any
purpose or essence to aim at.
It is through the three deliverances, the signless, the desireless,
and the void, that the drama of existence comes to an end. The
perception of impermanence is the main contributory factor for the
cessation of this drama. Some of the discourses of the Buddha,
concerning the destruction of the world, can be cited as object
lessons in the development of the perception of impermanence
leading to the signless deliverance.
For instance, in the discourse on the appearance of the seven

suns, Sattasuriyasutta, mentioned earlier,5 this world system,
which is so full of valuable things like the seven kinds of jewels,
gets fully consumed in a holocaust leaving not even a trace of ash
or soot, as if some ghee or oil has been burned up. The perception
of impermanence, arising out of this description, automatically
leads to an understanding of voidness.
If the conviction that not only the various actors and actresses
on the world stage, but all the accompanying decorations get fully
destroyed together with the stage itself at some point of time grips
the mind with sufficient intensity to exhaust the influxes of
sensuality, existence and ignorance, emancipation will occur then
and there. That may be the reason why some attained arahant-
hood immediately on listening to that sermon.6 That way, the
perception of impermanence acts as an extremely powerful
antidote for defilements.
Aniccasa¤¤à, bhikkhave, bhàvità bahulãkatà sabbaü

kàmaràgaü pariyàdiyati, sabbaü råparàgaü pariyàdi-
yati, sabbaü bhavaràgaü pariyàdiyati, sabbaü avijjaü
pariyàdiyati, sabbaü asmimànaü pariyàdiyati samå-
hanati.7
ßMonks, the perception of impermanence, when devel-

oped and intensively practised, exhausts all attachments to
sensuality, exhausts all attachments to form, exhausts all
attachments to existence, exhausts all ignorance, exhausts
all conceits of an àm' and eradicates it completely.û
5 A IV 100, Sattasuriyasutta; see sermon 8.

6 Mp IV 52.
7 S III 155, Aniccasa¤¤àsutta.
This shows that the perception of impermanence gradually leads to

an understanding of voidness, as is clearly stated in the following
quotation: Aniccasa¤¤ino, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno anattasa¤¤à
sanñhàti. Anattasa¤¤ã asmimànasamugghàtaü pàpuõàti diññheva
dhamme nibbànaü.8
ßMonks, in one who has the perception of impermanence, the
perception of not-self gets established. With the perception of not-
self, he arrives at the destruction of the conceit àm,' which is
extinction here and now.û
Such an assessment of the importance of the perception of im-
permanence will enable us to make sense out of the seemingly
contradictory statements in some of the verses in the Dhammapa-
da, such as the following:
Puttà matthi dhanaü matthi,

iti bàlo viha¤¤ati,
attà hi attano natthi,
kuto puttà kuto dhanaü?9
ßSons I have, wealth I have,

So the fool is vexed,
Even oneself is not one's self,
Where then are sons, where is wealth?û
The perception of not-self at its highest, gives rise to the idea of

voidness, as implied by the dictum su¤¤am idaü attena và
attaniyena và,10 ßThis is empty of self or anything belonging to a
self.û
Some are afraid of this term su¤¤atà, emptiness, voidness, for
various reasons. That is why we mentioned at the very outset,
8 A IV 353, Sambodhisutta.
10 E.g. at M I 297, Mahàvedallasutta.
already in the first sermon, that gradually the monks themselves

showed a lack of interest in those discourses that deal with the idea
of voidness.11 The Buddha had already predicted, as a danger that
will befall the Sàsana in the future, this lack of regard for such
discourses. This prediction reveals the high degree of importance
attached to them.
The last two sections of the Sutta Nipàta, namely Aññhakavagga
and Pàràyanavagga, abound in extremely deep sermons. In the
Pàràyanavagga, for instance, we find the Brahmin youth
Mogharàja putting the following question to the Buddha: Kathaü
lokaü avekkhantaü, maccuràjà na passati?12 ßBy looking upon
the world in which manner can one escape the eye of the king of
death?û The Buddha gives the answer in the following verse:
Su¤¤ato lokaü avekkhassu,

Mogharàja sadà sato,
attànudiññhim åhacca,
evaü maccutaro siyà,
evaü lokam avekkhantaü,
maccuràjà na passati.13
ßLook upon the world as void,

Mogharàja, being mindful at all times,
Uprooting the lingering view of self,
Get well beyond the range of death,
Him who thus looks upon the world,
The king of death gets no chance to see.û
From this we can infer that the entire Dhamma, even like the
world system itself, inclines towards voidness. This fact is borne
11 S II 267, âõisutta; see sermon 1.

12 Sn 1118, Mogharàjamàõavapucchà.
13 Sn 1119, ibid.
out by the following significant quotation in the CåëaTaõhà-

saïkhayasutta, cited by Sakka as an aphorism given by the
Buddha himself: Sabbe dhammà nàlaü abhinivesàya.14 Though
we may render it simply as ßnothing is worth clinging on to,û it
has a deeper significance. The word abhinivesa is closely associat-
ed with the idea of entering into or getting entangled in views of
one's own creation. The implication, then, is that not only the
views as such, but nothing at all is worth while getting entangled
in. This is suggestive of the emptiness of everything.
This brings us to a very important sutta among the Eighths of
the Aïguttara Nikàya, namely the Kiümålakasutta. In this
particular sutta we find the Buddha asking the monks how they
would answer a set of questions which wandering ascetics of other
sects might put to them. The questions are as follows:
Kiü målakà, àvuso, sabbe dhammà? Kiü sambhavà sabbe

dhammà? Kiü samudayà sabbe dhammà? Kiü samo-
saraõà sabbe dhammà? Kiü pamukhà sabbe dhammà?
Kim adhipateyyà sabbe dhammà? Kim uttarà sabbe
dhammà? Kiü sàrà sabbe dhammà?15
ßWhat is the root of all things? What is the origin of all

things? Where do all things arise? Towards what do all
things converge? What is at the head of all things? What
dominates all things? What is the point of transcendence
of all things? What is the essence of all things?û
The monks confessed that they were unable to answer those

questions on their own and begged the Buddha to instruct them.
Then the Buddha gave the exact answer to each question in a cut
14 M I 251, CåëaTaõhàsaïkhayasutta.
15 A IV 338, Kiümålakasutta.
and dried form, saying, this is the way you should answer if
wandering ascetics of other sects raise those questions.
Chandamålakà, àvuso, sabbe dhammà, manasikàrasam-

bhavà sabbe dhammà, phassasamudayà sabbe dhammà,
vedanàsamosaraõà sabbe dhammà, samàdhipamukhà
sabbe dhammà, satàdhipateyyà sabbe dhammà, pa¤¤ut-
tarà sabbe dhammà, vimuttisàrà sabbe dhammà.
ßRooted in desire, friends, are all things. Born of attention

are all things. Arisen from contact are all things. Converg-
ing on feeling are all things. Headed by concentration are
all things. Dominated by mindfulness are all things. Sur-
mountable by wisdom are all things. Yielding deliverance
as essence are all things.û
Before getting down to an analysis of the basic meaning of this

discourse, it is worthwhile considering why the Buddha forestalled
a possible perplexity among his disciples in the face of a barrage
of questions likely to be levelled by other sectarians. Why did he
think it fit to prepare the minds of the disciples well in advance of
such a situation?
Contemporary ascetics of other sects, notably the brahmins,
entertained various views regarding the origin and purpose of àll
things.' Those who subscribed to a soul theory, had different
answers to questions concerning thing-hood or the essence of
thing. Presumably it was not easy for the monks, with their not-
self standpoint, to answer those questions to the satisfaction of
other sectarians. That is why those monks confessed their incom-
petence and begged for guidance.
It was easy for those of other sects to explain away the ques-
tions relating to the origin and purpose of things on the basis of
their soul theory or divine creation. Everything came out of
Brahma, and self is the essence of everything. No doubt, such
answers were substantial enough to gain acceptance. Even modern
philosophers are confronted with the intricate problem of deter-
mining the exact criterion of a `thing.' What precisely accounts for

the thing-hood of a thing? What makes it no-thing?
Unfortunately for the sutta, its traditional commentators seem to
have ignored the deeper philosophical dimensions of the above
questionnaire. They have narrowed down the meaning of the set of
answers recommended by the Buddha by limiting its application to
wholesome mental states.16 The occurrence of such terms as
chanda, sati, samàdhi, and pa¤¤à, had probably led them to
believe that the entire questionnaire is on the subject of whole-
some mental states. But this is a serious underestimation of the
import of the entire discourse. It actually goes far deeper in laying
bare a basic principle governing both skilful and unskilful mental
states.
Now, for instance, the first two verses of the Dhammapada
bring out a fundamental law of psychology applicable to things
both skilful and unskilful: Manopubbaïgamà dhammà, ma-
noseññhà manomayà.17 Both verses draw upon this fundamental
principle. Nowadays, these two lines are variously interpreted, but
the basic idea expressed is that ßall things have mind as their
forerunner, mind is their chief, and they are mind-made.û This
applies to both skilful and unskilful mental states.
Now the sutta in question has also to be interpreted in the same
light, taking into account both these aspects. It must be mentioned,
in particular, that with the passage of time a certain line of inter-
pretation gained currency, according to which such terms as
chanda were taken as skilful in an exclusive sense. For instance,
the term sati, wherever and whenever it occurred, was taken to
refer to sammà sati.18 Likewise, chanda came to be interpreted as
16 Sv-pñ I 138.
17 Dhp 1, 2, Yamakavagga.
18 Cf. the discussion at As 250.
kusalacchanda, desire or interest in the skilful, or kattukamyatà-

chanda, desire to perform.19
But we have to reckon with a special trait in the Buddha's way
of preaching. His sermons were designed to lead onward the
listeners, gradually, according to their degree of understanding.
Sometimes the meaning of a term, as it occurs at the end of a
sermon, is different from the meaning it is supposed to have at the
beginning of the sermon. Such a technique is also evident.
The term chanda is one that has both good and bad connota-
tions. In such contexts as chandaràga20 and chandajaü aghaü,21 it
is suggestive of craving as the cause of all suffering in this world.
It refers to that attachment, ràga, which the world identifies with
craving as such. But in the context chandaiddhipàda,22 where the
reference is to a particular base for success, it is reckoned as a
skilful mental state. However, that is not a sufficient reason to
regard it as something alien to the generic sense of the term.
There is an important sutta, which clearly reveals this fact, in
the Saüyutta Nikàya. A brahmin named Uõõàbha once came to
Venerable ânanda with a question that has a relevance to the
significance of the term chanda. His question was: Kim atthiyaü
nu kho, bho ânanda, samaõe Gotame brahmacariyaü vussati?23
ßSir ânanda, what is the purpose for which the holy life is lived
under the recluse Gotama?û Venerable ânanda promptly gives the
following answer: Chandappahànatthaü kho, bràhmaõa, bhaga-
vati brahmacariyaü vussati. ßBrahmin, it is for the abandonment
of desire that the holy life is lived under the Exalted One.û Then
the brahmin asks: Atthi pana, bho ânanda, maggo atthi pañipadà
19 Vibh-a 289.
20 E.g. at D II 58, MahàNidànasutta.
21 S I 22, Nasantisutta.
22 E.g. at S V 253, Iddhipàdasaüyutta.
23 S V 272, Uõõàbhabràhmaõasutta.
etassa chandassa pahànàya? ßIs there, sir ânanda, a way or

practice for the abandonment of this desire?û Venerable ânanda
says: ßYes.û Now, what is the way he mentions in that context? It
is none other than the four bases for success, iddhipàda, which are
described as follows:
Chandasamàdhipadhànasaïkhàrasamannàgataü iddhi-
pàdaü bhàveti, viriyasamàdhipadhànasaïkhàrasamannà-
gataü iddhipàdaü bhàveti, cittasamàdhipadhànasaïkhà-
rasamannàgataü iddhipàdaü bhàveti,
vãmaüsàsamàdhipadhànasaïkhàrasamannàgataü id-
dhipàdaü bhàveti.
1) ßOne develops the basis for success that has volitional

preparations leading to a concentration through desire,û
preparations leading to a concentration through energy,û
preparations leading to a concentration by making up the
mind,û
preparations leading to a concentration through investi-
gation.û
Venerable ânanda replies that the way of practice to be followed

for the abandonment of desire is the above mentioned four bases
pertaining to desire, energy, mind and investigation. The brahmin
is puzzled at this reply. He thinks, if that is so, desire is not
abandoned, it is still there. And he raises this objection to show
that there is an implicit contradiction: Chandeneva chandaü
pajahissatã'ti, netaü ñhànaü vijjati, ßthat one abandons desire by
desire itself is an impossibility.û Then the Venerable ânanda
brings out a simile to convince the brahmin of the implicit truth in
his reply.
ßWhat do you think, brahmin, is it not the case that you earlier
had the desire Ì will go to the park,' and after you came here, the
appropriate desire subsided?û So this is the logic behind the
statement concerning the abandonment of craving. The term
chanda is used here in the first instance with reference to that type
of craving for the purpose of the abandonment of craving.
Desire as a basis for success is developed for the very aban-
donment of desire. So there is no question about the use of the
same word. Here, chanda as a base of success still belongs to the
chanda-family. A desire should be there even for the abandonment
of desire. This is a distinctive basic principle underlying the
middle path.
Some have a great liking for the word chanda, but dislike the
word taõhà. So much so that, if one speaks of a craving for
attaining Nibbàna, it might even be regarded as a blasphemy. In
another sermon given by Venerable ânanda himself, one ad-
dressed to a particular sick nun, we find the statement: Taõhaü
nissàya taõhà pahàtabbà,24 ßDepending on craving one should
abandon craving.û That again is suggestive of a special application
of the middle path technique. But the kind of craving meant here is
not something crude. It is specifically explained there that it is the
longing arising in one for the attainment of arahant-hood on
hearing that someone has already attained it. Of course, there is a
subtle trace of craving even in that longing, but it is one that is
helpful for the abandonment of craving. So one need not fight shy
of the implications of these words.
As a matter of fact, even the word rati, attachment, is used with
reference to Nibbàna. When, for instance, it is said that the
disciple of the Buddha is attached to the destruction of craving,
taõhakkhayarato hoti sammàsambuddhasàvako,25 it may sound
rather odd, because the word rati usually stands for lust. However,
24 A II 145, Bhikkuõãsutta.
according to the Middle Path principle of utilizing one thing to

eliminate another, words like chanda and taõhà are used with
discretion. Sometimes terms like nekkhamasita domanassa,26
unhappiness based on renunciation, are employed to indicate the
desire for attaining Nibbàna. Therefore the statement chanda-
målakà sabbe dhammà need not be interpreted as referring
exclusively to skilful mental states.
With regard to the significance of sati and samàdhi, too, we
may mention in passing, that terms like micchà sati, wrong
mindfulness, and micchà samàdhi, wrong concentration, do
sometimes occur in the discourses.27 So let us examine whether the
set of statements under consideration has any sequential coherence
or depth.
ßRooted in desire, friends, are all things.û We might as well
bring out the meaning of these statements with the help of an
illustration. Supposing there is a heap of rubbish and someone
approaches it with a basket to collect it and throw it away. Now,
about the rubbish heap, he has just a unitary notion. That is to say,
he takes it as just one heap of rubbish. But as he bends down and
starts collecting it into the basket, he suddenly catches sight of a
gem. Now the gem becomes the object of his desire and interest. A
gem arose out of what earlier appeared as a rubbish heap. It
became the thing for him, and desire was at the root of this
phenomenon Ý true to the dictum ßrooted in desire, friends, are all
things.û
Then what about origination through attention? It is through
attention that the gem came into being. One might think that the
origin of the gem should be traced to the mine or to some place
where it took shape, but the Buddha traces its origin in accordance
with the norm manopubbaïgamà dhammà, ßmind is the forerunner
26 M III 220, Saëàyatanavibhaïgasutta.

27 D II 353, D III 254, 287, 290, 291, M I 118, M III 77, 140, S II 168, S III 109, S
V 1, 12, 13, 16, 18-20, 23, 383, A II 220-229, A III 141, A IV 237, A V 212-248.
of all things.û So then, the root is desire and the source of origin is
attention, the very fact of attending.
Phassasamudayà sabbe dhammà, ßAll things arise from con-
tact.û There was eye-contact with the gem as something special
out of all the things in the rubbish heap. So the gem àrose' from
eye-contact. Vedanàsamosaraõà sabbe dhammà, ßAll things
converge on feeling.û As soon as the eye spotted the gem, a lot of
pleasant feelings about it arose in the mind. Therefore, all things
converge on feeling.
Samàdhipamukhà sabbe dhammà, ßHeaded by concentration
are all things.û Here, in this case, it may be wrong concentration,
micchà samàdhi, but all the same it is some kind of concentration.
It is now a concentration on the gem. It is as if his meditation has
shifted from the rubbish heap to the gem. Satàdhipateyyà sabbe
dhammà, ßDominated by mindfulness are all things.û As to this
dominance, undistracted attention is necessary for the maintenance
of that thing which has now been singled out. Where there is
distraction, attention is drawn to other things as well. That is why
mindfulness is said to be dominant. Be it the so-called wrong
mindfulness, but nonetheless, it is now directed towards the gem.
Now comes the decisive stage, that is, the `surmountability by
wisdom,' pa¤¤uttarà. Let us for a moment grant that somehow or
other, even though wrongly, micchà, some kind of surrogate
mindfulness and concentration has developed out of this situation.
Now, if one wants to cross over in accordance with the Dhamma,
that is, if one wants to attain Nibbàna with this gem itself as the
topic of meditation, one has to follow the hint given by the
statement pa¤¤uttarà sabbe dhammà, ßsurmountable by wisdom
are all things.û
What one has to do now is to see through the gem, to penetrate
it, by viewing it as impermanent, fraught with suffering, and not-
self, thereby arriving at the conviction that, after all, the gem
belongs to the rubbish heap itself. The gem is transcended by the
wisdom that it is just one item in this rubbish heap that is `The
world' in its entirety. If one wins to the wisdom that this gem is
something like a piece of charcoal, to be destroyed in the holo-

caust at the end of a world period, one has transcended that gem.
So then, the essence of all things is not any self or soul, as pos-
tulated by the brahmins. Deliverance is the essence. In such
discourses as the Mahàsàropamasutta, the essence of this entire
Dhamma is said to be deliverance.28 The very emancipation from
all this, to be rid of all this, is itself the essence. Some seem to
think that the essence is a heaping up of concepts and clinging to
them. But that is not the essence of this teaching. It is the ability to
penetrate all concepts, thereby transcending them. The deliverance
resulting from transcendence is itself the essence.
With the cessation of that concept of a gem as some special
thing, a valuable thing, separate from the rest of the world, as well
as of the ensuing heap of concepts by way of craving, conceit and
views, the gem ceases to exist. That itself is the deliverance. It is
the emancipation from the gem. Therefore, vimuttisàrà sabbe
dhammà, ßdeliverance is the essence of all things.û
So then, we have here a very valuable discourse which can even
be used as a topic of insight meditation. The essence of any mind
object is the very emancipation from it, by seeing it with wisdom.
Considered in this light, everything in the world is a meditation
object. That is why we find very strange meditation topics men-
tioned in connection with the attainments of ancient arahant
monks and nuns. Sometimes, even apparently unsuitable medita-
tion objects have been successfully employed.
Meditation teachers, as a rule, do not approve of certain medita-
tion objects for beginners, with good reasons. For instance, they
would not recommend a female form as a meditation object for a
male, and a male form for a female. That is because it can arouse
lust, since it is mentioned in the Theragàthà that lust arose in some
monk even on seeing a decayed female corpse in a cemetery.29 But
29 Th 315-316, Ràjadatta Thera.
in the same text one comes across an episode in connection with

Venerable Nàgasamàla, which stands in utter contrast to it.
Venerable Nàgasamàla attained arahant-hood with the help of a
potentially pernicious meditation object, as he describes it, in his
words: ßOnce, on my begging round, I happened to look up to see
a dancing woman, beautifully dressed and bedecked, dancing to
the rhythm of an orchestra just on the middle of the highway.û30
And, what happened then?
Tato me manasikàro,
yoniso udapajjatha,
àdãnavo pàturahu,
nibbidà samatiññhatha,
tato cittaü vimucci me,
passa dhammasudhammataü.31
ßJust then, radical attention

Arose from within me,
The perils were manifest,
And dejection took place,
Then my mind got released,
Behold the goodness of the Norm.û
If one wishes to discover the goodness of this norm, one has to

interpret the sutta in question in a broader perspective, without
limiting its application to skilful mental states. If a train of
thoughts had got started up about that gem, even through a wrong
concentration, and thereby a wrong mindfulness and a wrong
concentration had taken shape, at whatever moment radical
attention comes on the scene, complete reorientation occurs
instantaneously, true to those qualities of the Dhamma implied by
30 Th 267-268, Nàgasamàla Thera.

31 Th 269-270, Nàgasamàla Thera.
the terms, sandiññhika, visible here and now, akàlika, not involving
time, and ehipassika, inviting one to come and see.
Some might wonder, for instance, how those brahmins of old
who had practiced their own methods of concentration, attained
arahant-hood on hearing just one stanza as soon as they came to
the Buddha.32 The usual interpretation is that it is due to the
miraculous powers of the Buddha, or else that the persons con-
cerned had an extraordinary stock of merit. The miracle of the
Dhamma, implicit in such occurrences, is often ignored.
Now as to this miracle of the Dhamma, we may take the case of
someone keen on seeing a rainbow. He will have to go on looking
at the sky indefinitely, waiting for a rainbow to appear. But if he is
wise enough, he can see the spectrum of rainbow colours through
a dew drop hanging on a leaf of a creeper waving in the morning
sun, provided he finds the correct perspective. For him, the
dewdrop itself is the meditation object. In the same way, one can
sometimes see the entire Dhamma, thirty-seven factors of enlight-
enment and the like, even in a potentially pernicious meditation
object.
From an academic point of view, the two terms yoniso mana-
sikàra, radical attention, and ayoniso manasikàra, non-radical
attention, are in utter contrast to each other. There is a world of
difference between them. So also between the terms sammà diññhi,
right view, and micchà diññhi, wrong view. But from the point of
view of realisation, there is just a little difference.
Now as we know, that spectrum of the sun's rays in the dew
drop disappears with a very little shift in one's perspective. It
appears only when viewed in a particular perspective. What we
find in this Dhamma is something similar. This is the intrinsic
nature of this Dhamma that is to be seen here and now, timeless,
leading onward, and realizable by the wise each one by himself.
32 Pj II 587.
Our interpretation of this sutta, taking the word sabbe dhammà

to mean àll things,' is further substantiated by the Samiddhi Sutta
found in the section on the Nines in the Aïguttara Nikàya. It is a
discourse preached by Venerable Sàriputta. To a great extent, it
runs parallel to the one we have already analysed. The difference
lies only in a few details. In that sutta we find Venerable Samiddhi
answering the questions put to him by Venerable Sàriputta, like a
pupil at a catechism. The following is the gist of questions raised
and answers given:
`Kim àrammaõà, Samiddhi, purisassa saïkappavitakkà

uppajjantã'ti?'
`Nàmaråpàrammaõà, bhante.'
`Te pana, Samiddhi, kva nànattaü gacchantã'ti?'

`Dhàtåsu, bhante.'
`Te pana, Samiddhi, kiü samudayà'ti?'

`Phassasamudayà, bhante.'
`Te pana, Samiddhi, kiü samosaraõà'ti?'

`Vedanàsamosaraõà, bhante. '
`Te pana, Samiddhi, kiü pamukhà'ti?'

`Samàdhipamukhà, bhante.'
`Te pana, Samiddhi, kim adhipateyyà'ti?'

`Satàdhipateyyà, bhante.'
`Te pana, Samiddhi, kim uttarà'ti?'

`Pa¤¤uttarà, bhante.'
`Te pana, Samiddhi kiü sàrà'ti?'

`Vimuttisàrà, bhante.'
`Te pana, Samiddhi, kim ogadhà'ti?'

Àmatogadhà, bhante.'33
Except for the first two questions and the last one, the rest is the
same as in the questionnaire given by the Buddha. But from this
catechism it is extremely clear that Venerable Sàriputta is asking
about thoughts and concepts. In the case of the previous sutta, one
could sometimes doubt whether the word sabbe dhammà referred
to skilful or unskilful mental states. But here it is clear enough that
Venerable Sàriputta's questions are on thoughts and concepts. Let
us now try to translate the above catechism:
ßWith what as objects, Samiddhi, do concepts and thoughts

arise in a man?û
ßWith name-and-form as object, venerable sir.û
ßBut where, Samiddhi, do they assume diversity?û

ßIn the elements, venerable sir.û
ßBut from what, Samiddhi, do they arise?û

ßThey arise from contact, venerable sir.û
ßBut on what, Samiddhi, do they converge?û

ßThey converge on feeling, venerable sir.û
ßBut what, Samiddhi, is at their head?û

ßThey are headed by concentration, venerable sir.û
ßBut by what, Samiddhi, are they dominated?û

ßThey are dominated by mindfulness, venerable sir.û
33 A IV 385, Samiddhisutta.
ßBut what, Samiddhi, is their highest point?û

ßWisdom is their highest point, venerable sir.û
ßBut what, Samiddhi, is their essence?û

ßDeliverance is their essence, venerable sir.û
ßBut in what, Samiddhi, do they get merged?û

ßThey get merged in the deathless, venerable sir.û
Some noteworthy points emerge from this catechism. All concepts

and thoughts have name-and-form as their object. The eighteen
elements account for their diversity. They arise with contact. They
converge on feeling. They are headed by concentration. They are
dominated by mindfulness. Their acme or point of transcendence
is wisdom. Their essence is deliverance and they get merged in the
deathless. Be it noted that the deathless is a term for Nibbàna.
therefore, as we have stated above, everything has the potentiality
to yield the deathless, provided radical attention is ushered in.
It is indubitably clear, from this catechism, that the subject
under consideration is concepts and thoughts. All mind objects
partake of the character of concepts and thoughts. Therefore the
mind objects, according to the Buddha, have to be evaluated on the
lines of the above mentioned normative principles, and not on the
lines of self essence and divine creation as postulated by soul
theories.
In accordance with the dictum `mind is the forerunner of all
things,' manopubbaïgamà dhammà,34 the course of training
advocated by the Buddha, which begins with name-and-form as
object, reaches its consummation in seeing through name-and-
form, that is, in its penetration. It culminates in the transcendence
of name-and-form, by penetrating into its impermanent, suffering-
34 Dhp 1, Yamakavagga.
fraught, and not-self nature. This fact is borne out by the discours-
es already quoted.
The essence of the teaching is release from name-and-form.
When one rightly understands the relation between name and form
as well as their emptiness, one is able to see through name-and-
form. This penetration is the function of wisdom. So long as
wisdom is lacking, consciousness has a tendency to get entan-
gled in name-and-form. This is the insinuation of the following
Dhammapada verse about the arahant:
Kodhaü jahe vippajaheyya mànaü,

saüyojanaü sabbam atikkameyya,
taü nàmaråpasmim asajjamànaü,
aki¤canaü nànupatanti dukkhà.35
ßLet one put wrath away, conceit abandon,

And get well beyond all fetters as well,
That one, untrammelled by name-and-form,
With naught as his own Ý no pains befall.û
The path shown by the Buddha, then, is one that leads to the
transcendence of name-and-form by understanding its emptiness.
In this connection, the Brahmajàlasutta of the Dãgha Nikàya
reveals a very important fact on analysis.36 What it portrays is how
the sixty-two wrong views lose their lustre in the light of wisdom
emanating from the non-manifestative consciousness of the
Buddha, which is lustrous on all sides, sabbato pabha.37
As to how a lustre could be superseded, we have already ex-
plained with reference to a film show.38 The film show lost its
35 Dhp 221, Kodhavagga.

36 D I 1-46, Brahmajàlasutta.
38 See sermon 5.
lustre when the doors were flung open. The narrow beam of light,
directed on the cinema screen, faded away completely before the
greater light now coming from outside. Similarly, the sixty-two
wrong views in the Brahmajàlasutta are seen to fade away before
the light of wisdom coming from the non-manifestative con-
sciousness of the Buddha. The narrow beams of sixty-two wrong
views faded in the broader flood of light that is wisdom.
Those heretics who propounded those wrong views, conceived
them by dogmatically holding on to name-and-form. They got
entangled in name-and-form, and those views were the product of
speculative logic based on it. We come across an allusion to this
fact in the MahàViyåhasutta of the Sutta Nipàta. There it is
declared that those of other sects are not free from the limitations
of name-and-form:
Passaü naro dakkhiti nàmaråpaü,

disvàna và ¤assati tànim eva,
kàmaü bahuü passatu appakaü và,
na hi tena suddhiü kusalà vadanti.39
ßA seeing man will see only name-and-form,

Having seen he will know just those constituents alone,
Let him see much or little,
Experts do not concede purity thereby.û
In the Brahmajàlasutta itself we find some views advanced by

those who had higher knowledges. With the help of those higher
knowledges, which were still of the mundane type, they would see
into their past, sometimes hundreds of thousands of their past
lives, and drawing also from their ability to read others' minds,
they would construct various views. Many such views are record-
39 Sn 909, Mahàviyåhasutta.
ed in the Brahmajàlasutta, only to be rejected and invalidated.

Why so? The reason is given here in this verse.
The man who claims to see with those higher knowledges is
seeing only name-and-form, passaü naro dakkhiti nàmaråpaü.
Having seen, he takes whatever he sees as real knowledge, disvàna
và ¤assati tànim eva. Just as someone inside a closed room with
tinted windowpanes sees only what is reflected on those dark
panes, and not beyond, even so, those `seers' got enmeshed in
name-and-form when they proceeded to speculate on what they
saw as their past lives. They took name-and-form itself to be real.
That is why the Buddha declared that whether they saw much or
little, it is of no use, since experts do not attribute purity to that
kind of vision, kàmaü bahuü passatu appakaü và, na hi tena
suddhiü kusalà vadanti.
Here it is clear enough that those narrow wrong views are based
on name-and-form, assuming it to be something real. The Bud-
dha's vision, on the other hand, is one that transcends name-and-
form. It is a supramundane vision. This fact is clearly revealed by
the implications of the very title of the Brahmajàlasutta. At the
end of the discourse, the Buddha himself compares it to an all-
embracing super-net.40 Just as a clever fisherman would throw a
finely woven net well over a small lake, so that all the creatures
living there are caught in it as they come up, all the possible views
in the world are enmeshed or forestalled by this super-net, or
brahmajàla.
Let us now pause to consider what the mesh of this net could
be. If the Brahmajàlasutta is a net, what constitutes that fine mesh
in this net? There is a word occurring all over the discourse, which
gives us a clear answer to this question. It is found in the phrase
which the Buddha uses to disqualify every one of those views,
namely, tadapi phassapaccayà, tadapi phassapaccayà,41 ßand that
40 D I 46, Brahmajàlasutta.
too is due to contact, and that too is due to contact.û So from this
we can see that contact is the mesh of this net.
The medley of wrong views, current among those of other sects,
is the product of the six sense-bases dependent on contact. The
Buddha's vision, on the other hand, seems to be an all-
encompassing lustre of wisdom, born of the cessation of the six
sense-bases, which in effect, is the vision of Nibbàna. This fact is
further clarified in the sutta by the statement of the Buddha that
those who cling to those wrong views, based on name-and-form,
keep on whirling within the saüsàric round because of those very
views.
Sabbe te chahi phassàyatanehi phussa phussa pañisaü-

vedenti, tesaü phassapaccayà vedanà, vedanàpaccayà
taõhà, taõhàpaccayà upàdànaü, upàdànapaccayà bhavo,
bhavapaccayà jàti, jàtipaccayà jaràmaraõaü sokapa-
ridevadukkhadomanassupàyàsà sambhavanti. Yato kho,
bhikkhave, bhikkhu, channaü phassàyatanànaü
samudaya¤ca atthagama¤ca assàda¤ca àdãnava¤ca
nissara-õa¤ca yathàbhåtaü pajànàti, ayaü imehi sabbe-
heva uttaritaraü pajànàti.42
ßThey all continue to experience feeling coming into con-

tact again and again with the six sense-bases, and to them
dependent on contact there is feeling, dependent on feeling
there is craving, dependent on craving there is grasping,
dependent on grasping there is becoming, dependent on
becoming there is birth, and dependent on birth, decay,
death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair come to
be. But when, monks, a monk knows, as they truly are, the
arising, the going down, the satisfaction, the peril and the
stepping out concerning the six sense-bases, that monk has
a knowledge which is far superior to that of all those dog-

matists.û
This paragraph clearly brings out the distinction between those

who held on to such speculative views and the one who wins to the
vision made known by the Buddha. The former were dependent on
contact, that is, sensory contact, even if they possessed worldly
higher knowledges. Because of contact originating from the six
sense-bases there is feeling. Because of feeling they are lured into
craving and grasping which make them go round and round in
saüsàra.
The emancipated monk who keeps to the right path, on the other
hand, wins to that synoptic vision of the six sense-bases, replete in
its five aspects. That is what is known as the light of wisdom. To
him, all five aspects of the six sense-bases become clear, namely
the arising, the going down, the satisfaction, the peril and the
stepping out. That light of wisdom is considered the highest
knowledge, precisely because it reveals all these five aspects of the
six sense-bases.
The reference to the formula of dependent arising in the above
passage is highly significant. It is clear proof of the fact that the
law of dependent arising is not something to be explained with
reference to a past existence. It is a law relevant to the present
moment.
This name-and-form is reflected on consciousness. Now as to
this consciousness, the Nidànasaüyutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya,
which is a section dealing with the law of dependent arising in
particular, defines it in a way that includes all the six types of
consciousness:
Katama¤ca, bhikkhave, vi¤¤àõaü? Chayime, bhikkhave,

vi¤¤àõakàyà Ý cakkhuvi¤¤àõaü, sotavi¤¤àõaü, ghàna-
vi¤¤àõaü, jivhàvi¤¤àõaü, kàyavi¤¤àõaü, manovi¤¤à-

õaü, idaü vuccati, bhikkhave, vi¤¤àõaü.43
ßAnd what, monks, is consciousness? There are these

six classes of consciousness Ý eye-consciousness, ear-
consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness,
body-consciousness and mind-consciousness; this, monks,
is called consciousness.û
This shows that the consciousness mentioned in the formula of

dependent arising is not something like a re-linking consciousness.
The reference here is not to just one consciousness. It is in de-
pendence on name-and-form, reflected on all six types of con-
sciousness, that the six sense-bases get established.
The discrimination between an ìnternal' and an èxternal' is the
outcome of the inability to penetrate name-and-form, to see
through it. There is an apparent duality: I, as one who sees, and
name-and-form, as the objects seen. Between them there is a
dichotomy as internal and external. It is on this very dichotomy
that the six sense-bases are `based.' Feeling and all the rest of it
come on top of those six sense-bases. Craving and grasping follow
suit, as a result of which those dogmatists get caught up in the
vicious cycle of dependent arising and keep running round in
saüsàra as the Buddha has declared.
So then, it becomes clear from the Brahmajàlasutta that such a
wide variety of wrong views exist in this world due to the dogmat-
ic involvement in name-and-form reflected on consciousness, that
is by mistaking the reflection to be one's self. This, in brief, is
tantamount to sakkàyadiññhi, or personality view.
Now let us take up a parable by way of an illustration of the
distinction between the wrong view of the dogmatists, already
analysed, and the right view, which is in complete contrast to it. It
43 S II 4, Vibhaïgasutta.
is an episode in the Ummaggajàtaka which more or less looks like

a parable to illustrate this point.44 In the Ummaggajàtaka one
comes across the problem of a gem. In that story there are in fact
several such problems concerning gems, and we are taking up just
one of them.
The citizens of Mithilà came and informed king Videha that
there is a gem in the pond near the city gate. The king commis-
sioned his royal adviser Senaka with the task of taking out the
gem. He went and got the people to empty the pond but failed to
find the gem there. Even the mud was taken out and the earth dug
up in a vain attempt to locate the gem. When he confessed his
failure to the king, the latter entrusted the job to bodhisatta
Mahosadha, the youngest adviser. When he went there and had a
look around, he immediately understood that the gem is actually in
a crow's nest on a palm tree near the pond. What appeared in the
pond is only its reflection. He convinced the king of this fact by
getting a man to immerse a bowl of water into the pond, which
also reflected the gem. Then the man climbed up the palm tree and
found the gem there, as predicted by Mahosadha.
If we take this episode as an illustration, the view of the dogma-
tists can be compared to Senaka's view. The discovery of the
Buddha that name-and-form is a mere reflection is like the
solution advanced by bodhisatta Mahosadha to the problem of the
gem in the pond.
Now what is the role of personality view in this connection? It
is said that the Buddha preached the Dhamma adopting a via
media between two extreme views. What are they? The eternalist
view and the nihilist view. The eternalist view is like that attach-
ment to the reflection. Sometimes, when one sees one's own
image in water, one falls in love with it, imagining it to be some-
one else, as in the case of the dog on the plank mentioned in an
44 Ja VI 129 (no 546), Ummaggajàtaka.

earlier sermon.45 It can sometimes arouse hate as well. Thus there

could be both self-love and self-hate.
Inclining towards these two attitudes, the personality view itself
leads to the two extreme views known as eternalism and nihilism,
or annihilationism. It is like Senaka's attempt to find the gem by
emptying the water and digging the bottom of the pond. The
Buddha avoids both these extremes by understanding that this
name-and-form is a reflection, owing to the reflective nature of
this pond of consciousness. It has no essence.
The name in this name-and-form, as we have already stated in
an earlier sermon, is merely a formal name, or an apparent name.46
And the form here is only a nominal form, a form only in name.
There is neither an actual name nor a substantial form here. Name
is only apparent, and form is only nominal. With this preliminary
understanding one has to arouse that wisdom by building up the
ability to see through name-and-form, in order to win to freedom
from this name-and-form.
So, in this sermon, our special attention has been on name-and-
form, on the interrelation between name-and-form and conscious-
ness. All this reveals to us the importance of the first two lines of
the problematic verse already quoted, vi¤¤ànaü anidassanaü
anantaü sabbato pabhaü,47 ßConsciousness which is non-
manifestative, endless, lustrous on all sides.û
According to the Buddha's vision, by fully comprehending the
fact that name-and-form is a mere image, or reflection, the non-
manifestative consciousness develops the penetrative power to see
through it. But those others, who could not understand that it is a
reflection, aroused self-love and self-hate. It is as if one is trying to
outstrip one's shadow by running towards it out of fun, while the
45 See sermon 6.
46 See sermon 1.
other is trying to flee from it out of fear. Such is the nature of the
two extreme views in this world.
Dvãhi, bhikkhave, diññhigatehi pariyuññhità devamanussà

olãyanti eke, atidhàvanti eke, cakkhumanto ca passanti.48
ßObsessed by two views, monks, are gods and men, some

of whom lag behind, while others overreach, only they do
see that have eyes to see.û
This is how the Itivuttaka, the collection of the `thus said' dis-
courses, sums up the situation in the world. Some fall back and lag
behind, while others overstep and overreach. It is only they that
see, who have eyes to see.
48 It 43, Diññhigatasutta.
Nibbàna Sermon 10



This is the tenth sermon in the series of sermons on Nibbàna.
With the help of a parable based on the problem of the gem in the
Ummaggajàtaka, we made an attempt, towards the end of our last
sermon, to clarify to some extent how the personality view arises
due to the ignorance of the fact that name-and-form is something
reflected on consciousness. We mentioned in brief how a certain
would-be wise man took the trouble to empty a pond and even dig
out the mud under the impression that there is actually a gem in it,
simply because there appeared to be a gem in the pond.
Similarly, by taking to be real name-and-form, which is only an
image reflected on consciousness leading to a personality view,
sakkàyadiññhi, both eternalism and nihilism, built on the two views
263
of existence and non-existence, tended towards two extremes.

Under the influence of self love, eternalism took up the view that
there is a self, and looked forward to its perpetuation. Prompted by
self hate, annihilationism or nihilism cherished the fond hope that
the release from this self will occur at death. Both these extreme
views confuse the issue by not understanding the reflected image
as such.
Now how did the middle path, which the Buddha introduced to
the world, avoid these two extremes? It is by offering a knowledge
and vision of things as they are, yathàbhåta¤àõadassana, in place
of those two views of existence and non-existence. In other words,
he made known to the world the true knowledge and vision that
name-and-form is merely an image reflected on consciousness.
There is a special significance in the word yathàbhåta. In
contradistinction to the two words bhava and vibhava, the word
bhåta has some peculiarity of its own. In order to clarify the
meaning of the term yathàbhåta, we can draw upon a discourse in
the Itivuttaka, a few lines of which we had already quoted at the
end of the previous sermon. When presented in full, that discourse
will make it clear why the Buddha introduced the word bhåta in
preference to the existing usage in terms of bhava and vibhava.
This is how that discourse proceeds:
Dvãhi, bhikkhave, diññhigatehi pariyuññhità devamanussà

olãyanti eke, atidhàvanti eke, cakkhumanto va passanti.
Katha¤ca, bhikkhave, olãyanti eke? Bhavàràmà, bhik-
khave, devamanussà bhavaratà bhavasammudità, tesaü
bhavanirodhàya dhamme desiyamàne cittaü na pakkhan-
dati na pasãdati na santiññhati nàdhimuccati. Evaü kho,
bhikkhave, olãyanti eke.
Katha¤ca, bhikkhave, atidhàvanti eke? Bhaveneva kho

pana eke aññãyamànà haràyamànà jigucchamànà vibha-
vaü abhinandanti Ý yato kira, bho, ayaü attà kàyassa
bhedà paraü maraõà ucchijjati vinassati na hoti paraü
maraõà, etaü santaü etaü paõãtaü etaü yàthàvanti.

Evaü kho, bhikkhave, atidhàvanti eke.
Katha¤ca, bhikkhave, cakkhumanto passanti? Idha

bhikkhu bhåtaü bhåtato passati, bhåtaü bhåtato disvà
bhåtassa nibbidàya viràgàya nirodhàya pañipanno hoti.
Evaü kho, bhikkhave, cakkhumanto va passantã'ti.û2
ßObsessed by two views, monks, are gods and men, some

of whom lag behind, while others overreach. Only they do
see that have eyes to see. How, monks, do some lag be-
hind? Gods and men, monks, delight in existence, they are
attached to existence, they rejoice in existence. When
Dhamma is being preached to them for the cessation of
existence, their minds do not reach out towards it, do not
get pleased in it, do not get steadied in it, do not rest con-
fident with it. It is thus that some lag behind.
ßHow, monks, do some overreach? Being troubled,

ashamed, and disgusted of existence as such, some delight
in non-existence Ý since this self, at the breaking up of this
body after death, will be annihilated and destroyed, this is
peace, this is excellent, this is how it should be. Thus,
monks do some overreach.
ßAnd how, monks, do those with eyes see? Herein a monk

sees the become as become. Having seen the become as
become, he is treading the path towards dejection, dispas-
sion and cessation regarding becoming. Thus it is, monks,
that those with eyes see.û
2 It 43, Diññhigatasutta.
This passage clearly brings out the extreme nature of those two
views of existence and non-existence. The two verses occurring at
the end of this sutta present the gist of the discourse even more
clearly:
Ye bhåtaü bhåtato disvà,

bhåtassa ca atikkamaü,
yathàbhåte vimuccanti,
bhavataõhà parikkhayà.
Sa ve bhåtapari¤¤o so,
vãtataõho bhavàbhave,
bhåtassa vibhavà bhikkhu,
nàgacchati punabbhavaü.
ßThose who have seen the become as become,

As well as the going beyond of whatever has become,
Are released in regard to things as they are,
By the exhaustion of craving for becoming.
ßThat monk, who has fully comprehended the become,

Who is devoid of craving for continued becoming,
By the discontinuation of what has become,
Will not come back again to a state of becoming.û
Now it is extremely clear, even from the quotation as it stands, that

the Buddha has interposed this word bhåta between the dichoto-
mous terms bhava and vibhava. In the contemporary society, these
two terms were used to denote the existence and the destruction of
a soul. This usage is clearly revealed by some discourses, in which
those who held onto similar views expressed them in such terms
asbhavissàmi and na bhavissàmi.3 These expressions, meaning
3 E.g. at M I 8, Sabbàsavasutta; or at M I 135, Alaggadåpamasutta.

Ì will be' and Ì will not be,' carry with them an implication of a
person or a self.
The term bhåta, on the other hand, is not amenable to such a
usage. It has the passive sense of something that has become. Like
that reflection mentioned earlier, it conveys the idea of being
produced by causes and conditions. Going by the analogy of the
reflected image mentioned above, the eternalist, because of his
narcissistic self love, gets attached to his own self image and lags
behind. When the Buddha preaches the Dhamma for the cessation
of existence, he shrinks from fear that it would lead to the destruc-
tion of his self. It is like the narcissistic attempt to embrace one's
own image in water out of self love.
The annihilationist view leads to an attitude of escapism, like
that of one who is obsessed by his own shadow. One cannot
outstrip one's own shadow. It is only a vain attempt. So also is the
fond hope of the nihilist that by simply negating self one can be
free from repeated birth. It turns out to be mere wishful thinking,
because simply by virtue of the view Ì shall not be after death'
one cannot win deliverance, so long as such defilements like
ignorance and craving are there. These were the two extremes
towards which those two dogmatic views of eternalism and
annihilationism tended.
By introducing the term bhåta the Buddha made it known that
the five groups are the product of causes and conditions, that they
are conditionally arisen. In the Itivuttaka, for instance, one comes
across the following significant lines: Jàtaü bhåtaü samup-
pannaü, kataü saïkhatamaddhuvaü..4 The reference here is to
the five groups of grasping. They are ßborn,û ßbecome,û ßarisen,û
(that is conditionally arisen), ßmade up,û ßprepared,û and ßunsta-
ble.û These words are suggestive of some artificiality. The word
addhuvaü brings out their impermanence and insubstantiality.
There is no eternal essence, like sat, or being. It is merely a self
4 It 37, Ajàtasutta.
image, a reflection. So it seems that the word bhåta has connota-

tions of being a product of causes and conditions.
Therefore, in spite of the scare it has aroused in the soul-
theorists, Nibbàna is not something that destroys a truly existing
entity. Though Nibbàna is called bhavanirodha,5 cessation of
existence, according to the outlook of the Buddha the worldlings
have merely a craving for existence, bhavataïhà, and not a real
existence. It is only a conceit of existence, the conceit àm,'
asmimàna.
In reality it amounts to a craving, and this is the significance of
the term taïhà ponobhàvikà, craving which makes for re-
becoming. Because of that craving, which is always bent forward,
worldlings keep running round in saüsàra. But on analysis a
concrete situation always reveals a state of a become, a bhåta, as
something produced by causes and conditions.
A donkey drags a wagon when a carrot is projected towards it
from the wagon. The journey of beings in saüsàra is something
like that. So what we have here is not the destruction of some
existing essence of being or a soul. From the point of view of the
Dhamma the cessation of existence, or bhavanirodha, amounts to
a stopping of the process of becoming, by the removal of the
causes leading to it, namely ignorance and craving. It is, in effect,
the cessation of suffering itself.
Those who held on to the annihilationist view, entertained the
hope that their view itself entitled them to their cherished goal. But
it was in vain, because the ignorance, craving, and grasping within
them created for them the five groups of grasping, or this mass of
suffering, again and again despite their view, uppajjati dukkham
idaü punappunaü.
So what we have here is a deep philosophy of things as they are,
which follows a certain law of causality. The Buddha's middle
5 E.g. at A V 9, Sàriputtasutta.
path is based on this knowledge and vision of things as they are,

avoiding both extremes of self indulgence and self mortification.
Let us now consider the question of existence involved in this
context. The terms bhava and vibhava are generally associated
with the idea of worlds' existence. Some seem to take atthi, or ìs,'
as the basic element in the grammatical structure. Very often those
upholders of dogmatic views brought up such propositions as
èvery-thing exists,' sabbaü atthi, and `nothing exists,' sabbaü
natthi, before the Buddha, expecting him to give a categorical
answer.6
But the Buddha pointed out that asmi, or àm,' is more basic
than the usage of ìs' and ìs not.' The most elementary concept is
asmi, or àm.' Hence the term asmimàna, the conceit àm.' In the
grammatical structure, the pride of place should be given to asmi,
or àm.' We sometimes tend to regard atthi, or ìs,' as the primary
term. But asmi deserves pride of place in so far as it is the basic
element in the grammatical structure. It is like the central peg from
which all measurings and surveyings of the world start, since the
word màna in asmimàna also means `measuring.' Given asmi, or
àm,' everything else comes to be.
Let us take an illustration. If, for instance, we say ßthere is
something,û someone will pose the question ßwhere is it?û It
should be either here or there or yonder, that is, over there. It can
be in one of those three places. Now, if it is here, how does that
place become a `here?' That is where I am. `There' is where he is,
and `yonder' is where you are.
So we have here the framework of the grammar. Here is the
basic lining up for the formation of the grammatical structure, its
most elementary pattern. So, then, Ì am,' `you are,' and `he is.' In
this way we see that one can speak of the existence of something
relative to a viewpoint represented by àm' or Ì am.' That is why
the Buddha rejected as extremes the two views of absolute
6 E.g. at S II 76, Jàõussoõisutta.

existence and absolute non-existence, based on ìs,' atthi, and ìs

not,' natthi.
Only when there is an Ì,' can something exist relative to that I.
And that something, if it is `there,' it is where Ì' am not present,
or at a distance from me. If it is `yonder,' or over there, it is before
you who are in front of me. And if it is `here,' it is beside me.
From this we can see that this conceit àm' is, as it were, the origin
of the whole world, the origin of the world of grammar.
On a previous occasion, too, while discussing the significance
of the two terms itthabhàva and a¤¤athàbhàva, we had to make a
similar statement.7 The Buddha draws our attention to a very
important fact in this concern, namely, the fact that the conceit
àm' does not arise without causes and conditions. It is not
something uncaused, and unconditioned. If it is uncaused and
unconditioned, it can never be made to cease. The notion àm'
arises due to certain causes and conditions. There is a word
suggestive of this causal origin, namely upàdàya.
Now, for instance, we use the term pa¤c'upàdànakkhandha.
When we speak of the five groups of grasping, the word upàdàna
(upa + à + dà) is often rendered by grasping. The prefix upa is
supposed to imply the tenacity of the hold.8 One can therefore ask
whether it is not sufficient to relax the hold on the five groups.
Strictly speaking, the prefix upa in upàdàna conveys the sense of
proximity or nearness. Sometimes the two words upeti and
upàdiyati are found in juxtaposition. Upeti, upa + i, to go, means
`coming near' or àpproaching,' and upàdiyati has the sense of
`holding on to,' having come close. In other words, we have here
not only a case of holding, but of holding òn to.'
So the totality of existence, from the point of view of Dhamma,
is dependent on a holding on, or a grasping on. It is not something
uncaused and unconditioned. Here we may remind ourselves of
7 See sermon 2.
8 Vism 569.
the simile of the winding of a rope or a cord which we brought up

in a previous sermon.9 We cannot help going back to the same
simile again and again, if we are to deepen our understanding of
the Dhamma.
In that illustration we spoke of two persons winding up several
strands to make a rope or a cord. But both are winding in the same
direction from either end. Such an attempt at winding, however
long it is continued, does not result in an actual winding, for the
simple reason that the winding from one end is continually being
unwinded from the other end. But what happens if a third person
catches hold of the rope in the middle? Due to that hold on the
middle, something like a rope appears to get winded up.
Now existence, too, is something similar. It is because of the
hold in the middle that the rope gets wound up. From the point of
view of an outsider, the one in the middle is holding on to a rope.
But the truth is, that the semblance of a rope is there due to that
holding on itself. This, then, is the norm of this world. `Whatever
is of a nature to arise, all that is of a nature to cease, ' yaü ki¤ci
samudayadhammaü, sabbaü taü nirodhadhammaü.10
It is in the nature of things that every winding ends up in an
unwinding. But because of that hold in the middle, the windings
get accumulated. Just because of his hold in the middle, his hand is
under stress and strain. Similarly, the stress and strain that is
existence is also due to a grasping or a holding on to, upàdàna-
paccayà bhavo.
In fact, we have not given this illustration merely for the sake of
a simile. We can adduce reasons for its validity even from the
discourses. This word upàdàya is particularly noteworthy. As we
have already shown, upàdàna does not simply mean grasping, or
grasping rigidly, but holding on to something, having come close
to it. This holding on creates a certain relationship, which may be
9 See sermon 8.
technically termed a relativity. The two stand relative to each

other. For instance, that rope exists relative to the grasping of the
person who holds on to it. Now upàdàya is the absolutive form of
upàdàna, it has the implication of something relative.
There is a discourse in the Khandhasaüyutta, which clearly
reveals this fact. It is a sermon preached by Venerable Puõõa
Mantàõiputta to Venerable ânanda. This is the relevant paragraph:
Upàdàya, àvuso ânanda, asmãti hoti, no anupàdàya.

Ki¤ca upàdàya asmãti hoti, no anupàdàya? Råpaü
upàdàya asmãti hoti, no anupàdàya; vedanaü upàdàya
asmãti hoti, no anupàdàya; sa¤¤aü upàdàya asmãti hoti,
no anupàdàya; saïkhàre upàdàya asmãti hoti, no anu-
pàdàya; vi¤¤àõaü upàdàya asmãti hoti, no anupàdàya.
Upàdàya, àvuso ânanda, asmãti hoti, no anupàdàya.
Seyyathàpi, àvuso ânanda, itthã và puriso và daharo yuvà

maõóanakajàtiko àdàse và parisuddhe pariyodàte acche
và udakapatte sakaü mukhanimittaü paccavekkhamàno
upàdàya passeyya, no anupàdàya, evam eva kho, àvuso
ânanda, upàdàya asmãti hoti, no anupàdàya.11
Let us now try to get at the meaning of this important passage,

which should clarify further what we have already attempted to
explain through similes.
ßIt is with dependence, friend ânanda, that the notion

àm' occurs, not without dependence. With dependence on
what, does the notion àm' occur, and not without depend-
ence? With dependence on form does the notion àm' oc-
cur, not without dependence; with dependence on feeling
does the notion àm' occur, not without dependence; with
11 S III 105, ânandasutta.

dependence on perception does the notion àm' occur, not

without dependence; with dependence on preparations
does the notion àm' occur, not with out dependence; with
dependence on consciousness does the notion àm' occur,
not without dependence.
ßJust as, friend ânanda, a woman or a man, youthful and

fond of adornment, in looking at her or his facial image in
a mirror or in a bowl filled with pure, clear, clean water,
would be seeing it with dependence and not without de-
pendence, even so, friend ânanda, it is with dependence
that the notion àm' occurs, not without dependence.û
In fact, it is rather difficult to render the word upàdàya. It means

ìn dependence on' something and has a relative sense. Reinforced
with the emphatic double negative, the assertion seems to imply
that the notion àm' is something dependent and not independent,
that it arises due to causes and conditions. In the explanation that
follows, this dictum is substantiated by bringing in the five groups
or aggregates, relative to which one posits an àm.'
The subsequent illustration serves to bring out the required
nuance of the term upàdàya, which is more often connected with
the rather gross idea of grasping. The young woman or the young
man is looking at her or his face in a mirror. They can see their
own face, or the sign of it, mukhanimitta, only with the help of a
mirror, that is, as an image reflected on it. They are dependent on a
mirror or a similar object for seeing their own face, not independ-
ent.
What Venerable Puõõa Mantàõiputta seems to stress, is that the
notion àm' is the result of grasping or holding on to form, feeling,
perception, preparations, and consciousness. It is when one looks
into a mirror that one suddenly becomes self-conscious. Whether
one has a liking or a dislike for what one sees, one gets the notion
`this is me.' So it is by coming close to a mirror which reflects
one's facial image that the notion àm' occurs depending on it.
The word upàdàya therefore approximates to the idea of coming

close and holding on to.
That notion occurs due to a relationship arising from that hold-
ing on. Even if one already has no such notion, the moment one
looks into a mirror one is suddenly reminded of it, as if to exclaim:
ßAh, here I am!û This is the gist of what Venerable Puõõa Man-
tàõiputta is trying to put across through this discourse.
This shows that the conceit àm' arises due to the five grasping
groups. The absolutive upàdàya, though akin to upàdàna, has a
deeper significance. It is a word suggestive of a relationship. It
does not merely mean a holding on, but also a certain necessary
relationship arising out of that holding on. Just as the looking into
a mirror or a bowl of water gives rise to a facial image as a
reflection, here too the relationship calls forth the deluded reflec-
tion ßhere I am.û Given the notion ßhere I am,û there follows the
corollary ßthings that are mine.û
So there is supposed to be an Ì' in contradistinction to things
that are `mine.' It is the difficulty to demarcate the area of applica-
bility between these two concepts that has given rise to insoluble
problems. `Who am I and what is mine?' The twenty modes of
personality view, sakkàya diññhi, portray how one is at one's wit's
end to solve this problem.
Let us now see how the twenty modes of personality view are
made up. For instance, as regards form, it is four-fold as follows:
Råpaü attato samanupassati, råpavantaü và attànaü, attani và
råpaü, råpasmiü và attànaü.12 ßHe regards form as self, or self as
possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form.û It is the
same with the other four groups. In this way, the personality view
is altogether twenty-fold.
All this comes about due to the ignorance that name-and-form is
only a reflection, like that facial image. In grasping this self image
of name-and-form one grasps the five groups. Attachment to
name-and-form amounts to a holding on to these five groups. To

many, the relationship between name-and-form and the grasping
groups appears as a big puzzle. Wherever one looks, one sees this
self image of name-and-form. But when one grasps it, what comes
within the grasp is a group of form, feeling, perception, prepara-
tions, and consciousness.
The magical illusion created by consciousness is so complete
that it is capable of playing a dual role, as in double acting. Be
cause it reflects, like a mirror, consciousness itself is grasped, just
as one grasps the mirror. Not only the reflection of the mirror, but
the mirror itself is grasped. The grasping group of consciousness
represents such a predicament.
One can form an idea about the relation between name-and-
form and consciousness by going deeper into the implications of
this discourse. In the discussion of the interrelation between name
and form, the Buddha makes use of two highly significant terms,
namely adhivacanasamphassa and pañighasamphassa. How
contact arises dependent on name-and-form is explained by the
Buddha in the MahàNidànasutta of the Dãgha Nikàya.13 It is
addressed to Venerable ânanda in the form of a catechism.
Phassa, or contact, is a sort of hybrid, carrying with it the im-
plications of both adhivacanasamphassa and pañighasamphassa.
That is to say, it partakes of the character of name, nàma, as
suggested by adhivacanasamphassa, as well as that of form, råpa,
indicated by pañighasamphassa. This will be clear from the
relevant section of the catechism in the MahàNidànasutta:
`Nàmaråpapaccayà phasso'ti iti kho panetaü vuttaü,

tad'ânanda, iminàpetaü pariyàyena veditabbaü, yathà
nàmaråpapaccayà phasso. Yehi, ânanda, àkàrehi yehi
liïgehi yehi nimittehi yehi uddesehi nàmakàyassa pa¤¤atti
hoti, tesu àkàresu tesu liïgesu tesu nimittesu tesu
uddesesu asati api nu kho råpakàye adhivacanasam-

phasso pa¤¤àyethà'ti?'
`No hetaü, bhante.'
`Yehi, ânanda, àkàrehi yehi liïgehi yehi nimittehi yehi

uddesehi råpakàyassa pa¤¤atti hoti, tesu àkàresu tesu
liïgesu tesu nimittesu tesu uddesesu asati api nu kho
nàmakàye pañighasamphasso pa¤¤àyethà'ti?'

uddesehi nàmakàyassa ca råpakàyassa ca pa¤¤atti hoti,
tesu àkàresu tesu liïgesu tesu nimittesu tesu uddesesu
asati api nu kho adhivacanasamphasso và pañighasam-
phasso và pa¤¤àyethà'ti?'

uddesehi nàmaråpassa pa¤¤atti hoti, tesu àkàresu tesu
liïgesu tesu nimittesu tesu uddesesu asati api nu kho
phasso pa¤¤àyethà'ti?'
`Tasmàtih'ânanda, eseva hetu etaü nidànaü esa

samudayo esa paccayo phassassa, yadidaü nàmaråpaü.'
ßFrom name-and-form as condition, contact comes to be.

Thus it has been said above. And that ânanda, should be
understood in this manner, too, as to how from name-and-
form as condition, contact arises. If, ânanda, all those
modes, characteristics, signs and exponents, by which the
name-group, nàma-kàya, is designated were absent, would
there be manifest any verbal impression, adhivacanasam-
phassa, in the form-group, råpa-kàya?û
ßThere would not, lord.û
ßIf, ânanda, all those modes, characteristics, signs and

exponents, by which the form-group is designated were
absent, would there be manifest any resistance-impression,
pañighasamphasso, in the name-group?û
ßAnd if, ânanda, all those modes, characteristics, signs

and exponents, by which there is a designation of both
name-group and form-group were absent, would there be
manifest either any verbal impression or any resistance-
impression?û
ßAnd if, ânanda, all those modes, characteristics, signs

and exponents, by which there comes to be a designation
of name-and-form were absent, would there be manifest
any contact?û
ßWherefore, ânanda, this itself is the cause, this is the

origin, this is the condition for contact, that is to say,
name-and-form.û
With the help of four words of allied sense, namely àkàra, mode,
liïga, characteristic, nimitta, sign, and uddesa, exponent, the
Buddha catechetically brings out four conclusions by this disquisi-
tion. They are:
1) By whatever modes, characteristics, signs and exponents

the name-group, nàma-kàya, is designated, in their ab-
sence no designation of verbal impression, adhiva-
canasamphassa, in the form-group, råpa-kàya, is possible.
the form-group is designated, in their absence no designa-
tion of resistance-impression, pañighasamphasso, in the

name-group, nàmakàya, is possible.
both name-group and form-group are designated, in their
absence no designation of verbal impression or resistance-
impression is possible.
name-and-form is designated, in their absence no designa-
tion of contact is possible.
All this may well appear like a riddle, but then let us consider what
name-and-form means, to begin with. The definition we gave to
nàma in our very first sermon happened to be different from the
well known definition nowadays given in terms of a bending.14 We
interpreted nàma in the sense of a `naming.' Now this term
adhivacana also conveys the same idea. Adhivacana, synonym,
nirutti, nomenclature, and pa¤¤atti, designation, are part and
parcel of linguistic usage.
In the Niruttipathasutta of the Khandhasaüyutta one comes
across three terms, niruttipatha, adhivacanapatha, and
pa¤¤attipatha, pathways of nomenclature, pathways of synonyms,
and pathways of designation.15 These three terms are closely allied
in meaning, in that they bring out in a sharp relief the three aspects
of linguistic usage. Nirutti emphasises the explanatory or exposito-
ry function of language, adhivacana its symbolic and metaphorical
character, while pa¤¤atti brings out its dependence on convention.
What we have here is adhivacanasamphassa. Its affinity to
name is obvious, and this is precisely the meaning we attributed to
nàma. Therefore, what we have in this concept of nàmakàya, or
14 See sermon 1.
15 S III 71, Niruttipathasutta.
name-group, literally `name-body,' is a set of first principles in

linguistic usage pertaining to definition.
The form-group, or råpakàya, literally `form-body,' on the
other hand has something to do with resistance, as suggested by
the term pañighasamphassa. Pañigha means `striking against.'
Form, or råpa, has a striking quality, while name, or nàma, has a
descriptive quality. Phassa, or contact, is a hybrid of these two.
This is what gives a deeper dimension to the above disquisition.
The point that the Buddha seeks to drive home is the fact that
the concept of contact necessarily presupposes both name and
form. In other words, name and form are mutually interrelated, as
already stated above. There would be no verbal impression in the
form-group, if there were no modes, characteristics, etc., proper to
name. Likewise there could be no resistant impression in the
name-group, if there were no modes, characteristics, etc., proper to
form.
At first sight these two may appear as totally opposed to each
other. But what is implied is a case of mutual interrelation. The
expression peculiar to the name-group is a necessary condition for
the form-group, while the resistance peculiar to the form-group is
a necessary condition for the name-group. Since here we have
something deep, let us go for an illustration for the sake of clarity.
As we have already stated, a verbal impression in regard to the
form-group is there because of the constituents of the name-group.
Now the form-group consists of the four great primaries earth,
water, fire and air. Even to distinguish between them by their
qualities of hardness and softness, hotness and coolness, etc.,
feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention, which are the
constituents of the name-group, have to play their part. Thus it is
with the help of those members on the name side that the four
basic elements associated with form receive recognition.
Metaphor is a figure of speech, common in ornate literary lan-
guage as well as in technical terminology. Here the inanimate is
animated by personification. What is proper to the animate world
is superimposed on the inanimate. Now the word adhivacana is,
even literally, a superimposition, and it is a term with obvious
metaphorical associations. Whereas in the literary field it has an

ornate value as a figurative expression, in technical usage it serves
the purpose of facility of expression by getting the tools to speak
for themselves.
For instance, a carpenter might speak of two planks touching
each other as if they can actually touch and feel. The concept of
touch, even when it is attributed to inanimate objects, is the
outcome of attention, in this case the attention of the carpenter.
Here, again, we are reminded of the role of attention in the
origination of things as stated in the Kiümålakasutta and Samid-
dhisutta discussed above.16 In accordance with the dictum ßMind
is the forerunner of all things,û17 ßAll things are rooted in interest,
they originate with attention and arise out of contact,û chanda-
målakà, àvuso, sabbe dhammà, manasikàrasambhavà, phas-
sasamudayà, etc.18 Wherever the carpenter's interest went, his
attention discovered and picked up the thing, and here the thing is
the fact of two planks touching each other.
Interest, attention and contact together bring out some deeper
implications of the law of dependent arising. Not only with regard
to inanimate objects, but even in the case of this conscious body,
the question of contact is related to the fact of attention.
If, for instance I ask what I am touching now, one might say
that I am touching the palm leaf fan in my hand. This is because
we usually associate the idea of touching with the hand that holds.
But suppose I put away the fan and ask again what I am touching
now, one might find it difficult to answer. It might not be possible
for another to guess by mere external observation, since it is
essentially subjective. It is dependent on my attention. It could
even be my robe that I am touching in the sense of contact, in
16 A IV 385, Samiddhisutta; A IV 338, Kiümålakasutta; see sermon 9.

17 Dhp 1, Yamakavagga.
which case I am becoming conscious of my body as apart from the

robe I am wearing.
Consciousness follows in the wake of attention. Whatever my
attention picks up, of that I am conscious. Though I have in front
of me so many apparently visible objects, until my attention is
focused, eye-consciousness does not come about. The basic
function of this type of consciousness, then, is to distinguish
between the eye and the object seen. It is only after the eye has
become conscious, that other factors necessary for sense percep-
tion fall into place.
The two things born of that basic discrimination, together with
the discriminating consciousness itself, that is eye-consciousness,
make up the concept of contact. Cakkhu¤ca pañicca råpe ca
uppajjati cakkhuvi¤¤àõaü, tiõõaü saïgati phasso.19 ßDependent
on eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises, the concurrence of the
three is contact.û
The same principle holds good in the case of the two planks
touching each other. All this goes to show that it is with the help of
the factors in the name-group that we can even metaphorically
speak of a contact between inanimate things.
Let us now consider how resistance-impression, pañighasam-
phassa, comes about. It is said that the factors of the form-group
have a part to play in producing resistance-impression on the
name-group. We sometimes speak of an idea `striking us,' as if it
were something material. Or else an idea could be àt the back' of
our mind and a word òn the tip' of our tongue.
The clearest manifestation of contact is that between material
objects, where collision is suggestive of resistance, as implied by
the word pañigha. This primary sense of striking against or striking
together is implicit even in the simile given by the Buddha in the
Dhàtuvibhaïgasutta of the Majjhima Nikàya, and in the Phassa-
19 M I 111, Madhupiõóikasutta.
målakasutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya, concerning two sticks being

rubbed together to kindle a fire.20
Though as a gross manifestation contact is primarily associated
with the form-group, it is essentially connected with the name-
group, as we have already explained with illustrations. It is when
both resistance-impression and verbal impression come together
that contact arises, dependent on name-and-form, nàmaråpa-
paccayà phasso.
Another point that needs to be clarified in this connection is the
exact significance of the word råpa. This word has been variously
interpreted and explained among different Buddhist sects. How did
the Buddha define råpa? In ordinary usage it can mean either
forms visible to the eye, or whatever is generally spoken of as
`material.' Its exact significance has become a subject of contro-
versy. What precisely do we mean by `råpa'?
The Buddha himself has explained the word, giving the follow-
ing etymology in the Khajjanãyasutta of the Khandhasaüyutta in
the Saüyutta Nikàya. While defining the five groups there, he
defines the form group as follows:
Ki¤ca, bhikkhave, råpaü vadetha? Ruppatãti kho, bhik-

khave, tasmà råpan'ti vuccati. Kena ruppati? Sãtena pi
ruppati, uõhena pi ruppati, jighacchàya pi ruppati,
pipàsàya pi ruppati, daüsamakasavàtàtapasarãsapasam-
phassena pi ruppati. Ruppatãti kho, bhikkhave, tasmà
råpan'ti vuccati.21
ßAnd what, monks, do you call råpa? It is affected,

monks, that is why it is called råpa. Affected by what?
Affected by cold, affected by heat, affected by hunger, af-
fected by thirst, affected by contact with gadflies, mosqui-
20 M III 242, Dhàtuvibhaïgasutta; S IV 215, Phassamålakasutta.

toes, wind, sun and serpents. It is affected, monks, that is

why it is called råpa.û
This definition seems to convey something very deep, so much so

that various Buddhist sects came out with various interpretations
of this passage. The Buddha departs from the way of approach
taken up by the materialistic systems of thought in the world in
defining råpa with ruppati, `being affected.' It is not the inanimate
trees and rocks in the world that are said to be affected by cold and
heat, but this conscious body. So this body is not conceived of as a
bundle of atoms to be animated by introducing into it a life faculty,
jãvitindriya. What is meant by råpa is this same body, this body
with form, which, for the meditator, is a fact of experience.
Attempts at interpretation from a scholastic point of view creat-
ed a lot of complications. But the definition, as it stands, is clear
enough. It is directly addressed to experience. The purpose of the
entire Dhamma preached by the Buddha is not to encourage an
academic dabbling in philosophical subtleties with a mere jumble
of words. The purpose is utter disenchantment, dispassion and
cessation, ekantanibbidàya, viràgàya, nirodhàya.22 Therefore the
etymology given here in terms of ruppati, `to be affected,' is in
full accord with that purpose. Råpa is so called, because it is
affected by cold, heat, and the sting of gadflies, mosquitoes, etc.,
not because of any atomism in it.
If we are to examine further the meaning of this verb ruppati,
we can count on the following quotation from the Piïgiyasutta of
the Pàràyanavagga in the Sutta Nipàta. It runs: ruppanti råpesu
janà pamattà,23 ßHeedless men are affected in regard to forms.û
The canonical commentary Cåëaniddesa, commenting on the
word, brings out the various nuances connected with it. Ruppantãti
22 This expression occurs e.g. at D II 251, MahàGovindasutta.

23 Sn 1121, Piïgiyamàõavapucchà.
kuppanti pãëayanti ghaññayanti byàdhità domanassità honti.24

ßRuppanti means to be adversely affected, to be afflicted, to come
into contact with, to be dis-eased and dis-pleased.û
Surely it is not the trees and rocks that are affected in this man-
ner. It is this animate body that is subject to all this. The pragmatic
purpose of utter detachment, dispassion and cessation is clear
enough even from this commentary. What is known as the form-
group, råpakkhandha, is one vast wound with nine apertures.25
This wound is affected when it is touched by cold and heat, when
gadflies and mosquitoes land on it. This wound gets irritated by
them.
We come across yet another canonical reference in support of
these nuances in the following two lines in the Uññhànasutta of the
Sutta Nipàta. âturàna¤hi kà niddà, sallaviddhàna ruppataü.26
ßFor what sleep could there be for those who are afflicted, being
pierced with a dart.û
These two lines stress the need for heedfulness for beings
pierced with the arrow of craving. Here, too, the verb ruppati has
the sense of being affected or afflicted. All this goes to show that
the early Buddhist concept of råpa had a striking simplicity about
it.
As we have already stated at the very outset, the teachings in the
discourses are simple enough. But there is a certain depth in this
very simplicity, for it is only when the water is lucid and limpid
that one can see the bottom of a pond. But with the passage of time
there was a tendency to lose interest in these discourses, because
of the general predilection for complexity.
Materialistic philosophers, in particular, were carried away by
this trend, whether they were Hindus or Buddhists. Modern day
scientists, too, got caught in this trend. They pursued the material-
24 Nidd II 238.
25 A IV 386, Gaõóasutta.
26 Sn 331, Uññhànasutta.
istic overtones of the word råpa, without realizing that they are
running after a mirage. They went on analysing matter, until they
ended up with an atomism and grasped a heap of concepts. The
analysis of matter thus precipitated a grasping of a mass of
concepts. Whether one grasps a pole or a mole, it is a grasping all
the same.
The Buddha's admonitions, on the contrary, point in a different
direction. He pointed out that in order to be free from the burden
some oppression of form, one has to be free from the perception of
form. What is of relevance here is the very perception of form,
råpasa¤¤à. From the point of view of Dhamma, any attempt at
analysis of the materialistic concept of form, or any microscopic
analysis of matter, would lead to a pursuit of a mirage.
This fact, the modern day scientist is now in a position to appre-
ciate. He has found that the mind with which he carries on the
analysis is influencing his findings at every level. In other words,
he has been running after a mirage, due to his ignorance of the
mutual interrelation between name and form. One would not be in
such a plight, if one understands that the real problem at issue is
not that of form, but of the perception of form.
In an earlier sermon we happened to quote a verse which makes
it extremely clear. Let us now hark back to that verse, which
occurs in the Jañàsutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya:27

ßWhere name and form

As well as resistance and perception of form
Are completely cut off,
It is there that the tangle gets snapped.û
27 S I 13, Jañàsutta; see sermon 1.

The entire saüsàric problem is solved when the tangle gets

snapped. Name and form, resistance and perception of form are
completely cut off in that non-manifestative consciousness
mentioned in our earlier sermons.28 That, in effect, is the end of the
tangle within and the tangle without.
Our discussion of the law of dependent arising must have made
it clear that there is an interrelation between name-and-form and
consciousness on the one hand, and between name and form
themselves on the other. This, then, is a case of a tangle within and
a tangle without. Like the central spot of a whirlpool, the deepest
point of the entire formula of pañicca samuppàda is traceable to
the interrelation that obtains between name and form on the one
hand, and between name-and-form and consciousness on the other.
As far as the significance of perception of form is concerned,
the true purpose of the spiritual endeavour, according to the
Buddha, is the very freedom from this perception of form. How
does perception of form come about? It is due to that `striking
against,' or resistance. Perception of form arises, for instance,
when gadflies and mosquitoes land on this body.
As we have already mentioned, even the distinctions of hard
and soft, etc., with which we recognize the four elements, is a
matter of touching. We are only trying to measure and gauge the
four great primaries with this human frame. We can never ever
comprehend fully the gamut of these four great primaries. But we
are trying to understand them through this human frame in a way
that is meaningful to our lives.
All kinds of beings have their own specific experience of
`touch,' in relation to their experience of the four elements. So
what we have here is entirely a question of perception of form.
The true purpose, then, should be the release of one's mind from
this perception of form. It is only when the mind is freed from
resistance and the perception of form, as well as from name-and-
28 See sermon 7.
form, that one can win to the deliverance from this problem of the
tangle within and the tangle without that is saüsàra.
Yet another fact emerges from the above discussion. The two
views of existence and non-existence, bhava/vibhava, asserting an
absolute existence and an absolute non-existence, seem to have
posed an insoluble problem to many philosophers. Concerning the
origin of the world, they wondered whether sat, or being, came out
of asat, or non-being, or vice versa.
All these problems arose out of a misunderstanding about form,
or material objects, as we may well infer from the following two
lines of a verse in the Kalahavivàdasutta of the Sutta Nipàta.
Råpesu disvà vibhavaü bhava¤ca, vinicchayaü kurute jantu
loke.29 ßHaving seen the existence and destruction of material
forms, a man in this world comes to a conclusion.û
What is the conclusion? That there is an absolute existence and
an absolute non-existence. One comes to this conclusion drawing
an inference from the behaviour of visible objects. For instance,
we could presume that this machine before us exists in an absolute
sense, ignoring the causes and conditions underlying its existence.
The day this machine is destroyed we would say: ßIt was, but now
it is not.û
The Buddha has pointed out that such absolute views of exist-
ence and non-existence are a result of an incorrect understanding
about form. What actually is involved here is the perception of
form. Due to a misconception about the perception of form, the
world inclines towards the two extreme views of absolute exist-
ence and absolute non-existence.
So the whole point of our discussion today has been the clarifi-
cation of the mutual interrelation between name and form, to show
that name-and-form itself is only an image, or a shadow, reflected
on consciousness.
29 Sn 867, Kalahavivàdasutta.
Nibbàna Sermon 11



This is the eleventh sermon in the series of sermons on
Nibbàna. In our last sermon, we tried to explain that contact arises
dependent on name-and-form, because form gets a verbal impres-
sion by the naming quality in name, and name gets a resistance-
impression by the striking quality in form. In the context of this
Dhamma, contact, properly so-called, is a combination of these
two, namely verbal impression and resistance-impression.
We also happened to mention the other day a new etymological
explanation given by the Buddha to the word råpa, quoting the
relevant passage from the Khajjanãyasutta of the Khandha-
saüyutta in the Saüyutta Nikàya. He has defined the form group
with reference to àffectation': Ruppatãti kho, bhikkhave, tasmà
289
råpan'ti vuccati.2 ßIt is affected, monks, that is why it is called

form. By what is it affected? By cold, heat, hunger, thirst, and the
sting of gadflies, mosquitoes and the like.û
While analysing the implications of this `being affected,' we
mentioned that the form group could be compared to a wound.
According to the commentarial exegesis, too, ruppati means to be
adversely affected, to be afflicted, to come into conflict with, to be
diseased and displeased. These are reminiscent of the responses
usually associated with the person who has an easy lacerable
wound. To say that a pañighasamphassa arises because of this
lacerable quality is therefore very apt.
The primary sense of the word pañigha is `striking against.'
Perception of form arises as a result of an attempt to understand
through the factors on the name side this particular striking
against, which resembles the laceration of a wound. This percep-
tion of form, which follows in the wake of the feeling that arises
when something strikes against form, is like the groping of a blind
man in the dark. Generally, the worldling is in the habit of staring
at the form that comes within his grasp, to ascertain its true nature.
Likewise, he touches the form he sees with his eyes to verify it. As
the saying goes: `Seeing is believing, but touch is the real thing.'
But both these attempts are like the gropings of a blind man.
The worldling is unable to get rid of his delusion completely by
either of these methods. It is because he is accustomed to draw
conclusions under the influence of his perception of the compact,
ghanasa¤¤à.
The fact that the two extreme views of existence and non-
existence are also the outcome of this perception of the compact in
regard to form, is borne out by the following two lines of the verse
we quoted from the Kalahavivàdasutta in our previous sermon.
Råpesu disvà vibhavaü bhava¤ca, vinicchayaü kurute jantu loke.3

ßHaving seen the existence and destruction of material forms, a

man in this world comes to a conclusion.û
The worldling has the idea that material forms have an absolute
existence. This idea is the result of his perception of form. It is a
perception arising out of his impression of that `striking against.'
whatever the level of this perception of form be, it is not better
than the impression of a blind man. The two extreme views of
absolute existence and non-existence in the world are based on this
kind of impression.
Various types of views and opinions current in the world re-
garding material forms and matter in general, are the outcome of
the notion that they are absolutely real. There is a tendency in the
worldling to presume that what he grasps with his hands and sees
with his eyes exists absolutely. So a thing is said to exist for some
length of time, before it gets destroyed. The logical conclusion,
then, is that all things in the world exist absolutely and that at
some point of time they get absolutely destroyed. This is how the
two extreme views of absolute existence and absolute non-
existence have arisen in this world. This is the outcome of a
perception of form, which is tantamount to a pursuit of a mirage. It
is an illusion.
The Buddha has declared, in the Jañàsutta, that where name-
and-form as well as resistance and perception of form are cut off
and surcease, there the entire saüsàric problem, which amounts to
a tangle within and a tangle without, is also conclusively solved.4
That this is so could be inferred to some extent from what we have
discussed so far.
Nàma and råpa, as well as pañigha- and råpasa¤¤à, are highly
significant terms. Pañigha- and råpasa¤¤à are equivalent to
pañighasamphassa and adhivacanasamphassa respectively. Now
as to this perception of form, it is basically conditioned by contact.
4 S I 13, Jañàsutta; cf. volume I sermon 1.

That is why the Kalahavivàdasutta states that contact is the cause

of the two views of existence and non-existence.
In this Kalahavivàdasutta one finds a series of questions and
answers going deeper and deeper into the analysis of contact, step
by step. The question phasso nu lokasmiü kutonidàno, ßWhat is
the cause of contact in this world?û gets the answer nàma¤ca
råpa¤ca pañicca phasso, ßdependent on name-and-form is con-
tact.û5 The next question is: Kismiü vibhåte na phussanti phassà,
ßIn the absence of what, do contacts not bring about contact,û or,
ßtouches do not touch?û It gets the answer: Råpe vibhåte na
phusanti phassà, ßIn the absence of form, contacts do not bring
about contact.û
The question that comes up next, and the answer given, are
extremely important. They lead to a deep analysis of the Dhamma,
so much so that both verses deserve to be quoted in full. The
question is:
Kathaüsametassa vibhoti råpaü,

sukhaü dukhaü và pi kathaü vibhoti,
etaü me pabråhi yathà vibhoti,
taü jàniyàmà iti me mano ahu.6
ßTo one constituted in which manner does form

cease to exist,
Or, how even pleasure and pain cease to exist,
Do tell me how all these become non-existent,
Let us know this, such a thought arose in me.û
The answer to this question is couched in this extraordinary verse:
Na sa¤¤asa¤¤ã na visa¤¤asa¤¤ã,
no pi asa¤¤ã na vibhåtasa¤¤ã,
5 Sn 871-872, Kalahavivàdasutta.
evaü sametassa vibhoti råpaü,

sa¤¤ànidànà hi papa¤casaïkhà.7
What this verse purports to describe is the state of a person for

whom form as also pleasure and pain has ceased to exist. He is not
one with normal perception, nor is he one with abnormal percep-
tion. He is not non-percipient, nor has he rescinded perception. It
is to one constituted in this manner that form ceases to exist, for,
papa¤casaïkhà Ý whatever they may be Ý have perception as their
source.
The meaning of this verse needs to be clarified further. Accord-
ing to the MahàNiddesa, the allusion in this verse is to one who is
on the path to the formless realms, having attained the first four
absorptions.8 The commentary is forced to that conclusion,
because it takes the phrase na vibhåtasa¤¤ã as negating formless
realms as such. The assumption is that the person referred to is
neither conscious with normal perception, nor abnormally uncon-
scious, nor devoid of perception, as in the attainment of cessation,
nor in one of the formless attainments. So then, the only possibility
seemed to be to identify it with some intermediate state. That is
why the MahàNiddesa and the other commentaries interpret this
problematic state as that of one who is on the path to formless
attainments, aråpamaggasamaïgi.9
However, considerations of context and presentation would lead
to a different conclusion. The extraordinary state alluded to by this
verse seems to be a surpamundane one, which goes far deeper than
the so-called intermediate state. The transcendence of form,
indicated here, is more radical than the transcendence in attaining
to formless states. It is a transcendence at a supramundane level, as
we may well infer from the last line of the verse, sa¤¤ànidànà hi
8 Nidd I 280.
9 Nidd I 280 and Pj II 553.
papa¤casaïkhà. Papa¤casaïkhà is a term which has a relevance

to insight meditation and the denouement of the sutta is also
suggestive of such a background. The Kalahavivàdasutta, consist-
ing of sixteen verses, is, from beginning to end, a network of deep
questions and answers leading to levels of insight. The opening
verse, for instance, states the initial problem as follows:
Kuto pahåtà kalahà vivàdà,

paridevasokà sahamaccharà ca,
mànàtimànà saha pesuõà ca,
kuto pahåtà te tad iïgha bråhi.10
ßWhence do spring up contentions and disputes,

Lamentations, sorrows and envies,
And arrogance together with slander,
Whence do they spring up, pray tell me this.û
It is in answer to this basic question that this discourse gradually

unfolds itself. In accordance with the law of dependent arising, the
cause of contentions and disputes is said to be the tendency to hold
things dear, piyappahåtà kalahà vivàdà. Then the question is about
the cause of this idea of holding things dear. The cause of it is said
to be desire, chandanidànàni piyàni loke. Things dear originate
from desire. Desire, or interest, makes things `dear.'
The next question is: What is the origin of desire? Desire is
traced to the distinction between the pleasant and the unpleasant. It
is in reply to the question regarding the origin of this distinction
between the pleasant and the unpleasant that contact is brought in.
In fact, it is the question as to the origin of contact, phasso nu
lokasmiü kuto nidàno, which formed the starting point of our
discussion. The answer to that question is name-and-form,
nàma¤ca råpa¤ca. So in this chain of causes, the link that comes

next to contact is name-and-form.
Now the verse in question beginning with na sa¤¤asa¤¤ã goes
deeper than name-and-form. Even the question about contact has a
peculiar wording: Kismiü vibhåte na phusanti phassà, ßWhen
what is not there, do touches not touch?û The question, then, is not
just the cessation of contact as such. The answer, too, has the same
peculiarity. Råpe vibhåte na phusanti phassà, ßIt is when form is
not there that touches do not touch.û It is the subsequent question
regarding form that brings out the cryptic verse as the answer.
All this goes to show that the verse in question alludes to a
supramundane state far transcending the formless or any supposed
intermediate stage. The transcendence of pleasure and pain, as
well as perception of form, is implied here. The verse beginning
with na sa¤¤asa¤¤ã brings the entire analytical disquisition to a
climax. It comes as the thirteenth verse in the series. Usually, such
a disquisition leads up to a climax, highlighting Nibbàna. It is
obvious, therefore, that the reference here is to the Nibbànic mind.
We have here four negations: Na sa¤¤asa¤¤ã Ý na visa¤¤a-
sa¤¤ã Ý no piasa¤¤ã Ý na vibhåtasa¤¤ã. These four negations
insinuate a strange supramundane level of perception. In short, it is
an attempt to analyse the crux of the Dhamma in terms of percep-
tion. As to the provocation for such an approach, we may remind
ourselves of the fact that, according to the Buddha, release from
materiality amounted to a release from the perception of form.
Here, we have something really deep.
As it was stated in the Jañàsutta, for the disentangling of the
tangle, name-and-form, resistance and perception of form, have to
be cut off. This last mentioned perception of form, or råpasa¤¤à,
is highly significant. Before the advent of the Buddha the general
belief, even among ascetics, was that, in order to be free from
form, one has to attain to the formless, aråpa. But, as we pointed
out in an earlier sermon, this kind of approach to the question of
freedom from form, is like the attempt of one who, having imag-
ined a ghost in the darkness of the night, runs away to escape it.11
He is simply taking the fantasy of the ghost with him.
Likewise, perception of form is already implicit in the formless.
What has been done is only a pushing away of the perception of
form with the help of saïkhàras. It is merely a suppression of form
through the power of absorption. It does not amount to a cessation
of the perception of form.
What, then, is the message the Buddha gave to the world re-
garding the abandonment by way of eradication? He pointed out
that freedom from form can be won only by comprehending a
certain deep normative principle behind perception. Till then, one
keeps on going round and round in saüsàra. Even if one breaks
away from form to stay for aeons in formless realms, one swings
back to form at the end of that period. Why? Because the ghost of
form still haunts the formless. It is precisely because of this fact
that pre-Buddhistic ascetics could not free themselves from the
round of existence.
The Kalahavivàdasutta as a whole, could be regarded as an
extremely deep analysis of the basis of the two views of existence
and non-existence. Our departure from the MahàNiddesa in regard
to the interpretation of this discourse might sometimes be called in
question. But let the wise judge its reasonableness on its own
merits.
According to our interpretation so far, the thirteenth verse
marks the climax of the discourse, with its allusion to Nibbàna.
This is obvious from the fourteenth verse, in which the questioner
confesses: Yaü taü apucchimha akittayã no, a¤¤aü taü pucchàma
tad iïgha bråhi.12 ßWhatever we have asked you, that you have
explained to us. Now we wish to ask you something else, pray,
give us an answer to that too.û
11 See sermon 7.
The question now posed is this: Ettàvataggaü nu vadanti h'eke,

yakkhassa suddhiü idha paõóitàse, udàhu a¤¤am pi vadanti etto?
ßDo some, who are reckoned as wise men here, declare the highest
purity of the soul with this much alone, or else do they posit
something beyond this?û The interlocutor is trying to get the
solution restated in terms of the two views of existence and non-
existence. The term yakkha is used in this context in the sense of
an individual soul.13 It betrays an assumption based on a wrong
view. The question concerns the purity of the individual soul. The
interlocutor wants to ascertain whether wise men in the world
declare this state as the highest purity of the soul, or whether they
go beyond this in postulating something more. Here is an attempt
to get the answer already given restated in terms of the soul theory,
a sort of anti-climax. The two concluding verses that follow, give
the lie to this presumptuous question:
Ettàvataggaü pi vadanti h'eke

yakkhassa suddhiü idha paõóitàse,
tesaü paneke samayaü vadanti
anupàdisese kusalà vadànà.
ßSome, who are regarded as wise men here,

Call this itself the highest purity of the individual soul,
But there are again some among them, who speak of an
annihilation,
Claiming to be experts in the cessation without residue.û
Ete ca ¤atvà upanissità ti

¤atvà munã nissaye so vimaüsã,
¤atvà vimutto na vivàdam eti
bhavàbhavàya na sameti dhãro.
13 Similar connotations recur in the variant reading

paramayakkhavisuddhi at A V
64, and in the expression yakkhassa suddhi at Sn 478.
ßKnowing that they are dependent on speculative views,

The sage with discernment, with regard to whatever is
speculative,
Emancipated as he is through understanding, does not
enter into dispute,
A truly wise man does not fall back either on existence
or on non-existence.û
The concluding verse amounts to a refutation of both these

extreme views. The truly wise sage, who is released with proper
discernment of the nature of dogmatic involvement, has no
disputes with those who are at loggerheads with each other on the
issue of existence and non-existence. This, in effect, means that
Nibbàna as a goal avoids both extremes of eternalism and nihil-
ism.
The Upasãvasutta in the Pàràyanavagga of the Sutta Nipàta
provides further proof of the plausibility of the above interpreta-
tion. There, Nibbàna as the cessation of consciousness in the
arahant, is compared to the extinction of a flame:
Accã yathà vàtavegena khitto

atthaü paleti na upeti saïkhaü
evaü munã nàmakàyà vimutto
atthaü paleti na upeti saïkhaü.14
ßAs flame flung on by force of wind,

Reaches its end, comes not within reckoning,
So the sage, released from name-and-form,
Reaches his end, comes not within reckoning.û
14 Sn 1074, Upasãvamàõavapucchà.
When a flame goes out, it cannot be reckoned as having gone in

any of the directions, like north, east, south, and west. All what
can be said about it, is that it has gone out.15
Even after the Buddha has given this reply, the brahmin youth
Upasãva, entrenched as he is in the eternalist view, raises a
question which is similar to the one already quoted. He, too, is
trying to understand it in terms of the two extreme views of
existence and non-existence:
Atthaügato so uda và so natthi

udàhu ve sassatiyà arogo,
taü me munã sàdhu viyàkarohi,
tathà hi te vidito esa dhammo.
ßHas he reached his end, or is he no more,

Or is he eternally well,
That to me, sage, in full explain,
For this Dhamma is well within your ken.û
In the discourses we find similar instances of attempts to deter-

mine, in terms of those two extreme views, even a conclusive
statement of the Buddha on the question of Nibbàna. Yet another
instance is found in the Poññhapàdasutta of the Dãghanikàya.
There the Buddha outlines the path to Nibbàna from the point of
view of perception. The discourse, therefore, is one that highlights
the importance of the term sa¤¤à. In that discourse, the path of
training leading to Nibbàna is introduced under the heading
anupubbàbhisa¤¤ànirodha-sampajàna-samàpatti, ßthe attainment,
with full awareness, to the gradual cessation of higher levels of
perception.û16
What is significant in this particular context, is that the invita-

tion for this exposition came from the ascetics of other sects. In
response to their request to enlighten them on the subject of the
cessation of higher levels of perception, abhisa¤¤ànirodha, the
Buddha gave quite a long account of the course of training
required for it. But at the end of that deep exposition, the wander-
ing ascetic Poññhapàda raises the following question: Sa¤¤à nu kho
purisassa attà, udàhu a¤¤à sa¤¤à a¤¤à attà? ßIs perception a
man's soul, or is perception something and soul another?û This is
typical of their bigoted attitude, which prevented them from
understanding this Dhamma, free from the soul prejudice.
We went so far as to bring out all this evidence, because the
point at issue is fairly important. Even the attempt of the Mahà-
Niddesa to explain the verse beginning with na sa¤¤asa¤¤ã is far
from conclusive. It is not at all likely that the ascetics of other
sects subscribed to a view that the intermediate stage between the
fourth absorption and the first formless absorption is equivalent to
the purest state of the soul. Such an interim state is of no account.
As we go on, we might come across further proof of the tenabil-
ity of this interpretation. The verse beginning with na sa¤¤asa¤¤ã
is not easily forgotten, because of its unusual accent on the
negative particle. We might have to hark back to it when we come
across similar discourses dealing with Nibbàna. Till then, let us
remind ourselves of two similes we have already given, in order to
get a foretaste of the significance of this problematic verse.
Firstly, the Buddha's simile of the magic show as an illustration
for consciousness in the Pheõapiõóåpamasutta Ý màyåpama¤ca
vi¤¤àõaü.17 While describing the five groups, he compares
consciousness to a magical performance at crossroads, conducted
by a magician or his apprentice. A man with the right type of
vision, watching this magic show, understands that it is empty,
17 S III 142, Pheõapiõóåpamasutta.; cf. also sermon 6.

hollow and void of essence. It is as if he has seen through the

tricks and deceptions of the magician.
While watching a magic show, the audience in general reacts to
it with gaping mouths and exclamations. But how would a man
with radical attention and penetrative wisdom, who is fully aware
of the tricks of the magician, watch a magic show? He is simply
looking on with a vacant gaze.
This reminds us of the significance of the word vi¤¤àõaü
anidassanaü anantaü sabbato pabhaü.18 That gaze is èndless,'
anantaü, in the sense that it does not have the magic show as its
object. It goes beyond. It is also `non-manifestative,' anidassan-
aü, since the magic show does not manifest itself, as it has now
been penetrated through with wisdom. This wisdom is revealing in
its àll lustrous' nature, sabbato pabhaü, so much so that the tricks
are seen-through.
So this man with discernment is watching with a vacant gaze.
Now how would such a person appear to one who is deluded and
enchanted by the magic show? The latter might regard the former
as an inattentive spectator who misses the magic show. Or else, he
might think that the other is out of his senses, or insensate.
What the riddle verse beginning with na sa¤¤asa¤¤ã refers to, is
such a vacant gaze. That is to say, the person referred to is not one
with the ordinary worldling's perception, which is deluded, nor
has he fainted and become unconscious, na sa¤¤asa¤¤ã na
visa¤¤asa¤¤ã. He is not in a trance, devoid of perception, no pi
asa¤¤ã, nor has he put and end to perception, na vibhåtasa¤¤ã.
What these four negations highlight, is that vacant gaze of the one
who is emancipated through wisdom.
Somewhat on the lines of the simile used by the Buddha, we
might reintroduce, as a flashback, the simile of the cinema.19
Though it has a modernistic flavour, it could perhaps be more
18 M I 329, Brahmanimantanikasutta; cf. also sermon 8.

19 See sermons 5, 6 and 7.
easily understood. Let us suppose that a matinee show of a

technicolour film is in progress with closed doors and windows.
Suddenly, by some technical defect, the doors and windows are
flung open. What would be the change of perspective in the
spectator now? He, too, would be looking on with a vacant gaze.
Though still the show is going on, he is no longer seeing it. A sort
of `cessation' has occurred, at least temporarily.
The theme as well as the objective of all our sermons is ex-
pressed in the quotation beginning with ßThis is peaceful, this is
excellent,û etc., which forms the rubric, as it were, for each
sermon. The change that occurs in the spectator now, is somewhat
reminiscent of it. Though not all preparations, at least those
preparations connected with the film show are momentarily
`stilled.' Whatever assets in the form of the bundle of experiences
on which the film show is evalued, are `relinquished.' The craving
or the desire for the show has gone down. The colourful show has
`faded away,' making way for detachment. The film show has
`ceased' for him. It is also extinct for him, since his burning desire
has cooled off now. In this way, we can understand the four
puzzling negations in that riddle verse as an attempt to describe the
vacant gaze of this spectator, and that man with discernment at the
magic show.
Another aspect of special significance in this riddle verse
emerges from the last line, sa¤¤ànidànà hi papa¤casaïkhà, which
could be tentatively rendered as ßfor [whatever are termed]
papa¤casaïkhà have perception as their source.û Papa¤ca is a
term with a deep philosophical dimension in Buddhism. In fact,
even the rise of many Buddhist sects could be put down to an
insufficient appreciation of its significance. In our own philosoph-
ical tradition, too, much of the confusion with regard to the
interpretation of Nibbàna seems to have come about due to a lack
of understanding in this particular field. Therefore we propose to
devote sufficient time and attention to clarify the significance of
this term papa¤ca.
To begin with, we can bring up clear evidence of the fact that
the word papa¤ca is used in the discourses to convey some deep
idea. As a rule, whenever the Buddha presents a set of ideas

pertaining to some Dhamma topic, the deepest or the most im-
portant of them is mentioned last. This feature is quite evident in
the Aïguttara Nikàya, where very often a sermon is seen to unfold
itself in an ascending order, leading to a climax. In an enumeration
of items `the last but not the least,' happens to be the most im-
portant. Granted that this is the general trend, we can trace as
many as nine such contexts among the suttas in which papa¤ca is
counted last.20 This itself is a clue to its importance.
One of the most telling instances is to be found in the Eights of
the Aïguttara Nikàya. It is called Anuruddhamahàvitakkasutta.
There we are told that to Venerable Anuruddha, once meditating in
solitude in Pàcãnavaüsa Park, the following seven thoughts
occurred, concerning Dhamma:
Appicchassàyaü dhammo, nàyaü dhammo mahicchassa;

santuññhassàyaü dhammo, nàyaü dhammo asantuññhassa;
pavivittassàyaü dhammo, nàyaü dhammo saïgaõikàrà-
massa; àraddhaviriyassàyaü dhammo, nàyaü dhammo
kusãtassa; upaññithasatissàyaü dhammo, nàyaü dhammo
muññhassatissa; samàhitassàyaü dhammo, nàyaü dham-
mo asamàhitassa; pa¤¤avato ayaü dhammo, nàyaü
dhammo duppa¤¤assa.21
ßThis Dhamma is for one who wants little, not for one
who wants much; this Dhamma is for one who is content-
ed, not for one who is discontent; this Dhamma is for one
who is secluded, not for one who is fond of society; this
Dhamma is for the energetic, not for one who is lazy; this
20 D II 276, Sakkapa¤hasutta; D III 287, Dasuttarasutta; M I 65,

Cåëasãhanàdasutta; M I 112 Madhupiõóikasutta; A III 293, Bhaddakasutta; A
III 294, Anutappiyasutta; A IV 230, Anuruddhamahàvitakkasutta; A IV 331,
Parihànasutta; Sn 874, Kalahavivàdasutta.
21 A IV 228, Anuruddhamahàvitakkasutta.
Dhamma is for one who has set up mindfulness, not for

one who is laggard in mindfulness; this Dhamma is for
one who is composed, not for one who is flustered; this
Dhamma is for one who is wise, not for one who is un-
wise.û
When these seven thoughts occurred to him, Venerable Anuruddha

kept on pondering over them for a long while, probably with some
Dhamma zest. He might have even felt confident that this is a
perfect set of Dhamma thoughts, since the number is seven and
wisdom comes last. However, the Buddha was monitoring his
behaviour of mind from Bhesakaëàvanae, many leagues away, and
found that this set of seven is far from complete. So he appeared
before Venerable Anuruddha through his psychic power and,
having first commended Venerable Anuruddha for those seven
thoughts, calling them `thoughts of a great man,' mahàpurisavit-
akka, gave him an eighth to add on to them and ponder upon. The
eighth thought of a great man is:
Nippapa¤càràmassàyaü Dhammo nippapa¤caratino, nàyaü
Dhammo papa¤càràmassa papa¤caratino. ßThis Dhamma is for
one who likes and delights in nippapa¤ca and not for one who
likes and delights in papa¤ca.û
Following the Buddha's instructions in this concern, Venerable
Anuruddha attained Arahant-hood, and uttered two verses as a
paean of joy. From the two verses it becomes clear that the
Buddha's helpful hint regarding nippapa¤ca Ý whatever it may
mean Ý was what triggered off his attainment:
Yathà me ahu saïkappo,

tato uttari desayi,
nippapa¤carato Buddho,
nippapa¤caü adesayi.
Tassàhaü Dhamma ma¤¤àya,

vihàsiü sàsane rato,
tisso vijjà anuppattà,

kataü Buddhassa sàsanaü.22
ßWhatever thoughts I had on my own,

Going far beyond them the Lord preached to me,
The Buddha, who delights in nippapa¤ca,
Preached nippapa¤ca to me.
ßUnderstanding his Dhamma,

I dwelt delighting in his admonishment,
The three knowledges are attained,
Done is the Buddha's behest.û
The words of Venerable Anuruddha clearly reveal the immense

significance attached to the term papa¤ca and its relevance to the
question of attaining Nibbàna. It is noteworthy that a number of
suttas like Kalahavivàdasutta, Sakkapa¤hasutta, Cåëasãhanàda-
sutta, and Madhupiõóikasutta give prominence to the term
papa¤ca by listing it as the last.23 One of the most important
discourses throwing light on the significance of this term papa¤ca
is the Madhupiõóikasutta of the Majjhima Nikàya. We shall
therefore proceed to discuss this particular sutta at some length.
The Madhupiõóikasutta is in fact a discourse that unfolds itself
in three stages, like a three act play. It might not be inapt to say
something about the title of this discourse by way of introduction,
before we get down to an analysis of it. At the conclusion of the
discourse, Venerable ânanda makes the following comment on its
significance before the Buddha: ßLord, just as if a man overcome
by hunger and exhaustion came upon a honey-ball, and, from
whatever side he goes on licking it, he would get a sweet delec-
22 A IV 235, Anuruddhamahàvitakkasutta.
23 D II 276, Sakkapa¤hasutta; M I 65, Cåëasãhanàdasutta; M I 112
Madhupiõóikasutta; Sn 874, Kalahavivàdasutta.
table flavour which remains unimpaired, so too, Lord, any nimble

witted monk, from whatever angle he examines with wisdom the
meaning of this discourse on the Dhamma, he would find satisfac-
tion and gladness of mind. What is the name of this discourse,
Lord?û24 It was then that the Buddha gave this name to the
discourse, saying: ßWell, then, ânanda, you may remember this
discourse on the Dhamma as the `honey-ball discourse.'û
We might not have the ability to assimilate fully the flavour of
this discourse, and in any case we might not even have sufficient
time for it today. However, if we are to make a start, we may begin
with the first act, that is, where we find the Buddha spending his
noon-day siesta at Mahàvana in Kapilavatthu. The Sakyan
Daõóapàõi, so called because he used to carry a staff in hand,
comes to see the Buddha and puts the following short question to
him: Kiüvàdã samaõo kimakkhàyi? ßWhat does the recluse assert,
what does he proclaim?û
The Buddha's reply to it is rather long and winding, so much so
that it is not easy to render it clear enough:
Yathàvàdi kho, àvuso, sadevake loke samàrake sabrahma-

ke sassamaõabràhmaõiyà pajàya sadevamanussàya na
kenaci loke viggayha tiññhati, yathà ca pana kàmehi
visaüyuttaü viharantaü taü bràhmaõaü akathaükathiü
chinnakukkuccaü bhavàbhave vãtataõhaü sa¤¤à nànu-
senti, evaüvàdã kho ahaü, àvuso, evamakkhàyã.
ßAccording to whatever doctrine, friend, one does not

quarrel with anyone in the world with its gods, its Màras
and Brahmas, with the progeny of the world comprising
recluses and brahmins, gods and men, and also due to
which perceptions no more underlie that brahmin who
abides detached from sense pleasures, without perplexity,
remorse cut off and devoid of craving for any kind of ex-
istence, such is my doctrine, friend, thus do I proclaim it.û
It must be noted that the word brahmin in this context refers to the
Arahant. The reply, winding as it is, goes deeper in its insinua-
tions, touching the presumptions of the questioner. That is to say,
generally, in the world, if anyone proclaims a doctrine, it is natural
that it will come into conflict with other doctrines. Also, in
proclaiming that doctrine one has to have latent perceptions
relating to it. The Buddha's reply, however, seems to contradict
these presumptions. In a nutshell, the reply amounts to this:
Firstly, the Buddha's teaching is such that he does not come
into conflict with others. Secondly, perceptions do not lie latent in
him.
The occurrence of the term sa¤¤à, perception, in this context, is
also significant. We have already stressed the importance of this
term. Perceptions do not lie latent in the Buddha or in the doctrine
propounded by him.
Daõóapàõi's response to this reply of the Buddha is also record-
ed in the sutta. It is dramatic enough to substantiate our compari-
son of the discourse to a three-act play. Daõóapàõi shook his head,
wagged his tongue, raised his eyebrows into a three-lined frown on
his forehead and departed, leaning on his stick. The Buddha's
reply did not arouse any faith in him.
In the next act we find the Buddha seated in the company of the
monks in the evening and telling them of his brief encounter with
Daõóapàõi. Then one of the monks requested an explanation of
the enigmatic reply the Buddha had given to Daõóapàõi. The
Buddha's explanation, however, took the form of an even longer
statement, no less enigmatic than the former. It runs:
Yatonidànaü, bhikkhu, purisaü papa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhà

samudàcaranti, ettha ce natthi abhinanditabbaü abhi-
vaditabbaü ajjhosetabbaü, esevanto ràgànusayànaü,
esevanto pañighànusayànaü, esevanto diññhànusayànaü,
esevanto vicikicchànusayànaü, esevanto mànànusayà-
naü, esevanto bhavaràgànusayànaü, esevanto avijjà-

nusayànaü, esevanto daõóàdàna-satthàdàna-kalaha-
viggaha-vivàda-tuvaütuvaü-pesu¤¤a-musàvàdànaü,
etthete pàpakà akusalà dhammà aparisesà nirujjhanti.
ßFrom whatever source papa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhà beset a

man, if, in regard to that, there is nothing to be delighted
in, asserted, or clung to, then this itself is the end of the
underlying tendencies to attachment, to aversion, to views,
to doubts, to conceit, to attachment towards existence, and
to ignorance. This itself is the end of taking rods and
weapons, quarrels, disputes, accusations, slander and false
speech. Here these evil unskilful states cease without
remainder.û
After making such a long and winding statement, the Buddha rose
from his seat and went into his dwelling, as if it were the end of
the second act. One can well imagine the consternation of the
monks at this dramatic turn of events. The explanation looked
even more astounding than the original statement, because of its
elliptical character. So here is a case of a puzzle within a puzzle. It
is the first few words that are most puzzling.
Naturally, the monks were so perplexed that they decided to
approach Venerable MahàKaccàna and request him to give them a
detailed exposition of the Buddha's words, as he had been praised
by the Buddha for his skill in this respect. When they went to him
and made the request, Venerable MahàKaccàna showed some
modest hesitation at first, but finally agreed to it.
Now we come to the third act, in which Venerable Mahà-
Kaccàna is giving the exposition:
Cakkhu¤c'àvuso pañicca råpe ca uppajjati cakkhu-

vi¤¤àõaü, tiõõaü saïgati phasso, phassapaccayà vedanà,
yaü vedeti taü sa¤jànàti, yaü sa¤jànàti taü vitakketi,
yaü vitakketi taü papa¤ceti, yaü papa¤ceti tatonidànaü
purisaü papa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhà samudàcaranti atãtànàga-

tapaccuppannesu cakkhuvi¤¤eyyesu råpesu.
Not only with regard to eye and forms, but also with reference to
all the other sense-faculties, including the mind, together with their
respective sense-objects, a similar statement is made. Suffice it to
translate the one quoted above as a paradigm:
ßDependent on the eye and forms, brethren, arises eye-
consciousness; the concurrence of the three is contact; because of
contact, feeling; what one feels, one perceives; what one per-
ceives, one reasons about; what one reasons about, one turns into
papa¤ca; what one turns into papa¤ca, owing to that,û (tato-
nidànaü, which is the correlative of yatonidànaü forming the key
word in the Buddha's brief summary above), ßpapa¤casa¤¤à-
saïkhà beset him who directed his powers of sense-perception.
They overwhelm him and subjugate him in respect of forms
cognizable by the eye belonging to the past, the future and the
present.û It is the same with regard to the ear and sounds and the
rest. Lastly, even about mind and mind-objects Venerable Mahà-
Kaccàna makes a similar statement.
At this point, we are forced to say something about the com-
mentarial explanation of this particular passage. It seems that the
commentarial exegesis has failed to bring out the deeper implica-
tions of the term papa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhà. The main reason for the
confusion is the lack of attention on the part of the commentator to
the peculiar syntax of the formula in question.
The formula begins on an impersonal note, cakkhu¤c'àvuso
pañicca råpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvi¤¤àõaü. The word pañicca is
reminiscent of the law of dependent arising. Tiõõaü saïgati
phasso, ßThe concurrence of the three is contact.û Phassapaccayà
vedanà, ßConditioned by contact is feeling.û From here onwards
the formula takes a different turn. Yaü vedeti taü sa¤jànàti, yaü
sa¤jànàti taü vitakketi, yaü vitakketi taü papa¤ceti, ßWhat one
feels, one perceives; what one perceives, one reasons about; what
one reasons about, one turns into papa¤ca.û
In this way, we can distinguish three phases in this description

of the process of sense perception in Venerable MahàKaccàna's
exposition. It begins with an impersonal note, but at the point of
feeling it takes on a personal ending, suggestive of deliberate
activity. Yaü vedeti taü sa¤jànàti, yaü sa¤jànàti taü vitakketi,
yaü vitakketi taü papa¤ceti, ßWhat one feels, one perceives; what
one perceives, one reasons about; what one reasons about, one
turns into papa¤ca.û
Though we render the formula in this way, the commentary
explains it differently. It ignores the significance of the personal
ending and interprets the sensory process periphrastically, for
example as sa¤¤à sa¤jànàti, vitakko vitakketi, ßperception per-
ceives,û ßreasoning reasons about,û etc.25 It amounts to saying that,
when feeling occurs, perception comes forward and perceives it,
then reasoning takes up the task of reasoning about perception.
Papa¤ca then steps in and converts that reasoning into papa¤ca.
This is how the commentary explains that formula. It has left out
of account the significance of the use of the active voice in this
section of the formula.
There is a special purpose in using the active voice in this con-
text. It is in order to explain how a man is overwhelmed by
papa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhà Ý whatever it may be Ý that Venerable
MahàKaccàna has introduced this sequence of events in three
phases. In fact, he is trying to fill in the gap in the rather elliptical
statement of the Buddha, beginning with yatonidànaü, bhikkhu,
purisaü papa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhà samudàcaranti, ßMonk, from
whatever source papa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhà beset a man.û The initial
phase is impersonal, but then comes the phase of active participa-
tion.
From feeling onwards, the person behind it takes over. What
one feels, one perceives; what one perceives, one reasons about;
what one reasons about, one turns into papa¤ca. The grossest
25 Ps II 77.
phase is the third. Venerable MahàKaccàna's formula shows how

the process of sense-perception gradually assumes a gross form.
This third phase is implicit in the words yaü papa¤ceti tato-
nidànaü purisaü papa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhà samudàcaranti, ßWhat
one turns into papa¤ca, owing to that papa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhà beset
that man.û The word purisaü is in the accusative case here,
implying that the person who directed sense-perception is now
beset with, or overwhelmed by, papa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhà, as a result
of which all the evil unskilful mental states come to be. This itself
is an index to the importance of the term papa¤ca.
The course of events suggested by these three phases may be
illustrated with the legend of the three magicians. While journey-
ing through a forest, three men, skilled in magic, came upon a
scattered heap of bones of a tiger. To display their skill, one of
them converted the bones into a complete skeleton, the second
gave it flesh and blood, and the third gave it life. The resurrected
tiger devoured all three of them. It is such a predicament that is
hinted at by the peculiar syntax of the formula in question.
The comparison of this discourse to a honey-ball is understand-
able, since it holds the secret of the latent tendencies towards
dogmatic views. It also affords a deep insight into the nature of the
linguistic medium, and words and concepts in everyday usage.
We haven't yet clarified the meaning of the term papa¤ca. It is
already found in common parlance as a word suggestive of
verbosity and circumlocution. Etymologically, it is traceable to
pra + Ö pa¤c, and it conveys such meanings as `spreading out,'
èxpansion,' `diffuseness' and `manifoldness.' Verbosity and
circumlocution usually lead to delusion and confusion. However,
the word papa¤ca is sometimes used to denote a conscious
elaboration of what is already expressed in brief. In this particular
sense, the cognate term vipa¤cita¤¤å is used in the context of four
types of persons, distinguished according to their levels of under-
standing, namely ugghañita¤¤å, vipa¤cita¤¤å, neyyo, and pa-
daparamo.26 Here, vipa¤cita¤¤å signifies that sort of person to

whom comprehension of the doctrine comes when the meaning of
what is uttered in brief is analysed in detail.
All in all, papa¤ca in linguistic usage has the insinuation of a
certain degree of delusion brought about by verbosity and circum-
locution. But here the term has a deeper philosophical dimension.
Here it is not a case of linguistic usage, but the behaviour of the
mind as such, since it concerns sense-perception. The fact that it
follows in the wake of vitakka is suggestive of its affinity to
vicàra, or discursive thought, so often quoted as the twin of
vitakka, that is as vitakkavicàra.
The mind has the tendency to wander afar, all alone,
dåraïgamaü ekacaraü,27 through the medium of thought, or
vitakka. When vitakka breaks loose and runs riot, it creates a
certain deluded state of mind, which is papa¤ca.
26 A II 135, Ugghañita¤¤åsutta.
27 Dhp 37, Cittavagga.
Nibbàna Sermon 12



This is the twelfth sermon in the series of sermons on Nibbàna.
At the beginning of our last sermon, we brought up the two terms
papa¤ca and nippapa¤ca, which help us rediscover quite a deep
dimension in Buddhist philosophy, hidden under the sense of time.
In our attempt to clarify the meaning of these two terms, initially
with the help of the Madhupiõóikasutta, what we could determine
so far is the fact that papa¤ca signifies a certain gross state in
sense-perception.
Though in ordinary linguistic usage papa¤ca meant èlabora-
tion,' `circumlocution,' and `verbosity,' the Madhupiõóikasutta
has shown us that in the context of sensory perception it has some
special significance. It portrays how a person, who directed sense
313
perception, is overwhelmed by papa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhà with regard

to sense-objects relating to the three periods of time, past, present,
and future, as a result of his indulging in papa¤ca based on
reasoning about percepts.
All this goes to show that papa¤ca has connotations of some
kind of delusion, obsession, and confusion arising in a man's mind
due to sense perception. In explaining the meaning of this term,
commentators very often make use of words like pamatta, èxces-
sively intoxicated,' ìndolent,' pamàda, `headlessness,' and
madana, ìntoxication.' For example: Kenaññhena papa¤co?
Mattapamattàkàrapàpanaññhena papa¤co.2 ßPapa¤ca in what
sense? In the sense that it leads one on to a state of intoxication
and indolence.û Sometimes it is commented on as follows:
papa¤cità ca honti pamattàkàrapattà.3 ßThey are subject to
papa¤ca, that is, they become more or less inebriated or indolent.û
Or else it is explained as madanàkàrasaõñhito kilesapapa¤co.4
ßPapa¤ca of a defiling nature which is of an inebriating charac-
ter.û
On the face of it, papa¤ca looks like a term similar in sense to
pamàda, indolence, heedlessness. But there is a subtle difference
in meaning between them. Pamàda, even etymologically, conveys
the basic idea of èxcessive intoxication.' It has a nuance of
inactivity or inefficiency, due to intoxication. The outcome of such
a state of affairs is either negligence or heedlessness. But as we
have already pointed out, papa¤ca has an etymological back-
ground suggestive of expansion, elaboration, verbosity and
circumlocution. Therefore, it has no connotations of inactivity and
inefficiency. On the other hand, it seems to imply an inability to
reach the goal due to a deviation from the correct path.
2 Sv III 721.
3 Spk III 73.
4 Mp III 348.
Let us try to understand the distinction in meaning between

pamàda and papa¤ca with the help of an illustration. Suppose we
ask someone to go on an urgent errant to Colombo. If instead of
going to Colombo, he goes to the nearest tavern and gets drunk
and sleeps there Ý that is a case of pamàda. If, on the other hand,
he takes to a long labyrinthine road, avoiding the shortest cut to
Colombo, and finally reaches Kandy instead of Colombo Ý that is
papa¤ca.
There is such a subtle difference in the nuances associated with
these two terms. Incidentally, there is a couplet among the Sixes of
the Aïguttara Nikàya, which sounds like a distant echo of the
illustration we have already given:
Yo papa¤cam anuyutto
papa¤càbhirato mago,
viràdhayã so Nibbànaü,
yogakkhemaü anuttaraü.
Yo ca papa¤caü hitvàna,
nippapa¤ca pade rato,
àràdhayã so Nibbànaü,
yogakkhemaü anuttaraü.5
ßThe fool who indulges in papa¤ca,

Being excessively fond of it,
Has missed the way to Nibbàna,
The incomparable freedom from bondage.
ßHe who, having given up papa¤ca,

delights in the path to nippapa¤ca,
Is well on the way to Nibbàna,
The incomparable freedom from bondage.û
5 A III 294, Bhaddakasutta and Anutappiyasutta.

In this way we can understand the difference between the two

words papa¤ca and pamàda in respect of the nuances associated
with them.
Commentaries very often explain the term papa¤ca simply as a
synonym of craving, conceit, and views, taõhàdiññhimànànam
etaü adhivacanaü.6 But this does not amount to a definition of
papa¤ca as such. It is true that these are instances of papa¤ca, for
even in the Madhupiõóikasutta we came across the three expres-
sions abhinanditabbaü, abhivaditabbaü, and ajjhositabbaü,
suggestive of them.7
Abhinanditabbaü means `what is worth delighting in,' abhi-
vaditabbaü means `what is worth asserting,' ajjhositabbaü means
`what is worth clinging on to.' These three expressions are very
often used in the discourses to denote the three defilements
craving, conceit and views. That is to say, `delighting in' by way
of craving with the thought `this is mine'; àsserting' by way of
conceit with the thought `this am I'; and `clinging on to' with the
dogmatic view `this is my soul.'
Therefore the commentarial exegesis on papa¤ca in terms of
craving, conceit and views is to a great extent justifiable. Howev-
er, what is particularly significant about the term papa¤ca is that it
conveys the sense of proliferation and complexity of thought, on
the lines of those three basic tendencies. That is why the person
concerned is said to be òverwhelmed by papa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhà.'8
Here we need to clarify for ourselves the meaning of the word
saïkhà. According to the commentary, it means `parts,' papa¤ca-
sa¤¤àsaïkhà'ti ettha saïkhà'ti koññhàso,9 ß`papa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhà,'
here in `saïkhà' means parts.û In that case papa¤casaïkhà could
6 Ps II 10.
9 Ps II 75.
be rendered as `parts of papa¤ca,' which says nothing significant

about saïkhà itself. On the other hand, if one carefully examines
the contexts in which the terms papa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhà and pa-
pa¤casaïkhà are used in the discourses, one gets the impression
that saïkhà means something deeper than `part' or `portion.'
Saïkhà, sama¤¤à and pa¤¤atti are more or less synonymous
terms. Out of them, pa¤¤atti is fairly well known as a term for
`designation.' Saïkhà and sama¤¤à are associated in sense with
pa¤¤atti. Saïkhà means `reckoning' and sama¤¤à is àppellation.'
These three terms are often used in connection with worldly usage.
We come across quite a significant reference, relevant to this
question of papa¤ca, in the Niruttipathasutta of the Khandha-
saüyutta in the Saüyutta Nikàya. It runs:
Tayome, bhikkhave, niruttipathà, adhivacanapathà,

pa¤¤attipathà asaïkiõõà asaïkiõõapubbà, na saïkãyanti,
na saïkãyissanti, appañikuññhà samaõehi bràhmaõehi
vi¤¤åhi. Katame tayo? Yaü, bhikkhave, råpaü atãtaü nir-
uddhaü vipariõataü àhosã'ti tassa saïkhà, àhosã'ti tassa
sama¤¤à, àhosã'ti tassa pa¤¤atti, na tassa saïkhà àt-
thã'ti, na tassa saïkhà `bhavissatã'ti.10
ßMonks, there are these three pathways of linguistic

usage, of synonyms and of designation, that are not mixed
up, have never been mixed up, that are not doubted and
will not be doubted, and are undespised by intelligent
recluses and brahmins. What are the three? Whatever
form, monks, that is past, ceased, transformed, ìt was' is
the reckoning for it, ìt was' is its appellation, ìt was' is
its designation, it is not reckoned as ìt is,' it is not reck-
oned as ìt will be.'û
10 S III 71, Niruttipathasutta.

The burden of this discourse, as it proceeds in this way, is the

maxim that the three periods of time should never be mixed up or
confounded. For instance, with regard to that form that is past, a
verb in the past tense is used. One must not imagine what is past to
be existing as something present. Nor should one imagine whatev-
er belongs to the future as already existing in the present.
Whatever has been, is past. Whatever is, is present. It is a com-
mon mistake to conceive of something that is yet to come as
something already present, and to imagine whatever is past also as
present. This is the confusion the world is in. That is why those
recluses and brahmins, who are wise, do not mix them up.
Just as the above quoted paragraph speaks of whatever is past,
so the discourse continues to make similar statements with regard
to whatever is present or future. It touches upon all the five
aggregates, for instance, whatever form that is present is reckoned
as ìt is,' and not as ìt was' or ìt will be.' Similarly, whatever
form that is yet to come is reckoned as ìt will be,' and not as ìt
was' or ìt is.' This is how the Niruttipathasutta lays down the
basic principle of not confounding the linguistic usages pertaining
to the three periods of time.
Throughout this discourse, the term saïkhà is used in the sense
of `reckoning.' In fact, the three terms saïkhà, sama¤¤à and
pa¤¤atti are used somewhat synonymously in the same way as
nirutti, adhivacana and pa¤¤atti. All these are in sense akin to
each other in so far as they represent the problem of worldly
usage.
This makes it clear that the intriguing term papa¤casa¤¤à-
saïkhà has a relevance to the question of language and modes of
linguistic usages. The term could thus be rendered as `reckonings
born of prolific perceptions.'
If we are to go deeper into the significance of the term saïkhà,
we may say that its basic sense in linguistic usage is connected
with numerals, since it means `reckoning.' As a matter of fact,
numerals are more primitive than letters, in a language.
To perceive is to grasp a sign of permanence in something.
Perception has the characteristic of grasping a sign. It is with the
help of signs that one recognizes. Perceptions of forms, percep-

tions of sounds, perceptions of smells, perceptions of tastes, etc.,
are so many ways of grasping signs. Just as a party going through
a forest would blaze a trail with an axe in order to find their way
back with the help of notches on the trees, so does perception
catch a sign in order to be able to recognize.
This perception is like the groping of a blind man, fumbling in
the dark. There is a tendency in the mind to grasp a sign after
whatever is felt. So it gives rise to perceptions of forms, percep-
tions of sounds, etc. A sign necessarily involves the notion of
permanence. That is to say, a sign stands for permanence. A sign
has to remain unchanged until one returns to it to recognize it.
That is also the secret behind the mirage nature of perception as a
whole.11
As a matter of fact, the word sa¤¤à, used to denote perception
as such, primarily means the `sign,' `symbol,' or `mark,' with
which one recognizes. But recognition alone is not enough. What
is recognized has to be made known to the world, to the society at
large. That is why sa¤¤à, or perception, is followed by saïkhà, or
reckoning.
The relationship between saïkhà, sama¤¤à and pa¤¤atti in this
connection could also be explained. Saïkhà as `reckoning' or
`counting' totals up or adds up into groups of, say, five or six. It
facilitates our work, particularly in common or communal activi-
ties. So the most primitive symbol in a language is the numeral.
Sama¤¤à, or appellation, is a common agreement as to how
something should be known. If everyone had its own way of
making known, exchange of ideas would be impossible. Pa¤¤atti,
or designation, determines the pattern of whatever is commonly
agreed upon. This way we can understand the affinity of meaning
between the terms saïkhà, sama¤¤à and pa¤¤atti.
11 Marãcikåpamà sa¤¤à at S III 142, Pheõapiõóåpamasutta.

Among them, saïkhà is the most primitive form of reckoning. It

does not simply mean reckoning or adding up in terms of numer-
als. It is characteristic of language too, as we may infer from the
occurrence of the expression saïkhaü gacchati in many discours-
es. There the reckoning meant is a particular linguistic usage. We
come across a good illustration of such a linguistic usage in the
MahàHatthipadopamasutta, where Venerable Sàriputta is address-
ing his fellow monks:
Seyyathàpi, àvuso, kaññha¤ca pañicca valli¤ca pañicca

tiõa¤ca pañicca mattika¤ca pañicca àkàso parivàrito
agàraü tveva saïkhaü gacchati; evameva kho, àvuso,
aññhi¤ca pañicca nahàru¤ca pañicca maüsa¤ca pañicca
camma¤ca pañicca àkàso parivàrito råpaü tveva saïkhaü
gacchati.12
ßFriends, just as when space is enclosed by timber and

creepers, grass and clay, it comes to be reckoned as à
house'; even so, when space is enclosed by bones and
sinews, flesh and skin, it comes to be reckoned as `materi-
al form.'û
Here the expression saïkhaü gacchati stands for a designation as

a concept. It is the way something comes to be known. Let us go
for another illustration from a sermon by the Buddha himself. It is
one that throws a flood of light on some deep aspects of Buddhist
philosophy, relating to language, grammar and logic. It comes in
the Poññhapàdasutta of the Dãgha Nikàya, where the Buddha is
exhorting Citta Hatthisàriputta:
Seyyathàpi, Citta, gavà khãraü, khãramhà dadhi, da-

dhimhà navanãtaü, navanãtamhà sappi, sappimhà
sappimaõóo. Yasmiü samaye khãraü hoti, neva tasmiü

samaye dadhã'ti saïkhaü gacchati, na navanãtan'ti
saïkhaü gacchati, na sappã'ti saïkhaü gacchati, na
sappimaõóo'ti saïkhaü gacchati, khãraü tveva tasmiü
samaye saïkhaü gacchati.13
ßJust, Citta, as from a cow comes milk, and from milk

curds, and from curds butter, and from butter ghee, and
from ghee junket. But when it is milk, it is not reckoned as
curd or butter or ghee or junket, it is then simply reckoned
as milk.û
We shall break up the relevant quotation into three parts, for

facility of comment. This is the first part giving the introductory
simile. The simile itself looks simple enough, though it is sugges-
tive of something deep. The simile is in fact extended to each of
the other stages of milk formation, namely curd, butter, ghee, and
junket, pointing out that in each case, it is not reckoned otherwise.
Now comes the corresponding doctrinal point:
Evameva kho, Citta, yasmiü samaye oëàriko attapañilàbho

hoti, neva tasmiü samaye manomayo attapañilàbho'ti
saïkhaü gacchati, na aråpo attapañilàbho'ti saïkhaü
gacchati, oëàriko attapañilàbho tveva tasmiü samaye
saïkhaü gacchati.
ßJust so, Citta, when the gross mode of personality is

going on, it is not reckoned as `the mental mode of per-
sonality,' nor as `the formless mode of personality,' it is
then simply reckoned as `the gross mode of personality.'û
These three modes of personality correspond to the three planes of

existence, the sensuous, the form, and the formless. The first refers
to the ordinary physical frame, sustained by material food,
kabaëãkàràhàrabhakkho, enjoying the sense pleasures.14 At the
time a person is in this sensual field, possessing the gross mode of
personality, one must not imagine that the mental mode or the
formless mode of personality is hidden in him.
This is the type of confusion the ascetics entrenched in a soul
theory fell into. They even conceived of self as fivefold, encased
in concentric shells. Whereas in the Taittirãya Upaniùad one
comes across the pa¤cako÷a theory, the reference here is to three
states of the self, as gross, mental and formless modes of personal-
ity. Out of the five selves known to Upaniùadic philosophy,
namely annamaya, pràõamaya, saüj¤àmaya, vij¤àõamaya and
ànandamaya, only three are mentioned here, in some form or
other. The gross mode of personality corresponds to annamayàt-
man, the mental mode of personality is equivalent to saüj¤à-
mayàtman, while the formless mode of personality stands for
vij¤àõamayàtman.
The correct perspective of understanding this distinction is
provided by the milk simile. Suppose someone gets a jhàna and
attains to a mental mode of personality. He should not imagine
that the formless mode of personality is already latent in him. Nor
should he think that the former gross mode of personality is still
lingering in him. They are just temporary states, to be distin-
guished like milk and curd. This is the moral the Buddha is trying
to drive home.
Now we come to the third part of the quotation, giving the
Buddha's conclusion, which is extremely important. Imà kho,
Citta, lokasama¤¤à lokaniruttiyo lokavohàrà lokapa¤¤attiyo, yàhi
Tathàgato voharati aparàmasaü. ßFor all these, Citta, are worldly
apparitions, worldly expressions, worldly usages, worldly designa-
tions, which the Tathàgata makes use of without tenacious

grasping.û
It is the last word in the quotation, aparàmasaü, which is ex-
tremely important. There is no tenacious grasping. The Buddha
uses the language much in the same way as parents make use of a
child's homely prattle, for purpose of meditation. He had to
present this Dhamma, which goes against the current,15 through the
medium of worldly language, with which the worldlings have their
transaction in defilements. That is probably the reason why the
Buddha at first hesitated to preach this Dhamma. He must have
wondered how he can convey such a deep Dhamma through the
terminology, the grammar and the logic of worldlings.
All this shows the immense importance of the Poññhapàdasutta.
If the ordinary worldling presumes that ghee is already inherent in
the milk obtained from the cow, he will try to argue it out on the
grounds that after all it is milk that becomes ghee. And once it
becomes ghee, he might imagine that milk is still to be found in
ghee, in some latent form.
As a general statement, this might sound ridiculous. But even
great philosophers were unaware of the implications of their
theories. That is why the Buddha had to come out with this homely
milk simile, to bring them to their senses. Here lies the secret of
the soul theory. It carried with it the implication that past and
future also exist in the same sense as the present.
The Buddha, on the other hand, uses the verb atthi, ìs,' only for
what exists in the present. He points out that, whatever is past,
should be referred to as ahosi, `was,' and whatever is yet to come,
in the future, should be spoken of as bhavissati, `will be.' This is
the fundamental principle underlying the Niruttipathasutta already
quoted. Any departure from it would give rise to such confusions
as referred to above.
15 Pañisotagàmi at M I 168, Ariyapariyesanasutta.

Milk, curd, butter and ghee are merely so many stages in a

certain process. The worldlings, however, have put them into
watertight compartments, by designating and circumscribing them.
They are caught up in the conceptual trap of their own making.
When the philosophers started working out the logical relation-
ship between cause and effect, they tended to regard these two as
totally unrelated to each other. Since milk becomes curd, either the
two are totally different from each other, or curd must already be
latent in milk for it to become curd. This is the kind of dilemma
their logic posed for them.
Indian philosophical systems reflect a tendency towards such
logical subtleties. They ended up with various extreme views
concerning the relation between cause and effect. In a certain
school of Indian philosophy, known as àrambhavàda, effect is
explained as something totally new, unrelated to the cause. Other
schools of philosophy, such as satkàriyavàda and satkaraõavàda,
also arose by confusing this issue. For them, effect is already
found hidden in the cause, before it comes out. Yet others took
only the cause as real. Such extreme conclusions were the result of
forgetting the fact that all these are mere concepts in worldly
usage. Here we have a case of getting caught up in a conceptual
trap of one's own making.
This confusion regarding the three periods of time, characteris-
tic of such philosophers, could be illustrated with some folktales
and fables, which lucidly bring out a deep truth. There is, for
instance, the tale of the goose that lays golden eggs, well known to
the West. A certain goose used to lay a golden egg everyday. Its
owner, out of excessive greed, thought of getting all the as yet
ones. He killed the goose and opened it up, only to come to grief.
He had wrongly imagined the future to be already existing in the
present.
This is the kind of blunder the soul theorists also committed. In
the field of philosophy, too, the prolific tendency led to such subtle
complications. It is not much different from the proliferations
indulged in by the ordinary worldling in his daily life. That is why
reckonings born of prolific perception are said to be so over-
whelming. One is overwhelmed by one's own reckonings and

figurings out, under the influence of prolific perceptions.
An Indian poet once spotted a ruby, shining in the moonlight,
and eagerly approached it, enchanted by it, only to find a blood red
spittle of beetle. We often come across such humorous stories in
literature, showing the pitfalls of prolific conceptualisation.
The introductory story, leading up to the Dhammapada verse on
the rambling nature of the mind, dåraïgamaü ekacaraü, asa-
rãraü guhàsayaü, as recorded in the commentary to the
Dhammapada, is very illustrative.16 The pupil of venerable
Saïgharakkhita Thera, a nephew of his, indulged in a papa¤ca
while fanning his teacher. In his imagination, he disrobed, got
married, had a child, and was coming in a chariot with his wife
and child to see his former teacher. The wife, through carelessness,
dropped the child and the chariot run away. So he whipped his
wife in a fit of anger, only to realize that he had dealt a blow on his
teacher's head with the fan still in his hand. Being an arahant with
psychic powers, his teacher immediately understood the pupil's
state of mind, much to the latter's discomfiture.
A potter in Sanskrit literature smashed his pots in a sort of busi-
ness papa¤ca and was remorseful afterwards. Similarly the proud
milk maid in English literature dropped a bucket of milk on her
head in a daydream of her rosy future. In all these cases one takes
as present something that is to come in the future. This is a serious
confusion between the three periods of time. The perception of
permanence, characteristic of concepts, lures one away from
reality into a world of fantasy, with the result that one is over-
whelmed and obsessed by it.
So this is what is meant by papa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhasamudàcàra.
So overwhelming are reckonings born of prolific perception. As
we saw above, the word saïkhà is therefore nearer to the idea of
reckoning than that of part or portion.
16 Dhp 37, Cittavagga; Dhp-a I 301.

Tathàgatas are free from such reckonings born of prolific per-

ception, papa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhà, because they make use of worldly
linguistic usages, conventions and designation, being fully aware
of their worldly origin, as if they were using a child's language.
When an adult uses a child's language, he is not bound by it.
Likewise, the Buddhas and arahants do not forget that these are
worldly usages. They do not draw any distinction between the
relative and the absolute with regard to those concepts. For them,
they are merely concepts and designations in worldly usage. That
is why the Tathàgatas are said to be free from papa¤ca, that is
to say they are nippapa¤ca, whereas the world delights in pa-
pa¤ca. This fact is clearly expressed in the following verse in the
Dhammapada:
âkàse va padaü natthi

samaõo natthi bàhire,
papa¤càbhiratà pajà,
nippapa¤cà Tathàgatà.17
ßNo track is there in the air,

And no recluse elsewhere,
This populace delights in prolificity,
But `Thus-gone-ones' are non-prolific.û
It is because the Tathàgatas are non-prolific that nippapa¤ca is

regarded as one of the epithets of Nibbàna in a long list of thirty-
three.18 Like dukkhåpasama, quelling of suffering, papa¤ca-
våpasama, `quelling of prolificity,' is also recognized as an epithet
of Nibbàna. It is also referred to as papa¤canirodha, `cessation of
prolificity.' We come across such references to Nibbàna in terms
of papa¤ca quite often.
17 Dhp 254, Malavagga.

The Tathàgatas are free from papa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhà, although

they make use of worldly concepts and designations. In the
Kalahavivàdasutta we come across the dictum sa¤¤ànidànà hi
papa¤casaïkhà,19 according to which reckonings through prolifici-
ty arise from perception. Now the Tathàgatas have gone beyond
the pale of perception in attaining wisdom. That is why they are
free from papa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhà, reckonings born of prolific
perception.
Such reckonings are the lot of those who grope in the murk of
ignorance, under the influence of perception. Since Buddhas and
arahants are enlightened with wisdom and released from the
limitations of perception, they do not entertain such reckonings
born of prolific perception. Hence we find the following statement
in the Udàna: Tena kho pana samayena Bhagavà attano pa-
pa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhàpahànaü paccavekkhamàno nisinno hoti.20
ßAnd at that time the Exalted One was seated contemplating his
own abandonment of reckonings born of prolific perception.û The
allusion here is to the bliss of emancipation. Quite a meaningful
verse also occurs in this particular context:
Yassa papa¤cà ñhiti ca natthi,

sandànaü paligha¤ca vãtivatto,
taü nittaõhaü muniü carantaü,
nàvajànàti sadevako pi loko.21
ßTo whom there are no proliferations and standstills,

Who has gone beyond the bond and the deadlock,
In that craving-free sage, as he fares along,
The world with its gods sees nothing to decry.û
20 Ud 77, Papa¤cakhayasutta.
21 Ud 77, Papa¤cakhayasutta.
The two words papa¤ca and ñhiti in juxtaposition highlight the

primary sense of papa¤ca as a `rambling' or a `straying away.'
According to the Nettippakaraõa, the idiomatic standstill men-
tioned here refers to the latencies, anusaya.22 So the rambling
papa¤cas and doggedly persisting anusayas are no longer there.
The two words sanóànaü and palighaü are also metaphorically
used in the Dhamma. Views, diññhi, are the bond, and ignorance,
avijjà, is the deadlock.23
The fact that papa¤ca is characteristic of worldly thoughts,
connected with the household life, emerges from the following
verse in the Saëàyatanasaüyutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya:
Papa¤casa¤¤à itarãtarà narà,

papa¤cayantà upayanti sa¤¤ino,
manomayaü gehasita¤ca sabbaü,
panujja nekkhammasitaü irãyati.24
ßThe common run of humanity, impelled by prolific

perception,
Approach their objects with rambling thoughts, limited
by perception as they are,
Dispelling all what is mind-made and connected with
the household,
One moves towards that which is connected with renun-
ciation.û
The approach meant here is comparable to the approach of that

imaginative poet towards the ruby shining in moonlight, only to
discover a spittle of beetle. The last two lines of the verse bring
out the correct approach of one who is aiming at Nibbàna.
22 Nett 37.
23 Ud-a 373.
24 S IV 71, Adanta-aguttasutta.
It requires the dispelling of such daydreams connected with

the household as entertained by the nephew of Venerable
Saïgharakkhita Thera.
Worldlings are in the habit of constructing speculative views by
taking too seriously linguistic usage and grammatical structure. All
pre-Buddhistic philosophers made such blunders as the confusion
between milk and curd. Their blunders were mainly due to two
reasons, namely, the persistent latency towards perception and the
dogmatic adherence to views. It is precisely these two points that
came up in the very first statement of the Madhupiõóikasutta,
discussed in our previous sermon. That is to say, they formed the
gist of the Buddha's cursory reply to the Sakyan Daõóapàõi's
question. For the latter it was a riddle and that is why he raised his
eyebrows, wagged his tongue and shook his head. The question
was: ßWhat does the recluse assert and what does he proclaim?û25
The Buddha's reply was: ßAccording to whatever doctrine one
does not quarrel or dispute with anyone in the world, such a
doctrine do I preach. And due to whatever statements, perceptions
do not underlie as latencies, such statements do I proclaim.û
This might well appear a strange paradox. But since we have
already made some clarification of the two terms sa¤¤à and
pa¤¤à, we might as well bring up now an excellent quotation to
distinguish the difference between these two. It is in fact the last
verse in the Màgandiyasutta of the Sutta Nipàta, the grand finale
as it were:
Sa¤¤àviratassa na santi ganthà,

pa¤¤àvimuttassa na santi mohà,
sa¤¤a¤ca diññhi¤ca ye aggahesuü,
te ghaññhayantà vicaranti loke.26
26 Sn 847, Màgandiyasutta.
ßTo one unattached to percepts no bonds exist,

In one released through wisdom no delusions persist,
But they that cling to percepts and views,
Go about rambling in this world.û
In the Pupphasutta of the Khandhasaüyutta one comes across the

following declaration of the Buddha. Nàhaü, bhikkhave, lokena
vivadàmi, loko va mayà vivadati.27 ßMonks, I do not dispute with
the world, it is the world that is disputing with me.û
This looks more or less like a contradictory statement, as if one
would say `he is quarrelling with me but I am not quarrelling with
him.' However, the truth of the statement lies in the fact that the
Buddha did not hold on to any view. Some might think that the
Buddha also held on to some view or other. But he was simply
using the child's language, for him there was nothing worth
holding on to in it.
There is a Canonical episode which is a good illustration of this
fact. One of the most well-known among the debates the Buddha
had with ascetics of other sects is the debate with Saccaka, the
ascetic. An account of it is found in the CåëaSaccakasutta of the
Majjhima Nikàya. The debate had all the outward appearance of a
hot dispute. However, towards the end of it, the Buddha makes the
following challenge to Saccaka: ßAs for you, Aggivessana, drops
of sweat have come down from your forehead, soaked through
your upper robe and reached the ground. But, Aggivessana, there
is no sweat on my body now.û So saying he uncovered his golden-
hued body in that assembly, iti Bhagavà tasmiü parisatiü su-
vaõõavaõõaü kàyaü vivari.28
Even in the midst of a hot debate, the Buddha had no agitation
because he did not adhere to any views. There was for him no
27 S III 138, Pupphasutta.

28 M I 233, CåëaSaccakasutta.
bondage in terms of craving, conceit and views. Even in the thick

of a heated debate the Buddha was uniformly calm and cool.
It is the same with regard to perception. Percepts do not persist
as a latency in him. We spoke of name-and-form as an image or a
reflection. Buddhas do not have the delusion arising out of name-
and-form, since they have comprehended it as a self-image. There
is a verse in the Sabhiyasutta of the Sutta Nipàta which puts across
this idea:
Anuvicca papa¤ca nàmaråpaü,

ajjhattaü bahiddhà ca rogamålaü,
sabbarogamålabandhanà pamutto,
anuvidito tàdi pavuccate tathattà.29
ßHaving understood name-and-form, which is a product

of prolificity,
And which is the root of all malady within and without,
He is released from bondage to the root of all maladies,
That Such-like-one is truly known as `the one who has
understood.'û
Name-and-form is a product of papa¤ca, the worldling's prolifici-

ty. We spoke of the reflection of a gem in a pond and the image of
a dog on a plank across the stream.30 One's grasp on one's world
of name-and-form is something similar. Now as for the Buddha,
he has truly comprehended the nature of name-and-form. Whatev-
er maladies, complications and malignant conditions there are
within beings and around them, the root cause of all that malady is
this papa¤ca nàmaråpa. To be free from it is to be `such.' He is
the one who has really understood.
29 Sn 530, Sabhiyasutta.
30 See sermons 6 and 7 (dog simile) and sermon 9 (gem simile).
If we are to say something in particular about the latency of

perception, we have to pay special attention to the first discourse
in the Majjhima Nikàya. The advice usually given to one who
picks up the Majjhima Nikàya these days is to skip the very first
sutta. Why? Because it is not easy to understand it. Even the
monks to whom it was preached could not understand it and were
displeased. Ìt is too deep for us, leave it alone.'
But it must be pointed out that such an advice is not much dif-
ferent from asking one to learn a language without studying the
alphabet. This is because the first discourse of the Majjhima
Nikàya, namely the Målapariyàyasutta, enshrines an extremely
vital first principle in the entire field of Buddhist philosophy. Just
as much as the first discourse of the Dãgha Nikàya, namely the
Brahmajàlasutta, is of great relevance to the question of views,
even so the Målapariyàyasutta is extremely important for its
relevance to the question of perception.
Now what is the basic theme of this discourse? There is a cer-
tain pattern in the way objects occur to the mind and are apper-
ceived. This discourse lays bare that elementary pattern. The
Buddha opens this discourse with the declaration, sabbadhamma-
målapariyàyaü vo, bhikkhave, desessàmi,31 ßMonks, I shall preach
to you the basic pattern of behaviour of all mind objects.û
In a nutshell, the discourse deals with twenty-four concepts,
representative of concepts in the world. These are fitted into a
schema to illustrate the attitude of four types of persons towards
them.
The twenty-four concepts mentioned in the sutta are pañhavi,
àpo, tejo, vàyo, bhåta, deva, Pajàpati, Brahma, âbhassara,
Subhakinha, Vehapphala, abhibhå, àkàsàna¤càyatanaü,
vi¤¤àõa¤càyatanaü, àki¤ca¤àyatanaü, nevasa¤¤ànàsa¤¤à-
yatanaü, diññhaü, sutaü, mutaü, vi¤¤àtaü, ekattaü, nànattaü,
sabbaü, Nibbànaü. ßEarth, water, fire, air, beings, gods, Pajàpati,
31 M I 1, Målapariyàyasutta.
Brahma, the Abhassara Brahmas, the Subhakinha Brahmas, the

Vehapphala Brahmas, the overlord, the realm of infinite space, the
realm of infinite consciousness, the realm of nothingness, the
realm of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, the seen, the
heard, the sensed, the cognised, unity, diversity, all, Nibbàna.û
The discourse describes the differences of attitude in four types
of persons with regard to each of these concepts. The four persons
are:
1) An untaught ordinary person, who has no regard for the

Noble Ones and is unskilled in their Dhamma, assutavà
puthujjana.
2) A monk who is in higher training, whose mind has not yet
reached the goal and who is aspiring to the supreme secu-
rity from bondage, bhikkhu sekho appattamànaso.
3) An arahant with taints destroyed who has lived the holy
life, done what has to be done, laid down the burden,
reached the goal, destroyed the fetters of existence and
who is completely liberated through final knowledge,
arahaü khãõàsavo.
4) The Tathàgata, accomplished and fully enlightened,
Tathàgato arahaü sammàsambuddho.
Out of these, the second category comprises the Stream-winner,

the Once-returner and the Non-returner. Though there are four
types, according to the analysis of their attitudes, the last two can
be regarded as one type, since their attitudes to those concepts are
the same. So we might as well speak of three kinds of attitudes.
Let us now try to understand the difference between them.
What is the world-view of the untaught ordinary person, the
worldling? The Buddha describes it as follows:
Pañhaviü pañhavito sa¤jànàti. Pañhaviü pañhavito

sa¤¤atvà pañhaviü ma¤¤ati, pañhaviyà ma¤¤ati, pañhavito
ma¤¤ati, `pañhaviü me'ti ma¤¤ati, pañhaviü abhinandati.

Taü kissa hetu? Apari¤¤àtaü tassà'ti vadàmi.
ßHe perceives earth as èarth.' Having perceived earth

as èarth,' he imagines èarth' as such, he imagines òn the
earth,' he imagines `from the earth,' he imagines èarth
is mine,' he delights in earth. Why is that? I say that it is
because he has not fully comprehended it.û
The untaught ordinary person can do no better than to perceive

earth as èarth,' since he is simply groping in the dark. So he
perceives earth as èarth' and goes on imagining, for which the
word used here is ma¤¤ati, methinks. One usually methinks when
a simile or a metaphor occurs, as a figure of speech. But here it is
something more than that. Here it refers to an indulgence in a
deluded mode of thinking under the influence of craving, conceit
and views. Perceiving earth as èarth,' he imagines earth to be
substantially èarth.'
Then he resorts to inflection, to make it flexible or amenable to
his methinking. Òn the earth,' `from the earth,' èarth is mine,'
are so many subtle ways of methinking, with which he finally
finds delight in the very concept of earth. The reason for all this is
the fact that he has not fully comprehended it.
Then comes the world-view of the monk who is in higher train-
ing, that is, the sekha. Pañhaviü pañhavito abhijànàti. Pañhaviü
pañhavito abhi¤¤àya pañhaviü mà ma¤¤i, pañhaviyà mà ma¤¤i,
pañhavito mà ma¤¤i, `pañhaviü me'ti mà ma¤¤i, pañhaviü màbhi-
nandi. Taü kissa hetu? Pari¤¤eyyaü tassà'ti vadàmi.
ßHe understands through higher knowledge earth as èarth.'
Having known through higher knowledge earth as èarth,' let him
not imagine èarth' as such, let him not imagine òn the earth,' let
him not imagine `from the earth,' let him not imagine èarth is
mine,' let him not delight in earth. Why is that? I say it is because
it should be well comprehended by him.û As for the monk who is
in higher training, he does not merely perceive, but understands
through higher knowledge.
Here we are against a peculiar expression, which is rather prob-

lematic, that is, mà ma¤¤i. The commentary simply glosses over
with the words ma¤¤atã'ti ma¤¤i, taking it to mean the same as
ma¤¤ati, ßimagines.û32 Its only explanation for the use of this
peculiar expression in this context is that the sekha, or the one in
higher training, has already done away with diññhima¤¤anà or
imagining in terms of views, though he still has imaginings
through craving and conceit. So, for the commentary, mà ma¤¤i is
a sort of mild recognition of residual imagining, a dilly-dally
phrase. But this interpretation is not at all convincing.
Obviously enough the particle mà has a prohibitive sense here,
and mà ma¤¤i means `let one not imagine,' or `let one not enter-
tain imaginings,' ma¤¤anà. A clear instance of the use of this
expression in this sense is found at the end of the Samiddhisutta,
discussed in an earlier sermon.33 Venerable Samiddhi answered
Venerable Sàriputta's catechism creditably and the latter acknowl-
edged it with a ßwell-done,û sàdhu sàdhu, but cautioned him not to
be proud of it, tena ca mà ma¤¤i, ßbut do not be vain on account
of it.û34
The use of the prohibitive particle with reference to the world-
view of the monk in higher training is quite apt, as he has to train
himself in overcoming the tendency to go on imagining. For him it
is a step of training towards full comprehension. That is why the
Buddha concludes with the words ßWhy is that? I say it is because
it should be well comprehended by him.û
32 Ps I 41.
33 See sermon 9.
34 A IV 386, Samiddhisutta.
Nibbàna Sermon 13



This is the thirteenth sermon in the series of sermons on
Nibbàna. In our last sermon we attempted an exposition under the
topic sabbadhammamålapariyàya, ßthe basic pattern of behaviour
of all mind objects,û which constitutes the theme of the very first
sutta of the Majjhima Nikàya, namely the Målapariyàyasutta.2
We happened to mention that the discourse describes three
different attitudes regarding twenty-four concepts such as earth,
water, fire and air. We could however discuss only two of them
the other day, namely the world view, or the attitude of the
untaught ordinary person, and the attitude of the noble one, who is
in higher training.
337
So today, to begin with, let us bring up the third type of attitude

given in the discourse, that is, the attitude of arahants and that of
the Tathàgata, both being similar. It is described in these words:
Pañhaviü pañhavito abhijànàti, pañhaviü pañhavito ab-

hi¤¤àya pañhaviü na ma¤¤ati, pañhaviyà na ma¤¤ati,
pañhavito na ma¤¤ati, `pañhaviü me'ti na ma¤¤ati,
pañhaviü nàbhinandati. Taü kissa hetu? `Pari¤¤àtaü
tassà'ti vadàmi.
ßThe arahant (as well as the Tathàgata) understands

through higher knowledge earth as èarth,' having under-
stood through higher knowledge earth as èarth,' he does
not imagine earth to be èarth,' he does not imagine òn
the earth,' he does not imagine `from the earth,' he does
not imagine èarth is mine,' he does not delight in earth.
Why is that? I say, it is because it has been well compre-
hended by him.û
Let us now try to compare and contrast these three attitudes, so

that we can understand them in greater detail. The attitude of the
untaught ordinary person in regard to any of the twenty-four
concepts like earth, water, fire, air (the twenty-four cited being
illustrations), is so oriented that he perceives it as such.
For instance in the case of earth, he perceives a real earth, that
is, takes it as earth per se. It may sometimes be only a block of ice,
but because it is hard to the touch, he grasps it as èarth.' Thus the
ordinary person, the worldling, relies only on perception in his
pursuit of knowledge. Having perceived earth as èarth,' he
imagines it to be èarth.' The peculiarity of ma¤¤anà, or `me'-
thinking, is that it is an imagining in terms of Ì' and `mine.'
So he first imagines it as èarth,' then he imagines òn the
earth,' `from the earth,' èarth is mine' and delights in the earth.
Here we find various flexional forms known to grammar.
As a matter of fact, grammar itself is a product of the worldlings
for purposes of transaction in ideas bound up with defilements. Its
purpose is to enable beings, who are overcome by the personality

view, to communicate with their like-minded fellow beings.
Grammar, therefore, is something that caters to their needs. As
such, it embodies certain misconceptions, some of which have
been highlighted in this context.
For instance, pañhaviü ma¤¤ati could be interpreted as an
attempt to imagine an earth Ý as a full-fledged noun or substantive.
It is conceived as something substantial. By pañhaviyà ma¤¤àti,
ßhe imagines òn the earth,'û the locative case is implied; while
`pañhaviü me'ti ma¤¤ati, ßhe imagines èarth is mine,'û is an
instance of the genitive case, expressing the idea of possession.
Due to such imaginings, a reality is attributed to the concept of
èarth' and its existence is taken for granted. In other words, these
various forms of imaginings go to confirm the notion already
aroused by the concept of èarth.' Once it is confirmed one can
delight in it, pañhaviü abhinandati. This, then, is the worldview of
the untaught ordinary person.
The other day we mentioned that the monk who is in higher
training understands through higher knowledge, not through
perception, earth as èarth.' Though it is a higher level of under-
standing, he is not totally free from imaginings. That is why
certain peculiar expressions are used in connection with him, such
as pañaviü mà ma¤¤i, pañhaviyà mà ma¤¤i, pañhavito mà ma¤¤i,
`pañhaviü me'ti mà ma¤¤i, pañhaviü mà abhinandi.
Here we have to call in question the commentarial explanation.
According to the commentary, this peculiar expression had to be
used as a dilly-dally phrase, because the monk in higher training
could not be said to imagine or not imagine.3 But it is clear enough
that the particle mà in this context is used in its prohibitive sense.
Mà ma¤¤i means ßdo not imagine!û and mà abhinandi means ßdo
not delight!û
3 Ps I 41.
What is significant about the sekha, the monk in higher training,

is that he is in a stage of voluntary training. In fact, the word sekha
literally means a ßlearner.û That is to say, he has obtained a certain
degree of higher understanding but has not attained as yet full
comprehension.
It is precisely for that reason that the section about him is
summed up by the statement: Taü kissa hetu? Pari¤¤eyyaü
tassà'ti vadàmi. ßWhy is that? Because, I say, that it should be
comprehended by him.û Since he has yet to comprehend it, he is
following that course of higher training. The particle mà is
therefore a pointer to that effect. For example, mà ma¤¤i, ßdo not
imagine!û and mà abhi nandi, ßdo not delight!û
In other words, the monk in higher training cannot help using
the grammatical structure in usage among the worldlings and as
his latencies are not extinct as yet, he has to practise a certain
amount of restraint. By constant employment of mindfulness and
wisdom he makes an attempt to be immune to the influence of the
worldling's grammatical structure.
There is a possibility that he would be carried away by the
implications of such concepts as earth, water, fire and air, in his
communications with the world regarding them. So he strives to
proceed towards full comprehension with the help of the higher
understanding already won, keeping mindfulness and wisdom
before him. That is the voluntary training implied here.
The monk in higher training is called attagutto, in the sense that
he tries to guard himself.4 Such phrases like mà ma¤¤i indicate
that voluntary training in guarding himself. Here we had to add
something more to the commentarial explanation. So this is the
situation with the monk in higher training.
Now as to the arahant and the Tathàgata, the world views of
both are essentially the same. That is to say, they both have a
higher knowledge as well as a full comprehension with regard to
4 A III 6, Kàmasutta; see also Dhp 379, Bhikkhuvagga.

the concept of earth, for instance. Pari¤¤àtaü tassà'ti vadàmi, ßI

say it has been comprehended by him.û
As such, they are not carried away by the implications of the
worldlings' grammatical structure. They make use of the worldly
usage much in the same way as parents do when they are speaking
in their child's language. They are not swept away by it. There is
no inner entanglement in the form of imagining. There is no
attachment, entanglement and involvement by way of craving,
conceit and view, in regard to those concepts.
All this goes to show the immense importance of the Måla-
pariyàyasutta. One can understand why this sutta came to be
counted as the first among the suttas of the Majjhima Nikàya. It is
as if this sutta was intended to serve as the alphabet in deciphering
the words used by the Buddha in his sermons delivered in discur-
sive style. As a matter of fact the Majjhima Nikàya in particular is
a text abounding in deep suttas. This way we can understand why
both higher knowledge and full comprehension are essential.
We have shown above that this discourse bears some relation to
the grammatical structure. Probably due to a lack of recognition of
this relationship between the modes of imagining and the gram-
matical structure, the commentators were confronted with a
problem while commenting upon this discourse.
Such phrases as pañhaviü ma¤¤ati and pañhaviyà ma¤¤ati occur
all over this discourse in referring to various ways of imagining.
The commentator, however, always makes it a point to interpret
these ways of imagining with reference to craving, conceit and
views. So when he comes to the phrase mà abhinandi, he finds it
to be superfluous. That is why Venerable Buddhaghosa treats it as
a repetition and poses a possible question as follows:
`Pañhaviü ma¤¤atã'ti' eteneva etasmiü atthe siddhe kasmà
evaü vuttanti ce. Avicàritaü etaü poràõehi. Ayaü pana me attano
mati, desanàvilàsato và àdãnavadassanato và.5
5 Ps I 28.
Now this is how the commentator poses his own problem:

When the phrase pañhaviü ma¤¤ati by itself fulfills the purpose,
why is it that an additional phrase like pañhaviü abhinandati is
brought in? That is to say, if the imagining already implies
craving, conceit and views, what is the justification for the
concluding phrase pañhaviü abhinandati, ßhe delights in earth,û
since craving already implies a form of delighting?
So he takes it as a repetition and seeks for a justification. He
confesses that the ancients have not handed down an explanation
and offers his own personal opinion on it, ayaü pana me attano
mati, ßbut then this is my own opinion.û
And what does his own explanation amount to? Desanàvilàsato
và àdãnavadassanato và, ßeither as a particular style in preaching,
or by way of showing the perils of the ways of imagining.û He
treats it as yet another way of preaching peculiar to the Buddha, or
else as an attempt to emphasize the perils of imagining.
However, going by the explanation we have already given
above, relating these modes of imagining to the structure of
grammar, we can come to a conclusion as to why the phrase mà
abhinandi was brought in. The reason is that each of those
concepts crystallized into a real thing as a result of imagining,
based on the framework of grammar. It received real object status
in the world of imagination. Once its object status got confirmed,
one can certainly delight in it. It became a thing in truth and fact.
The purpose of these ways of imagining is to mould it into a thing.
Let us go deeper into this problem. There is, for instance, a
certain recurrent passage in the discourses on the subject of sense
restraint.6 The gist of that passage amounts to this: A person with
defilements takes in signs and features through all the six sense
doors, inclusive of the mind. Due to that grasping at signs and
features, various kinds of influxes are said to flow in, according to
the passages outlining the practice of sense restraint. From this we
6 E.g. D I 70, Sàma¤¤aphalasutta.

can well infer that the role of ma¤¤anà, or imagining, is to grasp at

signs with regard to the objects of the mind.
That is to say, the mind apperceives its object as `something,'
dhammasa¤¤à. The word dhamma in the opening sentence of this
sutta, sabbadhammamålapariyàyaü vo, bhikkhave, desessàmi,
means a `thing,' since everything is an object of the mind in the
last analysis.
Pañhaviü ma¤¤ati, ßHe imagines earth as earth,û is suggestive
of a grasping at the sign in regard to objects of the mind. Thinking
in such terms as pañhaviyà ma¤¤ati, pañhavito ma¤¤àti, and
`pañhaviü me'ti ma¤¤ati, ßHe imagines òn the earth,' he imagines
`from the earth,' he imagines èarth is mine,'û are like the corrobo-
rative features that go to confirm that sign already grasped.
The two terms nimitta, sign, and anuvya¤jana, feature, in the
context of sense restraint have to be understood in this way. Now
the purpose of a nimitta, or sign, is to give a hazy idea like `this
may be so.' It receives confirmation with the help of corroborative
features, anuvya¤jana, all the features that are accessory to the
sign. The corroboration comes, for instance, in this manner: `This
goes well with this, this accords with this, therefore the sign I took
is right.' So even on the basis of instructions on sense restraint, we
can understand the special significance of this ma¤¤anà, or `me'-
thinking.
The reason for the occurrence of these different ways of me-
thinking can also be understood. In this discourse the Buddha is
presenting a certain philosophy of the grammatical structure. The
structure of grammar is a contrivance for conducting the world-
lings' thought process, characterised by the perception of perma-
nence, as well as for communication of ideas arising out of that
process.
The grammatical structure invests words with life, as it were.
This mode of hypostasizing is revealed in the nouns and substan-
tives implying such notions as ìn it,' `by it' and `from it.' The last
of the flexional forms, the vocative case, he pañhavi, ßhey earth,û
effectively illustrates this hypostasizing character of grammar. It is
even capable of infusing life into the concept of èarth' and

arousing it with the words ßhey earth.û
In an earlier sermon we had occasion to refer to a legend in
which a tiger was reconstituted and resurrected out of its skeletal
remains.7 The structure of grammar seems to be capable of a
similar feat. The Målapariyàyasutta gives us an illustration of this
fact.
It is because of the obsessional character of this ma¤¤anà, or
me-thinking, that the Buddha has presented this Målapariyàya-
sutta to the world as the basic pattern or paradigm representing
three types of world views, or the world views of three types of
persons.
This discourse deals with the untaught ordinary person, who is
obsessed by this grammatical structure, the disciple in higher
training, who is trying to free himself from its grip, and the
emancipated one, completely free from it, at the same time giving
their respective world views as well.
The other day we enumerated the list of twenty-four concepts,
presented in that discourse. Out of these concepts, we have to pay
special attention to the fact that Nibbàna is counted as the last,
since it happens to be the theme of all our sermons.
Regarding this concept of Nibbàna too, the worldling is gener-
ally tempted to entertain some kind of ma¤¤anà, or me-thinking.
Even some philosophers are prone to that habit. They indulge in
some sort of prolific conceptualisation and me-thinking on the
basis of such conventional usages as ìn Nibbàna,' `from
Nibbàna,' òn reaching Nibbàna' and `my Nibbàna.' By hyposta-
sizing Nibbàna they develop a substance view, even of this
concept, just as in the case of pañhavi, or earth. Let us now try to
determine whether this is justifiable.
The primary sense of the word Nibbàna is èxtinction,' or èx-
tinguishment.' We have already discussed this point with reference
7 See sermon 11.

to such contexts as Aggivacchagottasutta.8 In that discourse the

Buddha explained the term Nibbàna to the wandering ascetic
Vacchagotta with the help of a simile of the extinction of a fire.
Simply because a fire is said to go out, one should not try to trace
it, wondering where it has gone. The term Nibbàna is essentially a
verbal noun. We also came across the phrase nibbuto tveva
saïkhaü gacchati, ßit is reckoned as èxtinguished.'û9
As we have already pointed out in a previous sermon, saïkhà,
sama¤¤à and pa¤¤atti, `reckoning,' àppellation' and `designa-
tion' are more or less synonymous.10 Saïkhaü gacchati only
means ßcomes to be reckoned.û Nibbàna is therefore some sort of
reckoning, an appellation or designation. The word Nibbàna,
according to the Aggivacchagottasutta, is a designation or a
concept.
But the commentator takes much pains to prove that the
Nibbàna mentioned at the end of the list in the Målapariyàyasutta
refers not to our orthodox Nibbàna, but to a concept of Nibbàna
upheld by heretics.11 The commentator, it seems, is at pains to
salvage our Nibbàna, but his attempt is at odds with the trend of
this discourse, because the sekha, or the monk in higher training,
has no need to train himself in refraining from delighting in any
heretical Nibbàna. So here too, the reference is to our orthodox
Nibbàna.
Presumably the commentator could not understand why the
arahants do not delight in Nibbàna. For instance, in the section on
the Tathàgata one reads: Nibbànaü nàbhinandati. Taü kissa
hetu? Nandi dukkhassa målan'ti iti viditvà, bhavà jàti, bhåtassa
jaràmaraõaü. ßHe does not delight in Nibbàna. Why so? Because
8 See sermon 1.
10 See sermon 12.
11 Ps I 38.
he knows that delighting is the root of suffering, and from becom-

ing comes birth and to the one become there is decay-and-death.û
It seems, then, that the Tathàgata does not delight in Nibbàna,
because delighting is the root of suffering. Now nandi is a form of
grasping, upàdàna, impelled by craving. It is sometimes expressly
called an upàdàna: Yà vedanàsu nandi tadupàdànaü, ßWhatever
delighting there is in feeling, that is a grasping.û12 Where there is
delighting, there is a grasping. Where there is grasping, there is
bhava, becoming or existence. From becoming comes birth, and to
the one who has thus come to be there is decay-and-death.
It is true that we project the concept of Nibbàna as an objective
to aim at in our training. But if we grasp it like the concept of earth
and start indulging in me-thinkings or imaginings about it, we
would never be able to realize it. Why? Because what we have
here is an extraordinary path leading to an emancipation from all
concepts, nissàya nissàya oghassa nittharaõà, ßcrossing over the
flood with relative dependence.û13
Whatever is necessary is made use of, but there is no grasping
in terms of craving, conceits and views. That is why even with
reference to the Tathàgata the phrase Nibbànaü nàbhinandati, ßhe
does not delight in Nibbàna,û occurs in this discourse.
One might ask: `What is wrong in delighting in Nibbàna?' But
then we might recall a pithy dialogue already quoted in an earlier
sermon.14 A deity comes and accosts the Buddha: ßDo you rejoice,
recluse?û And the Buddha responds: ßOn getting what, friend?û
Then the deity asks: ßWell then, recluse, do you grieve?û And the
Buddha retorts: ßOn losing what, friend?û The deity now mildly
remarks: ßSo then, recluse, you neither rejoice nor grieve!û And
the Buddha confirms it with the assent: ßThat is so, friend.û15
12 M I 266, MahàTaõhàsaïkhayasutta.
13 M II 265, âne¤jasappàyasutta.
14 See sermon 2.
15 S I 54, Kakudhasutta.
This then is the attitude of the Buddha and the arahants to the
concept of Nibbàna. There is nothing to delight in it, only equa-
nimity is there.
Seen in this perspective, the word Nibbàna mentioned in the
Målapariyàyasutta need not be taken as referring to a concept of
Nibbàna current among heretics. The reference here is to our own
orthodox Nibbàna concept. But the attitude towards it must surely
be changed in the course of treading the path to it.
If, on the contrary, one grasps it tenaciously and takes it to be
substantial, presuming that the word is a full-fledged noun, and
goes on to argue it out on the basis of logic and proliferate on it
conceptually, it will no longer be our Nibbàna. There one slips
into wrong view. One would never be able to extricate oneself
from wrong view that way. Here then is an issue of crucial
importance.
Many philosophers start their exposition with an implicit ac-
ceptance of conditionality. But when they come to the subject of
Nibbàna, they have recourse to some kind of instrumentality. ßOn
reaching Nibbàna, lust and delight are abandoned.û16 Commenta-
tors resort to such explanations under the influence of ma¤¤anà.
They seem to imply that Nibbàna is instrumental in quenching the
fires of defilement. To say that the fires of defilements are
quenched by Nibbàna, or on arriving at it, is to get involved in a
circular argument. It is itself an outcome of papa¤ca, or conceptu-
al prolificity, and betrays an enslavement to the syntax.
When one says `the river flows,' it does not mean that there is a
river quite apart from the act of flowing. Likewise the idiom ìt
rains' should not be taken to imply that there is something that
rains. It is only a turn of speech, fulfilling a certain requirement of
the grammatical structure.
16 Vibh-a 53.
On an earlier occasion we happened to discuss some very im-

portant aspects of the Poññhapàdasutta.17 We saw how the Buddha
presented a philosophy of language, which seems so extraordinary
even to modern thinkers. This Målapariyàyasutta also brings out a
similar attitude to the linguistic medium.
Such elements of a language as nouns and verbs reflect the
worldling's mode of thinking. As in the case of a child's imagina-
tion, a noun appears as a must. So it has to rain for there to be rain.
The implicit verbal sense becomes obscured, or else it is ignored.
A periphrastic usage receives acceptance. So the rain rains, and the
river flows. A natural phenomenon becomes mystified and
hypostasized.
Anthropomorphism is a characteristic of the pre-historic man's
philosophy of life. Wherever there was an activity, he imagined
some form of life. This animistic trend of thought is evident even
in the relation between the noun and the verb. The noun has
adjectives as attributes and the verb has adverbs to go with it.
Particles fall in between, and there we have what is called gram-
mar. If one imagines that the grammar of language must necessari-
ly conform to the grammar of nature, one falls into a grievous
error.
Now the commentators also seem to have fallen into such an
error in their elaborate exegesis on Nibbàna, due to a lack of
understanding of this philosophy of language. That is why the
Målapariyàyasutta now finds itself relegated, though it is at the
head of the suttas of the Majjhima Nikàya.
It is in the nature of concepts that nouns are invested with a
certain amount of permanence. Even a verbal noun, once it is
formed, gets a degree of permanence more or less superimposed
on it. When one says `the river flows,' one somehow tends to
forget the flowing nature of the so-called river. This is the result of
the perception of permanence.
17 See sermon 12.

As a matter of fact, perception as such carries with it the notion

of permanence, as we mentioned in an earlier sermon.18 To
perceive is to grasp a sign. One can grasp a sign only where one
imagines some degree of permanence.
The purpose of perception is not only to recognize for oneself,
but also to make it known to others. The Buddha has pointed out
that there is a very close relationship between recognition and
communication. This fact is expressly stated by the Buddha in the
following quotation from the Sixes of the Aïguttara Nikàya:
Vohàravepakkaü ahaü, bhikkhave, sa¤¤aü vadàmi. Yathà
yathà naü sa¤jànàti, tathà tathà voharati, evaü sa¤¤ã ahosin'ti.
ßMonks, I say that perception has linguistic usage as its result. In
whatever way one perceives, so one speaks out about it, saying: Ì
was of such a perception.'û19
The word vepakka is a derivative from the word vipàka, which
in the context of kamma, or ethically significant action, generally
means the result of that action. In this context, however, its
primary sense is evident, that is, as some sort of a ripening. In
other words, what this quotation implies is that perception ripens
or matures into verbal usage or convention.
So here we see the connection between sa¤¤à, perception, and
saïkhà, reckoning. This throws more light on our earlier explana-
tion of the last line of a verse in the Kalahavivàdasutta, namely
sa¤¤ànidànà hi papa¤casaïkhà, ßfor reckonings born of prolifici-
ty have perception as their source.û20
So now we are in a better position to appreciate the statement
that linguistic usages, reckonings and designations are the outcome
of perception. All this goes to show that an insight into the
philosophy of language is essential for a proper understanding of
this Dhamma. This is the moral behind the Målapariyàyasutta.
18 See sermons 9 and 12.

19 A III 413, Nibbedhikasutta.
20 Sn 874, Kalahavivàdasutta; see sermon 11.
Beings are usually dominated by these reckonings, appellations

and designations, because the perception of permanence is
inherent in them. It is extremely difficult for one to escape it. Once
the set of such terms as milk, curd and butter comes into vogue,
the relation between them becomes an insoluble problem even for
the great philosophers.
Since we have been talking about the concept of Nibbàna so
much, one might ask: `So then, Nibbàna is not an absolute,
paramattha?' It is not a paramattha in the sense of an absolute. It
is a paramattha only in the sense that it is the highest good,
parama attha. This is the sense in which the word was used in the
discourses,21 though it has different connotations now. As exem-
plified by such quotations as àraddhaviriyo paramatthapattiyà,22
ßwith steadfast energy for the attainment of the highest good,û the
suttas speak of Nibbàna as the highest good to be attained.
In later Buddhist thought, however, the word paramattha came
to acquire absolutist connotations, due to which some important
discourses of the Buddha on the question of worldly appellations,
worldly expressions and worldly designations fell into disuse. This
led to an attitude of dwelling in the scaffolding, improvised just
for the purpose of constructing a building.
As a postscript to our exposition of the Målapariyàyasutta we
may add the following important note: This particular discourse is
distinguished from all other discourses in respect of one significant
feature. That is, the concluding statement to the effect that the
monks who listened to the sermon were not pleased by it.
Generally we find at the end of a discourse a more or less
thematic sentence like attamanà te bhikkhå Bhagavato bhàsitaü
abhinanduü, ßthose monks were pleased and they rejoiced in the
words of the Exalted One.û23 But in this sutta we find the peculiar
21 E.g. at S 219, Munisutta; and Th 748, TelakàniTheragàthà.

22 Sn 68, Khaggavisàõasutta.
23 E.g. at M I 12, Sabbàsavasutta.
ending idaü avoca Bhagavà, na te bhikkhå Bhagavato bhàsitaü

abhinanduü, ßthe Exalted One said this, but those monks did not
rejoice in the words of the Exalted One.û24
Commentators seem to have interpreted this attitude as an index
to the abstruseness of the discourse.25 This is probably why this
discourse came to be neglected in the course of time. But on the
basis of the exposition we have attempted, we might advance a
different interpretation of the attitude of those monks. The declara-
tion that none of the concepts, including that of Nibbàna, should
be egoistically imagined, could have caused displeasure in monks,
then as now. So much, then, for the Målapariyàyasutta.
The Buddha has pointed out that this ma¤¤anà, or egoistic
imagining, or me-thinking, is an extremely subtle bond of Màra. A
discourse which highlights this fact comes in the Saüyutta Nikàya
under the title Yavakalàpisutta.26 In this discourse the Buddha
brings out this fact with the help of a parable. It concerns the battle
between gods and demons, which is a theme that comes up quite
often in the discourses.
In a war between gods and demons, the gods are victorious and
the demons are defeated. The gods bind Vepacitti, the king of the
demons, in a fivefold bondage, that is, hands and feet and neck,
and bring him before Sakka, the king of the gods.
This bondage has a strange mechanism about it. When Vepacitti
thinks `gods are righteous, demons are unrighteous, I will go to the
deva world,' he immediately finds himself free from that bondage
and capable of enjoying the heavenly pleasures of the five senses.
But as soon as he slips into the thought `gods are unrighteous,
demons are righteous, I will go back to the asura world,' he finds
himself divested of the heavenly pleasures and bound again by the
fivefold bonds.
25 Ps I 56.
26 S IV 201, Yavakalàpisutta.
After introducing this parable, the Buddha comes out with a

deep disquisition of Dhamma for which it serves as a simile:
Evaü sukhumaü kho, bhikkhave, Vepacittibandhanaü.

Tato sukhumataraü Màrabandhanaü. Ma¤¤amàno kho,
bhikkhave, baddho Màrassa, ama¤¤amàno mutto pàpima-
to. Asmã'ti, bhikkhave, ma¤¤itaü etaü, àyaü ahaü as-
mã'ti ma¤¤itaü etaü, `bhavissan'ti ma¤¤itaü etaü, `na
bhavissan'ti ma¤¤itaü etaü, `råpã bhavissan'ti ma¤¤itaü
etaü, àråpã bhavissan'ti ma¤¤itaü etaü, `sa¤¤ã bhavis-
san'ti ma¤¤itaü etaü, àsa¤¤ã bhavissan`ti ma¤¤itaü
etaü, `nevasa¤¤ãnàsa¤¤ã bhavissan'ti ma¤¤itaü etaü.
Ma¤¤itaü, bhikkhave, rogo, ma¤¤itaü gaõóo, ma¤¤itaü
sallaü. Tasmàtiha, bhikkhave, àma¤¤amànena cetasà
viharissàmà'ti eva¤hi vo, bhikkhave, sikkhitabbaü.
ßSo subtle, monks, is the bondage of Vepacitti. But more

subtle still is the bondage of Màra. Imagining, monks, one
is bound by Màra, not imagining one is freed from the
Evil One. Àm,' monks, is an imagining, `this am I' is an
imagining, Ì shall be' is an imagining, Ì shall not be' is
an imagining, Ì shall be one with form' is an imagining, Ì
shall be formless' is an imagining, Ì shall be percipient' is
an imagining, Ì shall be non-percipient' is an imagining,
Ì shall be neither-percipient-nor-non-percipient' is an im-
agining. Imagining, monks, is a disease, imagining is an
abscess, imagining is a barb, therefore, monks, should you
tell yourselves: `We shall dwell with a mind free from im-
aginings, thus should you train yourselves.'û
First of all, let us try to get at the meaning of this exhortation. The
opening sentence is an allusion to the simile given above. It says
that the bondage in which Vepacitti finds himself is of a subtle
nature, that is to say, it is a bondage connected with his thoughts.
Its very mechanism is dependent on his thoughts.
But then the Buddha declares that the bondage of Màra is even
subtler. And what is this bondage of Màra? ßImagining, monks,
one is bound by Màra, not imagining one is freed from that Evil
One.û Then comes a list of nine different ways of imaginings.
In the same discourse the Buddha goes on to qualify each of
these imaginings with four significant terms, namely i¤jitaü,
agitation, phanditaü, palpitation, papa¤citaü, proliferation, and
mànagataü, conceit.
I¤jitaü is an indication that these forms of imaginings are the
outcome of craving, since ejà is a synonym for taõhà, or craving.
Phanditaü is an allusion to the fickleness of the mind, as for
instance conveyed by the first line of a verse in the Dhammapada,
phandanaü capalaü cittaü, ßthe mind, palpitating and fickle.û27
The fickle nature of the mind brings out those imaginings.
They are also the products of proliferation, papa¤cita. We have
already discussed the meaning of the term papa¤ca.28 We hap-
pened to point out that it is a sort of straying away from the proper
path.
Mànagataü is suggestive of a measuring. Asmi, or àm,' is the
most elementary standard of measurement. It is the peg from
which all measurements take their direction. As we pointed out in
an earlier sermon, the grammatical structure of language is based
on this peg àm.'29
In connection with the three persons, first person, second person
and third person, we happened to mention that as soon as one
grants Ì am,' a `here' is born. It is only after a `here' is born, that
a `there' and a `yonder' come to be. The first person gives rise to
the second and the third person, to complete the basic framework
for grammar.
27 Dhp 33, Cittavagga.

29 See sermon 10.
So asmi, or àm,' is itself a product of proliferation. In fact, the

deviation from the proper path, implied by the proliferation in
papa¤ca, is a result of these multifarious imaginings.
It is in the nature of these imaginings that as soon as an imagin-
ing or a me-thinking occurs, a thing is born as a matter of course.
And with the birth of a thing as `something,' impermanence takes
over. That is to say, it comes under the sway of impermanence.
This is a very strange phenomenon. It is only after becoming a
`something' that it can become ànother thing.' A¤¤athàbhàva, or
otherwiseness, implies a change from one state to another. A
change of state already presupposes some state or other, and that is
what is called a `thing.'
Now where does a `thing' arise? It arises in the mind. As soon
as something gets hold of the mind, that thing gets infected with
the germ of impermanence.
The modes of imagining listed above reveal a double bind.
There is no freedom either way. Whether one imagines Ì shall be
with form' or Ì shall be formless,' one is in a dichotomy. It is the
same with the two ways of imagining Ì shall be percipient,' Ì
shall be non-percipient.'
We had occasion to refer to this kind of dichotomy while ex-
plaining the significance of quite a number of discourses. The root
of all this duality is the thought àm.'
The following two verses from the Dvayatànupassanàsutta
throw light on some subtle aspects of ma¤¤anà, or imagining:
Yena yena hi ma¤¤anti,

tato taü hoti a¤¤athà,
taü hi tassa musà hoti,
mosadhammaü hi ittaraü.
Amosadhammaü Nibbànaü,
tad ariyà saccato vidå,
te ve saccàbhisamayà,
nicchàtà parinibbutà.
ßIn whatever way they imagine,

Thereby it turns otherwise,
That itself is the falsity
Of this puerile deceptive thing.
ßNibbàna is unfalsifying in its nature,

That they understood as the truth,
And indeed by the higher understanding of that truth
They have become hungerless and fully appeased.û30
The first verse makes it clear that imagining is at the root of

a¤¤athàbhàva, or otherwiseness, in so far as it creates a thing out
of nothing. As soon as a thing is conceived in the mind by imagin-
ing, the germ of otherwiseness or change enters into it at its very
conception.
So a thing is born only to become another thing, due to the
otherwiseness in nature. To grasp a thing tenaciously is to exist
with it, and birth, decay and death are the inexorable vicissitudes
that go with it.
The second verse says that Nibbàna is known as the truth, be-
cause it is of an unfalsifying nature. Those who have understood it
are free from the hunger of craving. The word parinibbuta in this
context does not mean that those who have realized the truth have
passed away. It only conveys the idea of full appeasement or a
quenching of that hunger.
Why is Nibbàna regarded as unfalsifying? Because there is no
`thing' in it. It is so long as there is a thing that all the distress and
misery follow. Nibbàna is called animitta, or the signless, precise-
ly because there is no-thing in it.
Because it is signless, it is unestablished, appaõihita. Only
where there is an establishment can there be a dislodgement. Since
it is not liable to dislodgement or disintegration, it is unshakeable.
30 Sn 757-758, Dvayatànupassanàsutta.
It is called akuppà cetovimutti, unshakeable deliverance of the

mind,31 because of its unshaken and stable nature. Due to the
absence of craving there is no directional aspiration, or paõidhi.
Similarly su¤¤ata, or voidness, is a term implying that there is
no essence in Nibbàna in the substantial sense in which the
worldlings use that term. As mentioned in the MahàSàropama-
sutta, deliverance itself is the essence.32 Apart from that, there is
nothing essential or substantial in Nibbàna. In short, there is no
thing to become otherwise in Nibbàna.
On an earlier occasion, too, we had to mention the fact that
there is quite a lot of confusion in this concern.33 Saïkhata, the
compounded, is supposed to be a thing. And asaïkhata, or the
uncompounded, is also a thing. The compounded is an imperma-
nent thing, while the uncompounded is a permanent thing. The
compounded is fraught with suffering, and the uncompounded is
blissful. The compounded is not self, but the uncompounded
is . . . . At this point the line of argument breaks off.
Some of those who attempt this kind of explanation find them-
selves in a quandary due to their lack of understanding of the
issues involved. The two verses quoted above are therefore highly
significant.
Because of ma¤¤anà, worldlings tend to grasp, hold on and
adhere to mind-objects. The Buddha has presented these concepts
just for the purpose of crossing over the flood, desità nissàya
nissàya oghassa nittharaõà, ßThe process of crossing over the
flood with relative dependence has been preached.û34 All the
dhammas that have been preached are for a practical purpose,
based on an understanding of their relative value, and not for
31 E.g. at D III 273, Dasuttarasutta.

33 See sermon 2.
34 M II 265, âne¤jasappàyasutta.
grasping tenaciously, as illustrated by such discourses like the

Rathavinãtasutta and the Alagaddåpamasutta.35
Let alone other concepts, not even Nibbàna as a concept is to be
grasped. To grasp the concept of Nibbàna is to slip into an error.
So from the couplet quoted above we clearly understand how
subtle this ma¤¤anà is and why it is called an extremely subtle
bondage of Màra.
It might be recalled that while discussing the significance of the
Brahmanimantanikasutta we mentioned that the non-manifestative
consciousness described in that discourse does not partake of the
earthiness of earth.36 That is to say, it is not under the sway of the
earth-quality of earth.
In fact as many as thirteen out of the twenty-four concepts men-
tioned in the Målapariyàyasutta come up again in the Brahmani-
mantanikasutta. The implication therefore is that the non-
manifestative consciousness is not subject to the influence of any
of those concepts. It does not take any of those concepts as
substantial or essential, and that is why it is beyond their power.
For the same reason it is called the non-manifestative con-
sciousness. Consciousness as a rule takes hold of some object or
other. This consciousness, however, is called non-manifestative in
the sense that it is devoid of the nature of grasping any such
object. It finds no object worthy of grasping.
What we have discussed so far could perhaps be better appreci-
ated in the light of another important sutta in the Majjhima
Nikàya, namely the Cåëataõhàsaïkhayasutta. A key to the moral
behind this discourse is to be found in the following dictum
occurring in it: sabbe dhammà nàlaü abhinivesàya, ßnothing is
worth entering into dogmatically.û37
35 M I 145, Rathavinãtasutta; M I 130, Alagaddåpamasutta.

36 See sermon 8; M I 329, Brahmanimantanikasutta.
37 M I 251, CåëaTaõhàsaïkhayasutta.
The word abhinivesa, suggestive of dogmatic adherence, literal-

ly means ßentering into.û Now based on this idea we can bring in a
relevant metaphor.
We happened to mention earlier that as far as concepts are con-
cerned, the arahants have no dogmatic adherence. Let us take, for
instance, the concept of à house.' Arahants also enter a house, but
they do not enter into the concept of à house.' This statement
might appear rather odd, but what we mean is that one can enter a
house without entering into the concept of à house.'
Now leaving this as something of a riddle, let us try to analyse a
certain fairytale-like episode in the Cåëataõhàsaïkhayasutta,
somewhat as an interlude.
The main theme of the Cåëataõhàsaïkhayasutta is as follows:
Once Sakka, the king of the gods, came to see the Buddha when he
was staying at Pubbàràma and asked the question: `How does a
monk attain deliverance by the complete destruction of craving?'
The quintessence of the Buddha's brief reply to that question is the
above mentioned dictum, sabbe dhammà nàlaü abhinivesàya,
ßnothing is worth entering into dogmatically.û
Sakka rejoiced in this sermon approvingly and left. Venerable
MahàMoggallàna, who was seated near the Buddha at that time,
had the inquisitive thought: `Did Sakka rejoice in this sermon
having understood it, or did he rejoice without understanding it?'
Being curious to find this out he vanished from Pubbàràma and
appeared in the Tàvatiüsa heaven as quickly as a strong man
might stretch out his bent arm and bend back his outstretched arm.
At that time Sakka was enjoying heavenly music. On seeing
Venerable MahàMoggallàna coming at a distance he stopped
the music and welcomed the latter, saying: `Come good sir
Moggallàna, welcome good sir Moggallàna! It is a long time, good
sir Moggallàna, since you found an opportunity to come here.'
He offered a high seat to Venerable MahàMoggallàna and took
a low seat at one side. Then Venerable MahàMoggallàna asked
Sakka what sort of a sermon the Buddha had preached to him on
his recent visit, saying that he himself is curious on listening to it.
Sakka's reply was: `Good sir Moggallàna, we are so busy, we

have so much to do, not only with our own business, but also with
the business of other gods of Tàvatiüsa. So it is not easy for us to
remember such Dhamma discussions.' Then Sakka goes on to
relate some other episode, which to him seems more important:
Àfter winning the war against the asuras, I had the Vejayanti
palace built. Would you like to see it, good sir Moggallàna?'
Probably as a part of etiquette, binding on a visitor, Venerable
MahàMoggallàna agreed and Sakka conducted him around the
Vejayanti palace in the company of his friend, king Vessavaõa. It
was a wonderful palace with hundreds of towers. Sakka's maids,
seeing Venerable MahàMoggallàna coming in the distance, were
embarrassed out of modest respect and went into their rooms.
Sakka was taking Venerable MahàMoggallàna around, saying:
`See, good sir, how lovely this palace is.'
Venerable MahàMoggallàna also courteously responded, saying
that it is a fitting gift for his past merit. But then he thought of
arousing a sense of urgency in Sakka, seeing: how negligent he
has become now. And what did he do? He shook the Vejayanti
palace with the point of his toe, using his supernormal power.
Since Sakka had èntered into' the Vejayanti palace with his
craving, conceit and views, he also was thoroughly shaken, along
with the palace. That is to say, a sense of urgency was aroused in
him, so much so that he remembered the sermon the Buddha had
preached to him.
It was then that Venerable MahàMoggallàna asked Sakka point-
edly: `How did the Exalted One state to you in brief the deliver-
ance through the destruction of craving?' Sakka came out with the
full account, creditably.
So after all it seems that the Venerable MahàMoggallàna took
all this trouble to drive home into Sakka the moral of the sermon
sabbe dhammà nàlaü abhinivesàya, ßnothing is worth clinging
onto.û
If one goes through this discourse ignoring the deeper aspects of
it, it appears merely as a fairytale. Even as those heavenly maidens
entered their rooms, Sakka also had entered into this Vejayanti
palace of his own creation, while showing his distinguished visitor

around, like a rich man these days after building his mansion.
So from this we can see the nature of these worldly concepts.
For instance, in the case of the concept of à house,' entering the
house physically does not necessarily mean that one is ìn it.' Only
if one has entered into the concept of a house is he ìn it.'
Let us take a simply analogy. Little children sometimes build a
little hut, out of fun, with a few sticks and shady leaves. They
might even invite their mother for the house-warming. When the
mother creeps into the improvised hut, she does not seriously
entertain the concept of à house' in it, as the children would do.
It is the same in the case of Buddhas and arahants. To the
Emancipated Ones, who have fully understood and comprehended
the true meaning of concepts like `house,' `mansion' and `palace,'
the sand castles of adults appear no better than the playthings of
little children. We have to grant it, therefore, that Tathàgatas, or
Such-like Ones, cannot help making use of concepts in worldly
usage.
As a matter of fact, once a certain deity even raised the question
whether the emancipated arahant monks, when they use such
expressions as Ì speak' and `they speak to me,' do so out of
conceit. The Buddha's reply was:
Yo hoti bhikkhu arahaü katàvã,

khãõàsavo antimadehadhàrã,
àhaü vadàmã'ti pi so vadeyya,
`mamaü vadantã`ti pi so vadeyya
loke sama¤¤aü kusalo viditvà,
vohàramattena so vohareyyà.
ßThat monk, who is an arahant, who has finished his

task,
Whose influxes are extinct and who bears his final
body,
Might still say Ì speak,'
He might also say `they speak to me,'
Being skilful, knowing the world's parlance,

He uses such terms merely as a convention.û38
In the case of an arahant, who has accomplished his task and is

influx-free, a concept like `house,' `mansion,' or `palace' has no
influence by way of craving, conceit and views. He might say Ì
speak' or Ì preach,' he might even say `they speak to me,' but
since he has understood the nature of worldly parlance, he uses
such expressions as mere turns of speech. Therefore the Buddhas
and arahants, though they may enter a house, do not entertain the
concept of à house' in it.
Some might think that in order to destroy the concept of à
house,' one has to break up the tiles and bricks into atoms. But that
is not the way to deliverance. One has to understand according to
the law of dependent arising that not only is a house dependent on
tiles and bricks, but the tiles and bricks are themselves dependent
on a house. Very often philosophers forget about the principle of
relativity involved here.
Tiles and bricks are dependent on a house. This is a point worth
considering. One might think that a house is made up of tiles and
bricks, but tiles and bricks themselves come to be because of a
house. There is a mutual relationship between them.
If one raises the question: `What is a tile?,' the answer will be:
Ìt is an item used for building the roof of a house.' Likewise a
brick is an item used in building a wall. This shows the relativity
between a house and a tile as well as between a house and a brick.
So there is no need to get down to an atomistic analysis like
nuclear physicists. Wisdom is something that enables one to see
this relativity penetratively, then and there.
Today we happened to discuss some deep sections of the
Dhamma, particularly on the subject of ma¤¤anà. A reappraisal of
some of the deep suttas preached by the Buddha, now relegated
38 S I 14, Arahantasutta.
into the background as those dealing with conventional truth, will

be greatly helpful in dispelling the obsessions created by
ma¤¤anà. What the Målapariyàyasutta offers in this respect is of
utmost importance.
In fact, the Buddha never used a language totally different from
the language of the worldlings. Now, for instance, chemists make
use of a certain system of symbolic formulas in their laboratories,
but back at home they revert to another set of symbols. However,
both are symbols. There is no need to discriminate between them
as higher or lower, so long as they serve the purpose at hand.
Therefore it is not proper to relegate some sermons as discur-
sive or conventional in style. Always it is a case of using concepts
in worldly parlance. In the laboratory one uses a particular set of
symbols, but on returning home he uses another. In the same way,
it is not possible to earmark a particular bundle of concepts as
absolute and unchangeable.
As stated in the Poññhapàdasutta, already discussed, all these
concepts are worldly appellations, worldly expressions, worldly
usages, worldly designations, which the Tathàgata makes use of
without tenacious grasping.39 However philosophical or technical
the terminology may be, the arahants make use of it without
grasping it tenaciously.
What is of importance is the function it fulfills. We should
make use of the conceptual scaffolding only for the purpose of
putting up the building. As the building comes up, the scaffolding
has to leave. It has to be dismantled. If one simply clings onto the
scaffolding, the building would never come up.
Nibbàna Sermon 14
Etaü santaü, etaü paõãtaü, yadidaü sabbasaïkhàra-samatho



This is the fourteenth sermon in the series of sermons on
Nibbàna. In our last sermon we gave a description of the forms of
imaginings or methinkings, which the Buddha had compared to an
extremely subtle bondage of Màra. The Yavakalàpisutta of the
Saëàyatanasaüyutta in the Saüyutta Nikàya has shown us that all
kinds of thoughts concerning existence that stem from this subtle
conceit àm,' asmimàna, are mere imaginings or methinkings, and
that they are called a bondage of Màra, because they have the
power to keep beings shackled to existence.2
We have seen how they follow a dichotomy, even like the di-
lemma posed by the fivefold bondage of Vepacitti, the king of
2 S IV 201, Yavakalàpisutta.
363
demons. Whether one thinks Ì shall be' or Ì shall not be,' one is
in bondage to Màra. Whether one thinks Ì shall be percipient' or
Ì shall be non-percipient,' or Ì shall be neither-percipient-nor-
non-percipient,' one is still in bondage to Màra.
There is a dichotomy involved here. The fact that these imagin-
ings, which follow a dichotomy, must be transcended completely,
as well as the way to transcend them, has been preached by the
Buddha to Venerable Pukkusàti in the Dhàtuvibhaïgasutta of the
Majjhima Nikàya.
There is a pithy passage, forming the grand finale of this dis-
course, in which the Buddha gives a resume. We propose to quote
this passage at the very outset as it scintillates with a majestic
fervour of the Dhamma:
Yatthaññhitaü ma¤¤ussavà nappavattanti, ma¤¤ussave kho

pana nappavattamàne muni santo ti vuccatãti, iti kho
pan'etaü vuttaü. Ki¤ cètaü pañicca vuttaü?
Asmãti bhikkhu ma¤¤itam etaü, ayam aham asmãti

ma¤¤itam etaü, bhavissan'ti ma¤¤itam etaü, na bhavis-
san'ti ma¤¤itam etaü, råpã bhavissan'ti ma¤¤itam etaü,
aråpã bhavissan'ti ma¤¤itam etaü, sa¤¤ã bhavissan'ti
ma¤¤itam etaü, asa¤¤ã bhavissan'ti ma¤¤itam etaü, ne-
vasa¤¤ãnàsa¤¤ã bhavissan'ti ma¤¤itam etaü.
Ma¤¤itaü, bhikkhu, rogo, ma¤¤itaü gaõóo, ma¤¤itaü

sallaü. Sabbama¤¤itànaü tveva, bhikkhu, samatikkamà
muni santo ti vuccati.
Muni kho pana, bhikkhu, santo na jàyati na jiyyati na miy-

yati na kuppati na piheti. Tam pi'ssa bhikkhu natthi yena
jàyetha, ajàyamàno kiü jiyyissati, ajiyyamàno kiü miyyis-
sati, amiyyamàno kiü kuppissati, akuppamàno kissa
pihessati?
Yatthaññhitaü ma¤¤ussavà nappavattanti, ma¤¤ussave kho

pana nappavattamàne muni santo ti vuccatãti, iti yaü taü
vuttaü, idam etaü pañicca vuttaü.3
In the Dhàtuvibhaïgasutta we find the Buddha presenting some

points as the theme and gradually developing it, analysing,
clarifying, and expatiating, as the discourse proceeds. The opening
sentence in the above paragraph is a quotation of a part of that
original statement of the Buddha, which forms the theme. Here is
the rendering:
ß`Steadied whereon the tides of imaginings no longer oc-

cur in him, and when the tides of imaginings occur no
more in him, he is called a sage stilled,' so it was said.
And with reference to what was this said?
ßÀm,' monk, is something imagined; Ì am this' is some-

thing imagined; Ì shall be' is something imagined; Ì shall
not be' is something imagined; Ì shall be possessed of
form' is something imagined; Ì shall be formless' is
something imagined; Ì shall be percipient' is something
imagined; Ì shall be non-percipient' is something imag-
ined; Ì shall be neither-percipient-nor-non-percipient' is
something imagined.
ßThe imagined is a disease, the imagined is an abscess, the

imagined is a dart. It is with the surmounting of all what is
imagined, monk, that a sage is called `stilled.'
ßThe sage who is stilled is not born, nor does he age, nor
does he die, nor is he shaken, and he has no longing. Even
that is not in him whereby he might be born. Not being

born, how shall he age? Not aging, how shall he die? Not
dying, how shall he be shaken? Being unshaken, what
shall he long for?
ßSo it was with reference to this, that it was said `steadied

whereon the tides of imaginings no longer occur in him,
and when the tides of imagining occur no more in him, he
is called a sage stilled.'û
All this goes to show how relevant the question of imaginings is to

the path leading to Nibbàna. This pithy passage, which brings the
discourse to a climax, portrays how the sage is at peace when his
mind is released by stemming the tides of imaginings. He attains
release from birth, decay and death, here and now, because he has
realized the cessation of existence in this very world.
It is in this light that we have to interpret the above statement
ßeven that is not in him whereby he might be born.û Dependent on
existence is birth. Due to whatever postulate of existence one can
speak of a `birth,' even that existence is not in him. Not being
born, how can he age? How can he grow old or decay? This is
because of the implicit interrelation between conditions.
Here we can flash back to our analogy of a tree, mentioned
earlier.4 In order to explain the mutual interrelation between the
concepts of birth, decay and death, we brought up a simile, which
however is not canonical. That is to say, supposing there is some
kind of a tree, the buds, the leaves, the flowers, the fruits and the
wood of which could be sold for making one's livelihood.
If five men trading in those items respectively are made to line
up at some particular stage in the growth of this tree and asked
whether the tree is too young or too old, the answers given might
differ according to the individual standpoint grasped in each case.
4 See sermon 4.
It turns out to be a difference of viewpoint. For instance, the

man who makes his living by selling the buds would reply that the
tree is too old when the buds turn into leaves. Similarly, when it is
the season for the leaves to fall and the flowers to bloom, one who
trades in leaves might say that the tree is too old. And when
flowers turn into fruits, the florist's viewpoint would be similar. In
this way one can understand how this concept changes according
to what one grasps Ý that there is an implicit relativity about it.
Now, as for this sage, he has given up everything that he had
grasped. Grasping has been given up completely. Imagining, too,
has been abandoned. Hence, not being `born,' how shall he age?
The sage has no postulate of existence. Since there is no existence,
there is no `birth.' Because there is no birth, there is no decay.
It is a well known fact that the term jarà implies both growth
and decay. It is after setting a limit that we speak of a process of
`decay,' after `growth.' This limit, however, varies according to
our individual standpoint grasped Ý according to our point of view.
That is what we have tried to illustrate by this analogy.
Then we have the statement ßnot aging, how shall he die?û
Since decay is an approach to death, where there is no decay, there
is no death. The fact that there is no death we have already seen in
our exposition of the significance of the verses quoted above from
the Adhimutta Theragàthà.5 When the bandits got round to kill the
Venerable Adhimutta, he declared:
Na me hoti ahosin'ti,
bhavissan'ti na hoti me,
saïkhàrà vibhavissanti,
tattha kà paridevanà?6
5 See sermon 8.
ßIt does not occur to me Ì was,'

Nor does it occur to me Ì shall be,'
Mere preparations will get destroyed,
What is there to lament?û
This declaration exemplifies the above statement. When all

graspings are given up, there is no `decay' or `death.'
Amiyyamàno kiü kuppissati, ßnot dying, how shall he be shak-
en?û The verb kuppati does not necessarily mean ßgetting an-
noyed.û Here it means to be ßshaken upû or ßmoved.û When one
holds on to a standpoint, one gets shaken up if someone else tries
to dislodge him from that standpoint.
The deliverance in Nibbàna is called akuppà cetovimutti, the
unshakeable deliverance of the mind.7 All other deliverances of the
mind, known to the world, are shakeable, kuppa. They are un-
steady. They shake before the pain of death. Only Nibbàna is
called akuppà cetovimutti, the unshakeable deliverance of the
mind.
So this peaceful sage, the arahant, established in that concentra-
tion of the fruit of arahant-hood, arahatta phalasamàdhi, which is
known as the influx-free deliverance of the mind, anàsavà
cetovimutti, and is endowed with the wisdom proper to arahant-
hood, pa¤¤àvimutti, ßdeliverance through wisdom,û is unshaken
before death. His mind remains unshaken. That is why the arahant
Thera Venerable Adhimutta fearlessly made the above declaration
to the bandits.
Now as to the significance of the Buddha's statement amiy-
yamàno kiü kuppissati, akuppamàno kissa pihessati, ßnot dying,
how shall he be shaken, and being unshaken, what shall he long
for?û When there is no shock, no agitation or trembling, what does
one long for? Pihà means longing, desiring for something or other.
7 E.g. at D III 273, Dasuttarasutta.

In this context it refers to that longing which arises at the moment

of death in one who has not destroyed craving.
It is as a consequence of that longing that he enters some form
of existence, according to his kamma. That longing is not there in
this sage, for the simple reason that he is unshaken before death.
He has nothing to look forward to. No desires or longings. Akup-
pamàno kissa pihessati, ßbeing unshaken, what shall he long for?û
It is obvious, therefore, that the concepts of birth, decay and
death become meaningless to this sage. That is precisely why he is
at peace, having transcended all imaginings.
All this goes to show, that Nibbàna is a state beyond decay
and death. We can clearly understand from this discourse why
Nibbàna is known as a decayless, deathless state, realizable in this
very world. That sage has conquered decay and death here and
now, because he has realized the cessation of existence, here and
now.
This is something extremely wonderful about the arahant. He
realizes the cessation of existence in his attainment to the fruit of
arahant-hood. How does he come to realize the cessation of
existence? Craving is extinct in him, hence there is no grasping.
Where there is no grasping, there is no existence. Because there is
no existence, birth, decay and death, along with sorrow and
lamentation, cease altogether.
From the foregoing we could well infer that all those concepts
like birth, decay, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and
despair, come about as a result of a heap of pervert perceptions,
pervert thoughts and pervert views, based on the conceit of an
existence, the conceit àm.'
These three kinds of perversions known as sa¤¤àvipallàsa,
cittavipallàsa and diññhivipallàsa give rise to a mass of concepts of
an imaginary nature.8 The entire mass of suffering, summed up by
8 The vipallàsas occur at A II 52, Vipallàsasutta.

the terms birth, decay, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and
despair, are basically of a mental origin.
For an illustration of this fact, we can go back to our analogy of
winding some strands into a rope, mentioned earlier.9 We pointed
out that in the case of some strands that are being mistakenly
wound in the same direction, it is the grasp in the middle that gives
at least a semblance of a rope to it. So long as there is no such
grasping, the strands do not become knotty or tense, as they go
round and round. It is only when someone grasps it in the middle
that the strands begin to get winded up, knotty and tense. What is
called existence, or becoming, bhava, follows the same norm.
True to the law of impermanence, everything in the world
changes. But there is something innocent in this change. Imperma-
nence is innocuous in itself. We say it is innocuous because it
means no harm to anyone. It is simply the nature of this world, the
suchness, the norm. It can do us harm only when we grasp, just as
in the case of that quasi-rope.
The tenseness between winding and unwinding, arising out of
that grasp in the middle, is comparable to what is called
bhavasaïkhàra, ßpreparations for existence.û Saïkhàrà, or
preparations, are said to be dependent on avijjà, or ignorance.
Now we can form an idea of the relationship between these two
even from this analogy of the rope. The grasp in the middle creates
two ends, giving rise to a dilemma. In the case of existence, too,
grasping leads to an antinomian conflict. To become a thing, is to
disintegrate into another thing.
On a previous occasion we happened to discuss the significance
of the term ma¤¤anà, me-thinking or imagining, with reference to
the verse yena yena hi ma¤¤ati, tato taü hoti a¤¤athà.10 Ma¤¤anà
itself gives rise to a `thing,' which from its very inception goes on
disintegrating into another thing.
9 See sermon 8.
10 See sermon 2; Ud 32, Lokasutta.
Just as much as grasping leads to the concept of two ends, to

become a thing is to start changing into another thing, that is, it
comes under the sway of the law of impermanence. illustrations of
this norm are sometimes to be met with in the discourses, but their
significance is often ignored.
The idea of the two ends and the middle sometimes finds ex-
pression in references to an àbove,' `below' and àcross in the
middle,' uddhaü, adho, tiriyaü majjjhe; or in the terms `before,'
`behind' and `middle,' pure, pacchà, majjhe. Such references deal
with some deep aspects of the Dhamma, relating to Nibbàna.
As a good illustration, we may take up the following two verses
from the Mettagåmàõavapucchà in the Pàràyanavagga of the
Sutta Nipàta:
Yaü ki¤ci sampajànàsi,

uddhaü adho tiriyaü càpi majjhe,
etesu nandi¤ca nivesana¤ca
panujja vi¤¤àõaü bhave na tiññhe.
Evaü vihàrã sato appamatto,

bhikkhu caraü hitvà mamàyitàni,
jàtijaraü sokapariddava¤ca
idh'eva vidvà pajaheyya dukkhaü.11
ßWhatever you may know to be

Above, below and across in the middle,
Dispel the delight and the tendency to dwell in them,
Then your consciousness will not remain in existence.
A monk, endowed with understanding,

Thus dwelling mindful and heedful,
As he fares along giving up all possessions,
11 Sn 1055-1056, Mettagåmàõavapucchà.
Would abandon even here and now

Birth, decay, sorrow, lamentation and suffering.û
The word idh'eva occurring in the second verse is highly signifi-

cant, in that it means the abandonment of all those things here and
now, not leaving it for an existence to come.
In the MahàViyåhasutta of the Sutta Nipàta also a similar em-
phasis is laid on this idea of `here and now.' About the arahant it
is said that he has no death or birth here and now Ý cutåpapàto
idha yassa natthi, ßto whom, even here, there is no death or
birth.û12 In this very world he has transcended them by making
those two concepts meaningless.
The word nivesanaü, occurring in the first verse, is also signifi-
cant. It means ßdwelling.û In consciousness there is a tendency to
`dwell in.' That is why in some contexts it is said that form is the
abode or dwelling place of consciousness, råpadhàtu kho, gahapa-
ti, vi¤¤àõassa oko, ßthe form element, householder, is the abode of
consciousness.û13 The terms oka, niketa and nivesana are synony-
mous, meaning ßabode,û ßhome,û or ßdwelling place.û
The nature of consciousness in general is to abide or dwell in.
That non-manifestative consciousness, anidassana vi¤¤àõa,
however, has got rid of the tendency to abide or dwell in.
Now we can revert to the passage in the Dhatuvibhaïgasutta,
which speaks of an occurrence of tides of imaginings. The passage
actually begins with the words yatthaññhitaü ma¤¤ussavà nap-
pavattanti, ßsteadied where-on the tides of imaginings occur no
more in him.û The idea behind this occurrence of tides of imagin-
ings is quite often represented by the concept of àsava, influx.
Sensuality, kàma, existence, bhava, views, diññhi and ignorance,
avijjà, are referred to as ßinfluxes,û àsavà, or ßfloods,û oghà.
12 Sn 902, MahàViyåhasutta.
13 S III 9, Hàliddikànisutta.
These are the four kinds of samsàric habits that continuously flow
into the minds of beings.
The above mentioned sutta passage refers to a place steadied
whereon the tides of imaginings do not occur or flow in, a place
that is free from their ìnfluence.' This is none other than Nibbàna,
for which one of the epithets used is dãpa, or island.14
Since Nibbàna is called an island, some might take it literally to
mean some sort of a place in this world. In fact, this is the general
concept of Nibbàna some are prone to uphold in their interpreta-
tion of Nibbàna.
But why it is called an island is clearly explained for us by a
discourse in the Pàràyanavagga of the Sutta Nipàta, namely the
Kappamàõavapucchà. In this sutta, the Brahmin youth Kappa
poses the following question to the Buddha:
Majjhe sarasmiü tiññhataü

oghe jàte mahabbhaye
jaràmaccuparetànaü
dãpaü pabråhi, màrisa.
Tva¤ca me dãpam akkhàhi
yathayidaü nàparaü siyà.15
ßTo them that stand midstream,

To them in decay and death forlorn,
An island, sire, may you proclaim.
An island which none else excels,
Yea, such an isle, pray tell me sire.û
And this is the Buddha's reply to it:
Aki¤canaü anàdànaü
etaü dãpaü anàparaü
`nibbànam' iti naü bråmi
jaràmaccuparikkhayaü.16
ßOwning naught, grasping naught,

The isle is this, none else besides,
Nibbàna Ý that is how I call that isle,
Wherein Decay is decayed and Death is dead.û
The Buddha's reply makes it clear that the term Nibbàna stands
for the extinction of craving and grasping. The ideal of owning
naught and grasping naught is itself Nibbàna, and nothing else. If
the term had any other connotation, the Buddha would have
mentioned it in this context.
It is indubitably clear, then, that the epithet dãpaü, or island, has
to be understood in a deeper sense when it refers to Nibbàna. It is
that owning nothing and grasping nothing, that puts an end to
decay and death.
Though we have yet to finish the discussion of the Dhatu-
vibhaïgasutta, the stage is already set now to understand the
significance of a certain brief discourse in the Udàna, which is
very often quoted in discussions on Nibbàna. For facility of
understanding, we shall take it up now, as it somehow fits into the
context:
Atthi, bhikkhave, ajàtaü abhåtaü akataü asaïkhataü. No

ce taü, bhikkhave, abhavissa ajàtaü abhåtaü akataü
asaïkhataü, nayidha jàtassa bhåtassa katassa saïkha-
tassa nissaraõaü pa¤¤àyetha. Yasmà ca kho, bhikkhave,
atthi ajàtaü abhåtaü akataü asaïkhataü, tasmà jàtassa

bhåtassa katassa saïkhatassa nissaraõaü pa¤¤àyati.17
ßMonks, there is a not-born, a not-become, a not-made, a

not-compounded. Monks, if that not-born, not-become,
not-made, not-compounded were not, there would be no
stepping out here from what is born, become, made and
compounded. But since, monks, there is a not-born, a not-
become, a not-made, a not-compounded, therefore there is
a stepping out from what is born, become, made and com-
pounded.û
The terms ajàtaü, not-born, abhåtaü, not-become, akataü, not-

made, and asaïkhataü, not-compounded, are all epithets for
Nibbàna. The Buddha declares that if not for this not-born, not-
become, not-made, not-compounded, there would be no possibility
of stepping out or release here, that is, in this very world, from the
born, the become, the made and the compounded.
The second half of the passage rhetorically reiterates and em-
phasises the same fact. Now as to the significance of this profound
declaration of the Buddha, we may point out that the terms not-
born, not-become, not-made, not-compounded, suggest the
emancipation of the arahant's mind from birth, becoming and
preparations, saïkhàrà. They refer to the cessation of birth,
becoming and preparations realized by the arahant. So then the
significance of these terms is purely psychological.
But the commentator, the Venerable Dhammapàla, pays little
attention to the word idha, ßhere,û in this passage, which needs to
be emphasized. The fact that there is a possibility here and now, of
stepping out from the state of being born, become, made and
compounded, surely deserves emphasis, since, until then, release
17 Ud 80, Tatiyanibbànapañisaüyuttasutta.
from decay and death was thought to be possible only in another

dimension of existence, that is, after death.
The prospect of stepping out from decay and death here and
now in this very world has to be asserted for its novelty, which is
why the declaration opens with the word atthi, ßthere is.û Howev-
er, most of the scholars who tried to interpret this passage in their
discussion on Nibbàna, instead of laying stress on the word idha,
ßhere,û emphasize the opening word atthi, ßthere is,û to prove that
Nibbàna is some form of reality absolutely existing somewhere.
As that passage from the Dhatuvibhaïgasutta on ma¤¤anà,
which we discussed, has shown us, the terms ajàtaü abhåtaü
akataü and asaïkhataü have to be understood in a deeper sense.
Existence is a conceit deep rooted in the mind, which gives rise
to a heap of pervert notions. Its cessation, therefore, has also to be
accomplished in the mind and by the mind. This is the gist of the
Buddha's exhortation.
Let us now come back to the Dhatuvibhaïgasutta to discuss
another facet of it. We started our discussion with the grand finale
of that discourse, because of its relevance to the question of
ma¤¤anà. However, as a matter of fact, this discourse preached by
the Buddha to the Venerable Pukkusàti is an exposition of a
systematic path of practice for the emancipation of the mind from
imaginings or ma¤¤anà.
The discourse begins with the declaration chadhàturo ayaü,
bhikkhu, puriso, ßmonk, man as such is a combination of six
elements.û18 The worldling thinks that a being, satta (Sanskrit
sattva), exists at a higher level of reality than inanimate objects.
Now what did the Buddha do to explode this concept of a being
in his discourse to Venerable Pukkusàti? He literally thrashed out
that concept, by breaking up this `man' into his basic elements and
defining him as a bundle of six elements, namely earth, water, fire,
air, space and consciousness.

As the discourse proceeds, he explains in an extremely lucid

manner how one can detach one's mind from each of these
elements. We happened to mention at the very outset that the
depth of the Dhamma has to be seen through lucidity and not
through complicated over-drawings. In fact, this discourse exhibits
such lucidity.
The meditation subject of elements, which grew in complexity
at the hands of later Buddhist philosophers, who took to atomistic
analysis of a speculative sort, is presented here in this Dhatu-
vibhaïgasutta with a refreshing clarity and lucidity. Here it is
explained in such a way that one can directly experience it.
For instance in describing the earth element, the Buddha gives
as examples of the internal earth element such parts of the body as
head hairs, body hairs, nails and teeth. Because the external earth
element hardly needs illustration, nothing in particular has been
mentioned as to that aspect. Anyone can easily understand what is
meant by it. There is no attempt at atomistic analysis.
However, the Buddha draws special attention to a certain first
principle of great significance:
Yà c'eva kho pana ajjhattikà pañhavãdhàtu, yà ca bàhirà

pañhavãdhàtu, pañhavãdhàtur ev'esà. Taü n'etaü mama,
n'eso ham asmi, na me so attà ti evam etaü yathàbhåtaü
sammappa¤¤àya daññhabbaü. Evam etaü yathàbhåtaü
sammappa¤¤àya disvà pañhavãdhàtuyà nibbindati,
pañhavãdhàtuyà cittaü viràjeti.19
ßThat which is the internal earth element, and that which

is the external earth element, they are both just the earth
element itself. And that should be seen as it is with right
wisdom, thus: `this is not mine,' Ì am not this,' `this is not
my self.' Having seen thus with right wisdom as it is, he

becomes dejected with the earth element, he detaches his

mind from the earth element.û
It is this first principle that is truly important and not any kind of
atomic theory. This resolution of the internal/external conflict has
in it the secret of stopping the saüsàric vortex of reiterated
becoming, saüsàravañña. It is due to the very discrimination
between an ìnternal' and an èxternal' that this saüsàric vortex is
kept going.
Now in the case of a vortex, what is found inside and outside is
simply water. But all the same there is such a vehement speed and
activity and a volley of changes going on there. So it is the case
with this `man.' What is found in his body is the earth element.
What is to be found outside is also the earth element. And yet, the
ordinary person sees quite a wide disparity between the two. Why
is that? That is because of the illusory nature of consciousness.
We have devoted a number of sermons to explain the relation-
ship between consciousness and name-and-form. We happened to
speak of name-and-form as a reflection or a self-image.20 Even as
one who comes before a mirror, on seeing his reflection on it,
would say: `this is mine,' `this am I,' `this is my self,' the world-
ling is in the habit of entertaining cravings, conceits and views.
In fact the purpose of cravings, conceits and views is to rein-
force the distinction between an internal and an external. Already
when one says `this is mine,' one discriminates between the `this'
and Ì,' taking them to be separate realities. `This am I' and `this is
my self' betray the same tacit assumption.
Just as by looking at a mirror one may like or dislike the image
appearing on it, these three points of view give rise to various
pervert notions. All this because of the perpetuation of the distinc-
tion between an internal and an external, which is the situation
with the ordinary worldling.

Since cravings, conceits and views thus reinforce the dichotomy

between an internal and an external, the Buddha has upheld this
principle underlying the meditation on the four elements, to
resolve this conflict.
The fact that with the resolution of this conflict between the
internal and the external concerning the four elements the mind
becomes emancipated is put across to us in the following verse in
the Tàlapuña Theragàthà:
Kadà nu kaññhe ca tiõe latà ca

khandhe ime `haü amite ca dhamme
ajjhattikàn' eva ca bàhiràni ca
samaü tuleyyaü, tad idaü kadà me?21
This verse gives expression to Venerable Tàlapuña Thera's

aspiration to become an arahant. It says:
ßWhen shall I weigh as equal all these

Limitless things both internal and external,
Twigs, grass, creepers and these aggregates,
O! when shall that be for me?û
It is at the stage of arahant-hood that the internal and the external

appear alike. That is precisely why the Venerable Adhimutta
Thera, whom we quoted earlier, uttered the lines:
yadà pa¤¤àya passati.22
ßWhen one sees through wisdom,

The world to be comparable to grass and twigs.û
21 Th 1101, Tàlapuña Theragàthà.

22 Th 717, Adhimutta Theragàthà, see sermon 8.
The comparison is between the internal world of the five aggre-

gates, or this conscious body, and the inanimate objects outside.
Just as in the case of the four elements earth, water, fire and air,
the Buddha pointed out a way of liberating one's mind from the
space element with the help of similar illustrations. In explaining
the space element, too, he gave easily intelligible examples.
The internal space element is explained in terms of some aper-
tures in the body that are well known, namely those in the ears,
nose and the mouth.23 Apart from such instances, he did not speak
of any microscopic space element, as in scientific explanations,
probably because it is irrelevant. Such an analysis is irrelevant for
this kind of reflection.
Here we have to bear in mind the fact that perception as such is
a mirage.24 However far one may go on analysing, form and space
are relative to each other like a picture and its background. A
picture is viewed against its background, which is relative to it. So
also are these two concepts of form and space. Consciousness
provides the frame work for the entire picture.
By way of clarification we may allude to the pre-Buddhistic
attempts of Yogins to solve this problem, solely through the
method of serenity, samatha, ignoring the method of insight,
vipassanà. The procedure they followed was somewhat on these
lines:
They would first of all surmount the concept of form or matter
through the first four mental absorptions, or jhànas. Then as they
inclined towards the formless, what confronted them first was
space. A very appropriate illustration in this context would be the
method of removing the sign of the kasiõa and attending to the
space left by that removal as ìnfinite' or `boundless,' in order to
arouse the base of infinity of space.25

24 S III 141, Pheõapiõóåpamasutta.
25 Vism 327.
This mode of contemplation of space betrays the fact that space

is also something made up, or prepared, saïkhata. Whatever is
prepared, saïkhata, is thought out and mind-made, abhisaïkhataü
abhisa¤cetayitaü.
The Buddha proclaimed that there is only one asaïkhata, un-
prepared, that is Nibbàna.26 But later philosophers confounded the
issue by taking space also to be asaïkhata.27 They seem to have
ignored its relation to the mind in regarding causes and conditions
as purely external things.
Here we see the relativity between form and space. Like the
picture and its background, form and space stand relative to each
other. All this is presented to us by attention, manasikàrasam-
bhavà sabbe dhammà,28 ßall things originate from attention.û
Some of the later speculations about the nature of the space
element are not in consonance with the basic principles outlined in
the Dhamma. Such confusion arose probably due to a lack of
understanding of the term asaïkhata.
Now if we are to say something more about this particular dis-
course, what remains after detaching one's mind from these five
elements, namely earth, water, fire, air and space, is a conscious-
ness that is extremely pure.
The basic function of consciousness is discrimination. It distin-
guishes between the bitter and the sweet, for instance, to say: `this
is bitter,' `this is sweet.' Or else it distinguishes between the
pleasant, the unpleasant and the neutral with regard to feelings:
`this is pleasant,' `this is unpleasant,' `this is neither-unpleasant-
nor-pleasant.'
Now that the five elements earth, water, fire, air and space,
which create discrete objects as the outward manifestations of
consciousness, have been totally removed, the residual function of
26 Cf. Asaïkhatasaüyutta, S IV 359-373.

27 Mil 268.
consciousness amounts to a discrimination between the three

grades of feelings.
The sage who has arrived at this stage of progress on the path to
Nibbàna takes the next step by observing these three kinds of
feelings, pleasant, unpleasant and neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant,
as they arise and cease dependent on specific contacts, thereby
gradually bringing the mind to equanimity.
He brings his mind to a stage of radiant equanimity. But even
this equanimity he does not grasp by way of me-thinking or
imagining. The phrase used in this connection is visaüyutto naü
vedeti, ßbeing detached he experiences it.û29 There is a detach-
ment, an aloofness, even in going through those sensations. This is
clearly expressed in that context.
For instance, in the case of a pleasant feeling, it is said: aniccà ti
pajànàti, anajjhosità ti pajànàti, anabhinandità ti pajànàti, ßhe
understands it to be impermanent, he understands it to be unin-
volved, he understands it to be unrejoiced.û With the understand-
ing of impermanence, conceit goes down. The non-involvement
does away with the views. The absence of rejoicing suggests the
extinction of craving.
So the attainment of arahant-hood is in effect the cessation of
that consciousness itself. That consciousness is divested of its
most primary function of discriminating between the three grades
of feeling, pleasant, unpleasant and neither-unpleasant-nor-
pleasant.
The term visaüyutto connotes disjunction, suggestive of dispas-
sion and detachment. In this way, the Dhatuvibhaïgasutta clearly
brings out the relevance of the question of ma¤¤anà to the path
leading to Nibbàna.
In some contexts, this practice of desisting from me-thinking or
imagining is called atammayatà, non-identification. This is the

term used by the Buddha throughout the Sappurisasutta of the

Majjhima Nikàya. For instance we read there:
Sappuriso ca kho, bhikkhave, iti pañisa¤cikkhati: nevasa¤¤à-
nàsa¤¤àyatanasamàpattiyà pi kho atammayatà vuttà Bhagavatà.
Yena yena hi ma¤¤anti, tato taü hoti a¤¤athà ti.30
ßThe good man reflects thus: the principle of non-identification
has been recommended by the Buddha even with regard to the
attainment of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception
thus: in whatever way they imagine about it, thereby it turns
otherwise.û The `good man' referred to here is the noble disciple
on the supramundane path.
This term tammaya needs to be clarified in order to understand
the significance of this statement. It is derived from tad maya,
literally ßmade of thatû or ßof that stuff.û It is on a par with such
terms as sovaõõamaya, golden, and rajatamaya, silvery.
When one has cravings, conceits and views about something, he
practically becomes one with it due to that very grasping. In other
words, he identifies himself with it. That is why the person who
has imaginings about the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-
perception, which he has attained, thinks Ì am one who has
attained the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception.'
He thereby has conceit, which is a defilement in itself. As a
result, when he loses his mastery of that attainment, he becomes
disconcerted. It is for that reason that the Buddha had enjoined that
one should cultivate the attitude of atammayatà, or non-
identification, even with regard to the attainment of the sphere of
neither-perception-nor-non-perception.
The arahant is called atammayo in the sense that he does not
identify himself with anything. An arahant cannot be identified
with what he appears to possess. This is well expressed by the
following verse in the Devadåtavagga of the Aïguttara Nikàya:
30 M III 44, Sappurisasutta.

Pasayha Màraü abhibhuyya antakaü

yo ca phusã jàtikkhayaü padhànavà
sa tàdiso lokavidå sumedho
sabbesu dhammesu atammayo muni.31
ßThat ardent sage who has touched the extinction of

birth,
Having overpowered Màra and conquered the Ender,
That Such-like one, the wise sage, the knower of the
world,
Is aloof in regard to all phenomena.û
The idea of this aloofness can be presented in another way, that is

as detachment from the seen, the heard, the sensed and the
cognized, diññha, suta, muta, vi¤¤àta. One of the most important
suttas that merits discussion in this respect is the Bàhiyasutta in
the Bodhivagga of the Udàna. It is generally acclaimed as an
extremely profound discourse.
The ascetic Bàhiya Dàrucãriya came all the way from far off
Suppàraka to see the Buddha. When he reached Jetavana monas-
tery at Sàvatthi, he heard that the Buddha had just left on his alms-
round. Due to his extreme eagerness, he ran behind the Buddha
and, on meeting him, fell prostrate before him and begged: ßMay
the Exalted One preach to me the Dhamma.û
The Buddha, however, seemed not so responsive, when he
remarked: ßNow it is untimely, Bàhiya, we are on our alms-
round.û Some might be puzzled by this attitude of the Buddha. But
most probably it is one of those skilful means of the Buddha,
suggestive of his great compassion and wisdom. It served to tone
down the over enthusiastic haste of Bàhiya and to arouse a
reverential respect for the Dhamma in him.
31 A I 150, âdhipateyyasutta.
Bàhiya repeated his request for the second time, adding: ßI do

not know whether there will be a danger to the Exalted One's life
or to my own life.û For the second time the Buddha refused.
It was when Bàhiya made his request for the third time that the
Buddha acceded to it by giving a terse discourse, saïkhitta
Dhammadesanà, of extraordinary depth. The exhortation, brief
and deep as it is, was quite apt, since Bàhiya Dàrucãriya belonged
to that rare category of persons with quick understanding, khippà-
bhi¤¤à:32
Tasmàtiha te, Bàhiya, evaü sikkhitabbaü: diññhe

diññhamattaü bhavissati, sute sutamattaü bhavissati, mute
mutamattaü bhavissati, vi¤¤àte vi¤¤àtamattaü bhavissati.
Evaü hi te, Bàhiya,, sikkhitabbaü.
Yato kho te, Bàhiya, diññhe diññhamattaü bhavissati, sute

sutamattaü bhavissati, mute mutamattaü bhavissati,
vi¤¤àte vi¤¤àtamattaü bhavissati, tato tvaü Bàhiya na
tena. Yato tvaü Bàhiya na tena, tato tvaü Bàhiya na
tattha. Yato tvaü Bàhiya na tattha, tato tvaü Bàhiya
nev'idha na huraü na ubhayamantarena. Es'ev'anto duk-
khassa.33
No sooner had the Buddha finished his exhortation, the ascetic

Bàhiya attained arahant-hood then and there. Let us now try to
unravel the meaning of this abstruse discourse.
The discourse starts off abruptly, as if it had been wrested from
the Buddha by Bàhiya's repeated requests. Tasmàtiha, Bàhiya,
evaü sikkhitabbaü, ßWell then, Bàhiya, you had better train
yourself thus.û And what is that training?
32 A I 24, Etadaggavagga.
33 Ud 8, Bàhiyasutta.
ßIn the seen there will be just the seen, in the heard there will be
just the heard, in the sensed there will be just the sensed, in the
cognized there will be just the cognized. Thus, Bàhiya, should you
train yourself.û
It is as if the Buddha had addressed the ascetic Bàhiya in the
terminology of the Ariyans and established him on the path to
Nibbàna. Here the term muta, or ßsensed,û stands for whatever is
experienced through the tongue, the nose, and the body.
The basic principle in this training seems to be the discipline to
stop short at bare awareness, diññhe diññhamattaü, sute sutamattaü,
etc. The latter half of the discourse seems to indicate what happens
when one goes through that training. The entire discourse is a
presentation of the triple training of morality, concentration and
wisdom in a nutshell.
ßAnd when to you, Bàhiya, there will be in the seen just the
seen, in the heard just the heard, in the sensed just the sensed, in
the cognized just the cognized, then, Bàhiya, you are not by it.
And when you are not by it, you are not in it. And when, Bàhiya,
you are not in it, then, Bàhiya, you are neither here, nor there, nor
in between. This itself is the end of suffering.û
As a literal translation this appears cryptic enough to demand an
explanation. Let us first of all give a few clues to unravel the
puzzle.
The terms ßby it,û tena, and ßin it,û tattha, are rather elliptical.
Though unexpressed, they seem to imply the relevance of
ma¤¤anà to the whole problem.
As we happened to mention earlier, imaginings or methinkings
by way of craving, conceit and views, lead to an identification, for
which the term used is tammayatà. Such an identification makes
one unsteady, for when the thing identified with is shaken, one
also gets shaken up.
This kind of imagining ìn terms of' is indicated by the elliptical
tena, for we get a clear proof of it in the following two lines from
the Jaràsutta in the Aññhakavagga of the Sutta Nipàta:
Dhono na hi tena ma¤¤ati

yad idaü diññhasutaü mutesu và.34
Dhona is a term for the arahant as one who has ßshaken offû all
defilements. So these lines could be rendered as follows:
ßThe arahant, the one who has shaken off,

Does not imagine ìn terms of'
Whatever is seen, heard and sensed.û
Nibbàna Sermon 15



This is the fifteenth sermon in the series of sermons on
Nibbàna. Towards the end of our last sermon we happened to
quote a brief exhortation on Dhamma from the Udàna, which
enabled the ascetic Bàhiya Dàrucãriya to liberate his mind from
imaginings and attain the state of non-identification, atammayatà,
or arahant-hood. In order to attempt an exposition of that exhorta-
tion of the Buddha, which was pithy enough to bring about
instantaneous arahant-hood, let us refresh our memory of that
brief discourse to Bàhiya:
Tasmàtiha te, Bàhiya, evaü sikkhitabbaü: diññhe

diññhamattaü bhavissati, sute sutamattaü bhavissati, mute
389
mutamattaü bhavissati, vi¤¤àte vi¤¤àtamattaü bhavissati.

Evaü hi te, Bàhiya, sikkhitabbaü.

tena. Yato tvaü Bàhiya na tena, tato tvaü Bàhiya na
tattha. Yato tvaü Bàhiya na tattha, tato tvaü Bàhiya
nev'idha na huraü na ubhayamantarena. Es'ev'anto duk-
khassa.2
ßWell, then, Bàhiya, you had better train yourself thus: In

the seen there will be just the seen, in the heard there will
be just the heard, in the sensed there will be just the
sensed, in the cognized there will be just the cognized.
Thus, Bàhiya, should you train yourself.
ßAnd when to you, Bàhiya, there will be in the seen just

the seen, in the heard just the heard, in the sensed just the
sensed, in the cognized just the cognized, then, Bàhiya,
you will not be by it. And when, Bàhiya, you are not by it,
then, Bàhiya, you are not in it. And when, Bàhiya, you are
not in it, then, Bàhiya, you are neither here nor there nor in
between. This, itself, is the end of suffering.û
As a clue to an exegesis of this discourse, we made an attempt, the

other day, to unravel the meaning of the two puzzling terms in the
text, namely, na tena and na tattha. These two terms are apparent-
ly unrelated to the context. To get at their significance, we brought
up a quotation of two lines from the Jaràsutta of the Aññhakavagga
of the Sutta Nipàta:
Dhono na hi tena ma¤¤ati

yadidaü diññhasutaü mutesu và.3
Dhona is a term for the arahant in the sense that he has ßshaken
offû the dust of defilements. So then, these two lines imply that the
arahant does not imagine thereby, namely yadidaü, in terms of
whatever is seen, heard or sensed. These two lines are, as it were, a
random exegesis of our riddle terms in the Bàhiyasutta.
The first line itself gives the clue to the rather elliptical term na
tena, which carries no verb with it. Our quotation makes it clear
that the implication is ma¤¤anà, or imagining. Dhono na hi tena
ma¤¤ati, the arahant does not imagine `by it' or `thereby.'
Although the Bàhiyasutta makes no mention of the word
ma¤¤anà, this particular expression seems to suggest that what is
implied here is a form of imagining. By way of further proof we
may allude to another quotation, which we had to bring up several
times: Yena yena hi ma¤¤anti, tato taü hoti a¤¤athà.4 ßIn whatev-
er terms they imagine it, thereby it turns otherwise.û We came
across another expression, which has a similar connotation: tena
ca mà ma¤¤i, ßdo not be vain thereby.û5
The first thing we can infer, therefore, from the above quoted
two lines of the verse, is that what is to be understood by the
elliptical expression na tena in the Bàhiyasutta is the idea of
imagining, or in short, na tena ma¤¤ati, ßdoes not imagine
thereby.û
Secondly, as to what precisely is implied by the word tena, or
ßby it,û can also be easily inferred from those two lines. In fact,
the second line beginning with the word yadidaü, which means
ßnamelyû or ßthat is,û looks like a commentary on the first line
4 Sn 757, Dvayatànupassanàsutta; see sermon 13.
5 A IV 386, Samiddhisutta; see sermon 12.
itself. The dhono, or the arahant, does not imagine `thereby,'

namely by whatever is seen, heard and sensed.
The verse in question mentions only the three terms diññha, suta
and muta, whereas the Bàhiyasutta has as its framework the four
terms diññha, suta, muta and vi¤¤ata. Since what precedes the term
na tena in the Bàhiyasutta is the fourfold premise beginning with
diññhe diññhamattaü bhavissati, ßwhen to you, Bàhiya, there will
be in the seen just the seen,û it stands to reason that what the
Buddha meant by the term na tena is the attitude of not thinking
ìn terms of' whatever is seen, heard, sensed or cognized. That is
to say, not imagining `thereby.'
This same attitude of not imagining `thereby' is what is upheld
in the Målapariyàyasutta, which we discussed at length on a
previous occasion.6 There we explained the word ma¤¤anà, ßme-
thinking,û ßimagining,û taking as a paradigm the first term
pañhavi, occurring in the list of twenty-four terms given there.
Among the twenty-four terms, we find mentioned the four relevant
to our present problem, namely diññha, suta, muta and vi¤¤àta.7
We are now used to the general schema of the Målapariyàya-
sutta, concerning the attitude of the three categories of persons
mentioned there. Let us, for instance, take up what is said in that
context with regard to the sekha, or the monk in higher training.
Pañhaviü pañhavito abhi¤¤àya pañhaviü mà ma¤¤i, pañhaviyà
mà ma¤¤i, pañhavito mà ma¤¤i, pañhaviü me ti mà ma¤¤i,
pañhaviü mà abhinandi.
This is how the attitude of the sekha is described with regard to
pañhavi, or earth. Suppose we substitute diññha, or the seen, in
place of pañhavi. This is what we should get:
Diññhaü diññhato abhi¤¤àya diññhaü mà ma¤¤i, diññhasmiü mà
ma¤¤i, diññhato mà ma¤¤i, diññhaü me ti mà ma¤¤i, diññhaü mà
abhinandi.

What the sekha has before him is a step of training, and this is
how he has to train in respect of the four things, the seen, the
heard, the sensed and the cognized. He should not imagine in
terms of them.
For instance, he understands through higher knowledge, and not
through the ordinary perception of the worldling, the seen as
`seen.' Having thus understood it, he has to train in not imagining
the seen as a thing, by objectifying it. Diññhaü mà ma¤¤i, let him
not imagine a `seen.' Also, let him not imagine ìn the seen,' or
`from the seen.' We have already pointed out the relationship
between these imaginings and the grammatical structure.8
This objectification of the seen gives rise to acquisitive tenden-
cies, to imagine the seen as `mine.' Diññhaü me ti mà ma¤¤i, let
him not imagine Ì have seen' or Ì have a seen.'
This acquisition has something congratulatory about it. It leads
to some sort of joy, so the monk in higher training has to combat
that too. Diññhaü mà abhinandi, let him not delight in the seen.
It seems, then, that the Buddha has addressed the ascetic Bàhiya
Dàrucãriya in the language of the ariyans, for the very first
instruction given to him was ßin the seen there will be just the
seen.û So highly developed in wisdom and quick witted was
Bàhiya9 that the Buddha promptly asked him to stop short at the
seen, by understanding that in the seen there is just the seen.
Not to have imaginings or me-thinkings about the seen is there-
fore the way to stop short at just the seen. If one does not stop
short at just the seen, but goes on imagining in terms of ìn the
seen,' `from the seen,' etc., as already stated, one will end up with
an identification, or tammayatà.
In our last sermon we brought up the term tammayatà. When
one starts imagining in such terms about something, one tends to
become one with it, tammayo, even as things made out of gold and
8 See sermon 13.

9 According to A I 24 Bàhiya was outstanding for his khippàbhi¤¤à.
silver are called golden, suvaõõamaya, and silvery, rajatamaya. It

is as if one who grasps a gem becomes its owner and if anything
happens to the gem he is affected by it. To possess a gem is to be
possessed by it.
When one gets attached and becomes involved and entangled in
the seen through craving, conceit and views, by imagining egoisti-
cally, the result is identification, tammayatà, literally ßof-that-
ness.û
In this present context, however, the Buddha puts Bàhiya
Dàrucãriya on the path to non-identification, or atammayatà. That
is to say, he advises Bàhiya not to indulge in such imaginings.
That attitude leads to non-identification and detachment. When
one has no attachments, involvements and entanglements regard-
ing the seen, one does not have the notion of being in the seen.
Once we spoke about a children's hut into which the mother
was invited.10 When she crept into that plaything of a hut, she did
not seriously entertain the thought of being ìn' it. Similarly if one
does not indulge in imaginings, one has no notion of being ìn' the
seen.
This, then, is the significance of the words na tattha, ßnot in it.û
Yato tvaü Bàhiya na tena, tato tvaü Bàhiya na tattha. ßWhen,
Bàhiya, you are not by it, then, Bàhiya, you are not in it.û That is
to say, when for instance Bàhiya does not imagine `by the seen,'
he is not ìn the seen.' Likewise, he is not in the heard, sensed or
cognized. From this we can deduce the meaning of what follows.
Yato tvaü Bàhiya na tattha, tato tvaü Bàhiya nev'idha na
huraü na ubhayamantarena. At whatever moment you neither
imagine `by the seen' nor entertain the notion of being ìn the
seen,' which is tantamount to projecting an Ì' into the seen, then
you are neither here nor there nor in between.
In a number of earlier sermons we have sufficiently explained
the significance of the two ends and the middle as well as the
10 See sermon 13.

above, the below and the across in the middle. What do they
signify?
As we happened to point out on an earlier occasion, it is by
driving the peg of the conceit àm' that a world is measured out,
construed or postulated.11 We also pointed out that the grammati-
cal structure springs up along with it. That is to say, together with
the notion àm' there arises a `here.' `Here' am I, he is `there' and
you are `yon' or in front of me. This is the basic ground plan for
the grammatical structure, known to grammar as the first person,
the second person and the third person.
A world comes to be measured out and a grammatical structure
springs up. This, in fact, is the origin of proliferation, or papa¤ca.
So it is the freedom from that proliferation that is meant by the
expression nev'idha na huraü na ubhayamantarena, ßneither here
nor there nor between the two.û The notion of one's being in the
world, or the bifurcation as Ì' and `the world,' is no longer there.
Es'ev'anto dukkhassa, this, then, is the end of suffering, Nibbàna.
The fundamental first principles underlying this short exhorta-
tion of the Buddha could thus be inferred to some extent. We
could perhaps elicit something more regarding the significance of
the four key terms in question.
In the section of the fours in the Aïguttara Nikàya we come
across four modes of noble usages, cattàro ariya vohàrà,12
namely:
1) diññhe diññhavàdità,
2) sute sutavàdità,
3) mute mutavàdità,
4) vi¤¤àte vi¤¤àtavàdità.
11 See sermon 10.

12 A II 246, Catutthavohàrasutta.
These four are:
1) Asserting the fact of having seen in regard to the seen,

2) Asserting the fact of having heard in regard to the heard,
3) Asserting the fact of having sensed in regard to the
sensed,
4) Asserting the fact of having cognized in regard to the
cognized.
Generally speaking, these four noble usages stand for the principle
of truthfulness. In some discourses, as well as in the Vinayapiñaka,
these terms are used in that sense. They are the criteria of the
veracity of a statement in general, not so much in a deep sense.
However, there are different levels of truth. In fact, truthfulness
is a question of giving evidence that runs parallel with one's level
of experience. At higher levels of experience or realization, the
evidence one gives also changes accordingly.
The episode of Venerable MahàTissa Thera is a case in view.13
When he met a certain woman on his way, who displayed her teeth
in a wily giggle, he simply grasped the sign of her teeth. He did
not totally refrain from grasping a sign, but took it as an illustra-
tion of his meditation subject. Later, when that woman's husband,
searching for her, came up to him and asked whether he had seen a
woman, he replied that all he saw was a skeleton. Now that is a
certain level of experience.
Similarly the concept of truthfulness is something that changes
with levels of experience. There are various degrees of truth, based
on realization. The highest among them is called paramasacca.14
As to what that is, the Dhàtuvibhaïgasutta itself provides the
answer in the following statement of the Buddha.
13 Vism 21.
14 The term occurs e.g. at M I 480, Tevijjavacchagottasutta; at M II 173,
Cankãsutta; and at A II 115, Patodasutta.
Eta¤hi, bhikkhu, paramaü ariyasaccaü yadidaü amosa-

dhammaü Nibbànaü.15 ßMonk, this is the highest noble truth,
namely Nibbàna, that is of a non-falsifying nature.û All other
truths are falsified when the corresponding level of experience is
transcended. But Nibbàna is the highest truth, since it can never be
falsified by anything beyond it.
The fact that it is possible to give evidence by this highest level
of experience comes to light in the Chabbisodhanasutta of the
Majjhima Nikàya. In this discourse we find the Buddha instructing
the monks as to how they should interrogate a fellow monk who
claims to have attained arahant-hood. The interrogation has to
follow certain criteria, one of which concerns the four standpoints
diññha, suta, muta and vi¤¤àta, the seen, the heard, the sensed and
the cognized.
What sort of answer a monk who rightly claims to arahant-
hood would give is also stated thereby the Buddha. It runs as
follows: Diññhe kho ahaü, àvuso, anupàyo anapàyo anissito
appañibaddho vippamutto visaüyutto vimariyàdikatena cetasà
viharàmi.16
Here, then, is the highest mode of giving evidence in the court
of Reality as an arahant. ßFriends, with regard to the seen, I dwell
unattracted, unrepelled, independent, uninvolved, released,
unshackled, with a mind free from barriers.û
He is unattracted, anupàyo, by lust and unrepelled, anapàyo, by
hate. He is not dependent, anissito, on cravings, conceits and
views. He is not involved, appañibaddho, with desires and attach-
ments and is released, vippamutto, from defilements. He is no
longer shackled, visaüyutto, by fetters and his mind is free from
barriers.
What these barriers are, we can easily infer. They are the bifur-
cations such as the internal and the external, ajjhatta bahiddhà,

16 M III 29, Chabbisodhanasutta.
which are so basic to what is called existence, bhava. Where there

are barriers, there are also attach-ments, aversions and conflicts.
Where there is a fence, there is defence and offence.
So the arahant dwells with a mind unpartitioned and barrierless,
vimariyàdikatena cetasà. To be able to make such a statement is
the highest standard of giving evidence in regard to the four noble
usages.
It is also noteworthy that in the Bàhiyasutta the Buddha has
presented the triple training of higher morality, higher concentra-
tion and higher wisdom, adhisãla, adhicitta and adhipa¤¤à,
through these four noble usages. The commentary, too, accepts
this fact.17 But this is a point that might need clarification. How are
we to distinguish between morality, concentration and wisdom in
this brief exhortation?
Now how does the exhortation begin? It opens with the words
tasmàtiha te, Bàhiya, evaü sikkhitabbaü, ßwell then, Bàhiya, you
should train yourself thus.û This is an indication that the Buddha
introduced him to a course of training, and this is the preliminary
training: Diññhe diññhamattaü bhavissati, sute sutamattaü bha-
vissati, mute mutamattaü bhavissati, vi¤¤àte vi¤¤àtamattaü
bhavissati. ßIn the seen there will be just the seen, in the heard
there will be just the heard, in the sensed there will be just the
sensed, in the cognized there will be just the cognized.û
What is hinted at by this initial instruction is the training in
higher morality, adhisãlasikkhà. The most important aspect of this
training is the morality of sense-restraint, indriya saüvara sãla.
The first principles of sense-restraint are already implicit in this
brief instruction.
If one stops short at just the seen in regard to the seen, one does
not grasp a sign in it, or dwell on its details. There is no sorting out
as `this is good,' `this is bad.' That itself conduces to sense-
restraint. So we may conclude that the relevance of this brief
17 Ud-a 90.
instruction to the morality of sense-restraint is in its enjoining the

abstention from grasping a sign or dwelling on the details. That is
what pertains to the training in higher morality, adhisãlasikkha.
Let us see how it also serves the purpose of training in higher
concentration. To stop at just the seen in the seen is to refrain from
discursive thought, which is the way to abandon mental hindranc-
es. It is discursive thought that brings hindrances in its train. So
here we have what is relevant to the training in higher concentra-
tion as well.
Then what about higher wisdom, adhipa¤¤à? Something more
specific has to be said in this concern. What precisely is to be
understood by higher wisdom in this context? It is actually the
freedom from imaginings, ma¤¤anà, and proliferation, papa¤ca.
If one stops short at just the seen in the seen, such ramifications
as mentioned in discourses like the Målapariyàyasutta do not
come in at all. The tendency to objectify the seen and to proliferate
it as ìn it,' `from it' and ìt is mine' receives no sanction. This
course of training is helpful for the emancipation of the mind from
imaginings and proliferations.
The Buddha has compared the six sense-bases, that is eye, ear,
nose, tongue, body and mind, to a deserted village.18 Su¤¤aü idaü
attena và attaniyena và. ßThis is void of a self or anything belong-
ing to a self.û All these sense-bases are devoid of a self or any-
thing belonging to a self. Therefore they are comparable to a
deserted village, a village from which all inhabitants have fled.
The dictum ìn the seen there will be just the seen' is an advice
conducive to the attitude of regarding the six sense-bases as a
deserted village. This is what pertains to higher wisdom in the
Buddha's exhortation.
Papa¤ca, or prolific conceptualisation, is a process of transac-
tion with whatever is seen, heard, sensed, etc. So here there is no
process of such transaction. Also, when one trains oneself accord-
18 S IV 174, âsãvisasutta.
ing to the instruction, ßin the seen there will be just the seen, in the
heard there will be just the heard, in the sensed there will be just
the sensed, in the cognized there will be just the cognized,û that
identification implied by the term tammayatà will no longer be
there.
Egotism, the conceit àm' and all what prompts conceptual
proliferation will come to an end. This kind of training uproots the
peg of the conceit àm,' thereby bringing about the cessation of
prolific conceptualisation, the cessation of becoming and the
cessation of suffering.
We can therefore conclude that the entire triple training is en-
shrined in this exhortation. What happens as a result of this
training is indicated by the riddle like terms na tena, na tattha,
nev'idha na huraü na ubhayamantarena.
When the wisdom of the ascetic Bàhiya Dàrucãriya had suffi-
ciently matured by following the triple course of training, the
Buddha gave the hint necessary for realization of that cessation of
becoming, which is Nibbàna, in the following words: ßThen,
Bàhiya, you will not be by it. And when, Bàhiya, you are not by it,
then, Bàhiya, you are not in it. And when, Bàhiya, you are not in
it, then, Bàhiya, you are neither here nor there nor in between.
This, itself, is the end of suffering.û
This sermon, therefore, is one that succinctly presents the quin-
tessence of the Saddhamma. It is said that the mind of the ascetic
Bàhiya Dàrucãriya was released from all influxes immediately on
hearing this exhortation.
Now let us come back to the sequence of events in the story as
mentioned in the Udàna. It was after the Buddha had already set
out on his alms round that this sermon was almost wrenched from
him with much insistence. When it had proved its worth, the
Buddha continued with his alms round. Just then a cow with a
young calf gored the arahant Bàhiya Dàrucãriya to death.
While returning from his alms round with a group of monks, the
Buddha saw the corpse of the arahant Bàhiya. He asked those
monks to take the dead body on a bed and cremate it. He even told
them to build a cairn enshrining his relics, saying: ßMonks, a co-

celibate of yours has passed away.û
Those monks, having carried out the instructions, came back
and reported to the Buddha. Then they raised the question: ßWhere
has he gone after death, what is his after death state?û The Buddha
replied: ßMonks, Bàhiya Dàrucãriya was wise, he lived up to the
norm of the Dhamma, he did not harass me with questions on
Dhamma. Monks, Bàhiya Dàrucãriya has attained Parinibbàna.û
In conclusion, the Buddha uttered the following verse of uplift:

na tattha sukkà jotanti,
àdicco nappakàsati,
na tattha candimà bhàti,
tamo tattha na vijjati.
Yadà ca attanàvedi,
muni monena bràhmaõo,
atha råpà aråpà ca,
sukhadukkhà pamuccati.19
On the face of it, the verse seems to imply something like this:
ßWhere water, earth, fire and air

Do not find a footing,
There the stars do not shine,
And the sun spreads not its lustre,
The moon does not appear resplendent there,
And no darkness is to be found there.
When the sage, the brahmin with wisdom,
Understands by himself,
Then is he freed from form and formless,

And from pleasure and pain as well.û
The commentary to the Udàna, Paramatthadãpanã, gives a strange

interpretation to this verse. It interprets the verse as a description
of the destination of the arahant Bàhiya Dàrucãriya after he
attained Parinibbàna, the place he went to.20 Even the term
Nibbànagati is used in that connection, the `place' one goes to in
attaining Parinibbàna. That place, according to the commentary, is
not easily understood by worldlings. Its characteristics are said to
be the following:
The four elements, earth, water, fire and air, are not there. No
sun, or moon, or stars are there. The reason why the four elements
are negated is supposed to be the fact that there is nothing that is
compounded in the uncompounded Nibbàna element, into which
the arahant passes away.
Since no sun, or moon, or stars are there in that mysterious
place, one might wonder why there is no darkness either. The
commentator tries to forestall the objection by stating that it is
precisely because one might think that there should be darkness
when those luminaries are not there, that the Buddha emphatically
negates it. So the commentarial interpretation apparently leads us
to the conclusion that there is no darkness in the Nibbàna element,
even though no sun or moon or stars are there.
The line of interpretation we have followed throughout this
series of sermons allows us to depart from this commentarial
trend. That place where earth, water, fire and air do not find a
footing is not where the arahant Bàhiya Dàrucãriya had `gone'
when he passed away. The commentator seems to have construed
this verse as a reply the Buddha gave to the question raised by
those monks. Their question was: ßWhere has he gone after death,
what is his after death state?û They were curious about his borne.
20 Ud-a 98.
But when we carefully examine the context, it becomes clear

that they raised that question because they did not know that the
corpse they cremated was that of an arahant. Had they known it,
they would not have even asked that question. That is precisely the
reason for the Buddha's declaration that Bàhiya attained Pari-
nibbàna, a fact he had not disclosed before. He added that Bàhiya
followed the path of Dhamma without harassing him with ques-
tions and attained Parinibbàna.
Now that is the answer proper. To reveal the fact that Bàhiya
attained Parinibbàna is to answer the question put by those
inquisitive monks. Obviously they knew enough of the Dhamma
to understand then, that their question about the borne and destiny
of Venerable Bàhiya was totally irrelevant.
So then the verse uttered by the Buddha in conclusion was
something extra. It was only a joyous utterance, a verse of uplift,
coming as a grand finale to the whole episode.
Such verses of uplift are often to be met with in the Udàna. As
we already mentioned, the verses in the Udàna have to be inter-
preted very carefully, because they go far beyond the implications
of the story concerned.21 They invite us to take a plunge into the
ocean of Dhamma. Just one verse is enough. The text is small but
deep. The verse in question is such a spontaneous utterance of joy.
It is not the answer to the question `where did he go?'
Well, in that case, what are we to understand by the word
yattha, ßwhereû? We have already given a clue to it in our seventh
sermon with reference to that non-manifestative consciousness,
anidassana vi¤¤àõa. What the Buddha describes in this verse, is
not the place where the Venerable arahant Bàhiya went after his
demise, but the non-manifestative consciousness he had realized
here and now, in his concentration of the fruit of arahant-hood, or
arahattaphalasamàdhi.
Let us hark back to the four lines quoted in the Kevaóóhasutta:
21 See sermon 1.
tejo vàyo na gàdhati.22
ßConsciousness which is non-manifestative,

It is here that water, earth,
Fire and air no footing find.û
The first two lines of the verse in the Bàhiyasutta, beginning with
the correlative yattha, ßwhere,û find an answer in the last two lines
quoted above from the Kevaóóhasutta. What is referred to as ßit is
here,û is obviously the non-manifestative consciousness mentioned
in the first two lines. That problematic place indicated by the word
yattha, ßwhere,û in the Bàhiyasutta, is none other than this non-
manifestative consciousness.
We had occasion to explain at length in what sense earth, water,
fire and air find no footing in that consciousness. The ghostly
elements do not haunt that consciousness. That much is clear. But
how are we to understand the enigmatic reference to the sun, the
moon and the stars? It is said that the stars do not shine in that
non-manifestative consciousness, the sun does not spread its lustre
and the moon does not appear resplendent in it, nor is there any
darkness. How are we to construe all this?
Briefly stated, the Buddha's declaration amounts to the revela-
tion that the sun, the moon and the stars fade away before the
superior radiance of the non-manifestative consciousness, which is
infinite and lustrous on all sides.
How a lesser radiance fades away before a superior one, we
have already explained with reference to the cinema in a number
of earlier sermons.23 To sum up, the attention of the audience in a

cinema is directed to the narrow beam of light falling on the
screen. The audience, or the spectators, are seeing the scenes
making up the film show with the help of that beam of light and
the thick darkness around.
This second factor is also very important. Scenes appear not
simply because of the beam of light. The thickness of the darkness
around is also instrumental in it. This fact is revealed when the
cinema hall is fully lit up. If the cinema hall is suddenly illuminat-
ed, either by the opening of doors and windows or by some
electrical device, the scenes falling on the screen fade away as if
they were erased. The beam of light, which was earlier there,
becomes dim before the superior light. The lesser lustre is super-
seded by a greater lustre.
We might sometimes be found fault with for harping on this
cinema simile, on the ground that it impinges on the precept
concerning abstinence from enjoying dramatic performances, song
and music. But let us consider whether this cinema is something
confined to a cinema hall.
In the open air theatre of the world before us, a similar phenom-
enon of supersedence is occurring. In the twilight glow of the
evening the twinkling stars enable us to faintly figure out the
objects around us, despite the growing darkness. Then the moon
comes up. Now what happens to the twinkling little stars? They
fade away, their lustre being superseded by that of the moon.
Then we begin to enjoy the charming scenes before us in the
serene moonlit night. The night passes off. The daylight gleam of
the sun comes up. What happens then? The soft radiance of the
moon wanes before the majestic lustre of the sun. The moon gets
superseded and fades away. Full of confidence we are now
watching the multitude of technicoloured scenes in this massive

theatre of the world. In broad daylight, when sunshine is there, we

have no doubt about our vision of objects around us.
But now let us suppose that the extraneous defilements in the
mind of a noble disciple, treading the noble eightfold path, get
dispelled, allowing its intrinsic lustre of wisdom to shine forth.
What happens then? The stars, the moon and the sun get supersed-
ed by that light of wisdom. Even the forms that one had seen by
twilight, moonlight and sunlight fade away and pale into insignifi-
cance. The umbra of form and the penumbra of the formless get
fully erased.
In the previous sermon we happened to mention that form and
space are related to each other, like the picture and its background.
Now all this is happening in the firmament, which forms the
background. We could enjoy the scenes of the world cinema,
because of that darkness. The twilight, the moonlight and the
sunlight are but various levels of that darkness.
The worldling thinks that one who has eyes must surely see if
there is sunshine. He cannot think of anything beyond it. But the
Buddha has declared that there is something more radiant than the
radiance of the sun. Natthi pa¤¤àsamà àbhà, ßthere is no radiance
comparable to wisdom.û24
Let us hark back to a declaration by the Buddha we had already
quoted in a previous sermon:
Catasso imà, bhikkhave, pabhà. Katamà catasso? Can-

dappabhà, såriyappabhà, aggippabhà, pa¤¤appabhà, imà
kho, bhikkhave, catasso pabhà. Etadaggaü, bhikkhave,
imàsaü catunnaü pabhànaü, yad idaü pa¤¤appabhà.25
ßMonks, there are these four lustres. What four? The lustre
of the moon, the lustre of the sun, the lustre of fire, the
24 S I 6, Natthiputtasamasutta.
25 A II 139, Pabhàsutta; see sermon 7.
lustre of wisdom. These, monks, are the four lustres. This,

monks, is the highest among these four lustres, namely the
lustre of wisdom.û
So, then, we can now understand why the form and the formless
fade away. This wisdom has a penetrative quality, for which
reason it is called nibbedhikà pa¤¤à.26 When one sees forms, one
sees them together with their shadows. The fact that one sees
shadows there, is itself proof that darkness has not been fully
dispelled. If light comes from all directions, there is no shadow at
all. If that light is of a penetrative nature, not even form will be
manifest there.
Now it is mainly due to what is called `form' and `form-less,'
råpa/aråpa, that the worldling experiences pleasure and pain in a
world that distinguishes between a `pleasure' and a `pain.'
Though we have departed from the commentarial path of exege-
sis, we are now in a position to interpret the cryptic verse in the
Bàhiyasutta perhaps more meaningfully. Let us now recall the
verse in question:

na tattha sukkà jotanti,
àdicco nappakàsati,
na tattha candimà bhàti,
tamo tattha na vijjati.
Yadà ca attanàvedi,
muni monena bràhmaõo,
atha råpà aråpà ca,
26 E.g. S II 45, Bhikkhusutta; or A II 178, Ummaggasutta.

The verse can be fully explained along the lines of interpretation

we have adopted. By way of further proof of the inadequacy of the
commentarial explanation of the references to the sun, the moon
and the stars in this verse, we may draw attention to the following
points.
According to the commentary the verse is supposed to express
that there are no sun, moon or stars in that mysterious place called
anupàdisesa Nibbànadhàtu, which is incomprehensible to world-
lings. We may, however, point out that the verbs used in the verse
in this connection do not convey the sense that the sun, the moon
and the stars are simply nonexistent there. They have something
more to say.
For instance, with regard to the stars it is said that there the stars
do not shine, na tattha sukkà jotanti. If in truth and fact stars are
not there, some other verb like na dissanti, ßare not seen,û or na
vijjanti, ßdo not exist,û could have been used.
With reference to the sun and the moon, also, similar verbs
could have been employed. But what we actually find here, are
verbs expressive of spreading light, shining, or appearing beauti-
ful: Na tattha sukkà jotanti, ßthere the stars do not shineû; àdicco
nappakàsati, ßthe sun spreads not its lustreû; na tattha candimà
bhàti, ßthe moon does not appear resplendent there.û
These are not mere prosaic statements. The verse in question is
a joyous utterance, Udànagàthà, of extraordinary depth. There is
nothing recondite about it.
In our earlier assessment of the commentarial interpretation we
happened to lay special stress on the words èven though.' We are
now going to explain the significance of that emphasis. For the
commentary, the line tamo tattha na vijjati, ßno darkness is to be
found there,û is a big riddle. The sun, the moon and the stars are
not there. Even though they are not there, presumably, no darkness
is to be found there.
However, when we consider the law of superseding, we have
already mentioned, we are compelled to give a totally different
interpretation. The sun, the moon and the stars are not manifest,
precisely because of the light of that non-manifestative conscious-
ness. As it is lustrous on all sides, sabbato pabha, there is no

darkness there and luminaries like the stars, the sun and the moon
do not shine there.
This verse of uplift thus reveals a wealth of information relevant
to our topic. Not only the exhortation to Bàhiya, but this verse also
throws a flood of light on the subject of Nibbàna.
That extraordinary place, which the commentary often identifies
with the term anupàdisesa Nibbànadhàtu, is this mind of ours. It is
in order to indicate the luminosity of this mind that the Buddha
used those peculiar expressions in this verse of uplift.
What actually happens in the attainment to the fruit of arahant-
hood? The worldling discerns the world around him with the help
of six narrow beams of light, namely the six sense-bases. When
the superior lustre of wisdom arises, those six sense-bases go
down. This cessation of the six sense-bases could also be referred
to as the cessation of name-and-form, nàmaråpanirodha, or the
cessation of consciousness, vi¤¤àõanirodha.
The cessation of the six sense-bases does not mean that one
does not see anything. What one sees then is voidness. It is an in-
`sight.' He gives expression to it with the words su¤¤o loko, ßvoid
is the world.û What it means is that all the sense-objects, which the
worldling grasps as real and truly existing, get penetrated through
with wisdom and become non-manifest.
If we are to add something more to this interpretation of the
Bàhiyasutta by way of review, we may say that this discourse
illustrates the six qualities of the Dhamma, namely svàkkhàto, well
proclaimed, sandiññhiko, visible here and now, akàliko, timeless,
ehipassiko, inviting to come and see, opanayiko, leading onward
and paccattaü veditabbo vi¤¤åhi, to be realized by the wise each
one by himself. These six qualities are wonderfully exemplified by
this discourse.
In a previous sermon we had occasion to bring up a simile of a

dewdrop, dazzling in the morning sunshine.28 The task of seeing
the spectrum of rainbow colours through a tiny dew drop hanging
from a creeper or a leaf is one that calls for a high degree of
mindfulness. Simply by standing or sitting with one's face towards
the rising sun, one will not be able to catch a glimpse of the
brilliant spectrum of rainbow colours through the dewdrop. It
requires a particular viewpoint. Only when one focuses on that
viewpoint, can one see it.
So it is with the spectrum of the six qualities of the Dhamma.
Here, too, the correct viewpoint is a must, and that is right view.
Reflection on the meaning of deep discourses helps one to
straighten up right view.
Where right view is lacking, morality inclines towards dogmatic
attachment to rituals, sãlabbataparàmàsa. Concentration turns out
to be wrong concentration, micchà samàdhi.
Like the one who sits facing the sun, one might be looking in
the direction of the Dhamma, but right view is not something one
inherits by merely going to refuge to the Buddha. It has to be
developed with effort and proper attention. View is something that
has to be straightened up. For diññhujukamma, the act of straighten-
ing up one's view is reckoned as one of the ten skilful deeds,
kusalakamma.
So however long one may sit with folded legs, gazing at the
Buddha sun, one might not be able to see the six rainbow colours
of the Dhamma. One may be short of just one-hundredth of an
inch as the proper adjustment for right view. Yet it is a must. Once
that adjustment is made, one immediately, then and there,
tavad'eva, catches a glimpse of the spectrum of the Dhamma that
the Buddha has proclaimed.
We have stressed the importance of right view in particular,
because many are grappling with a self-created problem, concern-
28 See sermon 9.
ing the proper alignment between the triple training and the right
view of the noble eightfold path.
Now as to the triple training, morality, concentration and wis-
dom, we find wisdom mentioned last. It seems, then, that we have
to perfect morality first, then develop concentration, and only
lastly wisdom. One need not think of wisdom before that. But
when we come to the noble eightfold path, we find a different
order of values. Here right view takes precedence. As a matter of
fact, in the Mahàcattàrãsakasutta of the Majjhima Nikàya we find
the Buddha repeatedly declaring emphatically tatra, bhikkhave,
sammà diññhi pubbaïgamà, ßmonks, therein right view takes
precedence.û29 Even in a context where the subject is morality, we
find a similar statement. So how are we to resolve this issue?
In the noble eightfold path, pride of place is given to right view,
which is representative of the wisdom group. As the well-known
definition goes, right view and right thoughts belong to the
wisdom group; right speech, right action and right livelihood come
under the morality group; and right effort, right mindfulness and
right concentration belong to the concentration group.
So in this way, in the noble eightfold path, wisdom comes first,
then morality and lastly concentration. But in the context of these
three groups, firstly comes morality, secondly concentration and
lastly wisdom, Here, too, the answer given by the arahant-nun
Venerable Dhammadinnà to the lay disciple Visàkha comes to our
aid.
The lay disciple Visàkha poses the following question to
Venerable Dhammadinnà: Ariyena nu kho ayye aññhaïgikena
maggena tayo khandhà saïgahità, udàhu tãhi khandhehi ariyo
aññhaïgiko maggo saïgahito? ßGood lady, are the three groups
morality, concentration and wisdom, included by the noble
29 M III 71, Mahàcattàrãsakasutta.

eightfold path, or is the noble eightfold path included by the three

groups?û30
Even at that time there may have been some who raised such
questions. That is probably the reason for such a query. Then the
arahant-nun Dhammadinnà answers: Na kho àvuso Visàkha
ariyena aññhaïgikena maggena tayo khandhà saïgahità, tãhi ca
kho àvuso Visàkha khandhehi ariyo aññhaïgiko maggo saïgahito.
ßFriend Visàkha, it is not that the threefold training is included by
the noble eightfold path, but the noble eightfold path is included
by the threefold training.û
Since this appears to be something of a tangle, let us try to
illustrate the position with some other kind of tangle. Suppose
someone is trying to climb up a long rope, made up of three
strands. As he climbs up, his fingertips might come now in contact
with the first strand, now with the second and now with the third.
He is not worried about the order of the three strands, so long as
they are well knit. One can safely climb up, holding onto the three
strands, only when they are firmly wound up into a sturdy rope.
All these questions seem to have arisen due to an attitude of
taking too seriously the numerical order of things. To the noble
disciple climbing up the rope of the noble eightfold path, there
need not be any confusion between the numerical order of the
triple training and that of the noble eightfold path. But if someone
taking the cue from the order of the triple training neglects right
view or ignores its prime import, he might end up confused.
All in all, we are now in a position to correctly assess the deep
significance of the Bàhiyasutta. Here we have the quintessence of
the entire Saddhamma. We are not confronted with heaps of
perceptual data, which we are told today are essential requisites for
admission into the `city' of Nibbàna.
For the ordinary worldling, amassing a particular set of percepts
or concepts seems a qualification for entering Nibbàna. But what
30 M I 301, CåëaVedallasutta.
we have here, is a way of liberating the mind even from latencies

to percepts, cf. sa¤¤à nànusenti, Madhupiõóikasutta, ßperceptions
do not lie latent.û31 There is no heaping up anew.
What are called ßextraneous taints,û àgantukà upakkilesà,32 are
not confined to the well known defilements in the world. They
include all the rust and dust we have been collecting throughout
this long saüsàra, with the help of the influxes, àsavà. They
include even the heap of percepts which the world calls
`knowledge.' Even numerals are part of it.
The Buddha has briefly expressed here the mode of practice for
disabusing the mind from all such taints. Therefore there is no
reason for underestimating the value of this discourse, by calling it
vohàra desanà, conventional teaching. This discourse in the
Udàna is one that is truly ùp'-lifting. It indeed deserves a paean
of joy.
32 A I 10, Accharàsaïghàtavagga.
Nibbàna Sermon 16



This is the sixteenth sermon in the series of sermons on
Nibbàna. In the course of our discussion of the Bàhiyasutta in our
last sermon, we drew attention to the wide gap that exists between
the sensory experience of the worldling and that experience the
arahant gets through the eye of wisdom. It is the same gap that
obtains between the two terms papa¤ca and nippapa¤ca. In
sensory experience, which is based on worldly expressions,
worldly usages and worldly concepts, there is a discrimination
between a thing to be grasped and the one who grasps, or, in other
words, a subject-object relationship.
There is always a bifurcation, a dichotomy, in the case of senso-
ry perception. If there is a seen, there has to be something seen and
415
the one who sees. That is the logic. In the Bàhiyasutta, beginning
with ìn the seen there will be just the seen,' the Buddha pro-
claimed to the ascetic Bàhiya a brief exhortation on Dhamma
which enables one to transcend the above narrow viewpoint and
attain the state of non-proliferation or nippapa¤ca.
There is nothing to see, no one to see, only à seen' is there. The
cause of all these conceptual proliferation, or papa¤ca, in the
world is contact. The arahants understood this by their insight into
the fact that the seen, the heard, the sensed and the cognized are
simply so many collocations of conditions which come together
for a moment due to contact, only to break up and get dispersed
the next moment.
What is called the seen, the heard, the sensed and the cognized
are for the worldling so many `things.' But to the wisdom eye of
the arahants they appear as mere conglomerations of conditions,
dependent on contact, which momentarily come together and then
get dispersed. This insight into the dependence on contact,
phassam pañicca, is the very essence of the law of dependent
arising, pañicca samuppàda. It is equivalent to seeing the law of
dependent arising itself.
In order to transcend the narrow point of view limited to the
bases of sense contact or the six sense spheres and realize the state
of Nibbàna indicated by the words vi¤¤àõaü anidassanaü,
anantaü sabbato pabhaü,2 ßconsciousness which is non-
manifestative, endless, lustrous on all sides,û one has to see the
cessation of contact.
In a certain discourse in the Mucalindavagga of the Udàna, the
Buddha has declared in a verse of uplift that the cessation of
contact comes about only by doing away with that which brings
about contact. The wandering ascetics of other sects grew jealous
of the Buddha and his congregation of monks, because of their
own loss of gain and honour, and began to hurl abuse on monks in
the village and in the forest. A group of monks came and reported
this to the Buddha. The Buddha's response to it was only a paean
of joy. Udàna actually means a spontaneous utterance of joy, and
the verse he uttered was such a one. But it embodied an instruction
on Dhamma and a norm of Dhamma as well:
Gàme ara¤¤e sukhadukkhaphuññho,

nev'attato no parato dahetha,
phusanti phassà upadhiü pañicca,
Niråpadhiü kena phuseyyum phassà.3
In the first two lines we get an instruction:
ßTouched by pain in village or in forest,

Think not in terms of oneself or others,û
The reason for it is given in the norm of Dhamma which follows:
ßTouches can touch one, because of assets,

How can touches touch him, who is asset-less?û
This is all what the Buddha uttered. From this we can glean
another aspect of the significance of the terms sabbåpadhipañinis-
sagga, relinquishment of all assets, and nirupadhi, the asset-less,
used with reference to Nibbàna.
In a number of previous sermons we happened to explain the
concept of upadhi to some extent, as and when the terms upadhi
and pañinissagga came up.4 To refresh our memory, we may
summarize all that now. What is the concept of upadhi, or ßas-
sets,û recognized by the world?
3 Ud 12, Sakkàrasutta.
4 See sermon 8.
Whatever that bolsters up the ego, be it gold, silver, pearls,

gems, money, house and property, deposits and assets. All these
are reckoned as upadhi in general. But when considered from the
point of view of Dhamma, upadhi in a deeper sense stands for this
fivefold grasping groups, pa¤cupàdànakkhandha.
Upàdànakkhandha literally means ßgroups of grasping.û
Groups of grasping do not necessarily imply that there are material
objects to be grasped. But the worldling, overcome by that triple
proliferation of cravings, conceits and views, and carried away by
the worldly conventions, imagines those groups of grasping as
things grasped and deposited. The concept of upadhi as assets has
arisen as a result of this tendency to think of groups of grasping as
things grasped and deposited. So it turns out to be a question of
viewpoint.
Cravings, conceits and views prompt one to look upon all what
one has grasped so far and what one hopes to grasp in the future as
things one is grasping right now. One thinks of them as things
deposited in a safe. The worldlings are holding on to such a mass
of assets.
Nibbàna is the relinquishment of all such assets, accumulated in
the mind. In order to relinquish these assets there must be some
kind of understanding Ý an enlightenment. The vanity of all these
assets has to be seen through by the light of wisdom. It is only by
seeing their vanity that the assets are relinquished. In fact it is not
so much a deliberate giving up of assets, as a sequential liquida-
tion.
In a previous sermon we gave an illustration of the situation that
precipitates relinquishment. Let us bring it up again. We found the
cinema quite helpful as an illustration. In explaining the phenome-
non of relinquishment of assets with reference to the cinema, we
described how the assets accumulated in the minds of the audi-
ence, that is, the assets proper to the cinema world woven around
the story that is filmed, are automatically abandoned when the
cinema hall gets lit up.5 Then one understands the illusory nature
of what has been going on. It is that understanding, that enlight-
enment, which precipitates the giving up or relinquishment of
assets.
To go a step further in this illustration, when lights came on the
saïkhàras or preparations pertaining to the film show got exposed
for what they are. In fact, saïkhàra is a word that has associations
with the dramatic tradition in its relation to the acting of actors and
actresses down to their make-up, which is so artificial and spuri-
ous.
When the cinema hall gets lit up all of a sudden, one who has
been enjoying the film show is momentarily thrown out of the
cinema world, because those preparations are pacified or nullified,
sabba saïkhàrasamatho. As a consequence of it, the heap of
experiences which he had hitherto regarded as real and genuine,
lose their sanction. Those assets get liquidated or relinquished,
sabbåpadhipañinissagga. In their absence, that craving necessary
for the appreciation or enjoyment of the scenes to come becomes
extinct, taõhakkhayo. When craving is gone, the floridity of the
scenes to come also fades away, viràga. With that fading away or
decolouration, the film show ceases for the person concerned,
nirodha, though technically the movie is going on. Because of that
cessation all the fires of defilements proper to the cinema world,
with which he was burning, get extinguished, Nibbàna.
So here we have the full gamut of the cinema simile as an illus-
tration for Nibbàna. This kind of awakening in the cinema world
gives us a clue to the fact that the assets, upadhi, are relinquished
through an understanding born of enlightenment in the light of
wisdom. This in fact is something that should be deeply ingrained
in our minds. Therefore we shall endeavour to give some more
illustrations to that effect.
5 See sermons 5, 7, 9, 11, 15.

In our everyday life, too, we sometimes see and hear of instanc-

es where assets get relinquished due to understanding. Someone
heaps up a huge bundle of currency notes of the highest denomina-
tion, deposits it in his safe and keeps watch and ward over it day
and night. One fine morning he wakes up to hear that for some
reason or other that currency note has been fully devalued by law
the previous night. How does he look upon the wads of notes in
his safe now? For him, it is now a mere heap of papers. The
craving, conceit and view he had earlier in regard to the notes are
completely gone. The bank notes are no longer valid. He might as
well make a bonfire of it. So this is some sort of relinquishment of
assets in the world, however temporary it may be.
Another person gets a sudden transfer and is getting ready to
leave for his new station. His immovable assets he is forced to
leave behind, but his movable assets he hurriedly gathers up to
take with him. The vehicle has already come and is tooting
impatiently, signalling delay. It is well past time, but his `prepara-
tions' are not finished. Time-pressed, in hot haste, he is running
here and there. At last, when he can delay no longer, he grabs the
utmost he can take and darts to the door step. Just then, he wakes
up. It was only a dream! The transfer came in a dream. No real
vehicle, no real preparation, only a panting for nothing!
So here we have an àwakening' peculiar to the dream world.
This is an instance of letting go of assets connected with a dream.
We go through such experiences quite often. Of course, we take it
for granted that when we pass from the dream world to the real
world, the assets proper to the dream world drop off. But are we
sure that in leaving the dream world we are entering a real world?
Is awakening from a dream a true awakening when considered
from the point of view of the Dhamma? Do we actually open our
eyes, when we awaken from a dream?
Terms like Buddha, bodhi and sambodhi convey the sense of
awakening as well as understanding. Sometimes in the Dhamma
the emphasis is on the sense of awakening. Here then is a kind of
awakening.
Expressions like dhammacakkhu, ßDhamma-eye,û pa¤¤à-

cakkhu, ßWisdom-eye,û and cakkhuü udapàdi, ßthe eye arose,û
bespeak of an arising of some sort of an eye. We already have
eyes, but an eye is said to arise. All this goes to show that in the
context of Nibbàna, where we are concerned with the deeper
aspects of the Dhamma, the awakening from a dream is not a true
awakening. It is only a passage from one dream world to another.
But let us see how the concept of upadhi, or assets, goes deeper.
What lies before us is the dream of saüsàra. In order to awaken
from this dream, we have to understand somehow the vanity of all
assets connected with the dream that is saüsàra. The fact that this
understanding also comes through some illumination we have
already explained the other day in our discussion of the paean of
joy at the end of the Bàhiyasutta.6 As we pointed out then, the
world of the six sense-bases which the worldlings regard as `their
world,' when examined against the background of that Udàna
verse reveals itself to be no more than six narrow beams of light,
appearing through a solidly thick curtain, namely the darkness of
delusion.
We happened to mention the other day that the sun, the moon
and the stars shine precisely because of the presence of darkness.
In the non-manifestative consciousness which is infinite and
lustrous all round, vi¤¤àõaü anidassanaü, anantaü sabbato
pabhaü, sun, moon and stars are not manifest, because there is
absolutely no darkness for them to shine forth. Even the formless,
which is the penumbra of form, disappears in that penetrative
lustre of wisdom.
So the relinquishment of all assets, Nibbàna, is not like the
other temporary awakenings already mentioned. Those three
instances of awakening are of a temporary nature. The awakening
in the cinema world is extremely short lived. That film fan,
although he became disenchanted with the scenes because of the
6 Ud 9, Bàhiyasutta; see sermon 15.

unexpected sudden illumination of the cinema hall, when it is dark

again, influxes of sensuality, existence and ignorance so over-
whelm him that he gets engrossed in the cinema world as before.
The case of the devalued currency note is also like that. Though
the cravings, conceits and views about the devalued note are gone,
one still runs after notes that are valid. As for the awakening from
a dream, we all know that it is temporary. When again we go to
sleep, we have dreams.
But the awakening in Nibbàna is not of such a temporary char-
acter. Why? Because all the influxes that lead one into the
saüsàric slumber with its dreams of recurrent births are made
extinct in the light of that perfect knowledge of realization. That is
why the term àsavakkhaya, extinction of influxes, is used in the
discourses as an epithet of Nibbàna. The arahants accomplish this
feat in the concentration on the fruit of arahant-hood, ara-
hattaphalasamàdhi.
Though there are enough instances of references to this ara-
hattaphalasamàdhi in the discourses, they are very often interpret-
ed differently. As we have already seen in the context of that verse
of uplift in the Bàhiyasutta, some discourses alluding to the nature
of an arahant's mind have been misinterpreted, so much so that
there is a lot of confusion in regard to the concept of Nibbàna. As
a matter of fact, that concentration peculiar to an arahant is of an
extraordinary type. It baffles the worldling's powers of under-
standing. This can well be inferred from the following verse of the
Ratanasutta:
Yaü Buddhaseññho parivaõõayã suciü,

samàdhim ànantarika¤¤am àhu,
samàdhinà tena samo na vijjati,
idampi Dhamme ratanaü paõãtaü,

etena saccena suvatthi hotu.7
ßThat pure concentration, which the Supremely

Awakened One extolled,
That concentration which the Noble Ones call
ìmmediate' (ànantarika),
There is no concentration comparable to it,
This is the excellent jewel nature of the Dhamma,
By the power of this truth may there be well-being.û
This incomparable and extraordinary concentration has given rise

to many problems concerning the concept of Nibbàna. The
extraordinariness of this concentration of the arahant is to some
extent connected with the term ànantarika, referred to above. Now
let us turn our attention to the significance of this term.
The verse says that the concentration of the arahant is also
known as ànantarika. The term ànantarika is suggestive of an
extraordinary aspect of the realization of Nibbàna. Immediately
after the extinction of the defilements through the knowledge of
the path of arahant-hood one realizes Nibbàna, the cessation of
existence or the cessation of the six sense-bases. As we mentioned
earlier, it is as if the results are out as soon as one has written for
an examination.8 One need not wait for the results. Realization is
immediate.
There is a special term to denote this experience of realization,
namely, a¤¤à. It is a highly significant term, derived from àjànàti,
ßto know fully.û A¤¤à is ßfull comprehension.û
The concentration of the fruit of arahant-hood is also called
a¤¤àphalasamàdhi and a¤¤àvimokkha. A¤¤à carries with it a high
degree of importance. We come across in the Sutta terminology a
8 See sermon 1.
number of terms derived from the root ¤à, ßto know,û namely
sa¤¤à, vi¤¤àõa, pa¤¤à, ¤àõa, abhi¤¤à, pari¤¤à, a¤¤à. Sa¤¤à is
ßperception,û vi¤¤àõa is, radically, ßdiscriminative knowledge,û
pa¤¤à is ßdistinctive knowledge,û ¤àõa is ßknowledgeû as such,
abhi¤¤à is ßspecialized knowledge,û pari¤¤à is ßcomprehensive
knowledge,û a¤¤à is that ßfinal knowledgeû of certitude through
realization. The high degree of importance attached to a¤¤à is
revealed by the following two verses in the Itivuttaka:
Sekhassa sikkhamànassa
ujumaggànusàrino
khayasmiü pañhamaü ¤àõaü
tato a¤¤à anantarà.
Tato a¤¤à vimuttassa,

¤àõaü ve hoti tàdino
akuppà me vimuttãti
bhavasaüyojanakkhaye.9
ßTo the disciple in higher training, as he fares along

Training according to the straight path,
There arises first the knowledge of extinction,
And then immediately the final knowledge of certitude.
ßAnd to that steadfast such-like-one,

Thus released by final knowledge of certitude,
There arises the thought: Ùnshakeable is my
deliverance,'
Upon the destruction of fetters of existence.û
It is evident from these two verses that the realization referred to is

in many ways final and complete. In point of fact, these two verses
9 It 53, Indriyasutta.
have been presented by the Buddha in this context by way of

defining three things relevant to the realization of Nibbàna. These
three are called faculties, indriya. They are:
1) ana¤¤àta¤¤àssàmãt'indriya
2) a¤¤indriya
3) a¤¤àtàvindriya
The term a¤¤à is implicit even in the faculty called

ana¤¤àta¤¤àssàmãt'indriya. Ana¤¤àta¤¤àssàmi means ßI shall
know what has not been fully known.û This is the definition of
what in the verse is referred to as khayasmiü pañhamaü ¤àõaü,
ßfirst there is the knowledge of extinction.û The knowledge of the
extinction of the defilements is called ana¤¤àta¤¤àssàmãt'indriya
in this context. The words tato a¤¤à anantarà, ßand then immedi-
ately the final knowledge of certitude,û refer to that faculty of final
knowledge, or a¤¤indriya. The knowledge that prompts the
conviction ßunshakeable is my deliveranceû is the knowledge and
vision of deliverance, which is defined as a¤¤àtàvindriya. It refers
to one who is endowed with the final knowledge of certitude.
The difference between a¤¤indriya and a¤¤àtàvindriya is a
subtle one. For instance, the expression bhuttàvã pavàrito, one has
finished eating and made a sign of refusal, decisively shows that
one has had one's fill.10 Similarly, it is that a¤¤àtàvindriya (note
the past active participle), which prompts the words ßunshakeable
is my deliverance,û akuppà me vimutti.11 The knowledge and
vision of deliverance is reassuring to that extent.
As the above quoted verse from the Ratanasutta makes it clear,
this unique and extraordinary concentration has been extolled by
the Buddha in various discourses. But for some reason or other,
10 Vin IV 82, Pàcittiya 35.

11 E.g. M I 167, Ariyapariyesanasutta.
the commentators have simply glossed over references to it,

though they sometimes expatiate on a particle of mere grammati-
cal interest. Let us now take up for comment a few such discours-
es.
In the section of the Elevens in the Aïguttara Nikàya there
comes a discourse called Sandhasutta. There the Buddha gives to
Venerable Sandha a description of a level of concentration
characteristic of an excellent thoroughbred of a man. It is a strange
type of concentration. One who has that concentration is described
as follows:
So neva pañhaviü nissàya jhàyati, na àpaü nissàya

jhàyati, na tejaü nissàya jhàyati, na vàyaü nissàya
jhàyati, na àkàsàna¤càyatanaü nissàya jhàyati, na
vi¤¤àõa¤càyatanaü nissàya jhàyati, na àki¤ca¤¤àya-
tanaü nissàya jhàyati, na nevasa¤¤ànàsa¤¤àyatanaü nis-
sàya jhàyati, na idhalokaü nissàya jhàyati, na para-lokaü
nissàya jhàyati, yam p'idaü diññhaü sutaü mutaü
vi¤¤àtaü pattaü pariyesitaü anuvicaritaü manasà, tam
pi nissàya na jhàyati, jhàyati ca pana.
Evaü jhàyiü ca pana, Sandha, bhadraü purisàjànãyaü

saindà devà sabrahmakà sapajapatikà àrakà 'va
namassanti:
Namo te purisàja¤¤a,
namo te purisuttama,
yassa te nàbhijànàma,
yampi nissàya jhàyasi.12
In this discourse, the Buddha gives, as an illustration, the musing

of a thoroughbred of a horse, which we shall drop for brevity's
12 A V 324, Sandhasutta.
sake. The musing of an excellent thoroughbred of a man is

described as follows:
ßHe muses not dependent on earth, water, fire, air, the

sphere of infinite space, the sphere of infinite conscious-
ness, the sphere of nothingness, the sphere of neither-
perception-nor-non-perception, he muses not dependent
on this world or on the world beyond, whatever is seen,
heard, sensed, cognized, attained, sought after, traversed
by the mind, dependent on all that he muses not Ý and yet
he does muse.
ßMoreover, Sandha, to him thus musing the devas with

Indra, with Brahmà and with Pajàpati even from afar bow
down, saying:
`Homage to you, O thoroughbred of a man,

Homage to you, O most excellent of men,
For what it is on which you go on musing,
We are at a loss to comprehend.'û
Though all possible objects of concentration are negated, the

Buddha affirms that he does muse. Venerable Sandha, out of
curiosity inquires: ßBut then how, Lord, does that thoroughbred of
a man muse?û The Buddha explains that while in that state of
concentration, the perception of earth in earth, for instance, is gone
for him, pathaviyà pathavãsa¤¤à vibhåtà hoti. So also in the case
of other objects of the senses, such as water, fire, air, down to
whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, attained, sought after
and traversed by the mind.
The verb vibhåtà, repeatedly used in this connection, is however
differently interpreted in the commentary. It is paraphrased by
pàkañà, which means ßclearly manifest.û13 This interpretation

seems to distort the meaning of the entire passage.
It is true that in certain contexts vibhåta and avibhåta are taken
to mean ßmanifestû and ßunmanifest,û since vibhava is a word
which seems to have undergone some semantic development.
However, its primary sense is sufficiently evident in the Sutta
terminology. For instance, the twin term bhava/vibhava stands for
ßexistenceû and ßnon-existence.û In this context, too, vibhåta
seems to have a negative sense, rather than the sense of being
manifest. Hence our rendering: ßT... he perception of earth is gone
for him.û
It is obvious enough by the recurrent negative particle in the
first part of the Sutta (neva pañhaviü nissàya jhàyati, na àpaü
nissàya jhàyati, etc.) that all those perceptions are negated and not
affirmed as manifest. The commentator seems to have missed the
true import of the Sutta when he interprets vibhåta to mean
`manifest.'
If further proof is required, we may quote instances where the
word vibhåta is used in the Suttas to convey such senses as
ßgone,û ßdepartedû or ßtranscended.û In one of the verses we
happened to quote earlier from the Kalahavivàdasutta, there was
the question posed: Kismiü vibhåte na phusanti phassà?14 ßWhen
what is not there, do touches not touch?û The verse that follows
gives the answer: Råpe vibhåte na phusanti phassà.15 ßWhen form
is not there, touches do not touch.û In this context, too, vibhåta
implies absence.
A clearer instance comes in the Posàlamàõavapucchà of the
Pàràyanavagga in the Sutta Nipàta, namely the term vibhåta-
råpasa¤¤issa, occurring in one of the verses there.16 The canonical
13 Mp V 80.
14 Sn 871, Kalahavivàdasutta; see sermon 11.
16 Sn 1113, Posàlamàõavapucchà.
commentary Cåëaniddesa, which the commentator often draws

upon, also paraphrases the term with the words vigatà, atikkantà,
samatikkantà, vãtivattà,17 ßgone, transcended, fully transcended,
and superseded.û
So the word vibhåta in the passage in question definitely im-
plies the absence of all those perceptions in that concentration.
This, then, is a unique concentration. It has none of the objects
which the worldlings usually associate with a level of concentra-
tion.
We come across a number of instances in the discourses, in
which the Buddha and some other monks have been interrogated
on the nature of this extraordinary concentration. Sometimes even
Venerable ânanda is seen to confront the Buddha with a question
on this point. In a discourse included in the section of the Elevens
in the Aïguttara Nikàya, Venerable ânanda questions on the
possibility of attaining to such a concentration with an air of
wonderment:
Siyà nu kho, bhante, bhikkhuno tathàråpo

samàdhipañilàbho yathà neva pathaviyaü pathavãsa¤¤ã
assa, na àpasmiü àposa¤¤ã assa, na tejasmiü tejosa¤¤ã
assa, na vàyasmiü vàyosa¤¤ã assa, na àkàsàna¤càyatane
àkàsà-na¤càyatanasa¤¤ã assa, na vi¤¤àõa¤càyatane
vi¤¤àõan-càyatanasa¤¤ã assa, na àki¤ca¤¤àyatane
àki¤ca¤¤à-yatanasa¤¤ã assa, na nevasa¤¤ànàsa¤¤àyatane
neva-sa¤¤ànàsa¤¤àyatanasa¤¤ã assa, na idhaloke
idhaloka-sa¤¤ã assa, na paraloke paralokasa¤¤ã assa, yam
pìdaü diññhaü sutaü mutaü vi¤¤àtaü pattaü pari-
yesitaü anuvicaritaü manasà tatràpi na sa¤¤ã assa, sa¤¤ã
ca pana assa?18
17 Nid II 166 (Burm. ed.)

18 A V 318, Sa¤¤àsutta.
ßCould there be, Lord, for a monk such an attainment of

concentration wherein he will not be conscious (literally
`percipient') of earth in earth, nor of water in water, nor of
fire in fire, nor of air in air, nor will he be conscious of the
sphere of infinite space in the sphere of infinite space, nor
of the sphere of infinite consciousness in the sphere of in-
finite consciousness, nor of the sphere of nothingness in
the sphere of nothingness, nor of the sphere of neither-
perception-nor-non-perception in the sphere of neither-
perception-nor-non-perception, nor will he be conscious of
a this world in this world, nor of a world beyond in a
world beyond, whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized,
attained, sought after, traversed by the mind, even of it he
will not be conscious Ý and yet he will be conscious?û
Whereas the passage quoted earlier began with so neva pathaviü

nissàya jhàyati, ßhe muses not dependent on earthû and ended with
the emphatic assertion jhàyati ca pana, ßand yet he does muse,û
here we have a restatement of it in terms of perception, beginning
with neva pathaviyaü pathavãsa¤¤ã and ending with sa¤¤ã ca pana
assa. The Buddha answers in the affirmative and on being ques-
tioned as to how it is possible he gives the following explanation:
Idh'ânanda, bhikkhu, evaü sa¤¤ã hoti: Etaü santaü, etaü

paõãtaü, yadidaü sabbasaïkhàrasamatho sabbåpad-
hipañinissaggo taõhakkhayo viràgo nirodho nibbànan'ti.
Evaü kho, ânanda, siyà bhikkhuno tathàråpo
samàdhipañilàbho . . .
ßHerein, ânanda, a monk is thus conscious (evaü sa¤¤ã):

This is peaceful, this is excellent, namely the stilling of all
preparations, the relinquishment of all assets, the destruc-
tion of craving, detachment, cessation, extinction. It is
thus, ânanda, that there could be for a monk such an
attainment of concentration . . .û
This, in fact, is the theme of all our sermons. Venerable ânanda,

of course, rejoiced in the Buddha's words, but approached
Venerable Sàriputta also and put forward the same question.
Venerable Sàriputta gave the same answer verbatim.
Then Venerable ânanda gave expression to a joyous approba-
tion: Acchariyaü àvuso, abbhutaü àvuso, yatra hi nàma satthu ca
sàvakassa ca atthena atthaü vya¤janena vya¤janaü saüsandis-
sati samessati na viggahissati, yad idaü aggapadasmiü. ßFriend,
it is wonderful, it is marvelous, that there is perfect conformity
between the statements of the teacher and the disciple to the letter
and to the spirit without any discord on the question of the highest
level of attainment.û
These last words, in particular, make it sufficiently clear that
this concentration is arahattaphalasamàdhi, the concentration
proper to an arahant. Here, then, is the experience of Nibbàna,
extraordinary and unique.
Quite a number of discourses touch upon this samàdhi. Let us
take up some of the more important references. Venerable ânanda
is seen to pose the same question, rephrased, on yet another
occasion. It runs thus:
Siyà nu kho, bhante, tathàråpo samàdhipañilàbho yathà

na cakkhuü manasikareyya, na råpaü manasikareyya, na
sotaü manasikareyya, na saddaü manasikareyya, na
ghànaü manasikareyya, na gandhaü manasikareyya,
na jivhaü manasikareyya, na rasaü manasikareyya, na
kàyaü manasikareyya, na phoññhabbaü manasikareyya,
na pathaviü manasikareyya, na àpaü manasikareyya,
na tejaü manasikareyya, na vàyaü manasikareyya, na
àkàsàna¤càyatanaü manasikareyya, na vi¤¤àõa¤cà-
yatanaü manasikareyya, na àki¤ca¤¤àyatanaü mana-
sikareyya, na nevasa¤¤ànàsa¤¤àyatanaü manasikareyya,
na idhalokaü manasikareyya, na paralokaü mana-
sikareyya, yam p'idaü diññhaü sutaü mutaü vi¤¤àtaü

pattaü pariyesitaü anuvicaritaü manasà tam pi na mana-
sikareyya, manasi ca pana kareyya?19

concentration wherein he will not be attending to the eye,
nor to form, nor to the ear, nor to sound, nor to the nose,
nor to smell, nor to the tongue, nor to taste, nor to the
body, nor to touch, nor to earth, nor to water, nor to fire,
nor to air, nor to the sphere of infinite space, nor to the
sphere of infinite consciousness, nor to the sphere of noth-
ingness, nor to the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-
perception, nor to this world, nor to the world beyond,
whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, attained, sought
after, traversed by the mind, even to that he will not be
attending Ý and yet he will be attending?û
ßThere could be such a concentration,û says the Buddha, and

Venerable ânanda rejoins with his inquisitive: ßHow, Lord, could
there be?û Then the Buddha gives the following explanation,
which tallies with the one earlier given:
Idh'ânanda, bhikkhu evaü manasi karoti: Etaü san-

taü, etaü paõãtaü, yadidaü sabbasaïkhàrasamatho
sabåpadhipañinissaggo taõhakkhayo viràgo nirodho
nibbànan'ti. Evaü kho, ânanda, siyà bhikkhuno tathàråpo
samàdhipañilàbho . . .
ßHerein, ânanda , a monk attends thus: This is peaceful,

this is excellent, namely the stilling of all preparations, the
relinquishment of all assets, the destruction of craving, de-
19 A V 321, Manasikàrasutta.
tachment, cessation, extinction. It is thus, ânanda, that

there could be such an attainment of concentration . . .û
In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are now in a position to

take up for comment that enigmatic verse of the Kalahavivà-
dasutta, which in a previous sermon we left unexplained, giving
only a slight hint in the form of a simile:20
Na sa¤¤asa¤¤ã na visa¤¤asa¤¤ã,
no pi asa¤¤ã na vibhåtasa¤¤ã,
evaü sametassa vibhoti råpaü,
sa¤¤ànidànà hi papa¤casaïkhà.21
The general trend of this verse seems to imply something like this:
The worldlings usually believe that one has to have some form of
perception or other. But the one referred to in this verse is not
percipient with any such perception, na sa¤¤asa¤¤ã. As if to
forestall the question, whether he is then in a swoon, there is the
negation na visa¤¤asa¤¤ã. A possible alternative, like a plane of
existence devoid of perception, is also avoided by the emphatic
assertion no pi asa¤¤ã. Yet another possibility, that he has gone
beyond perception or rescinded it, is rejected as well with the
words na vibhåtasa¤¤ã.
The third line says that it is to one thus endowed that form ceas-
es to exist, while the last line seems to give an indication as to why
it is so: Sa¤¤ànidànà hi papa¤casaïkhà, ßfor reckonings born of
proliferation have perception as their source.û
The nature of these reckonings we have already discussed at
length. The conclusion here given is that they are rooted in
papa¤ca. Now the passages we have so far quoted are suggestive
20 See sermon 11.

of such a state of consciousness. Briefly stated, even the emphatic

tone characteristic of these discourses is sufficient proof of it.
For instance, in the first discourse we took up for discussion,
there is the recurrent phrase na jhàyati, ßdoes not muse,û with
reference to all the possible objects of the senses, but at the end of
it all comes the emphatic assertion jhàyati ca pana, ßnevertheless,
he does muse.û Similarly the passage dealing with the sa¤¤à
aspect starts with neva pathaviyaü pathavisa¤¤ã, ßhe is neither
conscious (literally `percipient') of earth in earth,û followed by a
long list of negations, only to end up with an emphatic sa¤¤ã ca
pana assa, ßbut nevertheless he is conscious.û So also in the
passage which takes up the attending aspect and winds up with the
assertion manasi ca pana kareyya, ßand yet he will be attending.û
All this evidence is a pointer to the fact that we have to interpret
the reference to the paradoxical state of consciousness implied by
na sa¤¤asa¤¤ã na visa¤¤asa¤¤ã etc. in the Kalahavivàdasutta in
the light of that unique concentration of the arahant Ý the ara-
hattaphalasamàdhi.
This is obvious enough even if we take into consideration the
occurrence of the term papa¤casaïkhà in the last line of the verse
in question. The worldly concepts born of the prolific tendency of
the mind are rooted in perception. That is precisely why perception
has to be transcended. That is also the reason for our emphasis on
the need for freedom from the six sense-bases and from contact.
The abandonment of papa¤casaïkhà is accomplished at this
extraordinary level of concentration.
The immense importance attached to the arahattaphalasamàdhi
comes to light in the passages we have quoted. These discourses
are abundant proof of the fact that the Buddha has extolled this
samàdhi in various ways. The verse beginning with na sa¤¤asa¤¤ã
na visa¤¤asa¤¤ã in particular points to this fact.
On an earlier occasion we gave only a clue to its meaning in the
form of an allusion to our simile of the cinema. That is to say,
while one is watching a film show, if the cinema hall is fully
illuminated all of a sudden, one undergoes such an internal
transformation, that it becomes questionable whether he is still
seeing the film show. This is because his perception of the film
show has undergone a peculiar change. He is no longer conscious
of a film show, nor has he put an end to consciousness. It is a
strange paradox. His gaze is actually a vacant gaze.
The verse in question expresses such a vacant gaze. When the
six sense-bases of the arahant cease and the lustre of wisdom
comes up, giving the conviction that all assets in the world are
empty, the vision in the arahattaphalasamàdhi is as vacant as that
gaze of the man at the cinema. It is neither conscious, nor uncon-
scious, nor non-conscious, nor totally devoid of consciousness. At
that level of concentration even this material form is abandoned.
The line in the paean of joy in the Bàhiyasutta, which we came
across the other day, atha råpà aråpà ca, sukhadukkhà
pamuccati,22 ßand then from form and formless and from pleasure
and pain is he freed,û can be better appreciated in the light of the
foregoing discussion. With the relinquishment of all assets, even
this body and the experience of a form and of a formless, as well
as pleasure and pain, cease altogether due to the cessation of
contact. That is why Nibbàna is called a bliss devoid of feeling,
avedayita sukha.23
Now as to this vacant gaze, there is much to be said, though one
might think that it is not at all worth discussing about. If someone
asks us: `What is the object of the gaze of one with such a vacant
gaze,' what shall we say? The vacant gaze is, in fact, not estab-
lished anywhere (appatiññham). It has no existence (appavattaü)
and it is object-less (anàrammaõaü). Even at the mention of these
three terms, appatiññham, appavattaü, and anàrammaõaü, some
might recall those highly controversial discourses on Nibbàna.24
Why do we call the vision of the arahant a vacant gaze? At the
highest point of the development of the three characteristics

23 Ps III 115, aññhakathà on the Bahuvedanãyasutta.
24 Ud 80, Pañhamanibbànapañisaüyuttasutta.
impermanence, suffering and not-self, that is, through the three

deliverances animitta, appaõihita and su¤¤ata, the ßsigness,û the
ßundirectedû and the ßvoid,û the arahant is now looking at the
object with a penetrative gaze. That is why it is not possible to say
what he is looking at. It is a gaze that sees the cessation of the
object, a gaze that penetrates the object, as it were.
When the cinema hall is fully illuminated, the mind of the one
with that vacant gaze at the film show does not accumulate the
stuff that makes up a film. Why? Because all those cinema
preparations are now stilled, cinema assets are relinquished and
the craving and the passion for the cinema film have gone down, at
least temporarily, with the result that the cinema film has `ceased'
for him and he is èxtinguished' within. That is why he is looking
on with a vacant gaze. With this illustration one can form an idea
about the inner transformation that occurs in the arahant.
From the very outset the meditator is concerned with saïkhàras,
or preparations. Hence the term sabbasaïkhàrasamatha, the
stilling of all preparations, comes first. Instead of the arising
aspect of preparations, he attends to the cessation aspect, the
furthest limit of which is Nibbàna. It is for that reason that the
term nirodha is directly applied to Nibbàna.
Simply because we have recapitulated the terms forming the
theme of our sermons, some might think that the formula as such
is some form of a gross object of the mind. This, in fact, is the root
of the misconception prevalent today.
It is true that the Buddha declared that the arahant has as his
perception, attention and concentration the formula beginning with
etaü santaü etaü paõãtaü etc. But this does not mean that the
arahant in his samàdhi goes on reciting the formula as we do at
the beginning of every sermon. What it means is that the arahant
reverts to or re-attains the realization he has already won through
the lustre of wisdom, namely the realization of the stilling of all
preparations, the relinquishment of all assets, the total abandon-
ment of the five aggregates, the destruction of craving, dispassion,
cessation and extinguishment. That is what one has to understand
by the saying that the arahant attends to Nibbàna as his object.
The object is cessation, nirodha. Here is something that Màra

cannot grasp, that leaves him utterly clueless. This is why
Venerable Nandiya in the Nandiyatheragàthà challenges Màra in
the following verse:
Obhàsajàtaü phalagaü,
cittaü yassa abhiõhaso,
tàdisam bhikkhum àsajja
kaõha dukkhaü nigacchasi.25
ßThe monk whose mind is always bright,

And gone to the fruit of arahant-hood,
Should you dare to challenge that monk,
O Blackie, you only come to grief.û
Kaõha, Blackie, is one of the epithets of Mara. Even gods and

Brahmas are unable to find out the object of the arahant's mind
when he is in the phalasamàpatti, the attainment to the fruit. Màra
can never discover it. That is why this attainment is said to leave
Màra clueless or deluded (Màrassetaü pamohanaü).26 All this is
due to the uniqueness of this level of concentration.
The three deliverances animitta, appaõihita and su¤¤ata, are
indeed extraordinary and the verse na sa¤¤àsa¤¤ã refers to this
arahattaphalasamàdhi, which is signless, undirected and void.
Usually one's vision alights somewhere or picks up some object
or other, but here is a range of vision that has no horizon. In
general, there is a horizon at the furthest end of our range of
vision. Standing by the seaside or in a plain, one gazes upon a
horizon where the earth and sky meet. The worldling's range of
vision, in general, has such a horizon. But the arahant's range of
vision, as here described, has no such horizon. That is why it is
25 Th 25, Nandiyatheragàthà.
26 Dhp 274, Maggavagga.
called anantaü, endless or infinite. Vi¤¤àõaü anidassanaü,

anantaü sabbato pabhaü, ßthe non-manifestative consciousness,
endless, lustrous on all sides.û
That vacant gaze is an èndless' perception. One who has it
cannot be called conscious, sa¤¤ã. Nor can he be called uncon-
scious, visa¤¤ã Ý in the worldly sense of the term. Nor is he devoid
of consciousness, asa¤¤ã. Nor has he put an end to consciousness,
vibhåtasa¤¤ã.
Let us now take up two verses which shed a flood of light on
the foregoing discussion and help illuminate the meaning of
canonical passages that might come up later. The two verses are
from the Arahantavagga of the Dhammapada:
Yesaü sannicayo natthi,

ye pari¤¤àta bhojanà,
vimokkho yesa gocaro,
gati tesaü durannayà.
Yass'àsavà parikkhãõà,
àhàre ca anissito,
vimokkho yassa gocaro,
padaü tassa durannayaü.27
ßThose who have no accumulations,

And understood fully the subject of food,
And whose feeding ground
Is the void and the signless,
27 Dhp 92-93, Arahantavagga.

Their track is hard to trace,

Like that of birds in the sky.
ßHe whose influxes are extinct,

And is unattached to nutriment,
Whose range is the deliverance,
Of the void and the signless,
His path is hard to trace,
Like that of birds in the sky.û
The accumulation here meant is not of material things, such as

food. It is the accumulation of karma and upadhi, assets. The
comprehension of food could be taken to imply the comprehension
of all four nutriments, namely gross material food, contact, will
and consciousness. The feeding ground of such arahants is the
void and the signless. Hence their track is hard to trace, like that of
birds in the sky.
The term gati, which we rendered by ßtrack,û has been differ-
ently interpreted in the commentary. For the commentary gati is
the place where the arahant goes after death, his next borne, so to
speak.28 But taken in conjunction with the simile used, gati
obviously means the ßpath,û padaü, taken by the birds in the sky.
It is the path they take that cannot be traced, not their destination.
Where the birds have gone could perhaps be traced, with some
difficulty. They may have gone to their nests. It is the path they
went by that is referred to as gati in this context. Just as when
birds fly through the sky they do not leave behind any trace of a
path, even so in this concentration of the arahant there is no object
or sign of any continuity.
The second verse gives almost the same idea. It is in singular
and speaks of an arahant whose influxes are extinct and who is
unattached to nutriment. Here, in the simile about the birds in the
28 Dhp-a II 172.
sky, we find the word padaü, ßpath,û used instead of gati, which
makes it clear enough that it is not the destiny of the arahant that
is spoken of.
The commentary, however, interprets both gati and padaü as a
reference to the arahant's destiny. There is a tacit assumption of
some mysterious anupàdisesa Nibbànadhàtu. But what we have
here is a metaphor of considerable depth. The reference is to that
unique samàdhi.
The bird's flight through the air symbolizes the flight of the
mind. In the case of others, the path taken by the mind can be
traced through the object it takes, but not in this case. The key
word that highlights the metaphorical meaning of these verses is
gocaro. Gocara means ßpasture.û Now, in the case of cattle
roaming in their pasture one can trace them by their footsteps, by
the path trodden. What about the pasture of the arahants?
Of course, they too consume food to maintain their bodies, but
their true `pasture' is the arahattaphalasamàdhi. As soon as they
get an opportunity, they take to this pasture. Once they are well
within this pasture, neither gods nor Brahmas nor Màra can find
them. That is why the path taken by the arahants in the phalas-
amàdhi cannot be traced, like the track of birds in the sky.
We have yet to discuss the subject of sa-upàdisesa and
anupàdisesa Nibbànadhàtu. But even at this point some clarity of
understanding might emerge. When the arahant passes away, at
the last moment of his lifespan, he brings his mind to this ara-
hattaphalasamàdhi. Then not even Mara can trace him. There is
no possibility of a rebirth and that is the end of all. It is this
èxtinction' that is referred to here.
This extinction is not something one gets in a world beyond. It
is a realization here and now, in this world. And the arahant, by
way of blissful dwelling here and now, enjoys in his everyday life
the supreme bliss of Nibbàna that he had won through the incom-
parable deliverances of the mind.
Nibbàna Sermon 17



This is the seventeenth sermon in the series of sermons on
Nibbàna. In our last sermon, we tried to analyse some discourses
that give us a clue to understand what sort of an experience an
arahant has in his realization of the cessation of existence in the
arahattaphalasamàdhi.
We happened to mention that the arahant sees the cessation of
existence with a deeply penetrative vision of the void that may be
compared to a gaze that knows no horizon. We also dropped the
hint that the non-manifestative consciousness, endless and lustrous
on all sides, we had spoken of in an earlier sermon,2 is an explicit
reference to this same experience.
2 See especially sermon 7.
441
How the arahant, ranging in his triple pasture of the signless

deliverance, the undirected deliverance and the void deliverance,
animitta vimokkha, appaõihita vimokkha and su¤¤ata vimokkha,
gets free from the latency to perception, transcends the duality of
form and formless, and crosses over this ocean of existence
unhindered by Màra, has been described in various ways in
various discourses.
Let us now take up for discussion in this connection three sig-
nificant verses that are found in the Itivuttaka:
Ye ca råpåpagà sattà
ye ca aråpaññhàyino,
nirodhaü appajànantà
àgantàro punabbhavaü.
Ye ca råpe pari¤¤àya,
aråpesu asaõñhità,
nirodhe ye vimuccanti,
te janà maccuhàyino.
Kàyena amataü dhàtuü,

phusaytivà niråpadhiü,
upadhipañinissaggaü,
sacchikatvà anàsavo,
deseti sammàsambuddho,
asokaü virajaü padaü.3
ßThose beings that go to realms of form,

And those who are settled in formless realms,
Not understanding the fact of cessation,
Come back again and again to existence.
3 It 62, Santatara Sutta.

ßThose who, having comprehended realms of form,

Do not settle in formless realms,
Are released in the experience of cessation,
It is they that are the dispellers of death.
ßHaving touched with the body the deathless element,

Which is asset-less,
And realized the relinquishment of assets,
Being influx-free, the perfectly enlightened one,
Proclaims the sorrow-less, taintless state.û
The meaning of the first verse is clear enough. Those who are in
realms of form and formless realms are reborn again and again due
to not understanding the fact of cessation.
In the case of the second verse, there is some confusion as to the
correct reading. We have mentioned earlier, too, that some of the
deep discourses present considerable difficulty in determining
what the correct reading is.4 They have not come down with
sufficient clarity. Where the meaning is not clear enough, there is a
likelihood for the oral tradition to become corrupt. Here we
accepted the reading asaõñhità:
Ye ca råpe pari¤¤àya,
aråpesu asaõñhità,
ßThose who, having comprehended realms of form,

Do not settle in formless realms.û
But there is the variant reading susaõñhità, which gives the

meaning ßsettled well.û The two readings contradict each other
and so we have a problem here. The commentary accepts the
4 See sermon 7.
reading asaõñhità.5 We too followed it, for some valid reason and
not simply because it accords with the commentary.
However, in several modern editions of the text, the reading
asaõñhità has been replaced by susaõñhità, probably because it
seems to make sense, prima facie.
But, as we pointed out in this series of sermons, there is the
question of the dichotomy between the form and the formless. The
formless, or aråpa, is like the shadow of form, råpa. therefore,
when one comprehends form, one also understands that the
formless, too, is not worthwhile settling in. It is in that sense that
we brought in the reading asaõñhità in this context.
Those who have fully comprehended form, do not depend on
the formless either, and it is they that are released in the realization
of cessation. They transcend the duality of form and formless and,
by directing their minds to the cessation of existence, attain
emancipation.
In the last verse it is said that the Buddha realized the relin-
quishment of assets known as nirupadhi, the ßasset-less.û It also
says that he touched the deathless element with the body. In a
previous sermon we happened to quote a verse from the Udàna
which had the conclusive lines:
Phusanti phassà upadhiü pañicca,

Nirupadhiü kena phuseyyum phassà.6
ßTouches touch one because of assets,

How can touches touch him who is asset-less?û
According to this verse, it seems that here there is no touch. So

what we have stated above might even appear as contradictory.
The above verse speaks of a `touching' of the deathless element
5 It-a II 42.
6 Ud 12, Sakkàrasutta; see sermon 16.
with the body. One might ask how one can touch, when there is no
touch at all? But here we have an extremely deep idea, almost a
paradox.
To be free from touch is in itself the `touching' of the deathless
element.
What we mean to say is that, as far as the fear of death is con-
cerned, here we have the freedom from the pain of death and in
fact the freedom from the concept of death itself.
The Buddha and the arahants, with the help of that wisdom,
while in that arahattaphalasamàdhi described as anàsavà ceto-
vimutti pa¤¤àvimutti,7 or akuppà cetovimutti,8 let go of their entire
body and realized the cessation of existence, thereby freeing
themselves from touch and feeling. That is why Nibbàna is called
a bliss devoid of feeling, avedayita sukha.9
This giving up, this letting go when Màra is coming to grab and
seize, is a very subtle affair. To give up and let go when Màra
comes to grab is to touch the deathless, because thereby one is
freed from touch and feelings. Here, then, we have a paradox. So
subtle is this Dhamma!
How does one realize cessation? By attending to the cessation
aspect of preparations.
As we have already mentioned, to arise and to cease is of the
nature of preparations, and here the attention is on the ceasing
aspect. The worldlings in general pay attention to the arising
aspect. They can see only that aspect. The Buddhas, on the other
hand, have seen the cessation of existence in a subtle way. The
culmination of the practice of paying attention to the cessation
aspect of preparations is the realization of the cessation of exist-
ence.
7 This expression occurs e.g. at M I 35, âkaïkheyyasutta.

8 This expression occurs e.g. at S IV 297, Godattasutta.
Bhava, or existence, is the domain of Màra. How does one

escape from the grip of Màra? By going beyond his range of
vision, that is to say by attending to the cessation of existence,
bhavanirodha.
All experiences of pleasure and pain are there so long as one is
in bhava. The arahant wins to the freedom from form and form-
less and from pleasure and pain, as it was said in a verse already
quoted:
Atha råpà aråpà ca,

ßAnd then from form and formless,

And from pleasure and pain is he freed.û
We explained that verse as a reference to arahattaphalasamàdhi.

Here, too, we are on the same point. The concept of the cessation
of existence is indeed very deep. It is so deep that one might
wonder whether there is anything worthwhile in Nibbàna, if it is
equivalent to the cessation of existence.
As a matter of fact, we do come across an important discourse
among the Tens of the Aïguttara Nikàya, where Nibbàna is
explicitly called bhavanirodha. It is in the form of a dialogue
between Venerable ânanda and Venerable Sàriputta. As usual,
Venerable ânanda is enquiring about that extraordinary samàdhi:
Siyà nu kho, àvuso Sàriputta, bhikkhuno tathàråpo

samàdhipañilàbho yathà neva pathaviyaü pathavisa¤¤ã
àkàsàna¤càyatanasa¤¤ã assa, na vi¤¤àõa¤càyatane vi¤-
¤àõancàyatanasa¤¤ã assa, na àki¤ca¤¤àyatane àki¤ca¤-

¤àyatanasa¤¤ã assa, na nevasa¤¤ànàsa¤¤àyatane neva-

sa¤¤ànàsa¤¤àyatanasa¤¤ã assa, na idhaloke idhaloka-
sa¤¤ã assa, na paraloke paralokasa¤¤ã assa Ý sa¤¤ã ca
pana assa?11
ßCould there be, friend Sàriputta, for a monk such an at-

tainment of concentration wherein he will not be con-
scious of earth in earth, nor of water in water, nor of fire in
fire, nor of air in air, nor will he be conscious of the sphere
of infinite space in the sphere of infinite space, nor of the
sphere of infinite consciousness in the sphere of infinite
consciousness, nor of the sphere of nothingness in the
sphere of nothingness, nor of the sphere of neither-
perception-nor-non-perception, nor of a this world in this
world, nor of a world beyond in a world beyond Ý and yet
he will be conscious?û
Venerable Sàriputta's reply to it is: ßThere could be, friend

ânanda.û Then Venerable ânanda asks again: ßBut then, friend
Sàriputta, in which manner could there be such an attainment of
concentration for a monk?û
At that point Venerable Sàriputta comes out with his own expe-
rience, revealing that he himself once attained to such a samàdhi,
when he was at Andhavana in Sàvatthi. Venerable ânanda,
however, is still curious to ascertain what sort of perception he
was having, when he was in that samàdhi. The explanation given
by Venerable Sàriputta in response to it, is of utmost importance.
It runs:
Bhavanirodho nibbànaü, bhavanirodho nibbànan'ti kho

me, avuso, a¤¤à'va sa¤¤à uppajjati a¤¤à'va sa¤¤à
nirujjhati.
Seyyathàpi, àvuso, sakalikaggissa jhàyamànassa a¤¤à'va

acci uppajjati, a¤¤à'va acci nirujjhati, evam eva kho me
àvuso bhavanirodho nibbànaü, bhavanirodho nibbànam
'ti a¤¤à'va sa¤¤à uppajjati a¤¤à'va sa¤¤à nirujjhati,
bhavanirodho nibbànaü sa¤¤ã ca panàhaü, àvuso,
tasmiü samaye ahosiü.
ßOne perception arises in me, friend: `cessation of exist-

ence is Nibbàna,' `cessation of existence is Nibbàna,' and
another perception fades out in me: `cessation of existence
is Nibbàna,' `cessation of existence is Nibbàna.'
ßJust as, friend, in the case of a twig fire, when it is burn-

ing one flame arises and another flame fades out. Even so,
friend, one perception arises in me: `cessation of existence
is Nibbàna,' `cessation of existence is Nibbàna,' and an-
other perception fades out in me: `cessation of existence is
Nibbàna,' `cessation of existence is Nibbàna,' at that time,
friend, I was of the perception `cessation of existence is
Nibbàna.'û
The true significance of the simile of the twig fire is that

Venerable Sàriputta was attending to the cessation aspect of
preparations. As we mentioned in connection with the formula
etaü santaü, etaü paõãtaü, ßthis is peaceful, this is excellent,û
occurring in a similar context, we are not to conclude that
Venerable Sàriputta kept on repeating 'cessation of existence is
Nibbàna.'
The insight into a flame could be different from a mere sight of
a flame. Worldlings in general see only a process of burning in a
flame. To the insight meditator it can appear as an intermittent
series of extinctions. It is the outcome of a penetrative vision. Just
like the flame, which simulates compactness, existence, too, is a

product of saïkhàras, or preparations.
The worldling who attends to the arising aspect and ignores the
cessation aspect is carried away by the perception of the compact.
But the mind, when steadied, is able to see the phenomenon of
cessation: òhitaü cittaü vippamuttaü, vaya¤cassànupassati,12
ßThe mind steadied and released contemplates its own passing
away.û
With that steadied mind the arahant attends to the cessation of
preparations. At its climax, he penetrates the gamut of existence
made up of preparations, as in the case of a flame, and goes
beyond the clutches of death.
As a comparison for existence, the simile of the flame is quite
apt. We happened to point out earlier, that the word upàdàna can
mean ßgraspingû as well as ßfuel.û13 The totality of existence is
sometimes referred to as a fire.14 The fuel for the fire of existence
is grasping itself. With the removal of that fuel, one experiences
extinction.
The dictum bhavanirodho nibbànam clearly shows that
Nibbàna is the cessation of existence. There is another significant
discourse which equates Nibbàna to the experience of the cessa-
tion of the six sense-bases, saëàyatananirodha. The same experi-
ence of realization is viewed from a different angle. We have
already shown that the cessation of the six sense-bases, or the six
sense-spheres, is also called Nibbàna.15
The discourse we are now going to take up is one in which the
Buddha presented the theme as some sort of a riddle for the monks
to work out for themselves:
12 A III 379, Soõasutta.

13 See sermon 1.
14 S IV 19, âdittasutta.
Tasmàtiha, bhikkhave, se àyatane veditabbe yattha

cakkhu¤ca nirujjhati råpasa¤¤à ca virajjati, se àyatane
veditabbe yattha sota¤ca nirujjhati saddasa¤¤à ca viraj-
jati, se àyatane veditabbe yattha ghàna¤ca nirujjhati
gandhasa¤¤à ca virajjati, se àyatane veditabbe yattha
jivhà ca nirujjhati rasasa¤¤à ca virajjati, se àyatane
veditabbe yattha kàyo ca nirujjhati phoññabbasa¤¤à ca vi-
rajjati, se àyatane veditabbe yattha mano ca nirujjhati
dhammasa¤¤à ca virajjati, se àyatane veditabbe, se
àyatane veditabbe.16
ßTherefore, monks, that sphere should be known wherein

the eye ceases and perceptions of form fade away, that
sphere should be known wherein the ear ceases and per-
ceptions of sound fade away, that sphere should be known
wherein the nose ceases and perceptions of smell fade
away, that sphere should be known wherein the tongue
ceases and perceptions of taste fade away, that sphere
should be known wherein the body ceases and perceptions
of the tangible fade away, that sphere should be known
wherein the mind ceases and perceptions of mind objects
fade away, that sphere should be known, that sphere
should be known.û
There is some peculiarity in the very wording of the passage, when

it says, for instance, that the eye ceases, cakkhu¤ca nirujjhati and
perceptions of form fade away, råpasa¤¤à ca virajjati. As we once
pointed out, the word viràga, usually rendered by ßdetachment,û
has a nuance equivalent to ßfading awayû or ßdecolouration.û17
Here that nuance is clearly evident. When the eye ceases, percep-
tions of forms fade away.
16 S IV 98, Kàmaguõasutta.
17 See sermon 5.
The Buddha is enjoining the monks to understand that sphere,

not disclosing what it is, in which the eye ceases and perceptions
of form fade away, and likewise the ear ceases and perceptions of
sound fade away, the nose ceases and perceptions of smell fade
away, the tongue ceases and perceptions of taste fade away, the
body ceases and perceptions of the tangible fade away, and last of
all even the mind ceases and perceptions of mind objects fade
away. This last is particularly noteworthy.
Without giving any clue to the meaning of this brief exhorta-
tion, the Buddha got up and entered the monastery, leaving the
monks perplexed. Wondering how they could get it explained,
they approached Venerable ânanda and begged him to comment
at length on what the Buddha had preached in brief. With some
modest reluctance, Venerable ânanda complied, urging that his
comment be reported to the Buddha for confirmation. His com-
ments, however, amounted to just one sentence:
Saëàyatananirodhaü, kho àvuso, Bhagavatà sandhàya

bhàsitaü.
ßFriends, it is with reference to the cessation of the six

sense-spheres that the Exalted One has preached this ser-
mon.û
When those monks approached the Buddha and placed Venerable

ânanda's explanation before him, the Buddha ratified it. Hence it
is clear that the term àyatana in the above passage refers not to
any one of the six sense-spheres, but to Nibbàna, which is the
cessation of all of them.
The commentator, Venerable Buddhaghosa, too accepts this
position in his commentary to the passage in question. Saëàyat-
ananirodhan'ti saëàyatananirodho vuccati nibbànam, tam
sandhàya bhàsitan ti attho, ßThe cessation of the six sense-
spheres, what is called the cessation of the six sense-spheres is

Nibbàna, the meaning is that the Buddha's sermon is a reference
to it.û18
The passage in question bears testimony to two important facts.
Firstly that Nibbàna is called the cessation of the six sense-
spheres. Secondly that this experience is referred to as an àyatana,
or a `sphere.'
The fact that Nibbàna is sometimes called àyatana is further
corroborated by a certain passage in the Saëàyatanvibhaïgasutta,
which defines the term nekkhammasita domanassa.19 In that
discourse, which deals with some deeper aspects of the Dhamma,
the concept of nekkhammasita domanassa, or ßunhappiness
connected with renunciation,û is explained as follows:
ßIf one contemplates with insight wisdom the sense-objects like
forms and sounds as impermanent, suffering-fraught and transient,
and develops a longing for Nibbàna, due to that longing or
expectation one might feel an unhappiness. It is such an unhappi-
ness which, however, is superior to an unhappiness connected with
the household life, that is called nekkhammasita domanassa, or
ùnhappiness connected with renunciation.'û
How such an unhappiness may arise in a monk is described in
that discourse in the following manner:
`Kudàssu nàmàhaü tadàyatanaü upasampajja viharis-

sàmi yadariyà etarahi àyatanaü upasampajja viharanti?'
iti anuttaresu vimokkhesu pihaü upaññhàpayato uppajjati
pihàpaccayà domanassaü. Yaü evaråpaü domanassaü
idaü vuccati nekkhammasitadomanassaü.
ßÒ, when shall I attain to and dwell in that sphere to

which the Noble Ones now attain and dwell in?' Thus, as
18 Spk II 391.
19 M III 217, Saëàyatanavibhaïgasutta.
he sets up a longing for the incomparable deliverances,

there arises an unhappiness due to that longing. It is such
an unhappiness that is called unhappiness connected with
renunciation.û
What are called ßincomparable deliverancesû are the three door-

ways to Nibbàna, the signless, the undirected and the void. We can
therefore conclude that the sphere to which this monk aspires is
none other than Nibbàna. So here we have a second instance of a
reference to Nibbàna as a `sphere' or àyatana. Now let us bring up
a third:
Atthi, bhikkhave, tad àyatanaü, yattha n'eva pathavã na

àpo na tejo na vàyo na àkàsàna¤càyatanaü na vi¤¤à-
õàna¤càyatanaü na àki¤ca¤¤àyatanaü na nevasa¤¤ànà-
sa¤¤àyatanaü na ayaü loko na paraloko na ubho candi-
masåriyà. Tatra p'ahaü bhikkhave, n'eva àgatiü vadàmi
na gatiü na ñhitiü na cutiü na upapattiü, appatiññhaü
appavattaü anàrammaõaü eva taü. Es'ev'anto duk-
khassà'ti.20
Incidentally, this happens to be the most controversial passage on

Nibbàna. Scholars, both ancient and modern, have put forward
various interpretations of this much vexed passage. Its riddle-like
presentation has posed a challenge to many a philosopher bent on
determining what Nibbàna is.
This brief discourse comes in the Udàna as an inspired utter-
ance of the Buddha on the subject of Nibbàna, Nibbànapañisaü-
yuttasutta. To begin with, we shall try to give a somewhat literal
translation of the passage:
20 Ud 80, Pañhamanibbànapañisaüyuttasutta.
ßMonks, there is that sphere, wherein there is neither

earth, nor water, nor fire, nor air; neither the sphere of in-
finite space, nor the sphere of infinite consciousness, nor
the sphere of nothingness, nor the sphere of neither-
perception-nor-non-perception; neither this world nor the
world beyond, nor the sun and the moon. There, monks, I
say, is no coming, no going, no staying, no passing away
and no arising; it is not established, it is not continuing, it
has no object. This, itself, is the end of suffering.û
Instead of getting down to the commentarial interpretation at the

very outset, let us try to understand this discourse on the lines of
the interpretation we have so far developed. We have already
come across two references to Nibbàna as an àyatana or a sphere.
In the present context, too, the term àyatana is an allusion to
arahattaphalasamàdhi. Its significance, therefore, is psychologi-
cal.
First of all we are told that earth, water, fire and air are not there
in that àyatana. This is understandable, since in a number of
discourses dealing with anidassana vi¤¤àõa and arahattaphalas-
amàdhi we came across similar statements. It is said that in
anidassana vi¤¤àõa, or non-manifestative consciousness, earth,
water, fire and air do not find a footing. Similarly, when one is in
arahattaphalasamàdhi, one is said to be devoid of the perception
of earth in earth, for instance, because he does not attend to it. So
the peculiar negative formulation of the above Udàna passage is
suggestive of the fact that these elements do not exercise any
influence on the mind of one who is in arahattaphalasamàdhi.
The usual interpretation, however, is that it describes some kind
of a place or a world devoid of those elements. It is generally
believed that the passage in question is a description of the
`sphere' into which the arahant passes away, that is, his after
death `state.' This facile explanation is often presented only as a
tacit assumption, for fear of being accused of heretical views. But
it must be pointed out that the allusion here is to a certain level of
experience of the living arahant, namely the realization, here and

now, of the cessation of existence, bhavanirodha.
The four elements have no part to play in that experience. The
sphere of infinite space, the sphere of infinite consciousness etc.
also do not come in, as we have already shown with reference to a
number of discourses. So it is free from both form and formless.
The statement that there is neither this world nor a world be-
yond could be understood in the light of the phrase, na idhaloke
idhalokasa¤¤ã, na paraloke paralokasa¤¤ã, ßpercipient neither of a
this world in this world, nor of a world beyond in a world beyondû
that came up in a passage discussed above.
The absence of the moon and the sun, na ubho candima såriyà,
in this sphere, is taken as the strongest argument in favour of
concluding that Nibbàna is some kind of a place, a place where
there is no moon or sun.
But as we have explained in the course of our discussion of the
term anidassana vi¤¤àõa, or non-manifestative consciousness,
with the cessation of the six sense-spheres, due to the all lustrous
nature of the mind, sun and moon lose their lustre, though the
senses are all intact. Their lustre is superseded by the lustre of
wisdom. They pale away and fade into insignificance before it. It
is in this sense that the moon and the sun are said to be not there in
that sphere.
Why there is no coming, no going, no staying, no passing away
and no arising, can be understood in the light of what we have
observed in earlier sermons on the question of relative concepts.
The verbal dichotomy characteristic of worldly concepts is
reflected in this reference to a coming and a going etc. The
arahant in arahattaphalasamàdhi is free from the limitations
imposed by this verbal dichotomy.
The three terms appatiññhaü, appavattaü and anàrammaõaü,
ßnot established,û ßnot continuing,û and ßobject-less,û are sugges-
tive of the three doorways to deliverance. Appatiññhaü refers to
appaõihita vimokkha, ßundirected deliverance,û which comes
through the extirpation of craving. Appavattaü stands for su¤¤ata
vimokkha, the ßvoid deliverance,û which is the negation of
continuity. Anàrammaõaü is clearly enough a reference to

animitta vimokkha, the ßsignless deliverance.û Not to have an
object is to be signless.
The concluding sentence ßthis itself is the end of sufferingû is
therefore a clear indication that the end of suffering is reached here
and now. It does not mean that the arahant gets half of Nibbàna
here and the other half `there.'
Our line of interpretation leads to such a conclusion, but of
course, in case there are shortcomings in it, we could perhaps
improve on it by having recourse to the commentarial interpreta-
tion.
Now as to the commentarial interpretation, this is how the
Udàna commentary explains the points we have discussed:21 It
paraphrases the term àyatana by kàraõa, observing that it means
reason in this context. Just as much as forms stand in relation of an
object to the eye, so the asaïkhata dhàtu, or the ßunprepared
element,û is said to be an object to the arahant's mind, and here it
is called àyatana.
Then the commentary raises the question, why earth, water, fire
and air are not there in that asaïkhata dhàtu. The four elements
are representative of things prepared, saïkhata. There can not be
any mingling or juxtaposition between the saïkhata and the asaï-
khata. That is why earth, water, fire and air are not supposed to be
there, in that àyatana.
The question why there are no formless states, like the sphere of
infinite space, the sphere of infinite consciousness, the sphere of
nothingness, the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception,
is similarly explained, while asserting that Nibbàna is nevertheless
formless.
Since in Nibbàna one has transcended the sensuous sphere,
kàmaloka, the concepts of a this world and a world beyond are
21 Ud-a 389.
said to be irrelevant. As to why the sun and the moon are not there,
the commentary gives the following explanation:
ßIn realms of form there is generally darkness, to dispel which
there must be a sun and a moon. But Nibbàna is not a realm of
form, so how could sun and moon come in?û
Then what about the reference to a coming, a going, a staying, a
passing away and an arising? No one comes to Nibbàna from any-
where and no one goes out from it, no one stays in it or passes
away or reappears in it.
Now all this is mystifying enough. But the commentary goes on
to interpret the three terms appatiññhaü, appavattaü and
anàrammaõaü also in the same vein. Only that which has form
gets established and Nibbàna is formless, therefore it is not
established anywhere. Nibbàna does not continue, so it is ap-
pavattaü, or non-continuing. Since Nibbàna takes no object, it is
objectless, anàrammaõaü. It is as good as saying that, though one
may take Nibbàna as an object, Nibbàna itself takes no object.
So this is what the traditional interpretation amounts to. If there
are any shortcomings in our explanation, one is free to go for the
commentarial. But it is obvious that there is a lot of confusion in
this commentarial trend. Insufficient appreciation of the deep
concept of the cessation of existence seems to have caused all this
confusion.
More often than otherwise, commentarial interpretations of
Nibbàna leaves room for some subtle craving for existence,
bhavataõhà. It gives a vague idea of a place or a sphere, àyatana,
which serves as a surrogate destination for the arahants after their
demise. Though not always explicitly asserted, it is at least tacitly
suggested. The description given above is ample proof of this
trend. It conjures up a place where there is no sun and no moon, a
place that is not a place. Such confounding trends have crept in
probably due to the very depth of this Dhamma.
Deep indeed is this Dhamma and hard to comprehend, as the
Buddha once confided in Venerable Sàriputta with a trace of
tiredness:
Saïkhittenapi kho ahaü, Sàriputta, dhammaü deseyyaü,

vitthàrenapi kho ahaü, Sàriputta, dhammaü deseyyaü,
saïkhittenavitthàrenapi kho ahaü, Sàriputta, dhammaü
deseyyaü, a¤¤àtàro ca dullabhà.22
ßWhether I were to preach in brief, Sàriputta, or whether I

were to preach in detail, Sàriputta, or whether I were to
preach both in brief or in detail, Sàriputta, rare are those
who understand.û
Then Venerable Sàriputta implores the Buddha to preach in brief,

in detail and both in brief and in detail, saying that there will be
those who understand. In response to it the Buddha gives the
following instruction to Venerable Sàriputta:
Tasmàtiha, Sàriputta, evaü sikkhitabbaü: Ìmasmi¤ca sa-

vi¤¤àõake kàye ahaïkàramamaïkàramànànusayà na bha-
vissanti, bahiddhà ca sabbanimittesu ahaïkàrama-
maïkàramànànusayà na bhavissanti, ya¤ca cetovimuttiü
pa¤¤àvimuttiü upasampajja viharato ahaïkàramamaï-
kàramànànusayà na honti, ta¤ca cetovimuttiü pa¤¤à-
vimuttiü upasampajja viharissàmà'ti. Eva¤hi kho,
Sàriputta, sikkhitabbaü,
ßIf that is so, Sàriputta, you all should train yourselves

thus: In this conscious body and in all external signs there
shall be no latencies to conceits in terms of I-ing and my-
ing, and we will attain to and dwell in that deliverance of
the mind and that deliverance through wisdom whereby no
such latencies to conceits of I-ing and my-ing will arise.
Thus should you all train yourselves!û
22 A I 133, Sàriputtasutta.
The Buddha goes on to declare the final outcome of that training:
Ayaü vuccati, Sàriputta, bhikkhu acchecchi taõhaü

vàvattayi saüyojanaü sammà mànàbhisamayà antam
akàsi dukkhassa.
ßSuch a monk, Sàriputta, is called one who has cut off

craving, turned back the fetters, and by rightly understand-
ing conceit for what it is, has made an end of suffering.û
We find the Buddha summing up his exhortation by quoting two

verses from a Sutta in the Pàràyanavagga of the Sutta Nipàta,
which he himself had preached to the Brahmin youth Udaya. We
may mention in passing that among canonical texts, the Sutta
Nipàta was held in high esteem so much so that in a number of
discourses the Buddha is seen quoting from it, particularly from
the two sections Aññhakavagga and Pàràyanavagga. Now the two
verses he quotes in this instance from the Pàràyanavagga are as
follows:
Pahànaü kàmacchandànaü,
domanassàna cåbhayaü,
thãõassa ca panådanaü,
kukkuccànaü nivàraõaü,
Upekhàsatisaüsuddhaü,
dhammatakkapurejavaü,
a¤¤àvimokhaü pabråmi,
avijjàyappabhedanaü.23
ßThe abandonment of both sensuous perceptions,

And unpleasant mental states,
23 Sn 1106-1107, Udayamàõavapucchà.
The dispelling of torpidity,

And the warding off of remorse,
ßThe purity born of equanimity and mindfulness,

With thoughts of Dhamma forging ahead,
And blasting ignorance,
This I call the deliverance through full understanding.û
This is ample proof of the fact that the arahattaphalasamàdhi is

also called a¤¤àvimokkha. Among the Nines of the Aïguttara
Nikàya we come across another discourse which throws more light
on the subject. Here Venerable ânanda is addressing a group of
monks:
Acchariyaü, àvuso, abbhutam, àvuso, yàva¤cidaü tena

Bhagavatà jànatà passatà arahatà sammàsambuddhena
sambàdhe okàsàdhigamo anubuddho sattànaü visuddhiyà
sokapariddavànaü samatikkamàya dukkhadomanassànaü
atthaïgamàya ¤àyassa adhigamàya nibbànassa sacchi-
kiriyàya.
Tadeva nàma cakkhuü bhavissati te råpà ta¤càyatanaü

no pañisaüvedissati. Tadeva nàma sotaü bhavissati te
saddà ta¤càyatanaü no pañisaüvedissati. Tadeva nàma
ghànaü bhavissati te gandhà ta¤càyatanaü no pañisaü-
vedissati. Sà ca nàma jivhà bhavissati te rasà ta¤càya-
tanaü no pañisaüvedissati. So ca nàma kàyo bhavissati te
phoññhabbà ta¤càyatanaü no pañisaüvedissati.24
ßIt is wonderful, friends, it is marvelous, friends, that the

Exalted One who knows and sees, that Worthy One, fully
enlightened, has discovered an opportunity in obstructing
24 A IV 426, ânandasutta.
circumstances for the purification of beings, for the trans-

cending of sorrow and lamentation, for the ending of pain
and unhappiness, for the attainment of the right path, for
the realization of Nibbàna.
ßIn as much as that same eye will be there, those forms

will be there, but one will not be experiencing the appro-
priate sense-sphere. That same ear will be there, those
sounds will be there, but one will not be experiencing the
appropriate sense-sphere. That same nose will be there,
those smells will be there, but one will not be experiencing
the appropriate sense-sphere. That same tongue will be
there, those flavours will be there, but one will not be ex-
periencing the appropriate sense-sphere. That same body
will be there, those tangibles will be there, but one will not
be experiencing the appropriate sense-sphere.û
What is so wonderful and marvelous about this newly discovered

opportunity is that, though apparently the senses and their corre-
sponding objects come together, there is no experience of the
appropriate spheres of sense contact. When Venerable ânanda had
described this extraordinary level of experience in these words,
Venerable Udàyã raised the following question:
Sa¤¤ãmeva nu kho àvuso ânanda, tadàyatanaü no pañi-

saüvedeti udàhu asa¤¤ã?
ßFriend, is it the fact that while being conscious one is not

experiencing that sphere or is he unconscious at that
time?û
Venerable ânanda affirms that it is while being conscious, sa¤¤ã-

meva, that such a thing happens. Venerable Udàyã's cross-question
gives us a further clue to the riddle like verse we discussed earlier,
beginning with na sa¤¤a sa¤¤ã na visa¤¤a sa¤¤ã.
It is indeed puzzling why one does not experience those sense-

objects, though one is conscious. As if to drive home the point,
Venerable ânanda relates how he once answered a related ques-
tion put to him by the nun Jañilagàhiyà when he was staying at the
Deer Park in A¤janavana in Sàketa. The question was:
Yàyaü, bhante ânanda, samàdhi na càbhinato na

càpanato na ca sasaïkhàraniggayhavàritavato, vimuttattà
ñhito, ñhitattà santusito, santusitattà no paritassati. Ayaü,
bhante, samàdhi kiüphalo vutto Bhagavatà?
ßThat concentration, Venerable ânanda, which is neither

turned towards nor turned outwards, which is not a vow
constrained by preparations, one that is steady because of
freedom, contented because of steadiness and not hanker-
ing because of contentment, Venerable Sir, with what fruit
has the Exalted One associated that concentration?û
The question looks so highly compressed that the key words in it

might need some clarification. The two terms abhinata and
apanata are suggestive of lust and hate, as well as introversion and
extroversion. This concentration is free from these extreme
attitudes. Whereas in ordinary concentration saïkhàras, or
preparations, exercise some degree of control as the term
vikkhambhana, ßpropping up,û ßsuppression,û suggests, here there
is no implication of any forcible action as in a vow. Here the
steadiness is born of freedom from that very constriction.
Generally, the steadiness characteristic of a level of concentra-
tion is not much different from the apparent steadiness of a
spinning top. It is the spinning that keeps the top up. But here the
very freedom from that spinning has brought about a steadiness of
a higher order, which in its turn gives rise to contentment.
The kind of peace and contentment that comes with samàdhi in

general is brittle and irritable. That is why it is sometimes called
kuppa pañicca santi, ßpeace subject to irritability.û25 Here, on the
contrary, there is no such irritability.
We can well infer from this that the allusion is to akuppà ceto-
vimutti, ßunshakeable deliverance of the mind.û The kind of
contentment born of freedom and stability is so perfect that it
leaves no room for hankering, paritassanà.
However, the main point of the question posed by that nun
amounts to this: What sort of a fruit does a samàdhi of this
description entail, according to the words of the Exalted One?
After relating the circumstances connected with the above ques-
tion as a flashback, Venerable ânanda finally comes out with the
answer he had given to the question:
Yàyaü, bhagini, samàdhi na càbhinato na càpanato na ca

sasaïkhàraniggayhavàritavato, vimuttattà ñhito, ñhitattà
santusito, santusitattà no paritassati, ayaü, bhagini,
samàdhi a¤¤àphalo vutto Bhagavatà.
ßSister, that concentration which is neither turned towards

nor turned outwards, which is not a vow constrained by
preparations, one that is steady because of freedom, con-
tented because of steadiness and not hankering because of
contentment, that concentration, sister, has been declared
by the Buddha to have full understanding as its fruit.û
A¤¤à, or full understanding, is one that comes with realization

conferring certitude and it is the fruit of the concentration de-
scribed above. Then, as if coming back to the point, Venerable
ânanda adds: Evaü sa¤¤ãpi kho, àvuso, tad àyatanaü no pañi-
saüvedeti. ßBeing thus conscious, too, friend, one does not

experience an appropriate sphere of sense.û
So now we have garnered sufficient evidence to substantiate the
claims of this extraordinary arahattaphalasamàdhi. It may also be
mentioned that sometimes this realization of the arahant is
summed up in a sentence like anàsavaü cetovimuttiü pa¤¤àvi-
muttiü diññheva dhamme sayaü abhi¤¤à sacchikatvà upasampajja
viharati,26 ßhaving realized by himself through higher knowledge
here and now the influx-free deliverance of the mind and deliver-
ance through wisdom, he dwells having attained to it.û
There is another significant discourse in the section of the Fours
in the Aïguttara Nikàya which throws some light on how one
should look upon the arahant when he is in arahattaphalasamà-
dhi. The discourse deals with four types of persons, namely:
1) anusotagàmã puggalo, ßdownstream bound person.û

2) pañisotagàmã puggalo, ßupstream bound person.û
3) ñhitatto puggalo, ßstationary person.û
4) tiõõo pàragato thale tiññhati bràhmaõo, ßthe Brahmin
standing on dry ground having crossed over and gone
beyond.û27
The first type of person indulges in sense pleasures and commits

evil deeds and is thus bound downstream in saüsàra. The second
type of person refrains from indulgence in sense pleasures and
from evil deeds. His upstream struggle is well expressed in the
following sentence: Sahàpi dukkhena sahàpi domanassena
assumukhopi rudamàno paripuõõaü parisuddhaü brahmacari-
yaü carati, ßEven with pain, even with displeasure, with tearful
26 E.g. D I 156, Mahàlisutta.

27 A II 5, Anusotasutta.
face and crying he leads the holy life in its fullness and perfec-
tion.û
The third type, the stationary, is the non-returner who, after
death, goes to the Brahma world and puts an end to suffering
there, without coming back to this world.
It is the fourth type of person who is said to have crossed over
and gone to the farther shore, tiõõo pàragato, and stands there,
thale tiññhati. The word brahmin is used here as an epithet of an
arahant. This riddle-like reference to an arahant is explained there
with the help of the more thematic description àsavànaü khayà
anàsavaü cetovimuttiü pa¤¤àvimuttiü diññheva dhamme sayaü
abhi¤¤à sacchikatvà upasampajja viharati, ßwith the extinction of
influxes he attains to and abides in the influx free deliverance of
the mind and deliverance through wisdom.û
This brings us to an extremely deep point in our discussion on
Nibbàna. If the arahant in arahattaphalasamàdhi is supposed to
be standing on the farther shore, having gone beyond, what is the
position with him when he is taking his meals or preaching in his
everyday life? Does he now and then come back to this side?
Whether the arahant, having gone to the farther shore, comes
back at all is a matter of dispute. The fact that it involves some
deeper issues is revealed by some discourses touching on this
question.
The last verse of the Paramaññhakasutta of the Sutta Nipàta, for
instance, makes the following observation:
Na kappayanti na purekkharonti,
dhammà pi tesaü na pañicchitàse,
na bràhmaõo sãlavatena neyyo,
pàraügato na pacceti tàdi.28
28 Sn 803, Paramaññhakasutta.
ßThey, the arahants, do not formulate or put forward

views,
They do not subscribe to any views,
The true Brahmin is not liable to be led astray by cere-
monial rites and ascetic vows,
The Such like One, who has gone to the farther shore,
comes not back.û
It is the last line that concerns us here. For the arahant it uses the
term tàdã, a highly significant term which we came across earlier
too. The rather literal rendering ßsuch-likeû stands for steadfast-
ness, for the unwavering firmness to stand one's ground. So, the
implication is that the arahant, once gone beyond, does not come
back. The steadfastness associated with the epithet tàdã is rein-
forced in one Dhammapada verse by bringing in the simile of the
firm post at the city gate: Indakhãlåpamo tàdi subbato,29 ßwho is
steadfast and well conducted like the pillar at the city gate.û
The verse in question, then, points to the conclusion that the
steadfast one, the arahant, who has attained supramundane
freedom, does not come back.
29 Dhp 95, Arahantavagga.

Nibbàna Sermon 18



This is the eighteenth sermon in the series of sermons on
Nibbàna. We happened to mention, in our last sermon, that many
of the discourses dealing with the subject of Nibbàna, have been
misinterpreted, due to a lack of appreciation of the fact that the
transcendence of the world and crossing over to the farther shore
of existence have to be understood in a psychological sense.
The view that the arahant at the end of his life enters into an
absolutely existing asaïkhata dhàtu, or ùnprepared element,'
seems to have received acceptance in the commentarial period. In
the course of our last sermon, we made it very clear that some of
the discourses cited by the commentators in support of that view
deal, on the contrary, with some kind of realization the arahant
467
goes through here and now, in this very life, in this very world Ý a
realization of the cessation of existence, or the cessation of the six
sense-spheres.
Even when the Buddha refers to the arahant as the Brahmin
who, having gone beyond, is standing on the farther shore,2 he was
speaking of the arahant who has realized, in this very life, the
influx-free deliverance of the mind and deliverance through
wisdom, in his concentration of the fruit of arahant-hood.
Therefore, on the strength of this evidence, we are compelled to
elicit a subtler meaning of the concept of `this shore' and the
`farther shore' from these discourses dealing with Nibbàna than is
generally accepted in the world. Our sermon today is especially
addressed to that end.
As we mentioned before, if one is keen on getting a solution to
the problems relating to Nibbàna, the discourses we are now
taking up for discussion might reveal the deeper dimensions of
that problem. We had to wind up our last sermon while drawing
out the implications of the last line in the Paramaññhakasutta of the
Sutta Nipàta: pàraügato na pacceti tàdi.3 We drew the inference
that the steadfast one, the arahant, who is such-like, once gone to
the farther shore, does not come back.
We find, however, quite a different idea expressed in a verse of
the Nàlakasutta in the Sutta Nipàta. The verse, which was the
subject of much controversy among the ancients, runs as follows:
Uccàvàca hi pañipadà,
samaõena pakàsità,
na pàraü diguõaü yanti,
na idaü ekaguõaü mutaü.4
2 E.g. It 57, Dutiyaràgasutta: tiõõo pàraü gato thale tiññhati bràhmaõo.

4 Sn 714, Nàlakasutta.
ßHigh and low are the paths,

Made known by the recluse,
They go not twice to the farther shore,
Nor yet is it to be reckoned a going once.û
The last two lines seem to contradict each other. There is no going
twice to the farther shore, but still it is not to be conceived as a
going once.
Now, as for the first two lines, the high and low paths refer to
the modes of practice adopted, according to the grades of under-
standing in different character types. For instances, the highest
grade of person attains Nibbàna by an easy path, being quick-
witted, sukhà pañipadà khippàbhi¤¤à, whereas the lowest grade
attains it by a difficult path, being relatively dull-witted, dukkhà
pañipadà dandhàbhi¤¤à.5
The problem lies in the last two lines. The commentary tries to
tackle it by interpreting the reference to not going twice to the
farther shore, na pàraü diguõaü yanti, as an assertion that there is
no possibility of attaining Nibbàna by the same path twice,
ekamaggena dvikkhattuü nibbànaü na yanti.6 The implication is
that the supramundane path of a stream-winner, a once-returner or
a non-returner arises only once. Why it is not to be conceived as a
going once is explained as an acceptance of the norm that requires
not less than four supramundane paths to attain arahant-hood.
However, a deeper analysis of the verse in question would re-
veal the fact that it effectively brings up an apparent contradiction.
The commentary sidetracks by resolving it into two different
problems. The two lines simply reflect two aspects of the same
problem.
They go not twice to the farther shore, and this not going twice,
na idaü, is however not to be thought of as a `going once' either.
5 Cf. e.g. A II 149, Saükhittasutta.

6 Pj II 498.
The commentary sidetracks by taking idaü, `this,' to mean the

farther shore, pàraü, whereas it comprehends the whole idea of
not going twice. Only then is the paradox complete.
In other words, this verse concerns the such-like one, the ara-
hant, and not the stream-winner, the once-returner or the non-
returner. Here we have an echo of the idea already expressed as
the grand finale of the Paramaññhakasutta: pàraügato na pacceti
tàdi,7 the such-like one, ßgone to the farther shore, comes not
back.û
It is the last line, however, that remains a puzzle. Why is this
`not going twice,' not to be thought of as a `going once?' There
must be something deep behind this riddle.
Now, for instance, when one says Ì won't go there twice,' it
means that he will go only once. When one says Ì won't tell
twice,' it follows that he will tell only once. But here we are told
that the arahant goes not twice, and yet it is not a going once.
The idea behind this riddle is that the influx-free arahant, the
such-like-one, gone to the farther shore, which is supramundane,
does not come back to the mundane. Nevertheless, he apparently
comes back to the world and is seen to experience likes and
dislikes, pleasures and pains, through the objects of the five
senses. From the point of view of the worldling, the arahant has
come back to the world. This is the crux of the problem.
Why is it not to be conceived of as a going once? Because the
arahant has the ability to detach himself from the world from time
to time and re-attain to that arahattaphalasamàdhi. It is true that
he too experiences the objects of the five external senses, but now
and then he brings his mind to dwell in that arahattaphalas-
amàdhi, which is like standing on the farther shore.
Here, then, we have an extremely subtle problem. When the
arahant comes back to the world and is seen experiencing the
objects of the five senses, one might of course conclude that he is
actually ìn the world.' This problematic situation, namely the

question how the influx-free arahant, gone to the farther shore,
comes back and takes in objects through the senses, the Buddha
resolves with the help of a simple simile, drawn from nature. For
instance, we read in the Jaràsutta of the Sutta Nipàta the follow-
ing scintillating lines:
Udabindu yathà pi pokkhare,

padume vàri yathà na lippati,
evaü muni nopalippati,
yadidaü diññhasutammutesu và.8
ßLike a drop of water on a lotus leaf,

Or water that taints not the lotus petal,
So the sage unattached remains,
In regard to what is seen, heard and sensed.û
So the extremely deep problem concerning the relation between

the supramundane and the mundane levels of experience, is
resolved by the Buddha by bringing in the simile of the lotus petal
and the lotus leaf.
Let us take up another instance from the Màgandiyasutta of the
Sutta Nipàta:
Yehi vivitto vicareyya loke,

na tàni uggayha vadeyya nàgo,
elambujaü kaõñakaü vàrijaü yathà,
jalena paükena anåpalittaü,
evaü munã santivàdo agiddho,
kàme ca loke ca anåpalitto.9
9 Sn 845, Màgandiyasutta.
ßDetached from whatever views, the arahant wanders in

the world,
He would not converse, taking his stand on them,
Even as the white lotus, sprung up in the water,
Yet remains unsmeared by water and mud,
So is the sage, professing peace and free from greed,
Unsmeared by pleasures of sense and things of the world.û
Among the Tens of the Aïguttara Nikàya we come across a

discourse in which the Buddha answers a question put by Venera-
ble Bàhuna. At that time the Buddha was staying near the pond
Gaggara in the city of Campa. Venerable Bàhuna's question was:
Katãhi nu kho, bhante, dhammehi tathàgato nissaño visaüyutto
vippamutto vimariyàdikatena cetasà viharati?10
ßDetached, disengaged and released from how many things
does the Tathàgata dwell with an unrestricted mind?û The Bud-
dha's answer to the question embodies a simile, aptly taken from
the pond, as it were:
Dasahi kho, Bàhuna, dhammehi tathàgato nissaño

visaüyutto vippamutto vimariyàdikatena cetasà viharati.
Katamehi dasahi? Råpena kho, Bàhuna, Tathàgato nissa-
ño visaüyutto vippamutto vimariyàdikatena cetasà vihara-
ti, vedanàya . . . sa¤¤àya . . . saïkhàrehi . . . vi¤¤àõena . . .
jàtiyà . . . jaràya . . . maraõena . . . dukkhehi . . . kilesehi
kho, Bàhuna, Tathàgato nissaño visaüyutto vippamutto
vimariyàdikatena cetasà viharati.
Seyyathàpi, Bàhuna, uppalaü và padumaü và

puõóarãkaü và udake jàtaü udake saüvaóóhaü udakà
accugamma tiññhati anupalittaü udakena, evam eva kho
10 A V 151, Bàhunasutta.
Bàhuna Tathàgato imehi dasahi dhammehi nissaño

visaüyutto vippamutto vimariyàdikatena cetasà viharati.
ßDetached, disengaged and released from ten things,

Bàhuna, does the Tathàgata dwell with a mind unrestrict-
ed. Which ten? Detached, disengaged and released from
form, Bàhuna, does the Tathàgata dwell with a mind unre-
stricted; detached, disengaged and released from feel-
ing . . . from perceptions . . . from preparations . . . from
consciousness . . . from birth . . . from decay . . . from
death . . . from pains . . . from defilements, Bàhuna, does
the Tathàgata dwell with a mind unrestricted.
ßJust as, Bàhuna, a blue lotus, a red lotus, or a white lotus,

born in the water, grown up in the water, rises well above
the water and remains unsmeared by water, even so,
Bàhuna, does the Tathàgata dwell detached, disengaged
and released from these ten things with a mind unrestrict-
ed.û
This discourse, in particular, highlights the transcendence of the

Tathàgata, though he seems to take in worldly objects through the
senses. Even the release from the five aggregates is affirmed.
We might wonder why the Tathàgata is said to be free from
birth, decay and death, since, as we know, he did grow old and
pass away. Birth, decay and death, in this context, do not refer to
some future state either. Here and now the Tathàgata is free from
the concepts of birth, decay and death.
In the course of our discussion of the term papa¤ca, we had
occasion to illustrate how one can be free from such concepts.11 If
concepts of birth, decay and death drive fear into the minds of
worldlings, such is not the case with the Tathàgata. He is free
11 See sermon 12.

from such fears and forebodings. He is free from defilements as

well.
The discourse seems to affirm that the Tathàgata dwells de-
tached from all these ten things. It seems, therefore, that the
functioning of the Tathàgata's sense-faculties in his everyday life
also should follow a certain extraordinary pattern of detachment
and disengagement. In fact, Venerable Sàriputta says something to
that effect in the Saëàyatanasaüyutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya:
Passati Bhagavà cakkhunà råpaü, chandaràgo Bhagavato
natthi, suvimuttacitto Bhagavà.12 ßThe Exalted One sees forms
with the eye, but there is no desire or attachment in him, well freed
in mind is the Exalted One.û
We come across a similar statement made by the brahmin youth
Uttara in the Brahmàyusutta of the Majjhima Nikàya, after he had
closely followed the Buddha for a considerable period to verify the
good report of his extraordinary qualities:
Rasapañisaüvedã kho pana so bhavaü Gotamo àhàraü àhàreti,
no rasaràgapañisaüvedã.13 ßExperiencing taste Master Gotama
takes his food, but not experiencing any attachment to the taste.û
It is indeed something marvelous. The implication is that there
is such a degree of detachment with regard to things experienced
by the tongue, even when the senses are taking in their objects.
One can understand the difference between the mundane and the
supramundane, when one reflects on the difference between
experiencing taste and experiencing an attachment to taste.
Not only with regard to the objects of the five senses, but even
with regard to mind-objects, the emancipated one has a certain
degree of detachment. The arahant has realized that they are not
`such.' He takes in concepts, and even speaks in terms of Ì' and
`mine,' but knows that they are false concepts, as in the case of a
child's language,
12 S IV 164, Koññhikasutta.
13 M II 138, Brahmàyusutta.
There is a discourse among the Nines of the Aïguttara Nikàya

which seems to assert this fact. It is a discourse preached by
Venerable Sàriputta to refute a wrong viewpoint taken by a monk
named Chandikàputta:
Evaü sammà vimuttacittassa kho, àvuso, bhikkhuno bhusà

cepi cakkhuvi¤¤eyyà råpà cakkhussa àpàthaü àgacchanti,
nevassa cittaü pariyàdiyanti, amissãkatamevassa cittaü
hoti ñhitaü àne¤jappattaü, vayaü cassànupassati. Bhusà
cepi sotavi¤¤eyyà saddà . . . bhåsa cepi ghànavi¤¤eyyà
gandhà . . . bhåsa cepi jivhàvi¤¤eyyà rasà . . . bhåsa cepi
kàyavi¤¤eyyà phoññhabbà . . . bhåsa cepi manovi¤¤eyyà
dhammà manassa àpàthaü àgacchanti, nevassa cittaü
pariyàdiyanti, amissãkatamevassa cittaü hoti ñhitaü
àne¤jappattaü, vayaü cassànupassati.14
ßFriend, in the case of a monk who is fully released, even

if many forms cognizable by the eye come within the
range of vision, they do not overwhelm his mind, his mind
remains unalloyed, steady and unmoved, he sees its pass-
ing away. Even if many sounds cognizable by the ear
come within the range of hearing . . . even if many smells
cognizable by the nose . . . even if many tastes cognizable
by the tongue . . . even if many tangibles cognizable by the
body . . . even if many mind-objects cognizable by the
mind come within the range of the mind, they do not
overwhelm his mind, his mind remains unalloyed, steady
and unmoved, he sees its passing away.û
So here we have the ideal of the emancipated mind. Generally, a

person unfamiliar with the nature of a lotus leaf or a lotus petal, on
14 A IV 404, Silàyåpasutta.
seeing a drop of water on a lotus leaf or a lotus petal would think

that the water drop smears them.
Earlier we happened to mention that there is a wide gap be-
tween the mundane and the supramundane. Some might think that
this refers to a gap in time or in space. In fact it is such a concep-
tion that often led to various misinterpretations concerning
Nibbàna. The supramundane seems so far away from the mun-
dane, so it must be something attainable after death in point of
time. Or else it should be far far away in outer space. Such is the
impression made in general.
But if we go by the simile of the drop of water on the lotus leaf,
the distance between the mundane and the supramundane is the
same as that between the lotus leaf and the drop of water on it.
We are still on the problem of the hither shore and the farther
shore. The distinction between the mundane and the supramun-
dane brings us to the question of this shore and the other shore.
The arahant's conception of this shore and the other shore
differs from that of the worldling in general. If, for instance, a
native of this island goes abroad and settles down there, he might
even think of a return to his country as a `going abroad.' Similarly,
as far as the emancipated sage is concerned, if he, having gone to
the farther shore, does not come back, one might expect him to
think of this world as the farther shore.
But it seems the arahant has no such distinction. A certain
Dhammapada verse alludes to the fact that he has transcended this
dichotomy:
Yassa pàraü apàraü và,

pàràpàraü na vijjati,
vãtaddaraü visaüyuttaü,
tam ahaü bråmi bràhmaõaü.15

This is a verse we have quoted earlier too, in connection with the

question of the verbal dichotomy.16 Yassa pàraü apàraü và,
pàràpàraü na vijjati, ßto whom there is neither a farther shore, nor
a hither shore, nor both.û That is to say, he has no discrimination
between the two. Vãtaddaraü visaüyuttaü, tam ahaü bråmi
bràhmaõaü, ßwho is free from pangs of sorrow and entangle-
ments, him I call a Brahmin.û
This means that the arahant is free from the verbal dichotomy,
which is of relevance to the worldling. Once gone beyond, the
emancipated one has no more use of these concepts. This is where
the Buddha's dictum in the raft simile of the Alagaddåpamasutta
becomes meaningful.
Even the concepts of a `this shore' and a `farther shore' are
useful only for the purpose of crossing over. If, for instance, the
arahant, having gone beyond, were to think àh, this is my land,'
that would be some sort of a grasping. Then there will be an
identification, tammayatà, not a non-identification, atammayatà.
As we had mentioned earlier, there is a strange quality called
atammayatà, associated with an arahant.17 In connection with the
simile of a man who picked up a gem, we have already stated the
ordinary norm that prevails in the world:18 if we possess some-
thing Ý we are possessed by it; if we grasp something Ý we are
caught by it.
This is the moral behind the parable of the gem. It is this con-
viction, which prompts the arahant not to grasp even the farther
shore, though he may stand there. `This shore' and the òther
shore' are concepts, which have a practical value to those who are
still on this side.
As it is stated in the Alagaddåpamasutta, since there is no boat
or bridge to cross over, one has to improvise a raft by putting
16 See sermon 5.
17 See sermon 14.
18 See sermon 9.
together grass, twigs, branches and leaves, found on this shore.

But after crossing over with its help, he does not carry it with him
on his shoulder:
Evameva kho, bhikkhave, kullåpamo mayà dhammo desito

nittharaõatthàya no gahaõatthàya. Kullåpamaü vo bhik-
khave àjànantehi dhammà pi vo pahàtabbà, pag'eva ad-
hammà.19
ßEven so, monks, have I preached to you a Dhamma that

is comparable to a raft, which is for crossing over and not
for grasping. Well knowing the Dhamma to be comparable
to a raft, you should abandon even the good things, more
so the bad things.û
One might think that the arahant is in the sensuous realm, when,
for instance, he partakes of food. But that is not so. Though he
attains to the realms of form and formless realms, he does not
belong there. He has the ability to attain to those levels of concen-
tration, but he does not grasp them egoistically, true to that norm
of atammayatà, or non-identification.
This indeed is something extraordinary. Views and opinions
about language, dogmatically entertained by the worldlings, lose
their attraction for him. This fact is clearly illustrated for us by the
Uragasutta of the Sutta Nipàta, the significance of which we have
already stressed.20 We happened to mention that there is a refrain,
running through all the seventeen verses making up that discourse.
The refrain concerns the worn out skin of a snake. The last two
lines in each verse, forming the refrain, are:
20 See sermon 5.
So bhikkhu jahàti orapàraü,

ßThat monk forsakes the hither and the thither,

Even as the snake its skin that doth wither.û
The term orapàraü is highly significant in this context. Oraü

means ßthis shoreû and paraü is the ßfarther shore.û The monk, it
seems, gives up not only this shore, but the other shore as well,
even as the snake sloughs off its worn out skin. That skin has
served its purpose, but now it is redundant. So it is sloughed off.
Let us now take up one more verse from the Uragasutta which
has the same refrain, because of its relevance to the understanding
of the term papa¤ca. The transcendence of relativity involves
freedom from the duality in worldly concepts such as `good' and
èvil.' The concept of a `farther shore' stands relative to the
concept of a `hither shore.' The point of these discourses is to
indicate that there is a freedom from worldly conceptual prolifera-
tions based on duality and relativity. The verse we propose to
bring up is:
Yo nàccasàrã na paccasàrã,
sabbaü accagamà imaü papa¤caü,
so bhikkhu jahàti orapàraü,
ßWho neither overreaches himself nor lags behind,

And has gone beyond all this proliferation,
That monk forsakes the hither and the thither,
Even as the snake its slough that doth wither.û
21 Sn 1-17 , Uragasutta.
This verse is particularly significant in that it brings out some

points of interest. The overreaching and lagging behind is an
allusion to the verbal dichotomy. In the context of views, for
instance, annihilationism is an overreaching and eternalism is a
lagging behind. We may give another illustration, easier to
understand. Speculation about the future is an overreaching and
repentance over the past is a lagging behind. To transcend both
these tendencies is to get beyond proliferation, sabbaü accagamà
imaü papa¤caü.
When a banknote is invalidated, cravings, conceits and views
bound with it go down. Concepts current in the world, like
banknotes in transaction, are reckoned as valid so long as cravings,
conceits and views bound with them are there. They are no longer
valid when these are gone.
We have defined papa¤ca with reference to cravings, conceits
and views.23 Commentaries also speak of taõhàpapa¤ca. diññhi-
papa¤ca and mànapapa¤ca.24 By doing away with cravings,
conceits and views, one goes beyond all papa¤ca.
The term orapàraü, too, has many connotations. It stands for
the duality implicit in such usages as the ìnternal' and the èxter-
nal,' òne's own' and ànother's,' as well as `this shore' and the
`farther shore.' It is compared here to the worn out skin of a snake.
It is worn out by transcending the duality characteristic of linguis-
tic usage through wisdom.
Why the Buddha first hesitated to teach this Dhamma was the
difficulty of making the world understand.25 Perhaps it was the
conviction that the world could easily be misled by those limita-
tions in the linguistic medium.
23 See sermon 12.

24 E.g. Ps I 183, commenting on M I 40, Sallekhasutta: n'etaü mama, n'eso ham
asmi, na meso attà ti.
We make these few observations in order to draw attention to

the relativity underlying such terms as `this shore' and the òther
shore' and to show how Nibbàna transcends even that dichotomy.
In this connection, we may take up for comment a highly con-
troversial sutta in the Itivuttaka, which deals with the two aspects
of Nibbàna known as sa-upàdisesà Nibbànadhàtu and anupàdis-
esà Nibbànadhàtu. We propose to quote the entire sutta, so as to
give a fuller treatment to the subject:
Vuttaü hetaü Bhagavatà, vuttam arahatà ti me suttaü:
Dve-mà, bhikkhave, nibbànadhàtuyo. Katame dve? Sa-

upadisesà ca nibbànadhàtu, anupàdisesà ca
nibbànadhàtu.
Katamà, bhikkhave, sa-upadisesà nibbànadhàtu? Idha,

bhikkhave, bhikkhu arahaü hoti khãõàsavo vusitavà ka-
takaraõãyo ohitabhàro anuppattasadattho parik-
khãõabhavasaüyojano sammada¤¤àvimutto. Tassa
tiññhanteva pa¤cindriyàni yesaü avighàtattà
manàpàmanàpaü paccanubhoti, sukhadukkhaü
pañisaüvediyati. Tassa yo ràgakkhayo dosakkhayo mo-
hakkhayo, ayaü vuccati, bhikkhave, sa-upadisesà
nibbànadhàtu.
Katamà ca, bhikkhave, anupàdisesà nibbànadhàtu? Idha,

bhikkhave, bhikkhu arahaü hoti khãõàsavo vusitavà ka-
takaraõãyo ohitabhàro anuppattasadattho parik-
khãõabhavasaüyojano sammada¤¤àvimutto. Tassa idheva
sabbavedayitàni anabhinanditàni sãtibhavissanti, ayaü
vuccati, bhikkhave, anupàdisesà nibbànadhàtu.
Etam atthaü Bhagavà avoca, tatthetaü iti vuccati:
Duve imà cakkhumatà pakàsità,

nibbànadhàtå anissitena tàdinà,
ekà hi dhàtu idha diññhadhammikà,

sa-upadisesà bhavanettisaïkhayà,
anupàdisesà pana samparàyikà,
yamhi nirujjhanti bhavàni sabbaso.
Ye etad-a¤¤àya padaü asaïkhataü,

vimuttacittà bhavanettisaïkhayà,
te dhammasàràdhigamà khaye ratà,
pahaüsu te sabbabhavàni tàdino.
Ayampi attho vutto Bhagavatà, iti me sutaü.26
ßThis was said by the Exalted One, said by the Worthy

One, so have I heard:
`Monks, there are these two Nibbàna elements. Which

two? The Nibbàna element with residual clinging and the
Nibbàna element without residual clinging.
Ànd what, monks, is the Nibbàna element with residual

clinging? Herein, monks, a monk is an arahant, with in-
fluxes extinct, one who has lived the holy life to the full,
done what is to be done, laid down the burden, reached
one's goal, fully destroyed the fetters of existence and re-
leased with full understanding. His five sense faculties still
remain and due to the fact that they are not destroyed, he
experiences likes and dislikes, and pleasures and pains.
That extirpation of lust, hate and delusion in him, that,
monks, is known as the Nibbàna element with residual
clinging.
Ànd what, monks, is the Nibbàna element without resid-

ual clinging? Herein, monks, a monk is an arahant, with
26 It 38, Nibbànadhàtusutta.
influxes extinct, one who has lived the holy life to the full,
done what is to be done, laid down the burden, reached
one's goal, fully destroyed the fetters of existence and re-
leased with full understanding. In him, here itself, all what
is felt will cool off, not being delighted in. This, monks, is
the Nibbàna element without residual clinging.'
ßTo this effect the Exalted One spoke and this is the gist
handed down as `thus said':
`These two Nibbàna elements have been made

known,
By the one with vision, unattached and such,
Of relevance to the here and now is one element,
With residual clinging, yet with tentacles to becom-
ing snapped,
But then that element without residual clinging is of
relevance to the hereafter,
For in it surcease all forms of becoming.
`They that comprehend fully this state of the unpre-

pared,
Released in mind with tentacles to becoming
snapped,
On winning to the essence of Dhamma they take de-
light in seeing to an end of it all,
So give up they, all forms of becoming, steadfastly
such-like as they are.'û
The standard phrase summing up the qualification of an arahant

occurs in full in the definition of the sa-upàdisesà Nibbànadhàtu.
The distinctive feature of this Nibbàna element is brought out in
the statement that the arahant's five sense faculties are still intact,
owing to which he experiences likes and dislikes, and pleasure and
pain. However, to the extent that lust, hate and delusion are extinct
in him, it is called the Nibbàna element with residual clinging.
In the definition of the Nibbàna element without residual cling-

ing, the same standard phrase recurs, while its distinctive feature is
summed up in just one sentence: Tassa idheva sabbavedayitàni
anabhinanditàni sãtibhavissanti, ßin him, here itself, all what is felt
will cool off, not being delighted in.û It may be noted that the verb
is in the future tense and apart from this cooling off, there is no
guarantee of a world beyond, as an asaïkhata dhàtu, or ùnpre-
pared element,' with no sun, moon or stars in it.
The two verses that follow purport to give a summary of the
prose passage. Here it is clearly stated that out of the two Nibbàna
elements, as they are called, the former pertains to the here and
now, diññhadhammika, while the latter refers to what comes after
death, samparàyika. The Nibbàna element with residual clinging,
sa-upàdisesà Nibbànadhàtu, has as its redeeming feature the
assurance that the tentacular craving for becoming is cut off,
despite its exposure to likes and dislikes, pleasures and pains,
common to the field of the five senses.
As for the Nibbàna element without residual clinging, it is defi-
nitely stated that in it all forms of existence come to cease. The
reason for it is none other than the crucial fact, stated in that single
sentence, namely, the cooling off of all what is felt as an inevitable
consequence of not being delighted in, anabhinanditàni.
Why do they not take delight in what is felt at the moment of
passing away? They take delight in something else, and that is: the
very destruction of all what is felt, a foretaste of which they have
already experienced in their attainment to that unshakeable
deliverance of the mind, which is the very pith and essence of the
Dhamma, dhammasàra.
As stated in the Mahàsàropamasutta of the Majjhima Nikàya,
the pith of the Dhamma is that deliverance of the mind,27 and to
take delight in the ending of all feelings, khaye ratà, is to revert to
the arahattaphalasamàdhi with which the arahant is already
27 M I 197, Mahàsàropamasutta.
familiar. That is how those such-like ones abandon all forms of

existence, pahaüsu te sabbabhavàni tàdino.
Let us now try to sort out the problems that are likely to be
raised in connection with the interpretation we have given. First
and foremost, the two terms diññhadhammika and samparàyika
have to be explained.
A lot of confusion has arisen, due to a misunderstanding of the
meaning of these two terms in this particular context. The usual
commentarial exegesis on the term diññhadhammika amounts to
this: Imasmiü attabhàve bhavà vattamànà,28 ßin this very life, that
is, in the present.û It seems all right. But then for samparàyika the
commentary has the following comment: samparàye khandha-
bhedato parabhàge, ßSamparàya means after the breaking up of
the aggregates.û The implication is that it refers to the arahant's
after death state.
Are we then to conclude that the arahant gets half of his
Nibbàna here and the other half hereafter? The terms diññhad-
hammika and samparàyika, understood in their ordinary sense,
would point to such a conclusion.
But let us not forget that the most distinctive quality of this
Dhamma is associated with the highly significant phrase,
diññhevadhamme, ßin this very life.û It is also conveyed by the
expression sandiññhika akàlika, ßhere and nowû and ßtimeless.û29
The goal of endeavour, indicated by this Dhamma, is one that
could be fully realized here and now, in this very life. It is not a
piecemeal affair. Granting all that, do we find here something
contrary to it, conveyed by the two terms diññhadhammika and
samparàyika? How can we reconcile these two passages?
In the context of kamma, the meaning of the two terms in ques-
tion can easily be understood. For instance, that category of
kamma known as diññhadhammavedanãya refers to those actions
28 It-a I 167.
29 In the standard formula for recollecting the Dhamma, e.g. at D II 93.
which produce their results here and now. Samparàyika pertains to

what comes after death, as for instance in the phrase samparàye ca
duggati, an ßevil born after death.û30 In the context of kamma it is
clear enough, then, that the two terms refer to what is experienced
in this world and what comes after death, respectively.
Are we justified in applying the same criterion, when it comes
to the so-called two elements of Nibbàna? Do the arahants
experience some part of Nibbàna here and the rest hereafter?
At this point, we have to admit that the term diññhadhammika is
associated with sa-upàdisesà Nibbànadhàtu while the term
samparàyika is taken over to refer to anupàdisesà Nibbànadhàtu.
However, the fact that Nibbàna is explicitly defined elsewhere as
the cessation of existence, bhavanirodho Nibbànaü,31 must not be
forgotten. If Nibbàna is the cessation of existence, there is nothing
left for the arahant to experience hereafter.
Nibbàna is solely the realization of the cessation of existence or
the end of the process of becoming. So there is absolutely no
question of a hereafter for the arahant. By way of clarification, we
have to revert to the primary sense of the term Nibbàna. We have
made it sufficiently clear that Nibbàna means èxtinction' or
èxtinguishment,' as of a fire.
All the commentarial jargon, equating vàna to taõhà, is utterly
irrelevant. If the idea of an extinguishment of a fire is brought in,
the whole problem is solved. Think of a blazing fire. If no more
firewood is added to it, the flames would subside and the embers
would go on smouldering before turning into ashes. This is the
norm. Now this is not an analogy we are superimposing on the
Dhamma. It is only an echo of a canonical simile, picked up from
the Nàgasutta of the Aïguttara Nikàya. The relevant verse, we are
quoting, recurs in the Udàyi Theragàthà as well:
30 S I 34, Maccharisutta.
Mahàgini pajjalito,
anàhàråpasammati,
aïgàresu ca santesu,,
nibbuto ti pavuccati.32
ßAs a huge blazing fire, with no more firewood added,

Goes down to reach a state of calm,
Embers smouldering, as they are, could be reckoned,
So long as they last, as almost èxtinguished.'û
Though we opted to render the verse this way, there is a variant

reading, which could lead to a different interpretation. As so often
happens in the case of deep suttas, here too the correct reading is
not easily determined. Instead of the phrase aïgàresu ca santesu,
attested as it is, many editions go for the variant reading
saïkhàresåpasantesu. If that reading is adopted, the verse would
have to be rendered as follows:
ßAs a huge blazing fire, with no more firewood added,

Goes down to reach a state of calm,
When saïkhàras calm down,
One is called èxtinguished.'û
It may be pointed out that this variant reading does not accord with
the imagery of the fire presented by the first two lines of the verse.
It is probably a scribe's error that has come down, due to the
rhythmic similarity between the two phrases aïgàresu ca santesu,
and saïkhàresåpasantesu.33 Between the reciter and the scribe,
phrases that have a similar ring and rhythm, could sometimes
bring about a textual corruption. Be that as it may, we have opted
for the reading aïgàresu ca santesu, because it makes more sense.
32 A III 347, Nàgasutta and Th 702, Udàyitheragàthà.
33 The corresponding verse in the Chinese parallel, Madhyama âgama discourse
118 (Taishº I 608c27), does not mention saïkhàra at all. (Anàlayo)
From the particular context in which the verse occurs, it seems

that this imagery of the fire is a restatement of the image of the
lotus unsmeared by water. Though the embers are still smoulder-
ing, to the extent that they are no longer hungering for more fuel
and are not emitting flames, they may as well be reckoned as
èxtinguished.'
We can draw a parallel between this statement and the defini-
tion of sa-upàdisesà Nibbànadhàtu already quoted. As a full-
fledged arahant, he still experiences likes and dislikes and
pleasures and pains, owing to the fact that his five sense-faculties
are intact.
The assertion made by the phrase beginning with tassa tiññhan-
teva pa¤cindriyàni yesaü avighàtattà . . . , ßhis five senses do
exist, owing to the non-destruction of which . . . ,û rather apologet-
ically brings out the limitations of the living arahant. It is reminis-
cent of those smouldering embers in the imagery of the Nàgasutta.
However, in so far as flames of lust, hate and delusion are
quenched in him, it comes to be called sa-upàdisesà
Nibbànadhàtu, even as in the case of those smouldering embers.
Craving is aptly called bhavanetti,34 in the sense that it leads to
becoming by catching hold of more and more fuel in the form of
upàdàna. When it is under control, the functioning of the sense-
faculties do not entail further rebirth. The inevitable residual
clinging in the living arahant does not precipitate a fresh exist-
ence.
This gives us a clue to the understanding of the term
anupàdisesa. The element upàdi in this term is rather ambiguous.
In the Satipaññhànasutta, for instance, it is used as the criterion to
distinguish the anàgàmi, the ßnon-returner,û from the arahant, in
the statement diññhevadhamme a¤¤à, sati và upàdisese
anàgàmità,35 ßeither full convincing knowledge of arahant-hood
34 A II 1, Anubuddhasutta.
here and now, or the state of non-return in the case of residual

clinging.û
But when it comes to the distinction between sa-upàdisesa and
anupàdisesa, the element upàdi has to be understood in a more
radical sense, in association with the word upàdiõõa. This body, as
the product of past kamma, is the `grasped' par excellence, which
as an organic combination goes on functioning even in the arahant
until his last moment of life.
Venerable Sàriputta once declared that he neither delighted in
death nor delighted in life, nàbhinandàmi maraõaü nàbhinandàmi
jãvitaü.36 So the embers go on smouldering until they become
ashes. It is when the life-span ends that the embers finally turn to
ashes.
The popular interpretation of the term anupàdisesà
Nibbànadhàtu leaves room for some absolutist conceptions of an
asaïkhata dhàtu, unprepared element, as the destiny of the
arahant. After his parinibbàna, he is supposed to enter this
particular Nibbànadhàtu. But here, in this discourse, it is explained
in just one sentence: Tassa idheva, bhikkhave, sabbavedayitàni
anabhinanditàni sãtibhavissanti, ßIn the case of him,û (that is the
arahant), ßO! monks, all what is felt, not having been delighted in,
will cool off here itself.û
This cooling off happens just before death, without igniting
another spark of life. When Màra comes to grab and seize, the
arahant lets go. The pain of death with which Màra teases his
hapless victim and lures him into another existence, becomes
ineffective in the case of the arahant. As he has already gone
through the supramundane experience of deathlessness, in the
arahattaphalasamàdhi, death loses its sting when at last it comes.
The influx-free deliverance of the mind and the influx-free
deliverance through wisdom enable him to cool down all feelings
in a way that baffles Màra.
36 Th 1001, Sàriputtatheragàthà.
So the arahant lets go of his body, experiencing ambrosial

deathlessness. As in the case of Venerable Dabba Mallaputta, he
would sometimes cremate his own body without leaving any
ashes.37 Outwardly it might appear as an act of self-immolation,
which indeed is painful. But this is not so. Using his jhànic
powers, he simply employs the internal fire element to cremate the
body he has already discarded.
This, then, is the Buddha's extraordinary solution to the prob-
lem of overcoming death, a solution that completely outwits Màra.
37 Ud 92, Pañhamadabbasutta.
Nibbàna Sermon 19



This is the nineteenth sermon in the series of sermons on
Nibbàna. Towards the end of our last sermon, we started com-
menting on the two terms sa-upàdisesà Nibbànadhàtu and
anupàdisesà Nibbànadhàtu. Our discussion was based on a
discourse, which we quoted from the Itivuttaka. We also drew
attention to a certain analogy found in the discourses, which shows
that the two Nibbàna elements actually represent two stages of the
extinguishment implicit in the term Nibbàna.
When no more firewood is added to a blazing fire, flames
would subside and the logs of wood already burning go on
smouldering as embers. After some time, they too get extinguished
and become ashes. With regard to the arahant, too, we have to
think in terms of this analogy. It can be taken as an illustration of
491
the two Nibbàna elements. To the extent the living arahant is free
from fresh graspings, lust, hate and delusions do not flare up. But
so long as he has to bear the burden of this organic combination,
this physical frame, the arahant has to experience certain afflic-
tions and be receptive to likes and dislikes, pleasures and pains.
In spite of all that, mentally he has access to the experience of
the extinguishment he has already won. It is in that sense that the
arahant is said to be in the Nibbàna element with residual clinging
in his everyday life, while taking in the objects of the five senses.
At the last moment of the arahant's life, even this organic body
that had been grasped as upàdiõõa has to be abandoned. It is at
that moment, when he is going to detach his mind from the body,
that anupàdisesà parinibbànadhàtu comes in. A brief hint to this
effect is given in one of the verses occurring in the Nàgasutta
referred to earlier. The verse runs thus:
Vãtaràga vãtadoso
vãtamoho anàsavo
sarãraü vijahaü nàgo
parinibbissati anàsavo.2
ßThe one who has abandoned lust,

Hate and delusion and is influx-free,
That elephant of a man, on giving up his body,
Will attain full appeasement, being influx-free.û
If we define in brief the two Nibbàna elements this way, a more

difficult problem confronts us relating to the sense in which they
are called diññhadhammika and samparàyika. Diññhadhammika
means what pertains to this life and samparàyika refers to what
comes after death. What is the idea in designating sa-upàdisesà
Nibbànadhàtu as diññhadhammika and anupàdisesà Nibbànadhàtu
as samparàyika?
2 A III 347, Nàgasutta.

In the context of kamma, the meaning of these two terms is

easily understood. But when it comes to Nibbàna, such an applica-
tion of the terms would imply two types of Nibbànic bliss, one to
be experienced here and the other hereafter.
But that kind of explanation would not accord with the spirit of
this Dhamma, because the Buddha always emphasizes the fact that
Nibbàna is something to be realized here and now in toto. It is not
a piecemeal realization, leaving something for the hereafter. Such
terms like diññhevadhamme, in this very life, sandiññhika, here and
now, and akàlika, timeless, emphasize this aspect of Nibbàna.
In the context of Nibbàna, these two terms have to be under-
stood as representing two aspects of a perfect realization attainable
in this very life. Briefly stated, anupàdisesà Nibbànadhàtu is that
which confers the certitude, well in time, that the appeasement
experienced by an arahant during this life time remains unchanged
even at death. To say that there is a possibility of realizing or
ascertaining one's state after death might even seem contradictory.
How can one realize one's after death state?
We get a clear-cut answer to that question in the following
passage in the Dhàtuvibhaïgasutta of the Majjhima Nikàya:
Seyyathàpi, bhikkhu, tela¤ca pañicca vaññi¤ca pañicca

telappadãpo jhàyati, tasseva telassa ca vaññiyà ca pari-
yàdànà a¤¤assa ca anupahàrà anàhàro nibbàyati,
evameva kho, bhikkhu, kàyapariyantikaü vedanaü ve-
diyamàno `kàyapariyantikaü vedanaü vedayàmã'ti pa-
jànati, jãvitapariyantikaü vedanaü vediyamàno
`jãvitapariyantikaü vedanaü vedayàmã'ti pajànati,
`kàyassa bhedà paraü maraõà uddhaü jãvitapariyàdànà
idheva sabbavedayitàni anabhinanditàni sãtãbhavissantã'ti
pajànati.3

ßJust as, monk, an oil lamp burns depending on oil and the
wick, and when that oil and the wick are used up, if it does
not get any more of these, it is extinguished from lack of
fuel, even so, monk, when he feels a feeling limited to the
body, he understands Ì feel a feeling limited to the body,'
when he feels a feeling limited to life, he understands Ì
feel a feeling limited to life,' he understands òn the break-
ing up of this body, before life becomes extinct, even here
itself, all that is felt, not being delighted in, will become
cool.û
The last sentence is particularly noteworthy in that it refers to an

understanding well beforehand that all feelings, not being delight-
ed in, will become cool at death. The futuristic ending signifies an
assurance, here and now, as the word idheva, even here itself,
clearly brings out. The delighting will not be there, because all
craving for a fresh existence is extirpated.
The arahant has won this assurance already in his ara-
hattaphalasamàdhi, in which he experiences the cooling off of all
feelings. That is why we find the arahants giving expression to
their Nibbànic bliss in the words sãtibhåto'smi nibbuto, ßgone cool
am I, yea, extinguished.û4
Since for the arahant this cooling off of feelings is a matter of
experience in this very life, this realization is referred to as
anupàdà parinibbàna in the discourses. Here we seem to have
fallen into another track. We opened our discussion with an
explanation of what anupàdisesa parinibbàna is, now we are on
anupàdà parinibbàna. How are we to distinguish between these
two?
Anupàdisesa parinibbàna comes at the last moment of the ara-
hant's life, when this organic combination of elements, grasped
par excellence, upàdiõõa, is discarded for good. But anupàdà
parinibbàna refers to the arahattaphalasamàdhi as such, for which
4 Th 298, Ràhulatheragàthà.
even other terms like anupàdà vimokkha are also applied on

occasion.5
As the term anupàdà parinibbàna signifies, the arahant experi-
ences, even in this very life, that complete extinguishment,
parinibbàna, in his arahattaphalasamàdhi. This fact is clearly
brought out in the dialogue between Venerable Sàriputta and
Venerable Puõõa Mantàniputta in the Rathavinãtasutta of the
Majjhima Nikàya.
Venerable Sàriputta's exhaustive interrogation ending with kim
atthaü carahàvuso, bhagavati brahmacariyaü vussati?,6 ßFor the
sake of what then, friend, is the holy life lived under the Exalted
One?,û gets the following conclusive answer from Venerable
Puõõa Mantàniputta: anupàdàparinibbànatthaü kho, àvuso,
bhagavati brahmacariyaü vussati, ßFriend, it is for the sake of
perfect Nibbàna without grasping that the holy life is lived under
the Exalted One.û
As the goal of endeavour, anupàdà parinibbàna surely does not
mean the ending of life. What it implies is the realization of
Nibbàna. It is that experience of the cooling off of feelings the
arahant goes through in the arahattaphalasamàdhi. It is some-
times also called nirupadhi, the ßasset-less.û7 Here we have a
problem of a semantic type. At a later date, even the term
nirupadhisesa seems to have come into vogue, which is probably a
cognate formed after the term anupàdisesa.8
Nowhere in the discourses does one comes across the term
nirupadhisesa parinibbàna. Only such terms as nirupadhi,
niråpadhiü, nirupadhi dhammaü are met with. They all refer to
that arahattaphalasamàdhi, as for instance in the following verse,
which we had occasion to quote earlier too:
5 E.g. M II 265, âne¤jasappàyasutta.

6 M I 147, Rathavinãtasutta.
7 S I 194, Moggallànasutta.
8 Bv-a 252.
Kàyena amataü dhàtuü,

phusayitvà niråpadhiü,
upadhipañinissaggaü,
sacchikatvà anàsavo,
deseti sammàsambuddho,
asokaü virajaü padaü.9
ßHaving touched with the body,

The deathless element, which is asset-less,
And realized the relinquishment of assets,
Being influx-free, the perfectly enlightened one,
Proclaims the sorrow-less, taintless state.û
To proclaim, one has to be alive. Therefore nirupadhi is used in

the discourses definitely for the arahattaphalasamàdhi, which is a
living experience for the arahant. Anupàdà parinibbàna, anupàdà
vimokkha and nirupadhi all refer to that experience of the cooling
off of feelings. This fact is clearly revealed by the following two
verses in the Vedanàsaüyutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya:
Samàhito sampajàno,
sato Buddhassa sàvako,
vedanà ca pajànàti,
vedanàna¤ca sambhavaü.
Yattha cetà nirujjhanti,

magga¤ca khayagàminaü,
vedanànaü khayà bhikkhu,
nicchàto parinibbuto.10
In this couplet, the experience of the fruit of arahant-hood is

presented under the heading of feeling. The disciple of the Bud-
9 It 62, Santatarasutta, see sermon 17.

10 S IV 204, Samàdhisutta.
dha, concentrated, fully aware and mindful, understands feelings,

the origin of feelings, and the point at which they surcease and the
way leading to their extinction. With the extinction of feelings,
that monk is hunger-less and perfectly extinguished. The reference
here is to that bliss of Nibbàna which is devoid of feeling, ave-
dayita sukha.11 It is hunger-less because it is free from craving.
The perfect extinguishment mentioned here is not to be under-
stood as the death of the arahant. In the discourses the term
parinibbuta is used as such even with reference to the living
arahant. Only in the commentaries we find a distinction made in
this respect. The parinibbàna of the living arahant is called
kilesaparinibbàna, the perfect extinguishment of the defilements,
while what comes at the last moment of an arahant's life is called
khandhaparinibbàna, the perfect extinguishment of the groups or
aggregates.12 Such a qualification, however, is not found in the
discourses.
The reason for this distinction was probably the semantic devel-
opment the term parinibbàna had undergone in the course of time.
The fact that this perfect extinguishment is essentially psychologi-
cal seems to have been ignored with the passage of time. That is
why today, on hearing the word parinibbàna, one is immediately
reminded of the last moment of the life of the Buddha or of an
arahant. In the discourses, however, parinibbàna is clearly an
experience of the living arahant in his arahattaphalasamàdhi.
This fact is clearly borne out by the statement in the Dhàtuvi-
bhaïgasutta already quoted: idheva sabbavedayitàni anabhi-
nanditàni sãtãbhavissantã'ti pajànati,13 ßHe understands that all
what is felt will cool off here itself.û It is this very understanding
that is essential. It gives the certitude that one can defeat Màra at
the moment of death through the experience of the cooling off of
feelings.

12 E.g. at Mp I 91.
The phrase jãvitapariyantikaü vedanaü refers to the feeling

which comes at the termination of one's life. For the arahant, the
arahattaphalasamàdhi stands in good stead, particularly at the
moment of death. That is why it is called akuppà cetovimutti, the
unshakeable deliverance of the mind. All other deliverances of the
mind get shaken before the pain of death, but not this unshakeable
deliverance of the mind, which is the REAL-ization of extin-
guishment that is available to the arahant already in the ara-
hattaphalasamàdhi, in the experience of the cooling off of
feelings. It is this unshakeable deliverance of the mind that the
Buddha and the arahants resort to at the end of their lives, when
Màra comes to grab and seize.
So now we can hark back to that verse which comes as the
grand finale in the long discourse from the Itivuttaka we have
already quoted:
Ye etad a¤¤àya padaü asaïkhataü,

vimuttacittà bhavanettisaïkhayà,
te dhammasàràdhigamà khaye ratà,
pahaüsu te sabbabhavàni tàdino.14
This verse might appear problematic, as it occurs at the end of a

passage dealing with the two Nibbàna elements. Ye etad a¤¤àya
padaü asaïkhataü, ßthose who having fully comprehended this
unprepared state,û vimuttacittà bhavanettisaïkhayà, ßare released
in mind by the cutting off of tentacles to becoming,û te
dhammasàràdhigamà khaye ratà, ßtaking delight in the extirpation
of feelings due to their attainment to the essence of dhamma,û that
is the unshakeable deliverance of the mind, pahaüsu te sab-
babhavàni tàdino, ßbeing steadfastly such like, they have given up
all forms of becoming.û
The last line is an allusion to the experience of the cessation of
existence here and now, which in effect is the realization of
14 It 39, Nibbànadhàtusutta, see sermon 18.

Nibbàna, true to the definition bhavanirodho nibbànaü, ßcessation

of existence is Nibbàna.û15 It is that very cessation of existence
that is called asaïkhata dhàtu, the ßunprepared element.û If bhava,
or existence, is to be called saïkhata, the `prepared,' the cessation
of existence has to be designated as asaïkhata, the ùnprepared.'
Here lies the difference between the two.
So we have here two aspects of the same unprepared element,
designated as sa-upàdisesà parinibbànadhàtu and anupàdisesà
parinibbànadhàtu. The mind is free even at the stage of sa-
upàdisesa, to the extent that the smouldering embers do not seek
fresh fuel. Anupàdisesa refers to the final experience of extin-
guishment. There the relevance of the term parinibbàna lies in the
fact that at the moment of death the arahants direct their minds to
this unshakeable deliverance of the mind. This is the ìsland' they
resort to when Màra comes to grab.
The best illustration for all this is the way the Buddha faced
death, when the time came for it. Venerable Anuruddha delineates
it beautifully in the following two verses:
Nàhu assàsapassàso,
ñhitacittassa tàdino,
anejo santimàrabbha,
yaü kàlamakarã muni.
Asallãnena cittena,
vedanaü ajjhavàsayi,
pajjotass'eva nibbànaü,
vimokkho cetaso ahu.16
ßAdverting to whatever peace,

The urgeless sage reached the end of his lifespan,
16 D II 157, Mahàparinibbànasutta.
There were no in-breaths and out-breaths,

For that steadfastly such-like one of firm mind.
ßWith a mind fully alert,

He bore up the pain,
The deliverance of the mind was like
The extinguishment of a torch.û
The allusion here is to the deliverance of the mind. This is a

description of how the Buddha attained parinibbàna. Though there
is a great depth in these two verses, the commentarial exegesis
seems to have gone at a tangent at this point. Commenting on the
last two lines of the first verse, the commentary observes: Bud-
dhamuni santiü gamissàmãti, santiü àrabbha kàlamakari, ßthe
Buddha, the sage, passed away for the sake of that peace with the
idea Ì will go to that state of peace.'û17
There is some discrepancy in this explanation. Commentators
themselves usually give quite a different sense to the word
àrabbha than the one implicit in this explanation. Here it means
ßfor the sake of.û It is for the sake of that peace that the Buddha is
said to have passed away.
In such commentaries as Jàtaka-aññhakathà and Dhammapada-
aññhakathà, commentators do not use the word àrabbha in the
introductory episodes in this sense. There it only means ßin
connection with,û indicating the origin of the story, as suggested
by the etymological background of the word itself. When for
instance it is said that the Buddha preached a particular sermon in
connection with Devadatta Thera, it does not necessarily mean
that it was meant for him.18 He may not have been there at all, it
may be that he was already dead by that time. The term àrabbha in
such contexts only means that it was in connection with him. It can
17 Sv II 595.
18 Devadattaü àrabbha at Dhp-a I 133 and Ja I 142.
refer to a person or an incident, as the point of origin of a particu-

lar sermon.
Granted this, we have to explain the verse in question not as an
allusion to the fact that the Buddha, the sage, passed away for the
sake of that peace with the idea Ì will attain to that state of peace.'
It only means that the Buddha, the sage, passed away having
brought his mind into that state of peace. In other words, according
to the commentary the passing away comes first and the peace
later, but according to the sutta proper, peace comes first and the
passing away later.
There is a crucial point involved in this commentarial diver-
gence. It has the presumption that the Buddha passed away in
order to enter into `that Nibbàna element.' This presumption is
evident quite often in the commentaries. When hard put to it, the
commentaries sometimes concede the sutta's standpoint, but more
often than otherwise they follow a line of interpretation that comes
dangerously close to an eternalist point of view, regarding
Nibbàna.
Here too the commentarial exegesis, based on the term àrabbha,
runs the same risk. On the other hand, as we have pointed out, the
reference here is to the fact that the Buddha adverted his mind to
that peace well before the onset of death, whereby Màra's attempt
is foiled, because feelings are already cooled off. It is here that the
unshakeable deliverance of the mind proves its worth.
As a `real'-ization it is already available to the Buddha and the
arahants in the arahattaphalasamàdhi, and when the time comes,
they put forward this experience to beat off Màra. That is why we
find a string of epithets for Nibbàna, such as tàõaü, leõaü, dãpaü,
saraõaü, paràyanaü, khemaü and amataü. When faced with
death, or the pain of death, it gives `protection,' tànaü. It provides
shelter, like a `cave,' leõaü. It is the ìsland,' dãpaü, within easy
reach. It is the `refuge,' saraõaü, and the `resort,' paràyanaü. It is
the `security,' khemaü, and above all the `death-less,' amataü.19
This deathlessness they experience in this very world, and when

death comes, this realization stands them in good stead.
Why Venerable Anuruddha brought in the profane concept of
death with the expression kàlamakari into this verse, describing
the Buddha's parinibbàna, is also a question that should arrest our
attention. This particular expression is generally used in connec-
tion with the death of ordinary people. Why did he use this
expression in such a hallowed context? It is only to distinguish and
demarcate the deliverance of the mind, couched in the phrase
vimokkho cetaso ahu, from the phenomenon of death itself.
The Buddhas and arahants also abandon this body, like other
beings. The expression kàlamakari, ßmade an end of time,û is an
allusion to this phenomenon. In fact, it is only the Buddhas and
arahants who truly make an ènd' of time, being fully aware of it.
Therefore the most important revelation made in the last two lines
of the first verse, anejo santimàrabbha, yaü kàlamakarã muni, is
the fact that the Buddha passed away having brought his mind to
the peace of Nibbàna.
All this goes to prove that an arahant, even here and now in this
very life, has realized his after death state, which is none other
than the birthless cessation of all forms of existence that amounts
to deathlessness itself.
In all other religions immortality is something attainable after
death. If one brings down the Buddha's Dhamma also to that level,
by smuggling in the idea of an everlasting Nibbàna, it too will
suffer the same fate. That would contradict the teachings on
impermanence, aniccatà, and insubstantiality, anattatà.
But here we have an entirely different concept. It is a case of
overcoming the critical situation of death by directing one's mind
to a concentration that nullifies the power of Màra. So it becomes
clear that the two terms sa-upàdisesà parinibbànadhàtu and
anupàdisesà parinibbànadhàtu stand for two aspects of the same
asaïkhatadhàtu, or the unprepared element.
As a matter of fact, arahants have already directly realized, well
in time, their after death state. That is to say, not only have they
gone through the experience of extinguishment here and now, but
they are also assured of the fact that this extinguishment is
irreversible even after death, since all forms of existence come to

cease.
This is an innovation, the importance of which can hardly be
overestimated. Here the Buddha has transcended even the dichot-
omy between the two terms sandiññhika and samparàyika. General-
ly, the world is inclined to believe that one can be assured only of
things pertaining to this life. In fact, the word sandiññhika literally
means that one can be sure only of things visible here and now.
Since one cannot be sure of what comes after death, worldlings are
in the habit of investing faith in a particular teacher or in a god.
To give a clearer picture of the principle involved in this state-
ment, let us bring up a simple episode, concerning the general
Sãha, included among the Fives of the Aïguttara Nikàya. It
happens to centre on dànakathà, or talks on liberality. Let it be a
soft interlude Ý after all these abstruse discourses.
Sãha, the general, is a wealthy benefactor, endowed with deep
faith in the Buddha. One day he approaches the Buddha and asks
the question: sakkà nu kho, bhante, sandiññhikaü dànaphalaü
pa¤¤àpetuü?20 ßIs it possible, Lord, to point out an advantage or
fruit of giving visible here and now?û
What prompted the question may have been the usual tendency
to associate the benefits of giving with the hereafter. Now the
Buddha, in his answer to the question, gave four advantages
visible here and now and one advantage to come hereafter. The
four fruits of giving visible here and now are stated as follows:
1) dàyako, sãha, dànapati bahuno janassa piyo hoti

manàpo, ßSãha, a benevolent donor is dear and accepta-
ble to many people.û
2) dàyakaü dànapatiü santo sappurisà bhajanti, ßGood
men of integrity resort to that benevolent donor.û
20 A III 39, Sãhasenàpattisutta.

3) dàyakassa dànapatino kalyàõo kittisaddo abbhuggac-

chati, ßA good report of fame goes in favour of that be-
nevolent donor.û
4) dàyako dànapati yaü yadeva parisaü upasaïkamati,
yadi khattiyaparisaü yadi bràhmaõaparisaü yadi
gahapatiparisaü yadi samaõaparisaü, visàrado va
upasaïkamati amaïkubhåto, ßWhatever assembly that
benevolent donor approaches, be it an assembly of
kings, or brahmins, or householders, or recluses, he ap-
proaches with self confidence, not crestfallen.û
These four fruits or advantages are reckoned as sandiññhika,

because one can experience them here and now. In addition to
these, the Buddha mentions a fifth, probably by way of encour-
agement, though it is outside the scope of the question:
5) dàyako, sãha, dànapati kàyassa bhedà paraü maraõà

sugatiü saggaü lokaü upapajjati, ßThe benevolent
donor, Sãha, when his body breaks up after death is re-
born in a happy heavenly world.û
This is a fruit of giving that pertains to the next world, sam-

paràyikaü dànaphalaü. Then Sãha the general makes a comment,
which is directly relevant to our discussion:
Yànimàni, bhante, bhagavatà cattàri sandiññhikàni dàna-

phalàni akkhàtàni, nàhaü ettha bhagavato saddhàya gac-
chàmi, ahaü petàni jànàmi. Ya¤ca kho maü, bhante,
bhagavà evamàha `dàyako, sãha, dànapati kàyassa bhedà
paraü maraõà sugatiü saggaü lokaü upapajjatã'ti,
etàhaü na jànàmi, ettha ca panàhaü bhagavato saddhàya
gacchàmi.
ßThose four fruits of giving, visible here and now, which

the Lord has preached, as for them, I do not believe out of
faith in the Exalted One, because I myself know them to
be so. But that about which the Exalted One said: `Sãha, a
benevolent donor, when the body breaks up after death is
reborn in a happy heavenly world,' this I do not know. As
to that, however, I believe out of faith in the Exalted One.û
Regarding the first four advantages of giving, Sãha says ßI do not

believe out of faith in the Exalted One, because I myself know
them to be so,û nàhaü ettha bhagavato saddhàya gacchàmi, ahaü
petàni jànàmi. It is because he knows out of his own experience
that they are facts that he does not believe out of faith in the
Exalted One. There is something deep, worth reflecting upon, in
this statement.
Then with regard to the fruit of giving, mentioned last, that is to
say the one that concerns the hereafter, samparàyika, Sãha con-
fesses that he does not know it as a fact, but that he believes it out
of faith in the Exalted One, etàhaü na jànàmi, ettha ca panàhaü
bhagavato saddhàya gacchàmi. It is because he does not know,
that he believes out of faith in the Exalted One.
Here then we have a good illustration of the first principle we
have outlined earlier. Where there is knowledge born of personal
experience, there is no need of faith. Faith is displaced by
knowledge of realization. It is where one has no such experiential
knowledge that faith comes in. That is why Sãha confesses that he
has faith in the fifth fruit of giving. With regard to the first four,
faith is something redundant for him.
Now that we have clarified for ourselves this first principle,
there is a certain interesting riddle verse in the Dhammapada, to
which we may apply it effectively, not out of a flair for riddles, but
because it is relevant to our topic:
Assaddho akata¤¤å ca,

sandhicchedo ca yo naro,
hatàvakàso vantàso,
sa ve uttamaporiso.21
This is a verse attributed to the Buddha that comes in the Arahan-

tavagga of the Dhammapada, which puns upon some words. Such
riddle verses follow the pattern of a figure of speech called double
entendr‚, which makes use of ambiguous words. The above verse
sounds blasphemous on the first hearing. The Buddha is said to
have employed this device to arrest the listener's attention. The
surface meaning seems to go against the Dhamma, but it provokes
deeper reflection.
For instance, assaddho means faithless, to be akata¤¤å is to be
ungrateful, sandhicchedo is a term for a housebreaker, hatàvakàso
is a hopeless case with no opportunities, vantàso means greedy of
vomit. So the surface meaning amounts to this:
ßThat faithless ungrateful man,

Who is a housebreaker,
Who is hopeless and greedy of vomit,
He indeed is the man supreme.û
For the deeper meaning the words have to be construed differently.

Assaddho implies that level of penetration into truth at which faith
becomes redundant. Akata, the unmade, is an epithet for Nibbàna,
and akata¤¤å is one who knows the unmade. Sandhicchedo means
one who has cut off the connecting links to saüsàra. Hatàvakàso
refers to that elimination of opportunities for rebirth. Vantàso is a
term for one who has vomited out desires. The true meaning of the
verse, therefore, can be summed up as follows:
ßThat man who has outgrown faith, as he is a knower

of the unmade,
21 Dhp 97, Arahantavagga.

Who has sundered all shackles to existence and de-

stroyed all possibilities of rebirth,
Who has spewed out all desires,
He indeed is the man supreme.û
The description, then, turns out to be that of an arahant. Assaddho

as an epithet for the arahant follows the same norm as the epithet
asekho. Sekha, meaning ßlearner,û is a term applied to those who
are training for the attainment of arahant-hood, from the stream-
winner, sotàpanna, upwards. Literally, asekha could be rendered
as ßunlearnedû or ßuntrained.û But it is certainly not in that sense
that an arahant is called asekha. He is called asekha in the sense
that he is no longer in need of that training, that is to say, he is an
adept. Assaddho, too, has to be construed similarly.
As we have mentioned before, the arahant has already realized
the cessation of existence in his arahattaphalasamàdhi, thereby
securing the knowledge of the unmade, akata, or the unprepared,
asaïkhata. The term akata¤¤å highlights that fact of realization.
The most extraordinary and marvelous thing about the realization
of Nibbàna is that it gives an assurance not only of matters
pertaining to this life, sandiññhika, but also of what happens after
death, samparàyika Ý in other words, the realization of the
cessation of existence.
Nibbàna as the realization here and now of the cessation of
existence, bhavanirodho nibbànaü, carries with it the assurance
that there is no more existence after death. So there is only one
asaïkhatadhàtu. The verse we already quoted, too, ends with the
words pahaüsu te sabbabhavàni tàdino, ßthose steadfastly such-
like ones have given up all forms of existence.û22
One thing should be clear now. Though there are two Nibbàna
elements called sa-upàdisesà Nibbànadhàtu and anupàdisesà
Nibbànadhàtu, there is no justification whatsoever for taking
anupàdisesà Nibbànadhàtu as a place of eternal rest for the
22 It 39, Nibbànadhàtusutta.
arahants after death Ý an everlasting immortal state. The death-

lessness of Nibbàna is to be experienced in this world itself. That
is why an arahant is said to feast on ambrosial deathlessness,
amataü paribhu¤jati, when he is in arahattaphalasamàdhi. When
it is time for death, he brings his mind to this samàdhi, and it is
while he is partaking of ambrosial deathlessness that Màra quietly
takes away his body.
An arahant might even cremate his own body, as if it is an-
other's. Now we are at an extremely deep point in this Dhamma.
We have to say something in particular about the two terms
saïkhata and asaïkhata. In our last sermon, we happened to give a
rather unusual explanation of such pair-wise terms like the `hither
shore' and the `farther shore,' as well as the `mundane' and the
`supramundane.' The two terms in each pair are generally believed
to be far apart and the gap between them is conceived in terms of
time and space. But we compared this gap to that between the
lotus leaf and the drop of water on it, availing ourselves of a simile
offered by the Buddha himself.
The distance between the lotus leaf and the drop of water on it
is the same as that between the hither shore and the farther shore,
between the mundane and the supramundane. This is no idle
sophistry, but a challenge to deeper reflection.
The Dhammapada verse we quoted earlier beginning with yassa
pàraü apàraü và, pàràpàraü na vijjati,23 ßto whom there is
neither a farther shore nor a hither shore nor both,û is puzzling
enough. But what it says is that the arahant has transcended both
the hither shore and the farther shore. It is as if he has gone beyond
this shore and the other shore as well, that is to say, he has
transcended the dichotomy.
We have to say something similar with regard to the two terms
saïkhata and asaïkhata. Saïkhata, or the prepared, is like a floral
design. This prepared floral design, which is bhava, or existence,
is made up, as it were, with the help of the glue of craving, the
23 Dhp 385, Bràhmaõavagga; see sermon 18.

tangles of views and the knots of conceits. If one removes the

glue, disentangles the tangles and unties the knots, the saïkhata, or
the prepared, itself becomes asaïkhata, the unprepared, then and
there. The same floral design, which was the saïkhata, has now
become the asaïkhata. This itself is the cessation of existence,
bhavanirodho. When one can persuade oneself to think of
Nibbàna as an extinguishment, the term parinibbàna can well be
understood as `perfect extinguishment.'
The parinibbàna of the arahant Dabba Mallaputta is recorded
in the Udàna as a special occasion on which the Buddha uttered a
paean of joy. Venerable Dabba Mallaputta was an arahant, gifted
with marvelous psychic powers, specializing in miracles per-
formed by mastering the fire element, tejo dhàtu. His parinibbàna,
too, was a marvel in itself.
When he found himself at the end of his lifespan, he approached
the Buddha and informed him of it, as if begging permission, with
the words: parinibbàna kàlo me dàni, sugata,24 ßit is time for me
to attain parinibbàna, O well-gone one.û And the Buddha too gave
permission with the words: yassa dàni tvaü, Dabba, kàlaü
ma¤¤asi, ßDabba, you may do that for which the time is fit.û
As soon as the Buddha uttered these words, Venerable Dabba
Mallaputta rose from his seat, worshipped the Buddha, circumam-
bulated him, went up into the sky and, sitting cross-legged,
aroused the concentration of the fire element and, rising from it,
attained parinibbàna. As his body thus miraculously self-cremated
burnt in the sky, it left no ashes or soot.
This was something significant that fits in with the definition of
Nibbàna so far given. That is probably why the Buddha is said to
have uttered a special verse of uplift or paean of joy at this
extinguishment, which was perfect in every sense:
Abhedi kàyo, nirodhi sa¤¤à,

vedanà sãtirahaüsu sabbà,
24 Ud 92, Pañhamadabbasutta.
våpasamiüsu saïkhàrà,
vi¤¤ànaü attham agamà.
ßBody broke up, perceptions ceased,

All feelings cooled off,
Preparations calmed down,
Consciousness came to an end.û
This event was of such a great importance that, though it occurred

at Veëuvana àràma in Ràjagaha, the Buddha related the event to
the congregation of monks when he returned to Sàvatthã. It was
not an incidental mention in reply to a particular question, but a
special peroration recounting the event and commemorating it
with the following two Udàna verses, which so aptly constitute the
grand finale to our Udàna text:
Ayoghanahatass'eva,
jalato jàtavedaso,
anupubbåpasantassa,
yathà na ¤àyate gati.
Evaü sammàvimuttànaü,
kàmabandhoghatàrinaü,
pa¤¤àpetuü gatã n'atthi,
pattànaü acalaü sukhaü.25
ßJust as in the case of a fire,

Blazing like a block of iron in point of compactness,
When it gradually calms down,
No path it goes by can be traced.
ßEven so of those who are well released,
25 Ud 93, Dutiyadabbasutta.
Who have crossed over the floods of shackles of sensu-

ality,
And reached Bliss Unshaken,
There is no path to be pointed out.û
We have deviated from the commentarial interpretation in our

rendering of the first two lines of the verse. The commentary gives
two alternative meanings, probably because it is in doubt as to the
correct one. Firstly it brings in the idea of a bronze vessel that is
being beaten at the forge with an iron hammer, giving the option
that the gradual subsidence mentioned in the verse may apply
either to the flames or to the reverberations of sound arising out of
it.26 Secondly, as a `some say so' view, kecidvàda, it gives an
alternative meaning, connected with the ball of iron beaten at the
forge.
In our rendering, however, we had to follow a completely dif-
ferent line of interpretation, taking the expression ayoghanahatas-
sa as a comparison, ayoghanahatassa + iva, for the blazing fire,
jalato jàtavedaso. On seeing a fire that is ablaze, one gets a notion
of compactness, as on seeing a red hot block of solid iron.
In the Dhammapada verse beginning with seyyo ayogulo bhut-
to, tatto aggisikhåpamo,27 ßbetter to swallow a red hot iron ball,
that resembles a flame of fire,û a cognate simile is employed
somewhat differently. There the ball of iron is compared to a
flame of fire. Here the flame of fire is compared to a block of iron.
All in all, it is highly significant that the Buddha uttered three
verses of uplift in connection with the parinibbàna of the arahant
Venerable Dabba Mallaputta. The most important point that
emerges from this discussion is that Nibbàna is essentially an
extinction or extinguishment.
An extinguished fire goes nowhere. In the case of other ara-
hants, who were cremated after their parinibbàna, there is a
26 Ud-a 435.
27 Dhp 308, Nirayavagga.
leftover as ashes for one to perpetuate at least the memory of their

existence. But here Venerable Dabba Mallaputta, as if to drive a
point home, through his psychic powers based on the fire element,
saw to it that neither ashes nor soot will mar his perfect extin-
guishment in the eyes of the world. That is why the Buddha
celebrated it with these special utterances of joy.
So then the cessation of existence is itself Nibbàna. There is no
everlasting immortal Nibbàna awaiting the arahants at their
parinibbàna.
That kind of argument the commentaries sometimes put forward
is now and then advanced by modern day writers and preachers,
too, in their explanations. When it comes to Nibbàna, they resort
to two pet parables of recent origin, the parable of the tortoise and
the parable of the frog.
In the former, a tortoise goes down into the water and the fishes
ask him where he came from. The tortoise replies that he came
from land. In order to determine what sort of a thing land is, the
fishes go on asking the tortoise a number of questions based on
various qualities of water. To each question the tortoise has to
reply in the negative, since land has none of the qualities of water.
The parable of the frog is much the same. When it gets into
water it has to say `no no' to every question put by the toad, still
unfamiliar with land. To make the parables convincing, those
negative answers, the `no-nos,' are compared to the strings of
negative terms that are found in the sutta passages dealing with the
arahattaphalasamàdhi, which we have already quoted.
For instance, to prove their point those writers and teachers
would resort to the famous Udàna passage beginning with:
Àtthi, bhikkhave, tad àyatanaü, yattha n'eva pathavã na

àpo na tejo na vàyo na àkàsàna¤càyatanaü na
vi¤¤àõàna¤càyatanaü na àki¤ca¤¤àyatanaü na neva-
sa¤¤ànàsa¤¤àyatanaü na ayaü loko na paraloko na ubho

candimasåriyà . . . '28
ßThere is, monks, that sphere, in which there is neither

earth, nor water, nor fire, nor air; neither the sphere of in-
finite space, nor the sphere of infinite consciousness, nor
the sphere of nothingness, nor the sphere of neither-
perception-nor-non-perception; neither this world nor the
world beyond, nor the sun and the moon . . . û
But we have reasonably pointed out that those passages do not in

any way refer to a non-descript realm into which the arahants
enter after their demise, a realm that the tortoise and the frog
cannot describe. Such facile explanations contradict the deeper
teachings on the cessation of existence, dependent arising and not
self. They create a lot of misconceptions regarding Nibbàna as the
ultimate aim.
The purpose of all those arguments is to assert that Nibbàna is
definitely not an annihilation. The ideal of an everlasting Nibbàna
is held out in order to obviate nihilistic notions. But the Buddha
himself has declared that when he is preaching about the cessation
of existence, those who held on to eternalist views wrongly
accused him for being an annihilationist, who teaches about the
annihilation, destruction and non-existence of a truly existing
being, sato satassa ucchedaü vinàsaü vibhavaü pa¤¤àpeti.29
On such occasions, the Buddha did not in any way incline to-
wards eternalism in order to defend himself. He did not put
forward the idea of an everlasting Nibbàna to counter the accusa-
tion. Instead, he drew attention to the three signata and the four
noble truths and solved the whole problem. He maintained that the
charge is groundless and utterly misconceived, and concluded with
the memorable declaration: pubbe càhaü, bhikkhave, etarahi ca
28 Ud 80, Pañhamanibbànapañisaüyuttasutta, see sermon 17.

dukkha¤ceva pa¤¤àpemi, dukkhassa ca nirodhaü, ßformerly as

well as now, I point out only a suffering and a cessation of that
suffering.û
Even the term tathàgata, according to him, is not to be con-
ceived as a self. It is only a mass of suffering that has come down
through saüsàra, due to ignorance. The so-called existence,
bhava, is an outcome of grasping, upàdàna. When grasping
ceases, existence comes to an end. That itself is the cessation of
existence, bhavanirodha, which is Nibbàna.
As the term anupàdà parinibbàna suggests, there is no grasping
in the experience of the cessation of existence. It is only when one
is grasping something that he can be identified with it, or reckoned
by it. When one lets go of everything, he goes beyond reckoning.
Of course, even the commentaries sometimes use the expression
apa¤¤attikabhàvaü gatà,30 ßgone to the state beyond designationû
with regard to the parinibbàna of arahants.
Nevertheless, they tacitly grant a destination, which in their
opinion defies definition. Such vague arguments are riddled with
contradictions. They obfuscate the deeper issues of the Dhamma,
relating to pañicca samuppàda and anattà, and seek to perpetuate
personality view by slanting towards eternalism.
It is to highlight some extremely subtle aspects of the problem
of Nibbàna that we brought out all these arguments today.
30 Sv II 635.
Nibbàna Sermon 20



This is the twentieth sermon in the series of sermons on
Nibbàna. In our last sermon we described, as something of a
marvel in the attainment of Nibbàna, the very possibility of
realizing, in this very life, as diññhadhammika, one's after death
state, which is samparàyika. The phrase diññheva dhamme sayaü
abhi¤¤à sacchikatvà, ßhaving realized here and now by one's own
higher knowledge,û2 occurs so often in the discourses because the
emancipated one ascertains his after death state as if by seeing
with his own eyes.
Natthi dàni punabbhavo, ßthere is no re-becoming now,û3 khãõà
jàti, ßextinct is birth,û4 are some of the joyous utterances of the
2 E.g. at M I 35, âkaïkheyyasutta.
3 E.g. at M I 167, Ariyapariyesanasutta.
515
Buddha and the arahants, which were inspired by the realization

of the cessation of existence in this very life. Through that realiza-
tion itself, they experience a bliss devoid of feeling, which is
called ßthe cooling off of feelings.û That is why Nibbàna as such
is known as avedayita sukha, a ßbliss devoid of feeling.û5
At the end of their lives, at the moment when death approaches,
those emancipated ones, the arahants, put forward their unshakea-
ble deliverance of the mind, akuppà cetomivutti (which remains
unshaken even in the face of death), and become deathless well
before their death, not after it.
On many an occasion the Buddha has spoken highly of this
unshakeable deliverance of the mind, describing it as the supreme
bliss, the supreme knowledge and the supreme freedom from
death. For instance, among the Sixes of the Aïguttara Nikàya, we
come across the following two verses:
Tassa sammà vimuttassa,

¤àõaü ce hoti tàdino,
àkuppà me vimuttã'ti,
bhavasaüyojanakkhaye.
Etaü kho paramaü ¤àõaü,

etaü sukhamanuttaraü,
asokaü virajaü khemaü,
etaü ànaõyamuttamaü.6
ßTo that such like one, who is fully released,

There arises the knowledge:
Ùnshakeable is my deliverance,'
Upon his extinction of fetters to existence.
4 E.g. at M I 23, Bhayabheravasutta.

6 A III 354, Iõasutta.
ßThis is the highest knowledge,

This is the unsurpassed bliss,
This sorrow-less, taintless security,
Is the supreme debtless-ness.û
Arahants are said to be debtless in regard to the four requisites

offered by the laity out of faith, but when Nibbàna is regarded as a
debtless-ness, it seems to imply something deeper.
Saüsàra or reiterated existence is itself a debt, which one can
never pay off. When one comes to think of kamma and its result, it
is a debt that keeps on gathering an interminable interest, which
can never be paid off. But even from this debt the arahants have
won freedom by destroying the seeds of kamma, by rendering
them infertile. They are made ineffective beyond this life, as there
is no rebirth. The meaningful line of the Ratanasutta, khãõaü
puràõaü, navaü natthi sambhavaü,7 ßwhatever is old is extinct
and there is no arising anew,û has to be understood in that sense.
The karmic debt is paid off and there is no fresh incurring.
All this is in praise of that unshakeable deliverance of the mind.
It is a kind of extraordinary knowledge, almost unimaginable, a
`real'-ization of one's own after death state.
In almost all serious discussions on Nibbàna, the subtlest moot
point turns out to be the question of the after death state of the
emancipated one. A brief answer, the Buddha had given to this
question, we already brought up in our last sermon, by quoting the
two concluding verses of the Udàna, with which that collection of
inspired utterances ends with a note of exceptional grandeur. Let
us recall them:
Ayoghanahatass'eva,
jalato jàtavedaso,
anupubbåpasantassa,
yathà na ¤àyate gati.
Evaü sammàvimuttànaü,
kàmabandhoghatàrinaü,
pa¤¤àpetuü gati natthi,
pattànaü acalaü sukhaü.8
ßJust as in the case of a fire,

Blazing like a block of iron in point of compactness,
When it gradually calms down,
No path it goes by can be traced.
ßEven so, of those who are well released,

Who have crossed over the flux of shackles of sensuali-
ty,
And reached bliss unshaken,
There is no path to be pointed out.û
The last two lines are particularly significant. There is no path to

be pointed out of those who have reached bliss unshaken. Acalaü
sukhaü, or ßunshakeable bliss,û is none other than that unshakea-
ble deliverance of the mind. Akuppa means ßunassailableû or
ßunshakeable.û Clearly enough, what the verse says is that after
their death the emancipated ones leave no trace of a path gone by,
even as the flames of a raging fire.
The flame may appear as something really existing due to the
perception of the compact, ghanasa¤¤à, but when it goes down
and disappears, no one can say that it went in such and such a
direction.
Though this is the obvious meaning, some try to attribute quite
a different meaning to the verse in question. The line pa¤¤àpetuü
gati n'atthi, ßthere is no path to be pointed out,û is interpreted
even by the commentators (who take the word gati to mean some
state of existence) as an assertion that, although such a bourne
8 Ud 93, Dutiyadabbasutta.
cannot be pointed out, the arahants pass away into some non-
descript realm.
This kind of interpretation is prompted by an apprehension of
the charge of annihilation. A clear instance of this tendency is
revealed in the commentary to the following verse in the
Dhammapada:
Ahiüsakà ye munayo,
niccaü kàyena saüvutà,
te yanti accutaü ñhànaü,
yattha gantvà na socare.9
ßInnocent are the sages,

That are ever restrained in body,
They go to that state unshaken,
Wherein they grieve no more.û
The commentator, in paraphrasing, brings in the word sassataü,

ßeternal,û for accutaü, thereby giving the idea that the arahants
go to an eternal place of rest.10 Because the verb yanti, ßgo,û
occurs there, he must have thought that this state unshaken,
accutaü, is something attainable after death. But we can give
another instance in support of our explanation of the term ac-
cutaü. The following verse in the Hemakamàõavapucchà of the
Pàràyanavagga in the Sutta Nipàta clearly shows what this
accutaü is:
Idha diññhasutamutavi¤¤àtesu,
piyaråpesu Hemaka,
9 Dhp 225, Kodhavagga.

10 Dhp-a III 321.
chandaràgavinodanaü,
nibbànapadaü accutaü.11
ßThe dispelling here in this world of desire and lust,

In pleasurable things,
Seen, heard, sensed and cognized,
Is Nibbàna itself, O Hemaka.û
This is further proof of the fact that there is no eternal immortal

rest awaiting the arahants after their demise. The reason for such a
postulate is probably the fear of falling into the annihilationist
view. Why this chronic fear? To the worldlings overcome by
craving for existence any teaching that leads to the cessation of
existence appears dreadful.
That is why they put forward two new parables, following the
same commentarial trend. The other day we mentioned about
those two parables, the parable of the tortoise and the parable of
the frog.12 When the fish and the toad living in water ask what sort
of a thing land is, the tortoise and the frog are forced to say `no,
no' to every question they put. Likewise the Buddha, so it is
argued, was forced to give a string of negative terms in his
discourses on Nibbàna.
But we have pointed out that this argument is fallacious and that
those discourses have to be interpreted differently. The theme that
runs through such discourses is none other than the cessation of
existence.
In the Alagaddåpama Sutta of the Majjhima Nikàya the Buddha
declares in unmistakeable terms that some recluses and brahmins,
on hearing him preaching the Dhamma for the cessation of
existence, wrongly accuse him with the charge of being an
annihilationist, sato sattassa ucchedaü vinàsaü vibhavaü
11 Sn 1086, Hemakamàõavapucchà.
12 See sermon 19.
pa¤¤àpeti, ßhe is showing the way to the annihilation, destruction

and non-existence of a truly existing being.û13
He clearly states that some even grieve and lament and fall into
despair, complaining ucchijjissàmi nàma su, vinassissàmi nàma
su, na su nàma bhavissàmi, ßso it seems I shall be annihilated, so
it seems I shall perish, so it seems I shall be no more.û14
Even during the lifetime of the Buddha there were various de-
bates and controversies regarding the after death state of the
emancipated person among recluses and brahmins. They were of
the opinion that the after death state of the emancipated one in any
particular religious system has to be explained according to a
fourfold logic, or tetralemma. A paradigm of that tetralemma
occurs quite often in the discourses. It consists of the following
four propositions:
1) hoti tathàgato paraü maraõà, ßThe Tathàgata exists

after death.û
2) na hoti tathàgato paraü maraõà, ßThe Tathàgata does
not exist after death.û
3) hoti ca na ca hoti tathàgato paraü maraõà, ßThe
Tathàgata both exists and does not exist after death.û
4) n'eva hoti na na hoti tathàgato paraü maraõà, ßThe
Tathàgata neither exists nor does not exist after death.û15
This four-cornered logic purports to round up the four possible

alternatives in any situation, or four possible answers to any
question. The dilemma is fairly well known, where one is caught
up between two alternatives. The tetralemma, with its four
15 E.g. at M I 484, Aggivacchagottasutta.
alternatives, is supposed to exhaust the universe of discourse in a

way that one cannot afford to ignore it.
When it comes to a standpoint regarding a particular issue, one
is compelled to say `yes' or `no,' or at least to assert both stand-
points or negate them altogether. The contemporary recluses and
brahmins held on to the view that the Tathàgata's after death state
has to be predicated in accordance with the four-cornered logic.
When we hear the term Tathàgata, we are immediately remind-
ed of the Buddha. But for the contemporary society, it was a sort
of technical term with a broader meaning. Those recluses and
brahmins used the term Tathàgata to designate the perfected
individual in any religious system, whose qualifications were
summed up in the thematic phrase uttamapuriso, paramapuriso,
paramapattipatto,16 ßthe highest person, the supreme person, the
one who has attained the supreme state.û
This fact is clearly borne out by the Kutåhalasàlàsutta in the
Avyàkata Saüyutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya. In that discourse we
find the wandering ascetic Vacchagotta coming to the Buddha
with the following report:
ßRecently there was a meeting of recluses, brahmins and

wandering ascetics in the debating hall. In that assembly,
the following chance talk arose: `Now there is this teacher,
Påraõa Kassapa, who is widely acclaimed and who has a
large following. When an ordinary disciple of his passes
away, he predicates his destiny. So also in the case of a
disciple who has attained the highest state of perfection in
his religious system. Other well known teachers like
Makkhali Gosàla, Nigaõñha Nàtaputta, Sa¤jaya Belaññhi-
putta, Pakudha Kaccàyana and Ajita Kesakambali do the
same. They all declare categorically the after death state of
both types of their disciples.
16 S III 116, Anuràdhasutta.

ß`But as for this ascetic Gotama, who also is a teacher

widely acclaimed with a large following, the position is
that he clearly declares the after death state of an ordinary
disciple of his, but in the case of a disciple who has at-
tained the highest state of perfection, he does not predicate
his destiny according to the above mentioned tetralemma.
Instead he makes such a declaration about him as the fol-
lowing:
ßAcchecchi taõhaü, vàvattayi sa¤¤ojanaü, sammà

mànàbhisamayà antam akàsi dukkhassa,17 `He cut off
craving, disjoined the fetter and, by rightly understanding
conceit for what it is, made an end of suffering.'û
Vacchagotta concludes this account with the confession that he

himself was perplexed and was in doubt as to how the Dhamma of
the recluse Gotama has to be understood. The Buddha grants that
Vacchagotta's doubt is reasonable, with the words ala¤hi te,
Vaccha, kaïkhituü, alaü vicikicchituü, kaïkhaniye ca pana te
ñhàne vicikicchà uppannà, ßIt behooves you to doubt, Vaccha, it
behooves you to be perplexed, for doubt has arisen in you on a
dubious point.û
Then the Buddha comes out with the correct standpoint in order
to dispel Vacchagotta's doubt. Sa-upàdànassa kvàhaü, Vaccha,
upapattiü pa¤¤àpemi, no anupàdànassa, ßIt is for one with
grasping, Vaccha, that I declare there is an occurrence of birth, not
for one without grasping.û
He gives the following simile by way of illustration. Seyyathàpi,
Vaccha, aggi sa-upàdàno jalati no anupàdàno, evam eva kvàhaü,
Vaccha, sa-upàdànassa upapattiü pa¤¤àpemi, no anupàdànassa,
ßJust as a fire burns when it has fuel to grasp and not when it has
no fuel, even so, Vaccha, I declare that there is an occurrence of
birth for one with grasping, not for one without grasping.û
17 S IV 399, Kutåhalasàlàsutta.
As we have mentioned before, the word upàdàna has two mean-

ings, it means both grasping as well as fuel. In fact fuel is just
what the fire `grasps.' Just as the fire depends on grasping in the
form of fuel, so also the individual depends on grasping for his
rebirth.
Within the context of this analogy, Vacchagotta now raises a
question that has some deeper implications: Yasmiü pana, bho
Gotama, samaye acci vàtena khittà dårampi gacchati, imassa
pana bhavaü Gotamo kim upàdànasmiü pa¤¤àpeti, ßMaster
Gotama, at the time when a flame flung by the wind goes even far,
what does Master Gotama declare to be its object of grasping or
fuel?û
The Buddha's answer to that question is: Yasmiü kho, Vaccha,
samaye acci vàtena khittà dårampi gacchati, tamahaü
vàtupàdànaü vadàmi; vàto hissa, Vaccha, tasmiü samaye
upàdànaü hoti, ßAt the time, Vaccha, when a flame flung by the
wind goes even far, that, I say, has wind as its object of grasping.
Vaccha, at that time wind itself serves as the object of grasping.û
Now this is only an analogy. Vaccha raises the question proper
only at this point: Yasmi¤ca pana, bho Gotama, samaye ima¤ca
kàyaü nikkhipati satto ca a¤¤ataraü kàyam anuppatto hoti,
imassa pana bhavaü Gotamo kim upàdànasmiü pa¤¤àpeti, ßAt
the time, Master Gotama, when a being lays down this body and
has reached a certain body, what does Master Gotama declare to
be a grasping in his case?û
The Buddha replies: Yasmi¤ca pana, Vaccha, samaye ima¤ca
kàyaü nikkhipati satto ca a¤¤ataraü kàyam anuppatto hoti, tam
ahaü taõhupàdànaü vadàmi; taõhà hissa, Vaccha, tasmiü
samaye upàdànaü hoti, ßAt the time, Vaccha, when a being lays
down this body and has reached a certain body, I say, he has
craving as his grasping. At that time, Vaccha, it is craving that
serves as a grasping for him.û
With this sentence the discourse ends abruptly, but there is an
intricate point in the two sections quoted above. In these two
sections, we have adopted the reading anuppatto, ßhas reached,û

as more plausible in rendering the phrase a¤¤ataraü kàyam
anuppatto, ßhas reached a certain body.û18 The commentary,
however, seeks to justify the reading anupapanno, ßis not reborn,û
which gives quite an opposite sense, with the following explana-
tion cutikkhaõeyeva pañisandhicittassa anuppannattà anuppanno
hoti,19 ßsince at the death moment itself, the rebirth consciousness
has not yet arisen, he is said to be not yet reborn.û
Some editors doubt whether the correct reading should be
anuppatto.20 The doubt seems reasonable enough, for even
syntactically, anuppatto can be shown to fit into the context better
than anuppanno. The word a¤¤ataraü provides us with the
criterion. It has a selective sense, like ßa certain,û and carries
definite positive implications. To express something negative a
word like a¤¤aü, ßanother,û has to be used instead of the selective
a¤¤ataraü, ßa certain.û
On the other hand, the suggested reading anuppatto avoids
those syntactical difficulties. A being lays down this body and has
reached a certain body. Even the simile given as an illustration is
in favour of our interpretation. The original question of Vaccha
about the flame flung by the wind, reminds us of the way a forest
fire, for instance, spreads from one tree to another tree some
distance away. It is the wind that pushes the flame for it to catch
hold of the other tree.
The commentarial explanation, however, envisages the situation
in which a being lays down this body and is not yet reborn in
another body. It is in the interim that craving is supposed to be the
grasping or a fuel. Some scholars have exploited this commentari-
18 This suggestion finds support in the Chinese parallel to the Kutåhalasàlàsutta,

Saüyukta âgama discourse 957 (Taishº II 244b2), which speaks of the being that
has passed away as availing himself of a mind-made body. (Anàlayo)
19 Spk III 114.
20 Feer, L. (ed.): Saüyutta Nikàya, PTS 1990 (1894), p 400 n 2.
al explanation to postulate a theory of antaràbhava, or interim

existence, prior to rebirth proper.
Our interpretation, based on the reading anuppatto, rules out
even the possibility of an antaràbhava. Obviously enough,
Vacchagotta's question is simple and straightforward. He is
curious to know what sort of a grasping connects up the being that
lays down the body and the being that arises in another body. That
is to say, how the apparent gap could be bridged.
The answer given by the Buddha fully accords with the analogy
envisaged by the premise. Just as the wind does the work of
grasping in the case of the flame, so craving itself, at the moment
of death, fulfills the function of grasping for a being to reach
another body. That is precisely why craving is called bhavanetti,
ßthe guide in becoming.û21 Like a promontory, it juts out into the
ocean of saüsàra. When it comes to rebirth, it is craving that
bridges the apparent gap. It is the invisible combustible fuel that
keeps the raging saüsàric forest fire alive.
All in all, what transpired at the debating hall (Kutåhalasàlà)
reveals one important fact, namely that the Buddha's reluctance to
give a categorical answer regarding the after death state of the
emancipated one in his dispensation had aroused the curiosity of
those recluses and brahmins. That is why they kept on discussing
the subject at length.
However, it was not the fact that he had refused to make any
comment at all on this point. Only, that the comment he had made
appeared so strange to them, as we may well infer from Vac-
chagotta's report of the discussion at the debating hall.
The Buddha's comment on the subject, which they had quoted,
was not based on the tetralemma. It was a completely new formu-
lation. Acchecchi taõhaü, vàvattayi sa¤¤ojanaü, sammà
mànàbhisamayà antam akàsi dukkhassa, ßHe cut off craving,
disjoined the fetter and, by rightly understanding conceit for what
it is, made an end of suffering.û
21 E.g. S III 190, Bhavanettisutta.

This then, is the correct answer, and not any one of the four
corners of the tetralemma. This brief formula is of paramount
importance. When craving is cut off, the `guide-in-becoming,'
which is responsible for rebirth, is done away with. It is as if the
fetter binding to another existence has been unhooked. The term
bhavasaüyojanakkhaya, ßdestruction of the fetter to existence,û
we came across earlier, conveys the same sense.22
The phrase sammà mànàbhisamaya is also highly significant.
With the dispelling of ignorance, the conceit àm,' asmimàna, is
seen for what it is. It disappears when exposed to the light of
understanding and that is the end of suffering as well. The con-
cluding phrase antam akàsi dukkhassa, ßmade an end of suffer-
ing,û is conclusive enough. The problem that was there all the time
was the problem of suffering, so the end of suffering means the
end of the whole problem.
In the Aggivacchagottasutta of the Majjhima Nikàya the Bud-
dha's response to the question of the after death state of the
arahant comes to light in greater detail. The question is presented
there in the form of the tetralemma, beginning with hoti tathàgato
paraü maraõà.23
While all the other recluses and brahmins held that the answer
should necessarily take the form of one of the four alternatives, the
Buddha put them all aside, ñhapitàni, rejected them, patikkhittàni,
refused to state his view categorically in terms of them,
avyàkatàni. This attitude of the Buddha puzzled not only the
ascetics of other sects, but even some of the monks like
Màluïkyàputta. In very strong terms, Màluïkyàputta challenged
the Buddha to give a categorical answer or else confess his
ignorance.24
As a matter of fact there are altogether ten such questions,
which the Buddha laid aside, rejected and refused to answer
22 It 53, Indriyasutta; see sermon 16.

24 M I 427, CåëaMàluïkyàputtasutta.
categorically. The first six take the form of three dilemmas, while
the last four constitute the tetralemma already mentioned. Since an
examination of those three dilemmas would reveal some important
facts, we shall briefly discuss their significance as well. The three
sets of views are stated thematically as follows:
1) sassato loko, ßThe world is eternal.û

2) asassato loko, ßThe world is not eternal.û
3) antavà loko, ßThe world is finite.û
4) anantavà loko, ßThe world is infinite.û
5) taü jãvaü taü sarãraü, ßThe soul and the body are the
same.û
6) a¤¤aü jãvaü a¤¤aü sarãraü, ßThe soul is one thing
and the body another.û
These three dilemmas, together with the tetralemma, are known as

abyàkatavatthåni, the ten undetermined points.25 Various recluses
and brahmins, as well as king Pasenadi Kosala, posed these ten
questions to the Buddha, hoping to get categorical answers.
Why the Buddha laid them aside is a problem to many scholars.
Some, like Màluïkyàputta, would put it down to agnosticism.
Others would claim that the Buddha laid them aside because they
are irrelevant to the immediate problem of deliverance, though he
could have answered them. That section of opinion go by the
Siüsapàvanasutta in the Saccasaüyutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya.26
Once while dwelling in a siüsapà grove, the Buddha took up
some siüsapà leaves in his hands and asked the monks: ßWhat do
you think, monks, which is more, these leaves in my hand or those
in the siüsapà grove?û The monks reply that the leaves in the
hand are few and those in the siüsapà grove are greater in number.
Then the Buddha makes a declaration to the following effect:
25 The expression abyàkatavatthu occurs e.g. at A IV 68, Abyàkatasutta.

26 S V 437, Sãsapàvanasutta.
ßEven so, monks, what I have understood through higher

knowledge and not taught you is far more than what I have taught
you.û
If we rely on this simile, we would have to grant that the ques-
tions are answerable in principle, but that the Buddha preferred to
avoid them because they are not relevant. But this is not the reason
either.
All these ten questions are based on wrong premises. To take
them seriously and answer them would be to grant the validity of
those premises. The dilemmas and the tetralemma seek arbitrarily
to corner anyone who tries to answer them. The Buddha refused to
be cornered that way.
The first two alternatives, presented in the form of a dilemma,
are sassato loko, ßthe world is eternal,û and asassato loko, ßthe
world is not eternal.û This is an attempt to determine the world in
temporal terms. The next set of alternatives seeks to determine the
world in spatial terms.
Why did the Buddha refuse to answer these questions on time
and space? It is because the concept of `the world' has been given
quite a new definition in this dispensation.
Whenever the Buddha redefined a word in common usage, he
introduced it with the phrase ariyassa vinaye, ßin the discipline of
the noble ones.û
We have already mentioned on an earlier occasion that accord-
ing to the discipline of the noble ones, `the world' is said to have
arisen in the six sense-spheres, chasu loko samuppanno.27 In short,
the world is redefined in terms of the six spheres of sense. This is
so fundamentally important that in the Saëàyatanasaüyutta of the
Saüyutta Nikàya the theme comes up again and again.
For instance, in the Samiddhisutta Venerable Samiddhi poses
the following question to the Buddha: `Loko, loko'ti, bhante,
vuccati. Kittàvatà nu kho, bhante, loko và assa lokapa¤¤atti và?28
27 S I 41, Lokasutta; see sermon 4.

28 S IV 39, Samiddhisutta.
ß`The world, the world,' so it is said Venerable sir, but how far,
Venerable sir, does this world or the concept of the world go?û
The Buddha gives the following answer: Yattha kho, Samiddhi,
atthi cakkhu, atthi råpà, atthi cakkhuvi¤¤àõaü, atthi cakkhu-
vi¤¤àõavi¤¤àtabbà dhammà, atthi tattha loko và lokapa¤¤atti và,
ßWhere there is the eye, Samiddhi, where there are forms, where
there is eye-consciousness, where there are things cognizable by
eye-consciousness, there exists the world or the concept of the
world.û
A similar statement is made with regard to the other spheres of
sense, including the mind. That, according to the Buddha, is where
the world exists. Then he makes a declaration concerning the
converse: Yattha ca kho, Samiddhi, natthi cakkhu, natthi råpà,
natthi cakkhuvi¤¤àõaü, natthi cakkhuvi¤¤àõavi¤¤àtabbà
dhammà, natthi tattha loko và lokapa¤¤atti và, ßWhere there is no
eye, Samiddhi, where there are no forms, where there is no eye-
consciousness, where there are no things cognizable by eye-
consciousness, there the world does not exist, nor any concept of
the world.û
From this we can well infer that any attempt to determine
whether there is an end of the world, either in temporal terms or in
spatial terms, is misguided. It is the outcome of a wrong view, for
there is a world so long as there are the six spheres of sense. That
is why the Buddha consistently refused to answer those questions
regarding the world.
There are a number of definitions of the world given by the
Buddha. We shall cite two of them. A certain monk directly asked
the Buddha to give a definition of the world: `Loko, loko'ti bhante,
vuccati. Kittàvatà nu kho, bhante, loko'ti vuccati? ß`The world,
the world,' so it is said. In what respect, Venerable sir, is it called
a world?û Then the Buddha makes the following significant
declaration:
Lujjatã'ti kho, bhikkhu, tasmà loko'ti vuccati. Ki¤ca luj-

jati? Cakkhu kho, bhikkhu, lujjati, råpà lujjanti, cakkhu-
vi¤¤àõaü lujjati, cakkhusamphasso lujjati, yampidaü
cakkhusamphassapaccayà uppajjati vedayitaü sukhaü và
dukkhaü và adukkhamasukhaü và tampi lujjati. Lujjatã'ti

kho, bhikkhu, tasmà loko'ti vuccati.29
ßIt is disintegrating, monk, that is why it is called `the

world.' And what is disintegrating? The eye, monk, is dis-
integrating, forms are disintegrating, eye-consciousness is
disintegrating, eye-contact is disintegrating, and whatever
feeling that arises dependent on eye-contact, be it pleasant,
or painful, or neither-pleasant-nor-painful, that too is dis-
integrating. It is disintegrating, monk, that is why it is
called `the world.'û
Here the Buddha is redefining the concept of the world, punning

on the verb lujjati, which means to ßbreak upû or ßdisintegrate.û
To bring about a radical change in outlook, in accordance with the
Dhamma, the Buddha would sometimes introduce a new etymolo-
gy in preference to the old. This definition of `the world' is to the
same effect.
Venerable ânanda, too, raises the same question, soliciting a
redefinition for the well-known concept of the world, and the
Buddha responds with the following answer: Yaü kho, ânanda,
palokadhammaü, ayaü vuccati ariyassa vinaye loko.30 ßWhatever,
ânanda, is subject to disintegration that is called `the world' in the
noble one's discipline.û
He even goes on to substantiate his statement at length:
Ki¤ca, ânanda, palokadhammaü? Cakkhuü kho, ânanda,

palokadhammaü, råpà palokadhammà, cakkhuvi¤¤àõaü
palokadhammaü, cakkhusamphasso palokadhammo,
yampidaü cakkhusamphassapaccayà uppajjati vedayitaü
sukhaü và dukkhaü và adukkhamasukhaü và tampi palo-
29 S IV 52, Lokapa¤hàsutta.
30 S IV 53, Palokadhammasutta.
kadhammaü. Yaü kho, ânanda, palokadhammaü, ayaü

vuccati ariyassa vinaye loko.
ßAnd what, ânanda, is subject to disintegration? The eye,

ânanda, is subject to disintegration, forms are subject to
disintegration, eye-consciousness is subject to disintegra-
tion, eye-contact is subject to disintegration, and whatever
feeling that arises dependent on eye-contact, be it pleasant,
or painful, or neither-pleasant-nor-painful, that too is sub-
ject to disintegration. Whatever is subject to disintegra-
tion, ânanda, is called `the world' in the noble one's
discipline.û
In this instance, the play upon the word loka is vividly apt in that it
brings out the transcendence of the world. If the world by defini-
tion is regarded as transient, it cannot be conceived substantially as
a unit. How then can an eternity or infinity be predicated about it?
If all the so-called things in the world, listed above, are all the time
disintegrating, any unitary concept of the world is fallacious.
Had the Buddha answered those misconceived questions, he
would thereby concede to the wrong concept of the world current
among other religious groups. So then we can understand why the
Buddha refused to answer the first four questions.
Now let us examine the next dilemma, taü jãvaü taü sarãraü,
a¤¤aü jãvaü a¤¤aü sarãraü, ßthe soul and the body are the same,
the soul is one thing and the body another.û To these questions
also, the other religionists insisted on a categorical answer, either
`yes' or `no.'
There is a `catch' in the way these questions are framed. The
Buddha refused to get caught to them. These two questions are of
the type that clever lawyers put to a respondent these days. They
would sometimes insist strictly on a `yes' or `no' as answer and
ask a question like `have you now given up drinking?' If the
respondent happens to be a teetotaler, he would be in a quandary,
since both answers tend to create a wrong impression.
So also in the case of these two alternatives, ßthe soul and the
body are the same, the soul is one thing and the body another.û
Either way there is a presumption of a soul, which the Buddha did

not subscribe to. The Buddha had unequivocally declared that the
idea of soul is the outcome of an utterly foolish view, kevalo
paripåro bàladhammo.31 That is why the Buddha rejected both
standpoints.
A similar `catch,' a similar misconception, underlies the tetra-
lemma concerning the after death state of the Tathàgata. It should
be already clear to some extent by what we have discussed so far.
For the Buddha, the term Tathàgata had a different connotation
than what it meant for those of other sects. The latter adhered to
the view that both the ordinary disciple as well as the perfected
individual in their systems of thought had a soul of some descrip-
tion or other.
The Buddha never subscribed to such a view. On the other
hand, he invested the term Tathàgata with an extremely deep and
subtle meaning. His definition of the term will emerge from the
Aggivacchagottasutta, which we propose to discuss now.
In this discourse we find the wandering ascetic Vacchagotta
trying to get a categorical answer to the questionnaire, putting each
of the questions with legal precision one by one, as a lawyer would
at the courts of law.
Kiü nu kho, bho Gotamo, `sassato loko, idam eva saccaü,
mogham a¤¤an'ti, evaü diññhi bhavaü Gotamo?32 ßNow, Master
Gotama, `the world is eternal, this only is true, all else is false,' are
you of this view, Master Gotama?û The Buddha replies: Na kho
ahaü, Vaccha, evaü diññhi, ßNo, Vaccha, I am not of this view.û
Then Vacchagotta puts the opposite standpoint, which too the
Buddha answers in the negative. To all the ten questions the
Buddha answers `no,' thereby rejecting the questionnaire in toto.
Then Vacchagotta asks why, on seeing what danger, the Buddha
refuses to hold any of those views. The Buddha gives the follow-
ing explanation:
`Sassato loko'ti kho, Vaccha, diññhigatam etaü diññhi-

gahanaü diññhikantàraü diññhivisåkaü diññhivipphanditaü
diññhisaüyojanaü sadukkhaü savighàtaü sa-upàyàsaü
sapariëàhaü, na nibbidàya na viràgàya na nirodhàya na
upasamàya na abhi¤¤àya na sambodhàya na nibbànàya
saüvattati.
ßVaccha, this speculative view that the world is eternal is

a jungle of views, a desert of views, a distortion of views,
an aberration of views, a fetter of views, it is fraught with
suffering, with vexation, with despair, with delirium, it
does not lead to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessa-
tion, to tranquility, to higher knowledge, to enlightenment,
to Nibbàna.û So with regard to the other nine views.
Now here we find both the above-mentioned reasons. Not only the
fact that these questions are not relevant to the attainment of
Nibbàna, but also the fact that there is something wrong in the
very statement of the problems. What are the dangers that he sees
in holding any of these views?
Every one of them is just a speculative view, diññhigataü, a
jungle of views, diññhigahanaü, an arid desert of views, diññhi-
kantàraü, a mimicry or a distortion of views, diññhivisåkaü, an
aberration of views, diññhivipphanditaü, a fetter of views, diññhi-
saüyojanaü. They bring about suffering, sadukkhaü, vexation,
savighàtaü, despair, sa-upàyàsaü, delirium, sapariëàhaü. They
do not conduce to disenchantment, na nibbidàya, to dispassion, na
viràgàya, to cessation, na nirodhàya, to tranquility, na upasamàya,
to higher knowledge, na abhi¤¤àya, to enlightenment, na sam-
bodhàya, to extinguishment, na nibbànàya.
From this declaration it is obvious that these questions are ill
founded and misconceived. They are a welter of false views, so
much so that the Buddha even declares that these questions simply
do not exist for the noble disciple, who has heard the Dhamma.
They occur as real problems only to the untaught worldling. Why
is that?
Whoever has a deep understanding of the four noble truths

would not even raise these questions. This declaration should be
enough for one to understand why the Buddha refused to answer
them.
Explaining that it is because of these dangers that he rejects
them in toto, the Buddha now makes clear what his own stance is.
Instead of holding any of those speculative views, he has seen for
himself the rise, samudaya, and fall, atthagama, of the five
aggregates as a matter of direct experience, thereby getting rid of
all Ì'-ing and `my'-ing and latencies to conceits, winning ultimate
release.
Even after this explanation Vacchagotta resorts to the fourfold
logic to satisfy his curiosity about the after death state of the monk
thus released in mind. Evaü vimuttacitto pana, bho Gotamo,
bhikkhu kuhiü uppajjati? ßWhen a monk is thus released in mind,
Master Gotama, where is he reborn?û The Buddha replies:
Uppajjatã'ti kho, Vaccha, na upeti, ßTo say that he is reborn,
Vaccha, falls short of a reply.û
Then Vacchagotta asks: Tena hi, bho Gotama, na uppajjati? ßIf
that is so, Master Gotama, is he not reborn?û Ý Na uppajjatã'ti kho,
Vaccha, na upeti, ßTo say that he is not reborn, Vaccha, falls short
of a reply.û
Tena hi, bho Gotama, uppajjati ca na ca uppajjati? ßIf that is
so, Master Gotama, is he both reborn and is not reborn?û Ý
Uppajjati ca na ca uppajjatã'ti kho, Vaccha, na upeti, ßTo say that
he is both reborn and is not reborn, Vaccha, falls short of a reply.û
Tena hi, bho Gotama, neva uppajjati na na uppajjati? ßIf that is
so, Master Gotama, is he neither reborn nor is not reborn?û Ý Neva
uppajjati na na uppajjatã'ti kho, Vaccha, na upeti, ßTo say that he
is neither reborn nor is not reborn, Vaccha, falls short of a reply.û
At this unexpected response of the Buddha to his four questions,
Vacchagotta confesses that he is fully confused and bewildered.
The Buddha grants that his confusion and bewilderment are
understandable, since this Dhamma is so deep and subtle that it
cannot be plumbed by logic, atakkàvacaro.
However, in order to give him a clue to understand the Dhamma
point of view, he gives an illustration in the form of a catechism.
Taü kiü ma¤¤asi, Vaccha, sace te purato aggi jaleyya,

jàneyyàsi tvaü àyaü me purato aggi jalatã'ti? ßWhat do you
think, Vaccha, suppose a fire were burning before you, would you
know `this fire is burning before me?'û Ý Sace me, bho Gotama,
purato aggi jaleyya, jàneyyàhaü àyaü me purato aggi jalatã'ti.
ßIf, Master Gotama, a fire were burning before me, I would know
`this fire is burning before me.'û
Sace pana taü, Vaccha, evaü puccheyya `yo te ayaü purato
aggi jalati, ayaü aggi kiü pañicca jalatã'ti, evaü puññho tvaü,
Vaccha, kinti byàkareyyàsi? ßIf someone were to ask you, Vaccha,
`what does this fire that is burning before you burns in dependence
on,' being asked thus, Vaccha, what would you answer?û Ý Evaü
puññho ahaü, bho Gotama, evaü byàkareyyaü `yo me ayaü
purato aggi jalati, ayaü aggi tiõakaññhupàdànaü pañicca jalatã'ti.
ßBeing asked thus, Master Gotama, I would answer `this fire
burning before me burns in dependence on grass and sticks.'û
Sace te, Vaccha, purato so aggi nibbàyeyya, jàneyyàsi tvaü
àyaü me purato aggi nibbuto'ti? ßIf that fire before you were to
be extinguished, Vaccha, would you know `this fire before me has
been extinguished?'û Ý Sace me, bho Gotamo, purato so aggi
nibbàyeyya, jàneyyàhaü àyaü me purato aggi nibbuto'ti. ßIf that
fire before me were to be extinguished, Master Gotama, I would
know `this fire before me has been extinguished.'û
Sace pana taü, Vaccha, evaü puccheyya `yo te ayaü purato
aggi nibbuto, so aggi ito katamaü disaü gato, puratthimaü và
dakkhiõaü và pacchimaü và uttaraü và'ti, evaü puññho tvaü,
Vaccha, kinti byàkareyyàsi? ßIf someone were to ask you, Vaccha,
when that fire before you were extinguished, `to which direction
did it go, to the east, the west, the north or the south,' being asked
thus, what would you answer?û Ý Na upeti, bho Gotama, ya¤hi so,
bho Gotama, aggi tiõakaññhupàdànaü pañicca jalati, tassa ca
pariyàdànà a¤¤assa ca anupahàrà anàhàro nibbuto tveva
saïkhaü gacchati. ßThat wouldn't do as a reply, Master Gotama,
for that fire burnt in dependence on its fuel of grass and sticks.
That being used up and not getting any more fuel, being without
fuel, it is reckoned as extinguished.û
At this point a very important expression comes up, which we

happened to discuss earlier too, namely saïkhaü gacchati.33 It
means ßto be reckoned,û or ßto be known as,û or ßto be designat-
ed.û So the correct mode of designation in this case is to say that
the fire is reckoned as èxtinguished,' and not to say that it has
gone somewhere.
If one takes mean advantage of the expression `fire has gone
out' and insists on locating it, it will only be a misuse or an abuse
of linguistic usage. It reveals a pervert tendency to misunderstand
and misinterpret. Therefore, all that can be said by way of predi-
cating such a situation, is nibbuto tveva saïkhaü gacchati, ßit is
reckoned as èxtinguished.'û
Now comes a well-timed declaration in which the Buddha,
starting right from where Vacchagotta leaves off, brings the whole
discussion to a climactic end:
Evameva kho, Vaccha, yena råpena tathàgataü

pa¤¤àpayamàno pa¤¤àpeyya, taü råpaü tathàgatassa
pahãnaü ucchinnamålaü tàlàvatthukataü anabhàvakataü
àyatiü anuppàdadhammaü. Råpasaïkhavimutto kho,
Vaccha, tathàgato, gambhãro appameyyo duppariyogàho,
seyyathàpi mahàsamuddo. Uppajjatã'ti na upeti, na uppa-
jjatã'ti na upeti, uppajjati ca na ca uppajjatã'ti na upeti,
neva uppajjati na na uppajjatã'ti na upeti.
ßEven so, Vaccha, that form by which one designating the

Tathàgata might designate him, that has been abandoned
by him, cut off at the root, made like an uprooted palm
tree, made non-existent and incapable of arising again.
The Tathàgata is free from reckoning in terms of form,
Vaccha, he is deep, immeasurable and hard to fathom, like
the great ocean. To say that he is reborn falls short of a re-
ply, to say that he is not reborn falls short of a reply, to say

that he is both reborn and is not reborn falls short of a re-

ply, to say that he is neither reborn nor is not reborn falls
short of a reply.û
This declaration, which a fully convinced Vacchagotta now

wholeheartedly hailed and compared to the very heartwood of a
Sàla tree, enshrines an extremely profound norm of Dhamma.
It was when Vacchagotta had granted the fact that it is improper
to ask in which direction an extinguished fire has gone, and that
the only proper linguistic usage is simply to say that ìt is extin-
guished,' that the Buddha came out with this profound pro-
nouncement concerning the five aggregates.
In the case of the Tathàgata, the aggregate of form, for instance,
is abandoned, pahãnaü, cut off at the root, ucchinnamålaü, made
like an uprooted palm tree divested from its site, tàlàvatthukataü,
made non-existent, anabhavakataü, and incapable of arising
again, àyatiü anuppàdadhammaü.
Thereby the Tathàgata becomes free from reckoning in terms of
form, råpasaïkhàvimutto kho tathàgato. Due to this very freedom,
he becomes deep, immeasurable and unfathomable like the great
ocean. Therefore he cannot be said to be reborn, or not to be
reborn, or both or neither. The abandonment of form, referred to
above, comes about not by death or destruction, but by the
abandonment of craving.
The fact that by the abandonment of craving itself, form is
abandoned, or eradicated, comes to light from the following
quotation from the Ràdhasaüyutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya:
Råpe kho, Ràdha, yo chando yo ràgo yà nandã yà taõhà,

taü pajahatha. Evaü taü råpaü pahãnaü bhavissati uc-
chinnamålaü tàlàvatthukataü anabhàvakataü àyatiü
anuppàdadhammaü.34
34 S III 193, Chandaràgasutta.

ßRàdha, you give up that desire, that lust, that delight, that
craving for form. It is thus that form comes to be aban-
doned, cut off at the root, made like an uprooted palm tree,
made non-existent and incapable of arising again.û
Worldlings are under the impression that an arahant's five

aggregates of grasping get destroyed at death. But according to
this declaration, an arahant is like an uprooted palm tree. A palm
tree uprooted but left standing, divested of its site, might appear as
a real palm tree to one who sees it from a distance. Similarly, an
untaught worldling thinks that there is a being or person in truth
and fact when he hears the term Tathàgata, even in this context
too.
This is the insinuation underlying the above quoted pronounce-
ment. It has some profound implications, but time does not permit
us to go into them today.
Nibbàna Sermon 21



This is the twenty-first sermon in the series of sermons on
Nibbàna. The other day we discussed, to some extent, the ten
questions known as the ßten indeterminate points,û dasa
avyàkatavatthåni, which the Buddha laid aside, refusing to give a
categorical answer as ßyesû or ßno.û We pointed out, that the
reason why he refused to answer them was the fact that they were
founded on some wrong views, some wrong assumptions. To give
categorical answers to such questions would amount to an asser-
tion of those views. So he refrained from giving clear-cut answers
to any of those questions.
Already from our last sermon, it should be clear, to some extent,
how the eternalist and annihilationist views peep through them.
The tetralemma on the after death state of the Tathàgata, which is
541
directly relevant to our theme, also presupposes the validity of

those two extreme views. Had the Buddha given a categorical
answer, he too would be committing himself to the presumptions
underlying them.
The middle path he promulgated to the world is one that trans-
cended both those extremes. It is not a piecemeal compromise
between them. He could have presented a halfway solution by
taking up one or the other of the last two standpoints, namely ßthe
Tathàgata both exists and does not exist after death,û or ßthe
Tathàgata neither exists nor does not exist after death.û But
instead of stooping to that position, he rejected the questionnaire in
toto.
On the other hand, he brought in a completely new mode of
analysis, illustrative of the law of dependent arising underlying the
doctrine of the four noble truths, in order to expose the fallacy of
those questions.
The other day we happened to mention the conclusive answer
given by the Buddha to the question raised by the wandering
ascetic Vacchagotta in the Aggivacchagottasutta of the Majjhima
Nikàya, concerning the after death state of the Tathàgata. But we
had no time to discuss it at length. Therefore let us take it up
again.
When the wandering ascetic Vacchagotta had granted the in-
congruity of any statement to the effect that the extinguished fire
has gone in such and such a direction, and the fact that the term
Nibbàna is only a reckoning or a turn of speech, the Buddha
follows it up with the conclusion:
Evameva kho, Vaccha, yena råpena tathàgataü

pa¤¤àpayamàno pa¤¤àpeyya, taü råpaü tathàgatassa
pahãnaü ucchinnamålaü tàlàvatthukataü anabhàvakataü
àyatiü anuppàdadhammaü. Råpasaïkhàvimutto kho,
Vaccha, tathàgato, gambhãro appameyyo duppariyogàho,
seyyathàpi mahàsamuddo. Uppajjatã'ti na upeti, na uppa-
jjatã'ti na upeti, uppajjati ca na ca uppajjatã'ti na upeti,

neva uppajjati na na uppajjatã'ti na upeti.2
ßEven so, Vaccha, that form by which one designating the

Tathàgata might designate him, that has been abandoned
by him, cut off at the root, made like an uprooted palm
tree, made non-existent and incapable of arising again.
The Tathàgata is free from reckoning in terms of form,
Vaccha, he is deep, immeasurable and hard to fathom, like
the great ocean. To say that he is reborn falls short of a re-
ply, to say that he is not re-born falls short of a reply, to
say that he is both reborn and is not reborn falls short of a
reply, to say that he is neither reborn nor is not reborn falls
short of a reply.û
As in the case of the aggregate of form, so also with regard to the

aggregates of feeling, perception, preparations and consciousness,
that is to say, in regard to all the five aggregates of grasping, the
Buddha made this particular declaration. From this it is clear, that
in this dispensation the Tathàgata cannot be reckoned in terms of
any one of the five aggregates.
The similes reveal to us the state of the Tathàgata Ý the simile
of the uprooted tree, for instance. On seeing a palm tree uprooted,
but somehow left standing, one would mistake it for a growing
palm tree. The worldling has a similar notion of the Tathàgata.
This simile of the tree reminds us of the Isidattatheragàthà, which
has an allusion to it:
Pa¤cakkhandhà pari¤¤àtà,
tiññhanti chinnamålakà,
dukkhakkhayo anuppatto,
patto me àsavakkhayo.3
ßFive aggregates, now fully understood,

Just stand, cut off at their root,
Reached is suffering's end,
Extinct for me are influxes.û
On reaching arahant-hood, one finds oneself in this strange

situation. The occurrence of the word saïkhà in this connection is
particularly significant. This word came up in our discussion of the
term papa¤ca in the contexts papa¤casaïkhà and pa-
pa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhà.4 There we had much to say about the word. It
is synonymous with sama¤¤à, ßappellation,û and pa¤¤atti,
ßdesignation.û Reckoning, appellation and designation are synon-
ymous to a great extent. So the concluding statement of the
Buddha, already quoted, makes it clear that the Tathàgata cannot
be reckoned or designated in terms of form, though he has form,
he cannot be reckoned by feeling, though he experiences feeling,
nor can he be reckoned by, or identified with, the aggregates of
perceptions, preparations or consciousness.
Now in order to make a reckoning, or a designation, there has to
be a duality, a dichotomy. We had occasion to touch upon this
normative tendency to dichotomize. By way of illustration we may
refer to the fact that even the price of an article can be reckoned,
so long as there is a vortex between supply and demand. There has
to be some kind of vortex between two things, for there to be a
designation. A vortex, or vañña, is an alternation between two
things, a cyclic interrelation. A designation can come in only so
long as there is such a cyclic process. Now the Tathàgata is free
from this duality.
3 Th 120, Isidattatheragàthà.
4 See sermon 12.
We have pointed out that the dichotomy between consciousness

and name-and-form is the saüsàric vortex. Let us refresh our
memory of this vortex by alluding to a quotation from the Udàna
which we brought up on an earlier occasion:
Chinnaü vaññaü na vattati,

ßThe whirlpool cut off whirls no more.

This, even this, is suffering's end.û
This, in fact, is a reference to the arahant. The vortex is between

consciousness and name-and-form. By letting go of name-and-
form, and realizing the state of a non-manifestative consciousness,
the arahant has, in this very life, realized the cessation of exist-
ence, which amounts to a cessation of suffering as well. Though he
continues to live on, he does not grasp any of those aggregates
tenaciously. His consciousness does not get attached to name-and-
form. That is why it is said that the vortex turns no more.
To highlight this figure of the vortex, we can bring up another
significant quotation from the Upàdànaparivaññasutta and the
Sattaññhànasutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya.
Ye suvimuttà te kevalino, ye kevalino vaññaü tesaü n'atthi
pa¤¤àpanàya.6 ßThose who are fully released, are truly alone, and
for them who are truly alone, there is no whirling round for
purposes of designation.û
This statement might sound rather queer. The term kevalã occurs
not only in the Saüyutta Nikàya, but in the Sutta Nipàta as well,
with reference to the arahant. The commentary to the Sutta
Nipàta, Paramatthajotikà, gives the following definition to the
term when it comes up in the Kasibhàradvàja Sutta: sab-
5 Ud 75, DutiyaLakuõñakabhaddiyasutta, see sermon 2.

6 S III 59, Upàdànaparivaññasutta and S III 63, Sattaññhànasutta.
baguõaparipuõõaü sabbayogavisaüyuttaü và.7 According to the

commentator, this term is used for the arahant in the sense that he
is perfect in all virtues, or else that he is released from all bonds.
But going by the implications of the word vañña, associated with
it, we may say that the term has a deeper meaning. From the point
of view of etymology, the word kevalã is suggestive of singularity,
full integration, aloofness and solitude. We spoke of a letting go of
name-and-form. The non-manifestative consciousness, released
from name-and-form, is indeed symbolic of the arahant's singu-
larity, wholeness, aloofness and solitude.
In the following verse from the Dhammapada, which we had
quoted earlier too, this release from name-and-form is well
depicted:
Kodhaü jahe vippajaheyya mànaü,

saüyojanaü sabbam atikkameyya,
taü nàmaråpasmim asajjamànaü,
aki¤canaü nànupatanti dukkhà.8
ßLet one put wrath away and conceit abandon,

And get well beyond all fetters as well,
That one, untrammelled by name-and-form,
With naught as his own, no pains befall.û
We came across another significant reference to the same effect in

the Màghasutta of the Sutta Nipàta:
Ye ve asattà vicaranti loke,

aki¤canà kevalino yatattà,
7 Pj II 152, commenting on Sn 82, Kasibhàradvàjasutta.

8 Dhp 221, Kodhavagga, see sermon 9.
kàlena tesu havyaü pavecche,

yo bràhmaõo pu¤¤apekho yajetha.9
ßThey who wander unattached in the world,

Owning naught, aloof, restrained,
To them in time, let the brahmin offer,
That oblation, if merit be his aim.û
This verse also makes it clear, that a freedom from ownings and
attachments is implicit in the term kevalã. It has connotations of
full integration and aloofness. The term kevala, therefore, is
suggestive of the state of release from that vortex.
If, for instance, a vortex in the ocean comes to cease, can one
ask where the vortex has gone? It will be like asking where the
extinguished fire has gone. One might say that the vortex has
`joined' the ocean. But that, too, would not be a proper statement
to make. From the very outset what in fact was there was the great
ocean, so one cannot say that the vortex has gone somewhere, nor
can one say that it is not gone. It is also incorrect to say that it has
joined the ocean. A cessation of a vortex gives rise to such a
problematic situation. So is this state called kevalã. What, in short,
does it amount to? The vortex has now become the great ocean
itself. That is the significance of the comparison of the emanci-
pated one to the great ocean.
The commentators do not seem to have paid sufficient attention
to the implications of this simile. But when one thinks of the
relation between the vortex and the ocean, it is as if the arahant
has become one with the ocean. But this is only a turn of speech.
In reality, the vortex is merely a certain pervert state of the
ocean itself. That perversion is now no more. It has ceased. It is
because of that perversion that there was a manifestation of
suffering. The cessation of suffering could therefore be com-
9 Sn 490, Màghasutta.
pared to the cessation of the vortex, leaving only the great

ocean as it is.
Only so long as there is a whirling vortex can we point out a
`here' and a `there.' In the vast ocean, boundless as it is, where
there is a vortex, or an eddy, we can point it out with a `here' or a
`there.' Even so, in the case of the saüsàric individual, as long as
the whirling round is going on in the form of the vortex, there is a
possibility of designation or appellation as `so-and-so.' But once
the vortex has ceased, there is actually nothing to identify with, for
purposes of designation. The most one can say about it, is to refer
to it as the place where a vortex has ceased.
Such is the case with the Tathàgata too. Freedom from the
duality is for him release from the vortex itself. We have explained
on a previous occasion how a vortex comes to be.10 A current of
water, trying to go against the mainstream, when its attempt is
foiled, in clashing with the mainstream, gets thrown off and
pushed back, but turns round to go whirling and whirling as a
whirlpool. This is not the norm. This is something abnormal. Here
is a perversion resulting from an attempt to do the impossible. This
is how a thing called à vortex' comes to be.
The condition of the saüsàric being is somewhat similar. What
we are taught as the four `perversions' in the Dhamma, describe
these four pervert attitudes of a saüsàric being:
1) Perceiving permanence in the impermanent.

2) Perceiving pleasure in the painful.
3) Perceiving beauty in the foul.
4) Perceiving a self in the not-self.
The saüsàric individual tries to forge ahead in existence, misled

by these four pervert views. The result of that attempt is the vortex
10 See sermon 3.
between consciousness and name-and-form, a recurrent process of

whirling round and round.
Because of this process of whirling round, as in a vortex, there
is an unreality about this world. What for us appears as the true
and real state of the world, the Buddha declares to be false and
unreal. We have already quoted on an earlier occasion the verse
from the Dvayatànupassanàsutta of the Sutta Nipàta, which
clearly illustrates this point:
Anattani attamàniü,
passa lokaü sadevakaü,
niviññhaü nàmaråpasmiü,
idaü saccan'ti ma¤¤ati.11
ßJust see the world, with all its gods,

Fancying a self where none exists,
Entrenched in name-and-form it holds
The conceit that this is real.û
What the world entrenched in name-and-form takes to be real, it

seems is unreal, according to this verse. This idea is reinforced by
the following refrain-like phrase in the Uragasutta of the Sutta
Nipàta: Sabbaü vitatham idan'ti ¤atvà loke,12 ßKnowing that
everything in this world is not `such.'û
We have referred to the special significance of the Uragasutta
on several occasions.13 That discourse enjoins a giving up of
everything, like the sloughing off of a worn-out skin by a serpent.
Now a serpent sheds its worn-out skin by understanding that it is
no longer the real skin. Similarly, one has to understand that
everything in the world is not `such.' Tathà is ßsuch.û Whatever is
às-it-is,' is yathàbhåta. To be às-it-is,' is to be `such.' What is
11 Sn 756, Dvayatànupassanàsutta, see sermon 6.

not às-it-is,' is ayathà or vitatha, ßunsuchû or ßnot such,û that is

to say, unreal.
It seems, therefore, that the vortex whirling between conscious-
ness and name-and-form, in the case of saüsàric beings, is
something not `such.' It is not the true state of affairs in the world.
To be free from this aberration, this unreal state of duality, is to be
an arahant.
The three unskilful mental states of greed, hate and delusion are
the outcome of this duality itself. So long as the whirling goes on,
there is friction manifesting itself, sometimes as greed and
sometimes as hate. Delusion impels and propels both. It is just one
current of water that goes whirling round and round, bringing
about friction and conflict. This interplay between consciousness
and name-and-form is actually a pervert state, abnormal and
unreal. To be a Tathàgata is a return to reality and suchness, from
this unreal, unsuch, pervert state.
We happened to mention earlier that the term Tathàgata was
already current among ascetics of other sects. But it is not in the
same sense that the Buddha used this term. For those of other
sects, the term Tathàgata carried with it the prejudice of a soul or
a self, even if it purported to represent the ideal of emancipation.
But in this dispensation, the Tathàgata is defined differently.
Tathà, ßeven so,û ßthus,û is the correlative of yathà, ßjust as,û ßin
whatever way.û At whatever moment it becomes possible to say
that às is the ocean, so is the vortex now,' then, it is the state
of tathàgata.
The vortex originated by deviating from the course of the main-
stream of the ocean. But if an individual, literally so-called, gave
up such pervert attitudes, as seeing permanence in what is imper-
manent, if he got rid of the four perversions by the knowledge and
insight into things as-they-are, then he comes to be known as a
Tathàgata.
He is a ßthus gone,û in the sense that, as is the norm of the
world, `thus' he is now. There is also an alternative explanation
possible, etymologically. Tathatà is a term for the law of depend-

ent arising.14 It means ßthusnessû or ßsuchness.û This particular
term, so integral to the understanding of the significance of pañicca
samuppàda, or ßdependent arising,û is almost relegated to the
limbo in our tradition.
Tathàgata could therefore be alternatively explained as a return
to that `thusness' or `suchness,' by comprehending it fully. In this
sense, the derivation of the term could be explained analytically as
tatha + àgata. Commentators, too, sometimes go for this etymolo-
gy, though not exactly in this sense.15
According to this idea of a return to the true state of suchness,
we may say that there is neither an increase nor a decrease in the
ocean, when a vortex ceases. Why? Because what was found both
inside the vortex and outside of it was simply water. So is the case
with the saüsàric individual.
What we have to say from here onwards, regarding this
saüsàric individual, is directly relevant to meditation. As we
mentioned on an earlier occasion, the four elements, earth, water,
fire and air, are to be found both internally and externally. In the
MahàHatthipadopama Sutta of the Majjhima Nikàya we come
across a way of reflection that leads to insight in the following
instruction:
Yà c' eva kho pana ajjhattikà pañhavidhàtu, yà ca bàhirà

pañhavidhàtu, pañhavidhàtu ev' esà. Taü n' etaü mama,
n' eso 'haü asmi, na meso attà 'ti evam etaü
yathàbhåtaü sammappa¤¤àya daññhabbaü.16
ßNow whatever earth element that is internal, and whatev-

er earth element that is external, both are simply earth el-
15 Sv I 62: tathalakkhaõaü àgatoti tathàgato.
ement. That should be seen as it is with right wisdom thus:

`this is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.'û
The implication is that this so-called individual, or person, is in

fact a vortex, formed out of the same kind of primary elements that
obtain outside of it. So then, the whole idea of an individual or a
person is a mere perversion. The notion of individuality in
saüsàric beings is comparable to the apparent individuality of a
vortex. It is only a pretence. That is why it is called asmimàna, the
ßconceit àm.'û In truth and fact, it is only a conceit.
This should be clear when one reflects on how the pure air gets
caught up into this vortex as an in-breath, only to be ejected after a
while as a foul out-breath. Portions of primary elements, predomi-
nating in earth and water, get involved with this vortex as food and
drink, to make a few rounds within, only to be exuded as dirty
excreta and urine. This way, one can understand the fact that what
is actually there is only a certain delimitation or measuring as
ìnternal' and èxternal.'
What sustains this process of measuring or reckoning is the
duality Ý the notion that there are two things. So then, the supreme
deliverance in this dispensation is release from this duality.
Release from this duality is at the same time release from greed
and hate.
Ignorance is a sort of going round, in a winding pattern, as in
the case of a coil. Each round seems so different from the previous
one, a peculiar novelty arising out of the forgetting or ignoring
trait, characteristic of ignorance.
However much one suffers in one life cycle, when one starts
another life cycle with a new birth, one is in a new world, in a new
form of existence. The sufferings in the previous life cycle are
almost forgotten. The vast cycle of saüsàra, this endless faring
round in time and space, is like a vortex.
The vortical interplay between consciousness and name-and-
form has the same background of ignorance. In fact, it is like the
seed of the entire process. A disease is diagnosed by the character-
istics of the germ. Even so, the Buddha pointed out, that the basic
principle underlying the saüsàric vortex is traceable to the vortical
interplay between consciousness and name-and-form, going on

within our minds.
This germinal vortex, between consciousness and name-and-
form, is an extremely subtle one that eludes the limitations of both
time and space. This, indeed, is the timeless principle inherent in
the law of pañicca samuppàda, or ßdependent arising.û Therefore,
the solution to the whole problem lies in the understanding of this
law of dependent arising.
We have mentioned on a previous occasion that the saïkhata, or
the ßprepared,û becomes asaïkhata, or the ßunprepared,û by the
very understanding of the `prepared' nature of the saïkhata.17 The
reason is that the prepared appears to be `so,' due to the lack of
understanding of its composite and prepared nature. This might
well appear a riddle.
The faring round in saüsàra is the result of ignorance. That is
why final deliverance is said to be brought about by wisdom in
this dispensation. All in all, one extremely important fact emerges
from this discussion, namely the fact that the etymology attributed
to the term Tathàgata by the Buddha is highly significant.
It effectively explains why he refused to answer the tetralemma
concerning the after death state of the Tathàgata. When a vortex
has ceased, it is problematic whether it has gone somewhere or
joined the great ocean. Similarly, there is a problem of identity in
the case of a Tathàgata, even when he is living. This simile of the
ocean gives us a clue to a certain much-vexed riddle-like discourse
on Nibbàna.
Many of those scholars, who put forward views on Nibbàna
with an eternalist bias, count on the Pahàràdasutta found among
the Eights of the Aïguttara Nikàya.18 In fact, that discourse occurs
in the Vinaya Cåëavagga and in the Udàna as well.19 In the
Pahàràdasutta, the Buddha gives a sustained simile, explaining
17 See sermon 19.

18 A IV 197, Pahàràdasutta.
19 Vin II 237 and Ud 53, Uposathasutta.
eight marvelous qualities of this dispensation to the asura king

Pahàràda, by comparing them to eight marvels of the great ocean.
The fifth marvelous quality is stated as follows:
Seyyathàpi, Pahàràda, yà kàci loke savantiyo mahàsam-

uddam appenti, yà kàci antalikkhà dhàrà papatanti, na
tena mahàsamuddassa ånattaü và pårattaü và pa¤¤àyati,
evam eva kho, Pahàràda, bahå ce pi bhikkhå anupàdis-
esàya nibbànadhàtuyà parinibbàyanti, na tena
nibbànadhàtuyà ånattaü và pårattaü va pa¤¤àyati.20
ßJust as, Pahàràda, however many rivers of the world may

flow into the great ocean and however much torrential
downpours may fall on it from the sky, no decrease or in-
crease is apparent in the great ocean, even so, Pahàràda,
although many monks may attain parinibbàna in the
Nibbàna element without residual clinging, thereby no de-
crease or increase is apparent in the Nibbàna element.û
Quite a number of scholars draw upon this passage when they put
forward the view that arahants, after their death, find some place
of refuge which never gets overcrowded. It is a ridiculous idea,
utterly misconceived. It is incompatible with this Dhamma, which
rejects both eternalist and annihilationist views. Such ideas seem
to have been put forward due to a lack of appreciation of the
metaphorical significance of this particular discourse and a
disregard for the implications of this comparison of the arahant to
the great ocean, in point of his suchness or tathatà.
In the light of these facts, we have to conclude that Nibbàna is
actually the truth, and that saüsàra is a mere perversion. That is
why the Dvayatànupassanàsutta, from which we have quoted
earlier too, is fundamentally important. It says that what the world
20 A IV 202, Pahàràdasutta.
takes as the truth, that the ariyans have seen with wisdom as
untruth:
Yaü pare sukhato àhu,

tad ariyà àhu dukkhato,
yaü pare dukkhato àhu,
tad ariyà sukhato vidå.21
ßWhat others may call bliss,

That the ariyans make known as pain.
What others may call pain,
That the ariyans have known to be bliss.û
And it effectively concludes:
Passa dhammaü duràjànaü,

sampamåëh' ettha aviddaså.
ßBehold a norm, so hard to grasp,

Baffled herein are ignorant ones.û
The truth of this profound declaration by the Buddha could be seen

in these deeper dimensions of the meaning of tathatà. By way of
further clarification of what we have already stated about the
Tathàgata and the mode of answering those questions about his
after death state, we may now take up the Anuràdhasutta of the
Saüyutta Nikàya, which is of paramount importance in this issue.
According to this discourse, when the Buddha was once dwell-
ing in the gabled hall in Vesalã, a monk named Anuràdha was
living in a hut in a jungle close by. One day he was confronted
with a situation, which shows that even a forest dwelling monk
cannot afford to ignore questions like this. A group of wandering
ascetics of other sects approached him and, seated in front of him,

made this pronouncement, as if to see his response:
Yo so, àvuso Anuràdha, tathàgato uttamapuriso par-

amapuriso paramapattipatto, taü tathàgataü imesu
catåsu ñhànesu pa¤¤àpayamàno pa¤¤àpeti: `Hoti tathàga-
to paraü maraõà'ti và `na hoti tathàgato paraü
maraõà'ti và `hoti ca na ca hoti tathàgato paraü
maraõà'ti và `neva hoti na na hoti tathàgato paraü
maraõà'ti và.22
ßFriend Anuràdha, as to that Tathàgata, the highest per-

son, the supreme person, the one who has attained the su-
preme state, in designating him one does so in terms of
these four propositions: `the Tathàgata exists after death,'
`the Tathàgata does not exist after death,' `the Tathàgata
both exists and does not exist after death,' `the Tathàgata
neither exists nor does not exist after death.'û
What those ascetics of other sects wanted to convey, was that the
state of the Tathàgata after death could be predicated only by one
of these four propositions, constituting the tetralemma. But then
Venerable Anuràdha made the following declaration, as if to
repudiate that view:
Yo so, àvuso, tathàgato uttamapuriso paramapuriso par-

amapattipatto, taü tathàgataü a¤¤atr'imehi catåhi
ñhànehi pa¤¤àpayamàno pa¤¤àpeti.
ßFriends, as to that Tathàgata, the highest person, the su-

preme person, the one who has attained the supreme state,
in designating him one does so apart from these four
propositions.û
22 S III 116 and S IV 380, Anuràdhasutta.

As soon as he made this statement, those ascetics of other sects

made the derogatory remark: ßThis must be either a new-comer to
the Order, just gone forth, or a foolish incompetent elder.û With
this insult, they got up and left, and Venerable Anuràdha fell to
thinking: ßIf those wandering ascetics of other sects should
question me further, how should I answer them creditably, so as to
state what has been said by the Exalted One, and not to misrepre-
sent him. How should I explain in keeping with the norm of
Dhamma, so that there will be no justifiable occasion for im-
peachment.û With this doubt in mind, he approached the Buddha
and related the whole episode. The Buddha, however, instead of
giving a short answer, led Venerable Anuràdha step by step to an
understanding of the Dhamma, catechetically, by a wonderfully
graded path. First of all, he convinced Venerable Anuràdha of the
three characteristics of existence:
`Taü kiü ma¤¤asi, Anuràdha, råpaü niccaü và aniccaü

và'ti?'
Àniccaü bhante.'
`Yaü panàniccaü dukkhaü và taü sukhaü và'ti?'

`Dukkhaü bhante.'
`Yaü panàniccaü dukkhaü vipariõàmadhammaü kallaü

nu taü samanupassituü: ètaü mama, eso 'ham asmi, eso
me attà'ti?'
`No hètaü bhante.'
ßWhat do you think, Anuràdha, is form permanent or im-

permanent?û
ßImpermanent, venerable sir.û
ßIs what is impermanent suffering or happiness?û

ßSuffering, venerable sir.û
ßIs what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change,

fit to be regarded thus: `This is mine, this am I, this is my
self?'û
ßNo indeed, venerable sir.û
So also with regard to the other aggregates, the Buddha guided

Venerable Anuràdha to the correct standpoint of the Dhamma, in
this case by three steps, and this is the first step. He put aside the
problem of the Tathàgata for a moment and highlighted the
characteristic of not-self out of the three signata, thereby convinc-
ing Anuràdha that what is impermanent, suffering and subject to
change, is not fit to be regarded as self. Now comes the second
step, which is, more or less, a reflection leading to insight:
Tasmà ti ha, Anuràdha, yaü ki¤ci råpam atãtànàgatapac-

cuppannam ajjhattaü và bahiddhà và oëàrikaü và sukhu-
maü và hãnaü và paõãtaü và, yaü dåre santike và,
sabbaü råpaü `n' etaü mama, n' eso 'ham asmi, na meso
attà'ti evam etaü yathàbhåtaü sammappa¤¤àya daññhab-
baü. Yà kàci vedanà atãtànàgatapaccuppannà . . . yà kàci
sa¤¤à . . . ye keci saïkhàra . . . yaü ki¤ci vi¤¤àõaü
atãtànàgatapaccuppannam ajjhattaü và bahiddhà và
oëàrikaü và sukhumaü và hãnaü và paõãtaü và, yaü dåre
santike và, sabbaü vi¤¤àõaü `n' etaü mama, n' eso 'ham
asmi, na meso attà'ti evam etaü yathàbhåtaü sammap-
pa¤¤àya daññhabbaü.
Evaü passaü, Anuràdha, sutavà ariyasàvako råpasmim pi

nibbindati, vedanàya pi nibbindati, sa¤¤àya pi nibbindati,
saïkhàresu pi nibbindati, vi¤¤àõasmim pi nibbindati.
Nibbindaü virajjati, viràgà vimuccati, vimuttasmiü vi-
muttam iti ¤àõaü hoti: `khãõà jàti vusitaü brahmacari-
yaü, kataü karaõãyaü, nàparam itthattàyà'ti pajànàti.
ßTherefore, Anuràdha, any kind of form whatsoever,

whether past, future or present, internal or external, gross
or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near, all form should
be seen as it really is, with right wisdom thus: `This is not

mine, this I am not, this is not my self.' Any kind of feel-
ing whatsoever, whether past, future or present . . . any
kind of perception . . . any kind of preparations . . . any
kind of consciousness whatsoever, whether past, future or
present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or su-
perior, far or near, all consciousness should be seen as it
really is, with right wisdom thus: `This is not mine, this I
am not, this is not my self.'
ßSeeing thus, Anuràdha, the instructed noble disciple gets

disgusted of form, gets disgusted of feeling, gets disgusted
of perception, gets disgusted of preparations, gets disgust-
ed of consciousness. With disgust, he becomes dispassion-
ate, through dispassion his mind is liberated, when it is
liberated, there comes the knowledge ìt is liberated' and
he understands: Èxtinct is birth, lived is the holy life,
done is what is to be done, there is no more of this state of
being.'û
Here the Buddha is presenting a mode of reflection that culminates

in arahant-hood. If one is prepared to accept the not-self stand-
point, then what one has to do, is to see with right wisdom all the
five aggregates as not-self in a most comprehensive manner. This
is the second step.
Now, as the third step, the Buddha sharply addresses a series of
questions to Venerable Anuràdha, to judge how he would deter-
mine the relation of the Tathàgata, or the emancipated one, to the
five aggregates:
ßWhat do you think, Anuràdha, do you regard form as the

Tathàgata?û
ßNo, venerable sir.û
ßDo you regard feeling . . . perception . . . preparations . . .

consciousness as the Tathàgata?û
ßWhat do you think, Anuràdha, do you regard the Tathàga-

ta as in form?û
ßDo you regard the Tathàgata as apart from form?û

ßDo you regard the Tathàgata as in feeling?û

ßDo you regard the Tathàgata as apart from feeling?û

ßDo you regard the Tathàgata as in perception?û

ßDo you regard the Tathàgataas apart from perception?û

ßDo you regard the Tathàgata as in preparations?û

ßDo you regard the Tathàgata as apart from preparations?û

ßDo you regard the Tathàgata as in consciousness?û

ßDo you regard the Tathàgata as apart from conscious-

ness?û
ßWhat do you think, Anuràdha, do you regard the Tathàga-

ta as one who is without form, without feeling, without per-
ception, without preparations, without consciousness?û
When Venerable Anuràdha gives negative answers to all these

four modes of questions, the Buddha draws the inevitable conclu-
sion that accords with the Dhamma:
Èttha ca te, Anuràdha, diññheva dhamme saccato thetato

tathàgate anupalabbhiyamàne, kallaü nu te taü
veyyàkaraõaü: `Yo so, àvuso, tathàgato uttamapuriso
paramapuriso paramapattipatto, taü tathàgataü
a¤¤atr'imehi catåhi ñhànehi pa¤¤àpayamàno pa¤¤àpeti?''
`No hetaü bhante.'
ßSo then, Anuràdha, when for you a Tathàgata is not to be

found in truth and fact here in this very life, is it fitting for
you to declare, as you did: `Friends, as to the Tathàgata,
the highest person, the supreme person, the one who has
attained the supreme state, in designating him one does so
apart from these four propositions?'û ßNo, venerable sir.û
This conclusion, namely that the Tathàgata is not to be found in

truth and fact even in this very life, is one that drives terror into
many who are steeped in the craving for existence. But this, it
seems, is the upshot of the catechism. The rebuke of the wandering
ascetics is justifiable, because the tetralemma exhausts the uni-
verse of discourse and there is no way out.
The Buddha's reproof of Anuràdha amounts to an admission
that even here and now the Tathàgata does not exist in truth and
fact, not to speak of his condition hereafter. When Anuràdha
accepts this position, the Buddha expresses his approbation with
the words:
Sàdhu, sàdhu, Anuràdha, pubbe càham Anuràdha etarahi ca
dukkha¤ceva pa¤¤àpemi dukkhassa ca nirodhaü. ßGood, good,
Anuràdha, formerly as well as now I make known just suffering
and the cessation of suffering.û
This declaration makes it clear that the four noble truths are the
teaching proper and that terms like Tathàgata, satta and pugala
are mere concepts. No doubt, this is a disconcerting revelation. So
let us see, whether there is any possibility of salvaging the

Tathàgata.
Now there is the word upalabbhati occurring in this context,
which is supposed to be rather ambiguous. In fact, some prefer to
render it in such a way as to mean the Tathàgata does exist, only
that he cannot be traced.
Tathàgata, it seems, exists in truth and fact, though one cannot
find him. This is the way they get round the difficulty. But then,
let us examine some of the contexts in which the word occurs, to
see whether there is a case for such an interpretation.
A clear-cut instance of the usage of this expression comes in the
Vajirà Sutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya. The arahant nun Vajirà
addresses the following challenge to Màra:
Kinnu `satto'ti paccesi,

Màra diññhigatannu te,
suddhasaïkhàrapu¤jo, yaü,
nayidha sattåpalabbhati.23
ßWhat do you mean by a `being,' O Màra,

Isn't it a bigoted view, on your part?
This is purely a heap of preparations, mind you,
No being is to be found here at all.û
The context as well as the tone makes it clear that the word
upalabbhati definitely means ßnot to be found,û not that there is a
being but one cannot find it.
We may take up another instance from the Puràbhedasutta of
the Sutta Nipàta, where the theme is the arahant:
Na tassa puttà pasavo và,

khettaü vatthuü na vijjati,
23 S I 135, Vajiràsutta.
attaü vàpi nirattaü và

na tasmim upalabbhati.24
ßNot for him are sons and cattle,

He has no field or site to build,
In him there is not to be found
Anything that is grasped or given up.û
The words attaü and nirattaü are suggestive of the dichotomy

from which the arahant is free. The context unmistakeably proves
that the expression na upalabbhati means ßnot to be found.û
All this goes to show that the Buddha set aside the four ques-
tions forming the tetralemma not because they are irrelevant from
the point of view of Nibbàna, despite the fact that he could have
answered them. That is to say, not that he could not, but that he
would not. How can one say that the question of an arahant's after
death state is totally irrelevant? So that is not the reason.
The reason is that the questions are misleading. Those who
posed these questions had the presumption that the word Tathàga-
ta implied a truly existing being or a person. But the Buddha
pointed out that the concept of a being or a person is fallacious.
Though it is fallacious, for the worldling living in an illusory
unreal world, it has its place as a relative reality. Due to the very
fact that it is grasped, it is binding on him. Therefore, when a
worldling uses such terms as Ì' and `mine,' or a `being' and a
`person,' it is not a mere way of expression. It is a level of reality
proper to the worldling's scale of values.
But for the arahants, who have reached the state of suchness, it
is a mere concept. In fact, it becomes a mere concept in the context
of the simile of the vortex and the ocean. That is to say, in the case
of the arahants, their five aggregates resemble the flotsam and
jetsam on the surface waters of a vortex already ceased at its
depth.
24 Sn 858, Puràbhedasutta.
On seeing the Buddha and the arahants, one might still say, as a
way of saying, `here is the Buddha,' `here are the arahants.' For
the Buddha, the concept of a `being' is something incompatible
with his teaching from beginning to end. But for the nonce he had
to use it, as is evident from many a discourse.
The expression aññha ariyapuggalà, ßthe eight noble persons,û
includes the arahant as well. Similarly in such contexts as the
Aggappasàdasutta, the term satta is used indiscriminately, giving
way to conventional usage:
Yàvatà, bhikkhave, sattà apadà va dipadà và catuppadà

và bahuppadà và råpino và aråpino và sa¤¤ino và
asa¤¤ino và nevasa¤¤inàsa¤¤ino và, tathàgato tesaü ag-
gamakkhàyati arahaü sammàsambuddho.25
ßMonks, whatever kinds of beings there be, whether foot-

less or two-footed, or four-footed, or many footed, with
form or formless, percipient or non-percipient, or neither-
percipient-nor-non-percipient, among them the Tathàgata,
worthy and fully awakened, is called supreme.û
Although the term satta occurs there, it is only by way of worldly

parlance. In truth and fact, however, there is no `being' as such. In
a previous sermon we happened to mention a new etymology
given by the Buddha to the term loka, or ßworld.û 26 In the same
way, he advanced a new etymology for the term satta. As men-
tioned in the Ràdhasaüyutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya, Venerable
Ràdha once posed the following question to the Buddha:
25 A II 34, Aggappasàdasutta.
26 See sermon 20.
`Satto, satto'ti, bhante, vuccati. Kittàvatà nu kho, bhante,

`satto'ti vuccati?27
ßVenerable sir, it is said à being,' à being.' To what ex-

tent can one be called à being?'û
Then the Buddha explains:
Råpe . . . vedanàya . . . sa¤¤àya . . . saïkhàresu . . .

vi¤¤àõe kho, Ràdha, yo chando yo ràgo yà nandã yà
taõhà, tatra satto, tatra visatto, tasmà `satto'ti vuccati.
ßRàdha, that desire, that lust, that delight, that craving in

form . . . feeling . . . perception . . . preparations . . . con-
sciousness, with which one is attached and thoroughly at-
tached to it, therefore is one called a `being.'û
Here the Buddha is punning on the word satta, which has two
meanings, a `being' and `the one attached.' The etymology
attributed to that word by the Buddha brings out in sharp relief the
attachment as well, whereas in his redefinition of the term loka, he
followed an etymology that stressed the disintegrating nature of
the world.28
Satto visatto, tasmà `satto'ti vuccati, ßAttached, thoroughly
attached, therefore is one called a `being.'û Having given this new
definition, the Buddha follows it up with a scintillating simile:
ßSuppose, Ràdha, some little boys and girls are playing

with sand castles. So long as their lust, desire, love, thirst,
passion and craving for those things have not gone away,
they remain fond of them, they play with them, treat them
as their property and call them their own. But when,
27 S III 190, Sattasutta.

28 S IV 52, Lokapa¤hàsutta.
Ràdha, those little boys and girls have outgrown that lust,
desire, love, thirst, passion and craving for those sand cas-
tles, they scatter them with their hands and feet, demolish
them, dismantle them and render them unplayable.û
Now comes the Buddha's admonition, based on this simile:
Evam eva kho, Ràdha, tumhe råpaü . . . vedanaü . . .

sa¤¤aü . . . saïkhàre . . . vi¤¤àõaü vikiratha vidhamatha
viddhaüsetha vikãëanikaü karotha taõhakkhayàya pañipa-
jjatha.
ßEven so, Ràdha, you all should scatter form . . . feel-

ing . . . perception . . . preparations . . . consciousness, de-
molish it, dismantle it and render it unplayable. Practice
for the destruction of craving.û
And then he winds up with that highly significant conclusive

remark: Taõhakkhayo hi, Ràdha, nibbànaü. ßFor, the destruction
of craving, Ràdha, is Nibbàna.û
Nibbàna Sermon 22



This is the twenty-second sermon in the series of sermons on
Nibbàna. We made an attempt, in our last sermon, to explain that
the comparison of the emancipated one in this dispensation to the
great ocean has a particularly deep significance. We reverted to the
simile of the vortex by way of explanation. Release from the
saüsàric vortex, or the breach of the vortex of saüsàra, is
comparable to the cessation of a whirlpool. It is equivalent to the
stoppage of the whirlpool of saüsàra.
Generally, what is known as a vortex or a whirlpool, is a certain
pervert, unusual or abnormal activity, which sustains a pretence of
an individual existence in the great ocean with a drilling and
churning as its centre. It is an aberration, functioning according to
a duality, maintaining a notion of two things. As long as it exists,
567
there is the dichotomy between a `here' and a `there,' oneself and

another. A vortex reflects a conflict between an ìnternal' and an
èxternal' Ý a `tangle within' and a `tangle without.' The cessation
of the vortex is the freedom from that duality. It is a solitude born
of full integration.
We happened to discuss the meaning of the term kevalã in our
last sermon. The cessation of a vortex is at once the resolution of
the conflict between an internal and an external, of the tangle
within and without. When a vortex ceases, all those conflicts
subside and a state of peace prevails. What remains is the bound-
less great ocean, with no delimitations of a `here' and a `there.' As
is the great ocean, so is the vortex now.
This suchness itself indicates the stoppage, the cessation or the
subsidence of the vortex. There is no longer any possibility of
pointing out a `here' and a `there' in the case of a vortex that has
ceased. Its `thusness' or `suchness' amounts to an acceptance of
the reality of the great ocean. That `thus-gone' vortex, or the
vortex that has now become `such,' is in every respect worthy of
being called tathàgata.
The term tàdã is also semantically related to this suchness. The
tathàgata is sometimes referred to as tàdã or tàdiso, ßsuch-like.û
The `such-like' quality of the tathàgata is associated with his
unshakeable deliverance of the mind. His mind remains unshaken
before the eight worldly vicissitudes.
Why the Buddha refused to give an answer to the tetralemma
concerning the after death state of the tathàgata, should be clear to
a great extent by those sutta quotations we brought up in our last
sermon. Since the quotation diññheva dhamme saccato thetato
tathàgate anupalabbhiyamàne,2 ßwhen a tathàgata is not to be
found in truth and fact here in this very life,û leads to the inference
that a tathàgata is not to be found in reality even while he is alive,
we were forced to conclude that the question `what happens to the
tathàgata after his death?' is utterly meaningless.
2 S III 118 and S IV 384, Anuràdhasutta.

It is also obvious from the conclusive statement, pubbe càhaü

etarahi ca dukkha¤ceva pa¤¤àpemi dukkhassa ca nirodhaü Ý
ßformerly as well as now I make known just suffering and the
cessation of sufferingû Ý that the Buddha, in answering this
question, completely put aside such conventional terms like
`being' and `person,' and solved the problem on the basis of the
four noble truths, which highlight the pure quintessence of the
Dhamma as it is.
We have to go a little deeper into this question of conventional
terms like `being' and `person,' because the statement that the
tathàgata does not exist in truth and fact is likely to drive fear into
the minds of the generality of people. In our last sermon, we gave
a clue to an understanding of the sense in which this statement is
made, when we quoted an extraordinary new etymology, the
Buddha had advanced, for the term satta in the Ràdhasaüyutta:
Råpe kho, Ràdha, yo chando yo ràgo yà nandã yà taõhà, tatra
satto, tatra visatto, tasmà `satto'ti vuccati.3 ßRàdha, that desire,
that lust, that delight, that craving in form with which one is
attached and thoroughly attached, therefore is one called a `be-
ing.'û
Here the Buddha has punned on the word satta, to give a new
orientation to its meaning, that is, råpe satto visatto, ßattached and
thoroughly attached to form.û
From prehistoric times, the word satta was associated with the
idea of some primordial essence called sat, which carried with it
notions of permanent existence in the world. As derivatives from
the present participle sant and sat, we get the two words satya and
sattva in Sanskrit. Satya means ßtruth,û or what is ßtrue.û Sattva
means a ßbeingû or the ßstate of being.û We might even take sattva
as the place from which there is a positive response or an affirma-
tion of a state of being.
Due to the semantic affinity between satya, ßtruth,û and sattva,
ßbeing,û an absolute reality had been granted to the term sattva
3 S III 190, Sattasutta.

from ancient times. But according to the new etymology advanced

by the Buddha, the term sattva is given only a relative reality
within limits, that is to say, it is `real' only in a limited and a
relative sense. The above quotation from the Ràdhasaüyutta
makes it clear that a being exists only so long as there is that
desire, lust, delight and craving in the five aggregates.
Alternatively, when there is no desire, or lust, or delight, or
craving for any of the five aggregates, there is no `being.' That is
why we say that it is real only in a limited and relative sense.
When a thing is dependent on another thing, it is relative and for
that very reason it has a limited applicability and is not absolute.
Here, in this case, the dependence is on desire or attachment. As
long as there is desire or attachment, there is a `being,' and when it
is not there, there is no `being.' So from this we can well infer that
the tathàgata is not a `being' by virtue of the very definition he
had given to the term satta.
The other day, we briefly quoted a certain simile from the
Ràdhasutta itself, but could not explain it sufficiently. The Buddha
gives this simile just after advancing the above new definition:
ßSuppose, Ràdha, some little boys and girls are playing

with sandcastles. So long as their lust, desire, love, thirst,
passion and craving for those things have not gone away,
they remain fond of them, they play with them, treat them
as their property and call them their own. But when,
Ràdha, those little boys and girls have outgrown that lust,
desire, love, thirst, passion and craving for those sandcas-
tles, they scatter them with their hands and feet, demolish
them, dismantle them and render them unplayable.û
When we reflect upon the meaning of this simile from the point of
view of Dhamma, it seems that for those little boys and girls,
sandcastles were real things, as long as they had ignorance and
craving with regard to them. When they grew wiser and outgrew
craving, those sandcastles became unreal. That is why they
destroyed them.
The untaught worldling is in a similar situation. So long as he is

attached to these five aggregates and has not comprehended their
impermanent, suffering-fraught and not-self nature, they are real
for him. He is bound by his own grasping.
The reality of the law of kamma, of merit and demerit, follows
from that very grasping. The dictum upàdànapaccayà bhavo,
ßdependent on grasping is existence,û becomes meaningful in this
context. There is an existence because there is grasping. But at
whatever point of time wisdom dawned and craving faded away,
all those things tend to become unreal and there is not even a
`being,' as there is no real `state of being.'
This mode of exposition receives support from the Kaccàyana-
gottasutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya. The way the Buddha has
defined right view in that discourse is highly significant. We have
already discussed this sutta on an earlier occasion.4 Suffice it to
remind ourselves of the basic maxim:
`Dukkham eva uppajjamànaü uppajjati, dukkhaü niru-

jjhamànaü nirujjhatã'ti na kaïkhati na vicikicchati apa-
rappaccayà ¤àõam ev' assa ettha hoti. Ettàvatà kho,
Kaccàyana, sammà diññhi hoti.5
ßIt is only suffering that arises and suffering that ceases.

Understanding thus, one does not doubt, one does not wa-
ver, and there is in him only the knowledge that is not de-
pendent on another. It is in so far, Kaccàyana, that one has
right view.û
What is called aparappaccayà ¤àõa is that knowledge of realiza-

tion by oneself for which one is not dependent on another. The
noble disciple wins to such a knowledge of realization in regard to
this fact, namely, that it is only a question of suffering and its
4 See sermon 4.
cessation. The right view mentioned in this context is the supra-

mundane right view, and not that right view which takes kamma as
one's own, kammassakatà sammà diññhi, implying notions of Ì'
and `mine.'
This supramundane right view brings out the norm of Dhamma
as it is. Being unable to understand this norm of Dhamma, con-
temporary ascetics and brahmins, and even some monks them-
selves, accused the Buddha of being an annihilationist. They
brought up groundless allegations. There was also the opposite
reaction of seeking refuge in a form of eternalism, through fear of
being branded as annihilationists.
Sometimes the Buddha answered those wrong accusations in
unmistakeable terms. We come across such an instance in the
Alagaddåpama Sutta. First of all the Buddha qualifies the emanci-
pated one in his dispensation with the terms ariyo pannaddhajo
pannabhàro visaüyutto.6 Once the conceit àm,' asmimàna, is
abandoned, this noble one is called pannaddhajo, ßone who has
put down the flag of conceit.û He has ßlaid down the burden,û
pannabhàro, and is ßdisjoined,û visaüyutto, from the fetters of
existence. About this emancipated one, he now makes the follow-
ing declaration:
Evaü vimuttacittaü kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhuü sa-indà

devà sa-pajàpatikà sa-brahmakà anvesaü nàdhigac-
chanti: idaü nissitaü tathàgatassa vi¤¤àõan'ti. Taü kissa
hetu? Diññhe vàhaü, bhikkhave, dhamme tathàgato
ananuvejjo'ti vadàmi.
Evaüvàdiü kho maü, bhikkhave, evam akkhàyiü eke sa-

maõabràhmaõà asatà tucchà musà abhåtena abbhàcik-
khanti: venayiko samaõo Gotamo, sato sattassa ucchedaü
vinàsaü vibhavaü pa¤¤àpeti.
ßA monk, thus released in mind, O! monks, gods includ-

ing Indra, Pajàpati and Brahmà, are unable to trace in their
search to be able to say of him: `the consciousness of this
thus-gone-one is dependent on this. And why is that so?
Monks, I say, even here and now the Tathàgata is not to
be found.
ßWhen I say thus, when I teach thus, some recluses and

brahmins wrongly and falsely accuse me with the follow-
ing unfounded allegation: `recluse Gotama is an annihila-
tionist, he lays down an annihilation, a destruction and
non-existence of a truly existing being.'û
As in the Anuràdha Sutta, here too the Buddha concludes with the
highly significant statement of his stance, pubbe càhaü etarahi ca
dukkha¤ceva pa¤¤àpemi dukkhassa ca nirodhaü, ßFormerly as
well as now I make known just suffering and the cessation of
suffering.û
Though the statements in the suttas follow this trend, it seems
that the commentator himself was scared to bring out the correct
position in his commentary. The fact that he sets out with some
trepidation is clear enough from the way he tackles the term
tathàgata in his commentary to the above discourse in the Majjhi-
ma Nikàya. In commenting on the word tathàgatassa in the
relevant context, he makes the following observation:
Tathàgatassà'ti ettha satto pi tathàgato'ti adhippeto, uttama-
puggalo khãõàsavo pi.7 ßTathàgata's, herein, a being also is meant
by the term tathàgata, as well as the highest person, the influx-free
arahant.û
Just as he gives two meanings to the word tathàgata, Venerable
Buddhaghosa attributes two meanings to the word ananuvejjo as
well:
7 Ps II 117.
Ananuvejjo'ti asaüvijjamàno và avindeyyo và. Tathàgato'ti hi

satte gahite asaüvijjamàno'ti attho vaññati, khãõàsave gahite
avindeyyo'ti attho vaññati. ßAnanuvejjo Ý `non-existing' or ùn-
traceable.' When by the word tathàgata a being is meant, the sense
`non existing' is fitting; and when the influx-free one is meant, the
sense ùntraceable' is fitting.û
According to this exegesis, the term tathàgata in contexts where
it means a `being' is to be understood as non-existing, asamvij-
jamàno, which is equivalent in sense to the expression
anupalabbhiyamàne, discussed above. On the other hand, the other
sense attributed to it is avindeyyo, which somehow grants the
existence but suggests that it is ùntraceable.' In other words, the
Tathàgata exists, but he cannot be traced or found out.
The commentator opines that the term in question has to be
understood in two different senses, according to contexts. In order
to substantiate his view, the commentator attributes the following
apocryphal explanation to the Buddha:
Bhikkhave, ahaü diññheva dhamme dharamànakaü yeva

khãõàsavaü vi¤¤àõavasena indàdãhi avindiyaü vadàmi.
Na hi sa-indà devà sa-brahmakà sa-pajàpatikà an-
vesantàpi khãõàsavassa vipassanàcittaü và maggacittaü
và phalacittaü và, idaü nàma àrammaõaü nissàya
vattatã'ti jànituü sakkonti. Te appañisandhikassa pa-
rinibbutassa kiü jànissanti?
ßMonks, I say that even here and now the influx-free one,
while he is alive, is untraceable by Indra and others in re-
gard to his consciousness. Gods, including Indra, Brahmà
and Pajàpati are indeed unable in their search to find out
either the insight consciousness, or the path consciousness,
or the fruition consciousness, to be able to say: ìt is de-
pendent on this object.' How then could they find out the
consciousness of one who has attained parinibbàna with
no possibility of conception?û
Presumably, the argument is that, since the consciousness of the

arahant is untraceable by the gods while he is alive, it is all the
more difficult for them to find it out when he has attained pa-
rinibbàna. That is to say, the arahant somehow exists, even after
his parinibbàna, only that he cannot be traced.
It is obvious from this commentarial trend that the commentator
finds himself on the horns of a dilemma, because of his inability to
grasp an extremely deep dimension of linguistic usage. The
Buddha's forceful and candid declaration was too much for him.
Probably, he demurred out of excessive faith, but his stance is not
in accordance with the Dhamma. It falls short of right view.
Let us now recapitulate the correct position in the light of the
above sutta passage. The Buddha declares at the very outset that
the emancipated monk undergoes a significant change by virtue of
the fact that he has abandoned the conceit àm.' That Tathàgata,
that emancipated monk, who has put down the flag of conceit, laid
down the burden of the five aggregates, and won release from the
fetters to existence, defies definition and eludes categorization.
Why is that?
As we pointed out earlier, the word asmi constitutes the very
basis of the entire grammatical structure.8 Asmi, or ßam,û is the
basic peg, which stands for the first person. The second person and
the third person come later. So asmi is basic to the grammatical
structure. When this basic peg is uprooted, the emancipated monk
reaches that state of freedom from the vortex. There is no dichot-
omy to sustain a vortex, no two teams to keep up the vortical
interplay. Where there is no turning round, there is no room for
designation, and this is the implication of the phrase vaññaü tesaü
n'atthi pa¤¤àpanàya, which we happened to quote on a previous
occasion.9 For the arahants there is no vortex whereby to desig-
nate.

9 M I 141, Alagaddåpamasutta; see sermon 2 and sermon 21.
That is why the Tathàgata, in this very life, is said to have

transcended the state of a `being.' Only as a way of speaking in
terms of worldly parlance one cannot help referring to him as a
`being.' But in truth and fact, his position is otherwise.
Going by worldly usage, one might indiscriminately think of
applying the four propositions of the tetralemma to the Tathàgata
as well. But it is precisely in this context that the questioner's
presumptions are fully exposed. The fact that he has misconceived
the implications of the terms satta and Tathàgata is best revealed
by the very question whether the Tathàgata exists after his death.
It shows that he presumes the Tathàgata to be existing in truth and
fact, and if so, he has either to go on existing or be annihilated
after death. Here, then, we have an extremely deep dimension of
linguistic usage.
The commentary says that gods and Brahmàs cannot find the
Tathàgata in point of his consciousness. The Tathàgata defies
definition due to his abandonment of proliferations of cravings,
conceits and views. Cravings, conceits and views, which bring in
attachments, bindings and entanglements to justify the usage of
terms like satta, `being,' and puggala, `person,' are extinct in the
Tathàgata. That is why he is beyond reckoning.
In the Brahmajàla Sutta of the Dãgha Nikàya the Buddha makes
the following declaration about himself, after refuting the sixty-
two views, catching them all in one super-net:
Ucchinnabhavanettiko, bhikkhave, tathàgatassa kàyo

tiññhati. Yav'assa kàyo ñhassati tàva naü dakkhinti de-
vamanussà. Kàyassa bhedà uddhaü jãvitapariyàdànà na
naü dakkhinti devamanussà.10
ßMonks, the Tathàgata's body stands with its leading fac-

tor in becoming cut off at the root. As long as his body
stands, gods and men will see him. With the breaking up
of his body, after the extinction of his life, gods and men
will not see him.û
And then he follows up this promulgation with a simile:
Seyyathà pi, bhikkhave, ambapiõóiyà vaõñacchinnàya yàni

kànici ambàni vaõñåpanibandhanàni, sabbàni tàni tad an-
vayàni bhavanti, evam eva kho, bhikkhave, ucchinnabha-
vanettiko tathàgatassa kàyo tiññhati. Yav'assa kàyo ñhassati
tàva naü dakkhinti devamanussà. Kàyassa bhedà uddhaü
jãvitapariyàdànà na naü dakkhinti devamanussà.
ßJust as, monks, in the case of a bunch of mangoes, when

its stalk is cut off, whatever mangoes that were connected
with the stalk would all of them be likewise cut off, even
so, monks, stands the Tathàgata's body with its leading
factor in becoming cut off at the root. As long as his body
stands, gods and men will see him. With the breaking up
of his body, after the extinction of his life, gods and men
will not see him.û
The simile employed serves to bring out the fact that the Tathàga-
ta's body stands with its leading factor in becoming eradicated.
Here it is said that gods and men see the Tathàgata while he is
alive. But the implications of this statement should be understood
within the context of the similes given.
The reference here is to a tree uprooted, one that simply stands
cut off at the root. In regard to each aggregate of the Buddha and
other emancipated ones, it is clearly stated that it is cut off at the
root, ucchinnamålo, that it is like a palm tree divested of its site,
tàlàvatthukato.11
In the case of a palm tree, deprived of its natural site but still
left standing, anyone seeing it from afar would mistake it for an
actual tree that is growing. It is the same idea that emerges from
the simile of the bunch of mangoes. The Tathàgata is comparable
to a bunch of mangoes with its stalk cut off.
What then is meant by the statement that gods and men see
him? Their seeing is limited to the seeing of his body. For many,
the concept of seeing the Tathàgata is just this seeing of his
physical body. Of course, we do not find in this discourse any
prediction that we can see him after five-thousand years.
Whatever it may be, here we seem to have some deep idea
underlying this discourse. An extremely important clue to a correct
understanding of this Dhamma, one that helps to straighten up
right view, lies beneath this problem of the Buddha's refusal to
answer the tetralemma concerning the Tathàgata. This fact comes
to light in the Yamaka Sutta of the Khandhasaüyutta.
A monk named Yamaka conceived the evil view, the distorted
view, tathàhaü bhagavatà dhammaü desitaü àjànàmi, yathà
khãõàsavo bhikkhu kàyassa bhedà ucchijjati vinassati, na hoti
paraü maraõà.12 ßAs I understand the Dhamma taught by the
Exalted One, an influx-free monk, with the breaking up of his
body, is annihilated and perishes, he does not exist after death.û
He went about saying that the Buddha had declared that the
emancipated monk is annihilated at death. Other monks, on
hearing this, tried their best to dispel his wrong view, saying that
the Buddha had never declared so, but it was in vain. At last they
approached Venerable Sàriputta and begged him to handle the
situation.
Then Venerable Sàriputta came there, and after ascertaining the
fact, proceeded to dispel Venerable Yamaka's wrong view by
getting him to answer a series of questions. The first set of
questions happened to be identical with the one the Buddha had
put forward in Venerable Anuràdha's case, namely a catechism on
the three characteristics. We have already quoted it step by step,
12 S III 109, Yamakasutta.

for facility of understanding.13 Suffice it to mention, in brief, that it

served to convince Venerable Yamaka of the fact that whatever is
impermanent, suffering and subject to change, is not fit to be
looked upon as `this is mine, this am I, and this is my self.'
The first step, therefore, consisted in emphasizing the not self
characteristic through a catechism on the three signata. The next
step was to get Venerable Yamaka to reflect on this not self
characteristic in eleven ways, according to the standard formula:
Tasmàtiha, àvuso Yamaka, yaü ki¤ci råpaü atãtànàga-

tapaccuppannaü ajjhattaü và bahiddhà và oëàrikaü va
sukhumaü và hãnaü và panãtaü và yaü dåre santike và,
sabbaü råpaü n'etaü mama n'eso 'ham asmi, na me so
attà'ti evam etaü yathàbhåtaü sammàpa¤¤àya daññhab-
baü. Ya kàci vedanà . . . ya kàci sa¤¤à . . . ye keci
saïkhàra . . . yaü ki¤ci vi¤¤àõaü atãtànàgatapaccup-
pannaü ajjhattaü và bahiddhà và oëàrikaü va sukhumaü
và hãnaü và panãtaü và yaü dåre santike và, sabbaü
vi¤¤àõaü n'etaü mama n'eso 'ham asmi, na me so attà'ti
evam etaü yathàbhåtaü sammàpa¤¤àya daññhabbaü.
Evaü passaü, àvuso Yamaka, sutavà ariyasàvako

råpasmiü nibbindati, vedanàya nibbindati, sa¤¤àya nib-
bindati, saïkhàresu nibbindati, vi¤¤àõasmiü nibbindati.
Nibbindam virajjati, viràgà vimuccati, vimuttasmiü vi-
muttam iti ¤àõaü hoti. Khãõà jàti vusitaü brahmacariyaü
kataü karaõãyaü nàparaü itthattàyà'ti pajànàti.
ßTherefore, friend Yamaka, any kind of form whatsoever,

whether past, future or present, internal or external, gross
or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near, all form must be
seen as it really is with right wisdom thus: `this is not
mine, this I am not, this is not my self.' Any kind of feel-
13 See sermon 21.

ing whatsoever . . . any kind of perception whatsoever . . .

any kind of preparations whatsoever . . . any kind of con-
sciousness whatsoever, whether past, future or present, in-
ternal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far
or near, all consciousness must be seen as it really is with
right wisdom thus: `this is not mine, this I am not, this is
not my self.'û
ßSeeing thus, friend Yamaka, the instructed noble disciple

gets disgusted of form, gets disgusted of feeling, gets dis-
gusted of perception, gets disgusted of preparations, gets
disgusted of consciousness. Being disgusted, he becomes
dispassionate, through dispassion his mind is liberated.
When it is liberated, there comes the knowledge ìt is lib-
erated' and he understands: èxtinct is birth, lived is the
holy life, done is what had to be done, there is no more of
this state of being.'û
As the third step in his interrogation of Venerable Yamaka,

Venerable Sàriputta poses the same questions which the Buddha
addressed to Venerable Anuràdha:
ßWhat do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form as

the Tathàgata?û
ßNo, friend.û
ßDo you regard feeling . . . perception . . . preparations . . .

consciousness as the Tathàgata?û
ßNo, friend.û
ßWhat do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard the

Tathàgata as in form?û
ßNo, friend.û
ßDo you regard the Tathàgata as apart from form?û

ßNo, friend.û
ßDo you regard the Tathàgata as in feeling?û

ßNo, friend.û
ßDo you regard the Tathàgata as apart from feeling?û

ßNo, friend.û
ßDo you regard the Tathàgata as in perception?û

ßNo, friend.û
ßDo you regard the Tathàgata as apart from perception?û

ßNo, friend.û
ßDo you regard the Tathàgata as in preparations?û

ßNo, friend.û
ßDo you regard the Tathàgata as apart from preparations?û

ßNo, friend.û
ßDo you regard the Tathàgata as in consciousness?û

ßNo, friend.û
ßDo you regard the Tathàgata as apart from conscious-

ness?û
ßNo, friend.û
ßWhat do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form,

feeling, perception, preparations and consciousness as con-
stituting the Tathàgata?û
ßNo, friend.û
ßWhat do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard the

Tathàgata as one who is devoid of form, feeling, perception,
preparations and consciousness?û
ßNo, friend.û
It was at this juncture that Venerable Sàriputta puts this conclusive

question to Venerable Yamaka in order to drive the crucial point
home:
ßBut then, friend Yamaka, now that for you a Tathàgata is

not to be found in truth and fact here in this very life, is it
proper for you to declare: Às I understand Dhamma taught
by the Exalted One, an influx-free monk is annihilated and
destroyed when the body breaks up and does not exist after
death?'û
At last, Venerable Yamaka confesses, ßFormerly, friend Sàriputta,

I did hold that evil view, ignorant as I was. But now that I have
heard this Dhamma sermon of the Venerable Sàriputta, I have
given up that evil view and have gained an understanding of the
Dhamma.û
As if to get a confirmation of Venerable Yamaka's present
stance, Venerable Sàriputta continues: ßIf, friend Yamaka, they
were to ask you the question: `Friend Yamaka, as to that monk, the
influx-free arahant, what happens to him with the breaking up of
the body after death?' Being asked thus, what would you answer?û
ßIf they were to ask me that question, friend Sàriputta, I would
answer in this way: Friends, form is impermanent, what is imper-
manent is suffering, what is suffering has ceased and passed away.
Feeling . . . perception . . . preparations . . . consciousness is
impermanent, what is impermanent is suffering, what is suffering
has ceased and passed away. Thus questioned, I would answer in
such a way.û Be it noted that, in this conclusive answer, there is no
mention whatsoever of a Tathàgata, a satta, or a puggala.
Now at this reply, Venerable Sàriputta expresses his approba-
tion: ßGood, good, friend Yamaka, well then, friend Yamaka, I
will bring up a simile for you that you may grasp this meaning all
the more clearly:
ßSuppose, friend Yamaka, there was a householder or a

householder's son, prosperous, with much wealth and
property, protected by a bodyguard. Then some man
would come by who wished to ruin him, to harm him, to

imperil him, to deprive him of life. And it would occur to
that man: `This householder or householder's son is pros-
perous, with much wealth and property, he has his body-
guard, it is not easy to deprive him of his life by force.
What if I were to get close to him and take his life?'
ßThen he would approach that householder or household-

er's son and say to him: `Would you take me on as a serv-
ant, sir?' Then the householder or householder's son
would take him on as a servant. The man would serve him,
rising up before him, going to bed after him, being at his
beck and call, pleasing in his conduct, endearing in his
speech. The householder or householder's son would re-
gard him as a friend, an intimate friend, and would place
trust in him. But once the man has ascertained that the
householder or householder's son has trust in him, he
waits for an opportunity to find him alone and kills him
with a sharp knife.û
Now this is the simile. Based on this deep simile, Venerable

Sàriputta puts the following questions to Venerable Yamaka to see
whether he has grasped the moral behind it:
ßWhat do you think, friend Yamaka, when that man ap-

proached that householder or householder's son and said
to him `would you take me on as a servant, sir?,' wasn't
he a murderer even then, though the householder or
householder's son did not know him as `my murderer?'
And when the man was serving him, rising up before him
and going to bed after him, being at his beck and call,
pleasing in his conduct and endearing in his speech, was-
n't he a murderer then too, though the householder or
householder's son did not know him as `my murderer?'
And when the man, finding him alone, took his life with a
sharp knife, wasn't he a murderer then too, though the
other did not know him as `my murderer?'û
Venerable Yamaka answers ßyes, friend,û by way of assent to all

these matter-of-fact questions. It was then, that Venerable Sàri-
putta comes out with the full significance of this simile, portraying
the uninstructed worldling in the same light as that naively
unsuspecting and ignorant householder or householder's son:
ßSo too, friend Yamaka, the uninstructed worldling, who

has no regard for the noble ones, and is unskilled and un-
disciplined in their Dhamma, who has no regard for good
men and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma,
regards form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as
in self, or self as in form. He regards feeling as self . . .
perception as self . . . preparations as self . . . conscious-
ness as self . . .
ßHe does not understand, as it really is, impermanent form

as ìmpermanent form,' impermanent feeling as ìmper-
manent feeling,' impermanent perception as ìmpermanent
perception,' impermanent preparations as ìmpermanent
preparations,' impermanent consciousness as ìmperma-
nent consciousness.'
ßHe does not understand, as it really is, painful form as

`painful form,' painful feeling as `painful feeling,' painful
perception as `painful perception,' painful preparations as
`painful preparations,' painful consciousness as `painful
consciousness.'
ßHe does not understand, as it really is, selfless form as

`selfless form,' selfless feeling as `selfless feeling,' self-
less perception as `selfless perception,' selfless prepara-
tions as `selfless preparations,' selfless consciousness as
`selfless consciousness.'
ßHe does not understand, as it really is, prepared form as

`prepared form,' prepared feeling as `prepared feeling,'
prepared perception as `prepared perception,' prepared
preparations as `prepared preparations,' prepared con-

sciousness as `prepared consciousness.'
ßHe does not understand, as it really is, murderous form as

`murderous form,' murderous feeling as `murderous feel-
ing,' murderous perception as `murderous perception,'
murderous preparations as `murderous preparations,' mur-
derous consciousness as `murderous consciousness.'û
This, then, is what the attitude of the uninstructed worldling

amounts to. Venerable Sàriputta now goes on to describe the
consequences of such an attitude for the worldling:
So råpaü upeti upàdiyati adhiññhàti àttà me'ti, vedan-

aü . . . sa¤¤aü . . . saïkhàre . . . vi¤¤àõaü upeti upàdiyati
adhiññhàti àttà me'ti. Tassime pa¤cupàdànakkhandhà up-
età upàdiõõà dãgharattaü ahitàya dukkhàya saüvattanti.
ßHe becomes committed to form, grasps it and takes a

stand upon it as `my self.' He becomes committed to feel-
ing . . . to perception . . . to preparations . . . to conscious-
ness, grasps it and takes a stand upon it as `my self.' These
five aggregates of grasping, to which he becomes commit-
ted, and which he grasps, lead to his harm and suffering
for a long time.û
Then Venerable Sàriputta contrasts it with the standpoint of the

instructed disciple:
ßBut, friend, the instructed noble disciple, who has regard

for the noble ones, who is skilled and disciplined in their
Dhamma, who has regard for good men and is skilled and
disciplined in their Dhamma, does not regard form as self,
or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in
form. He does not regard feeling as self . . . perception as
self . . . preparations as self . . . consciousness as self, or
self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in

self, or self as in consciousness.
ßHe understands, as it really is, impermanent form as ìm-

permanent form,' impermanent feeling as ìmpermanent
feeling,' impermanent perception as ìmpermanent percep-
tion,' impermanent preparations as ìmpermanent prepara-
tions,' impermanent consciousness as ìmpermanent
consciousness.'
ßHe understands, as it really is, painful form as `painful

form,' painful feeling as `painful feeling,' painful percep-
tion as `painful perception,' painful preparations as `pain-
ful preparations,' painful consciousness as `painful
consciousness.'
ßHe understands, as it really is, selfless form as `selfless

form,' selfless feeling as `selfless feeling,' selfless percep-
tion as `selfless perception,' selfless preparations as `self-
less preparations,' selfless consciousness as `selfless
consciousness.'
ßHe understands, as it really is, prepared form as `prepared

form,' prepared feeling as `prepared feeling,' prepared
perception as `prepared perception,' prepared preparations
as `prepared preparations,' prepared consciousness as
`prepared consciousness.'
ßHe understands, as it really is, murderous form as `mur-

derous form,' murderous feeling as `murderous feeling,'
murderous perception as `murderous perception,' murder-
ous preparations as `murderous preparations,' murderous
consciousness as `murderous consciousness.'
ßHe does not become committed to form, does not grasp

it, does not take a stand upon it as `my self.' He does not
become committed to feeling . . . to perception . . . to
preparations . . . to consciousness, does not grasp it, does

not take a stand upon it as `my self.' These five aggregates
of grasping, to which he does not become committed,
which he does not grasp, lead to his welfare and happiness
for a long time.û
What Venerable Sàriputta wanted to prove, was the fact that every
one of the five aggregates is a murderer, though the worldlings,
ignorant of the true state of affairs, pride themselves on each of
them, saying `this is mine, this am I and this is my self.' As the
grand finale of this instructive discourse comes the following
wonderful declaration by Venerable Yamaka:
ßSuch things do happen, friend Sàriputta, to those venera-

ble ones who have sympathetic and benevolent fellow
monks in the holy life, like you, to admonish and instruct,
so much so that, on hearing this Dhamma sermon of the
Venerable Sàriputta, my mind is liberated from the influx-
es by non-grasping.û
This might sound extremely strange in this age of scepticism

regarding such intrinsic qualities of the Dhamma like sandiññhika,
ßvisible here and now,û akàlika, ßtimeless,û and ehipassika,
ßinviting to come and see.û But all the same we have to grant the
fact that this discourse, which begins with a Venerable Yamaka
who is bigoted with such a virulent evil view, which even his
fellow monks found it difficult to dispel, concludes, as we saw,
with this grand finale of a Venerable Yamaka joyfully declaring
his attainment of arahant-hood.
This episode bears testimony to the fact that the tetralemma
concerning the Tathàgata's after death state has beneath it an
extremely valuable criterion, proper to this Dhamma. There are
some who are even scared to discuss this topic, perhaps due to
unbalanced faith Ý faith unwarranted by wisdom. The tetralemma,
however, reveals on analysis a wealth of valuable Dhamma
material that goes to purify one's right view. That is why the
Venerable Yamaka ended up as an arahant.
So this discourse, also, is further proof of the fact that the Bud-
dha's solution to the problem of the indeterminate points actually
took the form of a disquisition on voidness. Such expositions fall
into the category called su¤¤atapañisaüyuttà suttantà, ßdiscourses
dealing with voidness.û This category of discourses avoids the
conventional worldly usages, such as satta, ßbeing,û and puggala,
ßperson,û and highlights the teachings on the four noble truths,
which bring out the nature of things às they are.'
Generally, such discourses instill fear into the minds of world-
lings, so much so that even during the Buddha's time there were
those recorded instances of misconstruing and misinterpretation. It
is in this light that we have to appreciate the Buddha's prediction
that in the future there will be monks who would not like to listen
or lend ear to those deep and profound discourses of the Buddha,
pertaining to the supramundane and dealing with the void:
Puna ca paraü, bhikkhave, bhavissanti bhikkhå anàga-

tamaddhànaü abhàvitakàya abhàvitasãlà abhàvitacittà
abhàvitapa¤¤à, te abhàvitakàyà samànà abhàvitasãlà ab-
hàvitacittà abhàvitapa¤¤à ye te suttantà tathàgatabhàsità
gambhãrà gambhãratthà lokuttarà su¤¤atàpañisaüyuttà,
tesu bha¤¤amànesu na sussåsanti, na sotaü odahissanti,
na a¤¤àcittaü upaññhapessanti, na ca te dhamme ugga-
hetabbaü pariyàpuõitabbaü ma¤¤issanti.14
ßAnd moreover, monks, there will be in the future those

monks who, being undeveloped in bodily conduct, being
undeveloped in morality, being undeveloped in concentra-
tion, being undeveloped in wisdom, would not like to lis-
ten, to lend ear or to make an attempt to understand and
deem it fit to learn when those discourses preached by the
Tathàgata, which are deep, profound in meaning, supra-
mundane and dealing with the void, are being recited.û
14 A III 107, Tatiyaanàgatabhayasutta; cf. also S II 267, âõisutta.

This brings us to an extremely deep dimension of this Dhamma.

By way of clarification, we may allude to a kind of exorcism
practiced by some traditional devil dancers. At the end of an all-
night session of devil dancing, the mediating priest goes round,
exorcising the spirits from the house with fistfuls of a highly
inflammable incense powder. Blazing flames arise, as he sprinkles
that powder onto the lighted torch, directing the flames at every
nook and corner of the house. Some onlookers even get scared that
he is trying to set the house on fire. But actually no harm is done.
Well, the Buddha, too, as the mediating priest of the three
realms, had to conduct a similar exorcising ritual over linguistic
conventions, aiming at some words in particular. It is true that he
made use of conventional language in order to convey his teach-
ing. But his Dhamma proper was one that transcended logic,
atakkàvacaro.15
It happened to be a Dhamma that soared well above the limita-
tions of grammar and logic, and analytically exposed their very
structure. The marvel of the Dhamma is in its very inaccessibility
to logic. That is why it defied the four-cornered logic of the
tetralemma. It refused to be cornered and went beyond the con-
cepts of a `being' or a `self.' The saüsàric vortex was breached
and concepts themselves were transcended.
Now this is the exorcism the Buddha had to carry out. He
smoked out the term attà, ßself,û so dear to the whole world. Of
course, he could not help making use of that word as such. In fact
there is an entire chapter in the Dhammapada entitled Attavagga.16
But it must be emphasized that the term in that context does not
refer to a permanent self. It stands for òneself.' Some who
mistakenly rendered it as `self,' ended up in difficulties. Take for
instance the following verse:
16 Dhp 157-166 make up the 12th chapter of Dhp, the Attavagga.
Attà hi attano nàtho,

ko hi nàtho paro siyà,
attanà hi sudantena,
nàthaü labhati dullabhaü.17
ßOneself, indeed, is one's own saviour,

What other saviour could there be?
Even in oneself, disciplined well,
One finds that saviour, so hard to find.û
Those who render the above verse literally, with a self-bias, would
get stuck when confronted with the following verse in the Bàlav-
agga, the ßChapter of the Foolû:
Puttà m'atthi, dhanam m'atthi,

iti bàlo viha¤¤ati,
attà hi attano n'atthi,
kuto puttà, kuto dhanaü?18
ß`Sons I have, wealth I have,'

So the fool is vexed,
Even oneself is not one's own,
Where then are sons, where is wealth?û
Whereas the former verse says attà hi attano nàtho, here we find
the statement attà hi attano n'atthi. If one ignores the reflexive
sense and translates the former line with something like ßself is the
lord of self,û one will be at a loss to translate the seemingly
contradictory statement ßeven self is not owned by self.û
At times, the Buddha had to be incisive in regard to some
words, which the worldlings are prone to misunderstand and
misinterpret. We have already discussed at length the significance
17 Dhp 160, Attavagga.

of such terms as satta and tathàgata, with reference to their

etymological background. Sakkàyadiññhi, or ßpersonality view,û
masquerades even behind the term tathàgata, and that is why they
raise such ill-founded questions. That is also why one is averse to
penetrate into the meanings of these deep discourses.
Like the term tathàgata, the term loka also had insinuations of a
self-bias. The Buddha, as we saw, performed the same ritual of
exorcism to smoke out those insinuations. His definition of the
`world' with reference to the six sense-bases is a corrective to that
erroneous concept.19
Among the indeterminate points, too, we find questions relating
to the nature of the world, such as sassato loko Ý asassato loko,
ßthe world is eternal Ý the world is not eternal,û and antavà loko Ý
anantavà loko, ßthe world is finite Ý the world is infinite.û20 In all
such contexts, the questioner had the prejudice of the conventional
concept of the world. The commentaries refer to it as cakkavàëalo-
ka, the common concept of ßworld system.û 21 But the Buddha
advanced a profound definition of the concept of the world with
reference to the six bases of sense-contact.
In this connection, we come across a highly significant dis-
course in the Saëàyatanavagga of the Saüyutta Nikàya. There we
find the Buddha making the following declaration to the monks:
Nàhaü, bhikkhave, gamanena lokassa antaü ¤àtayyaü,

daññhayyaü, patteyyan'ti vadàmi. Na ca panàhaü, bhik-
khave, appatvà lokassa antaü dukkhassa antakiriyaü va-
dàmi.22
19 S I 41, Lokasutta, see also sermon 4; S IV 39, Samiddhisutta, see also sermon
20.
20 E.g. at M I 426, MahàMàlunkyasutta.
21 Spk I 116.
ßMonks, I do not say that by traveling one can come to

know or see or reach the end of the world. Nor do I say
that without reaching the end of the world one can put an
end to suffering.û
After this riddle-like pronouncement, the Buddha gets up and

retires to the monastery. We came across this kind of problematic
situation earlier too. Most probably this is a device of the Buddha
as the teacher to give his disciples an opportunity to train in the art
of analytical exposition of the Dhamma. After the Buddha had left,
those monks, perplexed by this terse and tantalizing declaration,
approached Venerable ânanda and begged him to expound its
meaning at length. With some modest hesitation, as usual, Vener-
able ânanda agreed and came out with the way he himself
understood the significance of the Buddha's declaration in the
following words:
Yena kho, àvuso, lokasmiü lokasa¤¤ã hoti lokamànã, ayaü

vuccati ariyassa vinaye loko. Kena c'àvuso lokasmiü lo-
kasa¤¤ã hoti lokamànã?
Cakkhunà kho, àvuso, lokasmiü lokasa¤¤ã hoti lokamànã,

sotena . . . ghànena . . . jivhàya . . . kàyena . . . manena
kho, àvuso, lokasmiü lokasa¤¤ã hoti lokamànã. Yena kho,
àvuso, lokasmiü lokasa¤¤ã hoti lokamànã, ayaü vuccati
ariyassa vinaye loko.
ßFriends, that by which one has a perception of the world

and a conceit of the world, that in this discipline of the no-
ble ones is called `the world.' By what, friends, has one a
perception of the world and a conceit of the world?
ßBy the eye, friends, one has a perception of the world and
a conceit of the world, by the ear . . . by the nose . . . by
the tongue . . . by the body . . . by the mind, friends one
has a perception of the world and a conceit of the world.
That, friends, by which one has a perception of the world
and a conceit of the world, that in this discipline of the no-

ble ones is called `the world.'û
It seems, then, that the definition of the world in the discipline of

the noble ones is one that accords with radical attention, yoniso
manasikàra, whereas the concept of the world as upheld in those
indeterminate points is born of wrong attention, ayoniso mana-
sikàra. In the present age, too, scientists, when they speak of an
ènd of the world,' entertain presumptions based on wrong
attention.
When those monks who listened to Venerable ânanda's exposi-
tion reported it to the Buddha, he fully endorsed it. This definition,
therefore, is as authentic as the word of the Buddha himself and
conclusive enough. It is on the basis of the six sense-bases that the
world has a perception of the `world' and a conceit of the `world.'
The conceit here meant is not pride as such, but the measuring
characteristic of worldly concepts. For instance, there is this basic
scale of measuring length: the inch, the span, the foot, the cubit
and the fathom. These measurements presuppose this body to be a
measuring rod. In fact, all scales of measurement, in some way or
other, relate to one or the other of the six sense-bases. That is why
the above definition of the world is on the side of radical attention.
The worldling's concept of the world, conventionally so called,
is the product of wrong or non-radical attention. It is unreal to the
extent that it is founded on the notion of the compact, ghanasa¤¤à.
The existence of the world, as a whole, follows the norm of arising
and ceasing. It is by ignoring this norm that the notion of the
compact receives acceptance.
Two persons are watching a magic kettle on display at a science
exhibition. Water is endlessly flowing from the magic kettle to a
basin. One is waiting until the kettle gets empty, while the other
waits to see the basin overflowing. Neither of their wishes is
fulfilled. Why? Because a hidden tube conducts the water in the
basin back again to the kettle. So the magic kettle never gets
emptied and the basin never overflows. This is the secret of the
magic kettle.
The world also is such a magic kettle. Gigantic world systems

contract and expand in cyclic fashion. In the ancient term for
world systems, cakkavàëa, this cyclic nature is already insinuated.
Taken in a broader sense, the existence or continuity of the world
is cyclic, as indicated by the two terms saüvañña and vivañña,
ßcontractionû and ßexpansion.û In both these terms, the significant
word vañña, suggestive of ßturning round,û is seen to occur. It is as
good as saying ßrise and fall,û udayabbaya.
When one world system gets destroyed, another world system
gets crystallized, as it were. We hear of Brahmà mansions emerg-
ing.23 So the existence of the world is a continuous process of
arising and ceasing. It is in a cycle. How can one find a point of
beginning in a cycle? Can one speak of it as èternal' or `non-
eternal?' The question as a whole is fallacious.
On the other hand the Buddha's definition of the term loka,
based on the etymology lujjati, palujjatã'ti loko, is quite apt and
meaningful.24 The world is all the time in a process of disintegra-
tion. It is by ignoring this disintegrating nature and by overempha-
sizing the arising aspect that the ordinary uninstructed worldling
speaks of a `world' as it is conventionally understood. The world
is afflicted by this process of arising and passing away in every
moment of its existence.
It is to be found in our breathing, too. Our entire body vibrates
to the rhythm of this rise and fall. That is why the Buddha offered
us a redefinition of the world. According to the terminology of the
noble ones, the world is to be redefined with reference to the six
bases of sense-contact. This includes mind and mind-objects as
well. In fact, the range of the six bases of sense-contact is all
comprehending. Nothing falls outside of it.
24 S IV 52, Lokapa¤hàsutta, see sermon 20.
Nibbàna Sermon 23



This is the twenty-third sermon in the series of sermons on
Nibbàna. The other day, we brought up quotations to prove that
Nibbàna, as the cessation of becoming, carries no implications of a
nihilist or annihilationist view because the Tathàgata has trans-
cended the concept of a being.
It became evident, from those quotations, that to assert with an
eternalist bias, the proposition that the Tathàgata exists after
death, simply because he is referred to as a being, or a person, in
the discourses, is contrary to the spirit of the Dhamma. The fact
that the arahant, who has done away with the latencies to conceits
of Ì' and `mine,' still continues to use even the words Ì' and
`mine,' only as a concession to worldly conventions and common
595
parlance, came to light from the Arahantasutta of the Saüyutta

Nikàya, quoted on an earlier occasion.
To remind ourselves of the relevant section of that quotation,
we may hark back to the following lines:
Àhaü vadàmã'ti pi so vadeyya,

`Mamaü vadantã'ti pi so vadeyya,
Loke sama¤¤aü kusalo viditvà,
Vohàramattena so vohareyya.2
ßHe might still say: Ì speak,'

He might also say: `They speak to me,'
Being skilful in knowing the worldly parlance,
He uses such terms merely as a convention.û
The philosophy of voidness that emerges from those discourses

which declare that in reality there is no Tathàgata, we compared to
the blazing flames arising from the fistfuls of a highly inflamma-
ble incense powder at the end of an all-night's ceremony of devil
dancing. Generally this fire ordeal is horrifying to the onlookers.
The Buddha also had to stage a similar fire ordeal in the
Dhammayàga, or the ßDhamma-sacrifice,û he administered to
exorcize the malignant personality view, sakkàyadiññhi,ingrained
in the minds of worldlings.
Of course there is no explicit reference to such a fire ordeal in
the discourses. However, we do come across a word somewhat
suggestive of this kind of exorcism. The word vidhåpeti, derived
from the word dhåpa, ßincense,û is suggestive of ßfumigatingû or
ßsmoking out.û For instance, we find the following verse in the
Bodhivagga of the Udàna with reference to the stages of reflection
on the law of dependent arising, in direct and reverse order, that
the Buddha had gone through just after his enlightenment:
2 S I 14, Arahantasutta, see sermon 13.

Yadà have pàtubhavanti dhammà,

âtàpino jhàyato bràhmaõassa,
Vidhåpayaü tiññhati Màrasenaü,
Suriyo 'va obhàsayam antalikkhaü.3
ßWhen dhammas manifest themselves,

To the resolutely meditating Brahmin,
He stands fumigating the hordes of Màra,
Like the sun irradiating the firmament.û
The dispelling of the hordes of Màra is rather suggestive of a

smoking out. In some other discourses, this verb vidhåpeti is found
contrasted with sandhåpeti. The meaning of both these verbs,
which have the dhåpa element in common, is not quite clear. It is
likely that the two words imply two functions of the ritual associ-
ated with incense. While some fragrant kinds of incense are used
for propitiating benevolent spirits, certain caustic types are utilized
for exorcising evil spirits.
For instance in the Khajjanãyasutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya,
with reference to the noble disciple, the phrase vidhåpeti na
sandhåpeti occurs.4 Since the implicit reference is again to the
hordes of Màra, the phrase could be rendered as ßhe exorcises and
does not propitiate.û
The ordinary worldling's mode of recognition of the Tathàgata
is comparable to the recognition of a vortex that has already
ceased with the help of the flotsam and jetsam lightly floating
around it. Even after the vortex has ceased, flotsam and jetsam
could still go on rotating, giving the wrong impression that the
vortex is still there. If one understands that the vortex has actually
ceased deep down at its centre, and that what remains there, now,
is the great ocean, undifferentiated and unique, one can get rid of
3 Ud 3, Bodhivagga.
the unfounded fear arising from the statement that there is no

Tathàgata in truth and fact.
The cessation of the puny centre of the whirlpool is equivalent
to inheriting an expansive great ocean. It is where a vortex ceases
that the great ocean prevails unhindered. To give up the limitations
of a vortex, is to inherit the limitless ocean. The irony arising from
these statements is already implicit in the term arahant. We use
this term with reference to the Buddha as well as the arahants.
Though the commentators later attributed various other meanings
to the term, the basic sense is ßto be worthy of gifts.û In fact, it is
being worthy of receiving everything.
It is by giving up all that one becomes worthy of all. Here
too, we have a paradox. To become an arahant is to let go of
everything. Craving has to be fully abandoned. It is when all
desires are gone, when everything is given up, that one becomes
worthy of receiving everything. This is the deeper side of the
significance of the term arahant.
There are six modes of measuring in accordance with the con-
ceit àm,' asmimàna. What is known as saëàyatana, or the six
sense-bases, comprise the six scales of measurement, asserting the
conceit àm.' At whatever point of time the measuring, evaluating
and assessing done by the six sense-bases, such as the eye, ear,
nose etc., ceases, the person concerned thereby becomes immeas-
urable, invaluable and boundless. It is here that the simile of the
vortex and the ocean becomes meaningful. So the only way of
becoming immeasurable and boundless is to abandon all those
scales of measurement. This might sound extremely strange.
With the cessation of a vortex, the attention of one who has
been looking at it turns towards the depth, immeasurability and
boundlessness of the great ocean. This line of reflection might
even enable one to get a glimpse of an unworldly beauty in this
philosophy of the void, which drives an unfounded fear into the
minds of the worldlings.
We do get positive proof of this fact in such sections of the
Dhammapada as those entitled The Flowers, The Worthy, The
Buddha, and The Brahmin, as well as in a number of discourses in
the Sutta Nipàta, where we come across marvelously scintillating
verses. This is understandable, since the dawn of that wisdom

which sees the voidness of a self and of everything belonging to a
self, and the attainment of the fruits of the path in the light of that
wisdom, marks the efflorescence as well as the fruition of the
saüsàric existence of a being.
This idea comes up, for instance, in the section on flowers in the
Dhammapada:
Yathà saïkàradhànasmiü,
Ujjhitasmiü mahàpathe,
Padumaü tattha jàyetha,
Sucigandhaü manoramaü.
Evaü saïkàrabhåtesu,
andhabhåte puthujjane,
atirocati pa¤¤àya,
sammàsambuddhasàvako.5
ßAs on top of a rubbish heap,

Dumped by the highway side,
There blossoms forth a lotus,
Pure in fragrance and charming.
ßSo amidst the worldlings blind,

The Fully Awakened One's disciple,
Outshines them in marked contrast,
In point of wisdom bright.û
So, then, the arahant is that charming lotus, arising out of the
cesspool of saüsàra. Surely there cannot be anything frightful
about it. There is nothing to get scared about this prospect.
5 Dhp 58-59, Pupphavagga.

In our last sermon we quoted from a discourse that gives some

new definitions and new concepts of the world.6 We brought up
two statements from the Lokakàmaguõasutta (No. 1) of the
Saëàyatanavagga in the Saüyutta Nikàya. The first statement is
somewhat riddle-like. There the Buddha addresses the monks and
declares:
Nàhaü, bhikkhave, gamanena lokassa antaü ¤àtayyaü,

daññhayyaü, pattayyan'ti vadàmi. Na ca panàhaü, bhik-
khave, appatvà lokassa antaü dukkhassa antakiriyaü va-
dàmi.7
ßMonks, I do not say that by traveling one can come to

know or see or reach the end of the world. Nor do I say
that without reaching the end of the world one can put an
end to suffering.û
We also mentioned, the other day, the explanation given by

Venerable ânanda to this cryptic statement at the request of those
monks who approached him to get it clarified. That explanation
embodies the definition given by the Buddha to the term world. It
is not the common concept of the world.
Yena kho, àvuso, lokasmiü lokasa¤¤ã hoti lokamànã, ayaü

vuccati ariyassa vinaye loko. Kena c'àvuso lokasmiü lo-
kasa¤¤ã hoti lokamànã?
Cakkhunà kho, àvuso, lokasmiü lokasa¤¤ã hoti lokamànã,

sotena . . . ghànena . . . jivhàya . . . kàyena . . . manena
kho, àvuso, lokasmiü lokasa¤¤ã hoti lokamànã. Yena kho,
àvuso, lokasmiü lokasa¤¤ã hoti lokamànã, ayaü vuccati
ariyassa vinaye loko.
6 See sermon 22.

ßFriends, that by which one has a perception of the world

and has a conceit of the world, that in this discipline of the
Noble Ones is called `the world.' By what, friends, has
one a perception of the world and a conceit of the world?
ßBy the eye, friends, one has a perception of the world and
a conceit of the world, by the ear . . . by the nose . . . by
the tongue . . . by the body . . . by the mind . . . That,
friends, by which one has a perception of the world and a
conceit of the world, that in this discipline of the Noble
Ones is called `the world.'û
That with which the world is measured, that itself is called `the
world.' The above-mentioned measuring rods, namely the eye, the
ear, the nose, the tongue, the body and the mind, give us a conceit
of the world and a perception of the world. Apart from these six
there is no way of knowing a world. All theories about the world
are founded on these six sense-bases.
By way of a simple illustration, we alluded to the fact that in the
absence of any standard measuring rod, we resort to the primordial
scales based on this physical frame of ours, such as the inch, the
span, the foot and the fathom. The subtlest scale of measurement,
however, is that based on the mind. It is in this mode of measuring
and reckoning that concepts and designations play their part. But
the Buddha's philosophy of the void goes against all these mental
modes. His exorcism by the vision of the void fumigates all
concepts and designations.
The six sense-bases are therefore so many scales of measure-
ment. It is with the help of these that the world is measured. So the
above definition of the world brings out the ßprepared,û saïkhata,
nature of the world. It is a thought-construct.
This does not amount to a negation of the role of materiality.
All we mean to say is that the concept of the world is actually an
outcome of these six sense bases. To that extent it is something
prepared, a thought-construct.
While discussing the ten indeterminate points on a previous

occasion, we happened to mention that the first four among them
concern the world:8
1) ßThe world is eternal.û

2) ßThe world is not eternal.û
3) ßThe world is finite.û
4) ßThe world is infinite.û
What those theorists meant by the term world in this context is

none other than that prepared world which is constructed by the
six sense-bases. That is to say, it is just the concept of the world.
However, they were not aware of the fact that their concept of
the world is a thought-construct, because they had no insight into
the law of dependent arising. They did not understand that these
are mere preparations. The fallacy involved here, that is, the
inability to understand that their concept of the world is the
outcome of wrong attention, we illustrated by the simile of the
magic kettle.
In an exhibition a magic kettle is displayed from which water
keeps on flowing into a basin. One curious onlooker is waiting to
see the kettle empty, while the other is waiting to see the basin
overflowing. Both are unaware of the fact that a hidden tube
conveys the water back again to the kettle, unseen through the
same flow of water.
The ordinary concept of the world carries with it the same falla-
cy. The worldlings under the sway of defilements, which thrive on
the perception of the compact, ghanasa¤¤à, have the habit of
grasping everything. The ordinary man of the world, fully over-
come by craving and grasping, entertains a perception of perma-
nence since he has no insight. That is why he regards the world as
8 See sermon 20.

a unit due to his perception of the compact, as he takes cognizance

only of the arising aspect, ignoring the decaying aspect.
Whether such a world is eternal or not, is the point at issue in
the case of the first set of questions mentioned above, while the
next set poses the dilemma whether it is finite or infinite. What is
at the root of all those ill-conceived notions, is the premise that it
is possible to posit an absolute existence or an absolute non-
existence. In other words, the two extreme views èverything
exists' and `nothing exists.'
The unique norm of dependent arising, which the Buddha dis-
covered, dismisses both those extreme views. It is set forth in the
Kaccàyanagottasutta of the Nidànasaüyutta in the Saüyutta
Nikàya, which we have quoted earlier too.9 We shall, however,
bring up again the relevant section to elucidate this point:
Dvayanissito khvàyaü, Kaccàyana, loko yebhuyyena: at-

thita¤ceva natthita¤ca. Lokasamudayaü kho, Kaccàyana,
yathàbhåtaü sammappa¤¤àya passato yà loke natthità sà
na hoti. Lokanirodhaü kho, Kaccàyana, yathàbhåtaü
sammappa¤¤àya passato yà loke atthità sà na hoti.10
ßThis world, Kaccàyana, for the most part, bases its views
on two things: on existence and non-existence. Now,
Kaccàyana, to one who with right wisdom sees the arising
of the world as it is, the view of non-existence regarding
the world does not occur. And to one who with right wis-
dom sees the cessation of the world as it really is, the view
of existence regarding the world does not occur.û
This is where our simile of the magic kettle becomes meaningful.

Had both onlookers understood that the magic kettle is getting
filled at the same time it gets emptied, and that the basin also gets

filled while it is being emptied, they would not have the curiosity
to go on looking at it.
In contradistinction to both these viewpoints, the law of de-
pendent arising promulgated by the Buddha transcends them by
penetrating into the concept as such. The Buddha explained the
arising of the world in terms of the twelve factors, beginning with
ßdependent on ignorance, preparations,û precisely because it
cannot be presented in one word.
Usually, the formula of dependent arising is summed up with
the words ayaü dukkhasamudayo, ßthis is the arising of suffer-
ing,û or with the more conclusive statement evam etassa kevalassa
dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti, ßthus is the arising of this
entire mass of suffering.û
There are also instances of explaining the arising of the world
through the principle underlying the norm of dependent arising.
The world arises in the six sense-bases. It is at the same time the
arising of suffering. The arising of suffering is almost synonymous
with the arising of the world.
The law of dependent arising is an explanation of the way a
concept of the world comes about. This is an extremely subtle
point. Since the concept of the world is a product of wrong
reflection, it is saïkhata, or ßprepared.û It is like something
imagined. The saïkhata, or the ßprepared,û has a certain circulari-
ty about it.
In fact, the two dilemmas mentioned above involve the question
of time and space. The question whether the world is eternal or not
eternal concerns time, whereas the question whether the world is
finite or infinite relates to space. Both time and space involve a
circularity. The furthest limit of the forenoon is the nearest limit of
the afternoon, and the furthest limit of the afternoon is the nearest
limit of the forenoon. This is how the cycle of the day turns round.
Where the forenoon ends is the afternoon, where the afternoon
ends is the forenoon.
A similar time cycle is to be found even in one moment. Rise
and fall occur as a cycle even within a single moment. The same
process goes on within an aeon. That is why an aeon is said to
have the two aspects called saüvatta, ßcontraction,û and vivañña,
ßexpansion.û World systems go on contracting and expanding.

The so-called existence of the world is a continuous process of
contraction and expansion. Therefore it is impossible to find any
beginning or end. The very question of a first beginning is ill
conceived. It is like an attempt to find a starting point in a cycle. It
is a problem that cannot be solved by speculation.
Because of the cyclic nature of existence, rise and fall is charac-
teristic of every single moment. It is by ignoring the decaying
aspect inherent in one moment that wrong reflection gives rise to
the inference that there must be an absolute end of the world.
Because the visible world gets destroyed, one conceives of an
absolute end of the world. But when one world system gets
destroyed, another world system gets crystallized somewhere else.
Speculative views and standpoints about the universe, current
among the worldlings, are of such a misleading nature that any
reasoning based on them leads to a circularity of argument as is
evident from the Lokàyatikàbràhmaõàsutta among the Nines of
the Aïguttara Nikàya.
This discourse is about two Lokàyatikàbràhmins. The term
Lokàyatika is a derivative from lokàyata, which signifies a branch
of knowledge dealing with the length and breadth of the world,
perhaps a prototype of modern science, though it relied more on
logic than on experiment. The two Brahmins were probably
students of such a branch of learning. One day they came to the
Buddha and posed this question:
ßSire Gotama, now there is this teacher Påraõa Kassapa

who claims omniscience, saying that he sees everything
and has knowledge and vision of everything while walk-
ing or standing, whether asleep or awake. With these
claims to omniscience, he makes the following declara-
tion:
ßAhaü anantena ¤àõena anantaü lokaü jànaü passaü

viharàmi.11 Ì dwell knowing and seeing an infinite world
with an infinite knowledge.'
ßBut then there is this teacher Nigaõñha Nàthaputta who

also has similar claims to omniscience, but declares: Ahaü
antavantena ¤àõena antavantaü lokaü jànaü passaü vi-
haràmi. Ì dwell knowing and seeing a finite world with a
finite knowledge.'û
Then the two Brahmins ask the Buddha which of these two
teachers claiming omniscience in such contradictory terms is
correct. But the Buddha's reply was: Alaü bràhmaõà, tiññhat'
etaü . . . Dhammaü vo desissàmi, ßEnough, brahmins, let that
question be . . . I shall preach to you the Dhamma.û
The expression used here is suggestive of the fact that the ques-
tion belongs to the category of unexplained points. Terms like
ñhapita, ßleft aside,û and ñhapanãya, ßshould be left aside,û are
used with reference to indeterminate points.
Why did the Buddha leave the question aside? We can guess the
reason, though it is not stated as such. Now the standpoint of
Påraõa Kassapa is: ßI dwell knowing and seeing an infinite world
with an infinite knowledge.û One can question the validity of his
claim with the objection: you see an infinite world, because your
knowledge is not finite, that is to say, incomplete. If it is complete,
there must be an end. Therefore, going by the sense of incom-
pleteness in the word anantaü, one can refute the former view.
Why you see the world as infinite is because your knowledge lacks
finality.
Nigaõñha Nàthaputta, on the other hand, is asserting that he sees
a finite world with a finite knowledge. But the followers of Påraõa
Kassapa can raise the objection: you are seeing the world as finite
because your knowledge is limited. Your knowledge has an end,
11 A IV 428, Lokàyatikàbràhmaõàsutta.
that is why you see a finite world. So here, too, we have a circle,
or rather a circularity of argument. The two terms anta and
ananata are ambiguous. That must be the reason why the Buddha
rejected the two standpoints in question.
Then he declares: ßI shall preach to you the Dhamma,û and
brings up as a simile an illustration which could be summed up as
follows. Four persons endowed with the highest ability to walk,
the highest speed and the widest stride possible, stand in the four
directions. Their speed is that of an arrow and their stride is as
wide as the distance between the eastern ocean and the western
ocean. Each of them tells himself: Ì will reach the end of the
world by walking' and goes on walking for hundred years, that
being his full lifespan, resting just for eating, drinking, defecating,
urinating and giving way to sleep or fatigue, only to die on the
way without reaching the end of the world.
`But why so?,' asks the Buddha rhetorically and gives the fol-
lowing explanation. ßI do not say, O! Brahmins, that the end of the
world can be known, seen or reached by this sort of running. Nor
do I say that there is an ending of suffering without reaching the
end of the world.û Then he declares: ßBrahmins, it is these five
strands of sense pleasures that in the Noble One's discipline are
called `the world.'û
In this particular context, the Buddha calls these five kinds of
sense-pleasures `the world' according to the Noble One's termi-
nology. This does not contradict the earlier definition of the world
in terms of the six sense-bases, for it is by means of these six
sense-bases that one enjoys the five strands of sense-pleasures.
However, as an art of preaching, the Buddha defines the world in
terms of the five strands of sense-pleasures in this context.
Then he goes on to proclaim the way of transcending this world
of the five sense pleasures in terms of jhànic attainments. When
one attains to the first jhàna, one is already far removed from that
world of the five sense-pleasures. But about him, the Buddha
makes the following pronouncement: Aham pi, bràhmaõà, evaü
vadàmi: àyam pi lokapariyàpanno, ayam pi anissaño lokamhà'ti,
ßAnd I too, O! Brahmins, say this: `This one, too, is included in
the world, this one, too, has not stepped out of the world.'û
The Buddha makes the same pronouncement with regard to

those who attain to the other jhànic levels. But finally he comes to
the last step with these words:
Puna ca paraü, bràhmaõà, bhikkhu sabbaso neva-

sa¤¤ànàsa¤¤àyatanaü samatikkama
sa¤¤àvedayitanirodhaü upasampajja viharati, pa¤¤àya c'
assa disvà àsavà parikkhãõà honti. Ayaü vuccati,
bràhmaõà, bhikkhu lokassa antam àgamma lokassa ante
viharati tiõõo loke visattikaü.
ßBut then, O! Brahmins, a monk, having completely trans-

cended the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-
perception, attains to and abides in the cessation of per-
ceptions and feelings, and in him, having seen with wis-
dom, the influxes are made extinct. This one, O!
Brahmins, is known as one who, on reaching the end of
the world, is dwelling at its very end, having crossed over
the agglutinative craving.û
Going by these discourses, one might conclude that the cessation

of perceptions and feelings is actually Nibbàna itself. But the most
important part of the above quotation is the statement pa¤¤àya c'
assa disvà àsavà parikkhãõà honti, ßhaving seen with wisdom, the
influxes are made extinct in him.û While in the attainment of the
cessation of perceptions and feelings, all preparations subside and
it is on rising from it that all influxes are made extinct by the
vision of wisdom.
This fact comes to light in the following answer of Venerable
Dhammadiõõà Therã to the question raised by the lay-follower
Visàkha, her former husband, in the Cåëavedalla Sutta:
Sa¤¤àvedayitanirodhasamàpattiyà vuññhitaü, kho àvuso

Visàkha, bhikkhuü tayo phassà phusanti: su¤¤ato phasso,
animitta phasso, appaõihito phasso.12
ßFriend Visàkha, when a monk has emerged from the at-

tainment of the cessation of perceptions and feelings, three
kinds of contact touch him: voidness contact, signless con-
tact, desireless contact.û
On this point, the commentary too, gives the explanation su¤¤atà

nàma phalasamàpatti,13 ß`voidness' means the attainment of the
fruit of arahant-hood.û
In answer to another question, Venerable Dhammadiõõà Therã
says, Sa¤¤àvedayitanirodhasamàpattiyà vuññhitassa, kho àvuso
Visàkha, bhikkhuno vivekaninnaü cittaü hoti vivekapoõaü
vivekapabbhàraü, ßFriend Visàkha, when a monk has emerged
from the attainment of the cessation of perceptions and feelings,
his mind inclines to seclusion, slants to seclusion, tends to seclu-
sion.û
Here the commentary explains nibbànaü viveko nàma, ßwhat is
called seclusion is Nibbàna.û So it is on emerging from the
attainment of the cessation of perceptions and feelings, that is in
the arahattaphalasamàdhi, references to which we have cited
earlier,14 that Nibbàna is realized. It is then that one actually sees
the end of the world.
So from this we can well infer that in advancing a new defini-
tion of the world, in introducing a new concept of the world, the
Buddha was not trying to sidetrack the moot point of the world-
lings by bringing in something totally irrelevant. He was simply
rejecting for some sound reason the worldlings' concept of the
world, which is born of wrong reflection, and illustrating the
13 Ps II 367.
correct measuring rod, the true criterion of judgement regarding

the origin of the concept of the world according to radical reflec-
tion.
Out of all the discourses dealing with the question of the end of
the world and the end of suffering, perhaps the most significant is
the Rohitassa Sutta, which is found in the Sagàthakasaüyutta of
the Saüyutta Nikàya, as well as in the section of the Fours in the
Aïguttara Nikàya. Once when the Buddha was staying at the
Jetavana monastery at Sàvatthã, a deity named Rohitassa visited
him in the night and asked the following question: ßWhere Lord
one does not get born, nor grow old, nor die, nor pass away, nor
get reborn, is one able, Lord, by traveling to come to know that
end of the world or to see it or to get there?û
The Buddha replies: ßWhere, friend, one does not get born, nor
grow old, nor die, nor pass away, nor get reborn, that end of the
world, I say, one is not able by traveling to come to know or to see
or to arrive at.û
When the Buddha gave this brief answer, the deity Rohitassa
praised him with the following words of approbation: Acchariyaü
bhante, abbhutaü bhante, yàva subhàsitam idaü bhagavatà,15 ßIt
is wonderful, Lord, it is marvelous, Lord, how well it is said by the
Exalted One.û
Why did he express his approbation? Because he had already
realized the truth of the Buddha's statement by his own experi-
ence. Then he goes on to relate the whole story of his past life:
ßIn times past, Lord, I was a seer, Rohitassa by name, son

of Bhoja, gifted so that I could fly through the air, and so
swift, Lord, was my speed that I could fly just as quickly
as a master of archery, well-trained, expert, proficient, a
past master in his art, armed with a strong bow, could
without difficulty send a light arrow far past the area col-
oured by a palm tree's shadow; and so great, Lord, was
15 S I 61 and A II 49 Rohitassasutta.
my stride that I could step from the eastern to the western

ocean. In me, Lord, arose such a wish as this: Ì will arrive
at the end of the world by walking.' And though such,
Lord, was my speed and such my stride, and though with a
lifespan of a century, living for a hundred years, I walked
continuously for hundred years, except for the times spent
in eating, drinking, chewing or tasting, or in answering
calls of nature, and the time I gave to way to sleep or fa-
tigue, yet I died on the way, without reaching the end of
the world. Wonderful is it, O! Lord, marvelous is it, Lord,
how well it is said by the Exalted One:
ßWhere, friend, one does not get born, nor grow old, nor
die, nor pass away, nor get reborn, that end of the world, I
say, one is not able by traveling to come to know or to see
or to arrive at.û
It is at this point, that the Buddha comes out with a momentous

declaration, while granting Rohitassa's approbation:
Yattha kho, àvuso, na jàyati na jãyati na mãyati na cavati

na upapajjati, nàhaü taü `gamanena lokassa antaü
¤àteyyaü daññheyyaü patteyyan'ti vadàmi. Na càhaü,
àvuso, appatvà lokassa antaü dukkhassantakiriyaü va-
dàmi. Api c'àhaü, àvuso, imasmiü yeva byàmamatte
kaëevare sasa¤¤imhi samanake loka¤ca pa¤¤àpemi lo-
kasamudaya¤ca lokanirodha¤ca lokanirodhagàmini¤ca
pañipadaü.
ßWhere, friend, one does not get born, nor grow old, nor
die, nor pass away, nor get reborn, that end of the world, I
say, one is not able by traveling to come to know or to see
or to arrive at. But neither do I say, friend, that without
having reached the end of the world there could be an end-
ing of suffering. It is in this very fathom-long physical
frame with its perceptions and mind, that I declare lies the
world, the arising of the world, the cessation of the world,

and the path leading to the cessation of the world.û
This momentous declaration, which is comparable to a fearless

lion's roar that puts all religious and philosophical systems to
flight, has been misinterpreted by some who have not grasped its
true significance. They say that according to this discourse the
cessation of the world is not here and that only the other three are
to be found in this fathom-long body.
Such misinterpretations are the result of taking seriously various
far-fetched speculations of later origin about Nibbàna. According
to them, Nibbàna is some mysterious non-descript place of rest for
the arahants after their demise. One who goes by that kind of
speculation is not ready to accept the Buddha's declaration that it
is in this very fathom-long body with its perceptions and mind that
a cessation of the world can be realized.
The commentary in this context simply observes that the four
noble truths are to be found not in grass and twigs outside, but in
this body consisting of the four elements.16 It has nothing more to
add. A certain modern scholar has rightly pointed out that the
commentator has missed a great opportunity for exegesis.17 The
reason for the commentator's lack of interest, in the case of such a
discourse of paramount importance, is probably his predilection
for these later speculations on Nibbàna.
All what we have so far stated in explaining the significance of
discourses dealing with the subject of Nibbàna, could even be
treated as a fitting commentary to the Rohitassasutta.
The point of relevance is the couple of words sasa¤¤imhi sama-
nake, occurring in the discourse in question. This fathom-long
physical frame is here associated with perceptions and mind. The
expression used by the Buddha in this context is full of signifi-
cance.
16 Spk I 118 and Mp III 89.

17 Mrs. Rhys Davids: The Book of the Kindred Sayings, PTS 1979, p 86 n 3.
As we saw above, Venerable ânanda defines the term `world'

as follows: yena kho, àvuso, lokasmiü lokasa¤¤ã hoti lokamànã,
ayaü vuccati ariyassa vinaye loko. ßFriends, that by which one
has a perception of the world and has a conceit of the world that in
the discipline of the Noble Ones is called `the world.'û The conceit
of the world is a form of measuring with the mind. So the two
words sasa¤¤imhi samanake are suggestive of the concept of the
world in the Noble Ones' discipline.
While discussing the significance of arahattaphalasamàpatti,
also known as a¤¤àphalasamàdhi, and a¤¤àvimokkha, we had
occasion to bring up such quotations as the following:
Siyà nu kho, bhante, bhikkhuno tathàråpo

samàdhipañilàbho yathà neva pañhaviyaü pañhavãsa¤¤ã
àkàsàna¤càyatanasa¤¤ã assa, na vi¤¤àõa¤càyatane
vi¤¤àõancàyatanasa¤¤ã assa, na àki¤ca¤¤àyatane
àki¤ca¤¤àyatanasa¤¤ã assa, na nevasa¤¤ànàsa¤¤àyatane
nevasa¤¤ànàsa¤¤àyatanasa¤¤ã assa, na idhaloke idhalo-
kasa¤¤ã assa, na paraloke paralokasa¤¤ã assa, yam
pìdaü diññhaü sutaü mutaü vi¤¤àtaü pattaü pari-
yesitaü anuvicaritaü manasà tatràpi na sa¤¤ã assa, sa¤¤ã
ca pana assa?18

concentration wherein he will not be conscious (literally:
`percipient') of earth in earth, nor of water in water, nor of
fire in fire, nor of air in air, nor will he be conscious of the
sphere of infinite space in the sphere of infinite space, nor
of the sphere of infinite consciousness in the sphere of in-
finite consciousness, nor of the sphere of nothingness in
the sphere of nothingness, nor of the sphere of neither-
18 A V 318, Sa¤¤àsutta, see also sermon 16.


perception-nor-non-perception, nor will he be conscious of
a this world in this world, nor of a world beyond in a
world beyond, whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized,
attained, sought after, traversed by the mind, even of that
he will not be conscious Ý and yet he will be conscious?û
The arahattaphalasamàdhi is so extraordinary that while in it one

has no perception of earth, water, fire and air, or of this world, or
of the other world, of whatever is seen, heard, sensed and cog-
nized, but one is all the same percipient or conscious, sa¤¤ã ca
pana assa.
To the question: Òf what is he percipient?,' kiü sa¤¤ã?, once
Venerable Sàriputta gave the answer that the perception is of
Nibbàna as the cessation of existence, bhavanirodho nibbànaü.19
In another discourse that we happened to quote, the mode of
questioning has the following sequence: ßCould there be, Lord, for
a monk such an attainment of concentration wherein he will not be
attending to the eye, nor to form, nor to the ear, nor to sound,û etc.,
but ends with the riddle like phrase, ßand yet he will be attending,û
manasi ca pana kareyya.20
When the Buddha grants the possibility of such a concentration,
Venerable ânanda rejoins with an inquisitive ßhow could there be,
Lord?,û and the Buddha explains that what a monk attends to
while in that attainment could be summed up in the stereotyped
phrase:
sabbåpadhipañinissaggo taõhakkhayo viràgo nirodho nibbànaü,
19 A V 9, Sàriputtasutta, see also sermon 17.

20 A V 321, Manasikàrasutta, see also sermon 16
It is Nibbàna, then, that one attends to while in that attainment.

So we find even the terms ßperception,û sa¤¤à, and ßattention,û
manasikàra, being used in the context of arahattaphalasamàpatti,
or ßattainment to the fruit of arahant-hood.û
Therefore, Nibbàna is not an experience as dry as a log of
wood, but a state of serene awareness of its true significance. It is
a transcendence of the world by realization of its cessation. That is
why the two words sasa¤¤imhi samanake, ßwith its perceptions
and mind,û have been used to qualify, kaëevare, ßphysical frame,û
or ßbody,û in the momentous declaration.
We also came across some instances in the discourses where the
Buddha calls the cessation of the six sense-spheres itself Nibbàna.
The most notable instance is perhaps the Kàmaguõasutta we had
already quoted.21 As we saw, even its presentation is rather
enigmatic. It runs:
Tasmàtiha, bhikkhave, se àyatane veditabbe yattha

cakkhu¤ca nirujjhati råpasa¤¤à ca virajjati, se àyatane
veditabbe yattha sota¤ca nirujjhati saddasa¤¤à ca viraj-
jati, se àyatane veditabbe yattha ghàna¤ca nirujjhati
gandhasa¤¤à ca virajjati, se àyatane veditabbe yattha
jivhà ca nirujjhati rasasa¤¤à ca virajjati, se àyatane
veditabbe yattha kàyo ca nirujjhati phoññabbasa¤¤à ca vi-
rajjati, se àyatane veditabbe yattha mano ca nirujjhati
dhammasa¤¤à ca virajjati, se àyatane veditabbe.22
ßTherefore, monks, that sphere should be known wherein

the eye ceases and the perception of forms fades away, the
ear ceases and the perception of sounds fades away, the
nose ceases and the perception of smells fades away, the
tongue ceases and the perception of tastes fades away, the
body ceases and the perception of tangibles fades away,
21 See sermon 17.

22 S IV 98, Kàmaguõasutta.
the mind ceases and the perception of ideas fades away,

that sphere should be known.û
Venerable ânanda, commenting on this riddle-like sermon of the

Buddha, concludes that the Buddha is here referring to the cessa-
tion of the six sense-spheres, saëàyatananirodhaü, àvuso, Bhaga-
vatà sandhàya bhàsitaü. ßFriends, it is with reference to the
cessation of the six sense-spheres that the Exalted One has
preached this sermon.û The cessation of the six sense-spheres is
Nibbàna.
All this goes to show that the concept of a world is the product
of the six sense-spheres. Those six measuring rods have measured
out a world for us.
Since the world is built up by the six sense-spheres, it has also
to cease by the cessation of those six sense-spheres. That is why
Nibbàna is defined as the cessation of the six sense-spheres,
saëàyatananirodho Nibbànaü. All those measuring rods and scales
lose their applicability with the cessation of the six sense-spheres.
How can there be an experience of cessation of the six sense-
spheres? The cessation here meant is actually the cessation of the
spheres of contact. A sphere of contact presupposes a duality.
Contact is always between two things, between eye and forms, for
instance. It is because of a contact between two things that one
entertains a perception of permanence in those two things. De-
pendent on that contact, feelings and perceptions arise, creating a
visual world. The visual world of the humans differs from that of
animals. Some things that are visible to animals are not visible to
humans. That is due to the constitution of the eye-faculty. It is the
same with regard to the ear-faculty. These are the measuring rods
and scales which build up a world.
Now this world, which is a product of the spheres of sense-
contact, is a world of papa¤ca, or ßproliferation.û Nibbàna is
called nippapa¤ca because it transcends this proliferation, puts an
end to proliferation. The end of proliferation is at the same time
the end of the six sense-spheres.
There is a discourse in the section of the Fours in the Aïguttara
Nikàya which clearly brings out this fact. There we find Venerable
Mahàkoññhita putting a question to Venerable Sàriputta on this

point. Venerable Mahàkoññhita and Venerable Sàriputta are often
found discussing intricate points in the Dhamma, not because they
are in doubt, but in order to clarify matters for us. They are
thrashing out problems for our sake. In this particular instance,
Venerable Mahàkoññhita puts the following question to Venerable
Sàriputta:
Channaü, àvuso, phassàyatanànaü asesaviràganirodhà at-
th'a¤¤aü ki¤ci?23 ßFriend, with the remainderless fading away and
cessation of the six spheres of sense-contact, is there something
left?û
Venerable Sàriputta's response was: Mà hevaü àvuso, ßDo not
say so, friend.û Venerable Mahàkoññhita follows it up with three
other possible alternatives, all of which Venerable Sàriputta
dismisses with the same curt reply. The three alternatives are:
Channaü, àvuso, phassàyatanànaü asesaviràganirodhà natth'
a¤¤aü ki¤ci? ßFriend, with the remainderless fading away and
cessation of the six spheres of sense-contact, is there nothing left?û
Channaü, àvuso, phassàyatanànaü asesaviràganirodhà atthi
ca natthi ca a¤¤aü ki¤ci? ßFriend, with the remainderless fading
away and cessation of the six spheres of sense-contact, is it the
case that there is and is not something left?û
Channaü, àvuso, phassàyatanànaü asesaviràganirodhà nev'at-
thi no natth'a¤¤aü ki¤ci? ßFriend, with the remainderless fading
away and cessation of the six spheres of sense-contact, is it the
case that there neither is nor is not something left?û
The mode of questioning takes the form of a tetralemma and
Venerable Sàriputta dismisses all the four alternatives as inappli-
cable. Then Venerable Mahàkoññhita asks why all these four
questions were ruled out, and Venerable Sàriputta explains:
`Channaü, àvuso, phassàyatanànaü asesaviràganirodhà

atth' a¤¤aü ki¤cã'ti, iti vadaü appapa¤caü papa¤ceti.
23 A II 161, Mahàkoññhitasutta.

natth'a¤¤aü ki¤cã'ti, iti vadaü appapa¤caü papa¤ceti.
atthi ca natthi ca a¤¤aü ki¤cã'ti, iti vadaü appapa¤caü
papa¤ceti. `Channaü, àvuso, phassàyatanànaü
asesaviràganirodhà nev'atthi no natth'a¤¤aü ki¤cã'ti, iti
vadaü appapa¤caü papa¤ceti.
Yàvatà, àvuso, channaü phassàyatanànaü gati tàvatà pa-

pa¤cassa gati, yàvatà papa¤cassa gati tàvatà channaü
phassàyatanànaü gati. Channaü, àvuso,
phassàyatanànaü asesaviràganirodhà papa¤canirodho
papa¤cavåpasamo.
ßFriend, he who says: `With the remainderless fading

away and cessation of the six spheres of sense-contact,
there is something left' is conceptually proliferating what
should not be proliferated conceptually. Friend, he who
says: `With the remainderless fading away and cessation
of the six spheres of sense-contact, there is nothing left' is
conceptually proliferating what should not be proliferated
conceptually. Friend, he who says: `With the remainder-
less fading away and cessation of the six spheres of sense-
contact, there is and is not something left' is conceptually
proliferating what should not be proliferated conceptually.
Friend, he who says: `With the remainderless fading away
and cessation of the six spheres of sense-contact, there
neither is nor is not something left' is conceptually prolif-
erating what should not be proliferated conceptually.
ßFriend, whatever is the range of the six spheres of sense-

contact, that itself is the range of conceptual proliferation,
and whatever is the range of conceptual proliferation, that
itself is the range of the six spheres of sense-contact. By
the remainderless fading away and cessation of the six
spheres of sense-contact, there comes to be the cessation
and appeasement of conceptual proliferation.û
The commentator gives the following explanation to the expres-

sion atth' a¤¤aü ki¤ci, ßis there something left?û: `tato paraü
koci appamattako pi kileso atthã'ti pucchati.24 According to him,
Venerable Mahàkoññhita is asking whether there is even a little
defilement left after the cessation of the six spheres of sense-
contact. But the question is obviously not about the remaining
defilements, in which case even a categorical negative could have
been the correct answer. The question here is about the very usage
of the expressions ìs' and ìs not.'
With the cessation of the six spheres of sense-contact all four
propositions of the tetralemma, based on the two standpoints ìs'
and ìs not,' lose their applicability. They are rejected in toto. Here
the papa¤ca, or ßconceptual proliferation,û implied, is the very
discrimination between ìs' and ìs not.'
The entire world is built up on the two concepts ìs' and ìs not.'
Being unaware of the saïkhata, or ßprepared,û nature of these
concepts, we are accustomed to say `this is' as occasion demands.
This recording machine before us ìs there.' So also are the things
which we presume to exist. We ourselves do exist, do we not? One
could say Ì am.'
Out of the two rapid processes going on within us every mo-
ment, namely arising and passing away, we are most of the time
dwelling on the side of arising. The two concepts ìs' and ìs not'
are structured on the six spheres of sense-contact. Not only ìs'
and ìs not,' but also the entire logical structure connecting these
two postulates is founded on these six spheres. Here, then, we see
the fistfuls of inflammable incense powder the Buddha had
directed towards language and logic, setting all that ablaze.
What this discourse highlights is the fact that by the very cessa-
tion of the six spheres of sense-contact the cessation of conceptual
proliferation is brought about. With reference to speculative views,
particularly to those wrong views that were put aside as unex-
24 Mp III 150.
plained points, the Buddha uses the term diññhipariëàha, ßdelirium

of views.û25 Pariëàha means ßdelirious fever.û
Patients in delirium cry out for water. The worldlings, in gen-
eral, are in high delirium. Even such teachers like Påraõa Kassapa
and Nigaõñha Nàtaputta, who were trying to solve these specula-
tive problems about the world by logic, were also in delirium.
Their views, based on wrong reflections, were mere hallucinations.
They kept on raising such questions, because they had no insight
into the nature of saïkhàras, or ßpreparations.û
The worldlings spend their whole lifetime running in search of
the world's end. All that is papa¤ca, conceptual proliferation. In
fact, the term papa¤ca is so pervasive in its gamut of meaning that
it encompasses the entire world. Usually, the term is glossed over
by explaining it with reference to taõhà, màna and diññhi, bringing
in craving, conceits and views as illustrations of papa¤ca. But that
does not amount to an explanation proper. It is only a definition in
extension by giving three instances of papa¤ca. To rattle off the
three instances is not a fit answer to the question `what is pa-
pa¤ca.'
The primary significance of papa¤ca is traceable to the linguis-
tic medium. We have already shown how the network of grammar
spreads as soon as the peg àm' is driven down to earth, as it
were.26 The reality in the first person in grammar beckons a second
and a third person to complete the picture. In logic, too, a similar
legerdemain takes place. The interminable questions of identity
and difference lead the logician up the garden path.
The `world' is precariously perched on a fictitious network of
grammar and logic.
It is as a solution to all this that the Buddha came out with the
extraordinary prospect of a cessation of the six spheres of sense-
contact. This, then, is a level of experience realizable here and
25 A II 11, Yogasutta.
now. That is why the Buddha declared that the world is in this
very fathom-long body with its perceptions and mind.
Now as to the questions about the world, we have already
pointed out that there is a circularity involved. Though one cannot
find an end in something of a cyclic nature, there is still a solution
possible. There is only one solution, that is, to break the cycle.
That is what the term vaññupaccheda means. One can breach the
cycle. The cycle cannot be discovered by traveling. It is not out
there, but in this very stream of consciousness within us. We have
already described it as the vortex between consciousness and
name-and-form. An allusion to the breach of the vortex is found in
the following verse, which we have already discussed in connec-
tion with Nibbàna:
tejo vàyo na gàdhati.
Ettha dãgha¤ca rassa¤ca,


Here it is that earth and water,
Fire and air no footing find.
ßHere it is that long and short,

27 D I 223, Kevaóóhasutta, see also sermon 6.

And Name-and-form are cut off without exception,

When consciousness has surceased,
These are held in check herein.û
Here one can see how name-and-form are cut off. Vi¤¤àõaü
anidassanaü, anantaü sabbato pabhaü, ßConsciousness, which is
non-manifestative, infinite and lustrous on all sides.û In this
consciousness even the four great primaries earth, water, fire and
air, do not find a footing. Cakkavàla, or a world-system, is
supposed to be made up of these four primary elements. Even the
term cakkavàla implies something cyclic. The world is a product
of these primary elements, but these are not there in that non-
manifestative consciousness.
Such relative distinctions as long and short, subtle and gross,
have no place in it. Name-and-form cease there, leaving no
residue. Like an expert physician, who treats the germ of a disease
and immunizes the patient, the Buddha effected a breach in the
saüsàric vortex by concentrating on its epicycle within this
fathom-long body.
The ever recurrent process of mutual interrelation between
consciousness and name-and-form forming the epicycle of the
saüsàric vortex was breached. With the cessation of conscious-
ness comes the cessation of name-and-form. With the cessation of
name-and-form comes the cessation of consciousness. That is the
dictum of the Naëakalàpãsutta.28 Out of the two bundles of reeds
left standing, supporting each other, when one is drawn the other
falls down. Even so, with the cessation of consciousness comes the
cessation of name-and-form. With the cessation of name-and-form
comes the cessation of consciousness. That is how the Buddha
solved this problem.
28 S II 114, Naëakalàpãsutta, see also sermon 3.

Nibbàna Sermon 24



This is the twenty-fourth sermon in the series of sermons on
Nibbàna. In our last sermon, we brought up a quotation from the
Rohitassa Sutta, which enshrines a momentous declaration by the
Buddha to the effect that the world, the arising of the world, the
cessation of the world, and the path leading to the cessation of the
world, could be pointed out with reference to this same body with
its perceptions and mind.2
The six sense-spheres, or the six bases of sense-contact, with
which we acquaint ourselves with the world as it is conventionally
understood and measured out, are themselves called `the world'
according to the Noble One's terminology.3 Therefore, one can
2 S I 62 and A II 50 Rohitassasutta; see sermon 23.
623
declare in accordance with the Dhamma, that the very cessation of

those six sense-spheres is the cessation of the world. It is this state
of the cessation of the world that is known as asaïkhata dhàtu, or
the ßunprepared element.û That unprepared state, described in
discourses on Nibbàna in such terms as atthi, bhikkhave, ajàtaü
abhåtaü akataü asaükataü,4 ßmonks, there is an unborn, an
unbecome, an unmade, an unprepared,û is this cessation of the six
spheres of sense, which is the end of that prepared world.
So, then, this particular world's end, the end of the world as
defined here, is not a destination to be reached by traveling. The
sage Rohitassa walked for hundred years in search of this world's
end at a speed of a flying arrow, but he failed to discover the
world's end. Why? It is because he took `the world' along with
him in his journey to see its end. Since this six-based body with its
perceptions and mind is itself the world, he was taking the world
with him in his exploration. That is why he had to die on the way
without seeing the end of the world.
That end of the world, which one cannot see or reach by travel-
ing, the Buddha pointed out in the very cessation of the six sense-
spheres. This fact comes to light in the discourses dealing with
Nibbàna in the Pàñaligàmiyavagga of the Udàna, which we had
already discussed.5 For instance, in the first discourse on Nibbàna,
beginning with the words atthi, bhikkhave, tad àyatanaü, ßthere
is, monks, that sphere,û we find towards the end the following
statement:
Tatra p'ahaü, bhikkhave, n'eva àgatiü vadàmi na gatiü na
ñhitiü na cutiü na upapattiü, appatiññhaü appavattaü
anàrammaõaü eva taü, es' ev' anto dukkhassa.6
In that particular state, described as a `sphere,' in which there is
neither earth, nor water, nor fire, nor air, etc., ßI say, there is
neither a coming, nor a going, nor a standing, nor a passing away,
4 Ud 80, Pàñaligàmiyavagga.
5 See sermon 7.
nor a being reborn; that state which is unestablished, non-

continuing and objectless, is itself the end of suffering.û So, then,
this journey's end, the journey's end that cannot be reached by
journeying, the Buddha pointed out in the cessation of the six
sense-spheres.
We come across the following passage in the fourth discourse
on Nibbàna in the Pàñaligàmiyavagga of the Udàna:
Nissitassa calitaü, anissitassa calitaü n' atthi, calite asati

passaddhi, passaddhiyà sati nati no hoti, natiyà asati
àgatigati na hoti, àgatigatiyà asati cutåpapàto na hoti,
cutåpapàte asati n' ev' idha na huraü na ubhayamantare,
ßTo the attached there is wavering, to the unattached there

is no wavering; wavering not being, there is calm; calm
being, there is no inclination; inclination not being, there
is no coming and going; coming and going not being,
there is no passing away or reappearing; when there is no
passing away or reappearing, there is neither a `here,' nor
a `there,' nor anything between the two Ý this is the end of
suffering.û
It is in such profound terms, that the Buddha described the end of

the world. One cannot see it by journeying. It can be seen only by
wisdom. In fact, even the very concept of `going' has to be
transcended in order to see it.
So, it seems, Rohitassa carried the world with him in his jour-
ney to see the end of the world. He made another blunder. He was
going in search of a place where there is no death, in order to
escape death. Even that, the Buddha had declared, is not possible
to see or reach by traveling.
Rohitassa took Màra along with him in his journey to find a

place where there is no death. Why do we say so? In the
Ràdhasaüyutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya we find Venerable Ràdha
putting the following question to the Buddha:
`Màro, màro'ti, bhante, vuccati, kittàvatà nu kho, bhante,
`màro'ti vuccati?8 ßMàra, Màra, they say, venerable sir, to what
extent is Màra called as such?û
Now this is how the Buddha answers the question:
Råpe kho, Ràdha, sati Màro và assa màretà và yo và pana

mãyati. Tasmàtiha tvaü, Ràdha, råpaü `Màro'ti passa,
`màretà'ti passa, `mãyatã'ti passa, `rogo'ti passa,
`gaõóo'ti passa, `sallan'ti passa, àghan'ti passa,
àghabhåtan'ti passa. Ye nam evaü passanti te sammà
passanti.
ßWhere there is form, Ràdha, there would be a Màra, or

one who kills, or one who dies. Therefore, Ràdha, in this
context you look upon form as `Màra,' as òne who kills,'
as òne who dies,' as a disease, as a boil, as a dart, as a
misery, as a wretchedness. They that look upon thus are
those that see rightly.û
As in the case of form, so also in regard to feeling, perception,

preparations and consciousness, the same mode of seeing rightly is
recommended. So, in this context, each of the five aggregates is
looked upon as a Màra, from the point of view of the Dhamma.
That is why we say that Rohitassa went in search of a deathless
place taking death along with him.
From this definition it is clear that so long as one grasps with
craving the aggregates of form, feeling, perception, preparations
and consciousness, there is a Màra, a killer, and one who dies.
Therefore it is, that by giving up the five aggregates one is freed
8 S III 189, Màrosutta.

from Màra, is liberated from death and attains the deathless state.
That is why we said that the arahant has attained the deathless
state, here and now, in this world itself.9 The principle involved
here we have already stated while discussing the law of dependent
arising.10
Let us remind ourselves of the relevant section of a verse in the
Bhadràvudhamàõavappucchà of the Pàràyanavagga of the Sutta
Nipàta:
Yaü yaü hi lokasmiü upàdiyanti,

ten' eva Màro anveti jantuü.11
ßWhatever thing they grasp in this world,

By that itself Màra pursues a man.û
Because of grasping, there is becoming or existence and with it

birth, decay and death, etc., follow suit, all due to craving. That is
the deep idea behind the Buddha's definition of the five grasping
groups in terms of Màra.
In fact, these six sense-spheres, the six bases, are within the
jurisdiction of Màra. This is evident from Màra's own words in
the Kassakasutta of the Sagàthakavagga of the Saüyutta Nikàya.
Once, when the Buddha was admonishing the monks with a
sermon on Nibbàna, it occurred to Màra, the Evil One: ßNow this
recluse Gotama is admonishing the monks and the monks are
listening attentively. I must go and blind their eye of wisdom.û
With this evil intention, he came there in the guise of a farmer,
carrying a plough on his shoulder, a goad in his hand, with
dishevelled hair and muddy feet, and asked the Buddha: ßRecluse,
did you see my oxen?û Then the Buddha retorted: ßWhat is the use
of oxen for you, Evil One?û Màra understood that the Buddha had
9 See sermon 14.

10 See sermon 3.
11 Sn 1103, Bhadràvudhamàõavappucchà.
recognized him and came out with the following boast of his
superiority:
Mam eva, samaõa, cakkhu, mama råpà, mama cakkhu-

samphassavi¤¤ànàyatanaü, kuhiü me, samaõa, gantvà
mokkhasi?12
Mam eva, samaõa, sotaü . . . Mam eva, samaõa,

ghànaü . . . Mam eva, samaõa, jivhà . . . Mam eva, sa-
maõa, kàyo . . .
Mam eva, samaõa, mano, mama dhammà, mama

manosamphassavi¤¤ànàyatanaü, kuhiü me, samaõa,
gantvà mokkhasi?
ßMine, O recluse, is the eye, mine are the forms and mine
the sphere of eye-contact, where will you, recluse, go to
escape me?
ßMine, O recluse, is the ear . . . Mine, O recluse, is the

nose . . . Mine, O recluse, is the tongue . . . Mine, O re-
cluse, is the body . . .
ßMine, O recluse, is the mind, mine are the mind-objects

and mine the sphere of mind-contact, where will you, re-
cluse, go to escape me?û
Now this is how the Buddha responded to that challenge:
Taveva, pàpima, cakkhu, tava råpà, tava cakkhusam-

phassavi¤¤àõàyatanaü, yattha ca kho, pàpima, n' atthi
cakkhu, n' atthi råpà, n' atthi cakkhusamphassa-
vi¤¤àõàyatanaü, agati tava tattha pàpima.
12 S I 115, Kassakasutta.
Taveva, pàpima, sotaü . . . Taveva, pàpima, ghàõaü . . .

Taveva, pàpima, jivhaü . . . Taveva, pàpima, kàyaü . . .
Taveva, pàpima, mano, tava dhammà, tava

manosamphassavi¤¤àõàyatanaü, yattha ca kho, pàpima,
n' atthi mano, n' atthi dhammà, n' atthi manosamphassa-
vi¤¤àõàyatanaü, agati tava tattha pàpima.
ßYours, O Evil One, is the eye, yours are the forms and
yours the sphere of eye-contact, but where there is no eye,
no forms and no sphere of eye-contact, there you cannot
go, Evil One.
ßYours, Evil One, is the ear . . . Yours, Evil One, is the

nose . . . Yours, Evil One, is the tongue . . . Yours, Evil
One, is the body . . .
ßYours, Evil One, is the mind, yours are the mind-objects

and yours the sphere of mind-contact, but where there is
no mind, no mind-objects and no sphere of mind-contact,
there you cannot go, Evil One.û
From the Buddha's reprisal to Màra's challenge, we can well infer

that there indeed is a place to which Màra has no access. That is
none other than the cessation of the six sense-spheres. Since it is
something realizable, it is referred to as a `sphere' in such contexts
as, for instance, in the discourse on Nibbàna beginning with the
words atthi, bhikkhave, tad àyatanaü,13 ßthere is, monks, that
sphere,û etc.
It is this same cessation of the six sense-spheres that is referred
to as papa¤canirodha and papa¤cavåpasama, cessation or
appeasement of conceptual proliferation. In the Mahàkoññhitasutta
we discussed in our previous sermon, we found Venerable
Sàriputta making the following conclusive statement to the same

effect:
Channaü, àvuso, phassàyatanànaü asesaviràganirodhà pa-
pa¤canirodho papa¤cavåpasamo,14 ßFriend, by the remainderless
fading away and cessation of the six spheres of sense-contact,
there comes to be the cessation and appeasement of conceptual
proliferation.û
That itself is the non-prolific state. All concepts of `going,'
`coming,' `being born,' `growing old' and `dying,' are to be found
in the prolific. They simply do not exist in the non-prolific. That is
why it is inaccessible to Màra. In it, neither the sense-bases, such
as the eye, ear and nose, nor their respective objects are to be
found. So it is clear that the cessation of the six sense-spheres is
that state of release from Màra, attainable here and now.
All the six sense-spheres are built up on the perception of per-
manence. Therefore, the realization of their cessation is possible
only through the perception of impermanence. The contemplation
of impermanence is the path to its realization.
An extremely subtle contemplation on impermanence, that can
bring about the cessation of the six sense-spheres, is to be found in
the Dvayamsutta number two of the Saëàyatanavagga of the
Saüyutta Nikàya. Dvayaü means a dyad. There are two discourses
by that name, and this is the second. A strikingly deep vision of
consciousness unfolds itself in this discourse as follows:
Dvayaü, bhikkhave, pañicca vi¤¤àõaü sambhoti. Ka-

tha¤ca, bhikkhave, dvayaü pañicca vi¤¤àõaü sambhoti?
Cakkhu¤ca pañicca råpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvi¤¤àõaü.
Cakkhu aniccaü vipariõàmi a¤¤athàbhàvi. Råpà aniccà
vipariõàmino a¤¤athàbhàvino. Itthetaü dvayaü ca-
la¤ceva vyaya¤ca aniccaü vipariõàmi a¤¤athàbhàvi.
14 A II 162, Mahàkoññhitasutta; see sermon 23.

Cakkhuvi¤¤àõaü aniccaü vipariõàmi a¤¤athàbhàvi. Yo

pi hetu yo pi paccayo cakkhuvi¤¤àõassa uppàdàya, so pi
hetu so pi paccayo anicco vipariõàmã a¤¤athàbhàvã. Anic-
caü kho pana, bhikkhave, paccayaü pañicca uppannaü
cakkhuvi¤¤àõaü, kuto niccaü bhavissati?
Yà kho, bhikkhave, imesaü tiõõaü dhammànaü saïgati

sannipàto samavàyo, ayaü vuccati, bhikkhave, cakkhu-
samphasso. Cakkhusamphasso pi anicco vipariõàmã
a¤¤athàbhàvã. Yo pi hetu yo pi paccayo cakkhusam-
phassassa uppàdàya, so pi hetu so pi paccayo anicco
vipariõàmã a¤¤athàbhàvã. Aniccaü kho pana, bhikkhave,
paccayaü pañicca uppanno cakkhusamphasso, kuto nicco
bhavissati?
Phuññho, bhikkhave, vedeti, phuññho ceteti, phuññho

sa¤jànàti. Itthete pi dhammà calà ceva vayà ca aniccà
vipariõàmino a¤¤athàbhàvino.15
Even by listening to it, one can easily guess that there is a string of
terms giving the idea of impermanence. Let us now try to translate
it:
ßDependent on a dyad, monks, consciousness comes to be.

How is it, monks, that consciousness comes to be depend-
ent on a dyad? Depending on eye and forms arises eye-
consciousness. Eye is impermanent, changing, becoming
otherwise. Forms are impermanent, changing, becoming
otherwise. Thus this dyad is unstable, evanescent, imper-
manent, changing, becoming otherwise.
ßEye-consciousness is impermanent, changing, becoming

otherwise. Whatever cause and condition there is for the
15 S IV 67, Dutiyadvayamsutta.
arising of eye-consciousness, that cause, that condition,

too, is impermanent, changing and becoming otherwise.
How can eye-consciousness, arisen in dependence on an
impermanent condition, be permanent, monks?
ßThat concurrence, that meeting, that togetherness of these

three things, monks, is called eye-contact. Even the eye-
contact, monks is impermanent, changing, becoming oth-
erwise. Whatever cause and condition there is for the aris-
ing of eye-contact, that cause and condition, too, is
impermanent, changing and becoming otherwise. How can
eye-contact, arisen in dependence on an impermanent
condition, be permanent, monks?
ßContacted, monks, one feels, contacted one intends, con-

tacted one perceives. Thus these things, too, are unstable,
evanescent, impermanent, changing and becoming other-
wise.û
The Sutta proceeds in this way, stressing the impermanence of the

other sense-spheres as well, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the body
and the mind. The entire discourse vibrates with the tone of
impermanence.
It is the law of dependent arising that the Buddha presents here
with reference to the six sense-spheres. In other words, how the
world gets built up. It is not founded on stable existing things, but
on what is impermanent, unstable and changing, whose nature is to
become otherwise. This is how the entire perception of the world
is built up. Its foundation is always crumbling, changing and
transforming.
Generally, in the discourse dealing with the question of sense-
restraint, one comes across the phrase na nimittaggàhi
nànuvya¤janaggàhã, ßhe doesn't grasp a sign nor does he dwell on
its details.û16 The tendency to grasp a sign in regard to the objects

of the six senses is the result of the perception of permanence. Due
to the perception of permanence, there is a grasping of signs, and
due to that grasping of signs, influxes flow in. Proliferations
through craving, conceits and views get heaped up. This is how
our world is constructed. This is the way the aggregates of
attachment get accumulated. On the other hand, the contemplation
of impermanence that leads to the signless concentration is helpful
in freeing the mind from these signs.
The reflection on an object can be of two types. Where there is
a perception of permanence, the tendency is to grasp the object
tenaciously and hang on to it. This pervert tendency is known as
paràmasana. It is impelled by the triple proliferations of craving,
conceits and views. Under its influence one is carried away by
prolific perceptions, papa¤casa¤¤à, and is kept under the sway of
worldly concepts and designations born of prolific perceptions,
papa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhà.
On the contrary, the perception of impermanence fosters a de-
tached and observant attitude in reflection, which is known as
sammasana. It is that healthy attitude which progressively leads to
the liberation of the mind from the influence of signs, and attenu-
ates the prolific tendencies to craving, conceits and views. This
kind of reflection is the harbinger of insight. Contemplation of
impermanence on these lines effectively puts an end to this entire
mass of saüsàric suffering, as is evident from the following
powerful declaration by the Buddha in the Khandhasaüyutta:
Aniccasa¤¤a, bhikkhave, bhàvità bahulãkatà sabbaü

kàmaràgaü pariyàdiyati, sabbaü råparàgaü pariyàdi-
yati, sabbaü bhavaràgaü pariyàdiyati, sabbaü avijjaü
16 E.g. in D I 70, Sàma¤¤aphalasutta.

pariyàdiyati, sabbaü asmimànaü pariyàdiyati samåhan-

ati.17
ßThe perception of impermanence, monks, when devel-

oped and intensively practised, extirpates all sensual lust,
extirpates all lust for forms, extirpates all lust for exist-
ence, extirpates all ignorance and extirpates and eradicates
the conceit àm.'û
The contemplation of impermanence, therefore, strikes at the very

root of this entire mass of saüsàric suffering. The discourse on the
dyad, quoted above, amply illustrates this fact. The recurrent terms
like cala, ßunstable,û and vaya, ßevanescent,û in the passage,
indicate that the entire superstructure of sensory knowledge is
founded on certain pervert attitudes. An imperceptible imperma-
nence underlies it.
In a number of sermons we had to bring up the simile of the
motion picture. The simile is not our own, but only a moderniza-
tion of a canonical simile used by the Buddha himself. The point
of divergence was the question the Buddha had addressed to the
monks in the Gaddulasutta.
Diññhaü vo, bhikkhave, caraõaü nàma cittaü?18 ßMonks, have
you seen a picture called a movie?û The monks answer in the
affirmative, and so the Buddha proceeds:
Tampi kho, bhikkhave, caraõaü nàma cittaü citteneva cintitaü.
Tena pi kho, bhikkhave, caraõena cittena citta¤¤eva cittataraü.
ßMonks, that picture called a movie is something thought out by
the mind. But the thought itself, monks, is even more picturesque
than that picture.û
To say that it is more picturesque is to suggest its variegated
character. Thought is intrinsically variegated. We have no idea
what sort of a motion picture was there at that time, but the
17 S III 155, Aniccasa¤¤àsutta.

18 S III 150, Gaddulasutta; see also sermons 5 and 6.
modern day movie has a way of concealing impermanence by the

rapidity of projections of the series of pictures on the screen. The
rapidity itself gives an impression of permanence, which is a
perversion, vipallàsa.
The movie is enjoyable because of this perversion. Due to the
perception of permanence, there is a grasping of signs, and in the
wake of it influxes flow in, giving rise to proliferation, due to
which one is overwhelmed by reckonings born of prolific concep-
tualization, papa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhà. That is how one enjoys a film
show. All this comes about as a result of ignorance, or lack of
awareness of the cinematographic tricks concealing the fleeting,
vibrating and evanescent nature of the scenes on the screen.
Though we resort to such artificial illustrations, by way of a
simile, the Buddha declares that actually it is impossible to give a
fitting simile to illustrate the rapidity of a thought process. Once
he proclaimed: Upamà pi na sukarà yàva lahuparivattaü cittaü,19
ßIt is not easy even to give a simile to show how rapidly thought
changes.û
Sometimes the Buddha resorts to double entendre to bring out
piquantly some deep idea. He puns on the word citta, ßthoughtû or
ßpicture,û in order to suggest the `picturesque' or variegated nature
of thought, when he asserts that thought is more picturesque,
cittatara, than the picture. We can see that it is quite reasonable in
the light of the Dvayamsutta. It is this series of picturesque
formations that gives us a perception of permanence, which in turn
is instrumental in creating a world before our eyes.
Our eye changes every split second. It is quivering, vibrating
and transient. So also are the forms. But there is a malignantly
pervert idea, ingrained in saüsàric beings, known as the percep-
tion of permanence in the impermanent, anicce niccasa¤¤à, which
prevents them from seeing the inherent transience of eye and
forms. That is how the six spheres of sense create a world before
us.
19 A I 10, Paõihita-acchavagga.
It is the substructure of this sense-created world that the Buddha

has revealed to us in this particular discourse on impermanence.
The substructure, on analysis, reveals a duality, dvayaü, bhik-
khave, pañicca vi¤¤àõaü sambhoti, ßdependent on a dyad, monks,
arises consciousness.û
Consciousness is not something substantial and absolute, like
the so-called soul. That is precisely the point of divergence for
Buddhism, when compared with those religious systems which
rely on soul theories.
In the Dhamma there is mention of six consciousnesses, as
cakkhuvi¤¤àõa, sotavi¤¤àõa, ghànavi¤¤àõa, jivhàvi¤¤àõa,
kàyavi¤¤àõa and manovi¤¤àõa, eye-, ear-, nose-, tongue-, body-
and mind-consciousness. Every one of these consciousnesses is
based on a dyad. Just as in the case of eye-consciousness we are
given the formula beginning with cakkhu¤ca pañicca råpe ca,
ßdependent on eye and forms,û so with regard to ear-
consciousness we get sota¤ca pañicca sadde ca, ßdependent on ear
and sounds,û and so on. Even when we come to mind-
consciousness, the theme is the same, mana¤ca pañicca dhamme
ca, ßdependent on mind and mind-objects.û Mind also is vibrating,
changing and transforming with extreme rapidity every moment.
So are the objects of the mind.
The entire world is structured on these vibrant, transient and
evanescent basic elements. That is the burden of this powerful
discourse of the Buddha. Therefore, if someone developed the
contemplation of impermanence to the highest degree and brought
his mind to the signless state, having started from the sign itself, it
goes without saying that he has realized the cessation of the world.
That is, the experience of Nibbàna.
It is, at the same time, the cessation of proliferation, pa-
pa¤canirodha. Prolific conceptualization is founded on the
perception of permanence, whereby one comes under the sway of
reckonings born of prolific perceptions, papa¤casa¤¤àsaïkhà.
Proliferation creates things, giving rise to the antinomian conflict.
Duality masquerades behind it.
It is by mistaking the impermanent eye and the impermanent
forms as permanent that the whole confusion has come about. One
imagines the eye and forms as permanent and thereby becomes

blind to their momentary change and transience. The glue of
craving and intoxicating influxes create a facade of a real world
before him. That is the world we touch with our hands and see
with our eyes. All this exposes the insubstantial nature of this
world.
The products of the six sense-bases can be summed up by the
four terms diññha, suta, muta and vi¤¤àta, things seen, heard,
sensed and cognized. The Dvayamsutta brings to light the fact that
all these four are insubstantial and coreless. Due to this very fact,
the Tathàgata who realized the cessation of the six sense-bases,
was confronted with the stupendous problem of mediating with the
world that could not even imagine the frightful prospect of a
cessation of the six sense-bases. That is to say, when he reached
the state of non-proliferation, nippapa¤ca, by experiencing the
cessation of the world through the cessation of the six sense-bases,
the Tathàgata had to grapple with the serious problem of truth and
falsehood in mediating with the world.
There is an extremely important discourse connected with the
idea of the void, su¤¤atàpañisaüyutta, which echoes this episte-
mological crisis, in the section of the Fours in the Aïguttara
Nikàya, entitled Kàëakàràmasutta. This Kàëakàràmasutta was
preached by the Buddha to the congregation of monks at the
Kàëaka monastery in the city of Sàketa. The discourse, though
brief, is one that is extremely deep in its presentation of the idea of
the void.
Before getting down to an exposition of this discourse, by way
of sketching its historical background, we may mention a few
things. Apart from the mention of the venue, nothing much could
be gleaned from the discourse itself as to how it was inspired. The
commentaries, however, relate the episode of Cåëasubhaddhà,
daughter of Anàthapiõóika, to explain the context in which the
discourse was preached.
Cåëasubhaddhà, who was a stream-winner, sotàpannà, was
given in marriage to the son of the millionaire Kàëaka of Sàketa, a
devout follower of Nigaõñha Nàtaputta. Cåëasubhaddhà managed
to convert Kàëaka by inviting the Buddha to Sàketa and getting
him to listen to the Dhamma. After his conversion, he built a

monastery in his park and offered it to the Buddha.
The commentary says that a group of five-hundred newly or-
dained monks of Sàketa gathered in this Kàëaka monastery and
were speaking in praise of the Buddha, marveling at his extraordi-
nary feat of converting the millionaire and the inhabitants of
Sàketa. It was at this juncture that the Buddha came and addressed
this deep discourse to those monks. According to the commentary,
the discourse was so profound that at five points of the sermon the
earth shook miraculously and at the end of the sermon all the five-
hundred monks who listened to it attained arahant-hood.
It is chronicled in the history of Buddhism that, during the great
missionary movement initiated by the emperor Asoka, Venerable
Mahàrakkhita was sent to convert the country of the Yonakas. The
very first sermon he preached there was based on this
Kàëakàràmasutta, on hearing which thirty-seven-thousand attained
fruits of the noble path. If the identification of the Yonakas with
the Greeks is correct, the choice of this deeply philosophical
discourse is understandable.
According to the chronicles and the commentaries, another
significant occasion in which the Kàëakàràmasutta served as a
theme was when Kàlabuddharakkhita Thera gave an all-night
sermon on the dark night of the new-moon Poya day, seated under
the black Timbaru tree at Cetiya Pabbata in Sri Lanka. King
Saddhàtissa was also present in the audience.
The fact that this discourse was held in high esteem is evident
from its historical background. As in the case of many other deep
discourses, here too we are faced with the problem of variant
readings. Even the commentator is at a loss to conclude and
editors go their own way. We have to wade through the variant
readings to make some sense out of the discourse as it is handed
down. Let us now take up the relevant portions of this abstruse
discourse:
Yaü, bhikkhave, sadevakassa lokassa samàrakassa sa-

brahmakassa sassamaõabràhmaõiyà pajàya sade-
vamanussàya diññhaü sutaü mutaü vi¤¤àtaü pattaü

pariyesitaü anuvicaritaü manasà, tam ahaü jànàmi.

pariyesitaü anuvicaritaü manasà, tam ahaü abha¤¤àsiü.
Taü tathàgatasssa viditaü, taü tathàgato na upaññhàsi.

pariyesitaü anuvicaritaü manasà, tam ahaü `na
jànàmã'ti vadeyyaü, taü mama assa musà, tam ahaü
`jànàmi ca na ca jànàmã'ti vadeyyaü, taü p' assa tàdisam
eva, tam ahaü `neva jànàmi na na jànàmã'ti vadeyyaü,
taü mama assa kali.
Iti kho, bhikkhave, tathàgato diññhà daññhabbaü diññhaü

na ma¤¤ati, adiññhaü na ma¤¤ati, daññhabbaü na
ma¤¤ati, daññhàraü na ma¤¤ati. Sutà sotabbaü sutaü na
ma¤¤ati, asutaü na ma¤¤ati, sotabbaü na ma¤¤ati,
sotàraü na ma¤¤ati. Mutà motabbaü mutaü na ma¤¤ati,
amutaü na ma¤¤ati, motabbaü na ma¤¤ati, motàraü na
ma¤¤ati. Vi¤¤àtà vi¤¤àtabbaü vi¤¤àtaü na ma¤¤ati,
avi¤¤àtaü na ma¤¤ati, vi¤¤àtabbaü na ma¤¤ati,
vi¤¤àtàraü na ma¤¤ati.
Iti kho, bhikkhave, tathàgato diññha-suta-muta-

vi¤¤àtabbesu dhammesu tàdã, yeva tàdã tamhà ca pana
tàdimhà a¤¤o tàdã uttaritarovà paõãtataro và n' atthã'ti
vadàmi.
Yaü ki¤ci diññhaü va sutaü mutaü và,

ajjhositaü saccamutaü paresaü,
na tesu tàdã saya saüvutesu,
saccaü musà và pi paraü daheyyaü.
Eta¤ca sallaü pañigacca disvà,

ajjhosità yattha pajà visattà,
jànàmi passàmi tath' eva etaü,
ajjhositaü n' atthi tathàgatànaü.20
ßMonks, whatsoever in the world, with its gods, Màras

and Brahmas, among the progeny consisting of recluses
and Brahmins, gods and men, whatsoever is seen, heard,
sensed, cognized, thought after and pondered over by the
mind, all that do I know.
ßMonks, whatsoever in the world, with its gods, Màras

and Brahmas, among the progeny consisting of recluses
and Brahmins, gods and men, whatsoever is seen, heard,
sensed, cognized, thought after and pondered over by the
mind, that have I fully understood. All that is known to the
Tathàgata, but the Tathàgata has not taken his stand upon
it.
ßIf I were to say, monks, whatsoever in the world, with its

gods, Màras and Brahmas, among the progeny consisting
of recluses and Brahmins, gods and men, whatsoever is
seen, heard, sensed, cognized, thought after and pondered
over by the mind, all that I do not know, it would be a
falsehood in me. If I were to say I both know it and know
it not, that too would be a falsehood in me. If I were to say
I neither know it nor am ignorant of it, it would be a fault
in me.
ßThus, monks, a Tathàgata does not imagine a visible

thing as apart from seeing, he does not imagine an unseen,
he does not imagine a thing worth seeing, he does not im-
agine a seer. He does not imagine an audible thing as apart
20 A II 25, Kàëakàràmasutta.
from hearing, he does not imagine an unheard, he does not

imagine a thing worth hearing, he does not imagine a
hearer. He does not imagine a thing to be sensed as apart
from sensation, he does not imagine an unsensed, he does
not imagine a thing worth sensing, he does not imagine
one who senses. He does not imagine a cognizable thing
as apart from cognition, he does not imagine an uncog-
nized, he does not imagine a thing worth cognizing, he
does not imagine one who cognizes.
ßThus, monks, the Tathàgata, being such in regard to all

phenomena, seen, heard, sensed and cognized, is such.
Moreover than he who is such there is none other higher
or more excellent, I declare.
ßWhatever is seen, heard, sensed,

Or clung to and esteemed as truth by other folk,
Midst those who are entrenched in their own views,
Being such, I hold none as true or false.
ßThis barb I beheld well in advance,

Whereon mankind is hooked, impaled,
I know, I see, 'tis verily so,
No such clinging for the Tathàgatas.û
In the first statement the Buddha declares that he knows, tam

ahaü jànàmi, whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, thought
after and pondered over by all beings in the world, and that is the
sum total of the knowledge acquired through the six sense-bases.
In the second statement he affirms that the knowledge he has is
of a higher order, tam ahaü abha¤¤àsiü, that amounts to an
understanding, taü tathàgatasssa viditaü, by virtue of which he
does not take his stand upon it, he has no stance, taü tathàgato na
upaññhàsi.
The third statement flows from this detached perspective. It is to
the effect that the Tathàgata cannot disclaim knowledge, despite
his detached attitude, as it would be tantamount to prevarication in

the eyes of the world, taü mama assa musà.
The fourth statement highlights the same incongruity, because
the Tathàgata placed in this awkward situation cannot compro-
mise by both claiming and disclaiming knowledge at the same
time, tam ahaü `jànàmi ca na ca jànàmã'ti vadeyyaü, taü p' assa
tàdisam eva.
As the fifth statement makes it clear, the Tathàgata does not
deem it fit to wriggle out by neither claiming nor disclaiming
knowledge of sense-data.
Then comes the declaration as to how the Tathàgata treats this
body of sensory knowledge of the worldling. ßThus, monks, a
Tathàgata does not imagine a visible thing as apart from the seen,û
iti kho, bhikkhave, tathàgato diññhà daññhabbaü diññhaü na
ma¤¤ati.
We have come across the terms diññha, suta, muta, vi¤¤àta quite
often, for instance in our discussion of the Bàhiyasutta in the
context diññhe diññhamattaü bhavissati, sute sutamattaü bhavis-
sati, mute mutamattaü bhavissati, vi¤¤àte vi¤¤àtamattaü bhavis-
sati, ßIn the seen there will be just the seen, in the heard there will
be just the heard, in the sensed there will be just the sensed, in the
cognized there will be just the cognized.û21
In common parlance, the word `seen' connotes something seen.
But here we have something more radical, avoiding substantialist
insinuations. It is just the seen in the seen, implied by diññha, in
this context too. The Tathàgata takes it just as a seen, without
imagining that there is something substantial worthwhile seeing, as
apart from it, diññhà daññhabbaü diññhaü na ma¤¤ati.
We are already familiar with the term ma¤¤anà, having dis-
cussed it in such discourses as the Målapariyàyasutta and the
Bàhiyasutta.22 It stands for imaginings, prompted by cravings,
conceits and views. The Tathàgata is free from such imaginings.
21 Ud 8, Bàhiyasutta, see sermon 14.

22 See sermons 12 to 15.
He does not imagine a thing worthwhile seeing apart from the

seen, nor does he imagine an unseen, adiññhaü na ma¤¤ati. The
phenomenon of seeing is not denied.
The phrase daññhabbaü na ma¤¤ati conveys the idea that the
Tathàgata does not imagine that there is something worth seeing,
that there is something essential in it. Daññhàraü na ma¤¤ati, he
does not imagine a seer or one who sees. He does not project an
agent into the phenomenon by taking seriously the subject-object
relationship.
With regard to the heard, suta, the sensed, muta, and the cog-
nized, vi¤¤àta, too, the Tathàgata has no such imaginings. Then,
in summing up it is said: Iti kho, bhikkhave, tathàgato diññha-suta-
muta-vi¤¤àtabbesu dhammesu tàdi, yeva tàdi, ßThus, monks, the
Tathàgata, being such in regard to all phenomena, seen, heard,
sensed and cognized, is `such.'û
The term tàdã, too, came up in a number of our earlier ser-
mons.23 We rendered it by ßsuch.û It stands for the quality of
steadfastness of the arahant in remaining unshaken by the eight
worldly vicissitudes. His mainstay, in this respect, is atammayatà,
or non-identification. He is such because he does not grasp any of
those things as `mine.' So he is `such' in regard to whatever is
seen, heard, sensed and cognized. There is no one who is higher or
more excellent than this such-like-one in point of suchness. Then
comes a couplet of verses, presenting the gist of the sermon.
Our rendering of the sermon is in need of further explication.
Though it gives a general idea, some words and phrases in the
original have far reaching implications. The basic idea behind the
series of declarations made is the extraordinary change of attitude
towards the question of speculative views, which marks off the
Tathàgata from all his contemporaries. He took a completely
different turn, transcending the extremes of eternalism and
annihilationism. This difference of attitude is revealed by the
riddle like statements in the first part of the discourse. One gets the

impression that the Tathàgata was confronted with a problematic

situation of the highest order.
The first statement is to the effect that the Tathàgata knows
whatever in the world with its gods, Màras and Brahmas, among
the progeny consisting of recluses and Brahmins, gods and men, is
seen, heard, sensed, cognized, thought after and pondered over by
the mind.
The second statement asserts that the Tathàgata has a higher
understanding of all that. All the same, he takes no stance in
regard to whatever is seen, heard, sensed and cognized.
This might appear as a riddle. Usually when one has a higher
understanding of something, one is inclined to take one's stand
upon it. But here we have a denial. The discourse bears some
resemblance to the tetralemma we had discussed earlier.24 But
there seems to be a difference here, in the formulation of the first
proposition of the tetralemma.
Normally the first proposition amounts to an unqualified asser-
tion of the affirmative standpoint. In this case, however, we find
the statement that the Tathàgata not only knows all what the world
knows, but that he has a higher understanding of it, abha¤¤àsiü. It
is precisely because he has a higher understanding that he takes no
stance in regard to it.
This might appear problematic, but let us remind ourselves of
the two levels of understanding mentioned in the Målapariyàya-
sutta, discussed earlier, namely sa¤jànàti and abhijànàti. As an
instance of the first level of understanding, we get the following
passage in that discourse in regard to the untaught ordinary person,
assutavà puthujjano:
Pañhaviü pañhavito sa¤jànàti. Pañhaviü pañhavito

sa¤¤atvà pañhaviü ma¤¤ati, pañhaviyà ma¤¤ati, pañhavito
24 See sermon 20.

ma¤¤ati, `pañhaviü me'ti ma¤¤ati, pañhaviü abhinan-

dati.25
ßHe perceives earth as èarth.' Having perceived earth as

èarth,' he imagines èarth' as such, he imagines òn the
earth,' he imagines `from the earth,' he imagines èarth is
mine,' he delights in earth.û
The untaught ordinary person has a perceptual knowledge of earth,

sa¤jànàti. That, too, is a level of knowledge. It is in fact the lowest
grade of knowing. The untaught ordinary person can do no better
than perceive earth as earth.
Having perceived earth as earth, he takes it seriously by its face
value and goes on imagining by way of craving, conceit and
views, granting it object-status. He imposes the grammatical
superstructure on it. He imagines òn the earth,' he imagines `from
the earth,' he imagines èarth is mine,' he delights in earth. This,
then, is the lowest grade of knowledge.
On the other hand, about the Tathàgata's level of understand-
ing, the Målapariyàyasutta has the following description:
Pañhaviü pañhavito abhijànàti, pañhaviü pañhavito ab-

hi¤¤àya pañhaviü na ma¤¤ati, pañhaviyà na ma¤¤ati,
pañhavito na ma¤¤ati,`pañhaviü me'ti na ma¤¤ati,
pañhaviü nàbhinandati.
ßHe understands through higher knowledge earth as

èarth,' having understood through higher knowledge
earth as èarth,' he does not imagine earth to be èarth,' he
does not imagine òn the earth,' he does not imagine `from
the earth,' he does not imagine èarth is mine,' he does not
delight in earth.û
The Tathàgata, who has a higher knowledge of earth, as suggested

by the word abhijànàti, does not entertain imaginings by taking
earth at its face value. He is not carried away by the grammatical
structure to imagine in such terms as òn the earth' and `from the
earth.'
In the present context, too, the same distinction in grades of
knowledge is evident. Firstly, the Tathàgata says: ßAll that do I
know, that have I fully understood. All that is known to the
Tathàgata.û It is precisely because of this full understanding that
he has not taken his stand upon it. He has no stance in regard to all
that. This is the gist of the first paragraph of the discourse, which
sounds more or less a paradox. It is because of this apparently
queer state of affairs that the Tathàgata had to confess that it
would be a falsehood on his part to say: ßAll that I do not know.û
If someone asks whether it is because he does not know that he
takes no stance, he cannot say: ßYes.û As a matter of fact, it is
precisely because he has understood that he takes no stance. But
the worldlings are of the opinion that knowledge of a thing entitles
one to assert it dogmatically.
To say ßI both know it and know it notû or ßI neither know it
nor am ignorant of itû would also be mistaken by the world as a
prevarication or equivocation. The first paragraph of the discourse
has to be understood in this light.
The commentary has it that the earth shook at five points in the
discourse. According to it the three significant terms jànàmi,
abbha¤¤àsiü and viditaü, ßI know,û ßI have fully understood,û all
that is ßknownû to the Tathàgata represent a plane of omniscience,
sabba¤¤utabhåmi, peculiar to a Buddha.26 Even at the end of this
proclamation of omniscience, it is said the earth shook as a mark
of approbation.
Then the phrase na upaññhàsi, ßdoes not take his stand upon it,û
is interpreted by the commentary as indicating the plane of the
influx-free one, khãõàsavabhåmi. Why the Tathàgata has no
26 Mp III 38.
stance in regard to sensory data is said to be due to his freedom

from influxes. He does not grasp them by way of craving, conceit
and views. He does not take his stand upon things seen, heard,
sensed and cognized. He has no inclination or clinging towards
them.
Nibbàna Sermon 25



This is the twenty-fifth sermon in the series of sermons on
Nibbàna. The other day we made an attempt to understand, in the
light of the Kàëakàràmasutta, the enlightened attitude of the
Tathàgata, who has realized the cessation of the six bases of
sense-contact, towards the view-points of the worldlings, who find
themselves confined within those six bases.
In that discourse, the Buddha declared with the words tam ahaü
jànàmi, ß[all] that do I know,û2 the fact that he has understood all
what the world with its gods, Màras and Brahmas, and the
progeny consisting of recluses and Brahmins, gods and men, have
seen, heard, sensed, cognized, thought after and pondered over by
the mind.
2 A II 25, Kàëakàràmasutta.
649
By his next assertion tam ahaü abbha¤¤àsiü, the Buddha pro-

claimed that he not only knows all that, but knows it thoroughly in
some special way. With the words taü tathàgatassa viditaü, he
declares that by virtue of this special knowledge he has understood
all what the world claims to know. Despite this special knowledge
and understanding, the Tathàgata takes no stance and has no
inclination or partiality towards those sensory data, as is evident
from the expression taü tathàgato na upaññhàsi.
Worldings in general are in the habit of asserting dogmatically
Ì know, I see, it is verily so,' jànàmi passàmi tath' eva etaü,3
when they have a special knowledge or understanding of some-
thing or other. But according to this discourse, it seems that the
Buddha takes no stance and has no inclination or partiality towards
those sensory data, precisely because he has a special knowledge
and understanding with regard to them. This fact is highlighted by
the concluding summary verses, particularly by the lines:
Jànàmi passàmi tath' eva etaü,

ajjhositaü n' atthi tathàgatànaü.
ßI know, I see, 'tis verily so.

In order to explain this strange difference of attitude, we quoted

the other day two significant terms from the Målapariyàyasutta of
the Majjhima Nikàya, namely sa¤jànàti and abhijànàti. They
represent two levels of knowledge in the context of that particular
discourse.
Sa¤jànàti stands for perceptual knowledge, whereas abhijànàti
conveys the idea of some special understanding of a higher order.
The level of knowledge implied by the term sa¤jànàti is that
which characterizes the ordinary worldling's world view. He is
deluded by the mirage-like perception in his view of the world and
goes on imagining, ma¤¤anà, a real world enslaved to the patterns

of the grammatical structure.
But the Tathàgata has penetrated into the true nature of those
seens, heards, sensed and the like, with his extraordinary level of
higher knowledge, abhi¤¤à, yielding full comprehension. There-
fore, he does not take his stand upon any of them. He has no
stance to justify the usage of the term upaññhàsi, since he does not
entertain imaginings, ma¤¤anà.
What is called ma¤¤anà is the imagining in egoistic terms,
imparting reality to illusory things. It is this principle of refraining
from vain imaginings that is indicated by the term na upaññhàsi,
ßdoes not take his stand upon.û
Tathàgatas have no clinging or entanglement, ajjhositaü, pre-
cisely because they entertain no imaginings. In regard to things
seen, heard, etc. the Tathàgatas have no clinging, binding or
entanglement by way of craving, conceit and views, respectively.
We happened to mention the other day that those peculiar decla-
rations, with which the Kàëakàràmasutta opens, bear some
resemblance to the tetralemma discussed in our treatment of the
undetermined points.4
The set of four alternative propositions concerning the Tathàga-
ta's after death state may be cited as a paradigm for the tetralem-
ma:
1) Hoti tathàgato paraü maraõà, ßThe Tathàgata exists

after death.û
2) na hoti tathàgato paraü maraõà, ßThe Tathàgata does
not exist after death.û
3) hoti ca na ca hoti tathàgato paraü maraõà, ßThe
Tathàgata both exists and does not exist after death.û
4 See esp. sermon 20.

4) n'eva hoti na na hoti tathàgato paraü maraõà, ßThe

Tathàgata neither exists nor does not exist after death.û5
The declarations found in this discourse bear some affinity to the

above-mentioned tetralemma. However, we find here the Buddha
making the first declaration in several stages. Firstly, he makes the
statement that whatever is seen, heard, sensed, and cognized,
thought after and pondered over by all beings in the world, that he
knows.
In the second statement he affirms that he has a higher
knowledge of all that. Then comes a sentence which reaffirms that
the Tathàgata has understood, but ends with the statement ßthe
Tathàgata does not take his stand upon it.û
Generally, when confronted with the tetralemma, the Buddha
summarily dismisses all the four alternative propositions. But here
the peculiarity is in not dismissing the first proposition at once. He
declares that he knows, that he has a higher knowledge, and that
he has understood all that.
Apparently he is affirming the first proposition, granting the
validity of sensory data. But then comes the concluding statement
to the effect that he does not take his stand upon them, na
upaññhàsi, which amounts to a negation.
The secret behind this peculiar presentation will emerge when
we bring up the proper similes and parables. Till then, what can be
gleaned from the context is that the Tathàgata has no stance, not
because he is ignorant, but due to the very fact that he knows full
well and has understood the nature of the sum total of sensory
data.
The worldlings are prone to think that it is when convincing
knowledge is lacking that one has no such stance. But the Buddha
declares here that he takes no stance in regard to what is seen,
heard, sensed etc., precisely because he has a special understand-
ing, a penetrative knowledge of the essence-lessness of the data
obtained through the six sense-bases.

So it seems, in this context too, we have the negation of the first

alternative, as is usual in the case of a tetralemma, only that the
negation is expressed here in a very peculiar way. Let us now take
up the second declaration:

pariyesitaü anuvicaritaü manasà, tam ahaü `na
jànàmã'ti vadeyyaü, taü mama assa musà.
ßIf I were to say, monks, whatsoever in the world, with its

gods, Màras and Brahmas, among the progeny consisting
of recluses and Brahmins, gods and men, whatsoever is
seen, heard, sensed, and cognized, thought after and pon-
dered over by the mind, all that I do not know, it would be
a falsehood in me.û
There is a difference of opinion as to the correct reading of this

second declaration. Deep suttas often present difficulties in
determining the exact reading, and this is especially the case with
the Kàëakàràmasutta.
In this instance, the commentary has followed the reading tam
ahaü `jànàmã'ti vadeyyaü, taü mama assa musà, ßif I were to say
`that I know,' it would be a falsehood in me.û But as we have
pointed out earlier, this reading is not meaningful.6 That is proba-
bly why the Chaññhasaïgãtipiñaka edition has followed the variant
reading tam ahaü `na jànàmã'ti vadeyyaü, ßif I were to say `that I
do not know.'û This departure from the commentarial tradition
seems justifiable, since the Buddha has already declared that he
knows all that.
It stands to reason, therefore, that in the second declaration he
makes it clear that to say Ì do not know' would be a contradiction,
a falsehood. But why this clarification?
6 See sermon 24.

Generally the worldlings expect one to unequivocally assert and

take one's stand upon one's viewpoint in categorical terms, as
expressed by the dictum idam eva saccaü, mogham a¤¤aü, ßthis
alone is true, all else is false.û7 Failure to do so is recognized as a
lack of knowledge or precision. The second declaration is meant to
forestall such an objection, since the first declaration ends with the
clause taü tathàgato na upaññhàsi, ßbut the Tathàgata has not
taken his stand upon it.û So it amounts to a statement like ìt is not
because I do not know that I take no stance.' In the same strain, we
can explain the declarations that follow.
It seems, then, that the second declaration tam ahaü `na
jànàmã'ti vadeyyaü, taü mama assa musà, ßif I were to say, àll
that I do not know,' it would be a falsehood in me,û amounts to the
second alternative of the tetralemma.
The next declaration follows the same trend. To quote the rele-
vant portion, tam ahaü `jànàmi ca na ca jànàmã'ti vadeyyaü, taü
p' assa tàdisam eva, ßif I were to say Ì both know it and do not
know it,' that too would be a falsehood in me.û
In regard to the aforesaid seens, heards, sensed etc., if I were to
say that I know, I do not know, or even a combination of both
those statements as Ì both know and do not know,' it would be a
falsehood on my part. Why? Because the world is accustomed to
put down such a vacillation to a lack of certitude. To say Ì both
know it and know it not' looks like a confession of partial
knowledge, since it can mean knowledge and ignorance going
fifty-fifty. So the Buddha says, in this instance, too, that it would
likewise be a falsehood, taü p' assa tàdisam eva.
Now we come to the fourth statement. The Buddha declares, ßif
I were to say Ì neither know it, nor am ignorant of it,' it would be
a fault in me,û tam ahaü `neva jànàmi na na jànàmã'ti vadeyyaü,
taü mama assa kali.
We can understand that position, too. Generally the worldlings
think that a refusal to make a categorical statement is either due to
partial knowledge, or to an attitude of wriggling out. In fact, this

attitude of wriggling out had already assumed the status of a

philosophy in itself in Sa¤jaya Belaññhiputta, a contemporary of
the Buddha.
When he was interrogated, he would respond with such a series
of negations like ßI do not say it is, I do not say it is thus, I do not
say it is otherwise, nor do I say it is neither,û etc.8 The attempt
here is to evade the issue by a sort of èel-wriggling.' That school
of philosophy, which resorted to such an evasive legerdemain,
came to be known as amarà-vikkhepa-vàda. The Buddha refuses
to subscribe to such tactical sophistry by rejecting the fourth
alternative Ì neither know it, nor am ignorant of it.'
Here, then, we have the same tetralemma, presented in a differ-
ent guise. It smacks of a riddle that the Buddha was confronted
with Ý the riddle of coming to terms with worldly parlance. As we
have already mentioned, the commentary analyses the main theme
of the discourse into five planes. It also records that the earth
shook at five points of the discourse, that is, at the end of the
proclamation for each plane.9
According to the commentary, the first plane is the plane of
omniscience, sabba¤¤utabhåmi. The phrases representative of that
plane are said to be tam ahaü jànàmi, ßthat I know,û tam aham
abbha¤¤àsiü, ßthat have I fully understood,û and taü tathàgatas-
sa viditaü, ßthat is known to the Tathàgata.û
Then comes the plane of the influx-free one, khãõàsavabhåmi,
represented by the section ending with the phrase na upaññhàsi,
ßdoes not take his stand upon it.û It is so called because that phrase
brings out the characteristic of not taking a stance by way of
cravings, conceits and views in the case of an influx-free one.
The three phrases taü mama assa musà, ßit would be a false-
hood on my part,û taü p' assa tàdisam eva, ßlikewise, that too
would be a falsehood in me,û and taü mama assa kali, ßit would
be a fault in me,û are interpreted by the commentary as represent-
8 D I 58, Sàma¤¤aphalasutta.
9 Mp III 38.
ing the third plane of truth, saccabhåmi. We have now dealt with
that, too.
What comes next as the fourth plane is the deepest of all. The
commentary calls it the plane of the void, su¤¤atàbhåmi. It is with
good reason that it is so called. The paragraph that follows is said
to represent that plane; it runs:
Iti kho, bhikkhave, tathàgato diññhà daññhabbaü diññhaü

na ma¤¤ati, adiññhaü na ma¤¤ati, daññhabbaü na
ma¤¤ati, daññhàraü na ma¤¤ati. Sutà sotabbaü sutaü na
ma¤¤ati, asutaü na ma¤¤ati, sotabbaü na ma¤¤ati,
sotàraü na ma¤¤ati. Mutà motabbaü mutaü na ma¤¤ati,
amutaü na ma¤¤ati, motabbaü na ma¤¤ati, motàraü na
ma¤¤ati. Vi¤¤àtà vi¤¤àtabbaü vi¤¤àtaü na ma¤¤ati,
avi¤¤àtaü na ma¤¤ati, vi¤¤àtabbaü na ma¤¤ati,
vi¤¤àtàraü na ma¤¤ati.
Here, too, we are confronted with the question of variant readings.

To begin with, here we have given the phrase diññhà daññhabbaü
diññhaü, whereas the commentary takes it as daññhà daññhabbaü
diññhaü. According to the commentary, daññhà is a hypothetical
variant of the absolutive form disvà, for it paraphrases `daññhà
daññhabban'ti disvà daññhabbaü,10 that is, ßdaññhà daññhabbaü
stands for disvà daññhabbaü.û So the whole sentence in question is
said to convey the sense ßhaving seen, he does not imagine a seen
worth seeing.û But the variant reading diññha is granted, though the
commentator prefers the reading daññha as it is suggestive of an
absolutive dçùñvà.
Taking the cue from this commentarial preference, the Burmese
Chaññhasaïgãti edition goes a step further in substituting sutvà,
mutvà and vi¤¤atvà rather arbitrarily to give an absolutive twist to
the three phrases that follow as sutvà sotabbaü sutaü, mutvà
motabbaü mutaü, and vi¤¤atvà vi¤¤àtabbaü vi¤¤àtaü. Probably
10 Mp III 39.
the editors thought that in this context the terms diññha, suta, muta
and vi¤¤àta could not be interpreted as they are.
But we may point out that, in keeping with the line of interpre-
tation we have followed so far, these three terms may be said to
stand for an extremely deep dimension of this discourse, dealing
with the void. The other day we simply gave a sketch of a possible
rendering.
The statement diññhà daññhabbaü diññhaü na ma¤¤ati has to be
interpreted as an assertion that the Tathàgata ßdoes not imagine a
sight worthwhile seeing as apart from the seen,û that there is
nothing substantial in the seen. So also the other statements, sutà
sotabbaü sutaü na ma¤¤ati, ßdoes not imagine a worthwhile
hearing apart from the heardû; mutà motabbaü mutaü na ma¤¤ati,
ßdoes not imagine a worthwhile sensing apart from the sensedû;
vi¤¤àtà vi¤¤àtabbaü vi¤¤àtaü na ma¤¤ati, ßdoes not imagine a
worthwhile cognition apart from the cognized.û
In case our interpretation still appears problematic, we may hark
back to the Bàhiyasutta we have already explained at length.11 The
philosophy behind the Buddha's exhortation to the ascetic Bàhiya
could be summed up in the words diññhe diññhamattaü bhavissati,
sute sutamattaü bhavissati, mute mutamattaü bhavissati, vi¤¤àte
vi¤¤àtamattaü bhavissati,12 ßIn the seen there will be just the
seen, in the heard there will be just the heard, in the sensed there
will be just the sensed, in the cognized there will be just the
cognized.û
What is meant is that one has to stop at just the seen, without
discursively imagining that there is some-`thing' seen, some-
`thing' substantial behind the seen. Similarly in regard to the
heard, one has to take it as just a heard, not some-`thing' heard.
In the case of the phrase diññhà daññhabbaü diññhaü na ma¤¤ati,
the word diññhà, being in the ablative case, we may render it as
ßdoes not imagine a sight worthwhile seeing às apart from' the
11 See sermon 15.

seen.û By way of further clarification of this point, we may revert

to the simile of the dog on the plank, which we gave in our
explanation of nàma-råpa.13 The simile, of course, is not canoni-
cal, but of fable origin.
When a dog, while crossing a stream, stops halfway on the
plank and starts wagging its tail and peeping curiously down, the
reason is the sight of its own image in the water. It imagines a dog
there, a `water-dog.' The dog thinks that there is something
worthwhile seeing, apart from the seen.
It is unaware of the fact that it is seeing what it sees because it is
looking. It thinks that it is looking because there is something out
there to be seen. The moment it realizes that it is seeing because it
is looking, it will stop looking at its own image in the water.
We have here a very subtle point in the law of dependent aris-
ing, one that is integral to the analysis of name-and-form. So, then,
due to the very ignorance of the fact that it is seeing because it is
looking, the dog imagines another dog, there, in the water. What is
called ma¤¤anà is an imagining of that sort.
No such imagining is there in the Tathàgata, diññhà daññhabbaü
diññhaü na ma¤¤ati, ßhe does not imagine a sight worth seeing as
apart from the seen.û In short, for him the seen is the be all and the
end all of it.
The seen is dependently arisen. It comes about due to a colloca-
tion of conditions, apart from which it has no existence per se.
Every instance of looking down at the water is a fresh experience
and every time an image of the dog in the water and of another
looking at it is created. The dog is seeing its own image. Every-
thing is dependently arisen, phassapaccayà, says the Brah-
majàlasutta, ßdependent on contact.û14
Here there is something really deep. It is because of the person-
ality-view, sakkàyadiññhi, that the world is carried away by this
illusion. One goes on looking saying that one is doing so as there
13 See sermon 6.
is something to be seen. But the seen is there because of the

looking.
This, then, is the moral behind the statement diññhà daññhabbaü
diññhaü na ma¤¤ati, ßdoes not imagine a seen worthwhile seeing
as apart from the seen itself.û This is the dictum implicit in the
Bàhiyasutta, too, which could be illustrated by the simile of the
dog on the plank. The Tathàgata does not imagine a sight as
existing apart from the bare act of seeing.
If further illustrations are needed, let us take the case of hearing
music from a distance. One imagines a thing called `music' and
with the idea of listening to the same music goes to the place
where the music is going on. One is not aware of the fact that at
each step in that direction one is hearing a different music. Why?
Because one is ignorant of the law of dependent arising. Just as in
the former case the dog seen is dependent on the dog looking, here
too, the auditory consciousness of a music is the outcome of a
dependence between ear and sound.
So, deluded as he is, he goes to the music hall to listen better to
the same music. He will realize the extent of his delusion if he
happens to put his ear to the musical instrument. When he does so,
he will hear not a music, but a set of crude vibrations. But this is
what is going on in the world. The world is steeped in the delusion
of imagining that it is the same music one is hearing, though at
each step in that direction the music changes. This is due to the
fact that it is dependently arisen. Actually, there is no person
hearing, but only a state of affairs dependent on the ear and sound,
a conditioned arising dependent on contact. In the present textual
context, the terms diññha, suta, muta and vi¤¤àta, seen, heard,
sensed and cognized, have to be understood in this light.
So this is how the phrase diññhà daññhabbaü diññhaü na ma¤¤ati
has to be interpreted. But the commentary does not seem to have
appreciated the relevance of this paragraph to the Buddha's
teachings on voidness. While commenting on diññhaü na ma¤¤ati
it expatiates àhaü mahàjanena diññhameva passàmã'ti
taõhàmànadiññhãhi na ma¤¤ati. According to it, what is meant is
that the Tathàgata does not imagine by way of cravings, conceits
and views that he is seeing just what the common people have
seen. This is an oversimplification, a rather shallow interpretation.
The next phrase, adiññhaü na ma¤¤ati, is similarly explained,

àdiññhaü na ma¤¤atã'ti àhaü mahàjanena adiññhameva etaü
passàmã'ti evampi taõhàdihi ma¤¤anàhi na ma¤¤ati, ßhe does not
imagine an unseenû means that the Tathàgata does not imagine by
way of imaginings through craving etc. that he is seeing something
unseen by the common people. The commentary, it seems, has
gone at a tangent, bypassing the deeper sense.
We have already explained the deeper significance of the
phrase, diññhaü na ma¤¤ati, ßdoes not imagine a seen.û Now what
does adiññhaü na ma¤¤ati mean?
In terms of our simile of the dog on the plank, diññhaü na
ma¤¤ati means that the Tathàgata does not imagine a dog in the
water. Adiññhaü na ma¤¤ati could therefore mean that the
Tathàgata does not imagine that the dog has not seen. Why he
does not treat it as an unseen should be clear from that declaration
we had already cited, ending with tam ahaü `na jànàmã'ti va-
deyyaü, taü mama assa musà, ßif I were to say `that I do not
know,' it would be a falsehood in me.û
The fact of seeing is not denied, though what is seen is not
taken as a dog, but only as an image of one, that is dependently
arisen. Since the understanding of it as a dependently arisen
phenomenon is there, the Tathàgata does not imagine an unseen
either, adiññhaü na ma¤¤ati.
The phrase daññhabbaü na ma¤¤ati, is also explicable in the
light of the foregoing discussion. Now, the dog on the plank keeps
on looking down at the water again and again because it thinks
that there is something worthwhile seeing in the water. Such a
delusion is not there in the Tathàgata. He knows that at each turn
it is a phenomenon of a seen dependently arisen, dependent on
contact, phassapaccayà.
Every time it happens, it is a fresh sight, a new preparation,
saïkhàra. So there is nothing to look for in it. Only a looking is
there, nothing worth looking at. Only a seeing is there, nothing to
be seen. Apart from the bare act of hearing, there is nothing to be
heard. It is the wrong view of a self that gives a notion of substan-
tiality. The above phrase, therefore, is suggestive of insubstantiali-
ty, essencelessness, and voidness.
Music is just a word. By taking seriously the concept behind

that word, one imagines a thing called `music.' The pandemonium
created by a number of musical instruments is subsumed under the
word `music.' Then one goes all the way to listen to it. The same
state of affairs prevails in the case of the seen. It is because the
Tathàgata has understood this fact that he does not imagine a thing
worth seeing or hearing. The same applies to the other sensory
data.
Then comes the phrase daññhàraü na ma¤¤ati, ßdoes not imag-
ine a seer.û Here we have the direct expression of voidness Ý the
voidness of a self or anything belonging to a self. Now that dog on
the plank has not understood the fact that there is a mutual
relationship between the looking dog and the seen dog. It is
because of the looking dog that the seen dog is seen. There is a
conditioned relationship between the two.
In other words, dependent on eye and forms arises eye-
consciousness, cakkhu¤ca pañicca råpe ca uppajjati cakkhu-
vi¤¤àõaü.15 The mere presence of the eye is not enough for eye
consciousness to arise, but dependent on eye and forms, arises
eye-consciousness.
Though stated simply, it has a depth that is not easy to fathom.
To say that it is dependent on eye and form is to admit that it is
dependently arisen. The law of dependent arising is already
implicated. There is therefore no seer, apart from the phenomenon
of seeing, according to the Tathàgata. He does not imagine a seer,
daññhàraü na ma¤¤ati. For the worldling, the bare act of seeing
carries with it a perception of òne who sees.' He has a notion of a
self and something belonging to a self.
The same teaching is found in the Bàhiyasutta. After instructing
Bàhiya to stop at just the seen, the heard, the sensed and the
cognized, the Buddha goes on to outline the end result of that
training:
15 E.g. M I 111, Madhupiõóikasutta.


tena. Yato tvaü Bàhiya na tena, tato tvaü Bàhiya na tat-
tha. Yato tvaü Bàhiya na tattha, tato tvaü Bàhiya nev'
idha na huraü na ubhayamantarena. Es' ev' anto duk-
khassa.16
ßAnd when to you, Bàhiya, there will be in the seen just

the seen, in the heard just the heard, in the sensed just the
sensed, in the cognized just the cognized, then, Bàhiya,
you are not by it. And when, Bàhiya, you are not by it,
then, Bàhiya, you are not in it. And when, Bàhiya, you are
not in it, then, Bàhiya, you are neither here nor there nor in
between. This, itself, is the end of suffering.û
That is to say, when, Bàhiya, you have gone through that training
of stopping at just the seen, the heard, the sensed and the cognized,
then you would not be imagining in terms of them. The algebraic-
like expressions na tena and na tattha have to be understood as
forms of egoistic imagining, ma¤¤anà.
When you do not imagine in terms of them, you would not be in
them. There would be no involvement in regard to them. In the
case of that music, for instance, you would not be in the orchestra.
The egoistic imagining, implicating involvement with the music,
presupposes a hearer, sotaraü, dwelling in the orchestra.
ßWhen, Bàhiya, you do not dwell in it,û yato tvaü Bàhiya na
tattha, ßthen, Bàhiya, you are neither here, nor there, nor in
between the two,û tato tvaü Bàhiya nev' idha na huraü na
ubhayamantarena. This itself is the end of suffering. In other
words, you would have realized voidness, su¤¤atà.
The expressions daññhàraü na ma¤¤ati, ßdoes not imagine a seerû;
sotàraü na ma¤¤ati, ßdoes not imagine a hearerû; motàraü na
ma¤¤ati, ßdoes not imagine a sensorû; and vi¤¤àtàraü na ma¤¤ati,
ßdoes not imagine a knower,û have to be understood in this light.

The Tathàgata does not even imagine a thinker apart from
thought. This is the plane of the void, su¤¤atàbhåmi, the perfect
realization of the corelessness or essencelessness of the seen, the
heard, the sensed and the cognized.
The very absence of ma¤¤anà, or ßegoistic imagining,û is to be
understood by su¤¤atàbhåmi, or ßthe plane of the void.û The
worldling takes seriously the subject-object relationship in the
grammatical structure, as it seems the simplest explanation of
phenomena. Because there is something to be seen, there is
someone who sees. Because there is someone who sees, there is
something to be seen.
There is a duality between these two. To understand the law of
dependent arising is to be free from this duality. It is the ability to
see a concatenation of conditions, a conglomeration of causal
factors Ý an assemblage instead of a bifurcation.
The way of the worldlings, however, is to follow the subject-
object relationship, a naive acceptance of the grammatical struc-
ture, which is the easiest mode of communication of ideas. They
are misled by it to take seriously such notions as òne who sees'
and a `thing seen,' òne who hears' and a `thing heard,' but the
Tathàgata is free from that delusion. Now we come to the fifth
section of the discourse, known as tàdibhåmi, the ßplane of the
such.û It runs:
Iti kho, bhikkhave, tathàgato diññha-suta-muta-

vi¤¤àtabbesu dhammesu tàdã yeva tàdã, tamhà ca pana
tàdimhà a¤¤o tàdã uttaritaro và paõãtataro và n' atthã'ti
vadàmi.
ßThus, monks, the Tathàgata, being such in regard to all

phenomena, seen, heard, sensed and cognized, is such.
Moreover than he who is such there is none other higher
or more excellent, I declare.û
The most difficult word, here, is tàdã. We have already explained

it to some extent. It can be rendered by ßsuchû or ßthus.û The
commentary explains it by the phrase tàdità nàma ekasadisatà,17

ßsuchness means to be always alike.û
By way of illustration, the commentary states Tathàgato ca
yàdiso làbhàdãsu, tàdisova alàbhàdãsu, ßas he is in regard to gain,
etc., so is the Tathàgata in regard to loss, etc.û The allusion here is
to the eight worldly vicissitudes, gain/loss, fame/ill-fame,
praise/blame, and pleasure/pain.18
But this explanation is rather misleading, as it ignores a certain
deep dimension of the meaning of the term tàdã. When it is said
ßas he is in regard to gain, so is he in regard to loss,û one can ask:
`How is he in regard to gain?' This is imprecise as a meaning.
However, the commentator happens to quote from the
Mahàniddesa another explanation, which is more to the point. It is
briefly stated as iññhàniññhe tàdã, ßsuch in regard to the desirable
and the undesirableû; and explained as làbhepi tàdã, alàbhepi tàdã,
yasepi tàdã,19 ayasepi tàdã, nindàyapi tàdã, pasaüsàyapi tàdã,
sukhepi tàdã, dukkhepi tàdã, ßhe is such in gain as well as in loss,
he is such in fame as well as in ill-fame . . .û etc. That is the
correct explanation. Instead of saying ßas he is in gain, so is he in
loss,û we have here a continuous suchness in regard to all vicissi-
tudes. He is such in gain as well as in loss, he is such in fame as
well as in ill-fame, he is such in praise as well as in blame, he is
such in pleasure as well as in pain.
The reason for this suchness we have explained on an earlier
occasion.20 In one sense, the term tàdã stands for the understanding
of the norm called tathatà. The other implication is the abstinence
from the tendency towards identification or acquisition, meant by
tammayatà. This exemplary trait is called atammayatà. This is an
extremely important term, occurring in the discourses, which,
however, has fallen into neglect at present.
17 Mp III 40.
18 A IV 157, Pañhamalokadhammasutta.
19 Nid II 459.
20 See sermon 21.
In the case of music, for instance, tammayatà would imply an

attachment to it that amounts to an identification with it. Tammayo
means ßmade of that,û as in suvaõõamaya, ßmade of gold,û and
rajatamaya, ßmade of silver.û To be free from this tammayatà, is
to be tàdã, ßsuch,û that is to say, not to be of that stuff, atamma-
yatà. The attitude of not leaning on or grasping is meant by it.
The quality of being tàdã, or ßsuch,û is often rendered by ßfirm-
ness,û ßsteadfastness,û and ßimmovability.û Generally, one
associates firmness, immovability or stability with holding on or
leaning on. But here we have just the contrary. Not to hold on to
anything, is to be `such.' This suchness has a flexibility of a higher
order, or an adaptability. The adaptability characteristic of the sage
who lives on piõóapàta, or alms-food, is highlighted in the
following verse:
Alatthaü yadidaü sàdhu,

nàlatthaü kusalàm iti,
ubhayeneva so tàdã,
rukkhaü va upanivattati.21
ßSuppose I got it, well and good,

Suppose I didn't get, that's fine too,
In both circumstances he is such,
And comes back [like one who walks up to a] tree.û
This kind of adaptability and resilience is also implied by the term

tàdã. Though the term is sometimes rendered by the word ßstead-
fast,û it does not stand for any rigidity. Instead, it carries implica-
tions of a non-rigid resilience.
This is a wonderful quality in Tathàgatas and arahants. We
may compare it to a revolving swing in a children's playground.
One who is seated in a revolving swing has nothing to get upset
about falling headlong when the swing goes up. The seats are hung
in such a way that they also turn with the revolving motion of the
21 Sn 712, Nàlakasutta.
swing. Had they been rigidly fixed, one seated there would fall off
the seat when it goes up. It is that kind of resilience that is charac-
teristic of the quality of tàdità, or ßsuchness.û This is how we have
to understand the famous lines in the Mahàmaïgalasutta:
Phuññhassa lokadhammehi,
cittam yassa na kampati,22
ßWhose mind remains unshaken,

When touched by worldly vicissitudes.û
This quality of being unshaken, this immovability, is the result of

not grasping. It comes when there is no tenacious clinging. It is to
one who rests on or leans on something that there is dislodgement
or instability.
Now I am leaning on the wall, if someone does damage to the
wall, I would get shaken.That is what is suggested by the axiom
nissitassa calitaü, anissitassa calitaü n'atthi, ßto one who is
attached, there is dislodgement, to the one detached, there is no
dislodgement.û23 The worldling, on the other hand, thinks that to
lean on or to rely on something is the mark of stability.
So it seems that the term tàdã has an extraordinary dimension of
meaning. In this particular context, however, the suchness spoken
of does not concern the eight worldly vicissitudes like gain and
loss. Here it carries a special nuance as is evident from the
statement:
Iti kho, bhikkhave, tathàgato diññha-suta-muta-vi¤¤àtabbesu
dhammesu tàdã yeva tàdã. ßThus, monks, the Tathàgata, being
such in regard to all phenomena, seen, heard, sensed and cognized,
is such.û
The suchness here meant is about the views adhered to by the
worldlings. In regard to things seen, heard, sensed and cognized,
22 Sn 268, Mahàmaïgalasutta.
23 Ud 81, Catutthanibbànapañisaüyuttasutta.
the worldlings go on asserting dogmatically idam eva saccaü,

mogham a¤¤aü, ßthis alone is true, all else is false.û But the
Tathàgata has no such dogmatic involvement. He only analytically
exposes them for what they are.
As we tried to illustrate by the simile of the dog on the plank,
the Tathàgata simply penetrates into their dependently arisen
nature and declares that all those views are dependent on contact,
phassapaccayà. That is the tàdã quality meant here. If we are to
understand the plane of suchness, tàdãbhåmi, in a deeper sense,
this is how we have to appreciate its significance. Now we come to
the couplet forming the grand finale to the Kàëakàràmasutta:
Yaü ki¤ci diññhaü va sutaü mutaü và,

ajjhositaü saccamutaü paresaü,
na tesu tàdã sayasaüvutesu,
saccaü musà và pi paraü daheyyaü.
Eta¤ca sallaü pañigacca disvà,

ajjhosità yattha pajà visattà,
jànàmi passàmi tath' eva etaü,
In the first verse, we have the difficult term sayasaüvutesu, which

we rendered by ßamidst those who are entrenched in their own
views.û The term carries insinuations of philosophical inbreeding,
which often accounts for dogmatic adherence to views. The
Tathàgata declares that he does not hold as true or false any of the
concepts of individual truths based on what is seen, heard, sensed
and cognized by others, because of his suchness. Being such, he
does not categorically label any of those views as true or false. He
penetrates into and analyses the psychological background of all
those dogmatic views and understands them as such.
In the final verse, he declares that he has seen well in advance
ßthe barb on which mankind is hooked impaled.û The barb is none
other than the dogmatic assertion, Ì know, I see, it is verily so.'
Having seen this barb, well in advance, the Tathàgata entertains
no dogmatic involvement of that sort.
The precise meaning of some words and phrases here is a matter

of controversy. A discussion of them might throw more light on
their deeper nuances. The most difficult term seems to be
sayasaüvuta. The commentary gives the following explanation:
`Sayasaüvutesu'ti `sayameva saüvaritvà piyàyitvà gahitaga-
haõesu diññhigatikeså'ti attho. Diññhigatikà hi `sayaü saüvutà'ti
vuccanti.24 ßSayasaüvutesu means among those dogmatic view-
holders, who have grasped those views, having recollected them
and cherished them. Dogmatic view-holders are called sayasaüvu-
ta.û
According to the commentary, the term sayasaüvuta refers to
persons who hold dogmatic views. But we interpreted it as a
reference to such views themselves.
By way of clarification, we may allude to some discourses in
the Aññhakavagga of the Sutta Nipàta, which bring up a wealth of
material to substantiate the salient points in the Kàëakàràmasutta,
while throwing more light on the particular term in question. The
chapter called Aññhakavagga in the Sutta Nipàta in particular
embodies a deep analysis of the controversies among contempo-
rary dogmatists.
Let us, first of all, take up for comment some verses that throw
more light on the meaning of the term sayasaüvuta from the
Cåëaviyåhasutta. That discourse unfolds itself in the form of
question and answer. The commentary explains, that this medium
of dialogue was adopted by the Buddha to resolve the clash of
philosophical moot points current in the society, and that the
interlocutor is a replica of the Buddha himself, created by his
psychic power.25 Be that as it may, the relevant question for the
present context is presented as follows:
Kasmà nu saccàni vadanti nànà,

pavàdiyàse kusalà vadànà,
24 Mp III 41.
25 Pj II 554
saccàni su tàni bahåni nànà,

udàhu te takkam anussaranti.26
ßWhy do they proclaim various truths,

Claiming to be experts each in his field,
Are there several and various truths,
Or do they merely follow logical consistency?û
The Buddha's reply to it is as follows.
Na h'eva saccàni bahåni nànà,

a¤¤atra sa¤¤àya niccàni loke,
takka¤ ca diññhãsu pakappayitvà,
`saccaü musà'ti dvayadhammam àhu.
ßThere are no several and various truths,

That are permanent in the world, apart from perception,
It is by manipulating logic in speculative views,
That they speak of two things called `truth and false-
hood.'û
There is no plurality in the concept of truth, apart from the

perception based on which they declare various speculative views.
It seems that the Buddha grants the possibility of various levels of
perception as a truth for all times, though he does not accept a
plurality of truths, arising out of a variety of speculative views
based on them.
He understands the psychology of logic, having seen penetra-
tively the perceptual background of each and every view. He
accepts as a psychological fact that such and such a perception
could precipitate such and such a view. Therefore, in a limited or
relative sense, they are `true.'
The dichotomy between truth and falsehood has arisen in the
world due to a manipulation of logic on individual viewpoints.
26 Sn 885, CåëaViyåhasutta.
This fact comes up for further comment in the Mahàviyåhasutta

that follows:
Sakaü hi dhammaü paripuõõam àhu,

a¤¤asssa dhammaü pana hãnaü àhu,
evam pi viggayha vivàdiyanti,
sakaü sakaü sammutim àhu sacaü.27
This verse describes how debating parties go on clashing with

each other. They call their own system of thought perfect, and the
other system of thought inferior. Thus they quarrel and dispute.
Their own individual viewpoint they assert as true. The phrase
sakaü sakaü sammutim, ßeach his own viewpoint,û is somewhat
suggestive of sayasaüvutesu, the problematic term in the
Kàëakàràmasutta.
Yet another verse from the Pasårasutta in the Aññhakavagga
exposes the biases and prejudices underlying these individual
truths:
Ìdh' eva suddhi' iti vàdiyanti,

nà¤¤esu dhammesu visuddhim àhu,
yaü nissità tattha subhaü vadànà,
paccekasaccesu puthå niviññhà.28
ß`Here in this system is purity,' they assert polemically,

They are not prepared to grant purity in other systems of
thought,
Whatever view they lean on, that they speak in praise
of,
They are severally entrenched in their own individual
truths.û
28 Sn 824, Pasårasutta.
The last line is particularly relevant, as it brings up the concept of

paccekasacca. To be a Paccekabuddha means to be enlightened
for oneself. So the term paccekasacca can mean ßtruth for one-
self.û Those who hold conflicting views go on debating entrenched
each in his own concept of truth.
The three expressions pacekasacca, sakaü sakaü sammutim
and sayasaüvutesu convey more or less the same idea. The words
tesu sayasaüvutesu refer to those narrow viewpoints to which they
are individually confined, or remain closeted in. The Tathàgata
does not hold as true or false any of those views limited by the
self-bias.
Another lapse in the commentary to the Kàëakàràmasutta is its
comment on the phrase paraü daheyyaü. It takes the word paraü
in the sense of ßsupreme,û uttamaü katvà, whereas in this context
it means ßthe other.û Here, too, we may count on the following
two lines of the Cåëaviyåhasutta of the Sutta Nipàta in support of
our interpretation:
Yen' eva `bàlo'ti paraü dahàti,

tenàtumànaü `kusalo'ti càha.29
ßThat by which one dubs the other a fool,

By that itself one calls oneself an expert.û
From this it is clear that the phrase paraü dahàti means ßdubs
another.û The last two lines of the Kàëakàràmasutta are of utmost
importance:
Jànàmi passàmi tath' eva etaü,

ßI know I see, it is verily so,

29 Sn 888, CåëaViyåhasutta.
Worldlings dogmatically grasp the data heaped up by their six

sense-bases, but the Tathàgatas have no such entanglements in
regard to sensory knowledge. Why so? It is because they have
seen the cessation of the six sense-bases.
By way of illustration, we may compare this seeing of the ces-
sation of the six sense-bases to an exposure of the inner mecha-
nism of a high-speed engine by removing the bonnet. In the
Dvayamsutta, from which we quoted in our last sermon, the
Buddha showed us the functioning of the gigantic machine called
the six-fold sense-base, its vibrations, revolutions, beats and
running gears. The discourse analyses the mechanism in such
words as:
Cakkhu aniccaü vipariõàmi a¤¤athàbhàvi. Råpà aniccà

vipariõàmino a¤¤athàbhàvino. Itthetaü dvayaü ca-
la¤ceva vyaya¤ca aniccaü vipariõàmi a¤¤athàbhàvi.30
ßEye is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise.

Forms are impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise.
Thus this dyad is unstable, evanescent, impermanent,
changing, becoming otherwise.û
The discourse proceeds in this vein and concludes with the words:
Phuññho, bhikkhave, vedeti, phuññho ceteti, phuññho

sa¤jànàti. Itthete pi dhammà calà ceva vayà ca aniccà
vipariõàmino a¤¤athàbhàvino.
ßContacted, monks, one feels, contacted one intends, con-

tacted one perceives. Thus these things, too, are unstable,
evanescent, impermanent, changing and becoming other-
wise.û
30 S IV 67, Dutiyadvayamsutta.
The concluding reference is to the products of the six sense-bases.

Feelings, intentions and perceptions, arising due to contact, are
also unstable, evanescent, impermanent, changing and becoming
otherwise.
The sum total of percepts is indicated by the words diññha, suta,
muta and vi¤¤àta. The totality of percepts are made up or `pre-
pared,' saïkhata. The term saïkhata has nuances suggestive of
`production.' If we take the six-fold sense-base as a high-speed
machine, productive of perceptions, the Buddha has revealed to us
the workings of its intricate machinery. Each and every part of this
machine is unstable, evanescent, impermanent, changing and
becoming otherwise.
The Buddha understood the made up or prepared nature,
saïkhata, of all these, as well as the preparations, saïkhàrà, that
go into it. That is why the Buddha has no dogmatic involvement in
regard to the products of this machine, the totality of all what is
seen, heard, sensed and cognized, diññha, suta, muta, vi¤¤àta.
None of them is substantial. They are essenceless and insubstan-
tial. There is nothing worthwhile grasping here as apart from the
activities or preparations that are dynamic in themselves.
So far we have tried to understand the state of affairs with refer-
ence to this discourse. But now let us take up a canonical simile
that facilitates our understanding. The Buddha has compared
consciousness to a magic show in the Pheõapiõóåpamasutta of the
Khandhasaüyutta we had already cited:31
Pheõapiõóåpamaü råpaü,
vedanà bubbuëåpamà,
marãcikåpamà sa¤¤à,
saïkhàrà kadalåpamà,
màyåpama¤ca vi¤¤àõaü,
dãpitàdiccabandhunà.
31 S III 142, Pheõapiõóåpamasutta, see sermon 11

ßForm is like a mass of foam,

And feeling but an airy bubble,
Perception is like a mirage,
And formations a banana trunk,
Consciousness is a magic show [a juggler's trick entire],
[All these similes] were made known by the kinsman of
the sun.û
As a matter of fact, the verse itself is a mnemonic summary of a

certain sermon delivered by the Buddha. According to it, the
Buddha, the kinsman of the sun, has compared form to a mass of
foam, feeling to a water bubble, perception to a mirage, prepara-
tions to a banana trunk, and consciousness to a magic show.
What is of relevance to us here is the comparison of conscious-
ness to a magic show. The simile of the magic show is presented
in that sutta in the following words:
Seyyathàpi, bhikkhave, màyàkàro và màyàkàrantevàsã và

càtummahàpathe màyaü vidaüseyya. Tam enaü cakkhumà
puriso passeyya nijjhàyeyya yoniso upaparikkheyya. Tassa
taü passato nijjhàyato yoniso upaparikkhato rittaka¤¤eva
khàyeyya tucchaka¤¤eva khàyeyya asàraka¤¤eva khàyeyya.
Ki¤hi siyà, bhikkhave, màyàya sàro?
Evam eva kho, bhikkhave, yaü ki¤ci vi¤¤àõaü atãtànàga-

tapaccuppannaü, ajjhattaü và bahiddhà và, oëàrikaü và
sukhumaü và, hãnaü và paõãtaü và, yaü dåre santike và,
taü bhikkhu passati nijjhàyati yoniso upaparikkhati. Tassa
taü passato nijjhàyato yoniso upaparikkhato rittaka¤¤eva
khàyati tucchaka¤¤eva khàyati asàraka¤¤eva khàyati. Ki¤hi
siyà, bhikkhave, vi¤¤àõe sàro?
ßSuppose, monks, a magician or a magician's apprentice

should hold a magic show at the four crossroads and a keen-
sighted man should see it, ponder over it and reflect on it
radically. Even as he sees it, ponders over it and reflects on it
radically, he would find it empty, he would find it hollow, he
would find it void of essence. What essence, monks, could

there be in a magic show?
ßEven so, monks, whatever consciousness Ý be it past, future

or present, in oneself or external, gross or subtle, inferior or
superior, far or near Ý a monk sees it, ponders over it and
reflects on it radically. And even as he sees it, ponders over it
and reflects on it radically, he would find it empty; he would
find it hollow; he would find it void of essence. What es-
sence monks, could there be in a consciousness? . . . û
Form is like a mass of foam

And feeling Ý but an airy bubble.
Perception is like a mirage
And formations a plantain tree.
Consciousness is a magic-show,
A juggler's trick entire,
All these similes were made known
By the 'Kinsman-of-the-Sun.û32
32 S.III.142. Cp. The central verse of the Diamond Sutra. (Bh. Isidatta)
Sadhu! Sadhu! Sadhu!
By the Same Author
Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought,
BPS1970
Samyutta Nikaya Ý An anthology, Part II, Wheel Series
No. 183/185, BPS 1972
Ideal Solitude Ý Wheel No. 188, BPS 1973
The Magic of the Mind, BPS 1974
Uttaritara Hudekalawa Ý Damsak No. 172/173 Ý BPS
1990
Towards Calm and Insight Ý Free Distribution 1991
Vidasun Upades (ßInsight Instructionû), Free Distribu-
tion 1996
Nivane Niveema (Nibbana Sermons Ý The Mind
Stilled), Free Distribution since 1997
From Topsy-turvydom to wisdom Ý volume 1 (Essays
written for ßbeyondthenet.netû), Free Distribution 1998
Pahan Kanuwa Dharma Deshana Ý (ßSermons given at
the forest hermitage of Pahan Kanuwaû), Vol.1 for free
distribution 1999
Seeing Through, Free Distribution 1999
Hitaka Mahima, Free Distribution 1999
Nivane Niveema Ý Library Edition Ý Part I, 2000
Hita thanima, 2000
Pahan Kanuwa Dharma Desana, Vol. 2
677
Towards a better world Ý Translation of Lowada San-

garawa, 2000
Pavatma ha navatama, 2001
Athi Hati Dakma, 2001
Pahan Kanuwa Dharma Deshana, Vol. III. 2002
Kaya Anuwa Giya Sihiya (ßMindfulness of the Bodyû),
2001
Divi Katare Sanda Andura, 2001
Pahan Kanuwa Dharma Deshana, Vol. I, 2003
Nibbana Ý The Mind Stilled Ý Vol. I, 2003
Abinikmana, 2003
Hitaka Mahima II, 2003
Nibbana and the Fire Simile, 2009
For more information about Ven. K. ¥àõananda's writings and

meditation methods as developed by Ven. ¥àõàràma and Ven.
¥àõananda visit us at:
www.nibbanam.com
Appendix
The Heretic Sage
A Dhamma-Interview
with Ven. Bhikkhu K.
Ñānananda
by Ven. Bhikkhu
Yogananda
Potgulgal Hermitage,
Devalegama, Sri Lanka 2009
How does a bhikkhu know the ford? Here a bhikkhu goes from time to
time to such bhikkhus who have learned much, who are well versed in the tra-
dition, who maintain the Dhamma, the Discipline, and the Codes, and he
enquires and asks questions of them thus: ‘How is this, venerable sir? What is
the meaning of this?’ These venerable ones reveal to him what has not been
revealed, clarify what is not clear, and remove his doubts about numerous
things that give rise to doubt. That is how a bhikkhu knows the ford.
–MAHĀGOPĀLAKA SUTTA (MN 33)
THE HERETIC SAGE (PART 1)

Bhante Ñāṇananda is not the monk I thought he would be.
He is much more. As I recall my first meeting with him in his
small cave kuti, the first word that crosses my mind is “inno-
cent”. For a senior monk who has been in the order for more
than 40 years, he is disarmingly simple, unpretentious and
friendly. Childlike even. But you would not get that impres-
sion from his classics Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist
Thought and The Magic of the Mind.
I was introduced to his writings by my friend Ven. Sumana,
an English monk. It was Bhante Ñāṇananda’s Nibbāna – The
Mind Stilled collection that I first read. Later I would go
through The Magic of the Mind, which I would find both
enchanting and baffling at the same time. It would take me
even longer to take up Concept and Reality. All of them would
leave a lasting impression on me, and define the way I inter-
pret the Dhamma. But not before completely misconceiving
what he was saying, engage in a lengthy correspondence with
him, and finally meet him only to learn that I was miserably
wrong on many things all that time. And it would be a meet-
ing I’ll always remember.
I was a staunch ‘Ñāṇavirist’ until that meeting, so for
me Nibbāna – The Mind Stilled was more or less a commen-
tary on Notes on Dhamma by Ven. Ñāṇavira Thera. Sure
enough there were some passages here and there that took
some effort to beat into submission, but language is a flexible
medium and the mind is infinitely creative. On the few occa-
sions when that problem could not be easily shrugged off, I

resorted to considering Bhante Ñāṇananda the scholar who
needed to bow in front of the experience of Ven. Ñāṇavira.
The first vassa in 2009 was a time when my understanding
of the Dhamma went through some changes. I noted those
thoughts down, and sent some of it to Bhante Ñāṇananda for
review. A particularly long letter that ran into more than 50
pages took two months for a reply. Bhante thought it would
take an equally long letter to explain the matters, which he
was not in a position to write: he had just returned from a
two-month stay in the hospital. Instead, he invited me to visit
him in his monastery and stay a few days. Which created a
few problems, because Ven. Katukurunde Ñāṇananda Thera
is an outcast.
His critical analysis of Buddhist texts and the unwillingness
to adhere to the commentarial tradition has made Bhante
Ñāṇananda a radical and a heretic. He probably knew what
he was getting into from the very beginning. In the introduc-
tion to Concept and Reality, written in 1969, he states:
It is feared that the novelty of some of our interpretations
will draw two types of extreme reaction. One the one hand,
it might give rise to a total antipathy towards the critical
analysis of doctrinal points as attempted here. On the
other, it might engender an unreasonable distrust leading
to a sweeping condemnation of the commentaries as a
whole. This work has failed in its purpose if its critical
scrutiny of the occasional shortcomings in the commentar-
ial literature makes anyone forget his indebtedness to the
commentaries for his knowledge of the Dhamma.[1]
Over the years he would become less apologetic and more
straightforward in his assertions, but his criticisms would
always remain subtle, his delightful sarcasm barely noticed
unless approached with the necessary background knowledge
and the attention they deserve. For example, criticising
theĀbhidhammika atomism and the commentarial sab-
hāva (own-essence) doctrine, he says:
An insight meditator, too, goes through a similar experi-
ence when he contemplates on name-and-form, seeing the
four elements as empty and void of essence, which will

give him at least an iota of the conviction that this drama
of existence is empty and insubstantial. He will realize
that, as in the case of the dumb show, he is involved with
things that do not really exist. […] Seeing the reciprocal
relationship between name-and-form, he is disinclined to
dabble in concepts or gulp down a dose of prescriptions.
[…] What is essential here, is the very understanding of
essencelessness. If one sits down to draw up lists of con-
cepts and prescribe them, it would only lead to a mental
constipation.[2]
It is in his latest booklet Nibbana and the Fire Simile that I
found him being the most direct:
There is a flush of Buddhist literature thriving in the West
which attempts to interpret this fire simile in the light of
the Vedic myth that the extinguished fire ‘goes into hid-
ing’. Though the Buddha succeeded in convincing the
Brahmin interlocutors of the dependently arisen nature of
the fire by the reductio-ad-absurdum method, these schol-
ars seem to be impervious to his arguments. What is
worse, misinterpretations have even sought refuge in bla-
tant mistranslations of sacred texts.
[…]
The term ‘extinction’ is anathema to the West in general.
Perhaps as a euphemism, ‘extinguishment’ might be ‘pass-
able’. But rather than playing with the ‘fire-simile’ it is bet-
ter to accept the obvious conclusions, willy nilly.[3]
To appreciate the rebelliousness of these passages and
many others like it, one needs to understand the context in
which they were written. The monastic Sangha in general is
quite dogmatic and traditionalist, not entirely welcoming of
challenging views. When the Nibbāna sermons were deliv-
ered at the Nissarana Vanaya, Bhante Ñāṇananda had the
backing of his teacher, the illustrious Elder Ven. Matara Sri
Ñāṇārāma Mahathera, who not only allowed him the freedom
but invited and encouraged him to express his radical views.
Even then he was criticized by many of his colleagues. Those
views were a main reason that led to Bhante Ñāṇananda’s

departure from the Nissarana Vanaya after the death of Ven.
Ñāṇārāma. He left on his own accord, and set up a small
monastery in Devalegama: Pothgulgala Aranya. It was there
that I first met him in November last year.
It is late in the evening that I arrive, and Bhante
Ñāṇananda is out visiting a doctor, something that was
becoming more frequent as his asthma was getting worse.
After he returns at around 10 pm, I’m taken to his small cave
kuti by his student Ven. Damita. I’m surprised to see how
frail and almost fragile Bhante Ñāṇananda is. I introduce
myself; he slaps his head and laughs, and asks: “How did you
manage to escape?”
The next day, after piṇḍapāta I went to visit him in his kuti.
He warmly welcomes me. I pull out his last reply to my letters
in which he provided some points to ponder on, and start
asking him for clarifications on each of the points. As I sit
there on the floor listening to his thoroughly informative
commentary, some of my cherished views get blasted to bits.
Answering a question dealing with the structure of experi-
ence, Bhante Ñāṇananda quotes
the Hemakamāṇavapucchā of the Sutta Nipāta (from mem-
ory, of course), and uses the simile of the plaintain trunk to
illustrate the way knowledge of experience is gained.
“It’s a beautiful sutta, where Hemaka explains the reason
why he gained faith in the Buddha.
Ye me pubbe viyākaṃsu
Huraṃ gotama sāsanaṃ,
Iccāsi iti bhavissati
Sabbaṃ taṃ itihitihaṃ
Sabbaṃ taṃ takkavaḍḍhanaṃ
Nāhaṃ tattha abhiramiṃ.
Tvañ ca me dhammam akkhāhi taṅhā nigghātanaṃ muni,
Yaṃ viditvā sato caraṃ tare loke visattikaṃ.
Those in the past who explained their teachings to me out-
side Gotama’s dispensation said “so it was and so it will
be”. All that is “so and so” talk; all that promoted specula-
tion. I did not delight in them. And you, O Sage, do

expound to me the teaching of destruction of craving,
knowing which faring mindfully I shall cross over the
clinging in the world.
“Those verses cut to the heart of the problem. They show
the value of this akālika Dhamma. Taṇhā is something that is
here and now, and it is taṇhakkhayo that is Nibbāna.
“Now, the simile of the plaintain trunk comes in here. At
the end, all of this is just a heap of saṇkhāra–s – preparations,
which the Buddha has equated to a plaintain trunk. It is not
necessary to roll the sheaths to realize the pithlessness of it;
one just needs to take the sword of paññā and cut through.
From the cross section itself one realizes. Actually that is
what is meant by understanding paṭiccasamuppāda, not
memorizing the 12 links. The Dhamma is akālikabecause of
the principle.”
In his letter Bhante has mentioned the importance of
understanding the difference
between vijānāti and pajānāti when it comes to dis-
cussing viññāṇa. I ask for an elaboration.
“This is something that tends to get overlooked. There are
many words that share the ñā root in the texts: sañjānāti,
vijānāti, pajānāti, abhijānāti, parijānāti, ājānāti. There may be
more. It is with a reason that there are these differences
between them.
“It is commonly known that the root ñā stands for ‘knowl-
edge’. Why is it said‘vijānāti’ when it could have easily been
said ‘jānāti’? Most translations just use ‘knows’.
But vijānāti means ‘discriminatively knows’. What is the main
job ofviññāṇa? We can clarify from the Mahāvedalla Sutta.
There we get the phrasesyaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vijānāti and yaṃ
vijānāti taṃ pajānāti. ‘What one perceives, that one discrimi-
nates’ and ‘what one discriminates, that one knows’.
“From the examples that follow that phrase we can under-
stand the jānanalevel of each. For sañjānāti: Nīlakampi
sañjānāti, pītakampi sañjānāti, lohitakampi sañjānāti, odā-
tampi sañjānāti – using colours. When someone is coming
from a distance, all we see is just some blob of colour. When
he comes closer we separate him from the others: ‘oh, he is

this person, not the other’. When we know deeply,
at pajānāti level, all is the same, just the four elements, but
let’s leave that aside for the moment.
“What are the examples given for vijānāti? There are two;
the first is sukhan’ti pi vijānāti, dukkhan’ti pi vijānāti,
adukkhamasukhan’ti pi vijānāti. This clearly shows thatvijā-
nana is unique to living beings, not found in trees and rocks.
The first level ofviññāṇa is in discriminating between differ-
ent feelings. For instance, in theMahānidāna Sutta we find
the Buddha asking Ven. Ananda Thera whether there would
be any self notion where there is no feeling. The answer is
‘no’. That shows that feeling is fundamental. So what is there
in feeling? Bifurcation, which is the most fundamental
delusion.”
He pauses to say how glad he is that there is no need to use
‘footnotes’ when talking to me. I’m glad I did the homework.
If you want to find Bhante Ñāṇananda in his zone, do the
necessary preparatory studies, and be willing to put up with
copious amounts of Pāḷi, not all of which would be translated.
But then he asks “Do you remember the other example

for vijānāti?” I don’t.
“There is a second example for vijānāti from the Khajjanīya
Sutta: ambilampi vijānāti, tittakampi vijānāti, kaṭukampi
vijānāti, madhurakampi vijānāti, khārikampi vijānāti,
akhārikampi vijānāti,loṇikampi vijānāti, aloṇikampi vijānāti —
different tastes. Do you see any difference between knowing
colours and knowing tastes?”
I mumble my ignorance.
“With taste the discrimination is explicit. When we taste

something, it takes a while to decide whether its sweet or
sour or salty. Some foods we can’t easily categorize by taste,
like the Nelli fruit. But it is not essential to go that far: what is
important is to remember that discriminating between differ-
ent feeling tones is the main function of viññāṇa.
“A unique feature of paṭiccasamuppāda is the way one
result becomes the cause for another. One pulls the other in.
When we take a pair of items inpaṭiccasamuppāda, one mem-

ber is also a member in the next pair. The very question
whether saññā and viññāṇa are the same or different reeks of
absolutism, an attempt to separate them into water-tight
compartments. But their connectedness is pointed out in the
Sutta with yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vijānāti, yaṃ vijānāti taṃ
pajānāti. This doesn’t mean all three are the same either. The
nuances are important.
“The difference between viññāṇa and paññā is explained
as paññā bhāvetabbā, viññāṇaṃ pariññeyyaṃ: paññā is to be
developed, viññāṇa is to be understood. When paññā is ful-
filled, viññāṇa is fully comprehended. As in the magic show:
to see through the magic is to miss the show.”
The last sentence is a reference to Bhante Ñāṇananda’s
short masterpieceThe Magic of the Mind.
“In the floodlights of paññā there is no room for the shad-
ows of viññāṇa. The delusion of self love reflects a world, so
there’s the two: an I and a world. Reflections on the eye,
reflections on the ear, reflections on the mind: taking these
reflections that fall on the senses as true, the materialists go
looking for a world out there. When the Buddha called all of
that a mere illusion, he meant all, including concepts. That’s
why it is said sabba dhammakkhayaṃpatto vimutto
upadhisaṅkhaye.[4] Mind and dhammas is the last resort of
delusion.”
This is one of the most controversial of Bhante
Ñāṇananda’s views. The Magic of the Mind discusses this
topic at length. He has been called an idealist and an illusion-
ist because of it; he rejects both accusations. Being a
Ñāṇavirist at the time, this ‘illusionist’ interpretation was
something I too found difficult to accept, especially in light of
Ven. Ñāṇavira’s explicit and vehement rejection of the notion
of māyā as a hindu concept shared by the Mahayanists.
“It is viññāṇa that discriminates between a sense and an
object. The Ābhidhammikas are stuck thinking that even
when all else falls apart mano viññāṇaremains. It is like we
separating a flowing river in to parts, naming them, and then
putting the parts back together to create a river. I remember
something Dr. W.S. Karunaratne said: ‘the grammar of nature
does not correspond to the grammar of language’. That’s a

nice saying. This is beautifully illustrated in thePoṭṭhapāda
Sutta. We separate the flux of existence in to parts,
with papañca-saññā-saṇkhā. Those saṇkhās are mere sugges-
tions. They can only nudge us toward a certain direction. We
cannot understand reality using them.
“Words have a limited capacity. It is okay to use them as
long as one realizes their limitations. One who realizes their
limitations would not be limited by them. The Poṭṭhapāda
Sutta ends with imā kho Citta lokasamaññā lokaniruttiyo
lokavohārā lokapaññattiyo, yāhi Tathāgato voharati, aparā-
masaṃ. We must be so grateful to the ancient bhāṇakas: it
would have been such a loss if that last word was forgot-
ten. Aparāmasaṃ – not grasping. That’s where the whole
secret lies.”
And then he laughs his delightful laugh, as if all that
should have been obvious in the first place.
NOTES
1. Ñāṇananda. K. (1997) [1971], Concept and Reality in
Early Buddhist Thought, Buddhist Publication Society,
p. VI.
2. ^ Ñāṇananda, Katukurunde, Bhikkhu (2004), Nib-
bāna – The Mind Stilled, Vol. II, Dharma Grantha Mudrana
Bharaya, p. 183.
3. ^ Ñāṇananda, Katukurunde, Bhikkhu (2010), Nib-
bāna and the Fire Simile, Dharma Grantha Mudrana
Bharaya, p. 26.
4. ^ Sn 992

There is hardly any teaching that has given rise to more inter-
nal disputes among Buddhists than paṭiccasamuppāda. My
next question is based on a comment by Bhante Ñāṇananda,
which considerspaṭiccasamuppāda as the golden mean
between atthitā (existence) and natthitā(non-existence),
replacing them with samudaya (arising) and vaya (pass-
ing away).
“Everyone knows that the middle way is the noble eight-
fold path. Everyone knows that the first sermon was the
Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta. But if for some reason
Āḷārakālāma or Uddaka Rāmaputta were alive, what we
would have as the Dhammacakkappavattana would be some-
thing short like the Bāhiya Sutta, because they were facing a
duality of a different nature.
“The five ascetics were given a teaching based on the ethi-
cal middle path, avoiding the two extremes of kāmasukhal-
likānuyoga and attakilamathānuyoga. But the middle path of
right view is found in the Kaccānagotta Sutta, beautifully
used by Ven. Nāgārjuna. When the Theravadins got
engrossed with the Abhidhamma they forgot about it. The
Mādhyamikas were alert enough to give it the attention it
deserved.
“Extremism is found not only in ethics, but also in various
kinds of views. The duality of asti and nāsti has a long his-
tory. I don’t have much knowledge in the Vedas, but I
remember in Ṛg Veda, in the Nāsādīya Sūkta,[1] you get the
beautiful phrase nāsadāsīn no sadāsīt tadānīṃ. They were
speculating about the beginnings: did existence come from
non-existence or vice-versa.
“All those kinds of dualities, be it asti/nāsti or sabbaṃ
ekattaṃ/sabbaṃ puthuttaṃ etc. were rejected by the Bud-
dha: majjhena Tathāgato Dhammaṃ deseti– he taught the
Dhamma by the middle. It’s not just the middle path. It’s not a
mixture of 50% of each. We usually think that the middle is
between two ends. It’s a rejection of both ends and an intro-

duction of a novel standpoint. Again, I remember Dr. W.S.
Karunaratne saying how paṭiccasamuppāda, both as a philos-
ophy and as a word, was novel to Indian thinking. There were
other vāda–s such as Adhiccasamuppāda and Issaranimmāna,
but not paṭiccasamuppāda, and it is not a vāda.
“The ‘parroting’ method of paṭiccasamuppāda involves
dishing out the 12 terms, and even then, the paṭiloma is often
forgotten. But the important thing is the principle, embedded
in ‘asmiṃ sati…’, as seen in many Suttas. There again, I also
made a mistake inadvertently when translating: in early edi-
tions of The Magic of the Mind I used ‘this/that’ following the
standard English translations. That’s completely wrong. It
should be ‘this/this’.
“In the formula we must take two elements that make a
pair and analyse the conditionality between them. ‘That’
implies something outside the pair, which is mislead-
ing. Paṭiccasamuppāda is to be seen among the elements in a
pair. The trick is in the middle; there’s no point in holding on
to the ends. And even that middle needs to be let go of, not
grasped.
“When introducing paṭiccasamuppāda we first get the prin-
ciple: imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, imassuppādā idaṃ uppaj-
jati… and then yadidaṃ – the word yadidaṃclearly shows that
what follows is an illustration. And then the well known 12
elements are given. But how is it in the paṭiloma? Avijjaya tu
eva – there’s an emphasis, as if to say: yes, the arising of suf-
fering is a fact, it is the nature of the world, but it doesn’t end
there; from the fading away of that same ignorance this suf-
fering could be made to cease. That is why we can’t categori-
cally say that any of these things exist or not. It entirely
depends on upādāna. It is upādānathat decides between exis-
tence and non-existence. When there is no upādāna you
get anupādā parinibbāna, right then and there. And that is
why the Dhamma isakālika.”
The impossibility of making categorical statements about
existence was discussed extensively in Bhante
Ñāṇananda’s The Magic of the Mind, and he reminds me
again about the importance of the Kālakārāma Sutta which
provided the basis for that book. He quickly adds that the
Buddha’s stand is not something like that of his contempo-
rary sceptic agnostic Sañjaya Bellaṭṭhiputta, the so-called eel-
wriggler; rather, the situation is beyond what could be
expressed through the linguistic medium. It can only be
known individually: paccattaṃ veditabbo.
His interpretation of paṭiccasamuppāda, which dramati-
cally deviates from the traditional exegesis, has earned
Bhante Ñāṇananda a few vehement critics. He amusedly
mentions a recent letter sent by a monk where he was
accused of ‘being a disgrace to the Theriya tradition’. This
criticism, no doubt coming from a Theravāda dogmatist, is
understandable seeing how accommodating Bhante
Ñāṇananda is when it comes to teachings traditionally con-
sidered Mahāyāna, hence taboo for any self-respecting Ther-
avādin. However, if one delves deeper, one would see that he
is only trying to stay as close as possible to early Buddhist
teachings.
“I didn’t quote from the Mahāyāna texts in the Nibbāna
sermons,” he says, “because there was no need. All that was
needed was already found in the Suttas. Teachers like Nāgār-
juna brought to light what was already there but was hidden
from view. Unfortunately his later followers turned it in to
a vāda.”
He goes on to quote two of his favourite verses from Ven.
Nāgārjuna’sMūlamādhyamakakārikā (as usual, from
memory):
Śūnyatā sarva-dṛṣtīnaṃ proktā niḥsaranaṃ jinaiḥ,
yeṣāṃ śūnyatā-dṛṣtis tān asādhyān babhāṣire [MK 13.8]
The Victorious Ones have declared that emptiness is the
relinquishing of all views. Those who are possessed of the
view of emptiness are said to be incorrigible.
Sarva-dṛṣti-prahāṇāya yaḥ saddharmam adeśayat,

anukampam upādāya taṃ namasyāmi gau-
tamaṃ [MK 26.30]
I reverently bow to Gautama who, out of compassion, has
taught the doctrine in order to relinquish all views.
“”
Bhante doesn’t bother translating the verses; the ones pro-
vided above are by David Kalupahana.
“When I first read the Kārikā I too was doubting Ven.

Nāgārjuna’s sanity” he laughs. “But the work needs to be
understood in the context. He was taking a jab at the Sarvās-
tivādins. To be honest, even the others deserve the rebuke,
although they now try to get away by using Sarvāstivāda as an
excuse. How skilled Ven. Nāgārjuna must have been, to com-
pose those verses so elegantly and filling them with so much
meaning, like the Dhammapada verses. It’s quite amazing.
This has been rightly understood by Prof. Kalupahana.”
Prof. David J. Kalupahana is an eminent Sri Lankan scholar
who stirred up another controversy when he portrayed Ven.
Nāgārjuna as a reformist trying to resurrect early Buddhist
teachings. He had been a lecturer during Bhante Ñāṇananda’s
university days as a layman at Peradeniya.
“If there is no substance in anything, what is left is empti-
ness. But many people are afraid of words. Like śūnyatā. They
want to protect their four.” With that ‘irreverent’ comment
about the four paramattha dhamma–s of the Abhidhamma,
Bhante Ñāṇananda breaks into amused laughter.
“If one does not approach the commentarial literature with
a critical eye, one would be trapped. Unfortunately many are.
In fact, I had to remove a few pages from the manuscript
of Concept and Reality on Ven. Nyanaponika’s request”.
I’m disappointed to hear that, as Concept and Reality had
already become my favourite commentary on the Buddhist
teachings. There are some delightfully understated criticisms
of the traditional views in the book, and I wonder what we
have lost in the editorial process at the hands of Ven.
Nyanaponika Thera, an undoubtedly very learned yet quite
conservative scholar. When I express my dismay, Bhante
Ñāṇananda adds that now he tends to agree with Ven.
Nyanaponika.
“I did it unwillingly, but later on I also thought it may have

been too much as it was my first book. Perhaps what is left is
quite enough. The message still gets through. Some of that I
could restate in the Nibbāna sermons as I had the backing of
my teacher.”
This teacher is Ven. Matara Sri Ñāṇārāma Mahathera, then
abbot of the Nissarana Vanaya and an illustrious elder of the
Sri Lankan forest tradition. I ask Bhante what the response of
the Sangha was when those controversial sermons were
delivered.
“Apart from a very few, the others didn’t really understand.

Some went around criticising, calling me a heretic. Fortu-
nately it didn’t get out of hand thanks to the teacher. But
then some others like Ven. Khemānanda were very
appreciative.”
Our discussion moves on to Ven. Ñāṇavīra Thera. I wonder
what influence this radical monk had on Bhante Ñāṇananda,
but I can’t muster enough courage to ask directly. So I just let
him speak on his views.
“It is true, Ven. Ñāṇavīra made a start. But I think he went
to an extreme in his criticisms, until his followers were drop-
ping even the useful things. And he failed to make the neces-
sary distinctions between saupādisesa and anupādisesaNib-
bāna elements. That led to an idealized view of the noble dis-
ciple. And now there is a lineage of ‘Ñāṇavīrists’ who fail to
see anything beyond Ven. Ñāṇavīra’s views. They are simply
idolizing him.”
I was one of them until I started a correspondence with
Bhante Ñāṇananda, so I know the way of thinking.
To end the discussion I pick up the thorniest of issues. I

ask: “What is a ‘thing’? Is it completely imaginary, or is it
something made by the mind using the ingredients ‘out
there’?” A straightforward answer to that rather extremist
question would make Bhante Ñāṇananda’s position clear on
the gamut of views.
“I’m sure you have read Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation

of the Saṃyutta Nikāya. You must have come across
the Pheṇapindūpama Sutta. In the notes you’ll see Ven. Bodhi

explaining that although the lump is illusory, the ingredients
aren’t. It is worse when it comes to the magic show. He says
that only the magic is not real; the magician’s appurtenances
are. This is a distortion of the simile given by the Buddha. We
must appreciate the great work done by Ven. Bodhi, but it is
unfortunate that he is bound by the commentarial tradition.
“What is considered the ‘truth’ is relative to each individ-
ual. Each person gives evidence in the court of reality based
on his own level of experience. For example, parents often
give false explanations to their little children. But these are
true to the kids. When asked, the kid will tell what his par-
ents told him. It’s true for the child, but not for us. In the
famous commentarial story about Ven. Tissa Thera we find
him seeing a woman as a skeleton, and saying so when asked
by her husband. The venerable was closer to the truth.
“When we transcend one level of truth, the new level
becomes what is true for us. The previous one is now false.
What one experiences may not be what is experienced by the
world in general, but that may well be truer. But how do we
reach the ultimate truth? This is beautifully explained in
the Dhātuvibhaṇga Sutta: Taṃ saccaṃ, yaṃ amosadhammaṃ
nibbānaṃ. And from the Dvayatānupassanā Sutta: amosad-
hammaṃ nibbānaṃ tad ariyā saccato vidū. It is Nibbāna that
is of non-falsifying nature, where there is no ‘thing’. Nibbāna
is the highest truth because there is no other truth to tran-
scend it.
“The Buddha called himself the first chick in this era to
break out of the egg of ignorance. All these wonderful things
we do such as space travel all happen inside
this saḷāyatana shell. If paṭiccasamuppāda is presented prop-
erly, perhaps a few more chicks would be able to break
through today.
“Ven. Nāgārjuna was right: at the end, all is empty. We are
not willing to accept that existence is a perversion. Existence
is suffering precisely because it is a perversion.”
It may not be a categorical answer, and it probably isn’t
possible to give one. But I will bring this issue up again later.
We have been talking for more than an hour, and it is time

for Bhante’s meal. I end the discussion, looking forward to
another one in the evening.
NOTES
1. ^ Ṛgveda: sūkta 10.129 (English translation)

In the traditional exegesis, pancupādānakkhandhā (five aggre-
gates of clinging) and nāma-rūpa (name-and-form) are used
interchangeably, implying that these two are the same. As
Ven. Ñāṇavīra Thera also pointed out in his Notes on
Dhamma, this is a dubious interpretation that does not find
explicit support in the Suttas. I ask Bhante Ñāṇananda how
we should understand the connection between pancupādā-
nakkhandha and nāma-rūpa.
“It is quite common to hear that these two are the same:
that rūpa-upādānakkhandha is the same as the rūpa in nama-
rūpa, and the other four aggregates are nāma. That is like try-
ing to measure distance in kilograms – a confusion.
“In that beautiful seminar in a moonlit night recorded in
the Mahāpuṇṇama Sutta, it is made quite clear
that viññāna cannot be a part of nāma. One venerable
asks “Ko hetu ko paccayo rūpakkhandhassa paññā-
panāya?” and so on — what is the cause for the designation of
each aggregate? And the Buddha answers that it is the four
great elements that give rise to the designation of an aggre-
gate of form. For vedanā, saññā and saṅkhāra, it is phassa –
contact. But for viññāna, the cause is nāma-rūpa.
“We are used to explaining paṭiccasamuppāda in the form
of the standard 12 links starting from avijjā. However, always
trying to put avijjā at the lead in exegesis led to misinterpre-
tations of certain Suttas. For example, commenting on
the Mahānidāna Sutta, Ven. Buddhaghosa Thera brings in the
so-called three-life interpretation whereas there is nothing
missing from the Sutta itself. As I tried to explain in The
Magic of the Mind, it is from the preparations that are done in

the darkness of ignorance that the duality
of viññāna andnāma-rūpa arise.
“And what is that duality? The same duality seen by the
dog on a plank over water.” Bhante Ñāṇananda is referring to
a simile he has often used in Dhamma discussions:
A dog is crossing a plank over a stream. Half way through
it looks in to the water and sees another dog there. It wags
its tail and the other responds. It snarls and the other
reacts. It looks away to ignore, but when it looks again the
water dog is still there looking on.
The view of an existing self is also due to such an unwise

attention. “I think therefore I am” is the resulting wrong
conclusion. Neither narcissistic love nor masochistic hate
can solve the problem. Ignoring with a cynical sneer is to
evade the problem. Therefore one has to thrash-down this
problem of the elusive self image to the basic confronta-
tion between consciousness and name and form.
– “Reflect Rightly on the Reflection”, From Topsy-
turvydom to Wisdom
“Nāma-rūpa is a deception. It is unreal. But in the illusion
of viññāna, wherever you look, it is there. Whatever it may
be, whether it’s a sight or a sound or a thought, it is
just vedanā, saññā, cetanā, phassa, manasikāra. But here
again there is a common misinterpretation: when listing
the nāma-dhamma–s, some start from phassa, vedanā,… They
put phassa to the front. But phassa has to be at the back.”
He says the above in Sinhala, where the word for ‘back’ is
‘passa’. The pun is lost in translation. As for
putting phassa first, it is often seen in the Abhidhamma liter-
ature when listing the cetasika–s.
“They say so because in paṭiccasamuppāda, phassa comes
before vedanā. That doesn’t apply here. In the Suttas, such as
the Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta, the ordering is never in that form.
The Buddha and the Arahats were not mistaken; logicallyone
can have phassa first, but psychologically it is vedanā that is
primary. It is through vedanā that one recognizes the four
great elements, not throughphassa. The self notion hinges

on vedanā. That is why it deserves to be the first.
“So one develops a saññā according to vedanā, based on
which one has cetanā, at which point the ‘personality’ is
taken for granted. This creates the duality necessary
for phassa. Manasikāra is at the end, somewhat like ekaggatā,
unifying them all: manasikāra sambhavā sabbe dhammā – all
things arise from attention.
“With vedanā, the self notion ‘awakens’, although here it is
more like dreaming. Or like a blind man groping in the dark.
The blind man reacts only to the feeling of bumping on to
something. That is why Ven. Ananda Thera replied to the
Buddha that it is not possible to have any self notion when
there is no vedanā.Taṇhā arises from vedanā.
“So where does pañcupādānakkhandha come
in? Pañcupādānakkhandhā is the final result of the constant
tussle between viññāṇa and nāma-rūpa. This is made clear in
theMahāsaḷāyatanika Sutta. What is gathered from the
six viññāṇa–s, at the end, are filtered down to things grasped
as “these are my forms, these are my feelings, these are my
perceptions, …
“You might remember how the Buddha explained the des-
ignation of akhandha, in the Mahāpuṇṇama Sutta: atītānāgat-
apaccuppannaṃ ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikaṃ vā
sukhumaṃ vā hīnaṃ vā paṇītaṃ vā yaṃ dūre santike vā (past,
future, present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior
or superior, far or near). That’s the demarcation of the heap.”
One of the main themes of Bhante Ñāṇananda’s classic The
Magic of the Mind is the illusory nature of viññāṇa. Earlier we
discussed some of the nuances involved in differentiating
between viññāṇa and paññā, and now the discussion moves
on to the relationship between viññāṇa and nāma-rūpa.
“It’s a pity that many Buddhists still cannot accept that the
goal of this practice is the cessation of viññāṇa. It is a suffer-
ing; the simile for viññāṇâhāra is being beaten by a spear 300
times a day. The darkness of avijjā creates the background for
it. As I pointed out with the similes of the cinema and the
magic show, these things can only happen as long as there is
darkness. All this is just an illusion, a drama. In fact, the old-
est meaning of saṅkhāra is found in that context of a

stage show.
“The connection between viññāṇa and nāma-rūpa can be
illustrated with a childish simile: it is like a dog chasing its
own tail. The modern Rohitassas who try to overcome a world
as seen through viññāna are no different. They chase after
what the Buddha dismissed as an illusion. There is nothing to
go chasing after here; all that needs to be done is to stay
where one is, and to realize that it is merely a shadow. When
the darkness of avijjā is dispelled, saṅkhāra–s are stilled. The
game is over.
“Viññāṇa and nāma-rūpa revolve around each other at an
indescribable speed. That’s why it was told to Ven. Sāti that it
is wrong to say “viññāṇaṃ sandhāvati saṃsarati anaññaṃ” (it
is this same viññāṇa that runs and wanders, not another). If
only the Ābhidhammikas realized that parivatta in lahupari-
vattaṃ cittaṃmeans ‘revolving’: viññāṇa paccayā
nāmarūpaṃ, nāmarūpa paccayā viññāṇaṃ.
“The Gāthās in the Sagāthaka Vagga, although often not
given enough attention, are very deep. I stopped the Nibbāna
series at sermon number 33, but what I had planned for 34,
although never delivered, was based on that beautiful verse
from the Nimokkha Sutta:
Nandībhavaparikkhayā saññāviññāṇasaṅkhayā,
Vedanānaṃ nirodhā upasamā evaṃ khvāhaṃ āvuso jānāmi
Sattānaṃ nimokkhaṃ pamokkhaṃ vivekan’ti. [SN 1.2]
When delight and existence are exhausted
When perception and consciousness are both destroyed
When feelings cease and are appeased – thus, O friend,
Do I know, for them that live
Deliverance, freedom, detachment.
– Translation by Bhante Ñāṇananda: Saṃyutta Nikāya –
An Anthology
“In all other religions, viññāṇa was taken as a unit, and
worse, as the soul. It is taught that even if everything else is
impermanent, this isn’t. And it is taught as that which
reaches Brahmā. But the Buddha pointed out that it is a mere
illusion. It can’t exist on its own.
“That brings us to a nice point. What is the simile used by

Ven. Sariputta Thera to illustrate the aññamaññapaccay-
atā (interdependence) of viññāṇa andnāma-rūpa?”
“The simile of the two bundles of bamboo reeds” I reply.
“Why is that? Couldn’t he have chosen something better,
some wood with pith – say, two bundles of Sāla wood? See
how penetrative they are even in their use of similes. The Pāḷi
for bamboo reed is tacasāra. Taca means skin or peel,
so tacasāra means that which has just the skin for its pith.
The thing taken by the world as being full of pith is summar-
ily dismissed by Ven. Sariputta Thera. It’s not a unit either,
but a bundle.
“I’m reminded of something Ven. Ñāṇavīra said: ‘all con-
sciousness is self consciousness.’ That is quite right. Occa-
sionally he came up with brilliant insights like that which
shook the establishment. He was one who wasn’t afraid to
point out these misinterpretations. It is unfortunate that he
was rather extremist in other areas.
“The whole notion of the so-called antarābhava depends
on the belief thatviññāṇa ‘goes’ on its own. The Buddha’s
explanation of the wandering ofviññāṇa is not like that of the
Upanishads where the simile of the leech is used.[1]According
to the Dhamma viññāṇa and nāma-rūpa are in a state of
whirling or turning around.
“The wandering of the mind is not like that of physical
things. It’s a circuitous journey of a mind and its object. With
the taking up of one object by a mind, a sort of whirling
begins; when one end is lost from grasp, the other end is
taken up: itthabāvaññathābhāvaṃ saṃsāraṃ n’ātivattati –
this-ness and otherwise-ness, that’s all there is in saṃsāra.
Our minds keep wandering away but keep coming back to
this upādinna. Who likes to let go of it, to die? It always
comes back to that which is held dearly. At the last moment,
when Māra comes to snatch it away, one does not want to
give it up, so there is a contest: the struggle for life. The Bud-
dha asked us to just give it up.
“Think of any kind of existence, and you will see that it
depends on grasping. There is no ‘thing’ that exists on its
own. Here again, I’m reminded of something Dr. W.S.
Karunaratne said: ‘Existence has got to be relative; there is no

absolute existence.’ But the world thinks of unitary things
existing on their own. They ask, ‘why, even when I don’t look
at this thing, doesn’t it continue existing’? But really there is
only a diṭṭha, a seen. There is only a suta, a heard. But the
moment we think of a seen ‘thing’, a heard ‘thing’, we are
trapped. We create things withmaññanā, ideation.
“The problem with ‘things’ is solved in the Bāhiya Sutta:
there are only diṭṭha, suta, muta, viññāta, nothing else. That
is the theme in the Kālakārāma Sutta too. As long as one
does maññanā about these, one would be deluded.”
Here we seem to have encountered a more thorough
answer to my earlier question about the ‘reality of things’, and
it is quite clear that Bhante Ñāṇananda has quite a different
view from the standard Theravadin interpretation which is
closer to naïve realism. It is also opposed to Ven. Ñāṇavīra
Thera’s explanations, and readers who are familiar with Clear-
ing the Path would notice that Bhante Ñāṇananda’s interpre-
tation is close to Sister Vajira’s earlier views. It is easy to see
why Bhante is sometimes accused of being a viññāṇavādinby
those who are less willing to consider the subtleties involved.
“But how is viññāṇa made to cease?” Bhante adds, dis-
cussing the final goal of Buddhist practice. “Viññāṇa has the
nature to reflect, and what it reflects isnāma-rūpa. One is
attached to the reflection because one doesn’t know that it is
a reflection. But when the knowledge arises, attachment
drops. In many instances where paññā is discussed, we find
the words paṭivedha and ativijjha, meaning ‘penetration’. The
view is replaced by a vision.”
Bhante then quotes from his own Concept and Reality:
For the Arahant … all concepts have become transparent to
such a degree in that all-encompassing vision, that their
boundaries together with their umbra and penumbra have
yielded to the radiance of wisdom. This, then, is the signifi-
cance of the word anantaṃ (endless, infinite). Thus the
paradoxically detached gaze of the contemplative sage as
he looks through the concepts is one which has no object
(ārammaṇa) as the point of focus for the worldling to iden-
tify it with. It is a gaze that is neither conscious nor non-

conscious (na saññī assa, saññī ca pana assa), neither
attentive nor non-attentive (na manasikareyya, manasi ca
pana kareyya), neither fixed nor not fixed (na jhāyati, jhāy-
ati ca pana) – a gaze that knows no horizon.
NOTES
1. ^ E.g.: “And just as a leech moving on a blade of
grass reaches its end, takes hold of another and draws itself
together towards it, so does the self, after throwing off this
body, that is to say, after making it unconscious, take hold
of another support and draw itself together towards it.”
[Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.3] – From The Upanishads –
A New Translation by Swami Nikhilananda

The following is a minimally edited transcript of Bhante
Ñāṇananda’s comments on the Neyyattha Sutta, which seems
to have been the seed out of which the Two Truths doc-
trine has been developed.
“We come across this in the Aṅguttara Nikāya: nītattha
sutta and neyyattha sutta.Nīta, taken as it is, means you are
led to it. Neyya means you have to be led. So nītameans you
are already at the meaning; you don’t have to reinterpret it.
Whatever is supposed to be the nīta in the Buddha word, you
have to take it ‘as such’. Now, it is different when it comes
to neyyattha: in that case you have to understand it in the
context of the Dhamma; you can’t take it as it appears.
“It is from this distinction that sammuti /
paramattha and samvṛti/paramārtha (in Buddhist Sanskrit)
have been developed. And also this is the reason I think the
Nettippakaraṇa and Petakopadesa were composed, as guides
to the commentator. Because it is the job of the commentator
to explain a sutta, and how it should be explained is a prob-
lem. There are occasions when the Buddha usedloka samaññā
loka nirutti (worldly conventions, worldly parlance) as they
are, according to the context. And on some occasions, espe-
cially to monks, he would say something very deep, which
you have to take as it is.
“The traditional interpretation, as you get in the commen-
taries, is very simple: it says neyyattha would be such suttas
where the ordinary concepts of beings etc. come in,
but nītattha is where you get anicca, dukkha, anattā. That’s a
very simple definition of it.
“Among the discourses, there are some, like the Bāhiya
Sutta, where you don’t have to reintroduce anything in to it.
But the people will have to introduce something to under-
stand them – that’s the whole trouble. A case which came to
my attention was that sutta in the Saṃyutta Nikāya, the case
of Moliyaphagguna, where, step by step, the Buddha had to
correct even the question of Moliyaphagguna.[1] Ko nu kho
bhante phusati? — it goes like that: ‘who, lord, does touch?’

[The Buddha replies:] ‘I don’t say like that. If I did, then you
can ask me like that. The correct question should be: Kim
paccayā?’
“So the paccaya terminology is actually the nītattha, if I
may say so. But you can’t talk with paccaya always. In fact, I
remember some people who tried to avoid the ‘I’ concept
altogether in conversations, using such phrases as ‘thispañ-
cakkhandha’. But that’s only artificial.
“This I may say is a challenge to understand the discourses.
Because you always have to ask yourself: what are
the nītattha suttas and what are the neyyattha suttas? With-
out a criterion to decide, you are in a fix. But if you start on
your own, I think you could take instances where the Buddha
is talking about the four noble truths, as well as patic-
casamuppāda.
“This is an instance where we see the difference between
the grammar of nature and the grammar of language. You
have to give way to the grammar of language if you’re to talk.
Because if you are to explain, you have to make compromises
with language, as we say ‘it rains’ or ‘devo vassatu’. Otherwise
there is something lacking. The subject, the object and then
the adjectives and adverbs and the sentence structure – these
are deciding our thinking. The logicians are bound by it. That
is why the Dhamma is atakkāvacara. That again is a chal-
lenge: what is meant by atakkāvacara?
“Logic has to distinguish one from the other. It is again a
logical question when they ask: saññā and vedanā – are they
completely different, or are they the same thing? That is the
way logic would put it. There’s no half way between. Even
that they tried to cover: I’m not very familiar with logic but
what is already apparent in the canon is the tetralemma. The
question of contradiction comes in: either it has to be this or
the other. But there are these grey areas.
“All these problems come up because, first of all, we break
reality – the flux of life – in to pieces. We differentiate
between a ‘thing’ and its colour: the colour is an adjective; the
object is something else. So we create problems for ourselves.
But then the Buddha had to convey a message – and in fact I
make it a point to say, why the Buddha hesitated to teach was

not out of jealousy or any other reason, but the problem was
how to present this doctrine in an intelligible way to people. I
may say that only the Buddha had that ability. Though it is
again an unsolved problem, about the Pacceka Buddha–s, it
seems, if ever they remain silent, hence called ‘silent’ Bud-
dhas, it is because they could not, unlike the Buddha, bring
these two truths in to alignment.
“Already in the Kalakārāma Sutta you see how deep the
problem is. But the Buddha could explain it sufficiently for
one to start practicing. And once you start practicing, then, as
in the Cūlahatthipadopama Sutta, you are walking the
Dhamma-way, and you’ll realize by yourself. You go and see.
Now, even though the Dhamma says ehipassika, we don’t
want to go; we want to stay where we are and go through
logic to understand the Dhamma. That is the problem with
the scholars.
“The Buddha’s Dhamma was an invitation. If you start the
practice, the rest you will know by yourself. The map can’t be
the same as the journey. No map is complete by itself; it may
use colours and signs etc. but it is never complete. So is the
Dhamma. Much of it, the Buddha left unexplained. That is
probably why the people are now complaining that there is
no methodology here and that something is lacking in the
Dhamma. But you can’t be spoon-fed.
“It is because the Buddha has given sufficient advice that
some could realize even by just listening. They didn’t merely
listen: they listened with rapt attention. Like in Ven. Bāhiya’s
case, they were not leading idle lives. Their plaything
was jhāna. So it was easy for the Buddha to make them
understand, as they had a sharp receptive apparatus. They
only needed saddhā. Without saddhā, with logic if you’re hop-
ing to understand, you’re gravely mistaken.
“So now, getting down to the type of suttas we have, at a
glance, perhaps, Bāhiya sutta is a clear cut case, although
those who want something objective, with a substantialist
view, would find something lacking there. And also, for
instance, when the Buddha answered the accusations of the
Brahmins, and when we come to the ten indeterminate
points, that perhaps is something likenītattha. The Buddha is

put to that point where He can’t agree any longer to the con-
vention. Because He used conventional words, people made it
an excuse to glean advantage from it. That is the case with
Nibbāna: the fire going out.
“If the fire ‘goes out’ some think you should be able to go
and locate where it is. Some scholars in the West also follow
the same Hindu way where they think when the fire goes out
it stays in some ineffable state. When it comes to such points
of absurdity the Buddha had to correct them. Otherwise the
Buddha would, for all practical purposes, use the convention.
Even to Bāhiya He said ‘This is our pinḍapāta time’, as if
there’s some strict time for pinḍapāta. As if His whole life is
for pinḍapāta. ‘We have to go on pinḍapāta, don’t come and
question us’! But when it comes to the Dhamma: ‘in the seen,
just the seen, in the heard, just the heard.’ When Bāhiya
could master and muster sufficient Samādhi he had built up
in the past, when he was sufficiently calmed down, then the
Buddha gave the real thing.
“There are also other occasions, for instance in the
Saṃyutta Nikāya, where you find the verses:
Ahaṃ vadāmīti pi so vadeyya
Mamaṃ vadantīti pi so vadeyya,
Loke samaññaṃ kusalo viditvā
Vohāramattena so vohareyyā’ti. [SN 1.25]
That monk still might use such words as “I,“
Still perchance might say: “They call this mine.“
Well aware of common worldly speech,
He would speak conforming to such use. (Source)
“So every time the Buddha says ‘I’m going’ and so on, you
should not think that He’s contradicted His
own anattā doctrine.
“Nītattha could also be in such cases like in the Alagaddū-
pama Sutta where the brahmins are repremanded for false
accusations. The Buddha comes out with the state-
ment: Pubbe c’āhaṃ bhikkhave etarahi ca dukkhañceva
paññāpemi dukkhassa ca nirodhaṃ – that is the best criterion
to decide on which side you are. ‘All formerly and now, I
merely say that there is suffering’ – there is no one suffering,

whether it’s a puggala or person or individual – all this rot
comes in because of not knowing that the Buddha’s message
is also part and parcel of language.
“For all practical purposes, the Buddha’s words are enough.
But for those who do not practice, but who are armchair crit-
ics, there is so much contradiction in the Buddha’s words.
Sometimes He says there is dukkha only, and sometimes He
says you are suffering. This is also the reason why there is
such a mess in the interpretations of the kamma doctrine
also. In sammādiṭṭhi, we may say there’s the
‘lower’ sammādiṭṭhi and the
‘higher’ sammādiṭṭhi.[2] The dasa-vatthuka
sammādiṭṭhi is kammassakatā. When a person
takes kamma as his own, he’s bound by it. You are bound by
your own grasping. Then it’s a fact that you’re going to these
various realms etc.: dependent on avijjā there is saṅkhāra.
Such people have to be judged by their own standards.
“By the way, I may also say, now that we are on the point: if
you’re translating the Dhammapada, it is wrong according to
my understanding to translate theattavagga as the chapter
on Self. It should be oneself. Otherwise, as Radhakrish-
nan finds it, you are on the side of attā. But it is ‘oneself’:
reflexive. If you understand that as self there’s a contradiction
between attāhi attano natthi andattāhi attano natho. But
these are just loke samaññā.
“Similarly in the Poṭṭhapāda Sutta, now and then the Bud-
dha had to come out, especially in the last words of the sutta
– they are very powerful: imā kho citta loka samaññā… yāhi
tathāgato voharati, aparāmasaṃ (“Citta, these are the world’s
designations, the world’s expressions, the world’s ways of
speaking, the world’s descriptions, with which the Tathagata
expresses himself but without grasping to them.”) I remem-
ber reading The Meaning of Meaning by Ogden and Richards;
there they quoted from the Poṭṭhapāda Sutta. They under-
stood that there’s something very deep in that simile about
milk, curd, butter etc. Though they didn’t get everything,
they knew the Buddha was nearer the truth about semantics.
“But now we think that where there’s a word there should

be something. It’s the thing that’s causing all the trouble.
There’s just a flux of life, a functioning, but no agent in it. But
the language requires both. That is why we have to say ‘it
rains’, leaving the room for someone to ask ‘what is this ‘it’?’.
The fire goes out: where has it ‘gone’? The Buddha from time
to time had to show the absurdity of such questions. In such
contexts you come across the nītattha.”
NOTES
1. ^ SN 12.12 (excerpt below)
2. ^ “And what is right view? Right view, I tell you, is
of two sorts: There is right view with effluents, siding with
merit, resulting in the acquisitions; and there is noble right
view, without effluents, transcendent, a factor of the path.”
[MN 117]
ADDENDUM FOR NOTE 1

[…]
“Who, now, Lord, exercises contact?”
“Not a fit question”, said the Exalted One. “I am not saying
(someone) exercises contact. If I were saying so, the ques-
tion would be a fit one. But I am not saying so. And I not
saying so, if anyone were to ask this: ‘Conditioned, now, by
what, Lord, is contact?’, this were a fit question. And the fit
answer there, would be: ‘Conditioned by the sixfold sense-
sphere, is contact, conditioned by contact is feeling’.“
[…]
– Translation by Bhante Ñāṇananda: Saṃyutta Nikāya –
An Anthology

The final part of the Mahāhatthipadopama Sutta contains an
interesting analysis by Ven. Sāriputta Thera which sheds light
on the connection between saḷāyatana and pañcupādā-
nakkhandha. I had carelessly commented on this section by
reading the English translation without referring to the Pāḷi,
and in his reply to my notes Bhante Ñāṇananda pointed out
an important distinction I had failed to make.
Ven. Ñāṇamoli’s translation of the relevant section reads as
follows:
If, friends, internally the eye is intact but no external forms

come into its range, and there is no corresponding [con-
scious] engagement, then there is no manifestation of the
corresponding section of consciousness. [MLDB (2009)
p. 283]
‘Corresponding [conscious] engagement’ is Ven. Ñāṇamoli’s
rendering of tajjo samannāhāra. I had taken this to be identi-
cal to manasikāra (attention), influenced by Ven. Ñāṇavīra
Thera’s writings. In my interview, I ask Bhante Ñāṇananda for
an explanation on the difference between the two.
“Earlier we pointed out how, in a discussion that may be
categorized asnītattha, the Buddha corrected Ven.
Moliyaphagguna’s questions which implied an agent behind
action. He rephrased them with the paccaya terminology.
Similarly, when we say manasikāra, some may tend to think
of an agent behind the attention. But Ven. Sāriputta Thera
takes a different approach here when explaining the arising
of viññāṇa.
“He discusses three possibilities:
1. The eye is not ‘broken’ – it is functional. External
forms don’t come to the vicinity. And Tajjo samannāhāra,
whatever that may be, is not present. Then, there’s no eye
consciousness.
“Here, we have to be specific about viññāṇa. Again, I’m

reminded of something Dr. W.S. Karunaratne said: “There is
no ‘the viññāṇa’; it is always ‘a viññāṇa’. Everything has to be
concrete – there is no abstract consciousness.” But people
think that consciousness exists on its own, and this has given
rise to various theories. Ven. Ñāṇavīra Thera also pointed this
out when he said “paṭiccasamuppāda is viññāṇa”.[1] I may not
agree with everything he said, but here he did reveal an
important matter. The reciprocal relationship
betweenviññāṇa and nāma-rūpa is the vortex of existence,
and it is the heart ofpaṭiccasamuppāda.
2. The eye is not broken, and external forms do come
to the vicinity. But tajjo samannāhāra is absent. Then,
there is no eye-consciousness.
3. The eye is not broken, external forms come to the
vicinity, and there is tajjo samannāhāra. Then, there is eye-
consciousness.
“The word tajjo comes from tat + ja. Tat means ‘that
[itself]’. It is the root of such important words
as tādī and tammaya. So tatja means ‘arisen out of that itself’.
What is samannāhāra? You might remember that, in
the Caṅkī Sutta, the Buddha happens to see the Kāpaṭhika
Brahmin youth. There we find the wordupasaṃharati along
with samannāhāra,[2] referring to a sort of focusing that may
have not been planned – a chance meeting of eye to
eye. Samannāhāra (āharati = brings) refers to a certain ‘bring-
ing together’.
“So tajjo samannāhāra points to the fact that this ‘bringing
together’ of the necessary factors for the arising of conscious-
ness is inherent to the situation itself. It is unique to the situ-
ation, and does not come from within a person or from the
outside. It is not exerted by oneself or an external agent: some
thought that there is an ātman inside who is in charge, while
others said that it is a God that injects consciousness into the
man. Letting go of all these extremes, Ven. Sāriputta Thera
pointed out the crucial role of tajjo samannāhāra with his
analysis of the three possibilities.”
And then Bhante falls silent, and looks on with a smile.
After a few moments, he asks: “What do you hear?”
There is a bird singing in the distance.
“Did it start singing only now?”

It probably had started earlier (and now that I am listening
to the tapes as I transcribe this, I know that it had started
many minutes earlier).
“It must have been singing all this while, but only now…”
I say.
“Only now…?”
“Only now did the attention went there.”
“There you have tajjo samannāhāra! So is it only because of
the sound of the bird that you heard it? Didn’t you hear it
only after I stopped talking? There could be other reasons
too: had there been louder noises, you may not have heard it.
So we see that it is circumstantial. That is why we mentioned
in our writings:everything is circumstantial; nothing is sub-
stantial.”
Please allow me to interject here and add that the last sen-
tence would remain something that I’ll always cherish from
these interviews. Not only because of the simple profundity of
the statement or the nice little practical experiment that led
up to it, but also because of the gentle kindness in the way it
was uttered.
“The attention that is present in a situation is to be under-

stood as having arisen out of the circumstances. If there is
anything of value in the Paṭṭḥāna, that would be here, in its
analysis of the 24 causes. I can’t say for certain, but it may
well be an attempt at systematising the general concept men-
tioned in this sutta: how a thought is connected to another.
Since it is impossible to explain this mechanism by breaking
it apart with words, Ven. Sāriputta Thera says it is circum-
stantial – unique to the situation itself.
“It is because of this nature of the Buddhadhamma that the
later Indian philosophers called it a saṅghātavāda – plural-
ism, or a theory of aggregates, where the causes are not lim-
ited to one or two or none. So my silence paṭicca, the sound
of the bird paṭicca, absence of other sounds paṭicca etc. there

was the arising of a different ear-consciousness.
“It is alright to refer to tajjo samannāhāra as manasikāra as
long as we make it clear that the process is impersonal. We
may also bring in the Kiṃ Mūlaka Sutta[3]here. Unfortunately
my explanation of it in The Magic of the Mind, in the chapter
‘Essence of Concepts’, was not accepted even by Ven.
Nyanaponika. In the sutta we find the statement manasikāra
sambhavā sabbe dhammā (born of attention are all things).
The commentary limits the discussion just to skillful states,
which is a very narrow way of looking at it. Be
it sammā or micchā, there the Buddha is pointing out the
general principle.
“It is probably because of the importance of the principle
discussed that the Buddha brought up the subject without
being prompted by anyone. It is as if He declared it because
the world would not hear or realize it otherwise. The sutta is
a wonderful revelation about what we take as a ‘thing’. It is
not something existing on its own in the world but a result of
many psychological causes. But when we say that, we are
accused of being viññāṇavādins and suññatavādins.
“One has to ask: why did the Buddha
say ‘manopubbaṇgamā dhammā, manoseṭṭhā
manomayā’ (Mind precedes all dhammas. Mind is their chief;
they are all mind-wrought – Dhp 1)? One has to admit that
the Dhamma is mano-mūlika. But again, the mind is just one
of the senses. What we have here is just a self-created prob-
lem. We discussed how existence is a perversion. The arising
of dhammas is also the arising of dukkha. Not realizing this,
some go looking for the truth among ‘things’.
“The search goes on because of delusion, and it is fruitless
because they are chasing illusions. Dhammas, things, are all
fabricated. They are all relative. They are all results
of maññanā (ideation). Just as those who were entrenched in
self-view saw the Buddha as a nihilist, those who are
entrenched in materialism cannot grasp the Buddhist philos-
ophy which puts the mind first.”
Here I ask a recurring question, probably because I still
can’t bring myself to accept the already given answers due to
my own materialistic tendencies (of those days): what would

one see if one looks at the world ‘objectively’ – if such a thing
were possible? Perhaps this is another way of asking what one
sees in thearahattaphala samādhi.
“Suññatā” comes the quick reply.
“Whether people accept it or not, the truth is emptiness.
We need not go far: it is already there in the three words ani-
mitta, appaṇihita and suññata. One has to go
from nimitta (sign) to animitta (signless), with the help of
signs. The culmination of paṇidhi (resolve)
is appaṇihita (undirected). ‘Thingness’ gives way to
emptiness.
“Imagine there were a large box here, with a label saying
that the contents weigh 1000kg. If I were to ask you to move
it, you’d object saying that it is too heavy for one person to
handle. Let’s say I somehow coax you to try. When you try to
lift, it comes off almost without effort – there’s no bottom to
the box! The 1000kg sign was deceiving you. That’s why the
realization of the Dhamma is equated to laying down of a
burden.
“To realize emptiness, one has to know what one is aiming
at. Yad’anuseti, tad’anumīyati, yad’anumīyati, tena saṇkhaṃ
gacchati (If one has an underlying tendency towards some-
thing, then one is measured in accordance with it. If one is
measured in accordance with something, then one is reck-
oned in terms of it. [SN 22.36]). As long as there
is anusaya there would be measuring, giving rise to the con-
cept of ‘things’. Elimination of anusaya is like the bottom of
the box giving way. After that, anyone can lift it.”
COLOPHON
This is part 5 of a series on Ven. Katukurunde Ñāṇananda
Thera. In November 2009 I had the opportunity to stay at his
monastery for a few days and have several long conversations
with him. The articles are based on the recordings of these
discussions.
NOTES
1. ^ … any exemplification of paṭiccasamuppāda in the
sphere of experience can be re-stated in the form of the
fundamental exemplification ofpaṭiccasamuppāda in the
sphere of experience, which is, as it must be, that begin-
ning with viññāṇa.
Thus, viññāṇa and paṭiccasamuppāda are one.
– Ven. Ñāṇavīra Thera, Notes on Dhamma, “A Note on
Paṭiccasamuppāda”, para. 20
2. ^ Atha kho kāpaṭhikassa māṇavassa etadahosi: ‘yadā
me samaṇo gotamo cakkhunā cakkhuṃ upasaṃharissati,
athāhaṃ samaṇaṃ gotamaṃ pañhaṃ pucchissāmī’ti. Atha
kho bhagavā kāpaṭhikassa māṇavassa cetasā cetoparivi-
takkamaññāya yena kāpaṭhiko māṇavo tena
cakkhūni upasaṃhāsi. Atha kho kāpaṭhikassa māṇavassa
etadahosi: ‘samannāharati kho maṃ samaṇo gotamo, yan-
nūnāhaṃ samaṇaṃ gotamaṃ pañhaṃ puc-
cheyyanti. [MII p. 169 (PTS)]
Then the thought occurred to Kāpaṭhika the youth, “When
Gotama the contemplative meets my gaze with his, I will
ask him a question.” And so the Blessed One, encompass-
ing Kāpaṭhika’s awareness with his awareness, met his
gaze. Kāpaṭhika thought, “Gotama the contemplative has
turned to me. Suppose I ask him a question.” [MN 95]
3. ^ […] Rooted in desire (or interest) friends, are all
things; born of attention are all things; arising from contact
are all things; converging on feelings are all things; headed
by concentration are all things; dominated by mindfulness
are all things; surmountable by wisdom are all things;
yielding deliverance as essence are all things; merging in
the Deathless are all things; terminating in Nibbana are all
things. [Excerpted from AN 8.83]
– Translation by Bhante Ñāṇananda (The Magic of the
Mind)
Sadhu! Sadhu! Sadhu!

Nibbàna - The Mind Stilled

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The Mind Stilled

Theravada Tipitaka Press

Nibbàna Meditation Association

Visit our website at books.nibbanam.com where you can

Or contact the editor via [email protected]

Printed in the United States of America

First Printing: May 2010

The late Venerable

Matara Sri ¥àõàràma Mahàthera

of Meetirigala Nissarana Vanaya

“...out in the jungle living beneath a huge boulder in a tin corrugated

“...profound, comprehensive and enlightening. no other series of

Readers familiar with the author's Concept and Reality,

ÞMr. G.T. Bandara

Nibbāna Sermon 20 ........................................................515

To the venerable Anàlayo of Lewella Meditation Centre, Kandy,

To Mr. U. Mapa, presently the Ambassador of Sri Lanka in

establish the Dhamma Publications Trust in his former capacity as

To Mrs. Yukie Sirimane for making available this translation as

Nibbànam paramam sukham

Etaü santaü, etaü paõãtaü, yadidaü sabbasaïkhàrasamatho

ßThis is peaceful, this is excellent, namely the stilling of all

With the permission of the Most Venerable Great Preceptor and

than dealing with those deep controversial suttas in academic

Ye te suttantà tathàgatabhàsità gambhãrà gambhãratthà

There is also another historical reason that can be adduced. An

Dve nàma kiü?

ßWhat is the `two'?û

with here: nàma¤ca råpa¤ca. In fact, this is a basic teaching in

Nàmaü sabbaü anvabhavi,

ßName has conquered everything,

ßBeings are conscious of what can be named,

Vedanà, sa¤¤à, cetanà, phasso, manasikàro Ý idaü

ßFeeling, perception, intention, contact, attention Ý this,

called `form.' So this is `name' and this is `form' Ý this,

Well, this seems lucid enough as a definition but let us see,

10 Spk I 95 commenting on S I 39.

behaviour. And that behaviour can be known with the help of

Yattha nàma¤ca råpa¤ca,

This is a verse found in the Jañàsutta of the Saüyutta Nikàya.14 In

Anto jañà bahi jañà,

ßThere is a tangle within, and a tangle without,

Sãle patiññhàya naro sapa¤¤o,

This means that a wise monk, established in virtue, developing

Yesaü ràgo ca doso ca,

ßIn whom lust, hate

It is the third verse that is relevant to our topic:

Yattha nàma¤ca råpa¤ca,

ßWhere name and form

The reference here is to Nibbàna. It is there that the tangle is

Now if we are to summarise all what we have said in this con-

cetaso ahu, ßthe mind's release was like the extinguishing of a

not independently, that there is no fire in the abstract. And when

Accã yathà vàtavegena khitto,

ßLike the flame thrown out by the force of the wind

Here the reckoning is to be understood in terms of the four

why the commentators conceived of it as something out there, on

30 E.g. at D I 194, Poññhapàdasutta.