Environmental Design
Environmental Design
Keywords: Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), “dark-side” problems, exclusion,
fortification, governance
More than half of the world’s population is now urbanized (United Nations, 2010), and this
proportion is projected to rise to 60% by 2030 (van Ginkel & Marcotullio, 2007). The
popularity of CPTED will therefore most likely continue to increase in the coming years.
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This article provides a brief overview of the key concepts of CPTED and how it is
currently understood in the 21st century. A more detailed review of CPTED is provided in
Cozens and Love (2015).
The issues, problems, and contexts associated with CPTED are highly complex. Every
CPTED intervention or design change has multiple effects, and some are beneficial in
crime prevention terms. However, in spite of widespread international support for
CPTED, outcomes are not always positive. Some aspects of CPTED interventions may
facilitate crime or reduce quality of life in some other manner.
Significantly, like most good theories, CPTED has a “dark side.” The “dark side” of CPTED
is multi-faceted, complex, and substantially hidden. Drawing on trends in the discipline of
urban planning (e.g., Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002), we here describe aspects of this
“dark side” of CPTED to highlight issues helpful in learning from this perspective.
Crime situations are rarely simple, and CPTED interventions can have multiple effects.
Some will reduce crime as intended, whereas others can contribute to crime via other
pathways, such as changes in routine activities. Some CPTED interventions can both
reduce and support crime simultaneously. For example, increased lighting can offer
increased surveillance to citizens while also facilitating criminal activity by highlighting
targets. Some CPTED interventions can reduce crime but at the expense of a significant
reduction in quality of life for the community. The most obvious examples include extreme
target hardening, overfortification, and exclusionary methods (e.g., discouraging young
people from using public spaces). Some CPTED interventions produce outcomes that are
not worth the investment in them, while others can increase crime or protect criminals.
For example, “offensible space” (Atlas, 1991) can be used by criminals to protect their
illegal businesses from the police. Each of these is an example of the potential for “dark-
side” CPTED outcomes.
What Is CPTED?
The origins of CPTED (pronounced “sep-ted”) can be traced to several sources, including
Jacobs (1961), Jeffery (1971), and Newman (1972). A commonly recognized definition of
CPTED asserts that “the proper design and effective use of the built environment can
lead to a reduction in the fear and incidence of crime, and an improvement in the quality
of life” (Crowe, 2000, p. 46). This focus on quality of life is clearly highlighted by Crowe
and Zahm (1994, p. 22), who observed “the first objective of crime prevention through
environmental design is a high-quality aesthetically pleasing built environment not crime
prevention per se, but good physical design.” This is achieved via three overlapping
strategies of territorial reinforcement, natural surveillance, and natural access control
(Crowe, 1991, 2000; Crowe & Zahm, 1994). Crowe (2000) elevates territorial reinforcement as
a principal component, arguing that “territoriality [is] the umbrella concept, comprising
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all natural surveillance principles, which in turn comprises all access control
principles” (Crowe, 2000, p. 38). These three “natural” strategies are summarized in Table
1.
Territorial Territoriality is about how people try to keep others away or dictate
reinforcement their behavior in areas that they perceive that they have the
authority to control. It depends on perceptions of and relationships
with the environment. High levels of promotion of feelings of
territoriality by CPTED interventions encourage individuals to take
control of the environment and defend it against misuse, abuse, or
potential offending. Strong feelings of territoriality can be
supported by architecture and design which clearly identifies
specific areas/setting as the domain of a particular individual,
group or land use activity. Being able to defend an environmental
setting is not enough on its own. Territorial feelings of pride and
ownership are required so residents/users actually want to perform
this role.
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These three strategies can be reinforced by “activity support” (the presence of staff and
scheduling of local activities) and as well as by target hardening (e.g., locks, security
cameras, and alarms) where the effectiveness of design and staffing is limited. Zahm
(2007, p. 10) argues that design features are “supported” by locks, guards, and alarms,
where needed, whereby “target hardening and security measures are not the primary
means for improvement.” Indeed, although CPTED emphasizes “natural” strategies as the
preferred approach, these can be supplemented (as needed) by organized and mechanical
strategies.
In terms of controlling access control and defining territory, Newman (1972) identified
“real” barriers (e.g., walls, fencing, bollards) and “symbolic” barriers (e.g., flower beds,
changes in surfaces/materials, and signage). Symbolic measures are considered “softer”
prevention strategies (Midtveit, 2005).
Organized strategies for access control include the use of security guards, whereas locks,
boom gates, and card entry systems represent mechanical forms of access control.
Organized or formal surveillance is provided by local stakeholders (e.g., shopkeepers,
security guards, and police), while CCTV and lighting are forms of mechanical
surveillance. Figure 1 illustrates this early model of CPTED. Over the years, the concepts
of maintenance (Wilson & Kelling, 1982), activity support (Wekerle & Whitman, 1995), and
target hardening (Moffat, 1983) have emerged as additional parts of the CPTED model.
Maintenance is an
important aspect of
territoriality. It can
influence offenders’
perceptions of the risks
associated with
committing a crime as well
as residents’/users’
Click to view larger
perceptions of safety in a
Figure 1. An early model of CPTED.
particular environmental
(Source: Crowe, 2000)
setting. Maintenance is an
expression of the sense of
ownership and proprietary concern for a specific environmental setting. Poorly
maintained settings showing signs of deterioration indicate to potential offenders that
there may be reduced levels of control, which can imply more tolerance of disorder. It can
send out the message that no one cares and no one is likely to intervene. The “broken
windows” theory of Wilson and Kelling (1982) supports this understanding of the
importance of maintenance in deterring crime. It recommends the routine and regular
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maintenance and rapid repair of graffiti and vandalism. For example, a broken window
that is not repaired can encourage vandals to break more windows. The rapid repair or
replacement of the broken window may, therefore, help to discourage further vandalism.
Legitimate activity support uses design, signage, and scheduled activities to encourage
intended use patterns in a specific space. The idea is to place unsafe or less safe (in crime
terms) activities (e.g., those involving cash) in safe locations with high levels of activity
and opportunities for surveillance. Similarly, safer activities can attract law-abiding
citizens, whose presence works to potentially discourage the presence of criminals. This
approach also contains aspects of territoriality, access control, and surveillance. Although
these additional law-abiding citizens may provide additional “eyes on the street” and
potentially discourage some types of crime, they may also actually encourage crime by
providing additional targets for offenses (e.g., pickpocketing).
Target hardening is directed at limiting or denying access to specific crime targets via the
use of physical barriers (e.g., fences, gates, locks, electronic alarms, surveillance, and
access control). Hardening targets may also involve reducing the rewards on offer to the
offender. In essence, target hardening strategies significantly increase the effort that
offenders must expend in committing a crime while also increasing the risks of being
seen and/or apprehended. Too much target hardening, however, can create a fortress
mentality and an overfortified environment that can discourage normal social interactions
and encourage fear and prompt residents to withdraw into the safety of their homes.
Some (e.g., see Atlas, 2008; Saville, 2015) feel that target hardening should not be
considered part of the CPTED model.
Also important is the role of social dimensions in the potential effectiveness of what has
become known as 1st generation CPTED, which focuses largely on physical design
(Saville & Cleveland, 1997). In some ways, this was the first “dark-side” issue for CPTED,
since it was observed that even in well-designed physical spaces that utilized 1st
generation CPTED principles, residents and citizens did not always act as guardians to
self-police the built form and settings within it. CPTED 2nd generation CPTED (Saville &
Cleveland, 1997, 2003A, 2003B, 2008) emerged, in part, to redress this imbalance. 2nd
Generation CPTED strategies help to encourage communities to act as “eyes on the
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street” and to care about what they are watching (Saville & Cleveland, 2008). Indeed, it
has been argued that “what is significant about Jacobs’ ‘eyes on the street’ are not the
sightlines or even the streets, but the eyes” (Saville & Cleveland, 1997, p. 1). This social
dimension to CPTED, often referred to as 2nd generation CPTED, is an important
development in the field. It also encompasses the notion of inclusion and identity and
promotes the idea that community participation in CPTED process is vital.
Although a detailed discussion is outside the scope of this paper, the key elements are
highlighted in Table 2.
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Some suggest that CPTED is poorly defined and argue that CPTED needs to be clarified
and reconceptualized (e.g., Ekblom, 2011; Gibson & Johnson, 2016). It is argued that weak
conceptualizations and poor definitions within CPTED can contribute to measurement
and evaluation issues (Ekblom, 2011).
In consideration of the developments in CPTED since Crowe (1991, 2000), a more recent
definition of CPTED has been suggested by Cozens (2016, p. 10) as “a process for
analysing and assessing crime risks in order to guide the design, management and use of
the built environment (and products) to reduce crime and the fear of crime and to
promote public health, sustainability and quality of life.” Figure 2 shows a recent, more
comprehensive conceptualization of 1st and 2nd generation CPTED.
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Recent developments in planning theory have seen the growth of a perspective known as
the “dark side” of planning theory (Flyvbjerg, 1996, 1998A, 1998B; Flyvbjerg & Richardson,
2002; Huxley & Yiftachel, 2000; Yiftachel, 1998). CPTED has close relationships with planning
and architecture, in which environment CPTED interventions are physically located.
Raising the issue of a “dark side” of planning implies that there are benefits in doing the
same in CPTED.
The main “dark side” of planning perspective is, in part, concerned with viewing planning
as operating as an oppressive mechanism of social control (Yiftachel, 1998). The “dark
side” of planning refers to how notions of power and politics are often ignored such that
there can be a “power blindness” (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002, p. 50). Furthermore,
planning can be manipulative and coercive and act as “a tool for the control and
disempowerment of social life” (Certoma, 2015, p. 25). Indeed, Schindler (2015) cites many
examples where architectural/environmental design has been manipulated to exclude and
segregate the poor and people of color in the United States. Examples include barriers to
access, such as low bridges to exclude buses and the installation of walls, bollards, and
street closures. She argues for the idea that using architecture/design as a form of
regulatory control to shape behavior is “at the core of much urban planning and
geography scholarship” (Schindler, 2015, p. 1944).
This “dark side” of planning theory is critical and analytical, in contrast to mainstream
planning theory (Yiftachel, 1998). The lack of critical analysis in mainstream planning
theory results in concern for how things should be done rather than how they are actually
done and whether such visions are achievable (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002). Focusing on
“what is actually done” may provide less idealistic, more grounded insights into what
planning is and which strategies might help to improve it. Flyvbjerg and Richardson (2002)
encourage planners to “take a walk on the dark side” of planning theory in order to
explore it and learn from it. They observe that “[p]lanning is inescapably about conflict:
exploring conflicts in planning, and learning to work effectively with conflict can be the
basis for a strong planning paradigm” (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002, p. 62). Indeed,
Yiftachel (1998, p. 400) argues that planners have tended to overlook this “dark side” and
“thereby literally keep planning’s dark side ‘in the dark’.”
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These discussions in the realm of planning indicate a need to explore the “dark-side”
issues of CPTED. Similarly, understanding the “dark side” of CPTED could provide
significant contributions to how we understand and apply the processes of CPTED.
One way of critically reviewing the design and implementation of CPTED interventions
and their outcomes is through program logic models. A program logic model is a
“picture” of the processes of designing and implementing an intervention. This is also a
feature of the more research-oriented theory of change methodology for evaluation to
promote change (e.g., see Clark & Taplin, 2012). Program logic models link the intended
outcomes (short-, medium-, and long-term) with outputs and inputs within the program
design and implementation processes while making explicit the assumptions
underpinning those processes (GHD, 2010).
Distinguishing between outcomes and outputs in the manner of program logic models
helps in identifying, describing, and addressing potential “dark-side” outcomes of CPTED.
Typically, in CPTED, when “dark-side” problems occur, they do so as adverse outcomes
from outputs correctly designed according to CPTED principles. The application of
program logic to understanding CPTED is described in more detail below.
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The program or intervention comprises only the middle three phases. The benefits (or
otherwise) emerge as outcomes in phases 4 and 5. Phase 1 offers the basis of a reference
condition. The design and development of the program or intervention occur in phases 2
and 3 and for many programs are modified in phase 4.
The development of CPTED interventions typically follows the same five phases in the
same manner (Love, 2016). The five phases are:
In program logic, each of the three phases of developing and implementing the program
or intervention—phases 2, 3, and 4—has inputs and outputs, as set out in Table 3.
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The outcomes of the program or intervention are the external effects of, and changes
resulting from, the implementation of the program or intervention in the world. The
outcomes of a program or intervention contrast with, and are totally different from, the
outputs of the program or intervention. The outputs are the internal products of the
program design and implementation, whereas the outcomes are the subsequent effects
on the world resulting from the intervention.
Successful interventions have outcomes as intended that result from the implemented
outputs of the intervention. An intervention may, however, have no, or insignificant,
outcomes in spite of having outputs exactly as planned and specified. Worse is when an
intervention produces outcomes that are adverse or opposite of what was intended.
All of the above occur when the processes of design and implementation of an
intervention are flawed or based on faulty information, assumptions, or principles. The
“dark-side” consequences in CPTED can occur both in outputs and outcomes of the
project logic model of CPTED intervention. The program logic model, in which the details
of program intent (intended outcomes), inputs, outputs, and the reasoning for them are
made explicit, provides a straightforward tool for exploring “dark-side” consequences of
CPTED.
A useful framework to assist in weighing all of the potential CPTED concepts is to adopt
the 3D approach (Crowe, 1991, 2000). This process emphasizes that all spaces require a
designated purpose that socially, culturally, legally, or physically defines acceptable
activities/use patterns. The 3Ds refer to the designation and definition of the purpose and
acceptable behaviors of a space, which can then be supported by the design of that space.
A range of questions about designation, definition, and design include the following
(Crowe, 2000):
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This simple process can also assist in highlighting and potentially avoiding “dark-side”
issues.
Common “dark-side” outcomes of CPTED revealed by the program logic model (and from
experience) include issues relating to governance and crime risks, the excessive use of
target hardening, the problem of “stand-off space,” CPTED design not defended or
repurposed by criminals, the institutionalization of CPTED, and issues around social
exclusion. The latter specifically concerns the potential for CPTED to result in “crime
prevention through exclusionary design.”
In recent years, the privatization of security has created a user-pays system (O’Malley,
1992) whereby the crime prevention aspect of governance becomes in part “a function of
whether property owners, designers or managers are willing and / or able to spend the
necessary funds” (Parnaby, 2007, p. 76). By implication, the opportunity to reduce crime is
not equitably distributed or available to all sections of the community.
The inclusion of crime prevention into governance has resulted in concepts such as the
“war on crime.” In Governing Through Crime, Simon (2007) argues that the promotion of
the concept of the “war on crime” has created a culture of fear and the notion of the
citizen as a victim of crime. For Simon (2007) this facilitated governance through the
framing of crime and crime prevention as an aspect of governance. It results in the
potential for a “dark side” in the role of CPTED in governance by which CPTED-focused
outputs can result in adverse outcomes of quality of life contrary to the aims of good
governance.
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For Parnaby (2006), CPTED and crime prevention becomes seen as risk management when
it is applied in the framing of crime prevention as an aspect of governance. As a
consequence, CPTED experts are regarded as similar to other risk management experts
who identify risks (inputs in program logic terms) to be addressed. The processes for
addressing those risks in order to produce crime prevention outputs can result in the
outcome of reduced crime, which in turn supports more accurate governing by reducing
the risks of deviation from the intended outcomes of government. There are obvious
parallels with other fields. For example, an environmental consultant identifies risks
linked to global warming and a nutrition expert highlights risks associated with fast food.
For Parnaby (2006, p. 2), CPTED experts “must identify, rationalize and concretize the
crime-related risks in question so that the layperson believes CPTED to be a logical and
prudent course of action.” The establishment of this latter belief is an output rather than
an outcome.
It has been argued that CPTED is a process rather than an outcome (output in program
logic terms) (Atlas, 2008; Cozens, 2014, 2016; Crowe, 2000), and in practice CPTED processes
often fail to adequately consider crime risks (Atlas, 2008; Clancey, 2010; Clancey, Fisher, &
Lee, 2015; Cozens, 2014, 2016). The implication is that the processes of CPTED are
compromised so that the application of CPTED principles results in incorrectly designed
outputs because they are based on inadequate inputs. This can be problematic. It has
been likened to a medical practitioner suggesting treatment for patients without initially
diagnosing their problems (Cozens, 2014, 2016). As observed by Atlas (2008, pp. 141–142):
“Risk assessment is the problem-seeking part of the CPTED process. Problem-solving
properly occurs after the risk assessment and problem seeking.” Even when risk
assessment is conducted, it is often limited by the availability of crime data and
undertaken too late in the solution development process (Clancey et al., 2015; Monchuk,
2011), such that it is “almost as an after-thought” (Clancey et al., 2015, p. 286).
The failure to assess local crime risks and the application of CPTED purely as a method of
rules and principles applied to physical aspects of sites results in CPTED outputs being
problematically produced in a “one-size-fits-all” manner (Cozens, 2014, 2016). This can
result in a CPTED “dark-side” issue whereby CPTED outputs, through lack of matching to
crime risks and other factors, can result in less-than-optimal quality-of-life outcomes.
The same factors have also resulted in fallacious thinking and faulty beliefs that
particular forms of urban design might align with CPTED principles and reduce crime
more than others. This “dark side” of CPTED is described in more detail in Cozens (2014),
where he draws attention to the erroneous but widespread CPTED and urban planning
beliefs that high-density settings and permeable, mixed-use streets are associated with
low rates of crime. In fact, in many cases, high-density settings and permeable, mixed-use
streets are often associated with much higher rates of crime than less dense, less
permeable, single-use settings (see Cozens, 2014, 2016; Cozens & Hillier, 2012).
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The role of many buildings is social, with access intended to be relatively informal and
public. Target hardening leads to buildings becoming more antisocial and more private,
with access becoming more controlled, more formal, and more restricted. This has
prompted Raymen (2015, p. 2) to ask whether, if we use CPTED target hardening, we are
“designing-in the decline of symbolic efficiency and the development of potentially
harmful subjectivities by designing-out the social?” That is, is the reduction in quality of
life from the target hardening greater than the benefits in crime reduction? It has been
suggested there are examples where too much “hard” security measures and target
hardening have been implemented under the banner of CPTED (Hollander, 2005).
It could be argued that gated communities can represent excessive use of a range of
CPTED principles, not just target hardening. McKenzie (2011) estimates that gated
communities represent nearly one fifth of the total housing stock in the United States
and, significantly, 60% of all new housing. Schneider and Kitchen (2002) suggest it was the
strong influence of Newman’s defensible space (1972) on crime prevention planning in
the United States that stimulated this proliferation of gated communities.
Flusty (1997) argues that in the design of walled/gated communities and/suburbs, there
are five new “species” of space to protect the citizen-consumer. These are specific to and
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Prickly space Cannot be comfortably occupied since they are defended by, for
example, wall-mounted sprinkler heads to remove loiterers.
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Figure 3 shows an example of defensive architecture where a cage has been installed to
cover an air vent at a university to prevent the homeless from sleeping there. Figure 4 is
an example of the use of floor studs to discourage sleeping or sitting outside a Tesco’s
branch in London.
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Although loud opera music is a “soft” measure, it seems not to overtly “exclude.” Other
devices, however, are designed specifically to exclude. Little (2015) discusses public space
in Britain and the use of the “mosquito” device. Howard Stapleton devised the Mosquito
Ultrasonic Teenage Youth Deterrent, and over 9,000 have been sold in the United
Kingdom since its launch in 2005, with distributors in the Netherlands, Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Morocco,
New Zealand, Australia, North America, and the United States (Compound Security
Systems, 2012). It is marketed as “the solution to the eternal problem of unwanted
gatherings of youths and teenagers in shopping malls, around shops and anywhere else
they are causing problems” (Little, 2015, p. 167). Little (2015, p. 168) observes how it is
used for “actively enacting social exclusion for a particular population.” He suggests it
could be viewed as a CPTED strategy (i.e., could be seen as target hardening or access
control) and is an obvious means of defining territoriality of some social groups to the
exclusion of others. It reflects several of the components of CPTED “as a means of access
control, activity support, image management and target hardening” (Little, 2015, p. 170).
Little (2015, p. 180) concludes, “young people occupying public spaces are not breaking
any laws. The Mosquito, however, is breaking laws.” It breaks equality and anti-
discrimination legislation. Many of these are cases of the outputs of CPTED processes of
target hardening acting to result in outcomes in the world that reduce the overall aim of
improving quality of life in an egalitarian manner.
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Stand-off space also provides a space for improved controlled surveillance and time for
response to adverse events. Efforts to “design out terrorism” using “defensible space”
increased in the United States after the 1993 World Trade Center attack, and this also
occurred in London and Manchester following attacks by the Irish Republican Army (IRA)
in 1992 and 1993 (Coaffee, 2004). In each case, the primary CPTED and anti-terrorism
design approach has been grounded on the use of stand-off space as the foundation for
other CPTED methods: typically surveillance, access control, and target hardening.
In the public realm, any responses to the risk of terrorism require a balanced approach,
since they pose “serious consequences for urbanity and the civic realm and in particular
for social control and freedom of movement” (Coaffee, 2004, p. 209). One result has been a
drive toward making cities safer via the use of “invisible security” or “unobtrusive
security,” sometimes considered as “soft” measures compared to the “hard” measures of
fences, razor wire, and concrete walls (Coaffee & Bosher, 2008). An example is the
Emirates football stadium in North London—home of the Arsenal Football Club, which is
surrounded by various ornaments, streetscape designs such as reinforced benches, large
canons (the insignia of the club), and large toughened lettering which spells out the clubs
name (see Figure 5), all located to prevent vehicle access.
These measures appear to have secured the structures and their occupants, but for
Hollander (2005) they compromise local social, economic, aesthetic, and transport issues.
Before the 9/11 attacks, many of the spaces around city facilities were vibrant and well-
used social spaces (e.g., used farmers’ markets, music concerts, and family picnics).
These locations are now fortress-like, sterile, and barren security zones (Hollander, 2005).
Raymen (2015, p. 4) is critical of using CPTED (target hardening) to create such sterile
public places, arguing that it can “design spaces so that they are deliberately absent of
anything resembling actually existing public sociability, in which public space becomes
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empty space to move through, rather than remain in.” This is the “dark side” of any
CPTED initiative that uses stand-off distance either alone or in conjunction with other
CPTED methods in socially dense settings.
Hollander (2005) suggests it is possible to design and manage security zones more
effectively to balance security and openness. It is also possible to balance security and
environmental sustainability (Coaffee & Bosher, 2008) by using “softer” measures that are
secure and “green.” This will be a challenging task for the future, and one that could
represent a form of sustainable urban environmentalism (Cozens, 2002). For the future, the
challenge is about “balancing the perceived risks with the broader objectives of
maintaining healthy, liveable and sustainable towns and cities” (Cozens, 2014, p. 217,
2016).
The exclusionary properties of CPTED can be (and have been) used to provide privilege to
some groups in society at the expense of others. This occurs in CPTED via a variety of
methods from specific exclusion by limiting access to only the permitted, to the
discouragement of certain social groups. One subtle method is by limiting access to those
who can afford private transport. This can be achieved by making access difficult by foot
or public transport, thus acting to inhibit those who are poorer and do not own a private
vehicle.
Key dimensions of this exclusionary “dark side” of CPTED include who, when, and how it
is used to exclude. CPTED interventions can be used in many ways to segregate the poor
from the rich or minimize the challenges to powerful elites, e.g., by controlling how
protests can be undertaken.
This has been a relatively hidden aspect of CPTED in which CPTED principles can be
used to disguise or hide social segregation and other anti-egalitarian practices. On a
slightly different note, Parnaby (2006) observes how CPTED is used to depoliticize risk by
making a binary distinction between legitimate and illegitimate users. It is a value-laden
process whose value-ladenness is not well recognized. Effectively, by dividing the world
between legitimate and illegitimate users of a resource, this apparently “cleanses CPTED
of its inherently subjective elements” (Parnaby, 2006, p. 9) and hides the use of
preconceptions about race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and gender. It hides anti-
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egalitarian policies under the he guise of using CPTED to “sort people” into legitimate or
illegitimate categories, deciding who belongs, who does not, and who has access to
resources.
Currently, part of the role of CPTED experts is to “identify, rationalise and concretize the
crime-related risks in question so that the lay person believes CPTED to be a logical and
prudent course of action” (Parnaby, 2006, p. 2). It is problematic, as Parnaby (2006)
describes, that CPTED experts “responsibilize” the management of crime risks and
sorting of legitimate from illegitimate users to make CPTED a moral, ethical, and civic
responsibility. This goal of securing and maintaining public compliance to assuming
processes of risk management are legitimate is common to all risk management experts
(Parnaby, 2006). By its nature, this kind of persuasion will always have the potential for
“dark sides” because of the lack of transparency and validation with their intrinsic
potential for behind-the-scenes corruption of outputs to shape outcomes to the preference
of some stakeholders. An example, as Midtveit (2005) notes, is how those engaged in crime
prevention (including architects and planners) work in the interests of their clients and
have responsibility over a limited space. She suggests that this is not necessarily a good
strategy because “the planning of safe communities is therefore directed towards the
communities of the few” (Midtveit, 2005, p. 32).
Using the project logic model analysis, these are issues in which inadequate inputs are
used uncritically to develop CPTED outputs that may contradict the intended outcomes of
improving quality of life.
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increase levels of fear and reduce the potential for resident intervention with individuals
withdrawing into their home and failing to provide the eyes on the street (Jacobs, 1961)
vital to the effectiveness of CPTED (Merry, 1981).
An additional “dark side” issue occurs when criminals and drug dealers use the well-
designed defensible spaces created with the use of CPTED strategies by legitimate
authorities to protect their illegal activities. Atlas (1991) notes how criminal gangs
manipulate CPTED strategies, such as access control and surveillance, to obstruct law
enforcement to actively benefit their criminal enterprises (Atlas, 1991). He refers to this as
“law and order obstruction through environmental design” (Atlas, 1990) and introduced the
concept of “offensible space” sometimes known as “reverse” CPTED, whereby criminals
use environmental design modifications to their own advantage (Atlas, 1991). Atlas studied
21 crime sites and observed how criminals used defensible space features to watch and
identify police and others approaching the area and modified the environment to hinder
this access. Later, Atlas (2008) suggested that the successfully implementation of
“offensible space” by some criminals is due to the resources they possess and the
consensus they may have created locally through intimidation and fear. Such criminals
manipulate the physical environment and the “character” of their own community to
increase their own personal security. One example of the use of such “offensible space”
was in Hulme (Manchester) in the United Kingdom (Mackay & Davey, 2006).
Using the project logic model analysis, these are issues in which inadequate inputs are
used uncritically or via an incomplete design process (that hasn’t included criminal
appropriation of the resources) to develop CPTED outputs that contradict the intended
outcomes of improving quality of life and reducing crime and the fear of crime.
The above and related realizations promoted the development of 2nd generation CPTED,
which has a social dimension. A detailed discussion is outside the scope of this article,
and readers are directed to other sources (e.g., Cozens, 2014, 2016; Saville & Cleveland,
1997, 2003A, 2003B, 2008). However, essentially, it concerns the support for social cohesion
within the community to promote self-policing by residents (Saville & Cleveland 2008).
CPTED applied only as a physical outcome, rather than a process that includes the local
community, can result in this “dark side” CPTED issue, whereby “defensible space,”
which is “capable of being defended,” becomes “undefended or offensible space” (Merry,
1981).
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reductions in internal transaction costs), it also results in ongoing potential for “dark-
side” problems of reduction in quality that can reduce effectiveness as outlined by
Deming (1986). These include:
Some “dark-side” issues of institutionalization of CPTED result from its relatively unusual
position at the intersection of at least four different professional fields: policing, law,
planning, and community development. Any or all of these disciplines can create
institutionalization-derived “dark-side” outcomes due to CPTED as an integrative field
being locked into the preferred paradigms of each professional group and
institutionalized. For example, in the disciplines of architecture, planning, and urban
design, it is often assumed that CPTED principles always inherently support the use of
permeable, high-density, and mixed-use developments—when this is not always the case.
This design-led and outcome-focused perspective therefore fails to apply CPTED as a
process—thereby ignoring locally specific issues and contexts (for a more detailed
discussion of this research, see Cozens, 2014, 2015A, 2015B, 2016; Cozens & Hillier, 2012; Groff,
Taylor, Elesh, McGovern, & Johnson, 2014; Johnson & Bowers, 2010). Assumptions made by
different institutions/disciplines potentially slow the pace of correction and improvement,
adaptation, new theory development, and the addressing of flaws in theory and practice.
These institutionalization “dark-side” problems are not yet well addressed in the CPTED
literature.
Page 22 of 30
There are seven obvious strategies to reduce the possibility of “dark-side” problems in
CPTED:
There is currently a broad base of simplified advice on developing CPTED solutions of the
form “for situation X use CPTED element Y.” This can be seen as a “cookie-cutter”
approach to creating CPTED designs and interventions as it does not explicitly check for
and avoid adverse outcomes. Nor does it check whether the outcomes from the changes
are worth the investment. Using CPTED as a process, rather than using it as an
oversimplistic design outcome, can help to avoid and minimize related “dark-side”
outcomes.
At the larger scale, the potential for learning from other CPTED practitioners’ adverse
experiences of “dark-side” outcomes has been limited by lack of communication. The
public communication of CPTED has primarily consisted of descriptions of
implementations. There has been very little literature detailing exactly what successes
were achieved and even fewer publications about failures or adverse consequences of
CPTED. Identifying and avoiding potential “dark-side” adverse outcomes will be
potentially more achievable when organizations and individuals begin publishing and
sharing their “dark-side” experiences.
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This article has provided an overview of the evolving concept of CPTED and explored the
potential “dark side” of CPTED. Understanding how CPTED can be abused/misused and
misapplied can hopefully make a significant contribution to its continued refinement and
evolution as well as to better outcomes in terms of reductions in crime and the fear of
crime and in an improvement in quality of life.
The field of CPTED will certainly benefit from the ongoing reconceptualization,
recommended by Ekblom (2011) and others. This may assist in redressing some of the
“dark-side” issues associated with institutionalization discussed in this article.
Significantly, for those charged with applying CPTED, acknowledging “dark-side” issues
will potentially improve our understanding of how CPTED works (or not). Using CPTED as
a process (not an outcome) can be promoted and critically analyzed using program logic
models, and these can assist in identifying, acknowledging, and minimizing “dark-side”
CPTED issues. Collaborative working across different institutions will also help highlight
and potentially minimize “dark-side” CPTED issues.
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Paul Cozens
Terence Love
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